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UPPSALA DISSERTATIONS IN MATHEMATICS
53
On Axioms and Images

in the History of Mathematics
Johanna Pejlare
Department of Mathematics
Uppsala University
UPPSALA 2007
Dissertation presented at Uppsala University to be publicly examined in Häggsalen, Ångström
Laboratory, Uppsala, Thursday, January 17, 2008 at 13:15 for the degree of Doctor of
Philosophy. The examination will be conducted in English.
Abstract
Pejlare, J. On Axioms and Images in the History of Mathematics. Uppsala Dissertations in
Mathematics 53. 16 pp. Uppsala. ISBN 978-91-506-1975-1.
This dissertation deals with aspects of axiomatization, intuition and visualization in the
history of mathematics. Particular focus is put on the end of the 19th century, before David
Hilbert's (1862–1943) work on the axiomatization of Euclidean geometry. The thesis consists
of three papers. In the first paper the Swedish mathematician Torsten Brodén (1857–1931)
and his work on the foundations of Euclidean geometry from 1890 and 1912, is studied. A
thorough analysis of his foundational work is made as well as an investigation into his general
view on science and mathematics. Furthermore, his thoughts on geometry and its nature and
what consequences his view has for how he proceeds in developing the axiomatic system, is
studied. In the second paper different aspects of visualizations in mathematics are
investigated. In particular, it is argued that the meaning of a visualization is not revealed by
the visualization and that a visualization can be problematic to a person if this person, due to a
limited knowledge or limited experience, has a simplified view of what the picture represents.
A historical study considers the discussion on the role of intuition in mathematics which
followed in the wake of Karl Weierstrass' (1815–1897) construction of a nowhere
differentiable function in 1872. In the third paper certain aspects of the thinking of the two
scientists Felix Klein (1849–1925) and Heinrich Hertz (1857–1894) are studied. It is
investigated how Klein and Hertz related to the idea of naïve images and visual thinking
shortly before the development of modern axiomatics. Klein in several of his writings
emphasized his belief that intuition plays an important part in mathematics. Hertz argued that
we form images in our mind when we experience the world, but these images may contain
elements that do not exist in nature.
Keywords: History of mathematics, axiomatization, intuition, visualization, images, Euclidean

geometry
Johanna Pejlare, Department of Mathematics, Box 480, Uppsala University, SE-75106

Uppsala, Sweden
© Johanna Pejlare
ISSN 1401-2049
ISBN 978-91-506-1975-1
urn:nbn:se:uu:diva-8345 (http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:uu:diva-8345)
List of Papers
This thesis is based on the following papers:
I Pejlare, J. (2007). Torsten Brodén and the foundations of Eu-

clidean geometry, Historia Mathematica 34, 402–427.
II Bråting, K., Pejlare, J. Visualizations in mathematics. To appear
in Erkenntnis.
III Pejlare, J. The role of intuition and images in mathematics: The
cases of Felix Klein and Heinrich Hertz. Submitted.
Contents
1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
2 Overview of the Thesis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
2.1 Summary of Paper I . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
2.2 Summary of Paper II . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
2.3 Summary of Paper III . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
3 Summary in Swedish . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
4 Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
1. Introduction
Modern axiomatics, as we know it today, was developed by David Hilbert

(1862–1943) during the beginning of the 20th century. His first edition of the
Grundlagen der Geometrie, which provided an axiomatization of Euclidean
geometry, was published in 1899, but was revised several times. He built up
Euclidean geometry from the undefined concepts “point”, “line” and “plane”
and from a few undefined relations between them. The properties of the unde-
fined concepts and relations are specified by the axioms as expressing certain
related facts fundamental to our intuition.
Hilbert’s work was the result of a long tradition of research into the founda-
tions of geometry. The historically most important event in the development
of geometry was Euclid’s systematic treatment of the subject in the form of
a uniform axiomatic-deductive system. His work entitled Elements,1 written
about 300 BC, still maintains its importance as one of the most valuable scien-
tific books of all time. Influenced by the work of Aristotle, Euclid set himself
the task of presenting geometry in the form of a logical system based on a
number of definitions, postulates and common notions. It was believed that,
in establishing this system, he was creating a sufficient foundation for the con-
struction of geometry.
However, Euclid’s Elements received a lot of criticism. One of the main
issues concerned logical gaps in the proofs, where at some points assumptions
that were not stated were used. This happened already in the proof of the first
proposition, where an equilateral triangle is constructed. To do this two circles
are drawn through each others’ centers. The corners of the triangle will now
be in the centers of the two circles and in one of the points of intersection of
the two circles. However, it does not follow from the postulates and common
notions that such a point of intersection actually exists, even if it seems to be
the case from the visual point of view. If we, for example, consider the rational
plane Q2 , instead of the real plane R2 , there are no points of intersection in this
case. Thus we could say that Euclid in the Elements assumed, without saying
so explicitly, the continuity of the two circles. In a similar way, continuity of
the straight line is assumed.
These defects are subtle ones, since we are not assuming something con-
trary to our experience; the tacit assumptions are so evident that there do not
appear to be any assumptions. These gaps in Euclid’s Elements were probably
1 For
a complete treatment of the Elements, see Heath (1956). An overview of the history of
geometry can be found in Eves (1990) and Kline (1972).
1
not considered to be of a very serious kind, since intuition could fill them in.
Of particular interest was instead the problem whether or not Euclid’s fifth
postulate, also called the parallel axiom, is necessary for the construction of
geometry, that is, whether or not the parallel axiom is independent of the other
postulates and common notions. The parallel axiom is formulated in the fol-
lowing way:2
That, if a straight line falling on two straight lines make the interior angles
on the same side less than two right angles, the two straight lines, if produced
indefinitely, meet on that side on which are the angles less than the two right
angles.
In the efforts to eliminate the doubts about the parallel axiom two ap-
proaches were followed. One was to replace it with a more self-evident state-
ment. The other was to prove that it is a logical consequence of the remaining
postulates, and that it therefore may be omitted without loss to the theory.
In spite of considerable efforts by several mathematicians for about two
millenia, no one was able to do this. This is no wonder, since, as was even-
tually found out, the parallel axiom is independent of, and thus cannot be
derived from, the other postulates and common notions, and also cannot be
omitted in Euclidean geometry. This observation was probably first made by
Carl Friedrich Gauss (1777–1855), who claimed that he already in 1792, at
the age of 15, had grasped the idea that there could be a logical geometry
in which the parallel axiom did not hold, that is, a non-Euclidean geometry.3
However, he never published anything of his work on the parallel axiom and
non-Euclidean geometry.
Generally credited with the creation of non-Euclidean geometry are
Nikolai Ivanovich Lobachevsky (1793–1856) and János Bolyai (1802–1860).
Lobachevsky published his first article on non-Euclidean geometry in
1829–1830 in the Kasan Bulletin. Bolyai’s article on non-Euclidean geometry
was published in 1832.4 Lobachevsky and Bolyai independently arrived at
their systems of geometry, which are essentially the same. They both took
all the explicit and implicit assumptions of Euclid’s Elements, except the
parallel axiom, for granted. Instead of the parallel axiom they included an
axiom contradicting it, with the consequence that all parallel lines in a given
direction converge asymptotically.
2 (Heath, 1956, p. 202). An equivalent formulation of the parallel axiom is Playfair’s axiom:
“Through a given point only one parallel can be drawn to a given straight line.” (Heath, 1956,
p. 220).
3 Gauss made this claim in letters to friends and colleagues, for example in a letter to Taurinus
of November 8, 1824, and in a letter to Schumacher of November 28, 1846. For details, see
(Gauss, 1973).
4 The article was published as an abstract to his father Wolfgang Bolyai’s book Tentamen. A
translation into German can be found in (J. Bolyai and W. Bolyai, 1913).
2
The realization that the parallel axiom could not be deduced from the other
assumptions, and thus could be exchanged with an axiom contradicting it,
implied that Euclidean geometry was no longer the only possible geometry.
Therefore Euclidean geometry is not necessarily the geometry of physical
space. Immanuel Kant (1724–1804) had regarded geometry as synthetic a pri-
ori, that is, geometrical knowledge is based on an immediate awareness of
space and this awareness accompanies all our perceptions of spatial things
without being determined by them (Torretti, 1978, p. 164). But with several
possible geometries references may have to be made to experience to decide
which one describes the world. For example, Hermann von Helmholtz (1821–
1894) criticized Kant and instead emphasized the empirical origin of geometry
and insisted that only experience can decide between the different geometries.
The discovery of non-Euclidean geometry also made mathematicians re-
alize that the deficiencies in Euclid’s Elements was a serious problem, and
a reconstruction of the foundations of Euclidean geometry had to be made.
However, the development of non-Euclidean geometry remained unknown to
mathematicians in general until the 1860s (Kline, 1972, p. 879). Instead, be-
cause of its beauty and simplicity, projective geometry, which may be regarded
as a non-metric geometry, since it ignores distances and sizes, received more
attention (Torretti, 1978, p. 110). In 1873 Felix Klein (1849–1925) proved
that projective geometry is independent of the parallel axiom, and hence is
valid in both Euclidean and non-Euclidean geometries. Therefore projective
geometry can be considered to be more fundamental than these. Klein is also
well-known for his use of intuitive models for “seeing” things in new per-
spectives (Glas, 2000, p. 80). For example, he constructed Euclidean models
of non-Euclidean geometries to be able to study less visualizable geometries
in a more intuitive manner. He expressed his view on geometric intuition and
its role in science in several of his writings.
In 1882 Moritz Pasch (1843–1930) managed to develop a complete ax-
iomatic system for projective geometry.5 He explicitly formulated all prim-
itive notions and axioms, and he understood the importance of a logical de-
duction of all the geometrical theorems from them. Furthermore, he rejected
pictures as irrelevant to geometrical foundations; he insisted that every con-
clusion which occurs in a proof must be confirmed by a picture, but it is not
justified by the picture (Pasch, 1882, p. 43).
Contro argues for two lines of development for research into the founda-
tions of geometry after Pasch, one in Italy and another in Germany that was
completed with the work of Hilbert (Contro, 1976, p. 291).
The most complete of the Italian geometers is probably Mario Pieri (1860–
1913), who focused on metamathematical issues while characterizing the na-
ture of an axiomatic theory (Marchisotto, 1993, p. 288). For Pieri the subject
5 Thework can also be found in (Pasch, 1976) together with an appendix by Max Dehn. The
axiomatic system is investigated in detail by (Contro, 1976).
3
of geometry is not the intuitive notion of space, but space envisioned as sub-
ject to all interpretations that fulfill certain conditions. But his work was only
one result of an Italian school that had been active for decades. Other im-
portant Italian mathematicians who contributed to the field of geometry were
Federigo Enriques (1871–1946), Gino Fano (1871–1952), Giuseppe Peano
(1858–1932) and Giuseppe Veronese (1854–1917). In Italy the formal and
logical point of view regarding an axiomatic theory was emphasized (Contro,
1976, p. 292). Apparently a complete and rigorous organization of the foun-
dations of geometry was achieved in Italy already in the 1890s. The question
of foundations had a direct connection to issues arising from teaching (Avel-
lone, Brigaglia and Zappulla, 2002). However, their work did not receive the
attention abroad which it deserved, and became overshadowed by the work of
Hilbert.
Not only in geometry, but also in analysis, the role of geometric intuition
was discredited during the second half of the 19th century since it can be de-
ceptive. For example, it was for a long time not uncommon to believe that ev-
ery continuous function must be everywhere differentiable, except at isolated
points (Volkert, 1987). But in 1872 Karl Weierstrass (1815–1897) constructed
a function that is continuous but nowhere differentiable. The result was proved
analytically, leaving obscure what the geometrical nature of the function may
be, and was used to discredit the role of visual representations in analysis
(Mancosu, 2005, p. 16). Klein, on the other hand, wanted to preserve visual
elements in mathematics, insisting that mathematics cannot be built from the
axioms alone. He argued that the axioms are exact idealizations originating in
inexact naïve intuition and that mathematics would become lifeless if intuition
was suppressed.
In this thesis I consider aspects of axiomatization, intuition and visualiza-
tion in the history of mathematics. In particular, I consider the period at the
end of the 19th century, before Hilbert’s work on the axiomatization of Eu-
clidean geometry. In the first paper I study the Swedish mathematician Torsten
Brodén (1857–1931) and his work on the foundations of Euclidean geometry
from 1890 and 1912. I make a thorough analysis of his foundational work
and investigate his general view on science and mathematics. Furthermore, I
investigate his thoughts on geometry and its nature and what consequences
his view has for the way in which he proceeds in developing the axiomatic
system.
The second paper is a joint work with Kajsa Bråting. We study different as-
pects of visualizations in mathematics. In particular, we argue that the mean-
ing of a visualization is not revealed by the visualization and that a visualiza-
tion can be problematic to a person if, due to limited knowledge or limited
experience, this person has a simplified view of what the picture represents.
In a historical study we consider, among other things, the discussion on the
role of intuition in mathematics which followed in the wake of Weierstrass’
construction of a continuous but nowhere differentiable function in 1872.
4
In the third paper I study certain aspect of the thinking of the two scien-
tists Felix Klein and Heinrich Hertz (1857–1894). Hertz is well-known for
his work on electrodynamics and for his contributions to the foundations of
mechanics, and considerably influenced Hilbert in his work on the founda-
tions of physics (Corry, 2004). I investigate how Klein and Hertz related to
the idea of naïve images and visual thinking shortly before the development
of modern axiomatics. Klein emphasized in several of his writings his belief
that intuition plays an important part in mathematics. Hertz argued that we
form images in our mind when we experience the world, but these images
may contain elements that do not exist in nature.
5
2. Overview of the Thesis
2.1 Summary of Paper I

A summary of this paper has been presented at the conferences “History and
Pedagogy of Mathematics” in Uppsala in 2004 and “Research in Progress” in
Oxford in 2005.
In this paper I study the Swedish mathematician Torsten Brodén’s work
on the foundations of Euclidean geometry from 1890 and 1912. In the 1890
article he tried to give a philosophical justification for his axiomatization. On
the one hand, he appealed to Helmholtz and wanted to obtain a theoretical
basis for the fact that the external reality as described by Euclidean geometry
corresponds to experience. But, on the other hand, he considered geometry to
be a priori.
The aim of Brodén’s 1890 article seems to be to take part in a contempo-
rary pedagogical debate on the problems in Swedish schools. He wanted to
decide if it is true that the value of geometry as a school subject lies in the
possibility for it to be treated in a strictly “scientific” way. His axiomatic sys-
tem is the result of his detailed investigation into what a scientific geometry
should look like. He argued that a scientific system should be built up from
a number of undefined “basic notions” and a number of unproven “axioms”,
satisfying certain criteria. Of particular interest are the criteria regarding the
sufficiency of the axioms for arranging geometry under certain logical forms
and the independence of the axioms.
I consider Brodén’s axiomatic system for Euclidean geometry from 1890
in detail and compare it with his later work on the foundations of geometry.
He insisted that geometry reduces all phenomena to motion, which can be
characterized by a collection of objects and a collection of relations between
them. From this he concluded that the two basic notions “point” and “imme-
diate equality of distance” are enough. Original in Brodén’s axiomatic system
is his use of symmetries, the symmetric correspondence in the line and the
symmetric equivalence in the plane. This seems to be an unusual approach at
this time. For example, he rotated a line around a fixed point by performing a
composition of reflections about two lines through a fixed point.
In 1890 Brodén gave two continuity axioms from which a bijection between
the points of the line and the real numbers follows. In doing this he transfered
George Cantor’s (1845–1918) idea to construct real numbers from Cauchy se-
quences of rational numbers to the straight line. I argue that these two axioms
implies the two continuity axioms of Hilbert from 1903, the Archimedean ax-
7
iom and the completeness axiom. Brodén in 1912 claimed that he anticipated
Hilbert when he in his 1890 axiomatization of Euclidean geometry gave a
formulation of a completeness axiom. I argue, however, that Brodén in 1912
exchanges this axioms into a weaker one, and Hilbert’s Archimedean axiom
does no longer follow.
Furthermore, Brodén gave an explicit proof for the sufficiency of the ax-
ioms for establishing Euclidean geometry. In the proof Brodén constructed a
coordinate system and deduced the distance formula for calculating the dis-
tance between two arbitrary points. In this formula, he claimed, the entire
Euclidean geometry lies embedded since “everything” can be derived from it.
I argue that Brodén’s demand of sufficiency could possibly be interpreted as
some kind of consistency proof. However, I do not believe that Brodén had a
general concept of consistency, as was later developed by Hilbert.
2.2 Summary of Paper II

This paper is a joint work with Kajsa Bråting. We have presented our results
at the conference “Towards a New Epistemology of Mathematics” in Berlin
in 2006.
In this paper we study visualizations in mathematics from a historical and
a didactical perspective. We criticize some different views on mathematical
visualizations that focus too much on pictures as being independent of the ob-
server. For example, during the latter half of the 19th century visual thinking
fell into disrepute since it can be deceptive. One reason could have been Weier-
strass’ construction of a continuous but nowhere differentiable function. Be-
fore this discovery it had not been an uncommon belief among mathematicians
that a continuous function must be differentiable, except at isolated points. As
a reaction to Weierstrass’ function Klein wanted to discuss the limitations of
our intuition of space. He indicated the need for informal thinking in math-
ematics and had a problem with mathematics, such as Weierstrass’ function,
that he could not verify through naïve intuition. Furthermore, the Swedish
mathematician Helge von Koch (1870–1924) found it difficult to understand
mathematics without “seeing” the mathematical results. Referring to Klein’s
naïve intuition, von Koch constructed a continuous but nowhere differentiable
function such that it from the visual representation would be possible to see
this result. However, with support from an empirical study of university stu-
dents’ solutions of a mathematical problem, we argue that for a person not
familiar with the existence of such functions, this result may not be so easy
to “see”. A visualization can be problematic to a person if this person, due
to limited knowledge or limited experience, has a simplified view of what the
picture represents. Furthermore, we argue that a person with enough mathe-
matical experience and familiarity with the theory can read what is unsaid in
the picture “between the lines”. Thus, we need to know some mathematics to
8
be able to know what to look for in a visualization and let the unsaid become
meaningful.
Moreover, we argue that the meaning of the visualization is not revealed by
the visualization; there must be an interaction between the visualization and
the person interpreting it. Removed from its mathematical context, the visu-
alization loses its meaning. A historical example we consider in connection
to this is the angle of contact. In the 17th century there was a debate between
Thomas Hobbes (1588–1679) and John Wallis (1616–1703) whether there ex-
ist an angle between a circle and its tangent, and, if such an angle exist, what
quantity it has. It seems that they sometimes did not base their arguments on
mathematical definitions, instead relying too much on the visualization and
trying to “see” the correct answer. Furthermore, we argue that a visualization
may be interpreted in different ways depending on context and on what ques-
tion should be answered. For example, depending on what definition of an
angle we use, the angle of contact may be zero or it may not exist.
2.3 Summary of Paper III

Parts of this paper has been presented at the conferences “Filosofidagarna
2005” in Uppsala and “Towards a New Epistemology of Mathematics” in
Berlin in 2006.
In this paper I study certain aspects of the thinking of the two scientists
Klein and Hertz at the end of the 19th century, before the development of mod-
ern axiomatics by Hilbert. In particular, I discuss their philosophical views of
mathematics and mechanics and how they related to the idea of naïve images
and visual thinking in science.
Klein insisted that intuition is the origin of geometry and also important to
its practice, and he objected that the axioms are arbitrary statements which we
set up as we please. He rejected Pasch’s demand that the full intuitive content
of geometry could be expressed in the axioms and also objected to Weier-
strass who wanted to suppress intuition from mathematics and rely only on
arithmetical proofs. Klein insisted that the axioms are idealizations of inexact
naïve intuition of space and claimed that mathematics will become lifeless
if intuition is suppressed. He furthermore insisted that naïve intuition always
precedes refined intuition, being the result of logical deduction from the exact
axioms. For Klein it was not the formal arguments and final results that were
of greatest importance, but the road to discovery. Moreover, he emphasized the
importance of a dynamical interaction at different levels between visual naïve
thinking and refined axiomatization. Thus, he tried to save naïve intuition as
an essential part of mathematics and its origin using visual and intuitive argu-
ments to get new perspectives and a deeper understanding of mathematics.
Hertz, on the other hand, had a very different philosophy compared to Klein.
According to him we, in order to build up a scientific theory describing real-
9
ity, form images in our mind. If the image of reality is sufficiently good, we
can predict events that will occur after a certain time in the external world. He
insisted that it is possible to form different images of the same object and intro-
duced three criteria on the basis of which the images may be compared with
each other such that the most appropriate one can be chosen. Furthermore,
Hertz argued that images may contain elements that do not exist in nature.
For example, in his image of mechanics he permitted concealed masses that
do not have any connection to our sensory system. Thus, he wanted to clear
out the concrete visual elements as a foundation of the concepts of modern
mathematics, showing a similarity to modern axiomatics later developed by
Hilbert.
10
3. Summary in Swedish
I den här avhandlingen diskuteras aspekter av axiomatisering, åskådning och

visualisering i matematikens historia. Framför allt studeras utvecklingen un-
der slutet av 1800-talet, det vill säga perioden som föregick David Hilberts
utveckling av den moderna axiomatiseringen. Hilbert publicerade år 1899 den
första upplagan av Grundlagen der Geometrie, i vilken han presenterade en
axiomatisering av den Euklidiska geometrin. Detta arbete var resultatet av en
lång tradition av forskning om geometrins grundvalar, som tog sin början i
Euklides Elementa från 300-talet före Kristus.
Under den första hälften av 1800-talet utvecklades den icke-Euklidiska ge-
ometrin av Carl Friedrich Gauss, Nikolai Ivanovich Lobachevsky och János
Bolyai. Insikten att Euklides parallellaxiom kunde ersättas med ett axiom som
motsäger detta och att det existerade många möjliga geometrier medförde att
den Euklidiska geometrin inte nödvändigtvis var den geometri som beskriver
det fysiska rummet. Immanuel Kant hade ansett att geometrin var syntetisk a
priori, men med många möjliga geometrier kan det vara nödvändigt att ref-
erera till erfarenheten för att avgöra vilken geometri som beskriver rummet.
Bland andra Hermann von Helmholtz kritiserade Kant och menade att ge-
ometrin har sitt ursprung i empirin.
Under slutet av 1800-talet bedrevs mycket forskning i Italien och Tysk-
land om geometrins grundvalar. I Italien betonades speciellt axiomatiserin-
gens formella och logiska sida, framför allt av Mario Pieri. Utvecklingen
i Tyskland fullbordades med Hilberts arbete. Ett viktigt bidrag gavs även
av Moritz Pasch, som 1882 konstruerade ett fullständigt axiomatiskt system
för den projektiva geometrin. Pasch tillbakavisade bilder som relevanta i ge-
ometrins grundvalar. Han menade att slutsatser som dras i ett bevis kan bekräf-
tas med bilder, men enbart bilder kan inte utgöra bevis.
I avhandlingens första artikel studeras den svenska matematikern Torsten
Brodéns arbete om geometrins grundvalar från 1890 och 1912. Syftet med
Brodéns artikel från 1890 var att bidra till en pedagogisk debatt om problem i
den svenska skolan. I ett försök att avgöra huruvida värdet för geometrin som
ett skolämne ligger i dess möjlighet att behandlas på ett strikt vetenskapligt
sätt, gjorde han en detaljerad undersökning av hur en vetenskaplig geometri
måste se ut. I avhandlingen undersöks det i detalj hur Brodén bygger upp sitt
axiomatiska system med utgångspunkt från hans filosofiska syn på geometrins
natur.
11
Inte bara i geometrin, utan även i analysen, misskrediterades åskådnin-
gens roll under den andra hälften av 1800-talet. År 1872 konstruerade Karl
Weierstrass en funktion som var kontinuerlig men ingenstans deriverbar. Innan
dess var det en inte ovanlig föreställning bland matematiker att kontinuerliga
funktioner var deriverbara överallt förutom i isolerade punkter. Inspirerad av
Weierstrass resultat diskuterade Felix Klein begränsningar av vår åskådning
av rummet. Klein ansåg att det finns ett behov av informellt tänkande i matem-
atiken och menade att det var problematisk med exempel som Weierstrass
funktion som han inte kunde verifiera med hjälp av naiv åskådning. Även
Helge von Koch hade problem med att förstå matematiska resultet som han
inte kunde “se”. För att förstå existensen av kontinuerliga men ingenstans de-
riverbara funktioner konstruerade han en funktion som är en variant av hans
numera välkända “snöflinga”. Han menade att det, utifrån den visuella repre-
sentationen av denna funktion, skulle vara möjligt att “se”, och därmed förstå,
existensen av kontinuerliga men ingenstans deriverbara funktioner. Med ut-
gångspunkt från bland annat detta historiska exempel diskuteras i avhandlin-
gens andra artikel visualiseringar i matematik. I artikeln kritiseras synen på
matematiska visualiseringar som fokuserar för mycket på bilder som varande
oberoende av betraktaren. Det argumenteras för att en visualisering kan vara
problematisk för en person som på grund av begränsad erfarenhet eller kun-
skap har en förenklad syn på vad bilden representerar. Med stöd av en empirisk
undersökning av universitetsstudenters lösning av ett matematiskt problem ar-
gumenteras det vidare för att en person som inte är väl förtrogen med till ex-
empel kontinuerliga men ingenstans deriverbara funktioner, är detta resultat
inte så lätt att “se” utifrån en visualisering.
I avhandlingens tredje artikel studeras Felix Kleins och Heinrich Hertz
filosofiska syn på matematiken och mekaniken och hur de relaterade till idén
om naiva bilder och visuellt tänkande i vetenskap. Klein menade att den naiva
åskådningen är en viktig del av geometrin och dess ursprung och var kri-
tisk gentemot Weierstrass som ville bannlysa åskådningen från matematiken
och enbart förlita sig på aritmetiska bevis. Klein menade att om åskådnin-
gen blir bannlyst så blir matematiken livlös. Vidare argumenterade han för att
axiomen är exakta idealiseringar som har sitt ursprung i inexakt åskådning.
Klein försökte bevara åskådningen som en väsentlig del av matematiken och
dess ursprung genom att använda visuella och åskådliga argument för att få
nya perspektiv och en djupare förståelse för matematiken. Hertz menade att vi
gör oss bilder av världen när vi upplever den, och eftersom vi aldrig kan upp-
leva världen exakt så kommer bilderna enbart att vara bilder och kan innehålla
element som inte existerar i naturen. När han konstruerade en ny axiomatis-
ering av mekaniken ville han rensa ut konkreta visuella element som grund
för begreppen. Detta innebär att hans bilder är formella och inte kopplade till
något visuellt, vilket visar en likhet med Hilberts senare axiomatik.
12
4. Acknowledgements
First of all I would like to thank my adviser Gunnar Berg and assistant ad-
viser Anders Öberg for their friendship and support during the years we have
worked together. Their enthusiasm and encouragement has helped me a lot
throughout the research leading to this thesis.
I thank Kajsa Bråting for the enjoyable cooperation on visualizations in
mathematics. I would also like to thank Sören Stenlund for his interest in my
research and for many fruitful discussions. Moreover, I thank Kim-Erik Berts,
Sten Kaijser, Johan Prytz and Staffan Rodhe for their valuable comments and
suggestions during the Uppsala seminars in the history of mathematics. Spe-
cial thanks go to Staffan for many enjoyable discussions.
Furthermore, I would like to thank friends and colleagues at the department
of mathematics at Uppsala University and at the department of mathematical
sciences at Göteborg University and Chalmers University of Technology for
providing a friendly working atmosphere.
In the spring of 2006 I visited Moritz Epple and the research group in the
history of science at the University of Frankfurt. I would like to thank them
for their warm and friendly hospitality during these two months. I am also
thankful to David Rowe at the University of Mainz for valuable discussions.
I also would like to thank the librarians at the Ångström library, Uppsala
University, at the library of the department of mathematical sciences, Göte-
borg University and Chalmers University of Technology, and at the library of
the department of mathematics and at the university library, Göttingen Uni-
versity, for always being helpful in my search for old manuscripts.
The research leading to this thesis was financially supported by the Swedish
Research Council and the Bank of Sweden Tercentenary Foundations through
the Research School of Mathematics Education. I am grateful for the oppor-
tunity provided by the Research School to pursue my research interests.
Finally, thank you Michael for your love and support.
13
References
Avellone, M., Brigaglia, A., Zappulla, C. (2002). The Foundations of

Projective Geometry in Italy from De Paolis to Pieri. Archive for History of
Exact Sciences, 56, 363–425.
Bolyai, J. (1832). Appendix, scientiam spatii absolute veram exhibens a

veritate aut falsitate Axiomatis XI Euclidei (a priori haud unquam decidenda)
independentem: adjecta ad casum falsitatis, quadratura circuli geometrica.
In: Bolyai, W., Tentamen in elementa matheseos purae, elementaris ac
sublimioris, methodo intuitiva, evidentiaque huic propria, introducendi. Cum
appendice triplici. Marosvásárhely.
Bolyai, W., Bolyai, J. (1913). Geometrische Untersuchungen. Translated by

P. Stäckel. Leipzig: Druck und Verlag von B. G. Teubner.
Brodén, T. (1890). Om geometriens principer. Pedagogisk Tidskrift, 26,

217–236, 255–271.
Brodén, T. (1912). Ett axiomsystem för den euklidiska geometrien. Beretning

om den anden Skandinaviske Matematikerkongres i Kjøbenhavn 1911.
Kjøbenhavn: Nordisk forlag.
Contro, W. (1976). Von Pasch zu Hilbert. Archive for History of Exact

Sciences, 15, 283–295.
Corry, L. (2004). Hilbert and the Axiomatization of Physics (1898–1918):

From “Grundlagen der Geometrie” to “Grundlagen der Physik”, Dordrecht:
Kluwer.
Eves, H. (1990). Foundations and Fundamental Concepts of Mathematics.

Third edition. Boston: PWS-Kent Publishing Company.
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Glas, E. (2000). Model-based reasoning and mathematical discovery: the

case of Felix Klein, Studies in the history and philosophy of science 31, 71–86.
15
Heath, T. (1956). Euclid’s Elements. New York: Dover Publications.
Hilbert, D. (1899). Grundlagen der Geometrie. Festschrift zur Feier der

Enthüllung des Gauss-Weber-Denkmals in Göttingen, 1–26. Leipzig: Verlag
von B. G. Teubner. Facsimile in: Sjöstedt, C. E. (1968). Le axiome de
parallèles de Euclides à Hilbert, 845–899. Stockholm: Natur och Kultur.
Kline, M. (1972). Mathematical Thought from Ancient to Modern Times. New

York: Oxford University Press.
Lobachevsky, N. I. (1829-1830). O nachalakh geometrii, Kasanski Vestnik,

Feb.–March 1829, pp. 178–187; April 1829, pp. 228–241; Nov.–Dec 1829,
pp. 227–243; March–April 1830, pp. 251–283; July–Aug. 1830, pp. 571–636.
Marchisotto, E. A. (1993). Mario Pieri and His Contributions to Ge-

ometry and Foundations of Mathematics. Historia Mathematica, 20, 285–303.
Mancosu, P. (2005). Visualization in logic and mathematics. In: P. Mancosu,

K. F. Jörgensen and S. A. Pedersen (eds) Visualization, explanation and
reasoning styles in mathematics, Springer, 13–28.
Pasch, M. (1882). Vorlesungen über neuere Geometrie. Leipzig: Druck und

Verlag von B. G. Teubner.
Pasch, M. (1976). Vorlesungen über neuere Geometrie. Zweite Auflage, mit

einem Anhang: Die Grundlagen der Geometrie in historischer Entwicklung
von M. Dehn. Berlin: Springer-Verlag.
Torretti, R. (1978). Philosophy of Geometry from Riemann to Poincaré.

Dordrecht: D. Reidel Publishing Company.
Volkert, K. (1987). History of pathological functions—on the origins of

mathematical methodology, Archive for History of Exact Sciences 37,
193–232.
16
Paper I
Torsten Brodén’s work on the foundations of Euclidean
Geometry ∗
Johanna Pejlare
Department of Mathematics, Uppsala university
Abstract. The Swedish mathematician Torsten Brodén (1857-1931) wrote two

articles on the foundations of Euclidean geometry, the first was published in 1890,
almost a decade before Hilbert’s first attempt, and the second was published in
1912. Brodén’s philosophical view on the nature of geometry is discussed and his
thoughts on axiomatic systems are described. His axiomatic system for Euclidean
geometry from 1890 is considered in detail and compared with his later work on
the foundations of geometry. The two continuity axioms given are compared to and
proved to imply Hilbert’s two continuity axioms of 1903.
Keywords: Torsten Brodén, Euclidean geometry, foundations of geometry, ax-

iomatic system, continuity axioms.
1. Introduction
The axiomatic system of Euclidean geometry that has gained most

favour is due to David Hilbert (1862–1943), whose Grundlagen der
Geometrie first appeared in 1899. His system is built up from undefined
concepts, which he calls “point”, “line” and “plane”, and from the
undefined relations “incidence of points”, “incidence of lines”, “inci-
dence of planes”, “betweenness of points”, “congruence of segments”
and “congruence of angles”. The properties of the undefined concepts
and relations are specified by the axioms as expressing certain related
facts basic to our intuition.
Hilbert’s work was the result of a long tradition of research into the
foundations of geometry. The realization that Euclidean geometry was
not necessarily the geometry of physical space made mathematicians
fully aware that the deficiencies in Euclid’s Elements were a serious
problem, and that a reconstruction had to be made1 . During the last
couple of decades of the 19th century an extensive discussion on the
foundations of geometry took place in Germany and Italy. The math-
ematicians in Scandinavia do not seem to have taken part in this
∗
The research leading to the present article was financially supported by the
Swedish Research Council and the Bank of Sweden Tercentenary Foundation.
1
Of particular interest was the problem whether or not Euclid’s parallel axiom
is independent from the other postulates and common notions. Other deficiencies
in Euclid’s Elements were the tacit assumptions regarding the continuity and the
infinite extent of the straight line.
2 Johanna Pejlare
discussion, with one exception. The Swedish mathematician Torsten

Brodén (1857–1931) wrote two articles on the foundations of geometry,
one was published in 1890 and the other was presented at the Sec-
ond Scandinavian Mathematical Congress in 1911 and published the
following year. In the 1890 article Om geometriens principer (’On the
Principles of Geometry’) an axiomatic system for Euclidean geometry
is developed and some philosophical statements on geometry and its
teaching are given. In the congress article Ett axiomsystem för den
euklidiska geometrien (’An Axiomatic System of the Euclidean Geome-
try’) the earlier system is presented again, but in a slightly revised and
more condensed form.
Torsten Brodén2 was born on the 16th of December 1857 in Skara,
Sweden. He began his studies at the University of Uppsala in 1877,
but transferred two years later to the University of Lund. There he
presented, in the spring of 1886, his Ph.D. thesis with the title Om rota-
tionsytors deformation till nya rotationsytor med särskildt afseende på
algebraiska ytor (‘On the Deformation of Surfaces of Rotation to New
Surfaces of Rotation with Special Attention to Algebraic Surfaces’).
He continued teaching at the Mathematical Seminar in Lund and at
secondary school before he in 1906 succeeded C.F.E. Björling (1839–
1910) as a Professor of mathematics at the University of Lund. He
retired as Professor Emeritus in 1922.
Brodén died on the 6th of July, 1931. When his wife, Fanny Kallen-
berg, whom he had married in 1896, died in 1952, their effects were
donated to the society Kungliga Fysiografiska Sällskapet i Lund, to
establish a fund for their memory, Torsten och Fanny Brodéns fond (F.
Brodén, 1950). Brodén had been elected a member of the society, whose
main purpose was to support research, in 1894. The fund still exists
today, and pays out scholarships for young researchers at the university
of Lund.
Brodén’s mathematical activity was unusually many-faceted. He
worked in such diverse fields as algebraic geometry, elliptic functions,
Fuchsian differential equations, set theory and the logical foundations
of mathematics. Among Swedish mathematicians of his time he had an
exceptional position because of his pronounced philosophical interest
(Zeilon, 1931, p. 59*).
Of great importance for his future career seems to be when Brodén
in 1891 got a traveling scholarship, Riksstatens mindre resestipendium,
and traveled to Germany and Austria for six months.3 The purpose
of this trip was, on the one hand, to study how mathematics was
2
Biographical notes on Torsten Brodén can be found in Svenskt Biografiskt
Lexikon (1925).
3
Details about Brodén’s journey can be found in Brodén (1892).
3
taught at the universities on the continent, and, on the other hand,

to study mathematics and to do research. Brodén visited several uni-
versities, among others in Berlin, Heidelberg, München and Vienna. He
stayed several months in Berlin, where he followed two courses given
by Leopold Kronecker, (1823–1891), Theorie der elliptischen Functio-
nen zweier Paare reeler Argumente and Allgemeine Arithmetik, erster
Theil, and a course given by Lazarus Fuchs, (1833–1902), Einleitung
in die Theorie der Differentialgleichungen. Brodén claims that he got
ideas for further research in private conversations with Kronecker, but
unfortunately Kronecker suddenly died at the end of the year.
Dennis Hesseling mentions Brodén in his book on the foundational
crisis in mathematics that had unfolded in the 1920s as a reaction
to Brouwer’s intuitionism. Brodén criticized the intuitionists for be-
ing primarily motivated by the fear of antinomies, and claimed that
these could instead be resolved in a different way (Hesseling, 2003,
pp. 175–176). Brodén was also involved in the development of modern
probability. Jan von Plato claims that Brodén in his study of Gyldén’s
problem, i.e., the question of limiting distribution of integers in a con-
tinued fraction, was the first to apply measure theory to probability
theory (von Plato, 1994, p. 31).
Brodén’s work on the axiomatization of geometry attracted some
earlier attention in (Contro, 1985). As a starting point Contro states
that during the latter part of the 1880s all parts of geometrical ax-
iomatics were treated and only had to be combined to a unit so that
the modern axiomatic could arise. He claims that it is already well-
known that this happened in Germany via Hilbert and in Italy via
Peano and his school, and that Brodén’s 1890 article shows that this
also happened in Scandinavia.
However, Brodén is not a major figure in the history of geometry
and he does not possess the general concept of a formal system that
would later appear with Hilbert. But he did have some good ideas and is
historically interesting as someone who shared contemporary interest in
the foundations of geometry. The intention with this article is to make a
thorough analysis of Brodén’s foundational work and to investigate his
general view on science and mathematics. In particular I will investigate
his thoughts on geometry and its nature and what consequences his
view has for how he proceeds in developing the axiomatic system.
4 Johanna Pejlare
2. Brodén’s 1890 paper
2.1. Brodén’s Conception of Geometry
Brodén’s first article on the axiomatization of geometry was published

in Pedagogisk Tidskrift, a pedagogical journal for Swedish secondary
school teachers, in 1890. In the article Brodén gives a philosophical and
pedagogical discourse on geometry and develops an axiomatic system
for Euclidean geometry.
In his remarks on the nature of geometry (Brodén, 1890, pp. 218–
220), one clearly sees the influence of Hermann von Helmholtz (1821–
1894) on Brodén. Brodén claims that (Brodén, 1890, p. 218):
Geometry, if it should have some application to the objects of
nature, has to be looked upon as a natural science, an empirical,
inductive science.
But he does not consider geometry to be like any other science. Quoting
Helmholtz’ 1882 article Über den Ursprung und Sinn der geometrischen
Sätze, he states that geometry is “die erste und vollendetste der Natur-
wissenschaften”.
Despite the fact that Brodén considers geometry to be a science,
he considers science to presuppose geometry (that is why geometry is
’die erste’). The reason for this is that science endeavours to reduce
different phenomena to ‘motion’, but to comprehend motion we need
the ‘empty, stationary space’ as a background. In this sense one may
say that motion presupposes geometry, he claims.
Even though Brodén considers geometry to be an empirical science,
he claims that it deals with ideal objects that are not revealed by the im-
mediate external experience. He does not consider this to be a conflict
and draws parallels to attempts to systematize chemistry and physics,
where the ideal objects correspond to ‘atoms’ and ‘ether vibrations’
respectively. The empirical comprehension, he claims, should only be
considered a starting point. He claims that phenomena of nature can
never be thoroughly explained, but experience can never lead to logical
contradictions. Thus all our knowledge must be arranged under the
logical foundations, which he considers to be an a priori element of all
our knowledge.
Referring to Georg Cantor (1845–1918) and Richard Dedekind (1831–
1916), Brodén claims that arithmetic can be considered as a logical
system independently of time- and space-intuition. He points out that,
in spite of the starting point that it is to be considered as a natural
science, geometry, as a logical possibility, also can be independent of
time- and space-intuition, since “geometry is nothing but arithmetic,
or can at least be totally dressed in arithmetic terms” (Brodén, 1890,
5
p. 219). In this way, Brodén claims, Euclidean geometry becomes an a

priori possible logical form among many other geometries. Its special
importance, he continues, is first gained through reality.
In relation to this discussion Brodén mentions Immanuel Kant (1724–
1804). He claims that his conception of geometry does not altogether
contradict Kant’s ideas. Instead he considers his view on the nature of
geometry as a development of Kant’s theories. But Brodén does not
at all consider that Kant regards geometry as synthetic a priori, which
has nothing to do with an empirical concept.
2.2. Pedagogical Motivation
Brodén’s aim with his 1890 article appears to be to take part in a

contemporary pedagogical debate on the problems in Swedish schools.
He points out that there are defects in the teaching of geometry, but
does not further discuss what these are and how to do something about
them. His aim is not to call for major reforms in the immediate future.
As a reason for this he refers to, among other things, the difficult
nature of geometry and the fact that a thorough judgement of the scien-
tific aspects of geometry demands considerations of deep and disputed
questions.
As a starting point in his investigation, Brodén discusses the of-
ten heard statement, that the value of geometry as a school subject
lies in the possibility for it to be treated in a strictly ‘scientific’ way
(Brodén, 1890, p. 218). To decide if this statement is true, he seeks
to investigate, on the one hand, what a strictly scientific geometry
should look like, and, on the other hand, if such a scientific character
is possible or suitable at the school level. His axiomatic system is the
result of his investigation into what a scientific geometry should look
like. His conclusion after carrying out this investigation is that a strictly
scientific geometry should not be present undiluted in school (Brodén,
1890, pp. 263–265). It is a difficult balancing act between, on the one
hand, keeping a scientific direction in the education and, on the other,
taking into consideration the students’ ability. Even though the value
of geometry, as a school subject, is considered to lie in its ability to
be treated in a strictly scientific way, Brodén is of the opinion that
understanding and simplicity should have priority. He continues that
it is a practical, rather than a scientific, teaching that should be aimed
at, but at the same time, education in geometry should prepare the
students for possibly more rigorous studies.
Brodén wants to gain support for his views by carrying out a detailed
examination of the foundations of geometry. He does this by first con-
sidering a few criteria which the basic notions and axioms for a scientific
6 Johanna Pejlare
geometry should fulfil. Thereafter he explains how he picks out the basic
notions and then he carries out the axiomatization. Finally he gives a
proof that his axioms are sufficient to obtain Euclidean geometry.
It seems that the article did not receive a lot of attention from math-
ematicians, even though Brodén wrote a summary of the mathematical
part of his work for the Jahrbuch über die Fortschritte der Mathematik.
A major reason for this might be that the Swedish language was an
obstacle for an international audience. Another reason might be his
choice of a pedagogical journal instead of a mathematical journal.
2.3. The Axiomatic System
Brodén considers the goal of science to be to obtain a clear insight

into the ‘nature of objects’. To attain this a scientific system should
be built up from a number of undefined ‘basic notions’ and a number
of unproven ‘axioms’. He gives a number of criteria which these basic
notions and axioms for a scientific geometry should fulfil (Brodén, 1890,
p. 220–221):
1. The notions should be reduced to the smallest possible number
of undefined basic notions.
2. All theorems should be proved from a smallest possible number
of unproven axioms.
3. There should be the greatest possible degree of empirical evi-
dence for the axioms.
4. The axioms should form a homogeneous system.
5. The sufficiency of the axioms for arranging geometry under
certain logical forms, should be clear.
6. The axioms should be independent of one another.
Brodén does not explain what he means with a homogeneous sys-
tem, but he claims that his axiomatics satisfies this requirement. He
might allude to a homogeneous ontology in the axiomatic system, i.e.,
a scientific system should be built up of similar components and one
should only use objects from the same category.
With the third criterion the empirical view Brodén has of geometry
shines through. However, it cannot be decided whether the axioms
are to be derived inductively from empirical evidence or whether they
should be compatible to empirical evidence, which could be possible
even in a formal system. Brodén is aware that different geometries (hy-
perbolic, elliptic) are possible, but points out that empirical evidence
(for example using triangles on an astronomical scale) up to now shows
no significant deviation from Euclidean geometry.
7
With the first and second criteria Brodén probably wants to empha-
size that the basic notions and axioms must be chosen in an ‘intelligent’
way, i.e., we should try to choose them in such a way that we need as
few of them as possible. He claims that “a reduction to the smallest
possible [number of axioms] is the goal of science” (Brodén, 1890, p.
260). We see that a balance in the choice of axioms has to be maintained
so that the second and fourth criteria are fulfilled; at the same time
as the axioms are chosen in an ‘intelligent’ way, the empirical evidence
should continue to be clear.
Contro interprets the second criterion to be the same as the sixth,
i.e., he considers the reduction to the smallest possible number of ax-
ioms to be the same as an independence criterion (Contro, 1985, p.
627). However, I do not agree with this interpretation, since Brodén
seems to give a different meaning to the term ‘independent’ than we do
today. The meaning of the axioms in Brodén’s system depends upon
the preceding ones. This suggest that he considers an axiom to be
independent if it cannot be deduced from the previously stated axioms.
The first thing Brodén has to do in establishing an axiomatic sys-
tem for geometry is to determine the basic notions, i.e., to determine
the undefined notions that are needed to formulate the axioms and
to give further definitions. Since he considers geometry to reduce all
phenomena to motion he carries out a careful analysis of it (Brodén,
1890, pp. 221–223). He claims motion to be a change in certain relations
between objects, i.e., motion has to do with a collection of objects and
a collection of relations between them. This leads him to the conclusion
that the two basic notions ‘point’ and ‘immediate equality of distance’,
or ‘AP = BP ’, are enough.
Brodén continues to establish the 16 axioms from which Euclidean
geometry should be built up (Brodén, 1890, pp. 223–230). The axioms
and definitions as presented are literal translations from Swedish.
In establishing the axiomatic system, Brodén first wants to com-
pletely determine the notion of a straight line, before he proceeds to
introduce the plane. To do this he needs to establish a more general
notion of equality of distance than the basic notion ‘immediate equality
of distance’. As a first axiom he introduces an axiom of transitivity of
equal distances, i.e., if AP = BP and CP = BP then AP = CP :
Axiom I Distances (from the same point) which equal one and the
same distance, are equal to each other.
Brodén does not indicate when he uses this axiom. With the basic
notion ‘AP = BP ! he can not talk about a set of points having the
same distance to a given point. With the introduction of Axiom I this
becomes possible.
8 Johanna Pejlare
To be able to define the straight line Brodén now discusses the

motion that is still possible in space when two of its points are fixed.
Next to these two points also other points are fixed, and the collection
of all these fixed points must form a straight line. But Brodén is not
satisfied with defining the line in this way. He introduces, referring
to Wolfgang Bolyai (1775–1846), the notion of ‘Einzig’ or ‘singularly
related to’4 . A point P is singularly related to two points A and B if
P does not have the same distances to A and B as any other point P ! .
In particular, A and B are singularly related to themselves. With the
help of this concept Brodén now states the following axiom and gives
the definition of the straight line:
Axiom II Two points unambiguously determine a system of points,
which form the total of all points singularly related to any two chosen
points in the system.
Definition Such a system of points is called a line.
By ‘line’ Brodén means ‘straight line’. Henceforth I will simply use
the term ‘line’.
Axiom II gives some kind of symmetry on the line; for two arbi-
trarily chosen points on the line every other point on the line is the
only point with given distances to the two chosen points. However, the
remaining characteristics of the line do not logically follow from the
axioms mentioned so far. Brodén also wants an inner symmetry on the
line. To obtain this he formulates the following two axioms:
Axiom III Every point P on a line defines a unique symmetric
correspondence between the points of the line, where the distances
from two corresponding points to the point P are equal, the dis-
tances from non-corresponding points to P are not equal, and P is
the only point corresponding only to itself.
Axiom IV Two points define one and only one correspondence
such that the points correspond to each other.
With Axiom III, a reflection in an arbitrarily chosen point is estab-
lished on the line, and Axiom IV forces two arbitrarily chosen points
to unambiguously determine such a reflection where these two points
will correspond to each other. In this symmetrical reflection one and
only one point will correspond uniquely to itself, and Brodén can now
give the following definition:
4
Brodén does not give a specific reference, but he probably read W. Bolyai’s
Kurzer Grundriss eines Versuchs from 1851, where the foundations of geometry are
considered and ‘Einzig’ is defined. W. Bolyai gives the same discussion in Tenta-
men, from 1832, where his son wrote the better known appendix on non-Euclidean
geometry. A translation from Latin to German can be found in (J. Bolyai and W.
Bolyai, 1913).
9
Definition The point corresponding to itself in the correspondence

determined by two other points is called the midpoint of the two
points.
With this definition, Brodén still cannot say anything about a point
lying ‘between’ two other points, or a distance being ‘bigger than’ or
‘smaller than’ another distance. To do this he has to introduce an
‘ordering axiom’, but before he does this he defines the general notion
of ‘equal distance’ on the line and he gives a more general axiom on
equality of distance. If we in the following definition let A = B ! and
B = A! it follows that the distance from A to B equals the distance
from B to A .
Definition The distance (on a line) between A and B equals the
distance between A! and B ! if there is a symmetric correspon-
dence where A corresponds to A! and B corresponds to B ! (or A
corresponds to B ! and B corresponds to A! ).
A B A’ B’
Axiom V The distances (on a line), which equal one and the same
distance, equal each other.
With this axiom Brodén can now compare arbitrary distances on
the line in the sense of deciding whether they are equal or not, but
he still cannot say anything about the distance between points which
are not on the same line. Furthermore, the axioms stated so far do not
suffice to characterize the inner structure of the line in Euclidean space.
For example, there is still the possibility of finite geometries. Brodén
gives a model (however he does not use the word ‘model’) of a finite
geometry that fulfils all the axioms he has stated so far. A straight line
in this geometry consists of the vertices of a regular polygon with an
odd number of edges. If we for example consider the line formed by the
vertices of a pentagon as in the figure below, the distance between two
points sharing the same side of the pentagon is constant. The point P
defines a unique symmetric correspondence, where A corresponds to A!
and B corresponds to B ! . The same correspondence is uniquely defined
by the two points A and A! , and P will be the midpoint of these two
points.
B’
A’ P
A B
10 Johanna Pejlare
To exclude finite geometries, Brodén has to include axioms which,

together with the axioms already stated, imply that the line is an
infinite continuum, i.e., that after the choice of a ‘zero-point’ (A) and
a ‘one-point’ (B) the line will unambiguously correspond to the real
numbers R. The first obstacle in doing this is to determine points on
the line corresponding to the natural numbers.
Brodén claims that on the line there has to be a system of points
with the characteristics that, if M is the midpoint of the point B and
an arbitrary point P in the system, and if the point Q corresponds
symmetrically to the point A with respect to M , then Q also belongs
to the system, and each point in the system has the same relation to
some other point in the system as Q has to P . Brodén calls Q the point
‘immediately following’ P , and P is the point ‘immediately preceding’
Q. With this construction Brodén can successively traverse a distance
AB on the line, and he can now give the following axiom which excludes
all finite geometries:
A B M P Q
Axiom VI On the straight line there is a system of points such

that every point in the system has points in the system immediately
following and immediately preceding it, with the single exception
that the point A does not have a preceding point.
This axiom could be interpreted in the following way: if a length
AB is successively traversed on the line, one does not come back to
the starting point. With this axiom Brodén can characterize points on
the line which correspond to the natural numbers. If the point A is the
zero-point and B is the one-point, he can now successively traverse the
distance one without coming back to the beginning and thus obtain all
the natural numbers. By means of a symmetric correspondence with
respect to the zero-point, he can also characterize the negative integers.
Thus, with this axiom Brodén achieves an ordering of certain points on
the line.
Now Brodén can define the notions ‘between’, ‘bigger than’ and
‘smaller than’, at least regarding the points in the system mentioned
in Axiom VI. Brodén does not show how to do this; he just states that
this can now easily be done.
However, Axiom VI is not enough to gain an unambiguous corre-
spondence between all the points on the line and the real numbers,
i.e., to get a continuous line. Brodén shows this by considering the two
points P and Q, where Q is the point immediately following P , and N is
the midpoint of Q and P . He claims that he can show, without difficulty,
that N belongs to a system of positive integers, where A is chosen as
11
zero-point and the midpoint between A and B is chosen as one-point,

and P and Q are the points immediate preceding respective following
N . It is clear, he further claims, that N cannot coincide with A, since
then P should immediately precede A, which contradicts Axiom VI.
A B P N Q
This method, Brodén continues, can easily be generalized so that

the midpoint between two arbitrary consecutive points in the original
system of positive integers can not coincide with any point in this
system. By constructing midpoints of all consecutive points, he claims,
nothing but new points are obtained, and together with the original
points they form a new system of positive integers. By successively con-
structing new midpoints, new systems of positive integers are obtained.
This leads, he continues, to a system of points that unambiguously is
represented by all positive and negative integers and fractions with the
denominator being a power of two.
However, as Brodén also points out, if one takes two different start-
ing points A and B, for example the zero-point and the three-point
instead of the zero-point and the one-point, then the new set of points
obtained by successively taking midpoints does not contain all the
points in the original set of points. So, if he does not want to im-
pose further restrictions, Brodén continues, he has to allow ‘different
relations’ among the points of the line. But since our experience does
not give any indication of such a difference, Brodén realizes that he has
to include a further axiom regarding the inner structure of the points of
the line. With this axiom he wants to achieve a correspondence between
every point on the line and the real numbers, i.e., he wants to obtain
a continuity of the line. The idea behind the axiom is to successively
take midpoints of smaller and smaller intervals and to take the limit.
With a construction like this Brodén obtains a bijection between the
line and the real numbers. To be able to express this in an easier way
he introduces the so-called c-system, which I will now outline.
With the number system 2an (a, n integers), i.e., the number system
corresponding to the points of the line obtained by taking the midpoint
a finite number of times, as basis, Brodén claims that all real numbers
can be represented. He proceeds with the statement that, if n assumes
all possible positive integer values, then
1 1 1 1
+ 2 + 3 + ... + n
2 2 2 2
represents a system of points with the relation to the one-point that
there are points in the system whose distance to it is smaller than any
12 Johanna Pejlare
given distance, i.e., the one-point is a ‘limit point’ for the system. He
claims that this in fact is the only limit point of the system, and that
the one-point cannot be a limit point for any other infinite system
c1 c2 c3 cn
c0 + + 2 + 3 + ... + n
2 2 2 2
where c0 is an integer or zero and ci , i ≥ 1, are equal to zero or one,
but not all equal to zero after some given i. The requirement that not
all ci are equal to zero after a certain point guarantees unambiguity,
i.e., that not two different systems has the same limit point.
A system like this Brodén refers to as a c-system in reduced form,
noticing that every infinite system b0 + b21 + 2b22 + 2b33 + ... + 2bnn where bi
equals 0, +1 or -1, through the merging of the negative terms with the
previous positive term, can be reduced to a c-system.
Brodén now notices that not every c-system has a limit point in the
system 2an . So to expand the point system on the line, he simply wants
every c-system to have a limit point. But he has to express this in a
different manner, since, if he goes outside the system 2an the notions of
‘bigger than’ and ‘smaller than’ still does not have any meaning and
thus the notion of ‘limit point’ cannot be used. To get around this
problem he expresses the axiom in the following way:
Axiom VII Between c-systems and the points of a line, a mutually
unambiguous correspondence can be established so that for two
arbitrary c-systems
c1 c2 c3 cn
c0 + + 2 + 3 + ... + n
2 2 2 2
and
c!1 c! c! c!
c!0 + + 22 + 33 + ... + nn
2 2 2 2
there correspond two points, whose distance to each other equals
the distance from the zero-point to the point corresponding to the
set
c1 − c!1 c2 − c!2 c3 − c!3 cn − c!n
c0 − c!0 + + + + ... +
2 22 23 2n
or its reduced set, and the one-point corresponds to the set
1 1 1 1
+ + + ... + n .
2 22 23 2
The axiom talks of a “mutually unambiguous correspondence” be-

tween infinite c-systems and points on the line, and thus, using modern
terminology, we would say that there is a bijection between the real
13
numbers and the points on a line. In fact, what has been shown is
much stronger, that the line and the real numbers are identical, since
the bijection is distance-preserving. The axiomatic construction of the
line is finished , because there is a fully worked out theory of real
numbers.
Brodén continues to determine the geometry of the plane. He does
this in a very similar way as with the line, by considering symmetries.
But first he wants to introduce an axiom which helps him to further
determine the notion of equality of distance.
Axiom VIII On every line through an arbitrary point P there

exist points, whose distances from P equal the distance to P from
an arbitrary point in space.
From previous axioms it follows that there exist two such points on
the line whose distances from a point P on the line equal the distance
from P to an arbitrary point in space.
Now Brodén can give a definition which helps him to compare two
arbitrary distances.
Definition The distances AB and CD are equal if, on the straight
line AC, the distances from A and C, which equal AB respectively
CD, are also equal to each other.
With this Brodén can now add an axiom which gives a general notion
of equality of distance.
Axiom IX Without exception it holds good that the distances that
are equal to one and the same are equal to each other.
Definition Two systems of points are equivalent if an unambiguous
mutual correspondence can be established, for which all correspond-
ing distances are equal.
With the following axiom, Brodén wants to introduce the plane by
the construction of a system of points. If there is such a system, he
claims, it has to be generated by a line that rotates around a fixed
point following a line. Our experience, he continues, tells us that a
system of this kind arises, but for the sake of simplicity he chooses to
formulate the axiom in the following way:
Axiom X There is a system of points, such that a line through two
arbitrarily chosen points in the system completely belongs to the
system, without filling the complete space.
Definition Such a system of points is called a plane.
14 Johanna Pejlare
After introducing the plane, it is now plausible for Brodén to seek

analogies between the fundamental properties of the plane and of the
line. He does this in the following three axioms, which correspond to
Axiom III and Axiom IV. With these axioms he obtains a ‘symmetrical
equivalence’ in the plane, which can be considered as a reflection of the
plane in a line lying in the plane.
Axiom XI Every line in the plane uniquely defines a symmetric
equivalence, where every point on the line, but no other point, is
self-corresponding.
Axiom XII Two arbitrarily chosen points unambiguously define
such an equivalence, where they correspond to each other.5
Axiom XIII The self-corresponding line is the complete locus for
equal distance from two corresponding points.
Definition The self-corresponding line in a symmetrical equiva-
lence is called the axis of symmetry.
However, these axioms are still not sufficient for the establishment
of Euclidean geometry. Brodén points out that a so called ‘pseudo-
spherical’ geometry, i.e., a hyperbolic geometry with constant negative
curvature, is still possible. To exclude this he has to add an axiom,
which is a version of Euclid’s parallel pxiom.
Axiom XIV The complete locus for symmetrically corresponding
points with the same mutual distance as two given points, forms
two lines.
With the axioms stated so far, Brodén claims, Euclidean plane ge-
ometry appears. Now that the inner structure of the plane has been
taken care of, he proceeds to space and adds the final two axioms:
Axiom XV Through three arbitrarily chosen points in space there

goes a plane, and if the points are not in a straight line, there is
only one such plane.
Axiom XVI Two planes cannot have only one point in common.
The last axiom, Brodén claims, excludes a fourth dimension. Thus,
he continues, he now has all the requirements needed for establishing
Euclidean three-dimensional geometry.
5
This equivalence is the reflection across the line that we normally call the
perpendicular bisector.
15
2.4. The Proof of Sufficiency
After stating the axioms, Brodén gives an explicit proof for the suf-
ficiency of Axiom I to Axiom XIV for establishing plane Euclidean
geometry by deriving the distance formula for two arbitrary points,
and, after adding Axiom XV and XVI, he claims that he in a similar
manner can prove sufficiency for establishing three-dimensional Eu-
clidean geometry (Brodén 1890, pp. 230–235). In this section I will
present and explain Brodén’s proof.
It might be a bit hard to grasp Brodén’s proof of sufficiency, since
it is quite long and he makes no effort to give an overview of his ideas.
The entire proof is written as one long account. To make Brodén’s
argumentation easier to read, I will dissect it into several propositions
with shorter proofs and I will also include some illustrations. In the
proofs of the propositions I will follow Brodén very closely. In between
I will try to give a more general overview of what he is doing. The
reader can, without losing track of Brodén’s main idea, skip the details
in the proofs.
Brodén starts his discussion by claiming that, in a symmetrical
equivalence in the plane, a line will correspond to another line. He
says that this is obvious, but he does not give a proof. However, there
does not seem to be any easy way to prove this claim, and perhaps it
should be regarded as an additional axiom. Brodén continues stating
that, if the two lines intersect, they will do so on the axis of symmetry,
and if a line goes through two points that correspond symmetrically to
each other, then the line must correspond to itself. He now gives the
definition of a line being ‘perpendicular’ to another line.
Definition A self-corresponding line that joins two points that corre-

spond to each other in a symmetrical equivalence is perpendicular to
the axis of symmetry.
Brodén further claims (again without giving a proof) that, through

a point not on a given line, there goes one and only one line perpen-
dicular to the line. If the point lies on a line there is also one and only
one line through the point perpendicular to the given line. This last
statement Brodén proves explicitly, but to be able to do this he first
has to show that the notion of a line being perpendicular to another
line is a symmetric relation.
Proposition 1 If a line B is perpendicular to another line A then A

is perpendicular to B.
16 Johanna Pejlare
Proof Suppose the line B is perpendicular to the line A, i.e., B is a self-

corresponding line in the symmetric equivalence where A is the axis of
symmetry. The two lines A and B have a point of intersection, namely
the midpoint of two points on B that correspond to each other in the
symmetric equivalence where A is the axis of symmetry. Let this point
be O. Let P and P ! be two arbitrary points on B that correspond
symmetrically to each other, and let R and S be two points on A
whose distance from O is equal to the distance OP (and consequently
also equal to OP ! ).
The points P and R determine a symmetric equivalence where the
axis of symmetry goes through O. In the same way S and P determine
a symmetric equivalence where the axis of symmetry goes through O.
In the former equivalence, P and R correspond to each other, and, since
O corresponds to itself, the line B and the line A correspond to each
other, and the points P ! and S correspond to each other. In the latter
equivalence, the points S and P respectively R and P ! correspond to
each other.
If now the two equivalences are combined, an equivalence is ob-
tained in which the lines A and B each correspond to themselves, but
the point O is the only point corresponding to itself, and R and S
correspond to each other. Thus two corresponding points on each line
lie symmetrically to O.
B A B B
P R P’ P
S R P’ P R S R S
A B A A
P’ S P P’
If we now put this equivalence together with the original (the sym-
metric equivalence that had the line A as axis of symmetry) we get an
equivalence in which every point on the line B corresponds to itself,
and the line A connects points that correspond to each other. Thus A
is a self-corresponding line in the symmetric equivalence where the line
B is the axis of symmetry, i.e., the line A is perpendicular to the line
B. !
Now that Brodén has proved that the notion ‘perpendicular’ is a

symmetrical relation, he claims that it is easy to see that through every
point on a line there is one and only one perpendicular line. He gives
the following proof of this:
17
Proposition 2 Through every point O on a line A goes one line B

perpendicular to A.
Proof Choose two arbitrary points on the line A that symmetrically

correspond to each other with respect to the point O. The symmetrical
axis B to A with respect to these two points goes through O. The line
A is perpendicular to the line B, and thus the line B is perpendicular to
the line A. But through O there can only be one line perpendicular to
A, since, if there were more, A would be perpendicular to all of them,
and then two symmetrical points on the line A would correspond to
several different axes of symmetry. Thus there can only be one line B
through O perpendicular to A. !
Brodén claims that he now, without any difficulty, can unambigu-

ously determine the position of a point in the plane. This he does
by constructing a coordinate system where the position of each point
is described by its coordinates. To construct this coordinate system
Brodén chooses two arbitrary lines A and B that are perpendicular
to each other and have the intersection point O. On each of the lines
he chooses a ‘one-point’, both of which have the same distance from
O, which in turn he chooses as the ‘zero-point’ of the two lines. The
points of the lines are now (according to Axiom VII) unambiguously
determined by real numbers.
To determine an arbitrarily chosen point P in the plane, Brodén
puts two lines through this point, perpendicular to the lines A and B,
and intersecting these lines in the points X and Y . The two points X
and Y are represented by the real numbers x and y. He assigns these
two numbers to the point P .
Brodén now points out that, because of the parallel axiom, i.e.,
Axiom XIV, every pair of values of x and y will determine one and
only one point in the plane.6 He proves this explicitly:
Proposition 3 Every pair of values of x and y corresponds to one and

only one point in the plane.
Proof Consider two lines L and L! that, with respect to the line A (the
x-axis) as axis of symmetry, form a locus of symmetric points with the
same mutual distance. These lines must intersect the line B (the y-
axis), since on this line there are two points, symmetric with respect to
O, with the same mutual distance as two arbitrarily given points. It is
6
It should be noted that it is also true in elliptical and hyperbolic geometry that
every pair of values (x, y) will determine one and only one point in the plane. Thus,
this statement does not require Axiom XIV, as Brodén claims.
18 Johanna Pejlare
possible to arbitrarily choose two symmetrical points since, according

to the assumptions about the line, all lines are ‘equivalent systems’.
The lines L and L! must be perpendicular to the y-axis, since their
relation to the x-axis, to form a locus of symmetric points with the same
mutual distance, cannot change through some equivalence in which the
x-axis corresponds to itself. Therefore, in such an equivalence, L and L!
must either correspond to each other or correspond to themselves. The
latter is valid, in particular, for the symmetry with the y-axis as axis
of symmetry. Since L and L! intersect the axis of symmetry in different
points, and in this symmetry cannot correspond to each other, L and
L! must each correspond to themselves, i.e., be perpendicular to the
y-axis. But the y-axis is an arbitrary line perpendicular to the x-axis.
Thus, it must hold that if two lines, with respect to a third line A as
axis of symmetry, form a locus for corresponding points with the same
mutual distance, then these two lines must be perpendicular to every
line that is perpendicular to A.7
Conversely, it also holds that if a line L is perpendicular to another
line B and this in turn is perpendicular to a third line A, then the first
line L together with its, with respect to A, symmetrically corresponding
line L! , forms a locus for corresponding points with the same mutual
distance in relation to A. This is so easily realized that a proof of it
need not be written out.
Since, as just pointed out, a line that belongs to such a locus, must
intersect every line that is perpendicular to the axis of symmetry, it
holds that two lines, each of which is perpendicular to one of two
mutually perpendicular lines, have one (and of course only one) point
in common. From this it follows that, to every pair of values of x and
y, there corresponds one and only one point in the plane. !
Now Brodén gives the definition of two lines being parallel to each
other:
Definition Two lines, which are perpendicular to the same line, are
parallel.
It remains for Brodén to determine the mutual position between

points whose x- and y-values are given. For this he needs to be able to
do a coordinate transformation.8 To do so he first defines the notion of
7
Here Brodén goes from Axiom XIV to the existence of rectangles. The rectangles
will be formed by the two parallel lines L and L" and two lines perpendicular to the
line A.
8
With the word ‘transformation’ Brodén obviously refers to what we today would
call ‘translation’.
19
‘transforming an object along a line’. This notion connects very closely

to the notion ‘transforming a line along itself’, so he only refers to the
account of the latter. The only difference is that, instead of keeping to
the points of the line as in the latter case, he now has to consider the
lines perpendicular to the line the object is transformed along.
With the notion ‘transforming a line along itself’, Brodén means the
possibility of an unambiguous and asymmetric correspondence in which
all corresponding distances are equal (i.e., if A corresponds to A! and
B to B ! then AB = A! B ! ) and the distance between two corresponding
points is constant (i.e., AA! = BB ! ). This is done by performing the
composition of two symmetric correspondences in the following way:
Proposition 4 There is an unambiguous and asymmetric correspon-

dence on the line at which corresponding distances on the line are
everywhere equal and the distance between two corresponding points
is constant.
Proof Suppose we want to establish such a correspondence in which a

given point A corresponds to another given point A! . First perform the
symmetric correspondence in which A corresponds to A! , and thereafter
correspond symmetrically with respect to A! .
A A’
A’ A
A A’
The result will be an asymmetric transformation that leaves all dis-

tances unchanged. That the distance between two corresponding, but
otherwise arbitrarily chosen, points B and B ! will equal the distance
AA! is realized in the following way:
B’’ A M A’ N B B’
B’ B N A’ M A B’’
Let B !! correspond symmetrically to B with respect to the midpoint

M of A and A! , so that M B !! = M B. Then B !! and B ! lie symmetrically
with respect to A! (i.e., B !! A! = B ! A! ). The midpoint N of B and A!
cannot coincide with M . Take N as the centre of symmetry. Then A!
corresponds to B, and since AB = A! B !! = A! B ! the point A must
correspond to either B !! or B ! . But A and B !! cannot correspond to
each other, i.e., N cannot be their midpoint, since this midpoint must,
20 Johanna Pejlare
when M is the centre of symmetry, correspond to the midpoint of B

and A! , i.e., N , and thus cannot coincide with N . Thus, when N is
the centre of symmetry, A must correspond symmetrically to B ! . Thus,
BB ! = AA! . !
Brodén points out that the transformation of an object along a

line does not presuppose the parallel axiom, i.e., Axiom XIV. But,
he continues, if the parallel axiom holds, the transformation becomes
simpler than would otherwise be the case, since then not only the line
L along which the transformation is performed will correspond to itself,
but every line parallel to L will do so. Furthermore, he continues, every
line M perpendicular to L, and consequently perpendicular to every
line parallel to L, will correspond to another line parallel to M . From
this it follows that, since the ‘perpendicular distance’, i.e., the shortest
distance, between two parallel lines is constant, along each line parallel
to L the same transformation will be performed as along L.
Brodén claims that an arbitrary transformation of an object in the
plane, through the composition of transformations along two mutually
perpendicular lines, is possible. From this it follows, he points out, that
two lines are perpendicular if each of them is perpendicular to one of
two mutually perpendicular lines, i.e., the geometry must be Euclidean
and thus Axiom XIV is satisfied. With this he can let every substitu-
tion x = x1 + h, y = y1 + k represent a ‘coordinate transformation’.
Thus, when doing a coordinate transformation, Brodén presupposes
the parallel axiom, i.e., Axiom XIV.
Now Brodén has constructed a coordinate system and he has shown
how he can transform an object in this system. He proceeds to seek the
arithmetic relation between the x- and y-values for points on a line. He
first remarks that the points (x1 , y1 ) and (−x1 , −y1 ) are on the same
line through O, and that this is independent of the parallel axiom. He
shows this in the following way:
Proposition 5 The two points (x1 , y1 ) and (−x1 , −y1 ) are on the same
line through O.
Proof The two points P = (x1 , y1 ) and P ! = (x1 , −y1 ) are symmetrical
with respect to the x-axis. Hence the line through O and P and the
line through O and P ! will be symmetric with respect to the x-axis. Let
the two points R and R! on these lines be symmetric to P respectively
P ! , with respect to O (such that OR = OP = OP ! = OR! ). Then R
and R! also have to be symmetric to the x-axis.
21
R’ P
R P’
But P and R! , respectively P ! and R, also correspond symmetrically

to each other with respect to a line through O, different from the x-
axis, as axis of symmetry. With respect to this line the midpoints to P
and P ! , respectively R! and R, also form a symmetric pair. But these
midpoints belong to the x-axis. Thus the x-axis must be perpendicular
to the aforementioned axis of symmetry, which hence must coincide
with the y-axis. Thus the points R and R! are (−x1 , −y1 ) and (−x1 , y1 ).
In other words, (x1 , y1 ) and (−x1 , −y1 ) are on the same line through
O. !
Now Brodén can present an equation for the line. To do this he once
again considers the line ROP , where P = (x1 , y1 ), R = (−x1 , −y1 ), and
P is in the first quadrant (i.e., x1 > 0, y1 > 0). He again presupposes
Axiom XIV and performs the coordinate transformation such that the
point R is transformed to the point O. The coordinates for O then
become (x1 , y1 ) and for P , (2x1 , 2y1 ). He observes that the coordinates
of those two points are in the same proportion. He further claims that,
by a simple reasoning, he can show that the same holds for all the
points on the line whose abscissas (x-values) have the form a/2n (a
and n integers), i.e., the relation between y and x is constant for all
the points on the line. He further asserts that, as long as he keeps
to the mentioned abscissas, the equation of the line through O and
P = (x1 , y1 ) becomes
y1
y= x.
x1
He then argues that, when one returns to the original origin O, i.e.,
doing another coordinate transformation, the equation of the line keeps
the same form, and it can be proved that the same equation holds for
all the points on the line. But for simplicity he ignores this proof, and
only states that the equation for a line not passing through the origin
is obtained through a coordinate transformation.
What now remains for Brodén to do is to determine the constant
relation between the distance from a point on the line to the origin
and the abscissa. To do this he considers the rotation of a line around
a point. He determines the rotation around a point O as being the
composition of two symmetric equivalences, whose axis of symmetry
passes through O. To obtain a rotation for which the positive part of
22 Johanna Pejlare
the x-axis is transferred into that part of the line through O under
consideration, which lies in the first quadrant, he takes the symmetric
equivalence in which these two directions correspond to each other, and
thereafter takes the symmetric equivalence in where the new direction
of the x-axis is the axis of symmetry. The result is a rotation of the
coordinate system around the origin.
X P X
Y P Y
P
X
Y
Brodén now supposes that in this rotation the direction OY is

transferred into the direction OQ. In the same way as in the case of
transforming a line along itself, he states that he can now show that an
asymmetric equivalence can be established in which OX corresponds
to OY and OP to OQ, i.e., he can establish a 90-degree rotation of
the line. He then asserts that from this it follows that the equation for
the line OQ must be either x = xy11 y or x = − xy11 y. To decide which
equation is valid, he considers the symmetric equivalence in which the
directions OX and OY correspond to each other, and where the lines
x = x1 and y = y1 correspond to y = x1 and x = y1 respectively, i.e.,
the point P = (x1 , y1 ) corresponds to the point (y1 , x1 ) and the line
OP (i.e., y = xy11 x) to the line y = xy11 x.
Y
(y1 , x1)
P=(x 1, y 1)
X
But the line y = xy11 x cannot coincide with the line OQ, and thus
the line OQ must have the equation y = − xy11 x. Thus, Brodén claims,
the line through the origin perpendicular to the line y = xy11 x must be
the line y = − xy11 x.
It is now easy for Brodén to determine the distance OP . He considers
the line through P perpendicular to OP , which intersects the x-axis in
the point T . After a coordinate transformation, Brodén states that the
equation for this line is
x1
y − y1 = − (x − x1 ) .
y1
23
Brodén now lets y = 0 and obtains the abscissa for the point T :
x21 + y12
OT =
x1
He further considers the symmetric equivalence that interchanges the
directions OP and OX. With this equivalence, he says, P must corre-
spond to a point P ! on OX, and T to a point T ! on OP . He claims that,
since T P is perpendicular to OP , also T ! P ! must be perpendicular to
OX, and further OP = OP ! and OT = OT ! .
T’
P
O
P’ T
"
Now Brodén claims that this, together with the fact that OP OT
x1 = OP " ,
implies that OP OT 2 2 2
x1 = OP , and thus OP = x1 · OT = x1 + y1 . Letting
OP = r and doing a coordinate transformation, he now obtains the
formula for calculating the distance between two arbitrarily chosen
points (x1 , y1 ) and (x2 , y2 ), which is:
!
r= (x2 − x1 )2 + (y2 − y1 )2
In this formula, Brodén claims, the entire plane Euclidean geometry
lies embedded, in the sense that ‘everything’ can be derived from this
formula, after the required notions have been defined in a suitable way.
Thus, he asserts that he has proved that his first 14 axioms are sufficient
for establishing plane Euclidean geometry.
Upon adding axioms XV and XVI, Brodén claims that every point
can be unambiguously represented with the coordinates (x, y, z). In
a similar manner as in the two-dimensional case, he claims that he
can prove the sufficiency of the 16 axioms for establishing Euclidean
three-dimensional geometry, by deducing the distance formula
!
r= (x2 − x1 )2 + (y2 − y1 )2 + (z2 − z1 )2 .
However, he does not carry out the proof.

24 Johanna Pejlare
3. Brodén’s 1912 paper
3.1. The Axiomatic System
After the publication of the 1890 article, it seems that Brodén changed
his field of interest. It was not until 1911, when he went to the Second
Scandinavian Mathematical Congress in Copenhagen, that he resumed
his work on the foundations of geometry.
During the end of the 19th century mathematics had gradually im-
proved its position in Scandinavia. Of special importance during this
period was the founding of Acta Mathematica by Gösta Mittag-Leffler
in 1882, which from the outset became one of the leading international
journals. As a result of the mathematical development in Scandinavia,
Mittag-Leffler took the initiative to launch a Scandinavian Mathemat-
ical Congress. The first congress took place in Stockholm in 1909 and
became a monument to the mathematical development that had so far
been achieved.
The Second Scandinavian Mathematical Congress was held from
August 28 to 31, 1911. In all 93 mathematicians from Denmark, Nor-
way and Sweden took part, and 23 lectures were given. Proceedings
were printed the following year in (Nielsen, 1912). Two talks were
given on the foundations of geometry. Johannes Hjelmslev (1873–1950),
professor at the university of Copenhagen, gave a talk with the title
Nye Undersøgelser over Geometriens Grundlag (‘New Investigations
on the Foundations of Geometry’), and Brodén’s talk was entitled Ett
axiomsystem för den euklidiska geometrien (‘An Axiomatic System for
the Euclidean Geometry’).
The most striking difference between Brodén’s 1890 and congress
articles is that the latter is considerably briefer in its presentation
(13 pages compared to 37 pages). In the congress article Brodén does
not discuss if his motivation is a pedagogical one and he does not say
anything about his philosophical conception of geometry. He also gives
a very meager discussion on how a scientific axiomatic system should
be built up, i.e., what criteria the basic notions and axioms should
fulfil. He just mentions that, to the greatest extent possible, the axioms
should be empirically evident, and the whole system of axioms should
be simple, natural and homogeneous (Brodén, 1912, p. 133). At the
end of the article he also brings up the sufficiency of the axioms and
he discusses their necessity. With these later additions, the criteria for
an axiomatic system becomes almost the same in the two articles.
Brodén starts with determining the two basic notions ‘point’ and
‘immediate equality of distance’, and thereafter he proceeds with stat-
ing the axioms (Brodén, 1912, pp. 124–128):
25
I. Fundamental axiom
Axiom 1 If AP = BP and CP = BP then AP = CP , or, in
words: with respect to immediate equality of distance, those dis-
tances which are equal to one and the same distance, are equal to
one another.
II. Axioms that make the general concept of equality of

distance possible
Axiom 2 The locus of a point P such that P A = P B, where A

and B are two given points, consists of more than one point.
Definition This locus is called a plane.
Axiom 3 A corresponding set within a plane consists of more than
one point.
Definition This set of points is called a line.
Axiom 4 The corresponding set within a line consists of a single
point which is distinct from both A and B.
Definition This point is called the midpoint for A and B.
Definition On a line, AB = CD if the pairs A, D and B, C or A,
C and B, D have the same midpoint.
Axiom 5 On a line those distances are equal that equal one and
the same distance.
Axiom 6 Through two arbitrarily chosen points there is always at
least one line (and hence also at least one plane).
Axiom 7 If P is a point on a line and A is a point outside the line,
then there is at least one point B on the line such that BP = AP .
Definition Let two pairs of points, A, B and C, D, be given and
let a point in the first pair be connected with a point in the second
pair (for example A and C) by a line. Take two points H and K on
the line such that HA = BA and KC = DC. If HA = KC then
also AB = CD.
Axiom 8 Without exception it holds good that distances that are
equal to one and the same are equal to each other.
III. Axioms for characterizing a line

and a plane
26 Johanna Pejlare
Axiom 9 Through two (different) points there is never more than

one line.
Axiom 10 The line that goes through two points in a plane lies
completely in the plane.
Axiom 11 Through three points not on a line there is always one
and only one plane.
IV. Axioms of symmetry
Axiom 12 Each point M on a line uniquely determines a symmetric

correspondence in which corresponding distances are equal and M
is the only point corresponding to itself.
Axiom 13 Every line in a plane uniquely determines a symmetric
correspondence of points in which corresponding distances are equal
and every point on the line but no other point is self-corresponding.
V. Axioms of continuity
Axiom 14 By means of successive traversal of equally long seg-

ments, one never returns to the point of departure.
Axiom 15 Completeness axiom.
VI. Parallel axiom
Axiom 16 By means of the symmetric equivalence in the plane

equidistant symmetric pairs form two lines.
Brodén refers to Axiom 14 as an Archimedean axiom, and this might
be the reason for him to include this axiom in the group of continuity
axioms. Hilbert’s version of the Archimedean axiom permits an iso-
morphism between scalar arithmetic and a system of real arithmetic.
However, Axiom 14 is weaker than the Archimedean axiom and should
only be considered as an axiom of ordering. This is discussed more
precisely in Section 4.1.
Axiom 15 just states “completeness axiom”, referring to Hilbert.
Hilbert’s completeness axiom permits a correspondence between the
real numbers and the points on a line.
After stating the axioms, Brodén gives a proof of sufficiency by
deriving the distance formula. He carries through this proof in the
same way as in 1890.
After proving sufficiency of the axioms, Brodén discusses their neces-
sity, i.e., if they are independent from each other. This is, he claims, an
incomparably more complicated question than proving the sufficiency
of the axioms. He does not carry out a proof of independence of all the
27
axioms, but only considers the special question whether the two axioms
of continuity, Axioms 14 and 15, are independent from the others. He
proves this explicitly by formulating a model in which the remaining
axioms are fulfilled, but Axioms 14 and 15 are not. Since he has a
two-dimensional model, he leaves out the axioms considering the space.
The model is a finite geometry consisting of nine points. When
arranged in a 3×3 matrix and letting the distance be a between two
points in the same row or column and b if not, three points will form
a line if in the same row, column or element of the determinant, i.e.,
there will be 12 lines in the model. In this model Brodén can easily
check that all the remaining axioms, except Axioms 7, 14 and 15, are
fulfilled. For example, considering the line 1 5 9, it uniquely determines
a symmetric correspondence of points in which the symmetric pairs 2-4,
3-7 and 6-8 are formed. If it is assumed that a = b, then also Axiom 7
is satisfied.
1 2 3
 
4 5 6
7 8 9
It is easily realized that Axiom 14 is not satisfied, since the model
only has 9 points and Axiom 14 implies that the geometry must have
infinitely many points. Brodén might consider Axiom 15 not to be
satisfied since the three points of a line does not correspond to the real
numbers.
Brodén also briefly discusses some differences between Hilbert’s ax-
iomatic system and his own. He asks whether his finite model would
satisfy all of Hilbert’s axioms, except the Archimedean and complete-
ness axioms. This is not the case, he concludes, since Hilbert’s axioms
already have as a consequence that a line has infinitely many points.
The reason for this is that, in Hilbert’s system, the notion ‘between’
plays the role of a basic notion. In Brodén’s system the notion ‘between’
cannot be defined until after Axiom 14 has been introduced. Thus, at
least as long as we stay within the plane, Hilbert’s axioms, excluding
the two concerning continuity, contain something more than Brodén’s
corresponding axioms.
3.2. Differences From the 1890 System
The main difference between Brodén’s two axiomatic systems is that

in the version of the congress article the concept of symmetry is not as
striking as in the 1890 version. In the 1890 system, symmetry was used
to characterize the line and the plane and, with the help of symmetry,
Brodén could extend the notion of immediate equality of distance.
28 Johanna Pejlare
In the congress article the concept of symmetry is not used to the

same extent. The group of axioms concerning symmetry includes only
two axioms, and they are introduced quite late, just before the two
continuity axioms and the parallel axiom. In 1890 five axioms had a
direct connection to symmetry (Axioms III, IV, XI, XII and XIII). In
the congress article Brodén, with Axioms 12 and 13, only retains Axiom
III and a slightly stronger version of Axiom XI.
The reason for not having to use symmetry to the same extent
is Brodén’s choice to introduce the line and the plane in a different
manner. In 1890 he introduces the line with the help of two points on
it, and characterizes it completely before he introduces the plane. In the
congress article he claims that he uses Leibniz’ definitions of the plane
and the line9 and he introduces the line with the help of the concept
of the plane. He does not explain why he relinquishes his former idea
of instead building up the geometry from point to line to plane.
However, it seems that Brodén has not thought through this idea
completely. As Contro remarks, there will be a problem later in the
system when Brodén introduces Axiom 10, saying that the line through
two points in a plane completely lies in the plane (Contro, 1985, p. 632).
Since the line and the plane have already been introduced, this axiom
should be proved from the other axioms, or at least reduced to a simpler
form. In the 1890 article this problem is avoided.
Axiom XVI from 1890, saying that two planes cannot have only one
point in common and with that restricting the axiomatization to three
dimensions, is not retained in the congress article. This is discussed
further in Section 4.3.
Axiom 14 is formulated in a different manner but has the same
meaning as Axiom VI from 1890.
To obtain continuity of the line, Brodén does not go through the
complicated construction using c-systems to establish a bijection be-
tween the real numbers and the points of the line, as he did in 1890. In-
stead he just refers to Hilbert and states “completeness axiom”. Brodén
mentions that he already gave a formulation in 1890, but Hilbert only
gave it in his second edition of Grundlagen der Geometrie in 1903. It
seems that Brodén wants to indicate that he was far in advance of
Hilbert in realizing the necessity of a completeness axiom, and at the
same time it seems like he wants to give the impression that he had
succeeded in formulating this axiom at the same abstract level, which
was not the case. The completeness axiom is discussed further in the
following section, in connection with the Archimedean axiom.
9
Leibniz’ definitions of line and plane (1679) were used by others, for example
by Pieri (1900; 1908).
29
4. Influences on Brodén and evaluations of his work
4.1. The Axioms of Continuity
One of the most intricate questions regarding the axiomatization of Eu-

clidean geometry concerns the principle of continuity. One of the main
defects in Euclid’s Elements was that continuity of the line was assumed
intuitively and not postulated. This problem was eventually solved by
Hilbert, who included two continuity axioms, the Archimedean axiom
and the completeness axiom, in his second edition of Grundlagen der
Geometrie from 1903.
In the congress article Brodén gives two continuity axioms, Axioms
14 and 15. In the 1890 article he also gives two axioms, Axioms VI and
VII, which are basically the same as the two axioms in the congress
article, at least for Brodén. In this section I will discuss Brodén’s two
versions of these axioms in relation to Hilbert’s continuity axioms and
related principles.
In his first edition of the Grundlagen der Geometrie from 1899,
Hilbert gives only one continuity axiom. This is the so-called Archimede-
an axiom,10 which he formulates in the following manner:11
Let A1 be any point upon a straight line between the arbitrarily
chosen points A and B. Take the points A2 , A3 , A4 ,... so that A1
lies between A and A2 , A2 between A1 and A3 , A3 between A2 and
A4 ,etc. Moreover, let the segments
AA1 , A1 A2 , A2 A3 , A3 A4 , ...
be equal to one another. Then, among this series of points, there

always exists a certain point An such that B lies between A and
An .
A A1 A2 A3 A4 An−1 B A n
This axiom corresponds to the process of estimating the distance

between two points on a line by using a measuring stick. If we start
10
Otto Stoltz (1842–1905) was probably the first to refer to this axiom as the
Archimedean axiom (Stoltz, 1883, p. 504). Archimedes explicitly formulated an
axiom that agrees with this, but it was probably used even earlier.
11
“Es sei A1 ein beliebiger Punkt auf einer Geraden zwischen den beliebig gegebe-
nen Punkten A und B; man construire dann die Punkte A2 , A3 , A4 ,..., so dass A1
zwischen A und A2 , ferner A2 zwischen A1 und A3 , ferner A3 zwischen A2 und A4
u. s. w. liegt und überdies die Strecken AA1 , A1 A2 , A2 A3 , A3 A4 ,... einander gleich
sind: dann giebt es in der Reihe der Punkte A2 , A3 , A4 ,... stets einen solchen Punkt
An , dass B zwischen A und An liegt”. (Hilbert, 1899, p. 19). English translation
from (Hilbert, 1950, p. 25).
30 Johanna Pejlare
at one point and successively traverse equal distances along the line
towards the second point, the axiom guarantees that we will eventually
pass the second point. Euclid’s theory of proportion and the entire
theory of measurements depend on this axiom (Eves, 1990, p. 86).
In all editions of the Grundlagen der Geometrie Hilbert includes
the Archimedean Axiom. He slightly changes the formulation in later
editions, however, they are all equivalent.
In the congress article Brodén claims that, with Axiom 14, which is
equivalent to his 1890 Axiom VI, he has a version of the Archimedean
axiom. However, this statement is not true. Brodén’s axiom gives an
ordering of certain points of the line, in the sense that he stepwise
can walk along the line, or successively traverse equally long segments
along the line, without coming back to the point of departure. The
axiom implies that the line can be extended indefinitely and consists of
at least countably many points. But it does not imply that it is always
possible to pass an arbitrarily chosen point on the line, and thus it does
not imply the Archimedean axiom.
One could say that Brodén’s Axiom VI bounds the line from below,
in the sense that it forces the line to consist of at least countably
many points and to be extended to infinity. On the other hand, the
Archimedean axiom in some sense bounds the line from above, forcing
every point of the line to be reachable.
The axioms Hilbert gave in 1899 are not enough to guarantee the
continuity of the line, i.e., that the line is homeomorphic to the real
numbers R. To complete the line he includes in the second edition of
the Grundlagen der Geometrie from 1903, a second axiom of continuity,
the so-called completeness axiom, which was formulated in the following
manner:12
To system of points, straight lines, and planes, it is impossible to add
other elements in such a manner that the system thus generalized
shall form a new geometry obeying all of the five groups of axioms
[...].
With this is meant that a proper extension in which all the axioms
remain true is not possible. If a point, before the extension, lies between
two other points, it should still do so afterwards, and congruent lines
and angles should stay congruent. This axiom, together with the axioms
it depends on, immediately implies that the set of all points lying on a
given line is homeomorphic to the real numbers R, the set of all points
12
“Die Elemente (Punkte, Geraden, Ebenen) der Geometrie bilden ein System
von Dingen, welches bei Aufrechterhaltung sämtlicher genannten Axiome keiner
Erweiterung mehr fähig ist”. (Hilbert, 1903, p. 16). English translation from (Hilbert,
1950, p. 25).
31
of a plane is homeomorphic to R2 , and the set of all points in space is

homeomorphic to R3 .
In the seventh edition of the Grundlagen der Geometrie, from 1930,
Hilbert gives a weaker version of the completeness axiom, since he
realized that it is enough to determine the continuity of the line with
an axiom to be able to prove the original completeness axiom:13
An extension of a set of points on a line with its order and congru-
ence relations that would preserve the relations existing among the
original elements as well as the fundamental properties of line order
and congruence that follows from [...] [the axioms of order, axioms
of congruence and the Archimedean axiom] is impossible.
In 1928 Richard Baldus refers to the completeness axiom as Hilbert’s
most original achievement in the development of axiomatics. The char-
acter of the completeness axiom differs from those of the other axioms,
in that it does not state new relations between the basic notions, but
says something about the relation between the axiomatic system and
the objects which may conceivably satisfy it. The completeness axiom
is a meta-theoretical statement, though in a peculiar sense, since the
theory with which it is concerned includes the axiom itself (Torretti,
1978, p. 234). However, the axiom can be expressed in a different and
more transparent manner. In 1930 Baldus showed that the Cantorian
axiom14 gives the full import of the completeness axiom:15 16
If, on a straight line, there is an infinite sequence of segments Aν Bν
such that each of these segments has its endpoints within the pre-
vious one and such that there is no segment on the line inside all
the segments Aν Bν , then there is a point within all the segments
Aν Bν .
With Axiom VII, Brodén already had some type of completeness
axiom in 1890. Here he makes a construction to obtain a one-to-one
correspondence between all real numbers and the points on the straight
line. However, Brodén’s axiom does not have the meta-theoretical char-
13
“Die Punkte einer Geraden bilden ein System, welches bei Aufrechterhaltung
der linearen Anordnung [...], des ersten Kongruenzaxioms und des Archimedischen
Axioms [...] keiner Erweiterung mehr fähig ist”. (Hilbert, 1930, p. 30). English
translation from (Hilbert, 1971, p. 26).
14
The Cantorian axiom is usually referred to as the Nested Intervals Theorem.
In 1874 Cantor uses the principle in his first proof of the nondenumerability of the
reals.
15
This was done already in 1900 by Mario Pieri.
16
“Liegt in einer Geraden eine unendliche Folge von Strecken Aν Bν derart, daβ
jede dieser Strecken ihre Endpunkte innerhalb der vorhergehenden hat und daβ es
keine Strecke auf der Geraden gibt, die innerhalb aller Strecken Aν Bν liegt, dann
gibt es einen Punkt, der innerhalb aller Strecken Aν Bν liegt”. (Baldus, 1930, p. 12).
32 Johanna Pejlare
acter of Hilbert’s version. Instead it involves a construction of the points

of the line, and assumes the existence of the points constructed in
an infinite process. Thus, it reduces the axiomatic construction to the
theory of real numbers.
We can easily realize that Axiom VII implies Baldus’ version of
the Cantorian axiom, and thus Hilbert’s completeness axiom. But the
Cantorian axiom does not imply Brodén’s Axiom VII. We can see this
since Brodén’s axiom immediately implies a correspondence between
every point of the line and every real number, but the Cantorian
axiom does not necessarily imply that every point on the line has a
corresponding real number. This we can easily realize if we for example
consider Veronese’s model from 1894 of a non-Archimedean geometry,
where the Cantorian axiom and thus Hilbert’s completeness axiom is
fulfilled, but Brodén’s Axiom VII is not (Veronese, 1894, p. 184):
In the Euclidean plane there is an infinite sequence of equidistant
parallel lines. If we assume that every Euclidean line is run through
from the left to the right, and the sequence of Euclidean lines is run
through from bottom to top, we can consider the collection of Euclidean
lines to form a line in the new geometry. If we compare the segment
AB with the segment AA1 according to the illustration, we see that
the Archimedean axiom is not fulfilled. It is easily seen that the Canto-
rian axiom is fulfilled, but Brodén’s Axiom VII is obviously not. This
example also shows that the Archimedean axiom is independent of the
Cantorian axiom.
B
A A1
Brodén needs Axiom VI to be able to to construct the points of

the line corresponding to the integers. These are necessary for him in
order to formulate Axiom VII. With Axiom VII the line is identical to
the real numbers, and since the real numbers are Archimedean, so is
the line. However, in 1890 Brodén does not say anything regarding the
Archimedean axiom, and might not be aware of its importance.
In the congress article Brodén does not formulate a completeness
axiom, but only states (Brodén, 1912, p. 128):
Axiom 15: Completeness axiom.
He is probably referring to Hilbert’s formulation of the axiom in the
second or third edition of the Grundlagen der Geometrie from 1903
or 1909. This is a mistake that leads to the most serious defect in the
congress article. Hilbert’s completeness axiom is weaker than Brodén’s
original formulation in Axiom VII of 1890. When Brodén, in the congress
33
article, chooses to use Hilbert’s completeness axiom instead of his own

version and at the same time does not give a stronger formulation
of Axiom 14, the Archimedean axiom can no longer be proved and a
non-Archimedean geometry is still possible. Thus Brodén’s axiomatic
system in the congress article is not complete. Brodén probably does
not realize this in his eager efforts to point out the similarities between
his and Hilbert’s axiomatic systems, and thus by mistake introduces
this defect. Thus, evidently, the congress axiomatization is inferior to
the 1890 axiomatization.
4.2. Sufficiency
One of the criteria Brodén gives which a scientific system should fulfill,
is that the sufficiency of the axioms for arranging geometry under cer-
tain logical forms should be clear. Since Brodén does not specify what
he means with ’sufficiency’ or ’logical forms’ it is difficult to interpret
this criterion in a reliable manner. Considering the proof of sufficiency
he carries out it is possible to further investigate the meaning of the
sufficiency criterion.
In the proof of sufficiency Brodén deduces the distance formula for
calculating the distance between two arbitrary points. He claims that
the entire Euclidean geometry lies embedded in this formula in the sense
that ’everything’ can be derived from this formula, after the required
notions have been defined in a suitable way.
Brodén’s statement that Euclidean geometry lies embedded in the
distance formula probably originates from his view on geometry. Ac-
cording to him geometry, like any other science, seeks to reduce all
phenomena to motion, and motion is just a change in certain relations
between objects. With the distance formula all the changes in the re-
lations between the objects can be described. In this sense it should
be enough to deduce the distance formula to be able to describe the
entire Euclidean geometry, or in Brodén’s words, to derive ’everything’.
By ’everything can be derived’ Brodén probably means that every
statement we intuitively consider to be a true statement of Euclidean
geometry, can be derived from the axioms.
Brodén’s demand that the axioms should be sufficient to derive
what is regarded as Euclidean geometry is similar to Hilbert’s early
position towards the completeness criterion. But Hilbert later replaced
this position by maximum consistency when adding the completeness
axiom to avoid the circular demand that appears when the axiomatic
system is used to decide whether a given proposition is a proposition
of geometry.
34 Johanna Pejlare
Contro claims that Brodén in the 1890 article with the proof of suf-
ficiency implicitly proves consistency of his axiomatic system (Contro,
1985, p. 632).17 In fact, Brodén does not, in any of the two articles,
discuss consistency in relation to the proof of sufficiency. But from our
point of view, Brodén’s proof of sufficiency could possibly be interpreted
as some kind of consistency proof, as I will try to explain:
Since Brodén has an empirical view of geometry and claims that
experience cannot lead to logical contradictions, he must consider his
system to be without contradictions. Thus, in this sense, we could
consider his system to be consistent. In the proof of sufficiency of the
axioms he has implicitly shown that from them he can construct a co-
ordinate system, i.e., Cartesian geometry. Therefore, since he considers
his system to be consistent and Cartesian geometry can be deduced
from it, he has, in this sense, proved consistency of Cartesian geome-
try. I do not, however, believe that Brodén had a general concept of
consistency, for instance the concept later developed by Hilbert.
4.3. The Problem of Dimension
In his 1890 article, Brodén claims that he has to introduce Axiom

XVI, saying that two planes cannot have only one point in common,
to exclude the fourth dimension. Later he makes a brief comment that
it is not the task of mathematics to investigate why space should have
three dimensions. These are the only times he mentions the concept of
dimension in the article.
To me it seems that Brodén has to introduce Axiom XVI since
he does not presuppose the space to have three dimensions. But he
probably thinks of the plane as being two-dimensional. This, and the
fact that Axiom XVI does not appear in the congress article, made me
think further about the problem of dimension, i.e., whether Brodén’s
system actually forces geometry to be three-dimensional and whether
Axiom XVI is necessary.
In 1890 Brodén introduces, with Axiom II, the line with the help of
the concept of Einzig or singularly related to. If the geometry should
in any sense be Euclidean, this forces the line to be of dimension one.
However, in Axiom X, Brodén defines the plane to be a system of
points, such that a straight line through two of its points completely
belongs to the system, without filling it entirely. With this axiom the
plane could be a hyperplane of any dimension greater than or equal to
two.
17
Contro might refer to the interpretability of Brodén’s geometry over the reals,
and hence consistency is shown relative to that of arithmetic, but no conclusion is
possible on the existing evidence.
35
If, for example, we think of the plane as the hyperplane of dimension

three, there will not be a problem when we introduce Axioms XI,
XII and XIII, concerning symmetric equivalence. We could think of
the symmetric equivalence as a 180-degree rotation of the hyperplane
around the line determined by the two points in question.
However, there will be a problem in introducing Axiom XIV, the
parallel axiom, if the plane is a hyperplane of dimension three or
greater. This axiom is crucial, since the complete locus of symmetrically
corresponding points with the same mutual distance as the distance
between two given points must form two lines. This is not the case in
the hyperplane version. If the plane would be of three dimensions, then
the complete locus would form a cylinder instead. This implies that the
plane must be of two dimensions.
Still, it might be possible that the entire space is of dimension four or
higher. But, if this were the case, and we chose three arbitrary points in
space, then there would be infinitely many planes through these three
points, also when they are not in a straight line, and hence Axiom XV
would not be fulfilled. Thus the plane must be two-dimensional and
embedded in a three-dimensional space, just as we would wish.
So, the first 15 axioms in the 1890 article force space to be of three
dimensions, and hence it is unnecessary to introduce Axiom XVI to
exclude a fourth dimension. The axioms already given will imply that
two planes, of dimension two and embedded in three dimensions, cannot
have only one point in common, since they are complete. Thus Axiom
XVI is dependent on the previous axioms, and should be excluded.
In the congress article Brodén did not include Axiom XVI. However,
this does not necessarily mean that he realized that the axiom was su-
perfluous in the 1890 axiomatic system, since in the congress article the
problem of dimension does not depend on the parallel axiom. Brodén
chooses to introduce the plane and the line in a different way, so the
problem of dimension does not arise.
If we assume space is of dimension n, and introduce the plane with
Axiom 2, then the plane must necessarily be of dimension n − 1. Axiom
3 introduces the line in such a way that it necessarily must be of
dimension n − 2 and, in a similar manner, Axiom 4 introduces the
midpoint that must be of dimension n − 3. But Axiom 4 also states
that the midpoint must, obviously, consist of only one point, and thus
be of dimension 0. Hence the space is of dimension three, and Brodén
does not have to worry about the dimension anymore. Thus, he does
not have to include Axiom XVI in the congress article.
36 Johanna Pejlare
4.4. Influences on Brodén
In both his articles Brodén refers to a number of works by other math-

ematicians and philosophers. In this section I will discuss some of the
references Brodén gives, and by whom he might have been influenced.
In the 1890 article, most of the references are given in the beginning,
where Brodén treats philosophical questions regarding the nature of
geometry. In his view on the status of geometry as a natural science, it
seems that Brodén is influenced by Helmholtz. He refers, in particular,
to two of Helmholtz’ articles: Über den Ursprung und die Bedeutung der
Geometrischen Axiome, from 1876, and Über den Ursprung und Sinn
der geometrischen Sätze, from 1882. With these two articles Helmholtz
took part in a debate with Kantian philosophers about the epistemo-
logical status of non-Euclidean geometry. He argued that, in general,
geometry derives from physical measurements, rather than from a priori
features of our spatial intuition. This implies that Euclidean geometry
only represents one possible outcome of our spatial measurements, and
therefore it is an empirical choice between it and various non-Euclidean
geometries (DiSalle, 1993, pp. 498–500).
In the 1890 article Brodén has similar ideas. He names empirical
evidence as one of the criteria for how his system should be built up,
and, when it comes to the choice between Euclidean and non-Euclidean
geometry, he talks about the ‘approximative’ validity of the parallel
axiom, Axiom XIV. It is not impossible, he claims, that this axiom is
not true. If it is not true, a ‘pseudo-spheric’, i.e., hyperbolic, geometry
is obtained, where there are infinitely many lines through a given point
outside a given line, that do not meet this line. Again referring to
Helmholtz, Brodén questions whether Euclidean geometry is the only
possible geometry in which we live, but until further notice he admits
the validity of Euclidean geometry, since no measurements have so
far been able to demonstrate something else. These statements on the
nature of geometry suggest that Brodén was influenced by Helmholtz.
In addition to the references made to Helmholtz, Brodén in the
1890 article also refers to Dedekind and Cantor. Specifically, he refers
to Dedekind’s 1872 article Stetigkeit und irrationale Zahlen, where the
theory of Dedekind cuts for defining the real numbers is developed.
Another article referred to is Was sind und was sollen die Zahlen? from
1888. Here Dedekind, by using set-theoretic ideas, gives a theory of the
integers. Furthermore, Brodén mentions two articles by Cantor, Über
die verschiedenen Standpunkte in bezug auf das aktuale Unendliche
from 1886 and Beiträge zur Lehre vom Transfiniten. Regarding the lat-
ter, he probably gave the wrong title and actually meant Mitteilungen
zur Lehre vom Transfiniten from 1887-1888. Both articles Brodén refers
37
to present discussions of philosophical questions concerning the infinite.

It is not immediately clear why Bodén chooses to refer to them. Brodén
again refers to Cantor when he claims that arithmetic is independent of
time- and space-intuition. In the same discussion Brodén claims that
geometry can be totally expressed in arithmetic terms. This idea he
probably attributes to Dedekind. Brodén’s conclusion is that geometry
is independent of time- and space-intuition, and thus becomes a possible
logical form among many others, whose special importance is gained
through reality.
In this discussion, Brodén takes Cantor as an authority to criticize
Kant’s view of geometry as being the result of pure intuition of space
and time. Cantor is a Platonist who considers mathematical truths to
exist a priori, independent of us (Dauben, 1979, p. 83). But at the same
time, Brodén considers his own view on the nature of geometry to be a
development of Kant’s theories without considering Kant’s conception
of geometry as synthetic a priori. This shows perhaps a lack of deeper
thought behind Brodén’s philosophical discussion. On the one hand, he
is clearly influenced by Helmholtz’ empirical view of geometry, and, on
the other, he appeals to Cantor who does not consider geometry to be
an empirical science.
When we consider the mathematical part of Brodén’s 1890 article,
we see further traces of possible influence from Cantor. If we compare
Brodén’s Axiom VII, where he gets, through a construction, a one-to-
one correspondence between the real numbers and the points of the line,
to Cantors’ theory of the real numbers, we can see some similarities.
Cantor constructs the real numbers from the rationals by considering
Cauchy sequences of rational numbers. Brodén transfers this idea to
the straight line, where he considers a sequence of binary fractions
corresponding to bisected distances. However, he does not give any
specific references to Cantor regarding this.
Brodén begins his congress article by claiming that his 1890 ax-
iomatic system exhibits similarities with those of Hilbert, Veronese and
Pieri, among others. The interesting thing is that they published their
work on the foundations of geometry after 1890, and thus Brodén can-
not, at least in his 1890 work, have been influenced by them. However,
it is also unlikely that they were influenced by Brodén. Hilbert and
Pieri might, of course, have read the summary of Brodén’s 1890 article
in Jahrbuch über die Fortschritte der Mathematik, where he gives the
basic mathematical ideas behind his system, but they most certainly
did not read the whole article, since it was published in Swedish.
In the congress article Brodén does not refer to any specific work,
but concerning Hilbert it is obvious that he is referring to the second
or third edition of Grundlagen der Geometrie, considering that the
38 Johanna Pejlare
first edition did not include a completeness axiom. With this reference,
Brodén probably wants to point out the importance of his work and
stress, in particular, the early appearance of his first article. This is
a very intriguing comment, since, in the 1890 article, he claims that
his attempt to axiomatize geometry should in no way be considered
original.
Brodén mentions Giuseppe Veronese (1854–1917) and Mario Pieri
(1860–1913) at the end of the congress article in a short discussion on
the choice to reduce the notions to the two basic notions ‘point’ and
‘immediate equality of distance’. He claims that Veronese and Pieri
have expressed the possibility of constructing an axiomatic system for
Euclidean geometry with these two basic notions, but that they, as far
as he knows, have not carried through this thought. Contro claims
that this statement shows that Brodén did not know of Pieri’s La
geometria elementare istituita sulle nozioni di punta e sfera from 1908,
where he does exactly this. Probably Brodén read of Pieri’s work in
Enriques’ article in Enzyklopädie der Mathematischen Wissenschaften,
which was written the year before Pieri’s 1908 article, and thus only
refers to his earlier work. Considering Veronese, Brodén probably refers
to Grundzüge der Geometrie, from 1894, which was a translation of
his 1891 book in Italian. It is not possible that Brodén and Veronese
were influenced by each other; Veronese’s Italian edition appeared af-
ter Brodén’s 1890 article, which he most certainly did not know of,
but before Brodén’s summary in Jahrbuch über die Fortschritte der
Mathematik appeared.
Brodén in neither of his articles mentions Moritz Pasch (1853–1930),
who in 1882 managed to develop a complete axiomatic system for pro-
jective geometry.18 This does, however, not indicate that Brodén had
no knowledge of Pasch’s work. But Brodén’s way of building up his
axiomatic system renders unlikely any direct influence of Pasch’s work
upon Brodén. For Pasch, the concept ‘between’ was of great importance
in building up projective geometry. Brodén cannot define ‘between’
until after Axiom VI, and he does not have to use the concept at all
throughout his system.
Characteristic for Brodén’s axiomatization of Euclidean geometry,
particularly for the 1890 system, but also for the 1912 version, is his
use of symmetries, the symmetric correspondence in the line and the
symmetric equivalence in the plane. It is unclear by whom Brodén
might thus have been influenced. Since Brodén, in 1890, gives careful
references concerning his discussion on the more philosophical questions
18
The work is reprinted in (Pasch, 1976), together with an appendix by Max
Dehn. The axiomatic system is investigated in detail by (Contro, 1976).
39
regarding the nature of geometry, but does not give any references
concerning his axiomatic system, and in particular his use of symme-
tries, this suggests that the latter was his own idea. The fact that, in
the congress article, he does not give any references to material that
preceeded his earlier work further supports this claim.
5. Conclusion
In 1912 Brodén claims that he anticipated Hilbert when he already in

his 1890 axiomatization of Euclidean geometry gave a formulation of
a completeness axiom. In this article I have investigated and analysed
what Brodén did in 1890 and I have compared this early work with his
1912 axiomatic system. I have also discussed its relation to Hilbert’s
work on Euclidean geometry. Furthermore, I have investigated Brodén’s
conception of geometry as outlined in his 1890 article.
Brodén seems to have trouble giving a philosophical justification for
his axiomatization. He has an empirical view of geometry and he wants
to obtain a theoretical basis for the fact that the external reality as
described by Euclidean geometry corresponds to experience. This idea
agrees with Helmholtz’ conception of Euclidean geometry as represent-
ing the only possible outcome of our spatial measurements. But, at the
same time, by appealing to Cantor, Brodén considers geometry to be a
priori. He claims that his axiomatic system is correct by referring to the
inherent consistency of reality. At the same time he declares that there
can be many possible geometries. It is a little difficult for the reader to
understand what status his particular axiomatization has among these
many other possibilities.
Brodén’s view of geometry as being a science that seeks to reduce
different relations to motion, guides him in his choice to reduce the
notions of geometry to ‘point’ and ‘immediate equality of distance’.
A similar choice of basic notions was made by Pieri in 1908. With
the help of the basic notions, Brodén develops the system of axioms.
Original in his axiomatic system is the use of symmetries. For example,
by performing reflections about two lines through a fixed point, he
rotates a line about that point. This seems to be an unusual approach
at that time.
Brodén in 1890 solved the problem of continuity of the line with
Axioms VI and VII, which make the line the same as the real numbers.
The real numbers by Cantor’s theory are complete and Archimedean,
and therefor so also is the line. However, in the 1912 congress article
Brodén, inspired by Hilbert, exchanges Axiom VII to the weaker Axiom
15, and Hilbert’s Archimedean axiom does no longer follow.
40 Johanna Pejlare
It is not possible to conclude from Brodén’s work that he anticipated

Hilbert. However, even though he is eclectic in his philosophy of geome-
try and did not possess the general concepts of a formal system, Brodén
still manages to present an axiomatic system of Euclidean geometry
that is quite remarkable.
Acknowledgements: I wish to thank Craig Fraser and the anony-

mous referees for their remarks which helped in improving the presen-
tation.
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Paper II
Visualizations in Mathematics ∗
Kajsa Bråting and Johanna Pejlare

Department of Mathematics, Uppsala University, Sweden
Abstract. In this paper we discuss visualizations in mathematics from a historical

and didactical perspective. We consider historical debates from the 17th and 19th
centuries regarding the role of intuition and visualizations in mathematics. We also
consider the problem of what a visualization in mathematical learning can achieve.
In an empirical study we investigate what mathematical conclusions university stu-
dents made on the basis of a visualization. We emphasize that a visualization in
mathematics should always be considered in its proper context.
Keywords: Visualizations, history of mathematics.
1. Introduction
In contemporary literature in mathematics education there is an on-

going discussion on how to use visualizations in mathematics. The
purpose of this literature is to suggest ideas about how mathematics
should become more easily accessible in learning contexts. For ex-
ample, David Tall (1991) has constructed computer based programs
which make visualizations of concepts such as gradients, integrals and
solutions to differential equations. According to Tall, students gener-
ally have very weak visualization skills in mathematics and the use of
computer based programs could be one way to improve the situation.
However, the use of visualizations in mathematics has also been criti-
cized. Historically, the status of visualizations has varied over the years.
For example, Paolo Mancosu (2005) argues that at the end of the 19th
century visual thinking in mathematics fell into disrepute since it can
be deceptive. He suggests that one reason could have been Weierstrass’
construction of a continuous but nowhere differentiable function. Before
this discovery, it was not an uncommon belief among mathematicians
that a continuous function must be differentiable, except at isolated
points. The reason for this was perhaps that mathematicians relied too
much on visual thinking. Nevertheless, as the development of visualiza-
tion techniques in computer science improved in the middle of the 20th
century, visual thinking rehabilitated the epistemology of mathematics
(Mancosu, 2005, pp. 13–21).
∗
Bank of Sweden Tercentenary Foundation and the Swedish Research Council.
2 Kajsa Bråting and Johanna Pejlare
In this paper we criticize some different views on mathematical visu-

alizations that focus too much on pictures independent of the observer.
In a historical study we investigate how some 19th century mathe-
maticians related to intuition and visual thinking in mathematics. For
example, Felix Klein (1893) made an attempt to construct an abridged
system of mathematics to avoid using results that he could not ver-
ify through naı̈ve intuition. Klein had a problem with visual thinking
versus the formal development of mathematics in the wake of Weier-
strass’ function. Moreover, we also consider the 17th century debates
between Thomas Hobbes and John Wallis regarding visualizations in
mathematics. One problem seems to be that they sometimes did not
base their arguments on mathematical definitions, instead they tried
to see the correct answer in the visualization. Another problem was
that at least Hobbes in some cases did not clearly distinguish between
mathematical objects and real objects.
Furthermore, we discuss the role of visualizations in learning con-
texts. Marcus Giaquinto (1994) argues that visual thinking can be
a means of discovery in geometry but only in restricted cases in el-
ementary analysis. However, we argue that it is not appropriate to
divide mathematics into ‘visible’ and ‘not so visible’ mathematics, re-
spectively. It is necessary to take into consideration what we want to
visualize and to whom. For example, the educated mathematician has
no problem of communicating through visualizations, nor the student
who has grasped the role these visualizations play in mathematics. For
a person who is not familiar with the relevant mathematical theory,
these visualizations may mean something completely different. Further-
more, we argue that mathematical visualizations do not have meaning
independent of the observer.
Through an empirical study of university students we further empha-
size the problem of drawing ‘correct’ mathematical conclusions on the
basis of visualizations. We also point out that mathematical concepts
may be difficult to understand in any other way than in mathematically
well-defined contexts.
2. Intuition in mathematics during the end of the 19th

century
2.1. Weierstrass’ function
Historically it was for a long time not uncommon to believe that ev-
ery continuous function must be everywhere differentiable, except at
isolated points. During the 19th century up to 1870 this was stated
Visualizations in Mathematics 3
and ‘proved’ in most of the leading textbooks in calculus (Hawkins,

1970, pp. 43–44). The ‘intuitively evident’ fact that a function that
varies continuously must be piecewise monotonic was used, and dif-
ferentiability and monotonicity were linked together. There was also a
belief in a close connection between the concept of a function and the
geometrical concept of a curve, which can be defined as the path traced
out by a moving point.
In 1872 Karl Weierstrass (1815–1897) constructed a function that
is continuous but nowhere differentiable. Weierstrass presented his re-
sult in a lecture for the Berlin Academy in July 18, 1872, but it was
first published by du Bois-Reymond in 1875. The existence of such a
function surprised many mathematicians.
Weierstrass constructed the following function:
!
f (x) = bn cos(an x)π
where x ∈ R, a is odd, 0 < b < 1 and ab > 1 + 3π/2. He proved

analytically that the limit function of this infinite sum is continuous
but nowhere differentiable. Weierstrass’ function was used to discredit
the role of visual representations in analysis since it is not clear what
the geometrical nature of the function may be.
2.2. The function strip
In the years following Weierstrass’ construction of a continuous but

nowhere differentiable function, there was a discussion on the role of
intuition in mathematics. A leading contributor to this debate was Felix
Klein (1849–1925). In an article from 1873 he discussed some ideas on
the inexactness of our intuition (Anschauung) of space. He wanted to
investigate how it is possible to use geometrical intuition in analytical
investigations. He considered this question to be of importance since
intuition is used in many areas of mathematics with great success. He
exemplified his ideas with the function concept. Klein claimed that, for
the function concept to be correct it has to be set free from intuition
and be defined on a purely arithmetical basis. However, he did not
consider this to have been done properly so far. This would be the
reason for the problems that were experienced with some functions, in
particular with the continuous but nowhere differentiable functions.
In the article Klein carried out an analysis of the function concept
and of the concept of an arbitrary curve. With a ‘curve’ Klein referred
to the graphical representation of a function. Thus, a curve does not
correspond directly to a function, since “the image, as well as its later
observations, is, as all activities of that kind, only of approximative
exactness” (Klein, 1873, p. 253). That is, a curve, as opposed to a
function, has a small but not negligible width. Thus, it is impossible to

consider the function exactly as a curve, he claimed.
Klein had an idea to develop a new formal mathematical concept
that would correspond directly to an arbitrary curve. So, instead of
trying to improve the visualizations of a function, that is, to draw better
curves, which he pointed out could never correspond exactly to the
function, he wanted to change the function concept, or develop a new
function concept, that would correspond exactly to the visualizations
we are actually able to make.
The new concept Klein introduced that would correspond to the
curve, he called the ‘function strip’ and it is a ‘function with a breadth’.
He denoted it y = f (x) ± ε, ε < δ − $, where δ is a real positive number
and $ is an indefinite real positive number smaller that δ. Thus, 2(δ −$)
corresponds to the width of the curve. The reason for him to choose $
to be indefinite was that he wanted the function strip to correspond to
the curve on the paper and thus he wanted the borders of the strip to
be indefinite.
The curve drawn on a paper will now, according to Klein, be the
physical realization of the function strip. With this new concept he
tried to develop an ‘exact mathematics of the inexact’. He considered
the function strip as a collection of functions that are approximatively
equal to each other and he considered a function to represent a strip if
all its values belongs to the strip. However, this function does not have
to be differentiable, not even continuous. Thus, Weierstrass’ function
could represent a strip.
2.3. Naı̈ve and refined intuition
In 1893 Klein continued to discuss limitations of our intuition of space.

He made a distinction between what he calls ‘naı̈ve’ and ‘refined’ in-
tuition in an attempt to explain these limitations. Naı̈ve intuition is
explained to be something that can be fallible and inexact. For example,
he claimed, if we imagine a line, we do not imagine ‘length without
breadth’, but a strip of a certain width, which is only approximately
equal to the mathematical line. Thus, the naı̈ve intuition is related to
the limits of visualizations. The refined intuition, on the other hand,
is not an intuition at all in the proper sense. Instead it is the result of
a logical deduction from axioms considered as exact truths. However,
the axioms are not arbitrary statements in Hilbert’s sense. They are
neither truths a priori, but are developed through an idealization of the
inexact data we receive through our naı̈ve intuition.
As an example of refined intuition Klein mentioned Euclid’s Ele-
ments, a theory carefully developed on the basis of well-formulated
axioms. However, he claimed that, just as most parts of mathematics,

Euclid’s geometry probably first went through a naı̈ve stage of devel-
opment before it was refined. Thus, there is a historical development
of mathematics from naı̈ve intuition to refined mathematics.
But there is also an interaction between naı̈ve and refined intuition
at a different level. Klein argued that it is always necessary to combine
naı̈ve intuition with axioms; naı̈ve intuition can never be set aside com-
pletely. According to him, we in daily life use visualizations that are not
exact; we visualize for example a strip of a certain width and not ‘length
without breadth’. We do not think of the mathematical point but of
something concrete. Klein did not believe that mathematics can be
built from axioms alone; the axioms and logic give a theory a skeleton,
but it is the intuition that gives life to a theory. The mathematical
discoveries depend on the naı̈ve intuition and are refined through the
logical deduction from the axioms. But mathematics can never be re-
duced to logic; the naı̈ve intuition cannot be totally discarded, not even
if the axiomatization is complete.
Klein also claimed that there are cases in mathematics when the
results cannot be verified by naı̈ve intuition. He developed an idea
of an abridged system of mathematics in an attempt to avoid using
these results that cannot be verified intuitively. This system would be
adapted to the needs of the applied sciences without passing through
the abstract mathematics.
Klein indicated that the naı̈ve intuition is important; there is a
need for informal thinking in mathematics. He had a problem with the
refined mathematics that he could not verify intuitively, such as Weier-
strass’ function. But he emphasized the importance of an interaction
between naı̈ve and refined intuition; the formal mathematics enrich the
informal naı̈ve intuition. However, it seems that he did not take any
observer into consideration, other than in a historical perspective. We
believe that Klein’s distinction between naı̈ve and refined intuition may
be adequate, but it must be dependent on the individual.
2.4. von Koch’s snowflake
The Swedish mathematician Helge von Koch (1870–1924) shed further

light to the conflict between mathematical intuition and Weierstrass’
function when he wrote:
Weierstrass’ example does not satisfy the spirit in geometrical re-
spects; because the function concerned is defined by an analytical
expression that hides the geometrical nature of the corresponding
curve in such a way that you cannot from this point of view see
why the curve does not have a tangent; you should rather say
that the appearance contradicts the present fact that Weierstrass

has established in a pure analytical manner (von Koch, 1906, pp.
145–146).
It appears that von Koch here did not distinguish between seeing and
understanding; he wanted to be able to see the mathematical results
to be able to understand them. This wish motivated him to find a
continuous but nowhere differentiable function where the geometrical
appearance agrees with this fact. The function he constructed is a
modification of the today well-known fractal known as von Koch’s
snowflake.
Like Weierstrass, von Koch constructed his function as the limit of
an infinite sequence of functions. The construction of the curve, which
is a third of the snowflake curve, is the following: let the first curve be a
segment of length 1; the second curve is obtained when the middle third
part is replaced by two sides of an equilateral triangle of side length
1
3 ; the third curve is obtained when the middle part of each segment is
replaced by two sides of an equilateral triangle of side length 312 ; and
so on. The result is not a curve of a function [0, 1] → R, but von Koch
constructed such a function through a simple modification; see Figure
1.
Figure 1. The construction of a third of von Koch’s snowflake curve and its
modification.
von Koch claimed that from the visual representation it would be

possible to see that the limit function was continuous but nowhere
differentiable. In the introduction to his article he refers to Klein’s
‘naı̈ve intuition’ with which von Koch claimed that it is possible to
understand the impossibility to draw a tangent at every point of the
curve. Apparently, von Koch wanted to connect Weierstrass’ result to
the naı̈ve intuition to get an understanding of the existence of contin-
uous functions that are nowhere differentiable. Furthermore, von Koch
emphasized that the possibility to illustrate the ‘geometrical nature’ is
important, in particular in the teaching of mathematics.
However, we want to point out that for a person who is not familiar
with the existence of continuous but nowhere differentiable functions,
it may not be so easy to see the impossibility of drawing a tangent to
von Koch’s curve as he claimed. It may possibly be easier to intuitively
understand that this function will be nowhere differentiable compared
to Weierstrass’ function, since in von Koch’s function more and more
singularities are added in every step, while in Weierstrass’ function only

differentiable functions are added. But how can we know for sure, just
by looking at the visualization, that in the limit von Koch’s function
will not be a smooth function? And how can we see that it will not ‘fall
apart’ and become discontinuous?
3. Debates on visual thinking in mathematics during the

17th century
3.1. The angle of contact
During the 17th century there was a debate among philosophers and
mathematicians regarding the angle of contact. The angle of contact,
which already occurred in Euclid’s Elements, appeared to be an angle
contained by a curved line (for example a circle) and the tangent to
the same curved line. Two of the questions in the 17th century debate
were the following:
1. Does there exist an angle between a circle and its tangent?
2. If such an angle exists, is it 0 or is it an infinitely small quantity
(or something else)?
a b
Figure 2. a) The angle of contact. b) The angle of contact ‘in proportion’ to another
angle of contact.
In 1656 the mathematician John Wallis (1616–1703) claimed that

the angle of contact was nothing, which was highly criticized by, among
others, the philosopher Thomas Hobbes (1588–1679) (Prytz, 2004, p.
11). Actually, this debate originated from an earlier discussion be-
tween Jacques Peletier (1517–1582) and Christopher Clavius (1537–
1612) (Peletier, 1563; Clavius, 1607).
According to Hobbes, it was not possible that something that we
actually could perceive from a picture drawn on a paper could be
nothing. Another reason why the angle of contact could not be nothing
was the possibility of making proportions in a certain way between
different angles of contact. Hobbes claimed:
[...] an angle of Contingence1 is a Quantity2 because wheresoever

there is Greater or Less, there is also Quantity (Hobbes, 1656, pp.
143–4).
This statement was perhaps based on Eudoxos’ theory of ratios,
which is embodied in books V and XII of Euclid’s Elements. Definitions
3 and 4 of book V states:
Definition 3. A ratio is a sort of relation in respect of size between
two magnitudes of the same kind.
Definition 4. Magnitudes are said to have a ratio to one another
which are capable, when multiplied, of exceeding one another (Heath,
1956, p. 114).
Hobbes, as well as Wallis, discussed the possibility of making pro-
portions between angles of contact on the basis of a picture similar
to Figure 2b above. Hobbes’ approach was to compare the ‘openings’
between two angles of contact. In Figure 2b there would be one ‘open-
ing’ between the small circle and the tangent line and another between
the large circle and the tangent line. Hobbes claimed that since the
former opening was greater than the latter, the angle of contact must
be a quantity because “wherever there is Greater and Less, there is also
quantity”. From this Hobbes concluded that the angle of contact was
a quantity (magnitude), and hence it could not be nothing.
However, in his A defense of the angle of contact, John Wallis (1685)
claimed that the angle of contact is of ‘no magnitude’. Furthermore,
Wallis (1685, p. 71) stressed that “[...] the angle of contact is to a
real angle as 0 is to a number”. That is, according to him it was not
possible, by multiplying, to get the angle of contact to exceed any real
angle. (Remember Definition 4 above.) He pointed out that an angle
of contact will always be contained in every real angle. However, he
stressed that what we see in Figure 2b is that “the smaller circle is
more crooked than the greater circle” (Wallis, 1685, p. 91).
Today this is not a problem since we have determined that the
answers to question 1 and 2 above are not dependent on the picture
drawn on a paper, but on which definition of an angle that we are using.
For example, in school an angle is defined as an object that can only
be measured between two intersecting segments (Wallin et al., 2000, p.
93). So the answer to question 1 above would then be ‘no’. However, an
angle can be defined differently. For example, in differential geometry
1
Hobbes used the term ‘the angle of Contingence’, instead of ‘the angle of
contact’.
2
Hobbes’ term ‘quantity’ can be interpreted as ‘magnitude’, which is used in for
example Euclid’s Elements.
an angle between two intersecting curved lines can be defined as the

angle between the two tangents in the intersection point. The angle of
contact would then be 0. Hence, the answer to the first question should
be ‘yes’ and to the second question ‘0’.
However, in the 17th century debate between Hobbes and Wallis
there seems to have been a tendency of relying too much on visualiza-
tions. Hobbes’, as well as Wallis’, position whether the angle of contact
existed or not, was based on what we can see (or not see) in pictures
such as Figures 2a and 2b. Hobbes argued that it could be seen that
one angle of contact had a greater ‘opening’ than the other. Meanwhile,
Wallis stressed that what we can see in Figure 2b is that the smaller
circle is more ‘crooked’ than the greater circle. The discussion of what
the picture above really was showing turned out to be problematic,
which perhaps was a result of an insecurity of how to relate to visual-
izations in mathematics during this time period. Whether we can see
angles of contact of different size, or more or less ‘crooked’ circles did
certainly not lead to any conclusion. Apparently, one essential problem
for Hobbes and Wallis was that their arguments were based too much
on what could be seen in the picture. To come across this problem, the
arguments have to be based on mathematical definitions. However, it
is not possible to find these definitions in the picture, so to speak. But,
we believe it is important to point out that a picture can certainly give
rise to the need of definitions.
3.2. Torricelli’s infinitely long solid
Another example of a debate from the 17th century is the debate

regarding ‘Torricelli’s infinitely long solid’. In 1642 the Italian mathe-
matician Evangelista Torricelli (1608–1647) claimed that it was possible
for a solid of infinitely length to have a finite volume (Mancosu, 1996,
p. 130). In modern terminology, one revolves for instance the hyperbola
y = x1 around the x-axis and cuts the resulting volume with a plane
perpendicular to the x-axis. Then one obtains, in ancient terminology,
an acutely infinitely long solid whose volume is finite. The techniques
that led Torricelli to the determination of the volume were provided by
Cavalieri’s theory of indivisibles (Mancosu, 1996, p. 131).
Mancosu stresses that Torricelli’s infinitely long solid was one of the
first examples which challenged the ancient idea that there could be no
ratio between the finite and infinite. Furthermore, Mancosu discusses
a debate between (among others) Hobbes and Wallis regarding Torri-
celli’s infinitely long solid. Hobbes insisted that all knowledge should
involve a set of self-evident truths known by ‘natural light’. He rejected
infinite objects, such as Torricelli’s infinitely long solid, since “we can
Figure 3. Torricelli’s infinitely long solid.
only have ideas of what we sense or of what we can construct out of

ideas so sensed” (Mancosu, 1996, pp. 145–146). Meanwhile, for Wallis,
Torricelli’s infinitely long solid was not a problem as long as it was con-
sidered as a mathematical object. Unlike Hobbes, it seems that Wallis
made a distinction between on the one hand mathematical objects and
on the other hand real objects. This is discussed further in Bråting and
Öberg (2005).
Torricelli’s infinitely long solid, as well as the angle of contact,
illustrates the fact that mathematical concepts may be difficult to
understand in any other way than in a mathematically well-defined
context. That is, there is no ‘royal road to mathematical knowledge’
and this means that there are limits to what visualizations can achieve.
4. What can visualizations achieve?
Marcus Giaquinto (1994) discusses whether it is possible to discover

truths in mathematics by means of visualizations. By discoveries he
does not mean scientific discoveries, but how one personally realizes
that something is true. He argues that visual thinking can be a means
of discovery in geometry but it can only in some restricted cases be
a means of discovery in elementary analysis. The reason why visual
thinking may be deceptive in analysis, he claims, is that basic concepts
in analysis involve limits of infinite processes.
It seems that Giaquinto makes some kind of distinction between
mathematics that can and cannot be discovered by means of visualiza-
tions. However, we are critical of this distinction, since we think that
it is necessary to take into consideration what we want to visualize and
to whom. The main problem with Giaquinto’s theory is that he does
not seem to consider who is supposed to make the discovery.
We will investigate Giaquinto’s claims by looking closer at one of his
examples. With this example Giaquinto wants to show that visualizing
the limit of an infinite process sometimes can be deceptive. He considers
the following sequence of curves: the first curve is a semicircle on a
segment of length d; dividing the segment into equal halves the second
curve is formed from the semicircle over the left half and the semicircle
under the right half; if a curve consists of 2n semicircles, the next curve
results from dividing the original segment into 2n+1 equal parts and
forming the semicircles on each of these parts, alternatively over and
under the line segment; see Figure 4. We can note that at those points
where two of the semicircles touch each other, we will have singularities.
The smaller the semicircles are the more singularities we get.
2
3
3
3 3
2
Figure 4. The sequence of semicircle curves.
Giaquinto claims that since the curves converges to the line segment,
the limit of the lengths of the curves appears to be the length of this seg-
ment. He points out that this belief is wrong, since the sequence of the
lengths of the curves will be πd πd πd πd
2 , 2 , 2 , 2 , ... and therefore converge
to πd2 . Furthermore, Giaquinto argues that this example lends credence
to the idea that visualizing is not reliable when used to discover the
nature of the limit of an infinite process.
However, it seems that Giaquinto does not take into consideration
that the interpretation of a visualization does not necessarily have
to be unique. We could for example in this case consider the limit
of the lengths of the curves, or we could consider the length of the
limit function. Depending on how we interpret the visualization we get
different results. If we look at the lengths of the curves and take the
limit we get the result πd2 . But if we instead consider the length of the
limit function, then the result is the length of the diameter, that is, the
result is d. Thus, depending on what question we want to answer we
have to interpret the visualization in different ways.
In the visualization of the semicircles much is left unsaid. The visu-
alization does for example not tell us to look for the limit of the lengths
of the curves or for the length of the limit function. We believe that
our mathematical experience, as well as the context, is important while
interpreting the visualization and ‘seeing’ the relation. Giaquinto does
not seem to take into consideration that people are on different levels of
mathematical knowledge, and that visualizations can certainly be suffi-
cient for convincing oneself of the truth of a statement in mathematics,

if one has sufficient knowledge of what they represent. A person with
little mathematical experience may not realize that the visualization
can be interpreted in more than one way, giving different results. With
experience we can learn to interpret the visualization in different ways,
depending on what is asked for. The more familiar we become with
mathematics the more we may be able to ‘read into’ the visualization.
Apparently Giaquinto believes that there exists a definite visual-
ization which reveals its meaning to the individual. However, we do
not believe that it is quite that simple. We argue that the individual
interacts with a mathematical visualization in a way which is better
or worse depending on previous knowledge and on the context. This
interaction is important and may even be necessary; the meaning of the
visualization is not independent of the observer. There will be a problem
if we forget the individual and presuppose that the visualization reveals
its meaning by itself.
5. An empirical study
In order to investigate if students may have problems to see the ‘correct’

mathematical conclusion in a visualization, we have done an empirical
study. The mathematical problem was based on von Koch’s snowflake
curve, which was discussed in Section 2.4. Recall that von Koch believed
that it was possible to see in the visualization that the limit function
is continuous but nowhere differentiable. However, our investigation
shows that, for students at least, this was not always that easy.
We gave thirtynine first year university students in mathematics the
following task:
Consider the following construction:
• Start with an equilateral triangle where each side has length 1.

• On the middle third of each of the three sides, build an equilateral triangle
with sides of length 1/3. Erase the base of each of the three new triangles.
• On the middle third of each of the twelve sides, build an equilateral triangle
with sides of length 1/9. Erase the base of each of the twelve new triangles.
• Repeat the process with this 48-sided figure.
Please answer the following questions as carefully as you can!

1. For how long can you repeat the process?

2. What figure will you get at the end? Is it continuous? Is it differentiable?
Most of the students did not have any problem with the first ques-
tion. However, the second question, gave rise to many different answers.
Sixteen of the thirtynine students thought that the ‘limit figure’ would
be everywhere smooth or everywhere smooth except at finitely many
points. Seven of these sixteen students answered that it would be a
circle or a square and nine that it would be a ‘flower’ (see figure 5).
Figure 5. Three common suggestions of what the limit figure would look like.
One of the latter nine students gave the following answer:

When you have received infinitely many small ‘spikes’, the ‘spikes’
are infinitely small and should then give a smooth curve. This curve
is both continuous and differentiable.
Fourteen of the thirtynine students did not think that the ‘limit
figure’ would be anywhere smooth. In fact, some of them were familiar
with the ‘snowflake’ curve. The remaining nine students did not give
answers that in any way were related to the task.
Although the students were familiar with mathematical concepts
such as continuity, differentiability and convergence, most of them were
not able to solve the ‘snowflake problem’. We would like to point out
that it is not enough to be acquainted with mathematical definitions
to be able to use them to solve difficult mathematical problems. The
‘snowflake curve’ is a typical example where it is necessary to use the
mathematical definitions in a ‘correct way’ to conclude that the ‘limit
figure’ is continuous but nowhere differentiable. Apparently, it is not
possible to draw von Kochs snowflake curve with such an accuracy
that you can suddenly see that the limit function will be continuous
but nowhere differentiable.
One can possibly conclude from the quotation above that this par-
ticular student may think that since the spikes are infinitely many and
infinitely small the curve will be ‘smoothened out’ and therefore the
singularities will disappear. Perhaps this student confused the figure
on the paper with the mathematical object. This is very similar to
understand that when we talk about circles, we can illustrate them
by drawing pictures on the blackboard, which are not circles them-
selves. This may of course also be difficult to small children, since they
would perhaps think that we are talking about the round thing on the
blackboard and not of a mathematical circle.
6. Discussion
A reason why a visualization can be problematic to an individual ob-

server is a simplified and limited view of what the picture actually
represents. This can be due to limited knowledge or limited experience.
Interpreting a visualization is more than just looking at a picture. Visu-
alizations leave much unsaid. For example, when drawing a line it is left
unsaid that it is a ‘length without breadth’. With enough experience
and familiarity with the mathematical theory, we can let the unsaid
become meaningful; we see that the line is without a width, the point
is without extension, and so on. We ‘read’ what is unsaid ‘between the
lines’ when interpreting the visualization.3 To see the mathematics in a
visualization, we obviously have to know some mathematics to be able
to know what to look for.
There is a distinction between what is clearly expressed and the
unsaid in a visualization. But it must not be forgotten that the dis-
tinction is not clear; the distinction depends on the context and on an
individuals experience. The less experience a person has, the more is
unsaid, which also limits understanding. With sufficient experience the
unsaid can be ‘read between the lines’. Standing outside the mathe-
matical community, much can seem to be unsaid and only indicated in
conversations between those belonging to the community. For example,
it may be quite easy for an experienced mathematician to conclude
using the visualization that the limit of von Koch’s snowflake will be
continuous but nowhere differentiable. Meanwhile, the students in our
empirical study had problems with this and suggested several differ-
ent answers. Most of the students did not seem to be experienced
enough to handle the tacitly understood ‘visual language‘ used in the
mathematical community.
Moreover, as already discussed, the meaning of the visualization is
not revealed by the visualization. We should take into consideration
that there is an interaction between the visualization and the individ-
ual. The visualization does not ‘live its own life’, so to speak. That is,
if a visualization is removed from its mathematical context, it loses its
meaning.
As we discussed in relation to the example of the sequence of the
semicircle curves in Section 4, a visualization can be interpreted in
3
Stenlund (2005) used this terminology in the context of spoken communication.
different ways. Thus, interpretation of visualizations are not necessarily

unique. Depending on the context and on what question you want to
answer, you may interpret the visualization in different ways. This prob-
lem also appears in connection with the angle of contact. Depending
on what definition we use, the angle will become 0 or it will not exist.
However, during the 17th century some mathematicians, for example
Hobbes and Wallis, had a tendency to base their arguments on visual
aspects instead; they tried to see the correct answer in the picture.
Our intention is not to criticize visualizations in mathematics. We
believe that, used in a proper way, visualizations can increase the un-
derstanding of mathematics. Furthermore, mathematical concepts may
in some cases originate from the physical world, that is, our ‘naı̈ve intu-
ition’ based on visualizations do give rise to a need for a mathematical
definition and thus will enrich mathematics.
Acknowledgements: We would like to thank Anders Öberg for many

valuable discussions.
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certaines questions de la théorie des courbes planes, Acta Mathematica, 30,
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the seventeenth century, Oxford University Press.
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Jörgensen, K. F. and Pedersen, S. A. (eds), Visualization, explanation and
reasoning styles in mathematics, Springer, 13–28.
Peletier, J. (1563). De contactu linearum.
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Wallis conception of quantities and angles. Licentiate thesis, Department of
Mathematics, Uppsala University, Uppsala, Sweden.
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to: Treatise of algebra, London.
Paper III
The role of intuition and images in mathematics and
mechanics: The cases of Felix Klein and Heinrich Hertz ∗
Johanna Pejlare
Department of Mathematics, Uppsala university
Abstract. In this paper certain aspects of the thinking of the two scientists Felix
Klein (1849–1925) and Heinrich Hertz (1857–1894) are studied. It is investigated how
Klein and Hertz related to the idea of naı̈ve images and visual thinking shortly before
the development of modern axiomatics. Klein in several of his writings emphasized
his belief that intuition plays an important part in mathematics. Hertz argued that
we form images in our mind when we experience the world, but these images may
contain elements that do not exist in nature. It is argued that Klein followed an old
tradition and wanted to save the visual elements and naı̈ve intuition as an essential
part of geometry and its origin. Hertz, on the other hand, wanted to clear out the
concrete visual elements as foundation for the concepts in modern mathematics.
Keywords: Felix Klein, Heinrich Hertz, intuition, images, axioms of geometry,

foundations of mechanics.
1. Introduction
The goal of this paper is to highlight certain aspects of the thinking

of two scientists, the mathematician Felix Klein (1849–1925) and the
physicist Heinrich Hertz (1857–1894). In particular, I discuss how they
related to the idea of naı̈ve images and visual thinking during the late
19th century, shortly before the development of modern axiomatics.
Furthermore, I investigate how they related to science and what they
thought about how a science should be built up.
During the end of the 19th century there was an extensive discussion
on the role of intuition in geometry and if physical space is Euclidean or
not. Already in the 17th century there was a debate among mathemati-
cians and philosophers regarding the ontological status of mathematical
objects (Mancosu, 1996, p. 149). One example that was discussed was
Evangelista Torricelli’s (1608–1647) claim from 1641 that if a branch
of the Apollonian hyperbola is revolved around one of the asymptotes,
an infinitely long solid with a finite volume is obtained. Torricelli’s in-
finitely long solid stretched the intuitive universe of geometrical figures
since it challenged the ancient idea that there could be no ratio between
the infinite and the finite. For example, Thomas Hobbes (1588–1679)
∗
Swedish Research Council and the Bank of Sweden Tercentenary Foundation.
2 Johanna Pejlare
insisted that we can only sense things of finite magnitude, and thus
we can have no conception of a thing when we say that it is infinite.
He further claimed that all knowledge must involve self-evident truths
known by “natural light” (Mancosu, 1996, p. 138).
As well as Torricelli, René Descartes (1596–1650) challenged ancient
dogmatism when he referred to the authority of the mind’s abilities
to treat new and classical geometrical problems with new algebraic
and geometrical concepts. Descartes made a classification of curves
by referring to them as being either geometrical or mechanical. This
classification rests upon our mind’s capacity of depicting a continuous
motion. With this classification, together with his new analytical tools,
Descartes managed to solve many problems that the ancients could not
solve using only ruler and compass. However, this way of introducing
geometrical entities and reasonings with reference to their clarity to the
mind may also be highly problematic, since it restricts the possibility
to solve some mathematical problems. Öberg (2007) argues that math-
ematics later paid a price in the sense that Descartes’ success depended
on his boldness of relying on what he could imagine.
As further discussed in (Bråting and Pejlare, 2007), there will be a
problem if mathematics is limited to expressing notions only referring
to their clarity to the mind. During the 19th century naı̈ve images in
mathematics became increasingly problematic when, for example, Karl
Weierstrass (1815–1897) in 1872 constructed a function that is contin-
uous but nowhere differentiable.1 The existence of such a function was
surprising since it challenged the naı̈ve way of thinking of mathematical
concepts, such as continuity and differentiability. It is not clear what
the geometrical nature of such a function may be and it was used to
discredit the role of visual representations in analysis (Bråting and
Pejlare, 2007, p. 3).
Another important mathematical contribution during the 19th cen-
tury is non-Euclidean geometry. The realization that the parallel axiom
could not be deduced from the other assumptions in Euclid’s geometry,
and that it could be replaced by an axiom contradicting it, implied
that Euclidean geometry was no longer the only possible geometry.
Thus, Euclidean geometry is not necessarily the geometry of physical
space. Immanuel Kant (1724–1804) had regarded geometry as synthetic
a priori, but with several possible geometries references may have to
be made to experience to decide which one describes the world. For
example, Hermann von Helmholtz (1821–1894) criticized Kant and
instead emphasized the empirical origin of geometry (Torretti, 1978,
1
Weierstrass’ result was first published by du Bois-Reymond in 1875. For an
interesting discussion on the history of pathological functions, see (Volkert, 1987).
3
p. 163). Another question of importance was to get clear about the

status of the remaining geometries.
Modern axiomatics, as we know it today, was developed by David
Hilbert (1862–1943) during the beginning of the 20th century. The
first edition of Grundlagen der Geometrie was published in 1899. In his
treatise, Hilbert built up Euclidean geometry from the undefined con-
cepts “point”, “line” and “plane”, and from a few undefined relations
between them. The properties of the undefined concepts and relations
are specified by the axioms. He systematically studied the mutual in-
dependence of the axioms by constructing models. He later turned his
attention to the axiomatization of physics and to the foundations of
mathematics in general.
Against this background I have in this paper studied the thinking
of Klein and Hertz at the end of the 19th century, that is, before the
modern axiomatics of Hilbert emerged. Klein wrote several articles on
his philosophical views of mathematics, emphasizing that his belief was
that intuition plays an important part in mathematics. For example,
he argued that geometry is the result of an idealization of our inexact
intuition of space, and he did not believe that mathematics can do
without naı̈ve intuition and visual aspects. Hertz insisted that we form
images in our mind when experiencing the world; since we can never
experience the world exactly, the image will simply be an image and
may contain elements that do not exist in nature. He developed his ideas
in the introduction of his book on the principles of mechanics, which
he worked on during the last years of his life. He had a considerable
influence on Hilbert’s concerns with the axiomatics of physics, both at
the methodological and the physical level (Corry, 2004). Hertz also in-
fluenced Hilbert’s thinking concerning the axiomatization of geometry;
as early as 1894 Hilbert referred to Hertz and his theory of images in his
lectures on the foundations of geometry (Hallett and Majer, 2000, p.
74). Furthermore, Hertz influenced Ludwig Wittgenstein’s (1889–1951)
philosophy of language and the critical method that he developed in
the Tractatus (Barker, 1980). Klein, on the other hand, had an interest
in educational questions and was deeply involved in transforming the
structure of mathematic thought at the German schools and universi-
ties. In 1895 he brought Hilbert to Göttingen and together they made
Göttingen the center of mathematics in Germany. Klein and Hilbert
also worked towards an integration of mathematics with other scientific
disciplines (Rowe, 1989, p. 186).
4 Johanna Pejlare
2. Felix Klein on Intuition in Mathematics
2.1. Axioms and Axiomatic Systems
Klein presented his view on intuition in mathematics and on the nature

of axioms in several writings during the 1890s and the beginning of the
20th century. He insisted that intuition is indispensable in geometric
discovery; a scientific geometry is built up from axioms, but intuition
lies at the root (Torretti, 1978, p. 147). Thus, he considered intuition
to be an important part of geometry and its origin. Furthermore, he
disagreed with the view that the axioms are arbitrary statements which
we set up as we please (Klein, 1909, p. 384).2 He also considered the
axiomatic method to have the general disadvantage not to stimulate
thinking (Klein, 1926, p. 336). According to Hermann Weyl (1885–
1955), Klein once said, regarding the axiomatic method:3
Suppose I have solved a problem; I have taken a hurdle or jumped a
ditch. Then you axiomaticians come around and ask: Can you still
do it after tying a chair to your leg?
This quote suggests that Klein rejected the axiomatic method as mean-
ingful in mathematical discovery. Nevertheless, he still recognized the
merits of the axiomatic method when in his book on the development
of mathematics in the 19th century he wrote:4
This abstract formulation is splendid for working out the proofs,
but is entirely unsuitable when it comes to finding new ideas and
methods; rather it represents the culmination of preceding develop-
ments.
Thus, Klein prompted Hilbert to publish his work on the foundations of
geometry in 1899 (Rowe, 1994, p. 193). Even though Klein’s emphasis
on the intuitive visualization of geometric ideas was in sharp contrast to
Hilbert’s axiomatic treatment of Euclidean geometry, Klein appreciated
the significance of Hilbert’s formal approach (Birkhoff and Bennett,
1988, p. 167).
Klein discussed three aspects of how the axioms should be chosen
and how the axiomatic system should be constructed (Klein, 1897, pp.
385–386). Central to his discussion is his views regarding the experience
of reality and the idea of concepts and axioms as idealizations of inexact
2
When it is possible, page numbers refer to Klein’s Gesammelte mathematische
Abhandlungen.
3
(Weyl, 1985, p. 16).
4
“Diese abstrakte Formulierung ist für die Ausarbeitung der Beweise vortref-
flich, sie eignet sich aber durchaus nicht zum Auffinden neuer Ideen und Methoden,
sondern sie stellt vielmehr den Abschluß einer voraufgegangenen Entwicklung dar”
(Klein, 1926, pp. 335–336). English translation from (Rowe, 1994, p. 192).
5
empirical data. He pointed out that experience takes a great part when
the axioms are coming into being, but he does not fully agree with
Helmholtz that the axioms originate from the experience alone. Instead
he claimed that:5
[...] the results of any observations are always only valid within def-
inite limits of exactness and under certain conditions; when we set
up the axioms we replace these results with statements of absolute
precision and generality.
Thus, Klein insisted that when we set up the axioms we have to take
experience into consideration. But the result of observations is inex-
act empirical data that are only valid within certain “definite limits”
and under special conditions. Therefore, it seems that his idealization
allowed a non-uniqueness in the results. Furthermore, he took the
standpoint that our conception of space has a lower threshold when
it comes to exactness. One reason for this, he claimed, is the way in
which our eyes are built up (Klein 1906, p. 247). It does not matter
how closely we look; depending on the constructions of our eyes we can
never experience reality exactly. He had discussed the inexactness of
our intuition of space already in 1873 in connection with the function
concept as a reaction to Weierstrass’ construction of a continuous but
nowhere differentiable function in 1872. Klein pointed out that, when
we think of a curve representing a function, it is not the exact function
we have in front of our eyes. Instead it is a strip of a certain small but
not negligible small width. Thus, for the function concept to be correct,
he claimed, it has to be set free from intuition (Klein, 1873, p. 214).6
Klein argued that the idealizations of empirical data take place
within the limits set by the threshold of exactness, and can be done in
different ways depending on the purpose (Klein, 1895, p. 236). When
the axioms are set up, he insisted, the inexact data are replaced, within
the limits, with absolute precision and universality (Klein, 1897, p.
386). For example, the “strips” of our intuition are replaced by width-
less lines and the concrete points are replaced by mathematical points.
The idealization is suggested by intuition but moves beyond it. In this
idealization of empirical data lies the true nature of the axioms, accord-
ing to Klein; he considered that when we have idealized the inexact data
into the axioms, these will be exact. However, neither did he believe
in the a priori truths of the axioms, nor did he discuss the meaning
of “true axioms”. Possibly he did not refer to the empirical evidence
5
“[...] die Ergebnisse irgendwelcher Beobachtungen gelten immer nur innerhalb
bestimmter Genauigkeitsgrenzen und unter partikulären Bedingungen; indem wir
die Axiome aufstellen, setzen wir an Stelle dieser Ergebnisse Aussagen von absoluter
Präzision und Allgemeinheit” (Klein, 1897, p. 386). My own translation.
6
For a further discussion on this, see (Bråting and Pejlare, 2007).
6 Johanna Pejlare
in accordance with Helmholtz as touched upon above: Klein did not

believe that the axioms directly corresponded to the empirical evidence.
For Klein an axiom is probably to be considered as a starting point in
the axiomatic system; it is not arbitrary but as soon as an idealized
axiom originating in inexact empirical data is set up, it is considered
to be true.
Another aspect that we have to take into consideration when the
axioms are chosen according to Klein, is that we have to avoid introduc-
ing inconsistencies when we build up the system (Klein, 1897, p. 386).
That is, it is not permitted to introduce a new axiom that contradicts
the other ones. Therefore it must be possible that our experience can
give rise to inconsistent axiomatic systems. In this respect Klein is in
contrast with Helmholtz; Klein probably, just as Helmholtz, considered
reality to be free from inconsistencies, but certainly the idealization of
empirical data can lead to inconsistencies. For example, an idealization
of empirical data can give rise to the parallel axiom of Euclid, but the
same data can also give rise to an axiom contradicting it (Klein, 1906,
249). Klein did not discuss this in any detail, but depending on how
we idealize the inexact empirical data a new axiom may be consistent
or not with the remaining axioms. If this was not the case, the aspect
of consistency would not have to be discussed in connection with the
geometrical axioms. Also not discussed by him is the correspondence
with reality, but it seems that, as long as the idealizations are done
within the limits according to the threshold of exactness and as long
as no inconsistencies are introduced, not only the axioms but also their
consequents will correspond to reality.
A third aspect of axioms and axiomatization that Klein discussed,
referring to Ernst Mach, is the “economy of thought”(Klein, 1897, p.
386). According to this, if there is a choice between two systems of
axioms that give necessary exactness when describing empirical data,
we should choose the less complicated one. However, Klein did not give
any further explanation on how such a choice should be made. But,
as a typical example he mentioned the choice between Euclidean and
hyperbolic geometry. The axioms of both geometries are in conformity
with our experience and both geometries are consistent and could thus
be used to describe reality. But for practical applications, Klein pointed
out, Euclidean geometry is easier to use and thus the hyperbolic ge-
ometry is rejected in favour of the Euclidean one. We don’t make this
choice because it is necessary, only because Euclidean geometry is less
complicated.
7
2.2. Naı̈ve and refined intuition
When Klein at the Evanston Colloquium7 in 1893 discussed the math-

ematical character of our intuition of space and the nature and limita-
tions of geometrical intuition, he made a distinction between what he
called “naı̈ve” and “refined” intuition:8
[...] the naı̈ve intuition is not exact, while the refined intuition is not
properly intuition at all, but arises through the logical development
from axioms considered as perfectly exact.
Naı̈ve intuition is characterized as something that can be fallible and
inexact. Naı̈ve intuition, Klein argued, was especially active during the
genesis of the differential and integral calculus, and he mentioned in
particular Newton who made the idea of motion fundamental in his
calculus. For example, Newton assumed the existence of a velocity of a
moving point in all cases. Therefore, Klein claimed, Newton did not con-
sider whether there might exist continuous but nowhere differentiable
functions (Klein, 1893, p. 223).
The refined intuition, on the other hand, Klein did not consider to
be intuition at all in the proper sense, but the result of logical deduction
from axioms that are considered to be exact. He exemplified the refined
intuition with Euclid’s Elements, a theory carefully developed on the
basis of well-formulated axioms (Klein, 1893, p. 223).
Also in 1895 Klein wrote on naı̈ve intuition and distinguished it from
intuition developed through logical deduction. He was convinced that a
refined theory is always preceded by a naı̈ve stage of development and
wrote that:9
[...] mathematical intuition, so understood [i.e., naı̈ve intuition], ev-
erywhere in its domain runs ahead of logical thinking, and therefore
has at all moments a wider scope than the latter.
He considered naı̈ve intuition to be an innate talent that precedes
logical thinking (Klein, 1895, p. 237). He also pointed out that within
most parts of mathematics the naı̈ve intuition comes first, and later
comes idealization and logic. Therefore refined intuition must be the
result of logical deduction from the axioms considered as idealizations
of empirical data received through experience or through our naı̈ve
intuition.
7
Klein held his Evanston lectures in connection with the World fair exhibition
in Chicago in 1893. The twelve lectures are published in (Klein, 2000).
8
(Klein, 1893, p. 226).
9
“[...] die so verstandene Mathematische Anschauung [d.h., naive Anschauung]
auf ihrem Gebiete überall dem logischen Denken voraneilt und also in jedem Mo-
mente einen weiteren Bereich besitzt als dieses” (Klein, 1895, p. 237). English
translation from (Glas, 2000, p. 79).
8 Johanna Pejlare
But Klein also argued for an interaction between naı̈ve and refined
intuition at a different level. He believed that it is necessary to combine
intuition with axioms and that there is an interaction between heuristic
reasoning on the basis of visualized structures and relations, and the
axiomatic method which delivers exact and rigorous proofs (Glas, 2000,
p. 79). He claimed that when imagining, for example, a point, we do not
picture ourselves an abstract mathematical point; instead we substitute
something concrete for it, which gives a naı̈ve definition holding only
approximately. This is not a refined definition, but according to Klein
in ordinary life and everyday mathematical activity we actually operate
with these “inexact definitions” (Klein, 1893, p. 226). Thus, in ordinary
life we do not operate with the idealized axioms, but with naı̈ve and
inexact empirical data.
In connection with this we could again consider the function concept
and the inexactness of our intuition of space as discussed by Klein in
1873. He argued that the function concept has to be set free from
intuition to be correct, that is, the naı̈ve concept of a curve should not
be included in the concept of a function. He also made an attempt to
develop a new refined concept, the “function strip” (Funktionsstreifen),
that is, a function with a width, that would correspond directly to the
naı̈ve concept of a curve. This indicates that Klein, at least in his early
career, had a belief that naı̈ve intuition we use in ordinary life in some
cases certainly can correspond to refined intuition.
Rowe argues that Klein’s approach to mathematics was profoundly
genetic and that he was convinced that the road to discovery, and
not the formal arguments, were of most importance (Rowe, 1989, p.
199). Thus, after it has been refined, the naı̈ve intuition still keeps its
special significance. This may possibly explain Klein’s belief that, in
the learning of mathematics, ontogeny recapitulates phylogeny:10
For whoever wants to enter into it must through his own labour
mentally recapitulate step by step the entire development; it is
by all means impossible to grasp even a single mathematical con-
cept without having mastered all the antecedent concepts and their
connections which led to its creation.
This quote together with Klein’s discussion on naı̈ve and refined intu-
ition, suggests that Klein was interested in what could later be called
a context of discovery of mathematics.
10
“Denn wer in sie eindringen will, muß in sich durch eigene Arbeit die ganze
Entwicklung Schritt für Schritt wiederholen; er ist doch unmöglich, auch nur einen
mathematischen Begriff zu erfassen, ohne all die davorliegenden Begriffe und ihre
Verbindungen in sich aufgenommen zu haben, die zu seiner Erschaffung führten”
(Klein, 1926, p. 1). English translation from (Glas, 2000, p. 81).
9
Furthermore, Klein rejected Pasch’s demand that the full intuitive

content of geometry could be expressed in the axioms (Klein, 1893, p.
228). Instead he insisted that in mathematical practice it is important
to combine naı̈ve and refined intuition:11
I find it impossible to develop geometrical consideration purely log-
ically, unless I have constantly before me the figure to which they
refer.
However, Klein also argued that there are cases where mathematical
results derived through logical deduction from axioms, and therefore
belonging to refined intuition, no longer can be verified through naı̈ve
intuition. One of the examples he brought up to illustrate this is an
example from the theory of automorphic functions (Klein, 1893, p. 227).
If a set of circles are given touching each other as in Figure 1, we can let
every circle be transformed by inversion in every other circle, forming
new circles. Thereafter, we can again let every circle be transformed by
inversion in every other circle. If this process is repeated indefinitely and
if the original points of contact between the circles in the first stage do
not lie on a circle, it can be shown, using analytical methods, that the
locus of all the points of contact between circles is a continuous curve,
but not analytic. Moreover, the points of contact form an everywhere
dense manifold, and at each intermediate point between the points of
contact, there is no determinate tangent.
Figure 1. A set of circles touching each other and the resulting curve.
According to Klein, it seems to be impossible to realize this result

using only naı̈ve intuition, even though the curve arises out of purely
geometrical considerations. This may contradict his earlier statement
that naı̈ve intuition is always in advance of logical thinking. One prob-
lem with this example may be that there is an infinite process involved;
we fail when we visually try to imagine the result. Bråting and Pejlare
(2007+) argues that visualizations may fail also in much simpler ex-
amples if the person does not possess enough experience or knowledge.
This seems to be a point which Klein did not take into consideration.
11
“Eine geometrische Betrachtung rein logisch zu führen, ohne mir die Figur, auf
welche dieselbe Bezug nimmt, fortgesetzt vor Augen zu halten, ist jedenfalls mir
unmöglich” (Klein, 1890, p. 381). My own translation.
10 Johanna Pejlare
2.3. Arithmetization of Mathematics
Around the end of the 19th century the term “arithmetization” was
used in order to describe various programmes providing non-geometric
foundations of analysis and other areas of mathematics (Petri and
Schappacher, 2007, p. 343). In view of the many mathematical ambigui-
ties he had cleared up, Weierstrass would later be considered the central
figure of arithmetization (Petri and Schappacher, 2007, p. 351). One of
the most well-known examples is his construction of a continuous but
nowhere differentiable function, a function whose existence may contra-
dict geometrical intuition. Three days after Weierstrass’ 80th birthday
in 1895, Klein gave a talk on arithmetization where he discussed his
own view on this.
According to Klein, the mathematics of the 17th and 18th centuries
does not exemplify the idea of a strictly logical system resting on it-
self, the paradigm example being Euclid’s Elements; in Klein’s view
this work described a refined theory founded on axioms considered as
idealizations of inexact empirical data. For example, Klein pointed out
that the mathematics of Newton and Leibniz originated in observations
of nature and in the intuition of space (Klein, 1895, p. 232). Also,
many mathematicians used the principle of continuity12 implicitly as
a foundation in proofs, and thus theorems that were possibly not true
were “proved”. A result of these incorrect proofs was a demand for ex-
clusively arithmetical proofs in mathematics. Klein considered himself
to live at a time where the development turned towards a more strin-
gent and rigorous mathematics where the unreliable intuition of space
was forced back. This is what Klein referred to as the “Weierstrassian
stringency” (Klein, 1895, p. 233).
Klein gave the development of the arithmetization of mathematics
his full acknowledgement. Nevertheless, in a similar manner as he re-
jected the understanding of the full intuitive content of geometry to
be contained in the axioms, he was critical towards the understanding
of arithmetic as containing the true mathematics. He wrote that the
significance of the arithmetization of mathematics lies in:13
[...] one the one hand, the total acknowledgement of the exceptional
importance of the development belonging to this, but on the other
12
For an interesting discussion on the history of the principle of continuity, see
(Kleiner, 2006).
13
“[...] einerseits die völlige Anerkennung der außerordentliche Wichtigkeit der
hierher gehörigen Entwicklungen, andererseits aber eine Zurückweisung der Auffas-
sung, als sei in der arithmetisierten Wissenschaft wie in einem Extrakt der eigentliche
Inhalt der Mathematik bereits erschöpfend enthalten” (Klein, 1895, p. 233). My own
translation.
11
hand, a rejection of the view that the real content of mathematics

is already exhaustively contained in the arithmetized science as an
essence.
The arithmetization of mathematics, where the intuition has been sup-
pressed, is, according to Klein, lifeless and can not stand alone. He
considered the arithmetization, just as the axioms, as the skeleton of
mathematics; the intuition of space is necessary in order to bring life
into the theory. In order to avoid uncertainties, such as false proofs
that all continuous functions are differentiable except at isolated points,
Klein agreed with Weierstrass that a logical sharpening of mathematics
is important; he pointed out that we have to lean against the arithmeti-
cal foundations and put mathematics through a new revision in order
to avoid these uncertainties. However, he rejected the view that the
arithmetical form of our thought is the goal. Instead he insisted that
we should not forget that mathematics cannot be treated exhaustively
through logical deduction; intuition of space needs to keep its special
significance (Klein, 1895, p. 234).
Furthermore, Klein argued that the arithmetization of mathematics
has as its original starting-point that the intuition of space is suppressed
(Klein, 1895, p. 234). He believed that it is important to connect the
results we get through an arithmetical course of action with intuition of
space. Thus, there must be an interaction between the naı̈ve intuition
of space and the refined arithmetized mathematics. As a result, we
practice our intuition of space that will be refined and at the same
time the analytical development will be illuminated.
Klein closed his 1895 address with a metaphor on mathematics as
a tree (Klein, 1895, p. 240): A tree lets its roots grow deep into the
soil and the branches are unfolding, giving shade. Neither the roots nor
the branches can be considered to be the most important part of the
tree. A botanist would say that the life of the tree is depending on an
interaction between its different parts. In the same way, Klein insisted,
mathematics depends on the interaction between the naı̈ve intuition of
space and the refined axiomatized and arithmetized theory.
2.4. A “new type” of Riemann surface
In his mathematical work Klein always made use of intuitive models for
“seeing” things in new perspectives (Glas, 2000, p. 80). One of the most
well-known examples of this is the Erlangen program, where he brought
the concept of group into geometry. His approach exemplified how less
visualizable geometries can be studied after a suitable transformation
into a “more intuitive” geometry.
12 Johanna Pejlare
Another example is Klein’s work in the 1870s on Riemann surfaces

(Klein, 1874; Klein, 1876) which originated in the study of algebraic
functions. In contradistinction to his mentor Alfred Clebsch’s (1833–
1872) more formal algebraic investigations, Klein wanted to connect the
analytical results and the geometrical Gestalt they described (Parshall
and Rowe, 1997, p. 168). In his intuitive approach he was dissatisfied
with the general possibilities to visualize algebraic functions y(x), which
in general can be done in two ways. One possibility is to represent x
and y as real coordinates in the plane and the image of the algebraic
function will be the algebraic curve. Another possibility is to let the
complex values of x be represented by the plane and to represent the
relation between x and y by the Riemann surface constructed on the
plane.
Klein considered both of these means of representations to be un-
satisfactory (Parshall and Rowe, 1997, p. 169): In the first case the
representation of the algebraic function is visually satisfying but in-
complete since only the real points on the curve are represented; in the
second case the image is complete but visually unsatisfying since the
Riemann surface is not embedded in three-dimensional space and since
it is impossible to visually study the relationship between the real curve
and the imaginary points of the function. Klein was dissatisfied with
these two ways of representing an algebraic function and he pointed out
that it is in many circumstances desirable to be able to easily transfer
between these two intuitive ways of understanding them, in order to
combine their advantages (Klein, 1874, p. 89). He also wanted to find
this connection in order to be able to understand the relationships
between the algebraic curve and the genus of the Riemann surface. In
order to get a better understanding of the underlying mathematics he
developed a new way of visually representing these functions (which he
believed to be closer in spirit to Riemann’s own way of thinking) to
acquire a naı̈ve intuition.
Klein argued that if the curve is considered as the envelope of its
tangents, such a transition can easily be created by constructing a
projective Riemann surface, which he called a “new type” of Riemann
surface. The idea is to associate a real point to each tangent, that
can be either real or imaginary. In general this is easily done. If the
tangent is real it is associated with the point of tangency. If the tangent
is imaginary it must somewhere intersect the real plane; this point
of intersection is the one the tangent will be associated with. Thus,
the imaginary tangent will be associated with the point of intersection
between itself and the conjugated tangent. If these two coincide in
one real tangent, Klein argued, the point of intersection will, when
the limit is taken, be the point of tangency. If a tangent has several
13
points of tangency, these conditions will be insufficient, but can easily

be generalized (Klein, 1874, pp. 89–90).
If all the real points associated with the algebraic curve are con-
sidered, they will form a closed surface, covering different parts of the
plane with a number of sheets. The number of sheets will always be the
same as the number of imaginary tangents that can be drawn from this
part of the plane to the algebraic curve and thus the number of sheets
covering each part of the plane will always be even. The constructed
surface will now be a complete image of the algebraic function, which
thus is visualized in a satisfactory manner. There is also a close connec-
tion between this surface and the ordinary Riemann surface, the only
differences being that straight lines in the projective Riemann surface
represent real isolated double tangents, and that real inflection tangents
in the ordinary Riemann surface are represented by two points (Klein,
1874, p. 90).
Figure 2. A cubic curve with two real components.
Illustrating his method, Klein carried out the construction of the

projective Riemann surface corresponding to conic sections, cubic func-
tions and functions of fourth order (Klein, 1874, p. 91–97). Considering
a case of a cubic function with two real components (see Figure 2), he
first concluded that the dual curve has class three and thus exactly
three tangents can be drawn to the curve from an arbitrary point in
the plane. It is easily realized that all three tangents from a point inside
the triangular branch or outside the oval branch are real, but there is
only one real tangent from every point in the region bounded by the two
components of the curve. Therefore there must also be two imaginary
tangents from every point in this region, and hence every such point
will be arranged to both of these tangents. As a result, this region
will be covered by two sheets, while there will be no sheet inside the
triangular branch or outside the oval branch. The resulting projective
Riemann surface hence can be considered as a torus.
The resulting torus is a complete and visually satisfying image of
the cubic function with two real components, since it is embedded in
three-dimensional space and both the real and the imaginary points are
14 Johanna Pejlare
represented. With this construction Klein claimed that he could easily

transfer between the algebraic curve and the Riemann surface. Further-
more, considering the torus constructed from the algebraic curve, it is
now also easy to intuitively understand that the genus of the Riemann
surface must be 1 in this case.
Klein had an urge to understand mathematical results in a visually
satisfactory manner. In the above example it seems that he used in-
tuitive arguments and naı̈ve images in his efforts to do this. However,
I would like to point out that he in this process did not necessarily
develop new mathematics, but rather a new perspective on how to
better understand already existing mathematical results. This shows
the importance of the interaction between the refined mathematical
theory and the naı̈ve and more visually satisfying aspects of mathemat-
ics: To get a deeper understanding of mathematics Klein insisted that
the visual arguments are indispensable. However, I do not think that
the above example necessarily agrees with Klein’s later philosophical
discussion regarding naı̈ve and refined intuition, where he claimed that
the refined theory is always preceded be a naı̈ve stage of development.
Instead, in this example, Klein was dissatisfied by an already existing
refined theory which urged him in developing a more naı̈ve and intuitive
understanding of the results. Thus, the interaction between naı̈ve and
refined intuition—if we should make such a distinction—is probably
much more complex than Klein considered.
2.5. The Development of Science
Intuition plays an important part in Klein’s mathematical activity. The

refined intuition is not intuition in a proper sense, but is the logical
deduction from exact and true axioms. The axioms are idealizations
of inexact empirical data, being the elements of the naı̈ve intuition.
According to Klein, there is constantly a dynamical interaction in the
individual between the naı̈ve and and refined intuition. The naı̈ve in-
tuition is necessary to give life and understanding to the mathematical
theory; through the naı̈ve intuition inspiration may be given for the
further development of mathematics, but a deeper understanding of the
already existing mathematics is also given through it. The refined intu-
ition, on the other hand, is the skeleton of the theory; formal proofs are
necessary. Therefore Klein appreciated Hilbert’s axiomatic treatment
of Euclidean geometry, and he gave his full acknowledgement of the
development of the arithmetization of mathematics. But he objected to
the trend of Weierstrass’ school to suppress intuition from mathematics
and rely only on arithmetical proofs. He considered mathematics to
become lifeless if the naı̈ve intuition was suppressed. Axiomatics was
15
only the culmination of preceding developments; for finding new ideas

and methods it is totally unsuitable. Thus, he saw a dynamical interplay
between naı̈ve and refined intuition at several levels as science develops.
3. Heinrich Hertz’s Theory of Images of Science
3.1. The Criteria of Images
In the Principles of Mechanics, which was published posthumously

in 1894, Hertz set himself the task to establish mechanics on new
foundations. He was dissatisfied with the concept of force, with the
assumptions of Newton’s laws and also with the energy formulation of
dynamics in terms of Hamilton’s principle. During this time there was
a confused discussion among physicists regarding the concept of force.
Hertz constructed an alternative system based on the primitive terms
mass, space and time and on the basis of these notions he was able to
give nominated definitions of force and energy.
In the introduction to the Principles of Mechanics, Hertz formu-
lated his thoughts on the foundations of empirical sciences. According
to Hertz, the most important problem for us to solve regarding the
knowledge of nature is the anticipation of future events; by making use
of knowledge of previous events we might draw conclusions from the
past to predict the future. To do this we have to build up a scientific
theory describing reality, in which we can deduce events. When we
build up this theory we “form for ourselves images or symbols of exter-
nal objects” (Hertz, 1894, p. 1/1).14 If the scientific theory provides a
sufficiently good image of reality, then we can predict events that in the
external world will occur after a certain time, that is, we can predict
the future. Hertz considered experience to be important in this process,
since there must be conformity between our thought and reality; with
accumulated experience we might succeed in forming an image such
that the necessary consequents of the image are always the images of
the consequents in nature.
However, according to Hertz, images are not necessarily unambigu-
ous; it is possible to form different images of the same objects. He
pointed out that images can be more or less appropriate in different
respects; comparing them to each other, we can choose the most appro-
priate one. He stated three criteria he considered an image must fulfill
14
The first page number refers to the page number in the 1910 edition of the
Prinzipien der Mechanik that constitutes the third volume of Hertz’s Gesammelte
Werke, and the second page number refers to the page number in the 1956 English
translation.
16 Johanna Pejlare
and on the basis of which we can compare different images with each
other (Hertz, 1894, pp. 2–3/2):
Firstly, an image must be logically “permissible” (logisch zulässig),
that is, all images must agree with the laws of our thought. An image
is either permissible or not, and when permissibility once has been
confirmed it will hold for all time.
Secondly, a permissible image will be “correct” (richtig) if the essen-
tial relations of the image will not contradict the relations of external
things, and if the necessary consequents of the image is the image of
the consequents in reality. An image is either correct or not according
to our present experience. An image that today is correct might with
future experience, when we know more regarding the consequents in
reality, no longer be so.
Thirdly, we can compare two correct images of the same object
or phenomenon regarding appropriateness. Of two images, the more
“appropriate” (zweckmässig) one is the more “distinct” (deutlich), pic-
turing more of the essential relations of the object. If the two images
are equally distinct, the “simpler” (einfach) one, containing the smaller
number of superfluous or empty relations, will be the more appropriate.
The empty relations can never be totally avoided since the image is sim-
ply an image produced by our mind. The appropriateness of the image
is contained in the notations, definitions and abbreviations. It is not
possible to decide if an image is appropriate or not by itself; depending
on the purpose different images may be more or less appropriate. By
gradually testing different images we can obtain the most appropriate
one.
Corry argues that Hertz’s requirement of permissibility is similar to
Hilbert’s requirement for consistency of an axiomatic system (Corry,
2004, p. 96). This may well be the case, considering Hertz’s concern
about the possibility of introducing contradictions in mechanics by the
addition of new hypotheses of the theory. Furthermore, Corry argues
that the source of knowledge referred to by the permissibility of an
image is the mind (Corry, 2004, p. 57). According to Hertz, permissi-
bility can be established once and for all, implicitly taking logic to be
given a priori. However, since images are created by thinking, it to me
seems impossible for an image not to be permissible; otherwise it must
contradict the laws of the mind by which it was created.
The source of knowledge referred to by the correctness of an image
is the experience. Thus, the correctness of an image depends on the
present state of experience and may change over time. According to
Corry, correctness runs parallel to Hilbert’s demand for completeness,
that is, all the known facts of a mathematical theory may be derived
from its system of postulates (Corry, 2004, pp. 95–96). Lützen gives
17
the same interpretation (Lützen, 2005, p. 289); however, he also argues

that completeness corresponds to “perfect distinctness” (Lützen, 2005,
p. 94), that is, the image “contains all the characteristics which our
present knowledge enables us to distinguish in natural motions” (Hertz,
1894, p. 12/10). It is argued by Corry that appropriateness, that is,
distinctness and simplicity, was echoed by Hilbert’s requirement of
independency of the axioms (Corry, 2004, p. 95). Hilbert provided the
tool of constructing models to prove the mutual independence among
the axioms. On the other hand, to me it seems that appropriateness is
mainly a means for Hertz to choosing between different images; since
the image is just an image and we never can experience the world
completely, we cannot create the perfectly appropriate image.
In the Grundlagen der Geometrie Hilbert did not include a criterion
of completeness, but a completeness axiom (“Axiom der Vollständig-
keit”) which should not be confused with the later model-theoretical
notion.15 This axiom did not state new facts and did not introduce new
properties of geometry. Instead it said something about the relation
between the axiomatic system and the set of objects that may satisfy it
(Torretti, 1978, pp. 233–234). This is very similar to Hertz’s criterion of
correctness. Correctness links the image to experience, makes sure that
there is a certain correspondence between the image and the external
world, but does not say anything regarding the structure of the image.
Therefore I agree with Corry in the interpretation of correctness as
similar to completeness. Moreover, regarding independency, I believe
that Corry is correct, at least in the sense that Hertz’s term “simplicity”
is similar to Hilbert’s criteria of independence.
Furthermore, Hilbert introduced the requirement of simplicity in
the Grundlagen der Geometrie, being more of an aesthetic criterion,
roughly saying that an axiom should contain “no more than a single
idea” (Corry, 2004, p. 95). Corry claims that Hertz also explicitly
formulated this criteria. It is not clear to me what part of Hertz’s
image theory Corry refers to. Possibly he refers to Hertz’s demand
of choosing the simpler one of two equally distinct images. However,
for Hertz the simpler image contains a smaller number of superfluous
or empty relations. This does not seem to have anything to do with
Hilbert’s idea of an axiom containing “no more than a single idea”.
15
The completeness axiom was not included in the first edition of the Grundlagen
der Geometrie from 1899, but Hilbert included it in the second edition from 1903.
It stated that: “To systems of points, straight lines, and planes, it is impossible to
add other elements in such a manner that the system thus generalized shall form a
new geometry obeying all of the five groups of axioms [...]” (Hilbert, 1950. p. 25).
18 Johanna Pejlare
3.2. The Concept of Force
One part in Hertz’s work to reformulate the classical mechanics was

to clean out concrete intuitive elements as foundation of the concepts.
This is most obvious in his intention to avoid the concept of force,
which he considered to be based on intuition and thus to be an unfa-
miliar element of modern mechanics. He carried out a critical discussion
about the concept of force as it appears in the traditional description
of mechanics, known as Newton’s mechanics (Hertz, 1894, pp. 5–16/4–
14). Newton’s mechanics is based on the four basic notions of space,
time, force and mass and on Newton’s three laws of motion:
1. (Law of inertia) An object at rest will remain at rest unless acted
upon by an external and unbalanced force. An object in motion will
remain in motion unless acted upon by an external and unbalanced
force.
2. (Law of acceleration) The rate of change of momentum of a body
is proportional to the resultant force acting on the body and is in
the same direction.
3. (Law of reciprocal actions) All forces occur in pairs, and these two
forces are equal in magnitude and opposite in direction.
Since force and not motion is considered as a basic notion, force
will be the cause of motion. But, according to Hertz, this point of view
will lead to problems, since it is easy to construct an example where
motion will be the cause of a new force (Hertz, 1894, pp. 6–7/5–6). If,
for example, we swing a stone tied to a string in a circle, we exert a
force upon the stone, constantly deflecting the stone from its straight
path. Through experiments we find that the motion of the stone is in
accordance with Newton’s second law, but according to Newton’s third
law, the stone must exert an equal but opposite force on the hand,
the so-called centrifugal force. But Hertz ruled out that the centrifugal
force is a force, since it can not be anything else than the inertia of the
stone and the effect of inertia should not be taken twice into account,
first as mass and then as force. Furthermore, he pointed out, we can
not consider motion as the cause of force without confusing our ideas
of the concepts. But having ruled out the centrifugal force as a force,
he was left without an answer to what force the stone exerts on the
hand according to Newton’s third law.
Hertz’s belief was that the origin of the difficulties regarding the
concept of force lies in the choice of fundamental laws (Hertz, 1894, p.
7/6). He discussed the problem that the concept of force in the first
two laws is slightly different from the concept of force in the third law;
19
in the first two laws the force acts upon a body in one direction, but
the content of the third law is that the force connects two bodies and is
directed from the first body to the second as well as from the second to
the first. He argued that these two slightly different concepts of force
may be enough to cause confusion.
It seems that the nature of force is mysterious, but Hertz did not
agree with the statement that further investigation of it is one of the
main problems of physics; he did not believe that empirical investi-
gations would solve the problem regarding the nature of force. In a
metaphor he discussed the nature of gold, which he did not consider
to be a mystery in the same sense as the nature of force is a mystery
(Hertz, 1894, p. 9/7). The reason for this, he pointed out, is not that
the nature of gold is better known to us than the nature of force;
we can never render the nature of a concept completely. Instead, he
insisted, in the relations of the nature of gold to other terms there are
no contradictions confusing us, and thus, even if the nature of gold is
not completely known, we are satisfied. Regarding the nature of force,
he continued, there are contradictions among the relations to other
terms. However, the solution to this problem is not to seek further
relations, he claimed, since:16
[...] we have accumulated around the terms “force” and “electricity”
more relations than can be completely reconciled amongst them-
selves. We have an obscure feeling of this and want to have things
cleared up. Our confused wish finds expression in the confused
question as to the nature of force and electricity. But the answer
which we want is not really an answer to this question. It is not
by finding out more and fresh relations and connections that it can
be answered; but by removing the contradictions existing between
those already known, and thus perhaps by reducing their number.
When these painful contradictions are removed, the question as to
the nature of force will not have been answered; but our minds, no
longer vexed, will cease to ask illegitimate questions.
16
“Auf die Zeichen ‘Kraft und ‘Elekricität aber hat man mehr Beziehungen
gehäuft, als sich völlig mit einander vertragen; dies fühlen wir dunkel, verlangen
nach Aufklärung und äußern unsern unklaren Wunsch in der unklaren Frage nach
dem Wesen von Kraft und Elektricität. Aber offenbar irrt die Frage in Bezug auf die
Antwort, welche sie erwartet. Nicht durch die Erkenntnis von neuen und mehreren
Beziehungen und Verknüpfungen kann sie befriedigt werden, sondern durch die
Entfernung der Widersprüche unter den vorhandenen, vielleicht also durch Ver-
minderung der vorhandenen Beziehungen. Sind diese schmerzenden Widersprüche
entfernt, so ist zwar nicht die Frage nach dem Wesen beantwortet, aber der nicht
mehr gequälte Geist hört auf, die für ihn unberechtigte Frage zu stellen” (Hertz,
1894, pp. 9/7–8).
20 Johanna Pejlare
Thus, Hertz, argued, instead of seeking for further relations, we have

to be satisfied with less relations. By removing the relations giving rise
to contradictions, no contradictions will appear to confuse our mind.
Hence, he did not solve the problem regarding the nature of force, but
he resolved the question regarding it since no confusion will appear
anymore.
Hertz was critical regarding the concept of force as a basic notion
in Newton’s mechanics, since this is the origin of the confusion that
appears. Nevertheless, he considered Newton’s mechanics to be permis-
sible (Hertz, 1894, pp. 9–10/8–9). According to Hertz, it is only in the
concept of force that the confusion appears; no contradictions appear
in the relations between the concepts of the image corresponding to the
relations between the phenomena in reality.
Furthermore, Hertz claimed that Newton’s mechanics is correct ac-
cording to present experience, since the consequents of the image are
the images of the consequents in reality of the things that are depicted
(Hertz, 1894, pp. 11/9–10). He however pointed out that with more
experience in the future we have to return to the question regarding
correctness of the image.
Since Newton’s mechanics is correct it can be compared to other
images regarding appropriateness, that is, regarding distinctness and
simplicity (Hertz, 1894, pp. 12–16/10–13). Hertz did not consider New-
ton’s mechanics to be a perfectly distinct image, since the fundamental
laws admit motions that do not occur in reality. Regarding simplicity,
he returned to the idea of force. According to him, the concept of force
was problematic and only an empty relation that could be eliminated
from the basic concepts of mechanics without altering the theory. The
metaphor he used is that of an “idle wheel”:17 the empty relation of
force can be removed from the theory or ‘machine’ without altering
its function. Thus, he argued, by removing the idle wheels we will no
longer raise questions about the nature of force.
3.3. Hertz’s Image of Mechanics
As already pointed out, Hertz considered it to be problematic to in-

troduce force as a fundamental concept because of its confusing ap-
17
In the German edition Hertz used “leergehenden Nebenräder” which was
translated into “sleeping partners” in the English edition. Maxwell used a similar
metaphor in 1890 when he used the term “idle wheel” for hypothetical particles
moving without friction (Kjaergaard, 2002, p. 140). The idle wheel metaphor inspired
Wittgenstein with his critical method of the Tractatus in calling for the elimination
of ‘empty relations’ and solving the problems of philosophy through finding the
source of the confusion and resolve the questions instead of trying to answer them
(Barker, 1980, p. 249).
21
pearance. To avoid the problems that appear, he developed his own

image of mechanics emanating from the three fundamental concepts
time, space and mass. In 1884 he had read Ernst Mach’s (1838–1916)
historio-critical Die Mechanik in ihrer Entwicklung and agreed with
him in rejecting force as a fundamental concept in physics (Blackmore,
1972, p. 119). Mach had tried to retain a phenomenalistic equivalent
derivative of force in his definition of mass. Hertz, on the other hand,
wanted the notion of force to be eliminated from physics altogether.
However, the three fundamental concepts time, space and mass are
not sufficient for deducing the complete mechanics and thus requires
some complement. In contrast to Mach, who did not allow the introduc-
tion of any theoretical concepts that were not connected to anything
observable, Hertz did not consider it to be sufficient to take only what
is immediately obvious to our senses into account when we try to
understand the movement of bodies. One reason for this view was
that he insisted that the actual universe must be greater than what is
revealed to us; we have to admit that something is hidden to us (Hertz,
1894, p. 30/25). Hertz presupposed invisible things being concealed
masses meeting the same laws as the visible masses; they differ from
the visible ones only in the way they interact with our sensory system.
The concealed mass is the extra hypothesis Hertz needed to be able to
construct his alternative image of mechanics. What we usually refer to
as force, and also energy, will in this system be caused by the motion
of ordinary and concealed masses.
Hertz combined the fundamental concepts in one single “fundamen-
tal law” summarizing the usual law of inertia and Gauss’ principle of
least constraint:18
Every free system persists in its state of rest or of uniform motion
in a straightest path.
From this principle, together with the hypothesis of concealed masses
and the ordinary connections, Hertz showed that the usual formulations
of mechanics, that is, Newton’s, Lagrange’s and Hamilton’s, can be
deduced by purely deductive reasoning. However, Hertz argued, it will
turn out to be convenient to introduce the idea of force into the system.
But he pointed out that force will now not be anything independent
of us as in Newton’s mechanics; instead it will be a mathematical
construction which we have total control of. Thus, force will not be
mysterious anymore and it can with the same justification be considered
as the cause of movement as movement can be considered as the cause
of force (Hertz, 1894, p. 34/28).
18
“Jedes freie System beharrt in seinem Zustande der Ruhe oder der gle-
ichförmigen Bewegung in einer geradesten Bahn” (Hertz, 1894, p. 162/144).
22 Johanna Pejlare
At the end of the introduction, Hertz discussed his image of mechan-

ics with respect to permissibility, correctness and appropriateness, and
compared it with Newton’s image (Hertz, 1894, pp. 39–49/33–41). Just
as Newton’s mechanics, he considered his image to be permissible, since
he regarded it as in itself conclusive, pure and free from contradictions.
He considered his image to be correct, at least according to present ex-
perience, and thus it can be compared to Newton’s image with respect
to appropriateness. In this respect, he gave the two images an equal
status if it is assumed that the advantages of both of them in different
directions are of equal value.
After this discussion Hertz returns to the question of correctness. He
observed that, regarding correctness, only one of the two images can be
correct, referring to future experience (Hertz, 1894, pp. 48–49/40–41).
This is the case, he claimed, since in Newton’s mechanics relative accel-
erations of masses are assumed, and from them fixed relations between
their positions can only be deduced approximately. In his own image,
on the other hand, fixed relations between positions are assumed, and
from these invariable relative accelerations between the masses can only
be deduced approximately. He concluded that both images can not
be simultaneously correct, and future experience may decide between
them; if natural motions could be perceived with sufficient accuracy,
we would know if relative acceleration or relative relation of position,
or possibly both, are only approximately invariable.
According to Hertz, we could favour Newton’s mechanics, since re-
garding actions at a distance, relative accelerations can be exhibited,
that appear to be invariant up to the limits of our observation, whereas
the fixed relations between the positions of bodies are perceived by our
senses to be only approximately constant. But he claimed that, with
more refined knowledge, the situation may change. With the assump-
tion of invariable distance-forces only a first approximation to the truth
is yielded. If the actions-at-a-distance is traced back to motion in a
medium whose smallest parts are subjected to fixed (rigid) connections,
a second approximation to the truth can be attained and evidence will
be in favor of Hertz’s image of mechanics.
3.4. The Development of Science
Hertz had a completely different philosophy of geometry of space com-

pared to Klein. In the Principles of Mechanics he clearly expressed
his Kantian view when he claimed that space and time are a priori
truths and that our inner intuition of space is Euclidean (Hertz, 1894,
p. 53/45). This belief may be remarkable at a time when non-Euclidean
geometries are well-known. As a student of the empiricist Helmholtz,
23
Hertz was well acquainted with non-Euclidean geometries and thus it

seems strange that Hertz in accordance with Kant claimed that space is
Euclidean a priori. This may at first also seem to fit badly with Hertz’s
theory of images, which may indicate that we could form non-Euclidean
images of space. The background to Hertz’s view is probably that he
considered Euclidean geometry to be an a priori assumption for our
concrete understanding of space. Thus, we would need a priori intuition
of Euclidean space space to be able to form different images of objects.
This is very different from considering geometry to be idealizations
from our concrete understanding of space, as Klein did. The Kantian a
priori intuition seems to be the only intuition that Hertz relied on. In
his image of mechanics, for example, concealed masses not connected to
any observable phenomena and thus not being based on visual intuition,
is a fundamental concept.
Hertz concept of images is not visual since the way of forming images
of empirical phenomena is not based on visual similarities, but on the
fundamental concepts and principles of mechanics. The reason for him
to use the word “image” probably is that an image has a direct connec-
tion to what is depicted: the relations of the image must be conform
with the relations of the external objects.
According to Hertz, science develops when we form better and better
images. When we create an image its permissibility will either be sat-
isfied or not. However, the correctness can, with increased experience,
become false even if it with earlier experience was true, since with in-
creased experience we know more about the consequents of the objects
in reality that we create images of. Thus, we can revise our image such
that the consequents of the image corresponds to the consequents in
reality. With experience we can also create more appropriate images
and thus science will develop.
4. Concluding Remarks
In this paper I have studied the philosophical views of two very different
scientists at a time shortly before the development of modern axiomat-
ics. As I see it, Klein’s thoughts are deeply connected with his interest
in educational questions and his wish to integrate different areas of
mathematics for “seeing” things in new perspectives. He followed an
old tradition and wanted to save the visual elements and naı̈ve intuition
as an essential part of geometry and its origin. He had, in contrast
to Hilbert, a genetic view on mathematics. Understanding, to Klein,
is to a large extent understanding the subject through its historical
development.
24 Johanna Pejlare
Hertz, in contrast to Klein, wanted to clear out the concrete visual

elements as a foundation of the concepts in modern mathematics. This
becomes obvious, for example, in his discussion on the concept of force
and his permitting of concealed masses, not having any connection
to our sensory system. Hertz’s images are not connected to anything
visual; instead they are formal. His way of forming images of empirical
phenomena does not depend on visual similarities but on the fundamen-
tal concepts and the principles of mechanics. This shows a similarity
to the modern axiomatics later developed by Hilbert. Furthermore,
Hertz did not seem to have an interest in the “context of discovery” of
mechanics. Instead it seems that he considered it to be in the applica-
tions of the theory that problems and ideas leading to new discoveries
emerge. As we have seen, both Klein and Hertz had an influence on their
contemporaries in general, and Hilbert in particular, but in different
directions.
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On Axioms and Images in the History of Mathematics

Article · January 2008

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On Axioms and Images

Keywords: History of mathematics, axiomatization, intuition, visualization, images, Euclidean

Johanna Pejlare, Department of Mathematics, Box 480, Uppsala University, SE-75106

This thesis is based on the following papers:

I Pejlare, J. (2007). Torsten Brodén and the foundations of Eu-

Modern axiomatics, as we know it today, was developed by David Hilbert

2.1 Summary of Paper I

2.2 Summary of Paper II

2.3 Summary of Paper III

I den här avhandlingen diskuteras aspekter av axiomatisering, åskådning och

Avellone, M., Brigaglia, A., Zappulla, C. (2002). The Foundations of

Bolyai, J. (1832). Appendix, scientiam spatii absolute veram exhibens a

Bolyai, W., Bolyai, J. (1913). Geometrische Untersuchungen. Translated by

Brodén, T. (1890). Om geometriens principer. Pedagogisk Tidskrift, 26,

Brodén, T. (1912). Ett axiomsystem för den euklidiska geometrien. Beretning

Contro, W. (1976). Von Pasch zu Hilbert. Archive for History of Exact

Corry, L. (2004). Hilbert and the Axiomatization of Physics (1898–1918):

Eves, H. (1990). Foundations and Fundamental Concepts of Mathematics.

Gauss, C. F. (1973). Werke. Achter Band. Hildesheim: G. Olms Verlag.

Glas, E. (2000). Model-based reasoning and mathematical discovery: the

Hilbert, D. (1899). Grundlagen der Geometrie. Festschrift zur Feier der

Kline, M. (1972). Mathematical Thought from Ancient to Modern Times. New

Lobachevsky, N. I. (1829-1830). O nachalakh geometrii, Kasanski Vestnik,

Marchisotto, E. A. (1993). Mario Pieri and His Contributions to Ge-

Mancosu, P. (2005). Visualization in logic and mathematics. In: P. Mancosu,

Pasch, M. (1882). Vorlesungen über neuere Geometrie. Leipzig: Druck und

Pasch, M. (1976). Vorlesungen über neuere Geometrie. Zweite Auflage, mit

Torretti, R. (1978). Philosophy of Geometry from Riemann to Poincaré.

Volkert, K. (1987). History of pathological functions—on the origins of

Abstract. The Swedish mathematician Torsten Brodén (1857-1931) wrote two

Keywords: Torsten Brodén, Euclidean geometry, foundations of geometry, ax-

The axiomatic system of Euclidean geometry that has gained most

discussion, with one exception. The Swedish mathematician Torsten

taught at the universities on the continent, and, on the other hand,

2. Brodén’s 1890 paper

2.1. Brodén’s Conception of Geometry

Brodén’s first article on the axiomatization of geometry was published

p. 219). In this way, Brodén claims, Euclidean geometry becomes an a

2.2. Pedagogical Motivation

Brodén’s aim with his 1890 article appears to be to take part in a

2.3. The Axiomatic System

Brodén considers the goal of science to be to obtain a clear insight

To be able to define the straight line Brodén now discusses the

Definition The point corresponding to itself in the correspondence

To exclude finite geometries, Brodén has to include axioms which,

Axiom VI On the straight line there is a system of points such

zero-point and the midpoint between A and B is chosen as one-point,

This method, Brodén continues, can easily be generalized so that

The axiom talks of a “mutually unambiguous correspondence” be-

Axiom VIII On every line through an arbitrary point P there

After introducing the plane, it is now plausible for Brodén to seek

Axiom XV Through three arbitrarily chosen points in space there

2.4. The Proof of Sufficiency

Definition A self-corresponding line that joins two points that corre-

Brodén further claims (again without giving a proof) that, through