Musket Centralisation - I Alam

THE MATCHLOCK MUSKET IN THE MUGHAL EMPIRE: AN INSTRUMENT OF
CENTRALIZATION
Author(s): Iqtidar Alam Khan
Source: Proceedings of the Indian History Congress, Vol. 59 (1998), pp. 341-359
Published by: Indian History Congress
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THE MATCHLOCK MUSKET IN THE
MUGHAL EMPIRE: AN INSTRUMENT OF
CENTRALIZATION
Iqtídar Alam Khan
Proper handguns, the arquebuses of the European records seem to

have reached India in the second half of the fifteenth century, possibly
simultaneously with or soon after the introduction of early cannons
in some of the Indian states.1 But, down to the first quarter of the
sixteenth century in India, the use of firearms as such was confined
to the siege operations or naval battles; these did not play any
noteworthy role in the open battles. It could become possible to deploy
firearms in the open battles only with the coming of matchlock musket
with Babur (1526).2 These could be fired with unprecedented accuracy
and rapidity from the ground. The introduction of light cannons which
could be carried with a cavalry force without totally hampering its
movement was an accompanying development facilitating this
significant advance in the art of warfare in India. But the key factor
in this respect was the introduction of matchlock musket.
From Babur's descriptions of the battles of Panipat (1526) and
Kanwa (1527), one can easily make out that his battle plans on both
these occasions rested mainly on the protection provided to the
artillery by his musketeers who in all probability carried Turkish
matchlocks.3 Under the expert direction of Ustad Ali Quii, Babur's
musketeers were some times capable of keeping up a barrage of fire
which it would have been possible to achieve only by adopting a system
of relay fire.4 The use of Turkish matchlocks carried by Babur's
musketeers seems to have contributed significantly to his remarkable
successes on a number of occasions during his military campaigns
in India. This role of the matchlock muskets introduced in North India
by Babur himself had a parralel in its singular contribution to th
Ottoman victories over Shah Ismail Safawi at Chaldiran in 1 5 1 4 and
over the Mamluks of Egypt in 1517. At Chaldiran, according to a
contemporary Arab chronicler, Ibn Ilyas, 12000 Ottoman soldiers
carrying muskets dumbfounded the Safawid army and caused its
complete rout. A similar impression is given by Ibn Zunbul's
description of large casualties inflicted by the Ottomans with the use
of firearms among which the muskets fitted with matchlocks carried
by Janissaries were, perhaps, the most conspicuous.5
342 IHC: Proceedings , 59th Session, 1998
In this context, William Irvine's view reiterated recently by Jos
Gommans that down to the middle of the eighteenth century, the bow
and arrow was considered in India a much more effective instrument
of combate than musket needs to be re-examined.6 This view seems
to be mainly based on a statement of Bernier where he has mentioned
the "astonishing quickness" with which the mounted archers of the
Mughal army discharged their arrows. According to him, a horseman
would shoot arrows six times before a musketeer could fire twice.7
With regard to this view, one noteworthy point is that Bernier's
statement on which it rests seems to compare the performance of
mounted archers with that of the musketeers fighting from horseback;8
the latter being present in the Mughal Empire during the sixteenth
century from quite an early date.9
The unwieldy Turkish matchlocks in vogue in the Mughal Empire
during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries were obviously not
convenient for repeat fire from horseback.10 That is why the mounted
musketeers were never able to gain a viable presence in the army of
the great Mughals before the middle of the seventeenth century.11
But it is not very correct to interpret Bernier's above statement as
indicating a pessimistic assessment of the performance of the muskets
as such in comparison to that of bows and arrows. That the musket
fitted with matchlocks when used from the ground in a skillful manner
could prove to be a devastating instrument of war not matched by
other missile throwing devices including bows and arrows was proved
at Chaldiran (1514), Marj Dabiq (1517), and Panipat (1526). These
amply demonstrated that even a small number of matchlockmen
fighting from the ground, if deployed innovatively, could contribute
in a significant measure to breaking the onslaught of a much larger
body of horsemen. As already alluded, Babur's description of a
skirmish with the Afghans across the Ganges near Kanauj on 27
February 1 528 bears out that his musketeers were capable of achieving
a high rate of fire which, apparently, was quite accurate up to a
considerable distance. The addition of a sight (shist) on the barrel12
and an improved mechanism of triggering13 appear to have given
matchlock fire a degree of accurancy not attainable in the case of
arrows shot with even the best quality bows. According to Bernier's
observation nine out of ten arrows shot by the rival troops in the
Battle of Samugarh (1654) either flew "over the soldiers' heads" or
fell short14 In contrast to this, the matchlock fire was always aimed
at specific targets and, therefore, the chance of its going stray was,
comparatively speaking, much less.
The deadly effect of the muskets' fire by the Mughal troops was
Medieval India 343
first registered at Bajaur, a fort in

east of Kabul, in 1591. 15 Accordin
had never before seen matchlocks
very impressive report they resp
Mughals had brought down with
they became very scared. "It so b
a head could be put out because
effective use of muskets in India
siege operations but during skirm
cited from the reigns of Babur's
admiral, Sidi Ali Reis, while trave
men (including 30 foot musketeer
surrounded by a large body of Ra
on Gujarat's frontier towards Sin
the attackers by firing at them fr
episode reveals that at times a sm
from the ground could prevail aga
Ali Reis' account also indicates t
peasant and tribal communities in th
sub-continent had come to develop a
possibly, were not within their re
when large bodies of Jat peasants
(near Peshawar) came forward to
party but were deterred by the disp
Similar stories can be cited from
illustrating that, some times, a sk
be of a critical significance in d
skirmish. A news report ( Waqa 7') d
the Mughal thanadar of Jodhpur,
story which deserves to be repro
from escaping, the Rathore rebels
When he came out, he was attacke
But the situation was saved for hi
and fifty musketeers belonging to
While the commander of the mus
fight from horseback, rushing
musketeers on their part kept u
attackers. It was in this manner t
of troops accompanying him came
Nagor.18 This episode is revealing
of foot musketeers in keeping* at
in the skirmishes fought on the
344 IHC: Proceedings , 59th Session, 1998
Jodhpur. It bears out the efficacy of the musket in the diffused fighting
taking place in the territory of the Mughal province of Ajmer (roughly
the same as modern Rajasthan) during the period of Rathor rebellion
(1678-80). 19 In this light, one may explain as to why the Mughal
authorities appeared so keen to recruit more and more musketeers
during the years of Rathor rebellion. They apparently, all the time
preferred recruiting musketeers rather than archers.20
The view that matchlocks were considered less useful than bows
and arrows in Mughal India down to the eighteenth century is,
therefore, nothing more than mere speculation based on insufficient
evidence. Its uncritical acceptance appears to have contributed to
concealing from general notice the fact that during the seventeenth
and eighteenth centuries, after archery from horseback, the use of
matchlock musket had emerged as the most effective form of combat
in Mughal India.
The far reaching significance of the coming of the matchlock
musket to India in the twenties of the sixteenth century was not
missed by the local warrior groups. It was recognized by the Mughals
as well as their adversaries in India that the handgun in its latest
form was a powerful instrument of violence that could contribute
profitably to the process of state formation, and still more importantly,
to promoting centralization within the existing state systems. It is
noteworthy thàt in the Mughal Empire as also in other contemporary
Indian states not only the artillery establishment (topkhana) but the
musketeers' corpses as well were generally sought to be kept under
the control of the central authority. Abu'l Fazi's classification of the
musketeers ( banduqchis ) as part of the royal household ( manzilabadi )
rather than as part of the army ( sipahabadi ) goes to indirectly confirm
this impression.21 It is understandable that the artillery "a pleasant key
to the door of conquest" in Abu'l Fazi's words,22 which involved large
expenditures, should have been controlled exclusively by the central
authority. But the fact that the comparatively affordable muskets23 and
corpses using them were also sought to be kept under the direct care
of the centre is significant and point to these being perceived in the
Mughal Empire from its very inception as viable instruments of centre's
control over the nobles as well as the indigenous power structures
in the regions. It was evidently not considered safe to leave them
entirely to the care of the nobles. That this policy originated with
Babur is borne by his order transferring, in 1528, 30% of the income
of his officers' assignments to the Diwan for adding cannons and
musketeers to his army.24 A similar situation is suggested by Akbar's
arrangement making available on payment to the jagirdars the help
Medieval India 345
of centrally maintained musketeer

However, under Akbar's mansab
the officers were allowed to ha
( piyada-i dakhili) equal in num
them to muster. One fourth of
total number of horsemen in th
But on paper these dakhli muskete
in the direct employ of the centra
horsemen in a 'in-i sipahabadi is
also were paid their stipends no
central treasury, though the am
his salary. This arrangement se
the mansab system introduced
It is plausible that while being
Mughal officers were some time
much larger number of musk
rules. This would, perhaps, expl
about Lashkar Khan (then holdi
his contingent (Jami'at-i khu
elephants and 1000 musketeers for
A similar impression is gathered
and 5033 musketeers) of the tr
army commanded by Ghaziuddi
1689. 28 But the surviving reco
Aurangzeb make it abundantly
serving in the contingent of a M
stipends from the central reven
( awaraq-i chihra wa tawjih) rec
other military personnel ( ahsham
also organized in a decimal orde
designated as mir-daha, sadiwal
death the noble with whom he
to execute a death certificate (f
was then sent for record to the centre.30 The overall command of the
musketeers during a campaign was entrusted to a commandant
( darogha ) appointed by the officer in whose contingent they were
placed but this appointment was always subject to king's approval.
This commandant or darogha , apparently, served as a link between
the noble commanding the contingent to which the musketeers were
attached and their immediate superiors, the mir-dahas?x
With the passage of time this practice appears to have led to a
situation where some times Rajput nobles belonging to more favoured
346 I HC: Proceedings, 59th Session , 1998
clans like the Kachwahas were allowed to recruit in their contingents
horsemen as well as infantry troops carrying muskets and pay them
through sub-assignments in their watans. Earliest evidence to this effect
relating to the contingent of the Kachwaha noble, Mirza Raja Jai Singh,
dates back to 167 1-72. 32 There have survived documents indicating
that this practice became more prominent in the beginning of the
eighteenth century. Under Jai Singh Sawai, small units (fards ) of foot
musketeers were headed by their immediate superiors after whose
names individual fards were identified. Several of the commanders
of the fards were in turn supervised by a still higher officer in the
service of the raja. One also comes across, during this phase, many
instances of the salaries of horsemen being settled on the condition of
their using muskets ( ba shart-i banduq ).33
In-any-case, till the end of Aurangzeb's reign, the practice of
recruiting musketeers directly in the contingents of the officers was,
a rare privilege that was not allowed to the ordinary nobles. Not even
all the Rajput nobles who sided with the Mughals during the Rathor
Rebellion of 1678-81 were allowed this privilege. This is for example,
evident from the conditional offer of Maha Singh Bhadoria in 1678,
to help in recruiting musketeers in the royal service (naukar-i sarkar-
i wala ) from his region on the condition that they would always be
deputed to serve under him.34
This persisting attempt in the Mughal Empire to have, as far as
possible, the corpses of musketeers in the employment of the central
authority, points to the musket being perceived by the Muhgals as a
weapon of considerable significance. It also suggests that unlike the
situation in the Mamluk and the Safawid Empires, the use of musket
did not carry any clearly perceptible stigma in Mughal India. On the
other hand, there was a tendency in the Mughal Empire from its very
inception towards displaying, muskets in different ways which was,
ostensibly, aimed at impressing their adversaries as well as the common
people in India with the military prowess resulting from the possession
of this latest variety of firearms. On 5 March 1526 (one and a half
month before the Battle of Panipat), Babur recorded his ordering the
shooting down with muskets of 100 Afghans, taken prisoners by
Humayun in the Punjab. This was done ťby way of example'.35 Again,
Babur's honouring three of his musketeers ( tufangandazan ) in
December 1528 by bestowing on each of them a dagger36 goes to
indicate" that in his perception the musketeers were not precluded
from the circle of military personnel considered eligible for royal
honours associated overwhingly with the horse service. Apparently,
muskets were considered 'honourable' not only when carried by cavalry
Medieval India 347
but also in the hands of ordinary m

The high status of the musket was
in 1535 a rule that his leaving t
firing a gun ( ba sada-i tufang ).38
came to be attached to the muske
Fazl makes it a point to mention Ak
in this weapon and his being uns
making and handling it.39 While
raja on one of Akbar's Hindu ar
official record goes out of the wa
in the use of musket ( tufang-ba
three military skills prescribe
administering a province for the
musket. It is equated in this pass
indicating that already by the en
come to be regarded in the Mugh
It is, therefore, not surprising th
paid as compared to cavalry troop
not available to other foot soldiers. From a letter of Hakim Abul Fath
to Mir Sharif Amli written from Lahore in 996 A.H./1588, it may, for
example, be gathered that the musketeers deputed to serve in particular
military campaigns were often paid parts of their salaries in advance.
This letter also bears out that Mir Sharif Amili then commanding a
minor expedition in the Salt Range region was advised by his friend
to continue to pay the monthly salaries of the musketeers from the
amount placed at his disposal notwithstanding the advance payment
already made to them. 'This suits the convenience of the Nawab' writes
Hakim Abu'l Fath.42 Moreover, five different salary scales each
having three classes introduced by Akbar for foot musketeers were,
apparently, designed to provide incentive to those entering the service
at the lower scales to improve their performance. It is also worth
noting in this context that under Akbar the average stipends of ordinary
^nusketeers as well as those of their mir-daha (captain of ten) were
igher than those of foot-soldiers (piyadagan ) of other categories
(including darbans , khidmattiyas and merwahs ).43 This situation
seems to have become still more marked during the seventeenth
century.44
II
For promoting centralization within the state, the Mughals as also the
Surs during the sixteenth century seem to have relied in a considerable
measure on the use of musketeers. It is suggested by the steady increase
in the strength of the musketeers in the service of the successive rulers
348 IHC: Proceedings , 59th Session , 1998
who, as already discussed, did not allow the nobles to employ
musketeers in their contingents. In 1526, Babur had with him only
1200 musketeers.45 Their number seems to have increased several times
by 1540. Even after his losses in the Bengal campaign, Humayun still
commanded 5000 musketeers at Kanauj in that year.46 Sher Shah ( 1 540-
45) had in his service 25000 musketeers.47 But the increase in the
strength of the musketeers between 1545 and 1595 was not as
spectacular. The total number of musketeers in Akbar's army around
1595 may still be placed around 35000.48 In this context it may also
be pointed out that, under Akbar, the role of musketeers in the larger
military apparatus of the Mughals was sought to be strengthened by
organizing them in the centrally maintained hazaris (corpses
comprising one thousand men) of five different grades each of which
was subdivided into three classes49 so that along with those equipped
with the more sophisticated, matchlocks, others carrying simple
arquebuses were also made use of profitably.
The musketeers were apparently perceived by the central authority
throughout the sixteenth century, as the comparatively economical
instruments for reinforcing centre's control over the nobles as also for
helping them in keeping the zamindars and peasants of chronically
disturbed regions ( mawas ) pacified. Sher Shah's garrisoning the
strategically located strongholds in different parts of the empire with
the centrally maintained musketeers totalling around 2600050 may be
cited as an interesting example of the manner in which muskets were
sought to be used, on the one hand for counteracting the military clout
of the local commanders and on the other hand, for making available
to them, at the centre's expense, an additional force which would
have been, perhaps, more convenient to be used in the limited
operations aimed at forcing the inhabitants of individual villages or
small clusters of villages to pay land-tax without much resistance.
That the use of musketeers in the village level operations would
have been a much less costly business than that involving cavalry
troops of any variety is borne by the wide gape that obtained
throughout the Mughal period in the salaries of the two types of
troops.51 Moreover, the total cost of equipping a cavalry trooper,
even of the meanest order, inclusive of the cost of a horse (with its
apparel), weapons and minimum of armour, would be quite
considerable. This cost would in any case be vastly higher than the
cost of a musket and ammunition needed for equipping a musketeer.52
It was, perhaps, in view of the low cost and greater effectiveness
of the musketeers in the village level operations that Akbar appears
to have made an arrangement subsequent to enforcement of Todar
Medieval India 349
Mai's regulations of 27th R.Y./l

as well as the officials of khalisa
maintained musketeers stationed
of an amir-i chakla (who in turn
having jurisdiction over a large t
this assistance they were made "
dam per bigha of cultivated land
the musketeers". It was further
that "if they do not need the hel
land-revenue ( mal-i wajib) in tha
under their seals to this effect and
The above arrangement of Akbar

where the nobles were not expect
the central authority to their mi
jagirs. These dakhli musketee
contingents of the nobles only w
a party to a regular military expe
allowing the nobles to have th
contingents was continuing in th
Babur's statement, already quote
October 1528 for precuring fi
including musketeers ( tufangch
"to drop into the Diwan , 30 in
to the nobles being barred from
troops handling firearms in gene
A situation of the musketeers be
authority may. be inferred fr
Apparently, as early as Babur's re
employed by the central authori
collecting land-revenue from the
termed wajahs) was considered sig
on them to contribute 30% of th
Diwan towards partly meeting t
musketeers.54
The musketeers were also. heavily relied upon by the Mughals

during the seventeenth century for pacifying the newly acquired
territories in the Deccan as well as for suppressing revolts all over the
empire. It is no doubt true that the number of musketeers employed
in the Mughal army on a regular basis under Shah Jahan was not
much higher than that in 1595. Lahori writing in 1646-47, places
the strength of musketeers, cannoneers and rocket-throwers at 40,000
One knows on the strength of surviving documents that in most cases,
350 IHC: Proceedings, 59th Session, 1998
an overwhelming majority of such groupings consisted of the
musketeers, others constituting not more than 2% of the total.55 This
would indicate that as compared to Akbar's reign (1595-96), by the
middle of the seventeenth century the strength of the musketeers in
the Mughal army had increased only marginally. But in addition to
foot musketeers there also came to be employed under Shah Jahan
horsemen carrying muskets in a separate corps of barqandaz sawar
which in a way, represented a new dimension of the increasing role of
the musket in the Mughal Empire. According to Lahori, àhadi and
barqandaz horsemen together came up to 7000. 56
In the second-half of the seventeenth century this trend appears
to have become more marked. The stray evidence that we have on the
actual strength of the musketeers serving in the Mughal armies on
different occasions in the second-half of the seventeenth century tends
to suggest that it was much larger than '2XA% of the horsemen
mentioned by Abu'l Fazl in A'in-Akbari. This is illustrated by the
inventory (siyaha) of the detachment commanded by Bahramand Khan
in the army of Gahziuddin Khan Firuz Jang, dated 23 Rabi' I, 1100
A.H./25 January 1689 quoted above. It bears out that along with 28,800
horsemen there were present in this army 5633 musketeers. The
strength of musketeers in this army thus comes up to 19.55% of the
total number of horsemen which was considerably higher than 12/2%
indicated for Akbar's reign (1 595-96) by Abu'l Fazl in A 'in-i Akbari.57
The surviving news-letters of the Mughal province of Ajmer for
the period of Rathor rebellion (1678-81) tend to suggest large scale
recruitment of musketeers from the local warrior communities. This
recruitment was generally made by the Mughal central authority, but
at times also by the Governor of Ajmer on his own.58 The attempt
obviously was to bolster the Mughals' military strength in the region
in the context of ongoing clash with a section of the Rajput chiefs.
That the noble commanding the operations was allowed by the central
authority to recruit musketeers directly in his contingent was obviously
a relaxation of the existing norm. It speaks of the urgency that the
central authority attached, during his time, to the task of mobilizing
maximum number of musketeers. It was, possibly, with the aim of
adding to the strength of musketeers' corps within the available funds
earmarked for foot soldiers that, at times, the Mughal authorities tended
to stop recruiting archers. Only when musketeers were not available
in sufficient strength they opted to take archers carrying bows with
short horns ( kaman-i kutah) which were, perhaps, considered more
efficient.59 During this derive to mobilize more musketeers, in addition
to Baksaryias who were conspicuous among them from quite an early
Medieval India 3 5 1
date, men belonging to the local

Bahalias, Narnaulis, Bundilas, Bag
came to be included in the Mughal
In addition to foot musketeers, mou
of Ottoman origin, were also prese
against Rathor rebels. These, gener
possibly, belonged to the central co
on the pattern of Ahadis since Shah
end of Aurangzeb's reign, the Barq
corps with a distinct organisational st
they were also organised in a decim
referred to by their Turkish design
100) and bing-bashi (commandant o
captain of ten, an equivalent of the
was, perhaps, missing. For some re
the foot soldiers including foot mu
them was, perhaps, 100 and not 10
Rajputana during the Rathor rebell
who were in turn made subordinate
the armies in which they served. Th
mentioned in news reports, along
include the Darogha and Mushirf-D
of Barqandaz units in different pla
was the jurisdiction of Mir Aatish a
At the same time, as noticed in t
this time, occasionally, some of the
Mughal emperor were having mounte
Some times, these mounted muske
Rajput nobles were also referred to
is a clear reference in the assignm
Muharram 1083 A.H./23 January 1
Kachwaha chief to a ' Barqandaz ' i
in the last section. This barat and
indicate that roughly from the third
a large number of horsemen, most
present in the contingent of the K
documents of this nature for the p
by me on a randum basis in the Rajas
mention persons belonging to e
Kachwahas, Panwars, Rathors, Cha
Rajawats, either opting to adopt
enhanced stipend or joining service
352 I HC: Proceedings , 59th Session, 1998
(dakhil-i banduq ). This would show that notwithstanding Berniers
remarks about the pitiable position of the musketeers, there did not
attach any stigma to the profession of musketeering in the eyes of the
Indian warrior groups.
As hinted by Bernier, till the middle of the seventeenth century,
the mounted musketeers in India opened fire only after dismounting.65
Even with this handicap they were perceived as of great utility in the
dispersed military operations against rebels resorting to hit and run
tactics. The manner in which a small party of the Mughal horsemen
carrying muskets are reported to have tackled a large rebel force of
Nahmardi tribesmen in pargana Sehwan of Sind some time during
Shah Jahan's reign (1636-56) supports this impression.66 Accordingly
to Yusuf Mirak, sixty or seventy Mughal horsemen carrying muskets
successfully obstructed a plundering raid by seven to eight hundred
piyadas and two to three hundred horsemen belonging to the hill tribe
of Nahmardis. He narrates that the Mughal hakim of Sehwan deputed
an officer, Shah Khwaja, at the head of about seventy horsemen to
chastise the Nahmardi tribe, who descending from the hills were
plundering villages in the neighbourhood of Sehwan. Shah Khwaja
"realised that with such a small force using arrows and svyords shall
not be effective ( rast nami tawan amad) as they (the raiders) are moving
rapidly in a group and shoot arrows very accurately. (The Mughal
horsemen) chose to use muskets. While pursuing (the raiders) they
continued to fire from a distance. Whenever, the enemy turned back
to attack them they moved away to one side, but when (the enemy)
resumed their flight, (the Mughal horseman) renewed the pursuit as
well as musket firt".
A similar episode may be cited from Waqa 7 ' Ajmer where a small
party of Ahadis and Barqandazes are reported to have pursued and
overpowered the entire population of a small town in Marwar.67 In the
fighting that ensued only three Mughal horsemen were injured while
they were able to massacre about 500 men. These reports make it
evident that the mounted musketeers of the Mughal army, inspite of
their inefficient way of using muskets noticed by Bernier, were proving
very effective against ťhe rebellious population. That was the reason
why their number in thé Mughal army registered a perceptible increase
in the second-half of the seventeenth century.
In addition to this, one should also take into account that a new
mode of using muskets by horsemen was introduced in the Mughal
Empire by the Rumis, i.e. troops recruited from the Ottoman territories
for their expertise of firing muskets from horseback. Writing in 1674,
Bhimsen states that the Rumis' form of combate (Jung-i Rumi ha)
Medieval India 353
was based on musket ( madar bar

to be a reference to the art of using
to the Mughal Empire by the R
The way Bhimsen identifies this n
suggests that till date (1674) the m
were still sticking to the practice
This situation, possibly, indicated
were equipped mainly with the m
handle from horseback. The newly
were apparently familiar with the
lighter and easier to fire, coul
horseback. It was thus yet anothe
musket which came to Mughal
seventeenth century and seemin
striking power of the Mughal cen
and rebellious elements in general
rural population in particular.
Ill
The matchlock muskets thus seem to have made a noteworthy

contribution to the establishment and growth of the Mughal Empire
in India as a highly centralized state. By the end of the sixteenth
century, after mounted archery, the musketry appears to have emerged
as the most potent form of combat in Mughal India. For its accuracy
upto a considerable distance and comparatively rapid fire, the
matchlock musket had come to be regarded in the Mughal Empire as
an instrument of combate more efficient than the time tested bow
and arrow. The mounted archer of the Mughal army was no doubt
more effective in open battle than the horseman carrying musket. But
this superiority of the mounted archer stemmed basically from his
expertise of shooting arrows rapidly from the back of a moving horse.
A foot musketeer, on the other hand, was always regarded far more
effective than a foot archer. The use of musket was considered
particularly suitable in the village level operations aimed at forcing
the defiant rural population of administratively unsettled tracts (i mawas )
to pay land revenue without much fighting. The muskets wielding foot
soldiers as well as horsemen were used by the Mughals very profitably
in a situation of dispersed or sporadic fighting as for example
occasioned repeatedly in the course of popular resistance to the Mughal
rule during the seventeenth century.
One cannot, however, miss to notice that, on the whole, from 1 526
onwards the increasing significance of musket in India as an instrument
of violence had had a contradictory impact on the fortunes of the
354 IHC: Proceedings, 59th Session, 1998
Mughal Empire. Side by side with contributing to the growing
centralization in the Mughal Empire, with the passage of time, the
muskets came to be used also by the defiant sections of the hereditary
chiefs and the peasantry in general who appeared to be in a state of
continuing conflict with the Mughal imperial authority. Falling of the
muskets into the hands of these groups seems to have contributed to
their heightened militancy. The popular revolts against the Mughals
during the second-half of the seventeenth century were a manifestation
this situation. As is well known, these popular revolts contributed to
the rapid decline and then collapse of the Mughal Empire during the
first-half of the eighteenth century. This contrary impact of the use of
musket on the fortunes of the Mughal Empire has been examined by
me earlier in a separate paper.69 My argument in this paper, shall be
appreciated better when it is read along with the other one.
NOTES AND REFERENCES
1 . See my articles 'The Nature of Handguns in Mughal India: 16th and 17t
Proceedings of the Indian History Congress, 52nd Session (1991-92), N
1992, p. 3 80 and 'Early use of Cannons and Musket in India', Journ
Economic and Social History of the Orienty ol.XXIV, Part II, pp. 160-6
2. My articles, 'Firearms in Central Asia and Iran during the fifteenth cen
Origins and Nature of Firearms brought by Babur', Proceedings of
History Congress , 56th session (1595), Calcutta, 1996, p. 440 and 'The
Handguns in Mughal India', op. cit., p. 283.
3. Babur-nama in English, tr. A.S. Beveridge, reprint, London, 1969,
473-74, 557-58,568-69.
4. Describing skirmishes between the Mughal army and the Afghans led by Shaikh
Biban entrenched on the opposite banks of the Ganges near Kannauj, Babur refers
to his matchlockmen making 'a carpet ( qalin ) of discharges, bringing down many
men and horses'. This discription speaks of the accuracy, wide range and rapidity
of fire kept up by the musketeers. It also suggests vaguly that Babur 's musketeers
had attempted the "volley technique", seventy years before it was introduced in
Europe in 1590s. Cf. Babaur-nama in English , pp. 599-600.
5. Cf. David Ayalon, Gunpowder and Firearms , in the Mamluk Kingdom , London,
1978, pp.60, 88-89. At the Battle of Raydanya, most of the Mamluks killed were
struck down by firearms. "They were killed by bullets only... Most of the killing
was by means of hand-guns, darbzanat , and other kinds of firearms" (Ibn Zunbul).
6. William Irvine, The Army of the ļndian Moghuls , reprint, New Delhi, 1962, p. 103.
Cf. Jos Gommans, 'War-Horse and Gunpowder in India (c. 1000-1850 A.D.)', paper
presented at New Military History of South Asia Conference, Cambridge, July 1997
(xerox copy), p. 14, where refering to Bernier, he goes on to say: "A trained archer
could get off six aimed shots per minute with out difficulty". One may point out in
this regard that Bernier no where uses the expression "aimed" in his otherwise well
known statement cited here.
7. Francois Bernier, Travels in the Mogul Empire , A.D. 1656-1668, tr. Archibald
Constable, revised by Vincent A. Smith, London, 1916, p. 48.
Medieval India 355
8. Cf. Ibid., p.217. The 'musketeers' of B

of inferior grades. This is indicated by
him, Rs.20, Rs.15, and Rs.10 per mon
more than Rs.7 per month. Even their
such high stipends. Compare, William
pp. 172-73.
9. The earliest indication of a mounted musketeer being a familiar image in the Mughal
Empire is the depiction of a horsemen carrying a short musket in Hamza-nama
(completed during 1550-6). Cf. Codisces Selecti Phototypiece Impressi Facsemile .
Vol.LII, 1&2, Akdemische Druck-u, Verlagsanstalt, Garz, 1974, Plate, V+A 24.
10. Som Prakash Verma, Art and Material Culture in the Paintings of Akbar 's Court .
New Delhi, 1978, p. 94, opines that the matchlock found in the illustrations of
Akbar 's reign has form identical to those of the earliest hand-guns developed in
Europe. For an illustrtion of matchlocks with long barrels andstraight stocks familiar
to the painters of Akbar 's court during 1550-60, see Hamza-nama painting in
Codices Selecti Phototypiece Impressi Facsimile, Vol.LII/l&2, Plate V.21.
11. Cf. Abdul Hamid Lahori, Badshah-nama, Vol.11, ed. Kabir al-Din Ahmad and Abdur
Rahman, Calcutta, 1868, p.715. The strength of the ahadis and barqandaz sawars
under Shah Jahan in 1646-47 was 7000.
12. A small metallic sight fixed on the barrel just above muzzle on the gun carried by a
horseman is clearly discernible in the Hamza-nama illustration cited in f.n.9 which
indicates that this improvement had already arrived in the Mughal Empire by 1550.
For specific reference to sight' (shist) by Jahangir see. Tuzuk-i Jahangiri , ed.
Saiyed Ahmad, Ghazipur & Aligarh, 1863-64, p. 129.
13. Needham, Science and Civilization in China , Vol.5, part 7, p. 428. A trigger-guard
was added in Europe around 1575 which should have reached India by the end of
the sixteenth century.
14. Travels in the Mugul Empire, A.D. 1 656- 1 668, p. 49.
15. Babur-nama in English, p. 368-69.
16. Sidi Ali Reis, Travels and Adventures of a Turkish Admiral (1 553-56), tr. A.
Vamberey, London, 1899, p. 37. For Nagar-Parkar see Irfan Habib, The Atlas of the
Mughal Empire , sheet 6A, and pp. 14, 16.
17. Ibid., pp.45, 63.
1 8 . Waqa 'i ' Sarkar Ajmer wa Ranthambhor, Asafiya Library, Hyderabad, Fan-i Tarikh ,
2242, transcript in the Research Library, Department of History, AMU, Aligarh.
NOS.15&16, pp. 321-22.
19. This corresponds to Jaroslav Lugs' general comment that in pre-modern settings
firearms proved more effective in lighter skirmishes, in ambush or during a siege
See his Firearms: Past and Present , Vol.1, London, 1975, p 15.
20. Waqa 'i ' Sarkar Ajmer wa Ranthambour , p. 112. A news report sent from Ajmer
some time in Zil Hij, 22 R.Y./April-May 1679 reads! "...the foot musketeers {piada
banduqchi) could not be procured, of necessity ( nachar ), the archers carrying bows
with short horns ( kaman-i kotah) have been recruited'.
21. A 'in-i Akbar i , Vol.1, Lucknow, 1893, p. 83.
22. Ibid., p. 82.

23. Op. cit., Price of musket ranged frame 1/2 of a rupee to one muhar/ rupees 9.
24. Babur-nama in English , p.617.
356 I HC: Proceedings, 59th Session, 1998
25. Cf. Abul Qasim Namakin, Munshat-i Namakin , MS, University Collection No. 26,
M.A. Library, AMU, Aligarh, f.675b. See also infra.
26. A 'in-i Akbari , Vol.1, pp. 121, 134. For a different interpretation of these passages
see Shireen Moosvi, The Economy of the Mughal Empire c. 1595 , Delhi, 1987, p. 223.
According to her the number of dakhli piyadas with a mansabdar numbered half
the dakhli horsemen and not that of the horsemen brought to muster.
27. Tuzuk-i Jahangiri, p. 186. For the mansab held by Lashkar Khan Cf. Athar All,
The Appartus of Empire , Delhi, 1985, p. 60 no.J623.
28. Selected Documents of Aurangzeb's Reign , ed. Yusuf Husain Khan, Hyderabad,
1958, pp. 200-201.
29. Cf. Waqa 'i ' Sarkar Ajmer wa Ranthambour, pp. 440-4 1 , 603, 669. Compare, Irvine,
The Army of the Indian Moghuls , pp. 156-58.
30. Select Documents of Shah Jahan 's Reig „ by Yusuf Husian Khan, Hyderabad, 1 950,
p. 173.
3 1 . Compare, Waqa 'i ' Sarkar Ajmer wa Ranthambour , p. 669.
32. There are present, for example, about 300 document in a bunch identified as " Fard -
; mulazman sarkar-i Nawab Namdar Maharaja Juo, 1074 H. Mutabiq 1721
Sambat" in the Rajasthan State Record Office, Bikaner. A majority of these
documents relate to mounted musketeers ( sawar banduq) and ordinary musketeers
( dakhil bunduq) recruited in the contingent of the Kachwaha Chief. A draft for
payment {barat) included in this bunch reads: "Agreed on 3 Muharram 1083/23
January 1673 to the effect that the salary of Allahadad, son of Taj Khan, the
Barqandaz , a subordinate (ta bain) of Sokhan Singh, is due for the period 1st Jumada
II, 1082 A.H./15 October 1671 to 29 Shawal 1082 A.H./28 February 1672. Draft
(barat) issued by Raja Ram, the Diwan. Previously attached to the Raja under Ali
Khan. For attendance endorsed under the seal of Sokhan Singh".
33. There are present in the Rajasthan State Record Office, Bikaner, a large number of
unlisted documents relating to the contingent of the Kachwaha chief dating back to
the first quarter of the eighteenth century. I have examined a few of them selected
on a random basis. Two packets of the documents seen by me may be identified
from the following notings on them:
(i) Jairpur Record: No. 3 833: ' Ulufa Sipahian (120 documents);
(ii) Siyaha ziyadti wa kami daftar Bakhshi , 1129 A. H. /1774 Samwat (218
Documents).
34. Waqa 'i ' Sarkar Ajmer wa Ranthambour , p. 4 17-18.
35. Babur-nama in English, p. 466.
36. Ibid., p. 633.
37. For a contrary view see Stewart Gordon, 'The limited adoption of European style
military forces by eighteenth century rulers in India', The Indian Economic and
Social History Review,. Vol . XXXV, No.3, July-September, 1998. According to him,
muskets were starting to be considered 'honourable* when carried by cavalry during
the eighteenth century.
38. Tarikh-i llchi-i Nizam Shah , MS. Br. Mus. Add.23513, ff.228b-229a.
39. A 'in-i Akbari, Vol.1, p. 83.
40. Akbar-nama , Vol.III, p. 52 and ( Takmila)t p. 815. Earlier, during the Gujarat
campaign (1573), Salbahan, according to Abu'l Fazl, was one of the musketeers
in attendance up on the king ( bandugchian-i khasa).
Medieval India 357
41. A 'in-i Akbari, Vol.1, p. 196.

42. Ruqq 'at-i Hakim Abu 'l Fath Gilani , ed.
p. 128.
43. A'in-i Akbari , Vol.1, pp.82, 134. Compare, Shireen Moosvi, The Economy of the
Mughal Empire, c.1595 , pp. 228-30.
44. Cf. Irvine, The Army of the Indian Moghuls , pp. 167, 1 73. As compared to rates of
payment for ordinary musketeers given in A in-i Akbari , those copied from an
eighteenth century text Ahwal-i Khwaqin (1147 A. H. /1734-35) are slightly higher.
45. Regarding the total strength of Babur's army, Abul Fazl's estimate of 12000 is
plausible ( Akbar-nama , Vol.1, Calcutta, 1873, p. 94). The strength of the
musketeers among them is nowhere indicated. It is, however, a fair guess that the
musketeers in Babur's army would not have numbered more than 1200, which seems
plausible in the light of Akbar's formula (12»/2%) for working out the number of
dakhli foot musketeers in the contingents of his mansabdars (Cf. A 'in-i Akbari ,
Vol.1, p. 134).
46. Haidar Doghlat, Tarikh-i Rashidi , tr., E. Denison Ross, reprint, Patna, 1973, p.475.
47. Abbas Khan Sarwani, Tarikh-i Sher Shahi , MS. India Office, 218, Ethe 219,
f.l08a&b.
48. From the wording of Abu'l Fazl's passage on the dakhili foot soldiers in the a in-i
Diyadgan, it may be inferred that the total number of foot musketeers assigned to
serve in the contingents of mansabdars came to about 12.5% of the agregate of
horsemen brought by them to muster. Shireen Moosvi ( The Economy of the Mughal
Empire , p.223) interprets this peąsage differently. She is of the view that the number
of dakhli piyadas would be half in strength of the dakhli horsemen rather than the
total strength of horsemen in the contigent of a mansabdar.
If Shireen Moosvi's estimate (p.219) for the total sawar ranks in 1595-96 (1,88,070)
is taken as approximating to the number of horsemen actually maintained in that
year, then the number of musketeers assigned to mansabdars , according to my
reading of Abu'l Fazl, would come upto roughly around 23,500. These together
with 12000 musketeers accompanying the king ( mulazim-i rikab-i nusrat i'tisam )
would make the total strength of musketeers under Akbar around 1595-96, roughly
35,000.
49. Cf. Abu'l Fazl, A 'in-i Abari , Vol.1, pp.84-85. The earliest allusion to the Mughal
musketeers being organized in a decimal order is to be found in the section on the
stipends of musketeeers ( a 'in-i mahawara-i banduqchi ) where captain of the ten
(mir-i daha) of the murketeers is mentioned.
50. Abbas Khan Sarwani, Tarikh-i Sher Shahi , f.l08a&b. In the following, the names
of the forts and within brakets the strength of musketeeers stationed there, may
give some idea of the geographical spread of the musketeers' garrissons under Sher
Shah: Gwalior (1000), Bayana (500) Ranthambour (1600), Chittor (3000), Mandu
(7000), Raisen (1000), Chuñar (1000), Rohtas (12000).
51. For the vast difference in the salaries of centrally maintained yakaspa sawars ana
ordinary musketeers ( sair piyada bandugchi) see Willaim Irvine, The Army of the
Indian Moghals , p. 173. The difference ranged from 4W. 25 to 6:26. The original
documents of Shah Jahan's reign seem to broadly corroborate Irvine's information.
Cf. R.A.Alvi, Studies in the History of Medieval Deccan , Delhi, 1977, p.30.
52. In Ain-i Akbari (Vol.1, p.82), the lowest cost of musket is given Vá rupee whiiest tne
lowest price of a horse is indicated as Rs.2. This would mean that a horse of lowest
grade was four times costlier than a gun of cheapest category. A scrutiny of the
358 I HC: Proceedings , 59th Session, 1998
prices of weapons given by Abu'l Fazl also reveals that an ordinary handgun could
be obtained for half the cost of an ordinary sword or bow. For a more detailed
discussion of the prices of war horses under Akbar see, Shireen Moosvi, The
Economy of the Mughal Empire, c.1595, p. 242-43.
53. Compare, Akbar 's order appointing a faujdar in suba Lahore reproduced by Abul
Qasim Namakin in Munshat-i Namakin , compiled in 1598, MS. University
Collection No. 26, M.A. Library, AMU, f.675b. For an English translation see,
Ishtiaq Ahmad Zilli, Proceedings of the Indian History Congress , 1970, pp. 367-
78. Cf. Akbar-nama, III, p. 382. In Todar Mai's recommendations regarding the
revenue administration of 27th R.Y./l 582-83, realization of one dam per bigha of
land under cultivation as the charge for gaurding {pasbani) was proposed. (Elliot's
reading of the word pasbani as pastani accepted by Beveridge, Vol. III, p. 565, n.4,
is not very convincing). Akbar's above order, apparently, refers to this regulation
in the form it was subsequently introduced in the Punjab.
54. Babur-nama in English, p. 617 .
55. Cf. Selected Documents of Aurangzeb's Reig , p. 214. A siyaha of detachment of
the Mughal army in the Deccan dated 24 Ziq'ada 1100 A H. /30 August 1684
indicates that out of 3720 foot-soldiers of the categories of musketeers ( banduqchis ),
grenadiers {gola-andaz) rocket-throwers ( ban-dars ) and cannoneers (< deg-andaz ),
put together, 3654 were musketeers.
56. Abdul Hamid, Lahori, Badshah-nama, Vol.11, p.715.
57. A in-Akbari, Vol.1, p. 134. Supra , p. 26, f.no.28.
58. Waqa 'i ' Sar kar Aj mer wa Ranthambour, pp.417-18. A news report sent from Ajmer
in Rajab 22 R.Y./August-September 1678 to the court brings out this situation clearly.
The report says that for reassuring the population of Ajmer it was advisiable to
station 400 additional musketeers inside the fort there. These, it is stated, could
be easily employed in the scale of Rs.3/- per month in behalf of the Emperor ( Sarkar -
i Wala) within the central funds available with the Darogha-i Khazana , but the
latter was not helpful; he refused to make any payment in the absence of a written
order {sanad). The report then goes on to put on record the protestations of Tahawwar
Khan, the commandant of Ajmer, tó the effect that despite financial constraints he
had to employ on his own (naukar mikunam) 200 additional musketeers for meeting
the emergency.
59. Waqa 'i ' Sarkar Ajmer wa Ranthambour , p. 1 1 2.
60. Down to the middle of eighteenth century, the Baksariyahs were identified as the
expert musketeers, hailing from the town of Baksar on the Ganges and the entire
tract of Bhojpur (Irvine, The Army of the Indian Moghuls , p. 1 68). In the 1 7th century,
their leading men were identified as Rajputs. A description (' arz-o-chehra) record
dated 23 Sh 'aban 1056 A.H./24 September 1646 identifies a musketeer ( barqandaz -
i Hindustani ), Ghanshyam, a commandant of one thousand (the Hazari) as Chauhan
Rajput hailing from Baksar ( Selected Documents of Shahjahan's Reig, p. 161).
This group were, apparently, specialising in firearms since the beginning of the
sixteenth century. Abu Turab Wali ( Tarikh-i Gujarat , compiled around 992 A.H./
1582-83, Calcutta, 1908, p. 22) refers to the gunners in the service of the Sultan of
Gujarat in 1536 as Porbias (men from the East). In all probability, these Parbias
were the same group who later came to be identified in the Mughal records as
Baksaries. Ratan Das Gupta ('Mercenaries and the Political Economy of Bengal,
1727-67', Social Scientist, No. 143, New Delhi, April 1985, pp. 22-23) provides an
interesting insight by linking Baksariyas' expertise in firearms with the easy
availability of saltpetre in the tract from where they hailed.
Medieval India 359
For references to Bundelas, Bhadorias

Baksariyas as musketeers in the Mugh
Waqa 'i ' Sarkar Ajmer wa Rantambour ,
61. Abdul Hamid, Lahori, op. cit., see f
62. Waqa 'i' Ajmer wa Ranthambour ,
63. Ibid., p.205.
64. Supra , f.no.32.
65. The pay scales, Rs.20/=, Rs.l5/= an
( Travels in the Mogul Empire, A.D. 16
their guns while squating on the groun
categories of mounted musketeers. The
Rs.6/= per month. (Cf. Irvine, The Arm
66. Cf. Yusuf Mirak, Mazhar-i Shahj
Haiderabad (Sind), 1962, pp. 139-40.
Empire , p. 13. Sarkar and fort of Seh
67. Waqa 'i ' Ajmer wa Ranthambour , p
68. Bhimsen, Nuskha-i dilkusha , Br. M
69. "Socio-political Implications of the D
Citi-Vithika : Journal of Art, History, C
Museum, Allahabad, 1995-96, pp. 64-7

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THE MATCHLOCK MUSKET IN THE MUGHAL EMPIRE: AN INSTRUMENT OF

Proper handguns, the arquebuses of the European records seem to

first registered at Bajaur, a fort in

of centrally maintained musketeer

but also in the hands of ordinary m

Mai's regulations of 27th R.Y./l

The above arrangement of Akbar

The musketeers were also. heavily relied upon by the Mughals

date, men belonging to the local

was based on musket ( madar bar

The matchlock muskets thus seem to have made a noteworthy

NOTES AND REFERENCES

8. Cf. Ibid., p.217. The 'musketeers' of B

22. Ibid., p. 82.

41. A 'in-i Akbari, Vol.1, p. 196.

For references to Bundelas, Bhadorias

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