Democratisation in Sub-Saharan Africa?

Literature Overview
Author(s): Elly Rijnierse
Source: Third World Quarterly , 1993, Vol. 14, No. 3, Democratisation in the Third
World (1993), pp. 647-664
Published by: Taylor & Francis, Ltd.

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Third World Quarterly, Vol 14, No 3, 1993

Democratisation in sub-Saharan
Africa? Literature overview
ELLY RIJNIERSE

In 10 or 15 years, 1989 might be called a historical year in the political

development of Africa. It all depends on whether the current democratisation
process turns out to be structural or just superficial and cosmetic. A power
struggle with national and international actors is going on in Africa, and for the
time being with varying results. In this article we will start with a short
impression of the developments. Then we will assess the continental and global
changes that led to the current 'democratisation wave' throughout sub-Saharan
Africa. The last part of the article covers some fundamental debates on
democracy in Africa, which have been generated or revived by these events.

Unrest throughout the continent

At independence, for most African countries more than three decades ago, many
of them adopted a multiparty system fashioned after the French or British model.
These Elysee/Westminster models soon failed and most sub-Saharan countries
have since had more or less repressive authoritarian regimes, with hardly any
changes of government except through military coups. (The exceptions of
Botswana, the Gambia, Mauritius and, disputably, Senegal should be noted
here.) During this era only a few attempts were made to reinstall a civil
government, for example in Nigeria, Ghana and Burkina Faso, but these attempts
were also in vain. In December 1989, when President Kerekou of Marxist-
Leninist oriented Benin had to give in to demands for democracy after the
extensive strikes and demonstrations-reinforced by French diplomatic pres-
sure-following international events like the fall of the Berlin Wall and the
public execution of Romanian President Ceausescu and his wife, a shock went
through the entire African continent. Since then, students, intellectuals, teachers,
trade union members, civil servants, relatives of political prisoners, youngsters
and traders alike have raised their voices and taken advantage of the uncertainty
that came over the African regimes. Following the example of Benin, there have
been national conferences in Congo, Togo, Mali, Niger, Gabon, Za-ire and Chad.
In Mauretania, Cameroon, Cote d'Ivoire, Kenya, Malawi, Zambia, Angola and
the Cape Verde Islands and Sao Tome, the governments had to organise
elections.
The results of these developments differ. In Benin, as well as in Burkina Faso
and Mali, there has been a transition to a multiparty system. In other countries,
with Togo as the clearest case, though Niger and Congo should also be
mentioned, we have witnessed the restoration of an authoritarian regime. In
Zaire nothing but a total implosion of the nation-state (in so far as it existed) has
taken place. In countries like Liberia, Somalia, Sudan and Angola the lengthy

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 ELLY RIJNIERSE

civil wars are simply continuing.' With the recent independence of Eritrea,
Ethiopia might become the most salient exception here.
No matter how columnists and social scientists assess the democratisation
process in Africa, looking at current political events in so many African
countries leads one to conclude that the authoritarian regimes in many countries
have been shaken since 1989.

Internal and external forces leading to political liberalisation

Some brief indications of the interlinkage of national and international develop-

ments and events leading to the unrest throughout Africa have been given in
connection with the Beninese example above. We will try to provide a more
complete assessment as to how and why a whole continent can be put into
motion.
Peter Meyns gave what we feel is a satisfactory answer to the question of
whether, in general, internal or external factors were the most important causes
for the widespread unrest: ". .. it has been the combination of external and
internal factors which created such effective pressure for political change.
International events, the end of the Cold War and all the implications that
ensued, no doubt initiated the process, but it might not have occurred if the
internal social forces demanding change had not already been there waiting for
a suitable moment to raise their voices. The crux of the matter is that the
established powers in African states-with only few exceptions-face a crisis of
legitimacy based on economic failing and their autocratic rule."2
The most important internal factors leading to the deep crisis of political
legitimacy among African leaders are the economic recession, seriously aggra-
vated since the second half of the 1980s, combined with poor management,
political repression and a lack of respect for human rights. The great importance
of the economic crisis for political legitimacy has a wide range of explanations
in the African context.
One of the reasons is that the leaders of the post-colonial states claimed their
right to rule on the basis of promises of improved material welfare. At the
moment the loss of distributive capacity is therefore predictably met with a
reduction in popular legitimacy.3
This legitimacy crisis, moreover, also has an ideological component. As
Schatzberg suggests, many ordinary Africans perceive modern-day political
rulers in terms of the fatherly authority prevailing within the African extended
family. In this perception the authority of the father is absolute and thus largely
unimpeachable. Ultimately, however, certain limitations are imposed upon this
authority. The father of a family has the obligation to support his children and
to show respect to the women who are near him. These relations can be seen as
an African version of the social contract described in Western political theory.
In the past 15 years, many political leaders in Africa have clearly failed to fulfill
these obligations, and Schatzberg feels that this is an essential element in the
present political legitimacy crisis.4
The number of non-governmental organisations (NGOs) has grown enormously

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 DEMOCRATISATION IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA?

in Africa over the last few years. Although authors differ in their explanations
of this phenomenon, they agree that it is an important factor in the recent
political crisis. These organisations seem to have been created with the aim of
addressing the consequences of the economic crisis. In the words of Naomi
Chazan: "By the late 1970s, the dissipation of state resources by unaccountable
rulers and the growing competition for increasingly scarce essential commodities
immobilized formal institutions and contributed to an economic crisis ...
throughout sub-Saharan Africa. With state agencies unable or unwilling to
assume responsibility for the welfare of their citizens, individuals and groups had
to devise methods of fending for themselves in conditions of growing impover-
ishment".5 Consequently a higher degree of organization, especially under these
conditions, will lead to more articulated protest against the African governments
(Mkandawire), and to the formulation of policy alternatives.6
An important factor in the current state legitimacy crisis is the appearance of
a new generation which has grown up since independence. Elderly people often
still respected the old and influential leaders, since they were the ones who had
led African countries to independence (eg President Nyerere of Tanzania,
President Kaunda of Zambia, President Banda of Malawi and President
Houphouet-Boigny of Cote d'Ivoire), but the new generation has seen nothing
but increasingly inept and corrupt administration. Moreover, the younger gener-
ation wants to have its place in society, to have a house, to be able to marry and
to have access to a minimum of prosperity-aspirations that have become
increasingly difficult to realise since the end of the 1970s.7.
Although there are, as we have seen, many reasons why the protests have
become louder in recent years, it is important to bear in mind that there have
been protests in various forms for decades. Bayart was already drawing attention
to this fact in 1986: "the subordinated social groups have not been as passive as
they are thought to be ... [I]n Africa [there is] little revolutionary potential. The
precarious equilibrium is maintained. Nevertheless, the state has been damaged
by constant pressure of those social groups and their everchanging tactics:
revolts, refusal to grow certain crops, declining productivity, strikes, abstention
at elections, migration, religious revivals".8
So the potential for protest, although naturally varying from place to place,
has been in existence all over sub-Saharan Africa. But we agree with Peter
Meyns, as quoted above, that it has been the changing international environment
which caused the similar and simultaneous articulation of the protest in so many
countries in the form of a call for political liberalisation and democracy.
One of the most influential international developments has been the end of the
Cold War. This event had a snowball effect in the African continent more or less
analogous to the one in the former Soviet bloc.
It started in 1985 when Gorbachev came to power in the Soviet Union. This
was a turning point that heralded a new Soviet policy towards Africa.9 Taking
into account the Soviet Union's weak economic situation, the decision was made
to stop financial and military aid to Third World countries. The aid had been
partly given for ideological reasons, in sheer competition with the Western
powers. As a consequence some of the African leaders were no longer backed
by this aid. The other side of the coin was the well-known fact that, in their

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 ELLY RIJNIERSE

struggle for military, technological and financial support, African leaders d

hesitate to play the two sides of the Iron Curtain off against each other. Th
consequence of the Soviet retreat from the African continent was that African
leaders were deprived of a certain power position. As a result, the Western
countries and the international organisations they controlled came to exert more
influence than ever on the governments of Africa, "even more than the usual
client-dependent relationship that characterized the 1970s and 1980s'.1O
In this new situation the African leaders had no choice but to address their
claims to the Western countries. They in turn could afford to be more critical,
certainly considering Africa's worsening economic situation. By now the failing
performance of the African states was generally considered by Western govern-
ments and institutions to be the main cause of the crisis in the continent. This
was relatively new. In earlier days, institutions like the World Bank saw the state
as the self-evident partner in efforts to bring about development, and consistently
defended the state elites against attacks by Marxist or 'marxisant' authors. Since
then, there has been a drastic change in the paradigm. The World Bank is now
one of the main critics of these same state elites, and the state is seen as a major
obstacle to development."
Apart from these changes in power positions, Gorbachev's new thinking also
served to discredit the nations of the Soviet bloc in an ideological sense: "As the
Soviet Union liberalized, it pressured its allies to do so as well. The loss of faith
in the command economy model of economic development also meant that
Africa's erstwhile 'Marxist-Leninist' or 'African Socialist' regimes, such as
Benin, the Congo and Mozambique faced an ideological, as well as an economic
" 12
crisis".
But it was not only the 'Marxist-Leninist' regimes that faced this ideological
crisis. The principle of the one-party state as such, defended by left-wing as well
as right-wing governments, became a subject for debate. Soon after indepen-
dence, criticism of the multiparty system was widely formulated, sometimes by
scholars, sometimes by African political leaders for obvious reasons, to legit-
imise the transition to a one-party state. Some of the criticism was, in short, as
follows: the Western state models were externally imposed and were not in
keeping with African reality. To emphasise the advantages of these models was
seen as a form of continuing imperialism; a multiparty system causes instability
and is therefore an obstacle to rapid development. This in turn meant that first
a certain extent of economic development was called for before political
participation can ensue; the multiparty system hinders the process of nation-
building; and as long as the nations of Africa are economically dependent on
Western countries, democracy is not feasible.
Surveying the failure of the African state over the last three decades, this
criticism of the multiparty system, which is not necessarily linked to the socialist
ideology, is now being reconsidered. This leads again to debates about whether
democracy is a Western concept, about democracy and development and about
the relation between the state and civil society. These debates will be elaborated
in the third part of this article.
Apart from developments on the intergovernmental level, the growth of NGOs
and in particular human rights organisations in the donor countries in recent

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 DEMOCRATISATION IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA?

years should be noted. These organisations exerted an important influence on

policy of their governments towards authoritarian regimes, and had signific
links with NGOS in the African countries.
Several structural changes on the international political level have thus taken
place: the economic and political crisis of the African continent which led to
greater dependence on the international community, changes in international
power relations, the provisional outcome of the ideological struggle between
liberalism and socialism and criticism of the one-party state. These develop-
ments seem to be ultimately expressed in the conditions currently linked to loans
and financial aid. On the economic level, conditions have been stipulated for
years as part of structural adjustment programmes. Recently political conditions,
like the introduction of the multiparty system, free and fair elections, respect for
human rights and freedom of the press, have been added. This leads to the
question of whether democracy is being imposed in an authoritarian way on
Africa by the international community, and whether this can be justified. In the
end it is the question of sovereignty which is at stake here.'3 We will return to
these questions in the third part of this article.

Fundamental debates

Thirty years ago, most new African countries had, as was noted above,
multiparty systems. They did not work out. Nowadays national and internatio
forces are again promoting multiparty systems. Will they work out now?
Many of the questions posed 30 years ago are being brought to the forefront
again. But circumstances have changed and lessons have to be drawn from
history. So the answers are not self-evident and new debates have emerged.

Democracy a Western concept?

The fundamental question of whether democracy is a universal or a purely

Western concept has once again emerged, certainly now that democratisation is
being stipulated by donor nations as a prerequisite for the continuation of
financial aid and for the granting of loans.
In an effort to arrive at a general definition of democracy, one might go back
to the definition President Abraham Lincoln gave on 19 November 1863:
"Government of the people, by the people, for the people".'4
Taking this all-embracing but highly abstract definition as a point of departure,
a distinction can be drawn between the value of the concept of democracy and
its practical application in a given context.'" Many authors now take the basic
value of democracy as that referred to by Abraham Lincoln-ie power should lie
with the people, be exercised by the people, for the benefit of the people-as a
universal value.'6
Mamdani drew a comparable distinction when he wrote about the concept of
human rights. Although the 'rights of man' were first formulated and presented
as a political item in the Enlightenment and the French and American Revolu-
tions, the West is not the only place where people are aware of human dignity
and of oppression. In the course of history, however, Western countries have

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 ELLY RIJNIERSE

developed a political consciousness, a legislative framework and a jurisprudence

as regards human rights.'7 If we apply this line of reasoning to the concept of
democracy, the distinction between the basic value of democracy and the forms
it has acquired in Western countries, which are historically and culturally
determined, becomes clear.
Now that academic circles acknowledge widely the desirability of democratic
development, the question is no longer whether democracy should be instituted,
but how democracy should be instituted.'8

Definitions of democracy

Definitions of democracy vary from extremely narrow to extremely wide

interpretations, from institutional changes to socioeconomic emancipation and
the development of a democratic culture.
Riley used Sandbrook's definition of democracy, which focuses on institu-
tional changes: "A political system characterized by regular and free elections in
which politicians organized into parties compete to form the government, by the
right of virtually all adult citizens to vote, and by guarantees of a range of
familiar political and civil rights".'9
Imam, on the other hand, tried to put a wider interpretation into words.
He focused on "people's right to participate fully in the discussions and
decisions on issues that affect them and take control of their own lives". And
he added: "democracy must include the right of people to live their own
aspirations and programmes, not only in political life, but also in economic,
cultural, religious and other aspects of life. In other words, democracy includes
ending the crisscrossing networks of oppression ..., exploitation ..., and
discrimination ...
Democracy can be defined either in behaviourist terms (true competition and
participation and effective civil freedom) or in structural terms (election systems,
political institutions appropriate to a multiparty system and independent legisla-
tion and jurisprudence).2' The tangible features in keeping with the structural
approach are often a prerequisite for the emergence of a truly comprehensive
democracy. This is why the two approaches often overlap in the analyses, which
can make matters extremely confusing.
Another way to draw distinctions between various definitions is by way of the
stages in the democratisation process. The process of political liberalisation, as
distinct from democratisation, can be defined as: "one in which the fear of
repression is relaxed and there are constitutional guarantees of a range of
political freedoms (especially the recognition of the right of opposition group-
ings to function and to express dissent) in which there is greater independence
for legislative assemblies where they still exist, and freedom of the press".22
A process of growing political accountability was viewed by Healy &
Robinson as "a move towards more inclusive politics, even within a single-party
system, through the introduction of measures to extend societal participation in
political decision-making".23
Lastly, the democratisation process "involves the introduction of universal

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 DEMOCRATISATION IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA?

suffrage and genuine political competition with free and fair elections to decide
who will take power".24
The importance of the distinctions between the three terms cited above is also
evident from Lemarchand's interpretation: "For, if by 'liberalization' is meant
the dismantling of dictatorships, there are good reasons to [assume] that [...]
liberalization can occur without democratization and [that] in some parts of
Africa the disintegration of authoritarian rule may be followed by anarchy or
intensified corruption [...I .
The definitions of democracy that come from all these different ways of
addressing political developments not only move on the scale from the basic
value of democracy, often highly abstract, at the one end to the 'tangible'
definitions, concrete in form and content but often (too) limited, on the other,
they also range from formal, institutional interpretations to the incorporation of
economic, social and cultural emancipation, as well as from the early to the 'full'
implementation of the concept of democracy, following the stages of the process.
As we will see below, debates on how to define democracy are part of a power
struggle. As Gills & Rocamora (1992: 501) stated: "perhaps more than at any
other time in the recent past, today the struggle to define 'democracy' has
become a major ideological battle".26

Multiparty systems and democracy

Freedom of expression and freedom of organisation, both basic elements of

political liberalisation, inevitably lead to people organised in groups, negotiating
for their interests. Convincing alternatives to a multiparty system to realise this
principle have been non-existent up to now, and it is widely believed that a
multiparty system-which can be organised in many different ways-is a basic
requirement if a democracy is to be built up. However, a formal democracy with
multiple parties and regular elections is in itself no guarantee for democracy.27
These authors are backed by Peter Anyang' Nyong'o, who noted that "in the
absence of a political culture of participation and accountability, multiparty
democracy is likely to remain confined to competition among the political elite
to the exclusion of the masses. Enfranchisement does not necessarily lead to
empowerment, since universal suffrage does not guarantee access to political
decision-making".28
Some authors have gone even further and noted that in various countries the
present transition to a multiparty system is nothing more than a cosmetic change
to legitimate the existing regimes.29 Niandou Souley clearly agreed with this
point of view: "Les experiences ivoiriennes et gabonaises sont les temoignages
eloquents d'une democratisation qui n'a servi qu'a relegitimer les regimes
d'Houphouet Boigny et Bogno".30 The authorities need legitimacy internally to
placate unrest, and externally to get foreign credit.
It seems that cynics often turn out to have been right, but because they too can
not provide any alternative, the debate will still be concentrated on the question
of how a credible multiparty system is to be introduced, given the political,
socioeconomic and cultural relations in Africa.

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 ELLY RIJNIERSE

Democracy and development

In the debate about democracy and development, three crucial questions can be
posed: (1) Is democracy a prerequisite for development, or development a
prerequisite for democracy? (2) Are the free market and democracy each other's
natural 'counterparts'? (3) Is the dependent position of Africa within the
international world economy an obstacle to democratisation?
(1) Until recently, the predominant opinion was that a certain extent of
economic development was necessary if democracy was to have any chance of
success. At the same time, however, it was also felt that an authoritarian regime
was needed to bring about economic growth. Under the pressure of day-to-day
reality, the relationship between democracy and development is once again being
debated.
Once again, Africa is faced with the task of putting democratic ideals and
principles into practice under poor economic conditions, in some countries
perhaps even poorer than when they became independent. As regards the
relationship between democracy and economic development, the same question
has to be posed as 30 years ago: is democracy a prerequisite for development or
is development a prerequisite for democracy? The big difference is that today
Africa can learn from its experiences of the past 30 years. The lesson from
history was formulated by Anyang' Nyong'o as follows: "After thirty years of
independence, there is no convincing correlation between dictatorships or au-
thoritarian regimes and higher levels of economic growth or development in
Africa. If anything, the more repressive regimes have done much poorer than the
more liberal ones".31
Nevertheless, there is still very little consensus of opinion in the academic
world. With reference to Latin America, Terry Lynn Karl concluded that:
"Patterns of greater economic growth and more equitable income distribution,
higher levels of literacy and education, and increases in media exposure may
better be treated as the products of stable democratic processes, rather than as the
prerequisites of their existence".32 Kankwenda similarly concluded that democ-
racy is a prerequisite for development. He proceeded from the assumption that
greater participation by the population can not help but effectuate some extent
of change.33
Kiihne held, however, that democracy has not proved to be a guarantee for
economic development. In his opinion, the link is far more complicated. He
referred to the paradox that although democratisation gives rise to many
expectations in the economic field, the short-term prospects-unlike the long-
term ones-are usually poorer.34
Rainer Tetzlaff' s point of departure remained that economic growth is a
favourable condition for the development of democracy, although he did not
suggest that democracy ought to be sacrificed to economic growth.35 Ninsin
adhered to this argument stating that the growth of the economy as a whole is
a favourable condition, since it means there is a larger 'pie' to be divided. "From
the viewpoint of the state, a stable and strong economy will infuse a measure of
flexibility in dealing with social discontent, dissent and opposition or
challenge .

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 DEMOCRATISATION IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA?

The fact that economic prosperity does not automatically lead to political
liberalisation and democratisation has been plainly illustrated by the Gulf states
of the oil sheiks: "In such cases, the economic prosperity is highly concentrated
so that it is an initial autocracy that is used for generating extreme economic
inequalities".37 Nevertheless Onimode adhered to the standpoint that a certain
extent of economic prosperity is a condition for the development of democracy,
although at the same time he rejected any form of dictatorship.38
Founou-Tchuigoua went even further. His point of departure was that eco-
nomic growth always precedes the development of democracy, and that there is
no other viable sequence. He is cynical about recent events in the sense that he
views free elections imposed from outside as an attempt to legitimate the
political developments without necessary guaranteeing any check on the people
in power. So for him, the question of whether the establishment of democratic
institutions can lead in the end to economic growth is quite irrelevant.39
Peter Meyns, unwilling to be caught in the 'which comes first' trap, com-
mented that: "In short, it does not make sense to define development as the
prerequisite for democracy, nor will it do to call for democracy as a condition
for development. Both assertions have some truth in them, but they need to be
seen in the dialectical relationship based on reciprocal dependence. The achieve-
ment of socio-economic development and the consolidation of democratic
institutions can then be identified as tasks which both need to be given
considerable weight in the overall process of development".40
(2) In the report Sub-Saharan Africa: From Crisis to Sustainable Growth
published by the World Bank in 1989, a causal relation is cited between political
liberalisation and successful economic rehabilitation.41 This political stance has
made the above-mentioned debates all the more relevant. But to a large extent,
it has also been this report that made it feasible to link political requirements to
economic aid, as is now an integral component to the policy of Western donor
countries.42 So these requirements are added to the economic conditions which
were posed earlier in accordance with the structural adjustment programmes.
This leads to the question of whether the free market and democracy are each
other's natural 'counterparts', as the World Bank seems to think.
Imam explicitly questioned this relation: "The debate on 'democratizing' the
economy has centered on the call for dismantling State machinery and adminis-
trative planning, and its replacement by economic agents acting in a deregulated
(free) market. Many questions are posed by this definition of economic democ-
racy. Must this process be accompanied by widespread privatization . . ., massive
unemployment, national currency devaluation and the escalation of prices as the
IMF and IBRD insist? What is democratic about this policy? How does one
consider the market-place as a democratic forum (given that players come to the
game with unequal strengths)? Are there no other forms of democratic processes
which might be advocated in the economic sector?"43
Hutchfull elaborated further upon this question in a theoretical manner: "One
of the myths of the new economic fundamentalism that today dominates the
international discourse on development is the natural compatibility of democracy
and the market ... This notion of the necessary harmony of markets and
democracy, far from being an orthodox wisdom of liberal democracy, is on the

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 ELLY RIJNIERSE

contrary a transparent (and fairly recent) piece of revisionism. Both Macpherson

and John Stuart Mill before him have argued convincingly that capitalism and
democracy belong to different genealogies and structural logics, and require to
be brought consciously into some compatibility with each other ... Sustaining
democracy required some state intervention into markets.. . . With the possible
exception of the United States, all mature capitalist democracies are highly
managed economies; none corresponds to the 'free markets' envisaged in World
Bank literature".44
(3) The old question of whether the increasingly dependent position of Africa
within the international world economy is an obstacle to democratisation is being
posed once again. With the recent political changes, there has been a turnabout
and the emphasis which used to be on the external causes of underdevelopment
is now on institutional underdevelopment, which is thought to be the great
restrictive factor for democratisation in Africa: "As the emphasis in the develop-
ment literature has shifted from external to domestic and political factors,
political and policy reform (good governance and adjustment), not restructuring
the global economic system, are seen as the solution".45
From a political point of view, the shift of attention from the international to
the national level supports the position of the Western donor countries. Evidently
they are relieved that it has become possible in the end to criticise the receiving
countries to a certain extent without being immediately accused of imperialism.
At the same time it is convenient for these countries that, as a consequence, the
discourse about international economic relations has been placed lower on the
agenda.
The shift to the other extreme has in turn given rise to critical responses on
the part of various authors. Onimode still uses the old theoretical framework. As
regards Africa's dependence on Western countries thanks to the debt crisis and
structural adjustment programmes, he has commented that: "These are the
current dominant imperialist strategies of recolonization or the New Colonialism
of finance capital".46
Hutchfull on the other hand opted for a critical review of both sides of the
coin: international economic relations as well as national political and economic
structures: "In many influential quarters democracy is seen as a substitute for,
not a complement to, the reorganization of the international economic order;
countries in economic distress are asked to adopt 'democracy' and 'free
markets'. In this situation, both Africa and the former Soviet bloc can look
forward in the foreseeable future to a global economy characterized by unstable
and declining commodity prices, through conditionality, capital export, and
discriminatory debt treatment".47

Long-term view on African political history

Just after independence, the general concern of academics was how to accelerate
the development of the newly emerging African states after the devastating
period of colonialism. This has often led to polemics between social scientists of
the two major schools of thought: the modernisation school and the neo-marxist

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 DEMOCRATISATION IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA?

dependencia school. Only in retrospect has the extent become clear to which
these polemics were part of the Cold War. After three decades of 'development
thinking' it can now be concluded that the development policies that ensued
have not led to the anticipated result, ie that the African continent should become
part of the modem world.
Observations like these have led scholars to step back and try to view
developments in a long-term historical perspective. From this position, it appears
that, despite their differences, social scientists from each of the above-mentioned
schools of thought shared several common points of departure: (1) the pre-colo-
nial socioeconomic and political structures of Africa were obsolete,
non-functional in modem times and would disappear in time; and (2) the state
would have to play a regulating, organising and propelling role in the race the
new African nations were on the verge of entering at the start of the 1960s.48
At the moment, both of these points of departure are subject to criticism: (1)
In the long-term view on African political history, the colonial and post-colonial
era are seen as relatively short periods, during which traditional African
structures certainly did not disappear, as was the assumption about 30 years ago.
This view emphasises the great extent to which traditional structures shape
present-day reality. Without insight into these structures, the contemporary
situation cannot be grasped.49 (2) The academic and political elites were so
involved in disputes with each other about the role of the state that they totally
disregarded important developments outside the immediate sphere of the
state. Today's widespread focus on civil society is a critical reaction to this
shortcoming.
Out of this general but important criticism two debates have come to the
forefront pertaining to the pursuit of neo-traditionalist alternatives for Western
institutional models, and the relation between the state and civil society.

Neo-traditional solutions

It is wise to devote some attention to possible neo-traditionalist ways to get the

population more involved in political decision making. In this respect the
tradition of the kgotlas in Botswana is an important example (although opinions
differ over the extent to which these kgotlas truly contribute towards embedding
the democratisation idea at the local level). Holm explained the function of the
kgotlas as follows: "The Botswana Democratic Party (BDP) has been most
assiduous in preserving the tradition of the kgotla, a community meeting in fr
of the chief's or headman's residence and presided over by him. Traditionally
these leaders did not take major decisions without ... achieving a consensus.
The BDP has ... amplified on this tradition in that govemment officials-both
civil servants and politicians-discuss all new policies with the local community
in the kgotla before any local implementation. They also seek to get a consensus
behind their proposals".50
Oculi, with an allusion to certain traditions of the Nigerian Hausa, and Simiyu
suggested working on democratizing constructions elsewhere in Africa that
would be a synthesis of traditional political practices and modem forms of

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 ELLY RIJNIERSE

conducting politics.5" These alternatives have not yet been widely disc
elaborated.

The state and civil society

The debates on civil society can be interpreted within the theoretical framework
of the Hobbesian, Lockian and Painian state (each depending on assumptions
regarding the nature of society): Hobbes worked from the premiss that by nature
society is in a state of perpetual warfare. It is the task of the state to impose order
upon this violent competition among individuals. Paine opted for the 'minimal
state'. He saw the state as a necessary evil and natural society as an unqualified
good. Locke presented an alternative perspective in which he sought an equi-
librium between the unlimited power of the state and individual rights. Here the
idea of the constitutional state came to the fore.52
The African authoritarian state can be seen as the practical consequence of the
Hobbesian image of man and society. As is evident from the one-sided attention
that has been focused for the past 30 years on the role of the state in the
development process, social scientists and politicians did not expect much good
to come of civil society. In contemporary reactions to the state's excesses and
its exercise of unlimited power, now more than ever, a great deal of value is
attributed to civil society and every effort is made to reduce the role of the state
to a minimum. This idea is mainly expressed in liberal theory, and manifests
itself in the policies of the IMF and the World Bank. Meyns cautioned against
tipping the scale, and propounded 'the golden mean', as formulated by Locke.53
Non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and people's organisations (Pos) are
by definition important bodies in civil society. Various authors have held that
social movements, and NGOs in particular, would be able to play a role in
transposing democracy to the people at the grassroots.54 Others, however, have
their doubts and the picture that emerges from the literature is certainly not
unambiguous on this point.
Larry Diamond formulated the reasons for positive expectations regarding the
possible role of NGOs in changing the African state structure in favour of
democratisation and greater institutional responsibility: "Although the compli-
ance of political leadership must ultimately be obtained for any project of
democratisation, it cannot be expected that the pressure for regime transforma-
tion will come from above. The most likely and most effective initiative will
come from below, outside the decrepit, authoritarian state, in civil society. Civil
society is a crucially important factor at every stage of democratization. The
greater the number, size, autonomy, resourcefulness, variety and democratic
orientation of popular organizations in society, the greater will be the prospect
for some kind of movement from rigid authoritarianism and for subsequent
movement toward semi-democracy and democracy".55
In contrast to this positive, hopeful interpretation, some authors have their
doubts. Naomi Chazan wrote the following: "It may also be possible ... that
these groups [grassroots organisations] far from supporting democratic tenden-
cies, foment particularism, fundamentalism and ethnic nationalism".56 A second

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 DEMOCRATISATION IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA?

objection to the generally positive role attributed to NGOs and POs is that to a
growing degree they are incorporated by African governments.57
In the end, all authors conclude that sharp distinctions will have to be drawn
between the various voluntary organisations. Chazan expects the most from NGOs
that are close to the state rather than from POs, which she attributes with the
negative properties mentioned earlier (fundamentalist, etc), because their aims
are solely focused upon promoting their own interests. She makes a comparison
with the independence movement that also emerged from small elite groups
closely linked to the colonial state: "These groups also constituted the nucleus
of the anticolonial movements in Africa".58 It is evident from the emphasis
Fowler put on how NGOS were subjected to state control that he had a somewhat
different view: "Those wishing to assist NGOs in the cause of democracy must
therefore adopt measures that can counter regime responses and promote
democratization within NGOS themselves".59 He did not draw an explicit distinc-
tion here, as Chazan did, between NGOs and Pos, because in his opinion the POs
have also long been incorporated into the aid circuit either via the state or in
some other manner.60
In order to realise democratic aspirations within civil society, the economic
base of that society is of great importance. Ninsin commented as follows:
"Strengthening the economic base of society and the state naturally means
creating independent opportunities for social groups to establish their relative
autonomy from the state in the realm of the economy and politics. It will also
enhance the capacity to consolidate the emerging tradition of independent
struggle against anti-democratic tendencies. Inevitably a society that has virile
and fearless social forces could easily maintain the independence and autonomy
of those key social and political institutions which can easily restrain arbitrari-
ness in government, and guarantee liberty".60

Newly emerging debates

Here we would like to give a short overview of the new topics for discussion,
without any pretence of compiling a complete list. Some of these debates-for
example, those about democracy and ethnicity-are already widely conducted,
others have barely begun.

1. The new democracies. One of the important questions now is: to what
extent will these new governments succeed in implementing essential
changes in the broader field of social and economic policies as well as the
narrower field of political practice? This is a point that is certain to
influence future developments in Africa, and research on this matter
would surely be advisable.
2. Multiparty systems and ethnicity. The demand for the multiparty systems
has clearly brought the ethnic question to the fore. Can political parties be
organised along ethnic lines, or does this enlarge the problems? Can terms
be stipulated by laws that make it possible to keep ethnic rivalry in check?
3. Democratic culture. What organisations can and do play a role in the
spread of know-how and awareness regarding human rights and civil

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 ELLY RIJNIERSE

rights? Are they national NGOS or churches? What role do schooling an

training play in this connection?
4. Religion and democracy. Ever since Catholic bishops chaired various
national conferences, the role of the churches has been in the limelight
again. It is, however, not desirable solely to devote attention to the
Islamic and Christian world-wide churches at the national level, and
perhaps more importantly, at the local level, because of the often
extremely comprehensive networks of parishes and congregations. Atten-
tion should also be devoted to the role of the syncretic churches which are
mushrooming in Africa at the moment, and to the role of the African
religions. The very existence of African religions is often denied or
overlooked, but they have not disappeared and would also seem to be
playing an important role in African politics.
5. The media. It is only natural that growing communication, internationally
as well as nationally, should also have affected the African political scene.
A great deal is often expected from the new freedom to gain access to
information, which political liberalisation has brought to Africa. How-
ever, opinions, many of which are still far from clear, greatly differ as to
the task of journalism. What forms of censorship are also applied in a
multiparty democracy? Do the media exercise self-censorship? Why?
6. The role of the armed forces and the police (which is not necessarily one
and the same thing) was largely overlooked in the literature we studied.
The dynamics of conflicts of interests and the struggle for power, the
stipulation of their position in the constitutions, and the opportunities to
keep a check on the exercise of their powers can be instrumental in the
course of the democratisation process. International loyalties, overlapping
interests and treaties (for example between France and Togo) can be of
decisive importance to the outcome.
7. Relations between political and social movements are crucial to the nature
of a democratic regime. These relations are assumed to be largely
non-existent, but it is also clear that little concrete research has been
conducted in this connection up to now. What is the power basis of the
political parties? How do they function? What are their platforms and how
are they drawn up?
8. Participation of the people. Since democratisation has been accelerated by
external developments, the whole process seems to have mainly taken
place in the cities, and even there entire segments of the population seem
to have been left out. Detailed research into possibilities for government
decentralisation and into neo-traditionalist forms of government would
therefore be highly recommended.
9. Democratisation, the last resort. Present-day democratisation is not the
result of a lengthy development of a middle class that has its own
economic basis and voices demands for political power. Instead it is the
last resort for the bankrupt nations of Africa. An entirely new question
that emerges here is how democratisation can take place under extremely
difficult economic circumstances.
10. Zero-sum syndrome. Numerous problems, such as the over-developed

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 DEMOCRATISATION IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA?

state, are caused by the fact that the state is the only possible source of
income. There are no segments of society that can adequately counterbal-
ance the state in this sense. Is this gradually changing nowadays, for
example via privatisation? Or-given the financial dependence of the
African countries-does the state, as channel for development funds and
loans and as import and export supervisor, remain the sole source of
income? Do greater supervision and 'good governance' provide sufficient
guarantees here? What role do the development policies of the interna-
tional community play here?
11. The international community. International organisations, transnational
enterprises, national governments and international NGOs have all come to
have more and more influence over African governments. It is extremely
important to gain insight into the changing interests of these actors, so
that here as well, supervision can be exercised. Related to this issue, and
referred to at various points above, is the question of how democratic the
international political scene really is.
12. Structural adjustment programmes. It would seem as if SAPS are apt to
lead to sizeable changes not only in the division of income and the
sources of income, but also in the development of human resources. There
are ample conjectures about the long-term as well as the short-term effects
they might have on the development of African states and on the
democratisation process, but so far few research results have been made
available.
13. Sovereignty. At the moment, the concept of sovereignty is a topic of
debate in international politics. The democratisation process in Africa has
added a special dimension to this debate. The borders set down in the
colonial period have caused specific problems, which are now once again
a focus of attention. The rights of minorities, refugees and migrants, all
of whom are numerically very much in evidence in Africa, need to be
defined once again. In this connection, the discussion on pan-Africanism
has also been revived.

Conclusion

Important structural changes seem to have resulted from shifts in international

power relations. The most salient of these changes is the disappearance
of the self-evident upholding of the authoritarian African regimes by the
international community. We have cited this as one of the most important
causative factors of the 'democratisation wave' throughout the African continent
at this stage. Nevertheless this does not mean that African regimes are no
more than Western puppets. The inability of the international community
(dominated by the West) to impose order is incontestably demonstrated in
such countries as Somalia, Angola and Zaire. At the same time there is no
reason to be optimistic about the near future, because, as Lemarchand pointed
out,62 the disintegration of authoritarian rule may be followed by anarchy or
intensified corruption.

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 ELLY RIJNIERSE

The current situation in the above-mentioned countries is the result of lengthy

processes. This is indicative of the enormous responsibility held by the Africans,
as well as the non-Africans, who govern these countries and create international
relations in more stable periods.

Notes
This article is based on an earlier work by R Buijtenhuijs and E Rijnierse, Democratization in Sub-Saharan
Africa (1989-1992): An Overview of the Literature, Research Report no 51, African Studies Centre, Leiden,
1993.
M Lobe-Ewane, 'Diagnostic sur les derapages de la transition democratique en Afrique. Un entretien avec
Achille Mbembe', Afrique 2000, 12, Jan-Feb-March 1993, pp 57-63.
2 P Meyns, 'Civil society and democratization in Africa' discussion paper prepared for the Southern Africa
Summer School 1991/92 on 'National Unity and Democratic Transition in Southern Africa', Harare, p 2.
3 M Bratton, 'Beyond the state: civil society and associational life in Africa', World Politics, 41(3), 1989,
p 410.
4 Shatzberg, Africa, forthcoming.
5 N Chazan, 'Africa's democratic challenge: strengthening civil society and the state', World Policy Journal,
Spring 1992, pp 279-307.
6 T Mkandawire, 'Further comments on the "Development and Democracy" debate', CODESRIA Bulletin, 2,
1991, pp 11-12; and Bratton, op cit, note 3, p 412.
7 Lobe-Ewane, op cit, note 1, p 62.
8 J-F, Bayart, 'Civil society in Africa', in: Political Domination in Africa: Reflexions on the Limits of Power,
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986.
9 P Shearman, 'Gorbachev and the Third World', Third World Quarterly, 9(4), 1987; and M. Light, 'Soviet
policy in the Third World', International Affairs, 67(2), 1991.
'1 S P Riley, 'The democratic transition in Africa. an end to the one-party state?', Conflict Studies, 245, 1991,
pp 1-37. See p 9.
See the opening lecture at a seminar on 'Good Governance', organised by the African Studies Centre in
Leiden, the Netherlands, the Centre for Non-Western Studies of the University of Leiden and the Institute
for Social Studies in the Hague, June 1992.
2 Riley, op cit, note 10, pp 8-9.
3 Lobe-Ewane, op cit, note 1, p 59.
14 C Toulabor, 'Transition democratique en Afrique', Africa 2000, 4, Jan-Feb-March 1991, p 6.
E E Rijnierse, 'Frankrijk/Afrika. De Franse Afrika-Politiek met betrekking tot de democratisering in Franco-
foon Zwart Afrika, 1990-1991', unpublished master's thesis, University of Amsterdam, March 1992, p 8.
16 Meyers, op cit, note 2, p 5; P Anyang' Nyong'o (ed), Popular Struggles for Democracy in Africa. London:
United Nations University, 1987, p 20; F Homquist, 'Why democratic forms of rule in Africa are necessary
and possible', in 'Beyond Autocracy in Africa', the inaugural seminar of the African Governance Program,
17-18 February 1989, Atlanta, GA: The Carter Center of Emory University; C. Ake, 'Democracy and
development', West Africa, March 26, 1990. K Post, 'The state, civil society, and democracy in Africa:
some theoretical issues', in R Cohen & H Gouldbourne (eds), Democracy and Socialism in Africa, Boulder
CO:, Westview Press, pp 34-52, 1991. See p 36; B Onimode, 'The democratization process and the
economy', CODESRIA paper presented to the Septieme Assembl6e Generale, 'Processus de Democratisation
en Afrique: Problemes et Perspectives', 10-14 February 1992, p 6; E Sall B H Sallah, 'Democratisation in
the Gambia and the current debate on democracy in Africa', CODESRIA paper presented to the Septieme
Assemblee Generale, 'Processus de Democratisation en Afrique: Problemes et Perspectives', 10-14
February 1992; and T Mkandawire, op cit, note 6, p 11.
7 M Mamdani, 'The social basis of constitutionalism in Africa', The Journal of Modern African Studies, 28,
1990, pp 359-374. See pp 359-360.
8 W Kuhne, Demokratisiering in Vielvoilkerstaaten unter schlechten wirtschaftlichen Bedingungen. Ein
Diskussionsbeitrag am Beispiel Afrikas, Ebenhausen: Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, 1992, p 25.
19 Riley, op cit, note 10, p 7.
20 A Imam, 'Democratization processes in Africa: problems and prospects', CODESRiA Bulletin, 2, 1991, pp 5
See p 5.
21 Brattow, op cit, note 3, p 421.
23 J Healey & M Robinson, Democracy, Governance and Economic Policy, Sub-Saharan Africa in Compar-
ative Perspective, London: Overseas Development Institute, 1992, p 22.

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 DEMOCRATISATION IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA?

23 Ibid, p 151; See also p 128.

24 Ibid, p 151.

25 See, eg R Lemarchand, 'African transitions to democracy: an interim (and mostly pessimistic) assessment',
Africa Insight, 22(3), 1992, pp 178-185; and M Bratton & N van der Walle, 'Towards governance in Africa:
popular demands and state responses', in G Hyden & M Bratton (eds), Governance and Politics in Africa:
Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1992, pp 27-56.
26 B Gills & J Rocamora, 'Low intensity democracy', Third World Quarterly, 113(3), 1992, pp 501-523.
27 Toulabour, op cit, note 14, p 159; and Imam, op cit, note 20, p 5.
28 P Anyang' Nyong'o, 'Political instability and the prospects for democracy in Africa', Africa Development
13(1), 1988, pp 71-86.
29 S Ellis, 'Governance in French-speaking Africa', paper presented at a conference sponsored by
Elizabeth House, University of Oxford and the World Bank, on Governance and Economic Developme
in Sub-Saharan Africa, Washington, DC, May 1991.
30 A Niandou Souley, 'Ajustement structurel et effondrement des modeles ideologiques: crise et renouveau de
l'Etat africain', Etudes internationales, 22(2) special issue, 1991, pp 253-265. See p 263.
31 P Anyang' Nyong'o 'Democratization processes in Africa', CODESRIA Bulletin, 2, 1991, pp 2-4. See p 3.
32 T L Karl 'Dilemmas of democratization in Latin America', in D Rustow & K P Erikson (eds), Comparative
Political Dynamics: Global Research Perspectives, New York: Harper Collins, 1991, p 168.
33 M Kankwenda, Crise economique, adjustement et de'mocratie en Afrique, CODESRIA paper presented to the
Septieme Assemblee Generale, 'Processus de Democratisation en Afrique: Problemes et Perspectives',
10-14 February 1992, p 22.
34 Kiihne, op cit, note 18, p 3. See also Mkwandire, 'Adjustment, political conditionality and democratisati
in Africa,' CODESRIA paper, presented at the Septieme Assemblee G6nerale, 'Processus de Democratisation
en Afrique: Problemes et Perspectives', 10-14 February 1992, p 24 and Healey & Robinson, op cit, note
22, p 157.
35 R Tetzlaff, 'Politische Herrschaft im Zeichen der "Afrikanische Krise". Zwisschen autoritarer
"Anpassungsdiktatur" und Versuchen zu demokratischer Legitimation', in D Neubert (ed), Die Zukunft
Afrikas-Uberleben in der Krise, 1991, pp 33-64. See p 38; and H Weiland, 'Democratic spring in Africa?
The demise of the one-party state?' International Affairs Bulletin, 15(2), 1991, pp 5-22. See p 14.
36 K A Ninsin, 'NGOs and democracy in Ghana', paper prepared for the international conference on Democracy
in Africa, organised by the Friedrich Ebert Foundation, Bonn, 1-3 June 1992, p 8.
37 Onimode, op cit, note 16, p 8.
38 Ibid, p 7.
39 B Founou-Tchuigoua, 'Les centres capitalistes devant les regimes politiques en Afrique et dans le Tiers
Monde. Quoi de Nouveau?', CODESRIA paper presented to the Septieme Assemblee Generale, 'Processus de
Democratisation en Afrique: Problemes et Perspectives', 10-14 February 1992, pp 4-7.
40 Meyns, op cit, note 2, pp 23-24.
41 World Bank, sub-Saharan Africa: From Crisis to Sustainable Growth, Washington DC, 1989.
42 Chazan, op cit, note 5, p 280.
43 Imam, op cit, note 20, p 6.
44 E Hutchfull, 'The international dimensions of the democratization process in Africa', CODESRIA paper
presented to the Septieme Assembl6e Generale, 'Processus de Democratisation en Afrique: Problemes et
Perspectives', 10-14 February 1992, p 21.
45 Ibid, p 20.
46 Onimode, op cit, note 16, p 14.
47 Hutchfull, op cit, note 44, pp 20-21. See also Lemarchand, op cit, note 25, p 179 and Kankwenda, op cit,
note 33, p 27.
48 M Mamdani et al, 'Social movements, social transformation and the struggle for democracy in Africa',
CODESRIA working paper series, Dakar, Senegal, 1988; N Chazan, Politics and Society in Contemporary
Africa, Basingstoke: Macmillan Education, 1988, introduction and M Doornbos, 'The African state in
academic debate: retrospect and prospect', The Journal of Modern African Studies, 28(2), 1990.
49 Bayart, 'Finishing with the idea of the Third World: the concept of the political trajectory', in J Manor (ed),
Rethinking Third World Politics, London: Longman 1991, p 53.
50 J D Holm, 'Botswana: a paternalistic democracy', in L. Diamond et al (eds), Democracy in Developing
Countries, Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1988, p 195.
51 O Oculi, 'Classical and colonial cultures in Africa and the problem of democratic politics', Savanna,
11(1), 1990, pp 1-12. See pp 10-11; and V G Simiyu, 'The democratic myth in the African traditional
societies', in WO Oyugi et al (eds), Democratic Theory and Practice in Africa, London: James Curry
Publishers, 1988, see p 68.
32 J Keane, Democracy and Civil Society, London: Verso, 1988, pp 37-42.
53 Meyns, op cit, note 2, p 11. See also T Killick, A Reaction Too Far, London: Overseas Development
Institute, 1989.

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 ELLY RIJNIERSE

54 G Lachenmann, Social Movements and Civil Society in West Africa, German Development Institute, Ber
1992.
55 L Diamond, 'Beyond autocracy: prospects for democracy in Africa', working paper for the inaugural
seminar of the Governance in Africa Program, in Beyond Autocracy in Africa, op cit, note 16. See also G
Hyden, No Short Cuts to Progress: African Development Management in Perspective, Berkeley, CA:
University of California Press, 1983, G Hyden 'Community governance and "High" Politics', in Beyond
Autocracy in Africa, op cit, note 16; and World Bank, op cit, note 41, p 61.
56 Chazan, op cit, note 5, p 283.
57 A Fowler, 'The role of NGOS in changing state-society relations: perspectives from eastern and southern
Africa', Development Policy Review, 9(1), 1991, pp 53-84; and I G Shivji, 'The Pos and the NGOS:
reflections on the place of the working people in the battle for democracy'. CODESRIA Bulletin, 4, 1990, pp
9-10.
58 Chazan, op cit, note 5, p 285.
59 Fowler, op cit, note 57, p 74.
60 Ibid, p 70.
61 Ninsin, op cit, note 36, p 8. See also Bratton, op cit, note 3, p 418.
62 Lemarchand, op cit, note 25, p 178.

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