06 - Polity Beyond The State - Postmodernizing Political Science in The Philippines

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•• Polity Beyond the State: "Postmodernizing"

Political Science in the Philippines

Antonio P. Contreras·

This article does not claim to be the first piece of


postmodern scholarship on Philippine society. In fact, many
scholars, both Filipino and foreign, consciously or
unconsciously, have already inquired into various domains
using a postmodern lens, and some of them have focused
on political questions. Unfortunately, however, a postmodern

• agenda is still very much absent or is not mainstreamed in


political science in the country. Most of the scholarly works
that can be labeled as postmodern are in the fields of the
humanities, particularly arts studies and literature, and in
history. This article argues for the strengthening of a
postmodern perspective within Philippine political science,
especially by Filipino political scientists.

I will argue for two main points. First, that there is a


need to include a postmodern approach in political science

• scholarship. Second, that this need stems from the fact that
politics and society in' the Philippines possess postmodern
elements. The need to "postmodernize" political science in
the country is made more relevant in the context of the
unraveling of the stateas the source of political consolidation.
While many rejoiced of the outcome of EDSA II, wherein
civil society availed of non-state and extra-constitutional
processes to effect a political succession, many shuddered
at the capacity of "people power" to generate an ugly head,
as seen in the May 1, 2001 event that followed it. In fact,
the reliance on "people power" mobilization has led to some
• political analysts to argue that indeed, political institutions
in the Philippines are weak, in that citizens have to rely on
extra-constitutional means to affect political change.
However, while most political analysts have characterized

• The author acknowledges the comments of two anonymous reviewers


but assumes full responsibility for the final manuscript.

49


the Philippine State as weak, and have lamented the
weakness of political institutions, I will argue otherwise. This
••
article posits that if at all, one can see the presence of strong
and plural political institutions. What it takes to reveal this is
to go beyond the State and its attendant epistemological
grounding in statist political science, and recognize the
postmodern realities that permeate our political life..
o
At the outset, I will not argue that postmodernism is the
only correct way of looking at Philippine society and politics.
I will also not argue that postmodernism has a monopoly of
the idea about non-state centered Political Science. What I
will emphasize in this article 'is for the inclusion of the
postmodern as one of the possible analytical lens to inquire
into the political in Philippine society.

The "Reality" of the Postmodern:


Philippine Politics as Telenove/a

The telenove/a is one of the most gripping forms of


popular culture in the Philippines that has captivated the
common tao in recent times. The twists and turns in· the
plot, usually a mixture of romance, sex, scandal, violence
and greed, mesmerize the audience that has come to elevate
the LatinAmerican soap opera and their actors into becoming

Filipino icons. This is as if the 'ghosts of the Galleon Trade
and of Spanish colonization have revisited us. They bring an
array of alien dreams and nightmares that eventually became
parts of our collective identity. In fact, we soon learned from
these imported cultural commodities and have since adapted
their fast-paced, cinematic styles to re-invent the
"f/orde/una" and "Anna Liza" of the past into the "Pangako
sa Iyo" and "Ikaw Lang angMamahalin" of the present.

In other parts of the world, we also have our own stories



of ernbeddinq our identities into others. The word "Filipino"
has become part of popular lexicon in other countries, even
as it assumed an unsavory meaning associated with either
silent servitude or salient whoring. The Filipino diaspora,

50 Philippine Political Science Journal 23 (46) 2002


• particularly seen in the "Pinoy" hands that rock the cradle
in Singapore, the "Pinoy" sweat that makes the oil flow in
Saudi Arabia, and the "Pinoy" hips that raises the heat in
Ginza, has also enabled usto bring our own brand of dreams
and nightmares into the reality of others.

This is a postmodern world, a world wherein the grand


theories and totalizing explanations about reality crumble
both from the homogenizing effects of globalization and
the pluralizing effects of localization. In a complex domain
wherein commodities and culture are traded in the world
market, a different kind of politics emerged to unsettle what
• appears to be settled; the idea of epistemological and moral
unity has been challenged. Earlier, the Enlightenment project
that braught to bear the process of modernity has created
this idea of unity, and together with it has installed the
Archimedean point of a single scientific truth. This body of
totalizing discourse has long governed the production of
truth and has infected the praduction of knowledge about
ourselvesthrough an adherence to a scientific endeavor that
excludes, more than includes, the voices of those who were
seen to be outside the boundaries of the "normal." History,
as the field of knowledge that defines our past, was written
from the point of view of the victors. Social sciences
eventually became avenues for knowledge that do not
liberate but instead control. Development, as the child of
modernity and Enlightenment, failed to solve the problems
of underdevelopment and poverty. It is indeed ironic that
the Enlightenment project contradicted the meaning of its
name: far from "enlightening," it has become avenues to
at best "muddle", at worst "darken" discourses of hope and
liberation .

• Postmodernism emerges in this context, carrying features


that confront the shortcomings of modernity and the
Enlightenment project. Postmodernism is critical both of
the centrality of reality as an experience, and the totalizing
discourse of history, or of ideology, as a grand narrative
(Agger, 1998). At this point, it is important for me to

Polity Beyond the State/Contreras 51


immediately posit that in my opproprictio n of the
postmodern, I will continue to talk about a set of "realities",
or of a "history", as experiences lived by Filipino political

subjects. This is to thwart the tendency of postmodernism
to become lost in disenabling relativism, thereby falling into
the trap of being too theoretically "chic" but lacking in
political relevance, in its valorization of multiple realities. My
use of "reality" and of "history" as words for describing
'prevailing truths is not to reify them, but instead to position
them as objects of deconstruction, as reasons for a political
project of transformation. This is an admission that while I
subscribe to postmodernism, I will neither be a "purist" nor
dogmatic.

Some would argue that the "postmodern" is again a
Western construct that European or North American
academics are inflicting on us to further their tenurial and
scholarly.fortunes. Others may even argue that the use of
the postmodern is another"orientalist" representation of
Philippine politics, by forcing a Western. construct to become
another analytical lens to scrutinize. I argue otherwise. lIeto
(2001), ina provocative article ina previous issue of this
Journal, has lamented the tendency of Western scholars to
look at Philippine politics from a Western perspective of an
idealized polity, and their tendencies to pass judgments on

'/

it using these "orientalist" lens. I believe that far from being.


used against postmodernism, Ileto's argument in fact is
consistent with a postmodern critique of Western
scholarships on Philippine politics, not only by American
and non-Filipino writers, but also by Filipino scholars. A
postmodern reading of Philippine politics entails both an
unveilinq-of the-hidden transcripts that have long been made
invisible in the plethora of scholarships about statist politics,
as well cs-cn unraveling of statist scholarship. This will
inevitably privilege local realities and the experiences of the

"othered" subjects displaced by a political science that gave
too much ernphosis on the.stote. However, and as I will argue
later in this article, I am also aware that the shift in focus
.away from grand narratives, and the recognition of multiple

52 Philippine Political SCienC~123 (46) 2002

" .


political spaces and agents, as well as domains for inquiry,
• effectively enables, but does not assure, a non-Orientalist
lens.

I believe that at the very least, postmodern academics


from Europe and North America have only put a name to
what has been a familiar Philippine reality. Postmodern
elements of Philippine politics was always present, but have
been silenced through a scholarship that focused on the
State. It is not because literature on postmodernism emerged
that politics and society have imbibed certain traits that are
now labeled as "postmodern." In fact, it is because of these

• realities that there is a need to talk about the "postmodern."


The following are examples of these realities that we see
emerging, or if not, have emerged already.

• The global diaspora not only of commodities, but of symbols


and of people - We see the results of this, for example,
through CNN, or in Jollibee outlets in the u.S. West Coast,
or in Overseas Filipino Workers;
• The rise and growing importance of transnational bodies
and institutions
• The decline of the State as having a monopoly for
• governance - This is seen both in privatization and
deregulation, and in the adoption of participatory
development strategies wherein partnerships with local
communities and other civil society organizations are
enabled;
• The decline of class as a singular basis for resistance, and
the emergence of identity politics based on gender, ethnicity,
sexual orientation, among others;
• The growing role of local institutions and processes,
including small groups, not only in national but also in global
• affairs. This is dramatized in the eventsthat rocked the World
Trade Organizations meetings in Seattle, or in the capacity
of local groups such as the Abu Sayyaf to destabilize the
State, or of AI Qaida and Osama Bin Laden to trigger a
global war against a faceless enemy;

Polity Beyond the State/Contreras 53


• The emergence of a politics based on style and not on
content, causing a decline on the role of ideology - This is
seen in the absence of ideology among political parties in

the Philippines;
• The rise of the media in the production of politicians
and of politics, and the emergence of politics as "theater"
or "reality N" - This is evident in the electoral supremacy
of celebrities; or in the manner televised news becomes a
powerful venue for the shaping of political agenda.

It is important to cite as example the role of mass media,


particularly the telenovela" as a manifestation of "simulated
reality," in the behavior of citizens in the Philippines, if only
to add empirical evidence to my claim of a postmodern

Philippine society. When Abu Sabaya, the spokesperson of
the Abu Sayyaf, was reportedly killed during an encounter,
speculations about his having survived were fueled by the
absence of a body to prove that, indeed, he was dead. When
I asked some ordinary people the basis of their doubt, they
pointed out to the fact that it is very possible that he is alive,
in the same manner that some characters, mostly villains,
in the telenovelas appear killed in various forms, but
eventually survive to continue sowing their brond of evil to
the good characters. It is remarkable how television, in its
"simulation of reality," has become no longer just a source
of entertainment, but also has emerged as a new standard
for public opinion.

The power of the telenovela in the consciousness of the


Filipino is therefore not a discontinuous or irrelevant event,
and it could not be dismissed as a non-political issue. In
fact, the Filipino has always treated politics more as almost
like a gripping telenovela, and less as a process where
politicians are busy crafting laws, or where interest groups
are deeply involved in pressuring the actors and the

processes of public policy. With the. aid of
telecommunications and information technology, the Filipino
becomes an active audience of a televised political drama -
replete with sex, scandal, violence, intrigue, and greed. Here,

54 Philippine Political Science Journal 23 (46) 2002


• one can argue that it is not because of Baudrillard, Lyotard,
Derrida and Foucault, the all-white male authors of
postmodern theory, that there are postmodern elements in
Philippine society. Public opinion is now galvanized, enabling
citizensto immediately express their take on an issuethrough
telemessage or "debatext," not because someone is reading
literature on postmodern theory, but because the public is
watching television and is using cellular phones.
Furthermore, it is not because of postmodern literature that
globalization, localization, and the decline of the State
happen. In fact, it is because of these phenomena that
postmodern theory becomes an accurate description of

• Philippine political reality - a continuing "telenovela" with


numerous subplots and cliffhangers captured by television
in the context of what would otherwise have been considered
as simple news.

Contradiction in Philippine Political Analysis:


Statism in the Context of a Weak Center
and a Fuzzy Grand Narrative

An inquiry on the political in Philippine society has been


traditionally carried out through a "statist" notion of politics .
• Political science, particularly the practice of political inquiry
and analysis in the Philippines, is dominated by a State-
centric discourse. Furthermore, and as Ileto (2001) laments,
most of these scholarships are limited by a tendency to weigh
and judge Philippine politics using Western ideal types.

Although civil society has been mainstreamed as a valid


object of political inquiry, seen in the development of the
discourse on "governance" as separate from the discourse
of "government", the theoretical underpinnings that support
• such explorations are still largely influenced by a neo-liberal
conceptualization of civil society. Here, and as influenced
by Locke and de Tocqueville, civil society is seen only in the
context of its function as a necessary limit to the State, acting
as a "brake fluid", if not a "safety net" that insulates the
citizen from State excess. Civil society is seen not in its own

Polity Beyond the State/Contreras 55


right. In fact, it is usually defined not on its own terms, but
as an ontological "other" of the State, as the institution that
it seeks to restrain but is the source of its legitimacy. Some

even are so bold enough to declare that the State is the
domain of the political, while civil society is the domain of
the cultural, thereby suggesting, albeit flawed, that the cultural
is not at all political. Furthermore, some even
unproblematically posit the "emergence" of civil society, as
if civil society is an after-thought, a historical predicate of
the State.

This neo-libercl notion of State-civil society relations


necessitates a critical look ifonly to reveal a problematic
"truth" upon which political practices and scholarships are

so deeply based. Philippine politics, as both an object of
scholarship as well as a practical domain, rests on the
assumption that a Philippine State exists, and that such a
State is a reality that permeates political behavior. However,
while this is true, there is a need for us to have a quick
reality check on the nature of the Philippine State. In the
Philippines, the colonial State, from the very start, used
colonial civil society institutions of religion and education as
legitimizing tools, even as traditional civil society institutions,
which prevailed in local and regional pre-colonial social
formations, were either co-opted or deligitimized. Thus, it is
clear that organic civil society institutions preceded the
development of the State, and in fact, the emergence of the
latter led to the disarticulation of the former. However, it is
also a historical fact that prior to the colonial process, there
was no unitary Filipino nation, nor was there a unitary set of
institutions which defined collective consciousness across
the archipelago. The absence of kingship, dynastic histories,
and royal court tradition, and the absence of a collective
notion of nationhood, together with the archipelagic nature
of the country, was later expressed in the proliferation of

ce'nters of power that the colonial State had to contend with.
The State became an external necessity for the elites to
govern; but structures of tradition (kinship, communities,
patron-client relationships, mutual reciprocal relations)

56 Philippine Political Science Journal23 (46) 2002


flourished as sources of social capital. At the local level,
elites mediated the relationships between the community (civil
society) and the State. This was assisted by a colonial project
which subsisted on Machiavellian techniques of "divide and
conquer" to deny the colony a unitary sense of nationhood.
The revolution which erupted in resistance to Spanish
colonizers was successful in creating a centralized base upon
which a polity may be defined and a nation can be imagined
for later construction, but it failed to completely cement a
strong and solid ground for nationhood. The development
of the sense of a nation in Philippine consciousness was,

• therefore, an articulation of being an act of resistance from


below, as well as an elitist act of creating a base upon which
power can be attained.

Hence, even after formal independence was achieved,


the process of nation-building continued, where elements
of "otherness," such as the indigenous peoples, were
assaulted and became targets of either benign or brutal
annexation. What happened in the Philippines was a
complex process of simultaneous State-building and nation-
building activities. This led to a more dynamic terrain from
where civil society institutions, particularly at local levels, were
able to offer localized sense of identities, even as collective
consciousness as a Filipino nation was also institutionalized
through Western and colonial educational and religious
institutions. Collective consciousness and social capital
flourished both as outcomes of legitimation projects from
the top and from below. Structures of power, both dominant
as well as that in opposition, engaged in a national level'
construction of the discourse of the nation. The social forces
that propelled the Philippine revolution, its war of

• independence against the United States, and the protracted


rebellion from Leftist adherents all existed in the context of a
grand narrative of a national scale. However, local struggles
and millenarian movements that were more particularistic
in orientation constantly erupted to punctuate these national
political projects.

Polity Beyond the State/Contreras 57


The fact that there is a weak center, and a pluralism of
partial power loci makes the Philippine civil society a complex
terrain to govern. In this context, national politics is merely
a theater, albeit an important one, which is the site for the
expression of a national agenda. However, the pluralism of
civil society centers enable people to go on with their ordinary
lives despite the tumultuous and corrupt State, by providing
safety nets and coping mechanisms outside the ambit of
statist politics. The process of state-building has not
displaced civil society from local people's lives. This is a
result of the fact that the development of the State was a
colonial and, later, an elitist, project which was a separate
sphere for political representation, even as it has relied on
local civil society institutions for legitimacy arid survival. The
political fortunes of powerful personalities inthe center relied
on the dynastic patron-client structures that operated at the
regions and local communities. Hence; the State, being a
colonial creation, became an external overlay that has
reshaped to some extent, but ~ever actually obliterated the
power of local institutions. In fact, and contrary to the neo-
liberal notion of civil society, the State derived its legitimacy
from civil society and not the other way. In this' context, the
State became a "necessary evil", even as for most Filipinos,
it is, only relevant when it begins to threaten their security
and survival. Organic civil society institutions which inhabit
local social realities provide the mechanisms which both
insulate the community from the corruption and neglect of
the State, and if required, mediate processes that would
foster political representation, and even resistance. The
tragedy is that the dispersal of local polities, and the presence
of autonomous political behavior at the local level, unmindful
of national political events, has also contributed to the
propagation of disenabling politics at the national level.
Politics, being a theater, is played as a contest of popularity
and style, a spectator sports, and not of substance. National

leaders emerge in the context of a discourse of appearances,
and not of agenda. It is therefore not surprising that we
have an electorate that cheerfully elects actors, sports and
media personalities, and beautiful men and women over
seasoned and well-prepared politicians.

58 Philippine Political Science Journal23 (46) 2002


• The tragic consequence of a political culture that rests
on "appearance politics," one that is played like a "reality
TV show," is just one level of tragedy. However, the more
fundamental tragedy is when political analysis and
scholarship, most of which as lIeto (2001) pointed out rely
on "Orientalist" lens, continue to see these as aberrations
that can be cured only through more policies, laws, and
political will, all of which remain as projects the success of
which rests on a strong State. Confronted with the tragic
consequences of a weak center and the absence of a

• cohesive national identity to provide a "grand narrative"


upon which State projects can derive their legitimacy, political
inquiry and analysis remain predominantly anchored on
"statist" epistemological groundings. We continue to lament
the "weakness" and the "softness" of the State, without
counting these as both a historical legacy as well as a
blessing upon which alternative ways of governing ourselves
can be re-designed, not necessarily anchored on a strong
State, but on strong, if not, radically plural and functional
civil societies. Furthermore, another tragedy is when political
scientists continue to view "politics" in the context of the
public, and in the context of overt acts and visible institutions
involved in either or both acts of state building and of
resistance to it. In this view, the private domain remains
muted in the gaze of the political scientist.

The Need to Transform Politics: Expanding


the Domain of the "Political"

It is important to reiterate the argument that the


emergence of the State, as a central apparatus for
.. consolidating power, became a historical milestone that
marginalized civil society and the individual in the private
sphere, not only in the domain of political practice but also,
and more importantly, in the domain of political theory. Much
of the theorizing in political science has focused on the State.
The "political" was defined within the context of public
processes which are involved in State-building and

Polity Beyond the State/Contreras 59


maintenance. Civil society, the "othered" domain was denied
the theoretical attention it deserved, even as its existence
prior to the development of the State was submerged in the

hegemonic centrality of statist and "Orientalist" scholarship.
The recent focus on civil society, while attempting to locate
this powerful domain in the analysis, nevertheless willingly
propagate the view that civiI society is a later "other", a
recent development that resulted from the breakdown or
inability of the State to govern. I am critical of this position,
not only for its historical inaccuracy, but also for its
acquiescence to dominant Western political theory.

This article strongly argues that civil society is community,


and communities have existed prior to the State. The
discourse of the Western liberal democratic theorists, which
'.
conflates civil society with civic minded ness, is a product of
their historical tragedies of being consumed by individualistic
pursuits that led to .the diminishing of the community.. One
has to "volunteer" to become a citizen in this cultural context,
something that is dramatized by people who shut their doors
and windows and refuse to intrude into the business of their
neighbors in the name of privacy end individual liberties.
However, this is not the reality of the Filipino. To hoist a
discourse of conjured communities and volunteered
citiienship on social formations that have strong community
institutions, such as the Philippines, and for civil society
activi~ts and scholars in these countries to buy such argument
is a tragic acquiescence to a Western imposition. The use
of adjectives such as "emerging" and "voluntary" when
referring to civil societies is within the contextual reality of
people who have suddenly seen the need to go beyond the
discourse of rights and into the discourse of civic-mindedness
to pursue collective goals. This is again another type of
"Oriental ism", wherein local realities are scrutinized and
classified according to Western parameters.

In the Philippines, the discourse of citizenship has long
been forced into, through the ruthless process of state-
building, ably aided by ideological institutions in civil society

60 Philippine Political Science Journal 23 (46) 2002


• itself. The process of nation building necessitatedthe building
of a central identity, the "Filipino" through educational and
cultural institutions. Thus, the discourse of citizenship is an
outcome of the desire to establish order, even as it created a
condition that constricted the spaces for individual freedom
and liberty. The political struggle, therefore, in the Philippines,
as in many other countries similarly situated, is not in terms
of cultivating the ethic of citizenship, but the ethic of
participation and liberation. In fact, James Scott (1998)
argued that in Southeast Asia, in general, the concept of
freedom is found not in association with the State, but in the

• form of being free from its power. The discourse of rights,


and not the discourse of civic-minded ness, becomes the
battering ram for assaulting the State. It is in this context
that civil societies "re-emerge."

The processes of state-building and maintenance, as


the locus of the political in the context of the dominant and
statist practice of Political Science, remain as a valid area to
launch academic inquiries and interpel lations. However,
there is a need to redefine the manner by which such inquiries
and interpellations are made. Post-structuralist theorists, most
notable of which is Michel Foucault, has long challenged
the totalizing image of a central locus of power that needs
to be assaulted. The explanatory power of "grand narratives"
and "grand theories" has also been subjected to critical
interrogation in postmodern theory. It is in this context that
there is a need to re-imagine the "political." A civil society
that gains validity only in the sense that it is able to restrain
State power, which is the dominant theme of most of the
definitions of civil society from Hegel to de Tocqueville to
United Nations Development Programme, is a captured civil

• society. In this view, the mode of engaging the State rests on


the assumption that civil society, as the "other" of the State,
must be able to match the structures of the latter. As most
activists point out, the goal of civil society is to nationalize its
struggle, even internationalize it, in a common front.
Federations, alliances and coalitions become organizational
necessities for them to succeed in providing the State its

Polity Beyond the State/Contreras 61


headaches and its challenges. While there is indeed value
in building a central movement to counter the discourse of •
the State, the question that needs to be asked is: What
happens after the fact that forces in "civil society" win ·the
battle? Would the structures and institutions of governance
be different, or would they merely be just another kind of
State?

What I am trying to dramatize in the above discussion is


the fact that political struggles which are waged in the domain
of statist assumptions of marginalization engender modes
of resistance that are just inversions of the centralizing
structure of power that they merely want to replace, but not
deconstruct. Civil society activism at present, not only in the
Philippines, but elsewhere, is increasingly taking. up a
centralized organizational mode for consolidating its forces.
Here, the danger of bureaucratization and cooption is all
too real. Progressive NGOs, for example, that have been
engendered by the community ethic which resides in organic
civil society, are experiencing an erosion of such ethic
whenever they attempt to expand cind scale up their
operations. There are also cases wherein the communitarian
spirit that prevails in grassroots organizations is eroded when
operations become subject of external funding.

Despite the above critique, we should not totally


abandon political actions that seek to nationalize the
advocacy by scaling up and expanding the domain of
operations. Nor is it a practical agenda to do away with the
State. Instead, in order to achieve a transformation of the
modes by which we are governed, we should change the
manner we govern ourselves. While I argue for the de-
centering of the state and the focusing on the autonomy of
civil society,.it is important to clarify that I am not subscribing
to a romanticized notion of civil society. My emphasis on

autonomy simply calls for a privileging of civil society as a
different sphere for politics, with its own unique logic and its
reliance on community norms and cultures of reciprocity. I
am not in any way arguing for civil society as separate and

62 Philippine Political Science Journal23 (46) 2002


• independent from the State. In fact, there is a need to locate
the analysis in the complex relationships between the State
and civil society. This opens up the possibility for a multi-
faceted and dynamic interface, wherein States can either
undermine or enable civil society, as civil society can either
undermine or enable the State. What I posit as problematic
is the Statist orientation of the liberal and western notion of
civil society as merely an appendage of, and whose logic is
derived from the State.

The expansion of legitimate civil society movement to


include localized struggles is an important dimension of the
• transformation of politics. This will require the recognition
of organic processes as valid conduits for politics. Organic
civil society institutions, such as those that reside in the sense
of community, and the collective identification of people with
their community, should be distinguished from the
/Iorganized" civil society groups. I enclose organized" in
/I

quotations if only to show my discomfort with the adjective,


since it is valid to argue that even organic civil society
institutions are organized systems of relationships, following
certain logic. They are not random or chaotic. Mulder

• (1996) raised a scathing critique of the transformative power


of organic civil societies, and instead gave preference to the
necessity for organized movements to effectively challenge
the State in the context of democratization. He labeled
organic institutions to be parochial, and that they create
political indifference. While I agree with Mulder up to the
extent of submitting to the reality that, indeed, local coping
mechanisms may provide ideological masks that tend to
favor the reproduction of the status quo, I strongly disagree
with the total rejection of organic institutions as potential

• sources for political transformation. The problem with


Mulder's analysis is that the domain of transformation
remains to be captured on a grand scale, that somewhat
the barometer of success is when local communities are
able to participate in national transformative projects aimed
at structures of governance, through massive
democratization movements. This stems from the continued

Polity Beyond the State/Contreras 63


reliance on the State as the focus and locus of transformative
politics. I argue that it is insufficient for social movements

to aim at merely transforming States and civil societies. What
is more important are to transform modes of governance,
that is, how do we create and maintain order in our lives in
all their levels and facets. This entails not only a movement
to change institutions that are external to us, but also to
change institutions near us and within us. It even entails
changing ourselves as well as the means by which we
produce knowledge and truth about ourselves.

Postmodernism and the Possibilities


for Philippine Politics

I argue that Philippine politics and society are already


undeniably postmodern in their orientation. The absence
of a strong center, and the fuzziness of the sense of a "nation"
and of collective identities, coupled with a pluralism of power
centers in civil society are postmodern traits. Furthermore,
and more visible at present, politics is played as a "simulated"
domain of representation, wherein modes of information
through the mass media, particularly television, has become
powerful key players. The structures that historical events
shaped have enabled present forms of subjective
consciousness that define the political behavior of the Filipino.
While these may have tragic consequences, such tragedy
can only be heightened if such phenomena continue to be
misunderstood.

Most of the key political crises right now in the country


occur· in the form of a breakdown of the State and its
institutions. The legitimacy of the Executive and the
Legislature, of the police and the Armed Forces, of the
Judiciary, and of constitutional bodies, are being eroded. •
On the other hand, dysfunctional civil society forces remain
as threats to the system, even to a point of holding some
institutions hostage. These include gambling and drug
syndicates, the Abu Sayyaf, and even morally righteous
elements coming from different political persuasions that

64 Philippine Political Science Journal23 (46) 2002


• tend to exceed the limits of restraint and deploy "People
Power" no longer as a strategy for principled struggle but
as an expression of political tantrum and a tool for political
blackmail.

While policy-based interventions remain as one of the


valid arena upon which solutions can be imagined and
realized, it is important to consider the fact that the root
causes of these crises rest not only in the absence of law, or
policy. Such roots deeply extend into the discursive premises
within which truth and falsity are produced, and wherein
Filipino identities are defined. The weakness of the State is
• definitely a cause of the problem. Strengthening the State is
therefore a key element in solving the crises. It is important
to note that the problem of a weak State is not a monopoly
of the Philippines, as it is a phenomenon that besets even
countries in the North. Offe (1996) talked about the
experience of European States in terms of an emerging crisis
of "crisis management", wherein the ability of the State to
govern is threatened by the increasing complexities of
modernity, leaving it with no choice but to "surrender" some
of its powers to civil society. The Philippines has, in fact,

• deployed policy initiatives that seek to devolve power to local


levels of governance, enabling not only local government
units, but also civil society actors, to participate effectively in
decision-making and policy implementation.

The challenge, however, is to go beyond the recruitment


of civil society as agents of the State in recapturing its
legitimacy, or as partners in effective governance. One
should view civil society as not a mere appendage of the
State, but as a collective of institutions that possess some

• autonomy from the state, and have become politically


powerful, yet are not fully understood and appreciated as
political institutions in themselves. While civil society has
become a focus for scholarship, inquiries are mostly done
in the context of an instrumentalist logic that seeks to
increase the utility of organizations, such as NGOs and POs,
and other civil society institutions, to the State. While there

Polity Beyond the State/Contreras 65


are already scholarly inquiries, mostly in the field of the
humanities and in history, of postmodern elements of
Philippine society, what is lacking is a postmodern

understanding within the discipline of political science of a
postmodern reality that the Philippine polity has long been
experiencing. This refers to the multiplicity of power centers
that operate autonomously from the State and .have the
power to shape the political identities of the Filipino. This
exists in coping mechanisms and in networks of trust - or
sense of community, that abound in local communities, which
could not be reduced to mere manifestations of patron-client
relationships, or whose logic can be derived merely from
the State. This also exists in popular culture - in the various
symbols and practices that have been the objects of
sociological and anthropological inquiries, but never of
political inquiries made by political scientists. All of these
can only be discovered if civil society is studied not only as a
collection of institutions that enable or constrain the
operations of the State, but as a sometimes autonomous
domain for acts that are not traditionally considered political
but have enormous implications for the production and
reproduction of power in society.

Implications on "Doing" Political Science •


Sociology, anthropology, history and other fields in the
humanities have already opened their doors to the study of
the, "political", some of which could be considered as
postmodern inquiries. These attempts by some scholars to
study Philippine society from a postmodern perspective have
already opened spaces to talk about the "postmodern" as
an academic subject of inquiry. However, political science,
particularly as taught and practiced in the Philippines, is still
very much statist in its orientation. 'It is also important to
point out the fact that very few courses, if at all, are offered

in. non-statist political science. The discipline is still very much
fixated on the study of the state. While the discourse of
governance has recognized the role of civil society, the latter
remains, seen as an appendage of the state.

66 Philippine Political Science Journal 23 (46) 2002


• What would it take to establish a postmodern
understanding within Political science? What would be its
implications on the practice of political science and of
politics? I offer two mechanisms: a) intensifying the inquiries
on the postmodern elements of Philippine politics; and b)
mainstreaming of postmodern inquiries in the field of political
science.

Inquiring into the Postmodern

The postmodern reality of Philippine politics needs to be


understood through a concerted effort to develop a critical

• mass of inquiries on the phenomenon, particularly on the


symbolic and discursive production of truth and meaning in
ordinary everyday lives.

One domain for inquiry is the manner by which civil


societies could exist as organic and sometimes autonomous
political entities outside of and despite the State. This domain
is enabled by a weakening State that allows civil society
institutions to prosper and thrive, even as strong civil societies
enable the State to be secure despite its weakness. A


corollary arena of inquiry is to inquire into the dynamics of
civil societies in the context of providing alternative
development and policy models, and to inquire into the
conditions within which such models become successful in
providing safety nets, if not in allowing local communities to
become autonomous institutions from the State. The key
challenge to this type of research lies in effecting an
epistemological shift away from State-centered inquiry, and
into an exploration of civil society in its own right, and on its
own terms, and not as mere adjuncts of the State. Another

• challenge is to avoid producing a grand theory about local


empirical realities, and to rest contented on the specificity of
experiences as ends by themselves, and not as raw materials
for the production of "policy proposals" or for hypothesis
testing.

Already, the works of scholars in the social sciences,


humanities and in history have made some significant

Polity Beyond the State/Contreras 67


inroads. It is noteworthy to mention the edited volume by
Alfred McCoy (2000), Lives at the Margin: Biography of
Filipinos Obscure, Ordinary and Heroic, as a good example

of locating the political not only in the grand structures of
the state, but in the local lives of ordinary people, who in
themselves are political subjects. However, while I appreciate
the privileging of the local, I am still conscious of the possibility
that such can still be done in the context of statist, and
perhaps Western, interpretations. For example, most of the
authors in the edited volume by McCoy (2000) look at
"local" and "obscure" individuals mostly in the context of
them as active participants in the political process-as
~ .
revolutionaries and local political leaders. In fact, only the
chapters written by Sidel and Mojares dealt with characters
that are traditionally not seen as "political". In studying two
"gangsters," Sidel almost achieved a postmodern agenda
of making visible the "non-traditional" acts of political actors.
However, Sidel again used as basis the "usual" parameter
to dismiss such acts as "non-politics", as just another form
of banditry. Sidel argued that any act motivated by concerns
of personal economic accumulation is not at all "social" in
character. Here, and using lIeto's (2001) argument, I am
uncomfortable with the use of neo-liberal parameters in
measuring the degree of "politics" in a political action.

Thus, it is obvious that beyond studying the "local" and
the"obscure", there is still much to bel done to deepen our
understanding of the "postmodern" in Philippine reality. The
critique of Ileto (2001) of foreign (American) scholarships
on Philippine politics, and the reactions by Sidel and Lande
(this volume) clearly illustrates the core of this issue, as their
debate misses the point. Another debate that misses the
point is the disagreement over the emphasis given to society
and to the State. I argue that contending emphasis on socio-
cultural variables, characteristic of studies influenced by

Migdal's (1988) work, or on institutional variables with focus
on the role of the State, as illustrated by the studies of Sidel
(1999) and Abinales (2000), fail to reveal the politics
inherent in every day "local" and "personal" politics. Both

68 Philippine Political Science Journal23 (46) 2002


• approaches unfailingly anchor the analysis on the centrality
of political behavior seen on how the traditional political
institutions and processes, such as local governments,
political dynasties, patron-client relationships, and electoral
contests, operate. While socio-cultural studies have privileged
cultural and society-centered variables as explaining political
structure, their inherent positivism limits the core of the
argument to mere causality, wherein social structure causes
political patterns. The analytical shift to the role of the State
and institutions, as illustrated by Sidel (1999) and Abinales
(2000), is a step that further closes the openings for the
emergence of the "postmodern" in the political science
agenda. This is because the explanatory variable goes back
to the structures of a grand narrative - that of the state and
the economy, even if the object of the inquiry is local politics.
For example, Sidel (1999) in his study of local political
warlords focused on the explanatory role of the state that
came out of the American colonial experience and the
economy that was shaped by primitive accumulation.
Abinales (2000) dismisses the explanatory role of identity
politics and of economic transformation in Southern
Mindanao politics. Instead, he considers these as mere
outcomes of state formation and political institutions.
• While I do not dismiss the importance of these debates,
nor the validity of the claims of each of the scholars, I would
argue that what is needed to enrich scholarship in the field
is to privilege a postmodern reading of Philippine politics
and go beyond the usual studies on class, patron-client
relationships, and elites within Philippine-styled democracy.
A shift in the independent variable may alter the focus of the
analysis, but not the over-all structure of inquiry, in that it
remains statist. Differences on whether the State is a cause
• or an effect do not displace its centrality from the argument.
What is required is that beyond the privileging of the "other"
and the local in political analysis, and beyond arguing
whether society or the State are separate or integrated, and
which better explains political transformation, the political
scientist has to inquire into the non-traditional domains of
the political.

Polity Beyond the State/Contreras 69


• [0
'One important aspect of this postmodern scholarship
is to inquire into the manner by which social institutions,
such as the media and popular culture, are involved in the
simulation of reality that enables a particular reading of an
event by an individual. For example, television programs,
both as entertainment, as well as news and public affairs,
are powerful conduits for the production of images upon
which political behavior can emanate. Another domain for
political inquiry is popular culture. Forms of this, seen in
texting, "mailing," organized sports, children's games,
gambling and other forms of leisure, songs and dances,
and rituals have to be considered as legitimate and valid
domains for political inquiry, not only by people in the
,
humanities but also in political science. It is in understanding
these domains of social production and reproduction that
one can have a grasp of the inner mindset of the electorate
and the political audience. Their silences can thus be
understood in contrast to their political articulations. Both
are political texts that warrant political analysis. These kinds
of inquiry are very much absent in political science, even as
they are already beginning to take root in the humanities
and in subaltern and post-colonial historical studies.

Conducting a Postmodern Inquiry



Political science can be enriched tlirough an adoption
of postmodern approaches, such as deconstruction and
intuitive interpretation, both of which are heavily based on
anti-positivistic and anti-objectivist research traditions.
Political scientists can learn much from the literary and
historical illustrations of postmodern inquiries, such as those
done by lIeto (1998) and Rafael (2000). If one adopts these
traditions, concepts such as the State, or policy, or legitimacy
will be subjected to critical readings and interpretations, as

texts that are socially produced in a particular political
context. In the Philippines, for example, there is a need to
deconstruct the notion of the State, as a '~nitary entity that
exists. There is also a need to deconstruct the notion of civil

70 Philippine Political Science Journal23 (46) 2002


• society, particularly made important by the blinding effect
of a romantic discourse which sees it only in its positive light,
and not in its dark excesses. Furthermore, with postmodern
methodology heavily relying on the use of textual narratives,
we could treat public policy as a text and subject it to
deconstruction to tease out its objectifying and liberating
aspects. There is a need to extend the domain of policy and
political analysis, to include textual interpretive readings of
policy texts, as discourses that are implicated in the
production of social meaning, and to treat political events
and practices in the context of social production and
reproduction of meanings.

• However, even as postmodern approaches have to be


adopted, we should also be wary of their pitfalls, particularly
their tendency towards relativism, their use of esoteric and
alienating language, and their tendency to too much reading
into symbols, signs and unarticulated reflections of human
subjects. Veneracion (2001), in his review of Rafael's book
White Love and Other Events in Filipino History (2000),
effectively made this point as he contrasted Glenn May
(1997) and Rafael Ileto's approaches. Veneracion pointed
out the tendency of the latter to hypothesize the state of
• mind of the writer or to rely on a detailed examination of the
reaction of a crowd to a historical actor's speech. I hold no
grudge against lIeto's and Rafael's styles, as I view these as
a different set of voices in a polyvocal world where Veneracion
and May provide other voices. However, I would argue that
the bottom-line in any political inquiry is that it must enable
political action that would favor liberation over oppression.
Hence, relying on postmodern language should not be a
license to confuse by casting the argument in words thai'

• could not be accessed and only academics could


understand, but instead should enable local spaces for
resistance, and should be grounded on people's
experiences. This is precisely why I refuse to totally debunk
the presence of "reality" and of "history", even as they may
be considered as forms of grand narrative. Nor I totally
abandon the empirical-positivist approaches in research,

Polity Beyond the State/Contreras 71


even if I am critical of their limitations, as I consider them
still useful in their own ways. You could not simply
deconstruct without an understanding of the "other" you

are deconstructing or unmasking. Furt.hermore;
postmodernism could not dismiss empirical positivism as
invalid without contradicting itself. With its adherence on
polyvocality, what is opposed is the tendency of the latter to
project itself as the absolute and only mediator of truth and
knowledge, and not the fact that empirical positivism is just
one way of producing a truth claim. Definitely, in a polyvocal
world-the use of opinion polls by SWS and Pulse Asia are
as legitimate source of political texts as the te/edrarrias on
television or the postmodern inquiries of lIeto or Rafael. •
Challenges to and Opportunities
for Postmodernism in the Philippines

There is still a lingering positivism among political


scientists,' in their emphasis on causality and not on
historicity. Elaborate studies describe the political dynamics
both at the local and national levels. However, these are
done in the context of theory building, wherein empirical
data is gathered to validate or reject existing theories and
approaches. For example, Sidel (1999) and Abinales (2000)
.used empirical cases to propose a statist and institutionalist

approach to the study of local politics, in opposition to the
social-structural studies that have until then dominated the
literature. However, beyond understanding politics, one hos
to be confronted with the challenge of political action. A
political scientist is both a scholar end a citizen. While it is
incumbent upon us to study empirical realities and dig deep
into their causes, we have to face the burden of making our
analysis politically relevant. Positivism has the tendency to
be apolitical and academic, in being too descriptive and
analytical. Thus, beyond positivist statist scholarship is the

challenge of political action.

. The adoption of a postmodern approach In inquiring


into, and its associated task of inquiring into the postmodern

72 Philippine Political Science Journal 23 (46) 2002


• elements of, Philippine politics will be likewise confronted by
this challenge. This puts to task the inability, if not total
discomfort, of postmodernism to provide a policy prescription
to political problems. This limitation emanates from its
valorization of polyvocality, and its debunking of grand
narratives. As such, postmodern inquiries are further
accused of leading to a form of disenabling relativism that
tends to "depoliticize" by denying the role of grand ideologies
in, and the importance of, national struggles. That is, they
become too academic, and worse, have the tendency to
use alienating language .

• It is in this regard that a type of postmodernism that


subscribes to critical social theory has better capacity
towards political commitment. The use of deconstruction
enables postmodern analysis to be critical of "reality" and
to foster a transformative agenda. Positivist political science
could not simply take on this agenda without compromising
its appeal to scientific legitimacy. Hence, its adherents offer
themselves as experts that play the role of policy analysts or
consultants, to remain within the ambit of the "scientific"
and the "professional." On the other hand, the critical

• postmodern scholar, who does not possess any pretensions


of being "scientific" and does not even consider it a liability,
may not become a consultant (In fact, she may not even
wish to become one) but can easily become a social activist.

While being a postmodernist in the Philippines at this


time may be academically fashionable, it is not politically
and financially attractive. A postmodern approach to political
analysis faces critique coming from all fronts: from
conservatives, neo-liberals, social democrats, and the radical

• left. Conservatives have always been suspicious of political


approaches that espouse radical critique of modernity. Neo-
liberalism still anchors much of its politics on the role of
public policy to provide the enabling conditions for civil society
and the market to thrive. In this context, the inability or
refusal of postmodernism to produce a policy prescription
is seen as irrelevant, and in fact can be considered as a

Polity Beyond the State/Contreras 73


mere academic exercisethat has no bearing on development
or qovernonce. On the other hand, the social democrats
that also believe in the inherent role of legislative and electoral

politics will likewise see postmodernism as a useless exercise.
To the radical left, the rejection of postmodernism of closs-
based resistance as the only basis for struggle, and of the
importance of grand ideologies of struggle, is at best, a
reactionary Western bourgeois diversionary tactic that
protects the growth of elite capitalism and its attendant
process of globalization.


Financially, postrnodern endeavors do not sit well with
funding institutions, particularly those that put privilege on
policy relevance and expect policy prescriptions as one of
the key result areas. It is therefore understandable why
postmodernists thrive in the humanities, where knowledge
is pursued in a "Iiberal" and not a "utilitarian" fashion.

However, I argue that it is about time to use another


lens in political science inquiry. It is apparent that the "old"
and "usual" lenses that we have used, while necessary in
shedding light into political phenomena and have aided us
in discovering some partial solutions to our problems, are
not sufficient in capturing and transforming political reality.
It is important for us to reflect on the fact that much of the

political problems that we have at present are questions of
legitimacy, the solution to which escapes legislation or policy
prescription, or formal State-induced acts. Legitimacy, as a
subjective embodiment of political orientation, is a function
of social institutions that have lives of their own and could
not be captured by mere Statesanctions. All the EDSA events,
from the first to the third episodes, are manifestations of
legitimacy crises, wherein significant sectors of Philippine
society acted to question the right of a sitting President. It is
almost laughable to argue that a law can be passed to ban

"people power." No single piece of legislation or state act
can ever cure the complex web of conditions that led to the
past and will lead to any future people power mobilizations.
Similarly, the credibility problem of the Philippine State could

74 Philippine Political Science Journal23 (46) 2002


not be easily solved by legislation. Furthermore,the problems
in Mindanao could not be solved simply by autonomy or
changing to federalism. Thus, while Abinales (2000)
dismisses the useof identity politics as an explanatory variable
in Mindanao, as he gives emphasis on the explanatory power
of state-local elite"accommodations", it will be foolish, if
not too academic, to simply do away with the issue of religion
or of ideology in addressing the problem.

At the global arena, the conflict in the Middle East will


not go away even if diplomatic agreements will be forged.
The war against terrorism will not be won through a
• conventional manner wherein States collide, but will have to
be fought in the domains where agents of terror thrive-in
the invisible, in the faceless. The creeping threat of
narcopolitics, illegal gambling and crime syndicates, even
of the Abu Sayyaf, thrive in the Philippines supported by a
vast network that draws its sustenance from the dark side
of civil society, nourished by a strong social capital. Such
problems are deeply embedded in the discursive terrain within
which policy is just one form of, if not irrelevant, textual
practice .

• Also significant is the fact that many solutions to political


problems are based not on concerted efforts driven by a
grand ideology, or by policy-inducement, but by the
articulation of agents and structures acting as free subjects
in the social production and reproduction of political texts.
For example, the EDSA II "people power" event was a
creation not of revolutionary ideology, but of collective
outrage over the brazen acts of individuals colliding with
the heroism of others, enabled by modern information

• technology. The same could be said about the war against


the Abu Sayyaf and narcopolitics, wherein state policies will
only amount to unleashing the "dogs of war", but will have
to rely on civil society mechanisms beyond the state, both at
the national and the local levels, to neutralize the social
structures that support, if not tolerate "terrorism" and
organized crime.

Polity Beyond the State/Contreras 75


The Philippines, as shaped by our history, has been
bequeathed with a weak center and a fuzzy grand narrative.
lnstecd of considering this as a curse that has to be cured
by strengthening the State thraugh political modernization
and State-building activities aided by policy and legislative
instruments, it is about time that we look at this as a blessing.
A weak center and a fuzzy grand narrative enable us to
create more spaces for civil society to thrive; they enable us
to imagine a different mode of institutionalizing power in
society. In fact, it is no small feat that despite the heavy
dosage of political crises that we have been getting, the
Philippine polity has survived. We may have a weak State,
but we do not have weak political institutions. This, itself, is
a fertile venue for postmodern explorations, as it undeniably
suggests the fact that our polity goes beyond the State, and
that our political life thrives despite of, and outside the bounds
of, the State. The sooner political scientists realize this, the
more will politics become "liberated" and "liberating."

Final Comments: My Personal "Take"

To the lamentations of Ileto (2001) about a.n •


"Orientalism" in political science scholarship---rnthe
Philippines, I am adding my own lament about the
"Modernist" and "Statist" standards that abound among
scholars. It is predictable that these scholars should expect
from someone like me - one who argues for the
postmodern, to adhere to "modernist" standards such as
clarity in prose, avoidance of repetitiveness, and the centrality
of rigor and precision in making arguments. I, on the'
contrary, argue that it is precisely the manner that I conjure
my texts and I structure my narrative that I begin to •
deconstruct the homogenizing and totalizing tendencies of
modernist scholarship. This is why I am using the first person,
and have deployed some literary elements in my text, to reflect
that "I am my text," and that I am not just writing about
something so distant and academic. It is also important to
point out that the emphasis on theoretical rigor, presented

76 Philippine Political Science Journal 23 (46) 2002


• as logical scientific arguments, becomes just one subterfuge
for "group thinking" and loss of individuality. This paper
may have not satisfied the expectations of modernist and
statist scholars that demand linear argumentation and clear
dichotomies and taxonomies. However, it is my modest
attempt to become postmodern, and to be "playful" even
as I problematize and offer another way of looking at the
political. Obviously, it will appear flawed to the scrutinizing
eyes of scholars reared and bred in modernist-statist social
science, as it can also fall short of the expectations of the
"pure" postmodernist. Yet, and as I have pointed out, I am
not a "purist" in that I am still cognizant of the disenabling
• elements of postmodernism. I will also not be a dogmatic
defender of postmodernism nor willi systematically discredit
other modes of inquiry as inferior, just because their modes
are different from mine, even if I disagree with them.

Some scholars see the postmodern in its "pure" form,


as one wherein politics becomes "impossible" and
"irresponsible." To these scholars, I could be seen as a
contradiction, in the sense that I espouse a politics of
participation and liberation even as I argue for a postmodern

• approach in doing political science. I do not subscribe to


this reading of postmodernism, and argue that these
scholars remain trapped in their positivist orientation, in how
they let concepts and discourses govern their "labels." I
argue that what the postmodern enables is a constant
problematization of constructs, a "playfulness" that allows
us to deconstruct even the "pure" concepts of the
postmodern. It also allows us to use concepts, even as we
are also allowed to appropriate and redefine them, even if
this means opposing the very tenets that the "purist" among

• postmodern scholars would espouse.

Some may also criticize my argument that "civil society"


pre-dates the State as anachronistic, and have run contrary
to how civil society was used by the "great" and "grand"
theorists such as Hegel and Gramsci. However, my response
to this is short: "I simply don't care." The beauty of

Polity Beyond the State/Contreras 77


postmodernism and of deconstruction is that they enable
us to appropriate terms and snatch them from their •
theoretical and conceptual security, and make them insecure
by exposing them to re-interpretations. This is also the
argument of many feminist and post-colonial subaltern
studies as they engage patriarchal and colonial discourses.
The power to name, re-name, and approp'riate what is
already named is not the prerogative of the "dead white
men" who dominated political theory and philosophy, and
history. Conceptual taxonomies are not to be justdetermined
by the colonial and the great scholar. Civil society is not the
property of Hegel; and to arrest its meaning and imply that
its definition is already cast in stone is a practice that is
oppressive, not to mention uncreative. Furthermore, my use,

of civil society to refer to community is not even novel, since
others before me have made the same argument. What I
have added is to divorce civil society from its statist anchor,
- and use it to "re-name" communities that existed prior, outside
or unconscious of, the State. In doing so, we will "empower"
these institutions and grant them conceptual legitimacy more
powerful than the taxonomic labels we have used to classify
them - as nascent, pre-historic, or wors~, primitive. -

As proof of my willingness to depart from a "purist"


interpretation, I uphold the view that deconstruction is a

method of inquiry. This argument runs contrary to Derrida
himself, as one who equated "method" with "domestication"
and therefore erosion of radical potential. While I agree with
Derrido on the notion that some discourses, particularly
those that are anchored- on positivist science, indeed
domesticate and de-rodiccllze, I will disagree with him on
the notion that "words" and "concepts" are so static that in
labeling a liberating word such as "deconstruction" as a
"method" would instantly overturn its radical power. Human
subjects create our own stories of liberotion: it is in the

manner we appropriate concepts, and not in the fact that
these concepts are labeled as such, that we could either be
free or be enslaved. After all, "deconstruction" is a radical
process enabled by conscious and empowered human

78 Philippine Political Science Journal23 (46) 2002


• subjects. Calling it a "method" would not automatically
assimilate these "free-thinking" subjects into mindless
"drones" working for a single "collective." A deconstructionist
would not simply allow to be sucked into the rigors of a
methodology, even if such method is "deconstruction" itself.
After all, the beauty of deconstruction is that it enables its
own self-problematization, what I call as "self-
deconstruction. "

As further proof of my departure from dogma, I am not


making a case for the rejection of the necessity of State-

• centered political analysis, nor the importance of policy as


well as grand theory, nor the validity of empirical-positivist
research. I am also not arguing that we throw out the State
as an institution. Nor I am making an argument about the
infallibility and the ideal nature of civil society, for I am
cognizant of its dark excesses. What I have, and "repetitively,"
argued is for us to go beyond these and to re-imagine
"politics" and the "political" using a postmodern lens. I am
not even arguing that it is only through the postmodern
approach that one can depose the centrality of the State in
political inquiry. I am cognizant of the many works done by

• others before me, who are not postmodern yet have


conducted political inquiries beyond the State. What I am
arguing is the point that postmodernism could offer us
another perspective; maybe not a better, but still a different,
way of inquiring into the political in Philippine society.

Academic scholarships and political activism are not


merely vocations which one takes. They are also domains
for governance, wherein certain types of power
arrangements and modes of legitimation operate. The

• choice of strategies for mobilization is as political as the


choice of theoretical perspectives to govern our inquiries
into the problems confronting society. There is a need to
relocate the political to make it defined not only in the context
in which we fight to transform the State, but also in how we
produce our own discourses of resistance, and how we
produce our truth and identities. This will necessarily lead to

Polity Beyond the State/Contreras 79


a relocation of the political away from totalizing grand
narratives to what Laclau end Mouffe (1985) referred to as •
"radical pluralism." This transformation will allow us to wage
collective action against the policies ofthe State in all fronts.
We can wage it as organized national struggles carried by
federations and alliances, or as a movement to establish a
regional civil society. We can also wage it as local and
everyday modes of coping and resistance through organic
communities using ideological institutions nurtured and bred
in their own local contexts. We can also wage it in our
struggles with our own personal ghosts - a true reflection
of the fact that the political is not only seen in the public and
the visible, but also in the private and the personal. .:. •
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