The End of History and the Last Man The End of History and the Last Man is a 1992

book by Francis Fukuyama, expandin g on his 1989 essay "The End of History?", published in the international affair s journal The National Interest. In the book, Fukuyama argues that the advent of Western liberal democracy may signal the end point of humanity's sociocultural evolution and the final form of human government. "What we may be witnessing is not just the end of the Cold War, or the passing o f a particular period of post-war history, but the end of history as such: that is, the end point of mankind's ideological evolution and the universalization of Western liberal democracy as the final form of human government."[1] Some see his thesis conflicting with Karl Marx's version of the "end of prehisto ry".[2]. Some scholars identify the German philosopher Georg Wilhelm Friedrich H egel as the source of Fukuyama's language, by way of Alexandre Kojve. Kojeve argu ed that the progress of history must lead towards secular free-market democracy, (conceived in terms of a multi-party system of political representation). It is conjectured that Fukuyama learned of Kojve through his teacher Allan Bloom. Highlights of Fukuyama thought * History should be viewed as an evolutionary process * Events still occur at the end of history * Pessimistic about man's future because of man's inability to control technolog y * The end of history means liberal democracy will become the only form of govern ment for all States. This form of government will be the last form of government . Fukuyama's thesis Fukuyama's thesis consists of three main elements.[3] * The empirical argument: Since the beginning of the 19th Century, there has bee n a move for States to adopt some form of liberal democracy as its government. * The philosophical argument: Fukuyama examines the influence of thymos (or huma n spiritedness). His argument is democracy hinders risky behavior. Enlightened r ational thought shows that the roles of master and slave are unsatisfying and se lf-defeating and hence not adopted by lofty spirts. This type of argument was or iginally taken up by Hegel and John Locke. Misinterpretations According to Fukuyama, since the French Revolution, democracy has repeatedly pro ven to be a fundamentally better system (ethically, politically, economically) t han any of the alternatives. The most basic (and prevalent) error in discussing Fukuyama's work is to confuse 'history' with 'events'. Fukuyama does not claim at any point that events will stop happening in the future. What he is claiming is that all that will happen i n the future (even if totalitarianism returns) is that democracy will become mor e and more prevalent in the long term, although it may have 'temporary' setbacks (which may, of course, last for centuries). * Some argue that Fukuyama presents 'American-style' democracy as the only 'corr ect' political system and that all countries must inevitably follow this particu lar government system; however, many Fukuyama scholars claim this is a misreadin g of his work.[citation needed] Fukuyama's argument is only that in the future t here will be more and more governments that use the framework of parliamentary d emocracy and that contain markets of some sort. Indeed, Fukuyama has stated: "The End of History was never linked to a specifically American model of social or political organization. Following Alexandre Kojve, the Russian-French philosop her who inspired my original argument, I believe that the European Union more ac curately reflects what the world will look like at the end of history than the c ontemporary United States. The EU's attempt to transcend sovereignty and traditi onal power politics by establishing a transnational rule of law is much more in line with a "post-historical" world than the Americans' continuing belief in God , national sovereignty, and their military."[4] Arguments in favor of Fukuyama's thesis This graph shows the number of nations in the different categories given by Free dom House in their survey Freedom in the World for the period for which there ar

e surveys, 1972-2005. Nations are categorized as "Free", "Partly Free", and "Not Free". Freedom House considers "Free" nations to be liberal democracies. * Empirical evidence has been used to support the theory. Freedom House argues t hat there was not a single liberal democracy with universal suffrage in the worl d in 1900, but that today 120 (62 percent) of the world's 192 nations are such d emocracies. They count 25 (19 percent) nations with 'restricted democratic pract ices' in 1900 and 16 (8%) today. They counted 19 (14 percent) constitutional mon archies in 1900, where a constitution limited the powers of the monarch, and wit h some power devolved to elected legislatures, and none today. Other nations had , and have, various forms of non-democratic rule.[5] * The democratic peace theory argues that there is statistical evidence that dem ocracy decreases systematic violence such as external and internal wars and conf licts. This seems compatible with Fukuyama's theory, but hardly with the increas ing class conflicts that Marx predicted. * The end of the Cold War and the subsequent increase in the number of liberal d emocratic states were accompanied by a sudden and dramatic decline in total warf are, interstate wars, ethnic wars, revolutionary wars, and the number of refugee s and displaced persons.[6][7] Criticisms of Fukuyama's thesis There have been many criticisms of the "end of history" thesis. Some of these in clude: * Jacques Derrida criticized Fukuyama in Specters of Marx (1993) as a "come-late ly reader" of Alexandre Kojve "in the tradition of Leo Strauss," who already desc ribed U.S. society in the 1950s as the "realization of communism." According to is but one symptom of the Derrida, Fukuyama and the quick celebrity of his book anxiety to ensure the "death of Marx." Fukuyama's celebration of liberal hegemon y is criticized by Derrida: For it must be cried out, at a time when some have the audacity to neo-evangeliz e in the name of the ideal of a liberal democracy that has finally realized itse lf as the ideal of human history: never have violence, inequality, exclusion, fa mine, and thus economic oppression affected as many human beings in the history of the earth and of humanity. Instead of singing the advent of the ideal of libe ral democracy and of the capitalist market in the euphoria of the end of history , instead of celebrating the end of ideologies and the end of the great emancipato ry discourses, let us never neglect this obvious macroscopic fact, made up of in numerable singular sites of suffering: no degree of progress allows one to ignor e that never before, in absolute figures, have so many men, women and children b Derrida's contention is notexterminated thethe earth.[8] een subjugated, starved or directed to on relative number of poor which is dec lining worldwide. Some researchers have found empirical evidence that democracie s are better at reducing poverty as compared with non-democracies.[9] Derrida goes on to analyze Fukuyama's book as taking part in the intellectual br anch of current Western Hegemony and the spreading its "New Gospel": "This end o f History is essentially a Christian eschatology. It is consonant with the curre nt discourse of the Pope on the European community: destined to become a Christi an State or Super-State, this community would still belong therefore to some Hol y Alliance." He claims that the book uses a 'sleight-of-hand trick' of making us e of empirical data whenever it seems to suit its message, while appealing to an ideal whenever the empirical data contradicts it.[8] * Environmentalist. There is also the argument by the environmentalist movement. They argue that relentless growth will conflict directly with the already defin ed scarce resources the Earth has. * Libertarianism. Some libertarians (represented by Hans-Hermann Hoppe) argue th at democracy failed the classical liberal tradition by subordinating individual rights (especially private property) to the public interest, and that democracy is actually a decline of civilization compared to monarchy (see Democracy: The G od That Failed). * Muslim fundamentalism. Some critics state that Muslim fundamentalism (as repre sented by Osama bin Laden for example) stands in the same relation to 21st centu ry democracy as, for example, Stalinism and fascism did in the 20th century (i.e . as a fundamental intellectual alternative). Fukuyama discusses this briefly in

The End of History. He argues that Islam is not an Imperialist force like Stali nism and Fascism: i.e. that it has little intellectual or emotional appeal outsi de the Islamic 'heartlands'. Fukuyama points to the economic and political diffi culties that Iran and Saudi Arabia are facing, and argues that such states are f undamentally unstable: either they will become democracies with a Muslim society (like Turkey) or they will simply disintegrate. Moreover, when Islamic states h ave actually been created (with the recent instance Afghanistan), they were easi ly dominated by the powerful Western states. Benjamin Barber wrote about this in Jihad vs. McWorld, as a direct response to Fukuyama's claim. Barber claims that there is only one alternative to "McWorld", and that is Fundamentalism, or Jiha d. But in his article "They Can Only Go So Far" Fukuyama says: Democracy's only real competitor in the realm of ideas today is radical Islamism . Indeed, one of the world's most dangerous nation-states today is Iran, run by extremist Shiite mullahs. But as Peter Bergen pointed out in these pages last we ek, Sunni radicalism has been remarkably ineffective in actually taking control of a nation-state, due to its propensity to devour its own potential supporters. Some disenfranchised Muslims thrill to the rantings of Osama bin Laden or Irani an President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, but the appeal of this kind of medieval Islami sm is strictly limited. * Marxism. Marxism is another "end of history" philosophy. Therefore Marxists li ke Perry Anderson have been among Fukuyama's fiercest critics. Apart from pointi ng out that capitalist democracies are still riven with poverty, racial tension etc., Marxists also reject Fukuyama's reliance on Hegel. According to them, Hege l's philosophy was fatally flawed until Marx 'turned it on its head' to create h istorical materialism. Fukuyama argues that even though there is poverty, racism and sexism in present-day democracies, there is no sign of a major revolutionar y movement developing that would actually overthrow capitalism. While Marxists d isagree with Fukuyama's claim that capitalist democracy represents the end of hi story, they support the idea that the "end of history" will consist of the victo ry of democracy: communism, in the Marxist view, must necessarily involve a form of direct democracy. * Illiberal democracy. Fareed Zakaria argued that the spread of democracy might not be accompanied by the triumph of free-markets, rule-of-law, and separation o f powers. * Clash of civilizations. Samuel P. Huntington, in his essay and book, "The Clas h of Civilizations," argues that the temporary conflict between ideologies is be ing replaced by the ancient conflict between civilizations. The dominant civiliz ation decides the form of human government, and these will not be constant. * Rise of Authoritarian Capitalism. Azar Gat, Professor of National Security at Tel Aviv University, argues in his Foreign Affairs article The Return of Authori tarian Great Powers that (the spread of) liberal democracy, as argued by Fukuyam a, faces two challenges: radical Islam and rising authoritarian powers, two chal lenges which could "end the end of history".[10] The first threat he considers l ess significant as radical Islamic movements "represent no viable alternative to modernity and pose no significant military threat to the developed world". The second challenge he considers more significant: the rise of nondemocratic great powers China and Russia, operating under authoritarian capitalist regimes, could pose a viable rival model which could inspire other states. * Chavismo. Venezuelan President Hugo Chvez has argued against "the end of histor y": he argued his case in his September 2006 address to the United Nations Gener al Assembly.[11] As recently as August 2006, Fukuyama has written in response to Chvez's argument, his main point being that Chavismo is only possible due to the unique oil reserves of Venezuela, and thus will not spread. [12] Posthuman future Fukuyama himself later conceded that his thesis was incomplete, but for a differ ent reason: "there can be no end of history without an end of modern natural sci ence and technology" (quoted from Our Posthuman Future). Fukuyama predicts that humanity's control of its own evolution will have a great and possibly terrible effect on the liberal democracy. Publication history

* Free Press, 1992, hardcover (ISBN 0-02-910975-2) * Perennial, 1993, paperback (ISBN 0-380-72002-7) See also * Clash of civilizations * Sociocultural evolution * Democratic peace theory * Last Man Notes 1. ^ The End of History and the Last Man. (Fukuyama, 1992.) 2. ^ "This social formation constitutes, therefore, the closing chapter of the p rehistoric stage of human society." Preface to 'A Contribution to the Critique o f Political Economy' (1859) 3. ^ It has been suggested, somewhat implausibly, that the origins for the term "end of history" (though not the thesis) might lie with 1066 and all that by WC Sellar and RJ Yeatman (copyright 1930). Chapter 62 describes how history comes t o an end when America becomes 'top nation' and refers to this point as 'The End of History'. Sellar and Yeatman's book is a unique parody of history books and w as not meant to be taken seriously. 4. ^ Francis Fukuyama. (2007-04-03). The history at the end of history. The Guar dian. Retrieved 2008-06-18 5. ^ Democracy's Century: A Survey of Global Political Change in the 20th Centur y. Freedom House, Inc. (2003). Retrieved 2008-06-18. 6. ^ Global Conflict Trends. Center for Systemic Peace. (2007-09-26). Retrieved 2008-06-18. Archived version 7. ^ Human Security Report 8. ^ a b Derrida, 1994. 9. ^ Halperin, Myers, Siegle, Weinstein. (2005). 10. ^ A. GAT, "The End of the End of History" in Foreign Affairs, July/August 20 07. 11. ^ Text of Hugo Chvez's address to the United Nations General Assembly, Septem ber 2006 12. ^ Francis Fukuyama. (2006-08-06). "History's Against Him". The Washington Po st. Retrieved 2008-06-18. References * Jacques Derrida (1994). Specters of Marx: State of the Debt, the Work of Mourn ing and the New International. Routledge. ISBN 0415910455. * Francis Fukuyama (1992). The End of History and the Last Man. Free Press. ISBN 0029109752. * Morton Halperin, Joanne J. Myers, Joseph T. Siegle, Michael M. Weinstein. (200 5-03-17). The Democracy Advantage: How Democracies Promote Prosperity and Peace. Carnegie Council for Ethics in International Affairs. Retrieved 2008-06-18. * W. C. Sellar and R. J. Yeatman (1930). 1066 and All That. Methuen. ISBN 041377 2705. External links * The Essay * Islam and America... Friends or Foes? * Introduction to Text * Booknotes interview with Fukuyama on The End of History and the Last Man, Febr uary 9, 1992 Retrieved from "http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_End_of_History_and_the_Last_Man "