SSRN Id1424591
SSRN Id1424591
SSRN Id1424591
Daniel Kaufmann
Aart Kraay
Massimo Mastruzzi
Abstract
This paper reports on the 2009 update of the Worldwide of public sector, private sector and NGO experts, as
Governance Indicators (WGI) research project, well as thousands of citizen and firm survey respondents
covering 212 countries and territories and measuring worldwide. The authors also explicitly report the
six dimensions of governance between 1996 and 2008: margins of error accompanying each country estimate.
Voice and Accountability, Political Stability and Absence These reflect the inherent difficulties in measuring
of Violence/Terrorism, Government Effectiveness, governance using any kind of data. They find that even
Regulatory Quality, Rule of Law, and Control of after taking margins of error into account, the WGI
Corruption. These aggregate indicators are based on permit meaningful cross-country comparisons as well as
hundreds of specific and disaggregated individual monitoring progress over time. The aggregate indicators,
variables measuring various dimensions of governance, together with the disaggregated underlying indicators, are
taken from 35 data sources provided by 33 different available at www.govindicators.org.
organizations. The data reflect the views on governance
This paper—a product of the Growth and the Macroeconomics Team, Development Research Group—is part of a larger
effort in the department to study the causes and consequences of governance for development. Policy Research Working
Papers are also posted on the Web at http://econ.worldbank.org. The authors may be contacted at [email protected],
[email protected], and [email protected].
The Policy Research Working Paper Series disseminates the findings of work in progress to encourage the exchange of ideas about development
issues. An objective of the series is to get the findings out quickly, even if the presentations are less than fully polished. The papers carry the
names of the authors and should be cited accordingly. The findings, interpretations, and conclusions expressed in this paper are entirely those
of the authors. They do not necessarily represent the views of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/World Bank and
its affiliated organizations, or those of the Executive Directors of the World Bank or the governments they represent.
________________________________________
[email protected], [email protected], [email protected]. The views
expressed here are the authors' and do not necessarily reflect those of the Brookings Institution,
the World Bank, its Executive Directors, or the countries they represent. The Worldwide
Governance Indicators are not used by the World Bank for resource allocation. We would like to
thank B. Parks, S. Rose, S. Radelet, C. Logan, M. Neumann, N. Meisel, J. Ould-Auodia, R.
Fullenbaum, Z. Nyiri, M. Seligson, F. Marzo, C. Walker, P. Wongwan, V. Hollingsworth, S.
Hatipoglu, D. Cingranelli, D. Richards, M. Lagos, R. Coutinho, S. Mannan, Z. Tabernacki, J.
Auger, L. Mootz, N. Heller, G. Kisunko, J. Rodriguez Mesa, J. Riano, B. Clausen and D.
Cieslikowsky for providing data and comments, and answering our numerous questions.
This paper presents the latest update of the Worldwide Governance Indicators
(WGI) research project. 1 The indicators measure six dimensions of governance: Voice
and Accountability, Political Stability and Absence of Violence/Terrorism, Government
Effectiveness, Regulatory Quality, Rule of Law, and Control of Corruption. They cover
212 countries and territories for 1996, 1998, 2000, and annually for 2002-2008. 2 The
indicators are based on several hundred individual variables measuring perceptions of
governance, drawn from 35 separate data sources constructed by 33 different
organizations from around the world. We assign these individual measures to
categories capturing the six dimensions of governance, and use an unobserved
components model to construct six aggregate governance indicators in each period.
The margins of error we report are not unique to the WGI, nor are they unique to
perceptions-based measures of governance on which we rely. Measurement error is
pervasive among all indicators of governance and institutional quality, including
individual indicators as well as ‘objective’ or fact-based ones -- if these are available at
1
This paper is the eighth in a series of estimates of governance across countries.
Documentation of previous rounds can be found in Kaufmann, Kraay, and Zoido-Lobatón
(1999a,b,2002), and Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi (2004, 2005, 2006a, 2006b, 2007b, and
2008). For broader survey review on governance indicators see Kaufmann and Kraay (2008).
2
A few of the entities covered by our indicators are not fully independent states (e.g. Puerto Rico,
Hong Kong, West Bank/Gaza, Martinique, French Guyana and others). A handful of very small
independent principalities (e.g. Monaco, San Marino, Lichtenstein and Andorra) are also included.
For stylistic convenience all 212 entities are referred to in this paper as “countries”.
Despite these margins of error, the WGI are sufficiently informative that many
cross-country comparisons result in statistically (and likely also practically) significant
differences in estimated governance. In comparing governance levels across countries,
for example, we document that over 64 percent of all cross-country comparisons using
the WGI for 2008 result in statistically significant differences at the 90 percent
significance level, and nearly 74 percent of comparisons are significant at the less
stringent 75 percent significance level. In assessing trends over time, we find that 35
percent of countries experience significant changes (at the 90 percent level) over the
decade 1998-2008 in at least one of the six indicators (roughly evenly divided between
significant improvements and deteriorations). This highlights the fact that governance
can and does change even over relatively short periods of time. This should both
provide encouragement to reformers seeking to improve governance, as well as warn
against complacency in other cases, as sharp deteriorations in governance are possible
as well.
The aggregate indicators that we report constitute a useful way of organizing and
summarizing the very large and disparate amount of information on governance
embodied in all of our underlying data sources. The specific aggregation procedure we
use also allows us to calculate explicit margins of error to capture the inherent
uncertainties in measuring governance. At the same time, we recognize that for some
purposes the information in the many individual underlying data sources can be of
interest to users. For example, several of these provide highly specific and
disaggregated information about particular dimensions of governance that could be of
interest for monitoring particular reforms. For this reason, we report country scores on
the individual indicators underlying our aggregate governance indicators, on the WGI
3
The only other governance-related indicators that we are aware of that now report margins of
error are the Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Index and the Global Integrity
Index.
First and most basic, perceptions matter because agents base their actions on
their perceptions, impression, and views. If citizens believe that the courts are inefficient
or the police are corrupt, they are unlikely to avail themselves of their services.
Similarly, enterprises base their investment decisions - and citizens their voting
decisions - on their perceived view of the investment climate and the government's
performance. Second, in many areas of governance, there are few alternatives to
relying on perceptions data. This is most particularly so for the case of corruption, which
almost by definition leaves no 'paper trail' that can be captured by purely objective
measures. Third, we note that even when objective or fact-based data are available,
often such data may capture a de jure notion of laws 'on the books' that differs
substantially from the de facto reality that exists 'on the ground'. In fact, in Kaufmann,
Kraay and Mastruzzi (2005) we document sharp divergences between de jure and de
facto measures of business entry regulation and find that corruption explains a good
deal of the extent to which the former are subverted in practice.
And finally, we note, as discussed in more detail in Kaufmann and Kraay (2008),
that virtually all measures of governance and the investment climate rely on judgment in
some measure, so that the distinction between 'subjective' and 'objective' data is
somewhat of a false dichotomy. Rather, a more useful distinction is between efforts to
measure formal rules as distinct from their implementation in practice, recognizing that
changes in formal rules (often associated with so-called 'actionable' indicators) need not
lead to desired changes in outcomes.
We begin by describing the data used to construct this round of the governance
indicators in Section 2, as well as various revisions to the data for previous years.
These revisions have resulted in minor changes to our previous estimates for 1996-
2007, and so the entire new dataset described here supersedes previous releases. In
Section 3 we briefly describe cross-country differences and changes over time in
governance as measured by our aggregate indicators. Section 4 concludes.
In this section we briefly describe the latest update of the WGI. Our methodology
for constructing aggregate governance indicators has not changed from past years, and
a detailed description can be found in Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi (2004), as well
as in a technical Appendix D to this paper.
The WGI data sources reflect the perceptions of a very diverse group of
respondents. Several are surveys of individuals or domestic firms with first-hand
knowledge of the governance situation in the country. These include the World
Economic Forum’s Global Competitiveness Report, the Institute for Management
Development’s World Competitiveness Yearbook, the World Bank / EBRD’s business
environment surveys, the Gallup World Poll, Latinobarometro, Afrobarometro, and the
AmericasBarometer. We refer to these as "Surveys" in Table 1. We also capture the
perceptions of country analysts at the major multilateral development agencies (the
European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, the African Development Bank,
the Asian Development Bank, and the World Bank), reflecting these individuals’ in-depth
experience working on the countries they assess. Together with some expert
assessments provided by the United States Department of State and the French Ministry
of Finance, Industry and Employment, we classify these as "Public Sector Data
Providers" in Table 1. We also have a number of data sources provided by various
The data sources in Table 1 are fairly evenly divided among these four
categories. Of the 35 data sources, seven are from commercial business information
providers and the remaining categories have nine data sources each. However, an
important distinction is that the commercial business information providers typically
report data for much larger country samples than our other types of sources. An
extreme example is the Global Insight Business Conditions and Risk Indicators, which
provides information on 203 countries in each of our six aggregate indicators. Primarily
for reasons of cost, household and firm surveys typically have much smaller country
coverage. Our largest surveys, the Global Competitiveness Report survey and the
Gallup World Poll each cover around 130 countries in 2008, and several regional
surveys cover necessarily smaller sets of countries. Some of the expert assessments
provided by NGOs and public sector organizations have quite substantial country
coverage, but others, particularly regionally-focused ones again have much smaller
country coverage. The top two panels of Table 2 summarize the distribution of country-
level data points from all of our underlying sources for each of the six indicators in 2008.
The 2008 WGI are based on a total of 12,114 country level data points (after averaging
multiple questions from individual sources), of which 42 percent come from commercial
business information providers. The remaining data points are fairly evenly distributed
between the remaining three types of data providers.
As in the past several years, we report the underlying data from virtually all of the
individual data sources that go into our aggregate indicators at www.govindicators.org.
The sources we have made available through our website are noted in Table 1. A
number of our data sources, such as Freedom House and Reporters Without Borders
have always been publicly available through the publications and/or websites of their
respective organizations. Several of our other sources provided by commercial risk
rating agencies and commercial survey organizations have only been available for a fee.
The only data sources we have not been able to obtain permission to publicize
fully are the World Bank's Country Policy and Institutional Assessment, and the
corresponding internal assessments produced by the African Development Bank and the
Asian Development Bank. We do note however that starting in 2002 the World Bank
began publishing limited information on its CPIA assessments on its external website.
For the years 2002-2004 the overall CPIA ratings are reported by quintile for countries
eligible to borrow from the International Development Association (IDA), the
concessional lending window of the World Bank. Starting in 2005, the individual country
We have made a number of revisions to the data sources underlying the current
update of the WGI. These revisions affect the data for all past years of the WGI, and so
the current release of the data 1996-2008 supersedes previous releases. As we
describe below, however, the revisions to the data for 1996-2007 are minor.
10
The second applies to the Gray Area Dynamics ratings previously produced by
Merchant International Group (MIG), a commercial business information provider. MIG
was acquired in 2008 by Cerberus Corporate Intelligence, and the Gray Area Dynamics
ratings were completely revised. This has resulted in a new set of 30 indicators starting
in 2008. We find these to be a significant improvement over the previous version, with
much more detailed definitions of concepts being measured, and more explicit guidance
as to the rating scale. Since the new version of Gray Area Dynamics is not available in
previous years, and since it differs substantially from the previous version, we treat it as
a new data source beginning in 2008. At the same time, we retain the old version of
Gray Area Dynamics as we used it before during 2002-2007, continuing to refer to the
latter as MIG. The new and old versions of this source are described in Appendix Table
A23. Finally, there has been a significant simplification in the questionnaire for the
Business Environment and Enterprise Performance surveys (BPS), with the result that
several questions asked in previous years were not asked in the latest round of the BPS.
In order to ensure over time comparability for this source, we drop these questions from
the previous rounds of the BPS as well. These changes are detailed in Appendix Table
A5.
We have also made a few further minor revisions to various sources. We have
added a few questions available in the Afrobarometer surveys that we had not used in
past years to make the source completely consistent over time. At the request of Global
Integrity, we have dropped the 2003 round of the Global Integrity Index from our
indicators for 2003, 2004, and 2005, as there were changes in Global Integrity’s
methodology between the first and subsequent rounds of this exercise, making the first
round not fully comparable with subsequent rounds. We have also dropped a question
11
We combine the many individual data sources into six aggregate governance
indicators, corresponding to the six dimensions of governance described above. The
premise underlying this statistical approach should not be too controversial – each of the
individual data sources provides an imperfect signal of some deeper underlying notion of
governance that is difficult to observe directly. This means that, as users of the
individual sources, we face a signal-extraction problem – how do we isolate an
informative signal about governance from each individual data source, and how do we
optimally combine the many data sources to get the best possible signal of governance
in a country based on all the available data? The statistical procedure we use to perform
this aggregation, known as the unobserved components model, is described in detail in
our past work (see for example Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi (2004), as well as
Appendix D). The main advantage of this approach is that the aggregate indicators are
more informative about unobserved governance than any individual data source.
12
The aggregation procedure first rescales the individual indicators from each
underlying source in order to make them comparable across data sources. It then
constructs a weighted average of each of these rescaled data sources to arrive at an
aggregate indicator of governance. The weights assigned to each data source are in
turn based on the estimates of the precision of each source that are produced by the
unobserved components model. In brief, the identifying assumption in the unobserved
components model is that any observed correlation between two measures of
corruption, for example, is due to their common, but unobserved, signal of corruption.
From this assumption it follows that data sources that are more correlated with each
other provide more reliable information about corruption, and so receive greater weight.
In past work, we have discussed in detail the merits of this approach--see particularly
Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi (2006a, Section 3). We have also documented that,
since the underlying data sources on average are quite correlated with each other, the
choice of weights used to construct the aggregate indicator does not substantially affect
the estimates of governance that we report (Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi 2006a,
2007a). 4
Here we briefly report some summary information on the weights for the 2008
indicators. Table 3 reports the weights assigned to each data source in each of the six
governance indicators in 2008. 5 This table reports the weights that would be used in the
case of a hypothetical country appearing in all of the available underlying data sources
4
It is also worth noting that a far more consequential weighting decision is whether to include a
data source or not. In the WGI we have for the most part opted to include as many data sources
as possible, then allowing the data and aggregation procedure to select the weights. In contrast,
household-survey based data sources receive zero weight in the Transparency International
Corruption Perceptions Index (TI-CPI) because the constructors of that measure have chosen to
exclude all such data sources.
5
A full version of this table reporting the weights for all years in Excel format is available for
downloading on the Resources tab of www.govindicators.org
13
One noteworthy feature in Table 3 is that there are some systematic differences
in the weights assigned to different types of sources. These are summarized in the
bottom panel of the table. For each of the four types of data sources, we first report the
share of each type in the total number of sources for each indicator. For example, for
Government Effectiveness, we rely on a total of 18 data sources, of which 5, or 28
percent, are from commercial business information providers. We also report the share
of the total weights accounted for by each type of indicator. Taking the same example of
Government Effectiveness, these 5 data sources together receive a somewhat higher
share of the total weight in the indicator, at 42 percent. The last column reports a simple
average of these two figures across all six indicators. These show that data from
commercial business information providers and data from non-governmental
organizations receive weights that are somewhat higher than their proportion in the total
number of data sources (37 versus 31 percent and 22 versus 16 percent respectively).
In contrast, survey-based indicators account for 14 percent of the weight on average, but
account for 27 percent of sources; and indicators provided by public-sector organizations
get almost exactly the same weight on average as their prevalence among the number
of sources would suggest (28 versus 26 percent).
6
The precise expression for the weights used for each country can be found in Kaufmann, Kraay
and Mastruzzi (2004, Equation (2)) and in the technical Appendix D to this paper.
14
7
These boundaries correspond to the 0.005 and 0.995 percentiles of the standard normal
distribution. For a handful of cases, individual country ratings can exceed these boundaries when
scores from individual data sources are particularly high or low. Note also that small adjustments
to this distribution of scores are made for earlier years to correct for compositional effects driven
by expansion of the sample of countries covered. See Appendix D for details.
15
8
As described in detail in Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi (2004), the output of our aggregation
procedure is a distribution of possible values of governance for a country, conditional on the
observed data for that country. The mean of this conditional distribution is our estimate of
governance, and we refer to the standard deviation of this conditional distribution as the “standard
error” of the governance estimate.
9
In an earlier paper (Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi (2004)) we showed how to obtain margins
of errors for other ‘objective’ measures of governance and found that they were as large, or larger
than those of the individual subjective measures on which we rely for the WGI (and thus
16
obviously (thanks to the aggregation) we also found that the WGI had much lower margins of
error than any ‘objective’ measure. This underscores the fact that all efforts to measure
governance involve margins of error, often non-trivial.
10
Due to space constraints we cannot label all countries in Figure 1. Instead we show country
names for countries at or near the vintiles of the distribution of the governance indicator.
11
A x% confidence interval for governance can be obtained as the point estimate of governance
th
plus or minus the standard error times the (100-x)/2 percentile of the standard normal
distribution. For example, the 90% confidence intervals we report throughout the paper are the
point estimate plus or minus 1.64 times the standard error.
17
This is not to say however that the aggregate indicators cannot be used to make
cross-country comparisons. To the contrary, there are a great many pair-wise country
comparisons that do point to statistically significant, and likely also practically
meaningful, differences across countries. Our 2008 Control of Corruption indicator for
example covers 208 countries, so that it is possible to make a total of 21,528 pair-wise
comparisons of corruption across countries using this measure. For 64 percent of these
comparisons, 90% confidence intervals do not overlap, signaling quite highly statistically
significant differences across countries. And if we lower our confidence level to 75
percent, which may be quite adequate for many applications, we find that 74 percent of
all pair-wise comparisons are statistically significant. In sum, the likelihood that a
comparison between any given pair of countries does exhibit a reasonably significant
difference in governance performance is close to three-quarters.
We also emphasize that the WGI are unusual in that we generate and report
these margins of error, which allow an explicit assessment of the significance of
observed cross-country and over time differences in estimates of governance. Although
rarely explicitly disclosed -- or even acknowledged-- all other measures of governance
are subject to margins of error as well, which in our past work we have shown to be at
12
Of course, asking whether 90% confidence intervals overlap or not corresponds to a hypothesis
test at a significance level that is more stringent than 10%. The assumptions underlying our
statistical model imply that the standard error of the difference between two country scores is the
square root of the sum of the squared standard errors of the two sources, which is always smaller
than the sum of the two standard errors themselves. It is more convenient -- and more
conservative -- for users to simply inspect confidence intervals and see whether they overlap.
18
13
See Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi (2004).
19
In Table 5 we provide more detail on all of the statistically significant (at the 90
percent level) changes in our six governance indicators over the period 1998-2008. The
first three columns report the level of governance in the two periods, and the change.
The next three columns report on how the underlying data sources move for each case.
In the column labeled “Agree” we report the number of sources available in both periods
which move in the same direction as the aggregate indicator. The columns labeled “No
Change” and “Disagree” report the number of sources on which that country’s score
does not change or moves in the opposite direction to the aggregate indicator. For each
country we also summarize the extent to which changes in the individual sources agree
with the direction of change in the aggregate indicator by calculating the “Agreement
Ratio”, or “Agree” / (“Agree” + “Disagree”). The agreement ratio is quite high for
countries with large changes in governance. Averaging across all countries and
indicators, we find an average agreement ratio of 0.90 for the period 1998-2008, as
reported in Table 5. This provides confidence that for countries with statistically
14
While this is not a formal test of the statistical significance of changes over time in governance,
it is a very simple and transparent rule of thumb for identifying changes in governance that are
likely to be significant. In Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi (2005, 2006) we have shown in more
detail how to assess the statistical significance of changes in governance, and that this simple
rule of thumb turns out to be a fairly good approximation.
20
The last three columns of Table 5 address directly the issue of adding sources
over time. Averaging over all the significant changes, we find that for a typical change,
between three and four new data sources were added between 1998 and 2008. One
might reasonably wonder about the extent to which changes in the aggregate indicators
are driven by the addition of sources whose ratings differed from those for 2008 provided
by sources also available in 1998. It turns out however that this effect is small in most
cases. To see this, in the second-last column, we have calculated the change that we
would have seen in the aggregate indicators had we used only those same data sources
available in both 1998 and 2008 for the indicated country. We refer to this as the
"balanced" change. The final column reports the ratio of this balanced change to the
actual change reported in the third column of Table 5. If this ratio is less than one, the
actual change exceeds (in absolute value) the balanced change, indicating that the
addition of sources magnified the change relative to what would have been observed
using only the balanced set of sources. And if this ratio is greater than one, the addition
of new sources offsets the change observed among the balanced sources. 15
It turns out that these compositional effects are not large. For 103 of the 126
significant changes reported in Table 5, the ratio of the balanced change to the actual
change is between 0.75 and 1.25, i.e. the balanced change is within 25 percent of the
actual change. Another way to see the relative unimportance of compositional effects is
to calculate the correlation between the balanced and unbalanced changes. Pooling all
six indicators, this correlation is equal to 0.99.
Finally, it is worth noting that the agreement ratios for significant changes in
governance are substantially higher than the agreement ratios for all changes in
governance. This can be seen in Table 6 which computes the same agreement ratio,
but for all countries over the period 1998-2008. The agreement ratio averages 69
percent, compared with 90 percent for large changes, suggesting that for the more
15
We note that there is a significant increase in the number of sources on which the WGI are
based in 2002. As a result, over time comparisons from 2002 onwards show a far smaller
incidence of added sources.
21
22
Over the period 1998-2003 the data show little evidence of substantial trends in
world averages of governance. Looking across all six indicators, there are five cases
where world averages of sources decline significantly, and 10 cases where the world
averages increase significantly (at the 90 percent confidence level). However, a closer
look at the table reveals that half of these significant improvements are concentrated in
just one source, DRI, whose global averages on the five indicators in which it appears
fluctuate substantially. Apart from this one source, all remaining significant changes are
split evenly between increases and decreases. We note also that the magnitude of the
changes is in most cases quite small. Averaging across all indicators and sources, the
mean change in the world average is just 0.02 (on a scale from 0 to 1). And if we
disregard the one source DRI that shows very large fluctuations in its global averages,
the mean change in the world average is just 0.01.
23
4. Conclusions
24
25
——— (1999b). “Governance Matters.” World Bank Policy Research Working Paper No.
2196, Washington, D.C.
——— (2002). “Governance Matters II – Updated Indicators for 2000/01.” World Bank
Policy Research Working Paper No. 2772, Washington, D.C.
Kaufmann, Daniel, Aart Kraay and Massimo Mastruzzi (2004). “Governance Matters III:
Governance Indicators for 1996, 1998, 2000, and 2002”. World Bank Economic
Review. 18:253-287.
Kaufmann, Daniel, Aart Kraay and Massimo Mastruzzi (2005). “Governance Matters IV:
Governance Indicators for 1996-2004. World Bank Policy Research Working
Paper No. 3630. Washington, D.C.
Kaufmann, Daniel, Aart Kraay and Massimo Mastruzzi (2006b). “Governance Matters V:
Aggregate and Individual Governance Indicators for 1996-2005”. World Bank
Policy Research Working Paper No. 4012. Washington, D.C.
Kaufmann, Daniel, Aart Kraay and Massimo Mastruzzi (2007a). “The Worldwide
Governance Indicators Project: Answering the Critics". World Bank Policy
Research Working Paper No. 4149. Washington, D.C.
Kaufmann, Daniel, Aart Kraay and Massimo Mastruzzi (2007b). “Growth and
Governance: A Reply/Rejoinder". Journal of Politics. 69(2):555-562.
Kaufmann, Daniel, Aart Kraay and Massimo Mastruzzi (2007c). “Governance Matters
VI: Aggregate and Individual Governance Indicators for 1996-2006”. World
Bank Policy Research Working Paper No. 4280. Washington, D.C.
Kaufmann, Daniel, Aart Kraay and Massimo Mastruzzi (2008). “Governance Matters VII:
Aggregate and Individual Governance Indicators for 1996-2007”. World Bank
Policy Research Working Paper No. 4654. Washington, D.C.
Kaufmann, Daniel and Aart Kraay (2008). "Governance Indicators: Where Are We and
Where Should We Be Going?" World Bank Research Observer. Spring 2008.
26
AUSTRIA CANADA
NAURU BELGIUM
GERMANY JAPAN
Figure 1: Margins of Error for the WGI, 2008
0.8
0.8
NETHERLANDS BOTSWANA
MAURITIUS CAPE VERDE
0.7
0.7
MARTINIQUE KUWAIT
UNITED KINGDOM SOUTH AFRICA
Control of Corruption
0.6
0.6
ITALY TURKEY
Percentile Rank
Percentile Rank
SAO TOME AND PRINCIPE MADAGASCAR
0.5
0.5
MALAYSIA COLOMBIA
27
ALBANIA DJIBOUTI
0.4
0.4
EQUATORIAL GUINEA ARGENTINA
JAMAICA MARSHALL ISLANDS
0.3
0.3
MADAGASCAR LEEWARD ISLANDS
CONGO VIETNAM
0.2
0.2
ECUADOR NIGER
BOLIVIA TOGO
0.1
0.1
BURUNDI WEST BANK/GAZA
GUINEA TURKMENISTAN
0
2.5
1.5
0.5
-0.5
-1.5
-2.5
2
-1
-2
2.5
1.5
0.5
-0.5
-1.5
-2.5
2
-1
-2
Governance Rating Governance Rating
Figure 2: Changes Over Time in Governance Indicators 1998-2008
2008
2
1
SUR
HRV
GHA
YUG
PER
IDNKEN
SLE LBR 0 PHL
NER SGP
-3 -2 BDI NGA -1 0
VEN THA 1 2 1998 3
IRQ
AFG -1
IRN
ZWE
BLR
ERI -2
-3
Rule of Law
3
2008
EST
1 LVA
THA
GEO
0 TTO
RWA YUG
-3 -2 ALB -1 0ARG 1 2 1998 3
BOL
LBR ECU
KGZ -1
ERI
CIV VEN
ZWE
-2
-3
28
Country Represe
Source Type* Public Coverage -ntative 1996 1998 2000 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
ADB African Development Bank Country Policy and Institutional Assessments Expert (GOV) Partial 53 x x x x x x x x x
AEO OECD Development Center African Economic Outlook Expert (GOV) Yes 48 x x x x x x x x x x
AFR Afrobarometer Survey Yes 19 x x x x x x x x
ASD Asian Development Bank Country Policy and Institutional Assessments Expert (GOV) Partial 29 x x x x x x x x
BPS Business Enterprise Environment Survey Survey Yes 27 x x x x x x x x
BRI Business Environment Risk Intelligence Business Risk Service / Financial Ethics Index Expert (CBIP) Yes 101 x x x x x x x x x x
BTI Bertelsmann Transformation Index Expert (NGO) Yes 125 x x x x x x x
CCR Freedom House Countries at the Crossroads Expert (NGO) Yes 62 x x x x x
DRI Global Insight Global Risk Service Expert (CBIP) Yes 144 x x x x x x x x x x x
EBR European Bank for Reconstruction and Development Transition Report Expert (GOV) Yes 29 x x x x x x x x x x
EGV Global E-Governance Index Expert (NGO) Yes 196 x x x x x x x x
EIU Economist Intelligence Unit Riskwire & Democracy Index Expert (CBIP) Yes 170 x x x x x x x x x x x
FRH Freedom House Expert (NGO) Yes 197 x x x x x x x x x x x
GAD Cerberus Intelligence Gray Area Dynamics** Expert (CBIP) Yes 164 x x
GCB Transparency International Global Corruption Barometer Survey Survey Yes 80 x x x x x x x
GCS World Economic Forum Global Competitiveness Report Survey Yes 134 x x x x x x x x x x x
GII Global Integrity Index Expert (NGO) Yes 79 x x x x x x
GWP Gallup World Poll Survey Yes 130 x x x x
HER Heritage Foundation Index of Economic Freedom Expert (NGO) Yes 179 x x x x x x x x x x x
HUM Cingranelli Richards Human Rights Database and Political Terror Scale Expert (GOV) Yes 192 x x x x x x x x x x x
IFD IFAD Rural Sector Performance Assessments Expert (GOV) Yes 90 x x x x x
IJT iJET Country Security Risk Ratings Expert (CBIP) Yes 185 x x x x x x
IPD Institutional Profiles Database Expert (GOV) Yes 85 x x x x
LBO Latinobarometro Survey Yes 18 x x x x x x x x x x
MIG Merchant International Group Gray Area Dynamics** Expert (CBIP) Yes 156 x x x x x x x
MSI International Research and Exchanges Board Media Sustainability Index Expert (NGO) Yes 76 x x x x x x x
OBI International Budget Project Open Budget Index Expert (NGO) Yes 85 x x x x
PIA World Bank Country Policy and Institutional Assessments Expert (GOV) Partial 142 x x x x x x x x x x
PRC Political Economic Risk Consultancy Corruption in Asia Survey Survey Yes 15 x x x x x x x x x
PRS Political Risk Services International Country Risk Guide Expert (CBIP) Yes 140 x x x x x x x x x x x
RSF Reporters Without Borders Press Freedom Index Expert (NGO) Yes 170 x x x x x x x x
TPR US State Department Trafficking in People report Expert (GOV) Yes 153 x x x x x x x x x
VAB Vanderbilt University Americas Barometer Survey Yes 23 x x x x x
WCY Institute for Management and Development World Competitiveness Yearbook Survey Yes 55 x x x x x x x x x x
WMO Global Insight Business Conditions and Risk Indicators Expert (CBIP) Yes 203 x x x x x x x x x x
*CBIP -- Commercial Business Information Provider, GOV -- Public Sector Data Provider, NGO -- Non-Governmental Organization Data Provider
**Gray Area Dynamics changed ownership and was substantially revised in 2008, we treat the previous and current version as separate sources, see text for details.
29
Commercial
Business Surveys of Non-
Information Firms or Governmental Public Sector
Providers Households Organizations Organizations Total
Number of Data Points
Voice and Accountability 677 385 794 367 2223
Political Stability/Absence of Violence 1087 189 0 327 1603
Government Effectiveness 738 398 321 398 1855
Regulatory Quality 801 219 304 427 1751
Rule of Law 920 420 474 743 2557
Control of Corruption 919 513 295 398 2125
Total 5142 2124 2188 2660 12114
30
VA PV GE RQ RL CC Average
Commercial Business Information Providers
bri .. 0.065 0.082 .. 0.064 0.041 0.063
dri .. 0.108 0.040 0.020 0.030 0.022 0.044
eiu 0.109 0.103 0.094 0.061 0.118 0.059 0.091
gad 0.030 0.074 .. 0.065 0.008 0.019 0.039
ijt .. 0.088 .. .. .. .. 0.088
prs 0.048 0.061 0.062 0.039 0.023 0.022 0.042
wmo 0.031 0.181 0.131 0.086 0.100 0.067 0.099
Surveys of Firms or Households
afr 0.026 .. 0.016 .. 0.035 0.025 0.025
bps .. .. 0.002 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.001
gcb .. .. .. .. .. 0.010 0.010
gcs 0.006 0.040 0.079 0.031 0.059 0.056 0.045
gwp 0.002 .. 0.007 .. 0.003 0.006 0.004
lbo 0.003 .. 0.000 .. 0.010 0.000 0.003
prc .. .. .. .. .. 0.069 0.069
vab 0.019 .. .. .. 0.011 0.007 0.012
wcy 0.005 0.036 0.051 0.052 0.071 0.088 0.051
Non-Governmental Organization Data Providers
bti 0.120 .. 0.046 0.085 0.014 0.052 0.063
ccr 0.141 .. .. .. 0.006 0.002 0.049
egv .. .. 0.008 .. .. .. 0.008
frh 0.190 .. .. .. 0.137 0.241 0.189
gii 0.043 .. .. .. 0.014 0.004 0.020
her .. .. .. 0.053 0.050 .. 0.051
msi 0.044 .. .. .. .. .. 0.044
obi 0.024 .. .. .. .. .. 0.024
rsf 0.023 .. .. .. .. .. 0.023
Public Sector Data Providers
adb .. .. 0.087 0.152 0.039 0.027 0.076
aeo .. 0.043 .. .. .. .. 0.043
asd .. .. 0.114 0.070 0.008 0.005 0.050
ebr .. .. .. 0.084 .. .. 0.084
hum 0.043 0.072 .. .. 0.011 .. 0.042
ifd 0.002 .. 0.037 0.048 0.021 0.022 0.026
ipd 0.080 0.092 0.065 0.029 0.066 0.098 0.072
pia .. .. 0.060 0.108 0.087 0.046 0.075
tpr .. .. .. .. 0.004 .. 0.004
31
Political
Voice and Stability/Abse Government Regulatory Control of
Accountability nce Violence Effectiveness Quality Rule of Law Corruption Average
Number of Countries
1996 194 180 182 183 171 154 177
1998 199 189 194 194 194 194 194
2000 200 190 196 196 196 196 196
2002 201 190 202 197 197 197 197
2003 201 200 202 197 202 198 200
2004 208 207 209 204 209 205 207
2005 208 208 209 204 209 205 207
2006 209 209 212 206 211 207 209
2007 209 209 212 207 211 208 209
2008 209 210 212 208 210 208 210
32
Governance Score
Agree/
2008 1998 No Dis- Sources Balanced Bal Chng/
Change Agree (agree+
(Level) (Level) change agree Added Change Actual Chng
Disagree)
Voice & Accountability
ERITREA -2.20 -1.18 -1.02 3 0 0 1.00 10 -0.71 0.70
THAILAND -0.56 0.40 -0.96 5 0 1 0.83 0 -0.73 0.77
BELARUS -1.60 -0.86 -0.74 3 0 1 0.75 6 -0.78 1.07
ZIMBABWE -1.52 -0.81 -0.71 4 0 1 0.80 10 -0.87 1.22
SINGAPORE -0.41 0.27 -0.67 2 0 4 0.33 8 -0.44 0.66
VENEZUELA -0.62 0.00 -0.62 5 0 2 0.71 8 -0.82 1.32
IRAN -1.48 -0.87 -0.61 2 0 3 0.40 0 -0.41 0.67
PHILIPPINES -0.20 0.39 -0.59 4 1 1 0.80 1 -0.46 0.79
PERU 0.02 -0.57 0.58 5 0 1 0.83 7 0.73 1.25
NIGERIA -0.60 -1.19 0.59 5 0 0 1.00 0 0.36 0.61
IRAQ -1.26 -1.93 0.68 5 0 0 1.00 9 0.75 1.10
KENYA -0.16 -0.87 0.71 4 0 1 0.80 6 0.48 0.68
AFGHANISTAN -1.26 -2.04 0.78 3 0 0 1.00 0 0.86 1.10
SURINAME 0.57 -0.22 0.78 3 0 0 1.00 0 0.81 1.03
CROATIA 0.48 -0.30 0.79 5 0 0 1.00 0 0.82 1.04
LIBERIA -0.29 -1.12 0.83 4 0 0 1.00 7 0.87 1.04
BURUNDI -0.66 -1.51 0.85 2 1 0 1.00 4 0.53 0.63
INDONESIA -0.14 -1.04 0.90 5 0 1 0.83 8 1.03 1.15
GHANA 0.48 -0.43 0.92 5 0 0 1.00 4 0.97 1.06
NIGER -0.41 -1.54 1.13 4 0 0 1.00 0 1.16 1.03
SIERRA LEONE -0.28 -1.47 1.19 3 0 0 1.00 6 1.24 1.04
SERBIA 0.19 -1.14 1.34 5 0 0 1.00 10 1.44 1.08
Average 3.91 0.09 0.73 0.87 4.73
33
Governance Score
Agree/
2008 1998 No Dis- Sources Balanced Bal Chng/
Change Agree (agree+
(Level) (Level) change agree Added Change Actual Chng
Disagree)
Governmnent Effectiveness
MALDIVES -0.35 0.96 -1.31 2 0 0 1.00 1 -1.07 0.82
ZIMBABWE -1.56 -0.47 -1.09 7 0 1 0.88 5 -0.96 0.88
COTE D'IVOIRE -1.39 -0.37 -1.02 6 0 0 1.00 0 -1.04 1.02
CHAD -1.48 -0.63 -0.85 3 0 0 1.00 2 -0.58 0.68
MAURITANIA -0.97 -0.14 -0.84 2 0 1 0.67 8 -0.58 0.69
FIJI -0.95 -0.16 -0.79 1 0 1 0.50 7 -0.72 0.91
BELIZE -0.42 0.35 -0.76 1 1 0 1.00 7 -0.53 0.70
TOGO -1.43 -0.68 -0.76 2 1 1 0.67 6 -0.74 0.97
SPAIN 0.99 1.72 -0.73 6 1 0 1.00 5 -0.66 0.90
BOLIVIA -0.81 -0.09 -0.72 4 2 0 1.00 0 -0.58 0.81
BELARUS -1.11 -0.47 -0.64 2 0 2 0.50 3 -0.62 0.97
ITALY 0.39 0.93 -0.54 4 1 2 0.67 3 -0.53 0.98
LEBANON -0.64 -0.11 -0.53 3 2 1 0.75 4 -0.46 0.86
ISRAEL 1.30 0.77 0.53 4 2 1 0.80 5 0.51 0.97
CHINA 0.24 -0.30 0.53 5 3 0 1.00 2 0.56 1.04
TAJIKISTAN -0.88 -1.44 0.56 3 1 0 1.00 7 0.55 0.98
INDONESIA -0.29 -0.85 0.56 7 0 1 0.88 6 0.67 1.20
COLOMBIA 0.13 -0.46 0.59 4 0 4 0.50 6 0.62 1.04
MALAYSIA 1.13 0.53 0.59 6 1 1 0.86 0 0.68 1.14
BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA -0.55 -1.18 0.63 2 1 0 1.00 7 0.69 1.10
ALGERIA -0.50 -1.16 0.65 6 1 0 1.00 1 0.81 1.25
ETHIOPIA -0.43 -1.12 0.69 4 1 0 1.00 0 0.79 1.14
IRAQ -1.41 -2.17 0.76 3 1 0 1.00 5 0.92 1.21
GEORGIA 0.18 -0.65 0.83 3 0 0 1.00 3 0.69 0.83
HONG KONG 1.83 0.96 0.86 4 1 2 0.67 1 0.81 0.94
KOREA, SOUTH 1.26 0.39 0.87 7 1 0 1.00 8 0.73 0.83
SERBIA -0.28 -1.19 0.91 3 0 0 1.00 6 0.92 1.02
AFGHANISTAN -1.31 -2.27 0.96 1 0 0 1.00 0 0.67 0.70
RWANDA -0.20 -1.17 0.97 3 0 0 1.00 0 0.89 0.92
Average 3.72 0.72 0.62 0.87 3.72
Regulatory Quality
ZIMBABWE -2.18 -0.68 -1.50 8 0 0 1.00 3 -1.72 1.15
ERITREA -2.13 -0.63 -1.49 3 0 0 1.00 4 -1.32 0.89
BOLIVIA -1.02 0.30 -1.32 6 0 0 1.00 0 -1.30 0.98
VENEZUELA -1.44 -0.15 -1.29 8 0 0 1.00 2 -1.67 1.29
ARGENTINA -0.65 0.64 -1.28 8 0 0 1.00 6 -1.63 1.27
MALDIVES -0.42 0.85 -1.27 2 0 0 1.00 0 -0.83 0.65
ECUADOR -1.14 -0.05 -1.09 6 0 0 1.00 1 -1.25 1.15
COTE D'IVOIRE -0.93 -0.07 -0.86 4 3 0 1.00 0 -0.91 1.05
GABON -0.65 0.21 -0.86 4 2 0 1.00 2 -0.74 0.86
URUGUAY 0.08 0.88 -0.80 5 1 0 1.00 4 -0.70 0.88
SLOVAKIA 1.14 0.46 0.68 8 0 0 1.00 2 0.64 0.94
ANGOLA -0.94 -1.66 0.71 6 1 0 1.00 1 0.82 1.14
TAJIKISTAN -0.97 -1.73 0.75 5 0 0 1.00 6 0.83 1.10
BELARUS -1.24 -2.01 0.76 5 0 1 0.83 3 0.74 0.96
CONGO, DEM. REP. -1.43 -2.43 1.00 6 0 0 1.00 0 1.05 1.06
LIBYA -0.93 -2.20 1.27 5 0 0 1.00 6 1.27 1.00
GEORGIA 0.59 -0.77 1.36 5 0 0 1.00 3 1.37 1.01
IRAQ -1.09 -2.76 1.67 4 0 0 1.00 4 1.71 1.02
Average 5.44 0.39 0.06 0.99 2.61
Note: Shaded countries correspond to significant increases in WGI estimates of governance (at the 90
percent level), and non-shaded areas correspond to significant declines.
34
Governance Score
Agree/
2008 1998 No Dis- Sources Balanced Bal Chng/
Change Agree (agree+
(Level) (Level) change agree Added Change Actual Chng
Disagree)
Rule of Law
ZIMBABWE -1.81 -0.53 -1.29 9 0 1 0.90 7 -1.33 1.04
ERITREA -1.24 -0.21 -1.03 4 0 0 1.00 8 -0.67 0.65
VENEZUELA -1.59 -0.71 -0.88 10 1 0 1.00 5 -0.88 1.00
BOLIVIA -1.12 -0.28 -0.84 7 2 0 1.00 0 -0.76 0.91
ARGENTINA -0.61 0.08 -0.69 8 2 1 0.89 8 -0.64 0.93
COTE D'IVOIRE -1.52 -0.90 -0.62 5 3 0 1.00 0 -0.49 0.79
TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO -0.25 0.37 -0.62 5 1 1 0.83 3 -0.48 0.77
ECUADOR -1.23 -0.63 -0.60 6 2 1 0.86 3 -0.49 0.82
KYRGYZSTAN -1.26 -0.67 -0.59 5 0 2 0.71 0 -0.39 0.65
THAILAND -0.03 0.48 -0.51 5 2 3 0.63 0 -0.45 0.87
LATVIA 0.73 0.20 0.52 8 1 0 1.00 5 0.60 1.15
ESTONIA 1.05 0.52 0.54 7 2 0 1.00 6 0.55 1.02
ALBANIA -0.60 -1.21 0.61 4 1 2 0.67 9 0.62 1.02
SERBIA -0.46 -1.27 0.81 4 0 1 0.80 9 0.78 0.97
LIBERIA -1.23 -2.07 0.84 4 1 0 1.00 6 0.94 1.11
GEORGIA -0.34 -1.21 0.87 4 1 2 0.67 4 0.75 0.86
RWANDA -0.50 -1.48 0.98 5 0 0 1.00 0 0.88 0.90
Average 5.88 1.12 0.82 0.88 4.29
Control of Corruption
ERITREA -0.38 0.78 -1.17 2 1 0 1.00 7 -1.34 1.15
ZIMBABWE -1.37 -0.43 -0.95 7 0 1 0.88 7 -0.97 1.03
COTE D'IVOIRE -1.17 -0.38 -0.79 3 2 1 0.75 0 -0.50 0.63
GREECE 0.10 0.69 -0.59 6 1 0 1.00 4 -0.63 1.07
ESTONIA 0.94 0.45 0.49 5 1 1 0.83 5 0.32 0.66
INDONESIA -0.64 -1.16 0.51 7 1 1 0.88 7 0.56 1.08
TANZANIA -0.51 -1.12 0.61 5 2 0 1.00 9 0.50 0.82
ALBANIA -0.45 -1.07 0.62 4 0 1 0.80 8 0.61 0.98
GEORGIA -0.23 -0.86 0.63 4 0 1 0.80 1 0.30 0.47
HONG KONG 1.88 1.16 0.71 6 0 2 0.75 1 0.67 0.95
RWANDA 0.03 -0.87 0.89 3 0 0 1.00 0 0.86 0.96
SERBIA -0.16 -1.08 0.92 4 0 0 1.00 8 0.85 0.93
LIBERIA -0.60 -1.73 1.13 4 0 0 1.00 5 1.37 1.21
Average 4.62 0.62 0.62 0.90 4.77
Note: Shaded countries correspond to significant increases in WGI estimates of governance (at the 90 percent
level), and non-shaded areas correspond to significant declines.
35
ALL CHANGES
Agree / (Agree
Sample Agree No Change Disagree + Disagree)
36
37
Regulatory Quality
CPIA 125 0.51 0.54 0.55 0.17 0.13 0.14 1.89 1.65 0.28 0.04 0.03 0.00
DRI 106 0.82 0.77 0.85 0.15 0.18 0.13 1.39 -2.28 3.68 0.03 -0.05 0.08
EIU 120 0.54 0.54 0.57 0.22 0.23 0.22 0.86 -0.04 0.89 0.02 0.00 0.03
GCS (burden of regulations) ** 95 .. 0.31 0.37 .. 0.12 0.12 .. .. 3.36 .. .. 0.06
HERITAGE *** 153 0.52 0.53 0.51 0.18 0.19 0.19 -0.36 0.31 -0.66 -0.01 0.01 -0.01
PRS * 140 0.62 0.71 0.71 0.20 0.22 0.22 3.41 3.64 -0.25 0.08 0.09 -0.01
WMO 182 0.55 0.59 0.60 0.25 0.25 0.25 1.67 1.23 0.43 0.04 0.03 0.01
Average 0.03 0.02 0.02
Rule of Law
CPIA 125 0.40 0.41 0.42 0.17 0.19 0.15 1.07 0.39 0.59 0.02 0.01 0.01
DRI 106 0.71 0.65 0.80 0.20 0.24 0.17 3.71 -1.94 5.43 0.10 -0.06 0.16
EIU 120 0.49 0.51 0.53 0.27 0.27 0.24 1.26 0.45 0.78 0.04 0.02 0.03
GCS (organized crime / police /
independent judiciary) ** 94 .. 0.55 0.60 .. 0.21 0.20 .. .. 1.59 .. .. 0.05
HERITAGE *** 153 0.54 0.48 0.45 0.24 0.24 0.24 -3.25 -2.21 -1.05 -0.09 -0.06 -0.03
HUM 155 0.56 0.50 0.46 0.37 0.40 0.40 -2.29 -1.41 -0.86 -0.10 -0.06 -0.04
PRS * 140 0.68 0.61 0.62 0.22 0.24 0.22 -2.42 -2.72 0.41 -0.06 -0.07 0.01
WMO 182 0.57 0.58 0.59 0.24 0.23 0.22 0.96 0.47 0.48 0.02 0.01 0.01
Average -0.01 -0.03 0.02
Control of Corruption
CPIA 125 0.38 0.43 0.41 0.16 0.16 0.16 1.75 2.49 -0.74 0.04 0.05 -0.02
DRI 106 0.57 0.52 0.66 0.27 0.30 0.26 2.53 -1.30 3.66 0.09 -0.05 0.14
EIU 120 0.34 0.35 0.39 0.33 0.34 0.32 1.25 0.19 1.03 0.05 0.01 0.04
GCS (bribe frequency)** 95 .. 0.60 0.58 .. 0.19 0.20 .. .. -0.98 .. .. -0.03
PRS * 140 0.51 0.42 0.43 0.21 0.19 0.20 -3.13 -3.57 0.43 -0.08 -0.09 0.01
WMO 182 0.50 0.54 0.53 0.27 0.26 0.26 1.07 1.26 -0.21 0.03 0.04 -0.01
Average 0.03 -0.01 0.02
38
39
2008 2007 2006 2005 2004 2003 2002 2000 1998 1996
Voice and Accountability
NA .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
Government Effectiveness
Policies to improve efficiency of public sector X X X X X X X X X ..
Budget Management X X X X X X X X X ..
Efficiency o f Public Expenditures X X X X X X X X X ..
Management of publ ic debt X X X X X X X X X ..
Quality of Public Administration X X X X X .. .. .. .. ..
Regulatory Quality
Trade policy X X X X X X X X X ..
Competitive en vironment X X X X X X X X X ..
Labor Market Policie s X X X X X X X X X ..
Rule of Law
Property rights X X X X X X X X X ..
Control of Corruption
Transparency / corruption X X X X X X X X X ..
Country Coverage 53 52 52 52 52 50 50 51 51 ..
Year of Publication 2008 2007 2006 2005 2004 2003 2002 2000 1998 ..
40
2008 2007 2006 2005 2004 2003 2002 2000 1998 1996
Voice and Accountability
NA .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
Government Effectiveness
NA .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
Regulatory Quality
NA .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
Rule of Law
NA .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
Control of Corruption
NA .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
Country Coverage 48 36 33 33 32 26 26 26 26 25
Year of Publication 2008 2007 2006 2005 2004 2003 2002 2000 1998 1996
41
Data Provider Michigan State University; Institute for Democracy (South Africa); Centre for Democracy and
Development (Ghana).
Description U.S-based university and African non-governmental organization
Website www.afrobarometer.org
Data Source Afrobarometer surveys
Type Survey
Respondents Households
Frequency Approximately every three years since 1999
Coverage African countries
Public Access Country level aggregates are publicly available through afrobarometer website. Record-level data
is released with some lag through the Inter-University Consortium for Political and Social
Research (www.icpsr.org).
Description This household survey is designed to collect data on attitudes towards democracy and government
in a sample of African countries. We do not use data from the 1999 survey as the questionnaire
from this year differs substantially from subsequent years.
2008 2007 2006 2005 2004 2003 200 2 2000 1998 1996
Voice and Accountability
How much do you trust the parliament? X X X X X X X .. .. ..
Overall, how satisfied a re yo u with the way democracy works in you r country? X X X X X X X .. .. ..
Free and fa ir elections X X X X .. .. .. .. .. ..
Government Effectiveness
X X X X X X X .. .. ..
Government handl ing of public services (roads, health, educatio n, electricity, ecc..)?
Regulatory Quality
NA .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
Rule of Law
Over the past year, how often have you or anyone in your family feared crime in your
X X X X X X X .. .. ..
own home?
Over the past year, how often have you or anyone in your family had something
X X X X X X X .. .. ..
stolen from your house?
Over the past year, how often have you or anyone in your family been physically
X X X X X X X .. .. ..
attacke d?
How much do you trust the courts of law? X X X X X X X .. .. ..
Trust in police X X X X X X X .. .. ..
Control of Corruption
How many elected leaders (parliamentarians) do you think are involved in
X X X X X X X .. .. ..
corruptio n?
How many judges and magistrates do you think are invo lved in corruption? X X X X X X X .. .. ..
How many government officials do you think are involved in co rruption? X X X X X X X .. .. ..
How many border/tax officials do you think are involved in corruption? X X X X X X X .. .. ..
Country Coverage 19 18 18 18 15 15 15 .. .. ..
Year of Publication 2008 2005 2005 2005 2002 2002 2002 .. .. ..
42
2008 2007 2006 2005 2004 2003 2002 2000 1998 1996
Voice and Accountability
NA .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
Political Stability and Absence of Violence
NA .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
Government Effectiveness
Quality of Public Administration
X X X X X X X X .. ..
Efficiency of Revenue Mob ilization X X X X X X X X .. ..
Quality of Budgetary & Financial Management
X X X X X X X X .. ..
Regulatory Quality
Trade policy X X X X X X X X .. ..
Competitive environment
X X X X X X X X .. ..
Rule of Law
Property rights X X X X X X X X .. ..
Control of Corruption
Anticorruption and Accounting Institutions X X X X X X X X .. ..
Country Coverage 28 29 26 25 26 26 25 25 .. ..
Year of Publication 2008 2007 2006 2005 2004 2003 2002 2000 .. ..
43
Data Provider World Bank and European Bank for Reconstruction and Development
Description Multilateral development banks headquartered in Washington, United States and London, United
Kingdom
Website http://www.worldbank.org/eca/governance
Data Source Business Environment and Enterprise Performance Survey.
Type Survey
Respondents Firms
Frequency Every three years since 1999
Coverage Transition economies in Eastern Europe and Former Soviet Union
Public Access Full access to firm-level data through website noted above
Description This survey, part of the Investment Climate Survey project of the World Bank, collects a wide
range of data on firms' financial performance and their perceptions of the regulatory and
investment climate.
2008 2007 2006 2005 2004 2003 2002 2000 1998 1996
Voice and Accountability
NA .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
Political Stability and Absence of Violence
NA .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
Government Effectiveness
How problematic are telecommunica tions for the growth of yo ur busines s X X X X X X X X .. ..
How problematic is electric ity for the growth of your bus iness. X X X X X X X X .. ..
How problematic is transportation for the growth of yo ur business. X X X X X X X X .. ..
Regulatory Quality
How problematic are labor regulations for the growth of your business. X X X X X X X X .. ..
How problematic are tax regulations for the growth of your business. X X X X X X X X .. ..
How problematic are cust oms and trade regulations for the growth of your business. X X X X X X X X .. ..
Rule of Law
How often is following characteristic associated with the court syst em: Fair and honest X X X X X X X X .. ..
How often is following characteristic associated with the court syst em: enforce able X X X X X X X X .. ..
How often is following characteristic associated with the court syst em: Quic knes s X X X X X X X X .. ..
How problematic is crime for the growth of your business. X X X X X X X X .. ..
How problematic is judiciary for the growth of your business. X X X X X X X X .. ..
Control of Corr uption
How co mmon is for firms to have to pay irregular additional payments to get things done X X X X X X X X .. ..
Percentage of total annual sales do firms pay in unofficial payments to public officials X X X X X X X X .. ..
How often do firms mak e extra payments in connec tion with taxes, cust oms, and judiciary?
X X X X X X X X .. ..
How problematic is co rruption for the growth of your business. X X X X X X X X .. ..
Country Coverage 30 27 27 27 27 27 27 18 .. ..
Year of Publication 2008 2005 2005 2005 2002 2002 2002 2000 .. ..
44
2008 2007 2006 2005 2004 2003 2002 2000 1998 1996
Voice and Accountability
NA .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
Government Effectiveness
ORI: Bureaucratic delays X X X X X X X X X X
Regulatory Quality
NA .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
Rule of Law
ORI: Enforceability of contract s X X X X X X X X X X
QLM: Direct Financial Fraud, Money Laundering and Organize d Crime X X X X X X X X X X
Control of Corruption
PRI: Internal Causes of Political Risk: Mentality, including xenophobia, nationalism,
co rruption, nepotism, willingness to co mpromise. X X X X X X X X X X
Country Coverage (PRI, ORI) 101 101 101 101 101 101 101 101 101 101
Country Coverage (QLM) 115 115 115 115 115 115 115 115 115 115
Year of Publication 2008 2007 2006 2005 2004 2003 2002 2000 1998 1996
45
2008 2007 2006 2005 2004 2003 2002 2000 1998 1996
Voice a nd Accountability
Political Participation (SI) X X X X X X X .. .. ..
Stabi lity of Democratic Institutions (SI)
X X X X X X X .. .. ..
Political and Social Integ ration (SI) X X X X X X X .. .. ..
Government Effectiveness
Consensus Building (MI) X X X X X X X .. .. ..
Governance Capability (MI)
X X X X X X X .. .. ..
Resource Efficiency (MI) X X X X X X X .. .. ..
Regulatory Quality
Competition (SI) X X X X X X X .. .. ..
Rule of Law
Rule of Law (SI) X X X X X X X .. .. ..
Control of Corruption
Anti-Corruption policy X X X X X .. .. .. .. ..
46
Domestic Political Risks: Civil War: An increase in scope or intensity of one or more civil
wars that reduce s the G DP growth rate by 4% during any 12-month period. X X X X X X X X X X
Domestic Political Risks: Major Urban Riot: An incr ease in scope, intensity, or frequency of
riot ing that reduce s the G DP growth rate by 1% during any 12-mont h period. X X X X X X X X X X
Government Effectiveness
Domestic Political Risk: Gove rnment Instability: An incr ease in government perso nnel
t urnover rate at senior leve ls that reduce s the GDP growt h rat e by 2% during any 12-mont h X X X X X X X X X X
period.
Domestic Political Risk: Gove rnment Ineff ective ness : A decline in government personnel
qualit y at any level that reduce s the G DP growth rate by 1% during any 12-mont h period. X X X X X X X X X X
Domestic Political Risk: Instit utional Failure: A deterioration of government capacity to cope
with national problems as a result of institutional rigidity or gridloc k that reduce s t he GDP X X X X X X X X X X
growth rate by 1% during any 12-month period.
Regulatory Quality
Policies Non-Tax: Regulations -- Exports : A 2% reduction in export volume as a resu lt of a
worse ning in export regulations or restrict ions (su ch as export limits) during any 12-month X X X X X X X X X X
period, with respect to the level at the time of the assessment .
Policies Non-Tax: Regulations -- I mports: A 2% reduct ion in import volume as a res ult of a
worse ning in import regulat ions or restrictions (such as import quotas) during any 12-month X X X X X X X X X X
period, with respect to the level at the time of the assessment .
Policies Non-Tax: Regulations -- O ther Business: An incr ease in ot her regulatory burdens,
with respect t o t he level at t he time of t he asse ssm ent, t hat reduce s total aggregate X X X X X X X X X X
investment in real LCU terms by 10%
Policies Non-Tax: O wnership of Business by Non-Residents: A 1-point incr ease on a s cale
f rom "0" t o "10" in legal restrictions on ownership of bus iness by non-resident s during any 12- X X X X X X X X X X
month period.
Policies Non-Tax: O wnership of Equities by Non-Residents: A 1-point incr ease on a sc ale
f rom "0" t o "10" in legal restrictions on ownership of equities by non-resident s during any 12- X X X X X X X X X X
month period.
Rule of Law
O utco mes Non-Price: Loss es and Costs of Crime: A 1-point incr ease on a sca le f rom "0" t o
"10" in crime during any 12-month period.
X X X X X X X X X X
Domestic Political Risk: Kidnapping of Foreigners: An incr ease in scope, intensity, or
f requency of kidnapping of foreigners t hat reduce s the G DP growth rate by 1% during any 12- X X X X X X X X X X
month period.
Policies Non-Tax: Enf orceabilit y of Gove rnment Contracts: A 1 point decline on a sc ale f rom
"0" to "10" in t he enforceability of co ntract s during any 12-month period. X X X X X X X X X X
Policies Non-Tax: Enf orceabilit y of Private Contracts: A 1-point decline on a scale from "0" to
"10" in the legal enf orceabilit y of contracts during any 12-mont h period.
X X X X X X X X X X
Control of Corruption
Risk Event Outco me non-price: Losses and Cost s of Corrupt ion: A 1-point incr ease on a
s cale from "0" t o "10" in corrupt ion during any 12-month period. X X X X X X X X X X
Country Coverage 144 142 142 122 118 118 117 111 106 106
Year of Publi cation 2008 2007 2006 2005 2004 2003 2002 2000 1998 1996
47
2008 2007 2006 2005 2004 2003 2002 2000 1998 1996
Voice and Accountability
NA .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
Government Effectiveness
NA .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
Regulatory Quality
Price liberalisation X X X X X X X X X X
Trade & foreign exchange system X X X X X X X X X X
Competition policy X X X X X X X X X X
Rule of Law
NA .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
Control of Corruption
NA .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
Country coverage 29 29 29 27 27 27 27 26 26 27
Year of Publication 2008 2007 2006 2005 2004 2003 2002 2000 1998 1996
48
2008 2007 2006 2005 2004 2003 2002 2000 1998 1996
Voice a nd Accountability
NA .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
Government Effectiveness
Global E-governance Index X X X X X X X .. .. ..
Regulatory Quality
NA .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
Rule of Law
NA .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
Control of Corruption
NA .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
49
2008 2007 2006 2005 2004 2003 2002 200 0 1998 1996
Voice and Accountability
Democracy Index X X X .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
Vested interests X X X X X X X X X X
Accountablity of Public Officials X X X X X X X X X X
Human Rights X X X X X X X X X X
Freedom of association X X X X X X X X X X
Government Effectiveness
Quality of bureaucracy / institutional effectiveness X X X X X X X X X X
Excessive bureacucracy / red tape X X X X X X X X X X
Regulatory Quality
Unfair competitive practices X X X X X X X X X X
Price controls X X X X X X X X X X
Discrimi natory tariffs X X X X X X X X X X
Excessive protections X X X X X X X X X X
Discrimi natory taxes X X X X X X X X X X
Rule of Law
Violent crime X X X X X X X X X X
Organized crime X X X X X X X X X X
Fairness of judicial process X X X X X X X X X X
Enforceabi lity of contracts X X X X X X X X X X
Speediness of judicial process X X X X X X X X X X
Confisca tion/expropriation X X X X X X X X X X
Intellectual property rights protection X X X X X X X X X X
Private property protection X X X X X X X X X X
Control of Corruption
Corruption among public officials X X X X X X X X X X
Country coverage 150 150 152 127 125 120 120 120 120 120
Country coverage (democracy Index) 170 170 170
Year of Publication 2008 2007 2006 2005 2004 2003 2002 2000 1998 1996
50
2008 2007 2006 2005 2004 2003 2002 2000 1998 1996
Voice and Accountability
Nations in Transit
Media X X X X X X X X X X
Civil Soci ety X X X X X X X X X X
Electoral Process X X X X X X X X X X
Government Effectiveness
NA .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
Regulatory Quality
N/A .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
Rule of Law
Nations in Transit: Ju dicial framework and independence X X X X X X X X X X
Countries at the Crossroads: Rule of Law X X X X X .. .. .. .. ..
Control of Corruption
Nations in Transit: Corruption X X X X X X X X X ..
Countries at the Crossroads: Anti-Corruption and Transparency X X X X X .. .. .. .. ..
Country coverage (FRH) 197 197 197 196 196 196 196 192 191 191
Country coverage (FRP) 195 195 195 194 194 193 193 187 186 187
Country coverage (FNT) 29 29 29 29 29 28 27 27 27 27
Country coverage (CCR) 62 62 62 62 60 30 .. .. .. ..
Year of Publication (FRH, FRP & FNT) 2009 2008 2007 2006 2005 2004 2003 2001 1999 1997
Year of Publication (CCR) 2007 2007 2006 2006 2005 2004 .. .. .. ..
51
2008 2007 2006 2005 2004 2003 2002 2000 1998 1996
Voice and Accountability
NA .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
Government Effectiveness
NA .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
Regulatory Quality
NA .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
Rule of Law
NA .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
Control of Corruption
Frequency of corruption among public institutions: Political parties X X X X X .. .. .. .. ..
Frequency of corruption among public institutions: Parliament/Legislature X X X X X .. .. .. .. ..
Frequency of corruption among public institutions: Media X X X X X .. .. .. .. ..
Frequency of corruption among public institutions: The military .. X X X X .. .. .. .. ..
Frequency of corruption among public institutions: Education system .. X X X X .. .. .. .. ..
Frequency of corruption among public institutions: Legal system/Judiciary X X X X X .. .. .. .. ..
Frequency of corruption among public institutions: Medical services .. X X X X .. .. .. .. ..
Frequency of corruption among public institutions: Police .. X X X X .. .. .. .. ..
Frequency of corruption among public institutions: Registry and permit services .. X X X X .. .. .. .. ..
Frequency of corruption among public institutions: Utilities (telephone, electricity, wa .. X X X X .. .. .. .. ..
Frequency of corruption among public institutions: Tax revenue .. X X X X .. .. .. .. ..
Frequency of corruption among public institutions: Customs .. .. .. X X .. .. .. .. ..
Frequency of corruption among public institutions: Public officials X .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
Frequency of household bribery X X X X X .. .. .. .. ..
Country coverage * 79 78 79 74 62 .. .. .. .. ..
Year of Publication 2008 2007 2006 2005 2004 .. .. .. .. ..
52
2008 2007 2006 2005 2004 2003 2002 2000 1998 1996
Voice and Accountability
Firms are u sually informed clearly and transparently by the Government on changes in policies affecting
X X X .. X X X .. .. ..
their i ndustry
Newspapers can publish stories of their choosing without fear of censorship or retaliation X X X X X X X .. .. ..
When deciding upon policie s and contracts, Government officials favor well-connected firms X X X X X X X X .. ..
Influe nce of legal contribu tions to political parties on specific public policy outcomes .. .. X .. X X X .. .. ..
Effecti veness of national Parliame nt/Congress as a law making and oversight institution X X X X X X X .. .. ..
Government Effectiveness
Quality of general infrastructure X X X X X X X X X X
Quality of public schools X X X X X X X X X X
Time spent by senior management dealing with government officials .. .. X X X X X X X X
Regulatory Quality
Administrative regulations are burdensome X X X X X X X X X X
Tax system is distortio nary X X X X X X X X X X
Import b arriers / cost of tariffs a s obstacle to growth X X X X X X X X X X
Competition in local market is limited X X X X X X X X X ..
It is easy to start company X X X .. X X X X X ..
Anti monopoly policy is lax and ineffective X X X X X X X X X X
Environmental regulations hurt competitiveness X X X X X X X X X ..
Rule of Law
Common crime imposes costs on business X X X X X X X .. .. ..
Organized crime imposes costs on business X X X X X X X X X X
Money laundering through banks is pervasive .. .. X X X X X .. .. ..
Effecti veness of Police X X X X X X X X X X
The judiciary is independent from political influences of government, citizens, or firms X X X X X X X X X ..
Legal framework to challenge the legality of government actions is inefficient X X X X X X X X X X
Intell ectual Property protection is weak X X X X X X X X X X
Protection of financial assets is weak X X X X X X X X .. ..
Illegal donation to parties are frequent .. .. X .. X X X .. .. ..
Percenta ge of firms which are unofficial or unregistered / Tax evasion X X X X X X X X X X
Control of Corruption
Public trust in financial honesty of politicians X X X X X X X X X ..
Diversion of public funds due to corruption is common X X X X X X X .. .. ..
Frequent for firms to make extra payments conn ected to trade permits X X X X X X X X X X
Frequent for firms to make extra payments conn ected to public utilities X X X X X X X X X X
Frequent for firms to make extra payments conn ected to tax payments X X X X X X X X X X
Frequent for firms to make extra payments conn ected to loan applications .. .. .. .. X X X X X X
Frequent for firms to make extra payments conn ected to awarding of public contracts X X X X X X X X X X
Frequent for firms to make extra payments to influence laws, policies regu lations, decrees .. .. X .. X X X X X X
Frequent for firms to make extra payments to get favourable judicial deci sions X X X X X X X X X X
Extent to which firms' illegal payments to influence government policies impose costs on firms X X X X X X X X .. ..
Extent to which influence of powerful firms with political ties impose costs on other firms .. X X .. X X X .. .. ..
53
NA .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
Government Effectiveness
NA .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
Regulatory Quality
NA .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
Rule of Law
Executive Accountability
X X X .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
Judicial Accounta bility
X X X .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
Rule of Law
X X X .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
Law Enfo rcement
X X X .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
Control of Corruption
Anti-Corruption Agency
X X X .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
Country coverage 79 66 41 .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
Year of Publication 2008 2007 2006 .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
54
2008 2007 2006 2005 2004 2003 2002 2000 1998 1996
Voice and Accountability
Confidence in honesty of elections X X X .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
Political Stability and Absence of Violence
NA .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
Government Effectiveness
Satisfaction with public transportation system X X X .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
Satisfaction with roads and highways X X X .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
Satisfaction with education system X X X .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
Regulatory Quality
NA .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
Rule of Law
Confidence in the police force X X X .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
Confidence in judicial system X X X .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
Have you been a victim of crime? X X X .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
Control of Corruption
Is corruption in governmnent widespread? X X X .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
55
2008 2007 2006 2005 2004 2003 2002 2000 1998 1996
Voice a nd Accountability
NA .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
Government Effectiveness
NA .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
Regulatory Quality
Forei gn investment X X X X X X X X X X
Banking / Finance X X X X X X X X X X
Rule of Law
Property Rights X X X X X X X X X X
Control of Corruption
NA .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
Country coverage 179 157 157 157 155 155 156 155 161 150
Year of Publication 2009 2008 2007 2006 2005 2004 2003 2001 1999 1997
56
Data Provider University of Binghamton Cingranelli-Richards Human rights database (CIRI) and University of
North Carolina Political Terror Scale (PTS)
Description United States based universities
Website www.humanrightsdata.com
Data Source Cingranelli-Richards Human Rights Dataset (CIRI) and the Political Terror Scale (PTS)
Type Expert assessment
Respondents Coding by Cingranelli-Richards and Gibney teams
Frequency Annually since 1980
Coverage Global sample of countries
Public Access Yes
Description The Cingranelli-Richards dataset is a numerical coding on a 2 or 3 point scale of data on 13 human
rights, as reported in Amnesty International Human Rights Reports and the U.S. Department of
State Country Reports on Human Rights Practices. It is produced by Professor David Cingranelli
at the University of Binghamton, U.S.A. and Professor David Richards at the University of
Memphis, U.S.A. and is available at www.humanrightsdata.com. The Political Terror Scale is a
numerical coding on a 5-point scale of state-sponsored domestic political terror through
imprisonments, torture, disappearances and violations of the rule of law. It is produced by Prof.
Marc Gibney at the University of North Carolina and is available electronically at:
http://www.politicalterrorscale.org/. Note that the two sources are averaged and treated as a single
source in Political Stability and Absence of Violence since they are based on the same underlying
publications. Note also that the indicators refer to data from the previous year: we therefore lag the
data from this source by one year.
2008 2007 2006 2005 2004 2003 2002 2000 1998 1996
Voice and Accountability
Restrictions on domestic and foreign travel (CIRI) X X X X X X X X X X
Freedom of political participation (CIRI) X X X X X X X X X X
Imprisonments because of ethnicity, race, or political, religious beliefs? (CIRI) X X X X X X X X X X
Freedom of Speech (CIRI) X X X X X X X X X X
Government Effectiveness
NA .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
Regulatory Quality
NA .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
Rule of Law
Independence of judiciary (CIRI) X X X X X X X X X X
Control of Corruption
NA .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
Country coverage (CIRI) 192 192 192 192 192 159 159 159 159 159
Country coverage (PTS) 180 180 177 176 178 178 178 178 177 174
Year of Publication 2008 2008 2007 2006 2005 2004 2003 2001 1999 1997
57
2008 2007 2006 2005 2004 2003 2002 2000 1998 1996
Voice a nd Accountability
Policy a nd legal framework for rural organizations X X X X X .. .. .. .. ..
Dialo gue between government and rural organizations X X X X X .. .. .. .. ..
Government Effectiveness
Allocation & management of public resources for rural development X X X X X .. .. .. .. ..
Regulatory Quality
Enabling conditions for rural financial services develo pment X X X X X .. .. .. .. ..
Investment climate for rural businesses X X X X X .. .. .. .. ..
Access to agricultural in put and produce markets X X X X X .. .. .. .. ..
Rule of Law
Access to land X X X X X .. .. .. .. ..
Access to water for agriculture X X X X X .. .. .. .. ..
Control of Corruption
Accountability, transparency and corruption in rural areas X X X X X .. .. .. .. ..
58
2008 2007 2006 2005 2004 2003 2002 2000 1998 1996
Voice a nd Accountability
NA .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
Government Effectiveness
NA .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
Regulatory Quality
NA .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
Rule of Law
NA .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
Control of Corruption
NA .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
Country Coverage 185 184 182 177 167 .. .. .. .. ..
Year of public ation 2008 2007 2006 2005 2004 .. .. .. .. ..
59
Data Provider French Ministry of the Economy, Finance and Industry and the Agence Francais de Developpement
2008 2007 2006 2005 2004 2003 2002 2000 1998 1996
Voice and Accountability
Satisfaction with democracy
X X X X X X X X X X
Trust in Parliament
X X X X X X X X X X
Political Stability and Absence of Violence
NA
.. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
Government Effectiveness
Trust in Government
X X X X X X X .. .. X
Regulator y Quality
NA .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
Rule of Law
Trust in Ju diciary X X X X X X X X X X
Trust in Police X X X X X X X X X X
Have you been a victim of crime?
X X X X X X X X X X
Country Coverage 18 18 18 18 18 17 17 17 17 17
Year of publication 2008 2007 2006 2005 2004 2003 2002 2000 1998 1996
61
2008 2007 2006 2005 2004 2003 2002 2000 1998 1996
Voice and Accountability
Military Involvement in Poli tics X .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
Inclusiveness / Patronage X .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
Relig ious Freedom X .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
Opposi tion X .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
Government Effectiveness
Bureaucracy (MIG) .. X X X X X X .. .. ..
Regulatory Quality
Unfair Trade (MIG) .. X X X X X X .. .. ..
Unfair Competition (MIG) .. X X X X X X .. .. ..
Stock Exchange / Capital Ma rkets X .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
Forei gn Investment X .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
Rule of Law
Legal Safeguards (MIG) .. X X X X X X .. .. ..
Organized Crime (MIG) .. X X X X X X .. .. ..
Nationalisation / Expropriation X .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
Control of Corruption
Corruption (MIG) .. X X X X X X .. .. ..
Cronyism X .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
Government Efforts to Tackle Corruption X .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
62
2008 2007 2006 2005 2004 2003 2002 2000 1998 1996
Voice and Accountability
Media Sustainability Index X X X X X X X .. .. ..
Government Effectiveness
NA .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
Regulatory Quality
NA .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
Rule of Law
NA .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
Control of Corruption
NA .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
Country Coverage * 76 76 63 38 20 20 20 .. .. ..
Year of publication 2009 2008 2007 2005 2005 2004 2002 .. .. ..
63
2008 2007 2006 2005 2004 2003 2002 2000 1998 1996
Voice and Accountability
Open Budget Initiative X X X X .. .. .. .. .. ..
Political Stability and Absence of Violence
NA .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
Government Effectiveness
NA .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
Regulatory Quality
NA .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
Rule of Law
NA .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
Control of Corruption
NA .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
Country Coverage 85 59 59 59 .. .. .. .. .. ..
Year of publication 2008 2006 2006 2006 .. .. .. .. .. ..
64
2008 2007 2006 2005 2004 2003 2002 2000 1998 1996
Voice and Accountability
NA .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
Government Effectiveness
Management of external debt X X X X X X X X X X
Quality public administration X X X X X X X X .. ..
Budget management X X X X X X X X X X
Efficiency of reve nue mobilization / public expenditures X X X X X X X X X X
Regulatory Quality
Busi ness regulatory environment X X X X X X X X X ..
Trade policy X X X X X X X X X X
Rule of Law
Property rights X X X X X X X X X ..
Control of Corruption
Transparency, accountability and corruption in public sector X X X X X X X X X ..
Country coverage 142 140 136 134 135 136 136 136 136 131
Year of Publication 2008 2007 2006 2005 2004 2003 2002 2000 1998 1996
65
2008 2007 2006 2005 2004 2003 2002 2000 1998 1996
Voice and Accountability
NA .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
Government Effectiveness
NA .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
Regulatory Quality
NA .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
Rule of Law
NA .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
Control of Corruption
To what extent does corruption exist in a way that detracts from the
business environment for foreign companies? X X X X X X X X X X
Country Coverage 15 13 13 13 12 12 12 12 12 12
Year of publication 2008 2007 2006 2005 2004 2003 2002 2000 1998 1997
66
Military in Politics The military are not elect ed by anyo ne, so their participation in gove rnment,
either direct or indirect, reduces accountability and therefore represents a risk. The threat of
military intervention might lead as well to an anticipated potentially inefficie nt change in policy or X X X X X X X X X X
eve n in government. It also works as an indica tion that the government is unable to function
effect ive ly and that the co untry has an uneasy environment for foreign business.
Democratic Accountability. Quantifies how responsive gove rnment is to its people, on the basis
that the less response there is the more likely is that the gove rnment will fall, peac efully or violently.
It includes not only if free and fair elections are in place, but als o how likely is the gove rnment to X X X X X X X X X X
remain in power or remain popular.
Ext ernal conflict : The external co nflict measu re is an assessm ent both of the risk to the incu mbent
government and to inward investment. It ranges from trade restrict ions and embargoes, whether
impose d by a single co untry, a group of co untries, or the international community as a whole,
X X X X X X X X X X
through geopolitical disputes, armed threats, exch anges of fire on borders, border incu rs ions,
foreign-supported insurgency, and full-sca le warfare.
Ethnic tensions : This component meas ures the degree of tension within a co untry attributable to
racial, nationality, or language divis ions. Lower ratings are given to countries where racial and
nationality tensions are high beca use opposing groups are intolerant and unwilling to compromise. X X X X X X X X X X
Higher ratings are given to countries where tensions are minimal, eve n though su ch differences
may still exist.
Government Effectiveness
Bureaucratic Quality. Measures institutional strength and quality of the civil se rvice , assess how
much strength and expertise bureaucrats have and how able they are to manage political
alternations without dras tic interruptions in government se rvice s, or policy ch anges . Good X X X X X X X X X X
performers have so mewhat autonomous bureaucracies, free from politica l pressu res, and an
est ablish ed mechanism for recruitment and training.
Regulatory Quality
Investment Profile. Assessm ent of fact ors that affect the risk to operations : co ntract
viability/expropriation, repatriation and payment delays. X X X X X X X X X X
Rule of Law
Law and Order. The Law sub-co mponent is an asse ssment of the st rength and impartiality of the
legal syst em, while the Order s ub-component is an assessm ent of popular obse rva nce of the law. X X X X X X X X X X
Control of Corruption
Corruption. Measures corruption within the political s ystem, whic h dis torts the eco nomic and
financial environment, reduces the efficiency of government and business by enabling people to
assu me positions of power through patronage rather than ability, and introduce s an inherently X X X X X X X X X X
instability in the political system.
Country Coverage 140 140 140 140 140 140 140 140 140 130
Year of public ation 2008 2007 2006 2005 2004 2003 2002 2000 1998 1996
67
2008 2007 2006 2005 2004 2003 2002 2000 1998 1996
Voice and Accountability
Press Freedom Index X X X X X X X .. .. ..
Government Effectiveness
NA .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
Regulatory Quality
NA .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
Rule of Law
NA .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
Control of Corruption
NA .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
68
2008 2007 2006 2005 2004 2003 2002 2000 1998 1996
Voice and Accountability
NA .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
Government Effectiveness
NA .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
Regulatory Quality
NA .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
Rule of Law
Trafficking in People X X X X X X X X .. ..
Control of Corruption
NA .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
69
2008 2007 2006 2005 2004 2003 2002 2000 1998 1996
Voice and Accountability
Trust in Parliament X X X X X .. .. .. .. ..
Satisfaction with democracy X X X X X .. .. .. .. ..
Government Effectiveness
NA .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
Regulatory Quality
NA .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
Rule of Law
Trust in Supreme Court X X X X X .. .. .. .. ..
Trust in Justice system X X X X X .. .. .. .. ..
Trust in Police X X X X X .. .. .. .. ..
Have you been a victim of crime? X X X X X .. .. .. .. ..
Control of Corruption
Frequency of corruption among government officials X X X X X .. .. .. .. ..
Country coverage 23 22 20 11 11 .. .. .. .. ..
Year of Publication 2008 2006 2006 2004 2004 .. .. .. .. ..
70
2008 2007 2006 2005 2004 2003 2002 2000 1998 1996
Voice and Accountability
Transp arency of Government policy X X X X X X X X X X
Government Effectiveness
X X X X X X X X .. X
Gove rnment economic policies do not adapt quickl y to c hanges in the eco nomy
The public se rvice is not independent from politica l interference
X X X X X X X X X ..
Gove rnment decisions are not effec tively implemented X X X X X X X X X ..
Bureaucracy hinders business activity X X X X X X X X X X
The distribution infras tructure of goods and service s is generally inefficient
X X X X X X X X .. X
Policy direction is not cons ist ent X X X X X .. .. .. .. ..
Regulatory Quality
Protectionism in the country negatively affects the conduct of business X X X X X X X X X ..
Competition legislation in yo ur co untry does not prevent unfair competition X X X X X X X X X X
Price co ntrols affect pricing of products in most industries
X X X X X X X X X X
Acce ss to ca pital markets (foreign and domestic) is easily available
X X X X X X X .. .. ..
Ease of doing business is not a co mpetitive adva ntage for yo ur co untry
X X X X X .. .. .. .. ..
Financial inst itutions' transparency is not widely deve loped in your c ountry X X X X X X X .. .. ..
Customs' authorities do not facilitate the efficient transit of goods
X X X X X X X X X ..
The legal framework is detrimental to your co untry's c ompetitiveness X X X X X X X X X ..
Foreign inve stors are free to acquire control in domestic co mpanies X X X X X X X X X X
Public sec tor co ntract s are sufficiently open to foreign bidders X X X X X X X X X X
Real personal taxes are non dist ortionary X X X X X X X X X X
Real c orporate taxes are non dist ortionary
X X X X X X X X X ..
Banking regulation does not hinder competitiveness X X X X X X X .. .. ..
Labor regulations hinder business activities X X X X X .. .. .. .. ..
Subsidies impair ec onomic development
X X X X X .. .. .. .. ..
Ease to st art a business
X X X X X .. .. .. .. ..
Rule of Law
Tax evasion is a common practice in your country X X X X X X X X X ..
Just ic e is not fairly administered in society X X X X X X X X X X
Perso nal secu rity and private property are not adequately protect ed
X X X X X X X X X X
Parallel eco nomy impairs eco nomic deve lopment in yo ur country X X X X X X X X X X
Patent and copyright protection is not adequately enforced in your co untry
X X X X X X X .. X X
Control of Corruption
Bribing and corruption exist in the eco nomy X X X X X X X X X X
Country coverage 55 55 53 51 51 51 49 49 46 46
Year of Publication 2008 2007 2006 2005 2004 2003 2002 2000 1998 1996
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Representativeness How well the population and organised interests can make their
voices heard i n the political system. Provided representation is handled fairly and X X X X X X X X X ..
effectively, it will ensu re greater stability and better designed policies.
Regulatory Quality
Tax Effectiveness How efficient the country’s tax collection system is. The rules may
be clear an d transparent, but whether they are enforce d consistently. This factor looks X X X X X X X X X ..
at the relati ve e ffectiveness too of corporate and personal, indirect and direct taxation.
..
Rule of Law
Judicial Independence An assessment of how far the state a nd other outside actors
can influ ence and distort the le gal system. This will determine the level of legal X X X X X X X X X ..
impartiality i nvestors can expect.
Crime How much of a threat businesses face from crime such as kidnapping,
extortion, street violence , burglary and so on. These problems can cause major
inconvenience for foreign investors and req uire them to take expensive securi ty X X X X X X X X X ..
precautions.
Control of Corruption
Corruption : An a ssessment of the in trusiveness of the country’s b ureaucracy. The
amount of red tape likely to countered is assessed, as is the likelihood of encountering X X X X X X X X X ..
corrupt officials and other groups.
Country Coverage 203 202 202 201 202 186 186 181 181 ..
Year of Publication 2008 2007 2006 2005 2004 2003 2002 2000 1998 ..
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Representative Sources
BRI Fractionalization of political sp ectrum and the power of these factions.
Fractionalization by language, ethnic and/or religious groups and the power of these factions.
Restric tive (coerc ive) measures required to retain power.
Organiza tion and strength of force s for a radical government.
Societal co nflict involving demonstrations, strike s, and street violence .
Inst ability as perceived by non-const itutional changes, assas sinations, and guerrilla wars.
DRI Military Coup Risk
Major Insurgency/Rebellion
Political Terrorism
Political Assassination
Civil War
Major Urban Riot
EIU Armed conflict
Violent demonstrations
Soci al Unrest
International tensions
GAD Autonomy and Separatism
Civil Unrest
State of Emergency / Martial Law
Active Terrorist Groups in the Last Two Years
GCS Country terrorist threat : Does the threat of terrorism in the country impose significant co sts on firms?
HUM Frequency of political killings
Frequency of disappearance s
Frequency of torture
IJT Security Risk Rating
IPD Conflicts of ethnic, religious, regional nature …
Violent actions by underground political organisations
Violent social conflicts
External public se curity
PRS Internal Conflict : Asse sses politica l violence and its influence on governance.
External conflict: The external conflict measure is an as sessm ent both of the risk to the incu mbent government and to inward invest ment.
Government Stability. Measures the government’s ability to ca rry out its declared programs , and its ability to stay in office .
Ethnic tensions : This component measu res the degree of tension within a country attributable to racial, nationality, or language divisions.
Non-representative Sources
AEO Civil Tensions
WCY Risk of political instability
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Representative Sources
BRI Bureaucratic delays
DRI Government Inst ability : An increase in government perso nnel turnove r rate at senior levels that reduces the GDP growth rate by 2% during any
12-month period.
Government Ineffectiveness: A decline in government personnel quality at any leve l that reduc es the GDP growth rate by 1% during any 12-
month period.
Institutional Failure: A deterioration of government c apacity to co pe with national problems as a resu lt of inst itutional rigidity that reduc es the
GDP growth rate by 1% during any 12-month period.
EGV Global E-government
EIU Quality of bureaucracy
Excessi ve bureaucracy / red tape
GCS Quality of general infrastruct ure
Quality of public schools
GWP Satisf action with public transportation syst em
Satisf action with roads and highways
Satisf action with education syst em
IPD Government-citizen relations
Capacity of the tax administration to implement measu res decided on
Quality of the supply of public goods: education and basic health
Capacity of the political authorities
PRS
Bureaucratic Quality. Measu res inst itutional strength and quality of the civil service, asse sses how much st rength and expertise bureauc rats
have and how able they are to manage politica l alternations without drastic interruptions in government se rvice s, or policy ch anges.
WMO Policy consistency and forward planning: How confident businesses can be of the co ntinuity of economic policy stance - whether a ch ange of
gove rnment will entail major policy disruption, and whether the cu rrent gove rnment has pursued a coherent st rategy.
Bureaucracy : An assessm ent of the quality of the country’s bureaucracy. The better the bureaucracy the quicker decisions are made and the
more easily foreign investors can go about their business.
Non-representative Sources
ADB Management of public debt
Policies to improve efficiency of public se ctor
Revenue Mobilization
Budget Management
AFR Government handling of water and sa nitation services
Government handling of roads and bridges
Government handling of electric ity supply
Government handling of health se rvices
Government handling of educa tion services
ASD Civil service
Revenue Mobiliza tion and Budget Management
Management and Efficiency of Public Expenditures
BPS How problematic are telecommunications for the growth of your business
How problematic is electricity for the growth of your business.
How problematic is transp ortation for the growth of your business.
BTI Consensus Building
Governance Capability
Effective Use of Reso urces
CPIA Management of external debt
Quality public Administration
Revenue Mobilization
Budget Management
IFDAllocation & management of publlic reso urces for rural deve lopment
LBO Trust in Government
WCY Government eco nomic policies do not adapt quickl y to changes in the economy
The public servic e is not independent from political interference
Government dec isions are not effectively implemented
Bureaucracy hinders business act ivity
The distribution infrastructure of goods and services is generally inefficient
Policy direct ion is not co nsistent
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Representative Sources
BRI Enforc eability of contracts
Direct Financia l Fraud, Money Laundering and Organized Crime
DRI Losses and Costs of Crime
Kidnapping of Foreigners
Enforc eability of Gove rnment Contracts
Enforc eability of Priva te Contracts
EIU Violent crime
Organize d crime
Fairness of judicial process
Enforc eability of contracts
Speediness of judicial process
Confisca tion/expropriation
GAD Nationalis ation / Expropriation
GCS Common crime imposes costs on busines s
Organize d crime imposes costs on business
Quality of Police
The judiciary is independent from politica l influence s of members of government, citizens or firms
Legal framework to challenge the legality of government actions is inefficient
Intellectual Property protection is weak
Protec tion of financial assets is weak
Tax evasio n
GWP Confidence in the police forc e
Confidence in judicial syst em
Have you been a victim of crime?
HER Property Rights
HUM Independenc e of Ju diciary
IPD Respect for law in relations between citizens and the administration
Secu rity of perso ns and goods
Organise d c riminal activity (drug-trafficki ng, arms-trafficki ng, etc.
Importance of the informal ec onomy
Importance of tax evasion in the formal sect or
Importance of cust oms evasion (smuggling, under-declaration, etc)
Running of the justice syst em
Secu rity of traditional property rights
Secu rity of property rights: formal property rights
Secu rity of contracts between private agents
Government respect for contracts
Settlement of economic disputes: justice in commercial matters
Intellectual property
Arrangements for the protection of intellect ual property
Agricultural sect or: se curity of rights and property transact ions
PRS Law and Order. The Law su b-component is an as sessm ent of the strength and impartiality of the legal syst em, while the Order su b-
co mponent is an asse ssm ent of popular observance of the law (assess ed separately).
TPR Trafficki ng in People Report
WMO Ju dicial Independence An asse ssm ent of how far the state and other outside actors can influence and dist ort the legal syst em. This will
determine the level of legal impartiality inve stors c an expect.
Crime - How much of a threat bus inesses face from crime suc h as kidnapping, extortion, street vio lence, burglary...
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Non-representative Sources
ADB Property Rights
AFR Base d on yo ur experiences, how easy or diffic ult is it to obtain help from the police when yo u need it?
Over the past year, how often, if ever, have you or anyone in your family feared crime in yo ur own home?
Over the past year, how often, if ever, have you or anyone in your family had s omething stolen from your house?
Over the past year, how often, if ever, have you or anyone in your family been physi cally attacke d?
Trust in co urts
ASD Rule of Law
BPS Fairness, honesty, enforceability, and quickness of the court system
How problematic is crime for the growth of your business.
How problematic is judiciary for the growth of your busin ess.
BTI Rule of Law
Priva te Property
CCR Rule of Law
CPIA Property rights
FRH Ju dicial Framework and Independence
GII Executive Accountability
Judicial Accountability
Rule of Law
Law Enforcement
IFD Access to land
Access to water for agricu lture
LBO Trust in Ju diciary
Trust in Police
Have you been a victim of crime?
VAB Trust in Justice
Trust in Police
Trust in Supreme Court
Have you been a victim of crime?
WCY Tax eva sion is a co mmon practice in your co untry
Justice is not fairly administered in society
Personal se curity and private property are not adequately protected
Parallel economy impairs economic development in your co untry
Patent and co pyright protect ion is not adequately enforc ed in yo ur country
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Representative Sources
BRI I nternal Causes of Political Risk : Mentality, including xenophobia, nationalism, corruption, nepotis m, willingness to compromise
Indirect Diversion of Funds
DRI Losse s and Costs of Corruption
EIU Corruption
GAD Cronyism
Government Efforts to Tackl e Corruption
GCS Public trust in financial hones ty of politic ians
Diversion of public funds due to corruption is common
Frequent for firms to make extra payments co nnected to: import/export permits
Frequent for firms to make extra payments co nnected to: public utilities
Frequent for firms to make extra payments co nnected to tax payments
Frequent for firms to make extra payments co nnected to: awarding of public co ntract s
Frequent for firms to make extra payments co nnected to: getting favorable judicial decisions
Extent to which firms' illegal payments to influence gove rnment policies impos e co sts on other firms
GWP Is corruption in government widespread?
IPD Corruption
PRS Corruption. Measu res co rruption within the political syst em, which distorts the economic and financial environment, reduces the efficiency of
gove rnment and business by enabling people to assu me positions of power through patronage rather than ability, and introduce s an
inherently instability in the political system.
WMO Corruption : This index assesses the intrusiveness of the country’s bureaucracy. The amount of red tape like ly to countered is assessed, as is
the like lihood of enco untering corrupt officials and other groups.
Non-representative Sources
ADB Transparency / co rruption
AFR How many elected leaders (parliamentarians or local co uncilors) do yo u think are involved in co rruption?
How many judges and magist rates do you think are invo lve d in corruption?
How many gove rnment officials do yo u think are involved in co rruption?
How many border/tax officials do you think are involve d in corruption?
ASD Anti-corruption
BPS How common is for firms to have to pay irregular additional payments to get things done
On average, what perce nt of total annual sa les do firms pay in unoffic ial payments to public officials
How problematic is corruption for the growth of your business.
Frequency of bribery in taxes, cus toms and judiciary
BTI Corruption
CCR Transparency / co rruption
CPIA Transparency / co rruption
FRH Corruption
GCB Frequency of co rruption among politic al parties, gove rnment officials, parliament, media and judiciary
Frequency of household bribery
GII Anti-Corruption Agency
IFD Accountability, transp arency and corruption in rural areas
LBO Have yo u heard of act s of corruption?
PRC Corruption Index
VAB Frequency of corruption among government officials
WCY Bribing and co rruption exist in the economy
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Note: “Est.” refers to estimate, “S.E.” refers to standard errors, and “N.” refers to number of sources. The standard
errors have the following interpretation: there is roughly a 70% chance that the level of governance lies within plus or
minus one standard error of the point estimate of governance.
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This appendix summarizes all of the relevant technical information regarding the
construction of the Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI). All of the technical details
provided here can be found in various papers in the "Governance Matters" series
(Kaufmann, Kraay and Zoido-Lobatón (1999a, 1999b and 2002) and Kaufmann, Kraay
and Mastruzzi (2004, 2005, 2006 and 2007). The first section explains the Unobserved
Components Model that provides the statistical basis for the WGI. The second section
explains in detail two types of rescaling applied to the aggregate WGI.
This section deals with the specification and estimation of the unobserved
components model on which the WGI are based. The basic premise of the UCM is
simple: each of our observed underlying data sources provides a noisy or imperfect
signal of the true, but unobserved, level of governance in a country. The UCM provides
a framework for extracting a minimum-variance estimate of governance from the
observed data.
Let yjk denote the score of country j on indicator k. We assume that we can write
the observed score as a linear function of unobserved governance, gj, and an error term,
εjk, as follows:
(1) y jk = α k + βk ⋅ (g j + ε jk )
where αk and βk are unknown parameters which map unobserved governance gj into the
observed data yjk. As a choice of units, we assume that g(j) is a normal random variable
with mean zero and variance one. We assume that the error term is also normally
distributed with mean zero and standard deviation σk which varies across data sources
k. We also assume that the error term is uncorrelated across data sources. 16
The parameters of the unobserved components model, αk, βk and σk have very
straightforward interpretations. Since the mean of unobserved governance and the error
term are by assumption both zero, the parameter αk simply captures the mean of the
16
This is a strong assumption, but one that is necessary for identification. See Kaufmann, Kraay,
and Zoido-Lobaton (1999a) and Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi (2006) for detailed discussion
of the validity of this assumption and the consequences of relaxing it.
98
Applying standard results for the multivariate normal distribution, the conditional
distribution of gj given the observed data yj is normal, with the following mean and
variance:
y jk − α k
(2) [ ]
E g j | y j = ∑ w jk ⋅
k∈K j βk
−1
(3) [ ]
V g j | y j = 1 + ∑ σk−2
k∈K
j
In particular, the mean of governance conditional on the data available for country j, that
we use as our estimate of governance, is just a weighted average of the standardized
scores from each data source. The weights applied to each data source are inversely
−1
proportional to the precision of each data source, i.e. w k = σ ⋅ 1 + ∑ σ k−'2 . In other
−2
k '∈K
k
j
words, data sources that provide a more precise signal of governance receive a greater
weight in the conditional mean, and hence in our estimate of governance. The variance
of the conditional distribution summarizes how reliable or precise is this estimate of
governance. This variance is smaller the larger is the number of data sources available
for each country, and the more precise are each of those data sources.
We refer to the expression in Equation (2) as the "governance estimate" for each
country, and the square root of the variance in Equation (3) as the "standard error" of the
99
In order to implement (2) and (3), we need to first estimate the unknown
parameters αk, βk and σk for every indicator k. This in turn requires us to distinguish
between "representative" and "non-representative" indicators, which we treat differently
in the estimation process. Representative indicators are indicators that cover a set of
countries in which the distribution of governance is likely to be similar to that in the world
as a whole. Practically these include all of our indicators with large cross-country
coverage of developed and developing indicators. In contrast non-representative
indicators cover either specific regions (for example the BEEPS survey of transition
economies or the Latinobarometer survey of Latin American countries), or particular
income levels (for example the World Bank CPIA ratings that cover only developing
countries). Our classification of "representative" and "non-representative" indicators is
given in Table 1 of this paper.
Summing these over all countries j and then maximizing over the unknown parameters
delivers our maximum-likelihood estimates of αk, βk and σk for every representative
indicator k. Identification requires that we have a minimum of three representative
indicators. Note that the number of data sources available for each country varies, and
so the dimension of yj and α is Kjx1, and conformably Ω is KjxKj. This way we are able
to compile the likelihood function even though there potentially are missing observations
for each country even among the representative indicators.
17
See Kaufmann, Kraay and Zoido-Lobatón (1999a) for the Bayesian interpretation of these
expressions.
100
Finally, we collect all of the parameter estimates from the representative and
non-representative surveys, and insert them into the expressions in Equations (2) and
(3) to arrive at estimates of governance and standard errors for each country. As
discussed in the next section, there are two further rescaling steps before we arrive at
the final estimates that we report.
We next perform two rescalings of the aggregate indicators obtained using the
procedure described above. We first rescale the data to set the mean of the governance
estimates to zero, and their standard deviation to one. The estimates of governance
obtained from the UCM theoretically have a mean of zero, and a standard deviation
slighly less than one. In any particular sample, however, the mean could be different.
To avoid confusion in interpreting the data, we begin by setting the mean of the
governance estimates for each indicator and year to zero, and the standard deviation to
one. In particular, for each indicator and year, we subtract the sample mean (across
countries) from each country, and divide by the sample standard deviation (across
countries). We then also divide the standard errors of the governance estimates for
each country by the sample standard deviation of the governance estimates.
This first rescaling is just a renormalization of the scores, and of course has no
impact on countries' relative positions on the governance indicators. It is also consistent
with our choice of units for governance noted above, and notably that it has a mean of
zero and a standard deviation of one in each period. If there were trends in global
averages of governance over time, this choice of units would not be appropriate.
101
The second rescaling is substantively more interesting, and addresses the fact
that the sample of countries covered by our governance indicators has expanded since
1996, and quite considerably for some of our indicators. If the new countries added
each year were broadly representative of the worldwide distribution of governance, this
too would pose no special difficulties. However, for some of our indicators, we find that
countries added in later years score on average somewhat higher than countries that
were continuously in the sample. This in turn means that it would be inappropriate to
impose a global average governance score of zero in earlier periods for the smaller set
of countries for which data is available in the earlier periods, since our earlier estimates
did not include the better-than-average performers added later. It also means that some
countries in our aggregate indicators in the earlier years would have showed small
declines in some dimensions of governance over time that were driven by the addition of
better-performing countries in later years.
The adjustment factor for the mean is simply − y T ⋅ (NT − NT −1 ) / NT −1 where NT is the number of
18
countries with data in period T and y T is the average score of the additional countries in period
T. The higher is the average score of the new entrants and/or the more new entrants there are,
the more we lower the mean in the previous period. This ensures that a hypothetical sample
consisting of our year T-1 adjusted scores for all countries combined with the year T scores for
the countries added in year T relative to T-1 would have a mean of zero and standard deviation of
one. We also adjust the standard deviation of the year T scores to ensure that the standard
deviation of this hypothetical sample would be one. We do this by multiplying the scores (and the
standard errors) for each country in year T-1 by a factor of
NT / NT −1 − ((NT − NT − ) / NT −1 ) VT + y T − y T −1 , where VT is the variance across countries in our
2 2
estimates of governance in year T for the new entrants to the sample in period T. The greater is
the dispersion in the scores of new entrants, the more we need to reduce the dispersion of scores
in the previous years.
102
• Since we adjust the scores for all countries in a given year and indicator by the
same amount, this adjustment also has no effect on the relative positions of
countries on that indicator in that year. It does however make countries' scores
more comparable over time, since the adjustment is designed to remove the
effect of adding new countries on the scores of countries already in the sample.
• As a consequence of this adjustment, global averages of the adjusted data show
moderate trends over-time, mostly improvements as the countries added over
time typically have slightly better scores than those countries continuously in the
sample. It is important to remember though that this improvement does not
reflect an average improvement for all countries in the world. Rather it reflects
the changing composition of our sample since the new entrants during this period
have had above-average performance in this dimension of governance. As
noted above there is no evidence of any significant improvement in the world
average for the country sample that has been consistently covered over time.
• This rescaling of the aggregate indicators is perfectly consistent with the
unobserved components model that we use to construct the aggregate indicators
in each period. In particular, rescaling the mean and standard deviation of the
aggregate indicators in the way that we do is equivalent to imposing slightly
different means and standard deviations of governance as a choice of units in
each of the periods. And as we have argued this changing choice of units is an
appropriate way to correct for changes in the composition of countries covered
by the indicators over time.
• Finally, for some purposes it is useful to look just at countries' percentile ranks
rather than their scores on our governance indicators. Without similar
adjustments these percentile ranks too would not be fully comparable over-time
as they too would be influenced by new entrants. Thus, we also perform such
adjustment to the percentile ranks, and when we report countries' scores in the
form of percentile ranks on our website, we compute the percentile ranks based
on a sample consisting of the actual data we have for that indicator and year,
combined with imputed data from the nearest year as described above.
103