THIRD DIVISION

[G.R. No. 202051. April 18, 2016.]

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by the

DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC WORKS & HIGHWAYS; ENGINEER
SIMPLICIO D. GONZALES, District Engineer, Second
Engineering District of Camarines Sur; and ENGINEER
VICTORINO M. DEL SOCORRO, JR., Project Engineer, DPWH,
Baras, Canaman, Camarines Sur, petitioners, vs. SPOUSES
ILDEFONSO B. REGULTO and FRANCIA R. REGULTO ,
respondents.

DECISION

PERALTA, J :p

For resolution of this Court is the petition for review on certiorari dated
July 10, 2012 filed by petitioners, the Republic of the Philippines as
represented by the Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH);
Engineer Simplicio D. Gonzales, District Engineer, Second Engineering
District of Camarines Sur; and Engineer Victorino M. Del Socorro, Jr., Project
Engineer, DPWH, Baras, Canaman, Camarines Sur assailing the Order 1 dated
May 24, 2012 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Naga City, Branch 62,
which ordered herein petitioners to pay respondents spouses Ildefonso B.
Regulto and Francia R. Regulto (Spouses Regulto) the amount of Two
Hundred Forty-Three Thousand Pesos (P243,000.00) as just compensation for
the part of their property traversed by the Naga City-Milaor Bypass Project of
the DPWH.
The factual antecedents are as follows:
Respondents spouses Ildefonso B. Regulto and Francia R. Regulto are
the registered owners of the property in controversy located at Mabel, Naga
City, Camarines Sur consisting of 300 square meters covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 086-2010000231. 2 The Spouses Regulto
acquired the said property by virtue of a deed of absolute sale executed by
Julian R. Cortes, attorney-in-fact of the spouses Bienvenido and Beatriz
Santos, in February 1994. 3 The subject property originated from a Free
Patent property consisting of 7,759 square meters registered and covered by
Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 235 dated April 14, 1956. 4
Sometime in April 2011, the DPWH Second Engineering District of
Camarines Sur apprised the Spouses Regulto of the construction of its road
project, the Naga City-Milaor Bypass Road, which will traverse their property
and other adjoining properties. 5 The DPWH initially offered the spouses the
sum of P243,000.00 or P1,500.00 per square meter for the 162 square-meter
affected area as just compensation. 6
 However, in a letter dated May 11, 2006, the DPWH, through District
Engr. Rolando P. Valdez, withdrew the offer, and informed the Spouses
Regulto that they were not entitled to just compensation since the title of
their land originated from a Free Patent title acquired under Commonwealth
A c t (C.A.) No. 141, known as the Public Land Act, which contained a
reservation in favor of the government of an easement of right-of-way of
twenty (20) meters, which was subsequently increased to sixty (60) meters
by Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 635, for public highways and similar works
that the government or any public or quasi -public service enterprise may
reasonably require for carrying on their business, with payment of damages
for the improvements only. 7
The Spouses Regulto, in their letter dated May 30, 2011, protested the
findings of the DPWH and ordered them to cease from proceeding with the
construction. 8 They alleged that since their property is already covered by
TCT No. 086-2010000231, it ceased to be a public land. 9 They
communicated that the market value of the property is P450,000.00 plus the
Zonal Value of the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR), which is more or less
the acceptable just compensation of their property. 10 Furthermore, they
requested that they be furnished, within five (5) days from the receipt of
their letter, with a Program of Works and Sketch Plan showing the cost of the
project and the extent or area covered by the road that will traverse their
property. 11
The DPWH furnished the Spouses Regulto with the sketch plan showing
the extent of the road right-of-way that will cut across their property. 12 It
also reiterated its earlier position that the title to the land was acquired
under C.A. No. 141. 13
On October 8, 2011, the Spouses Regulto filed a complaint for payment
of just compensation, damages with prayer for issuance of temporary
restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction before the RTC of Naga
City, Branch 62, against herein petitioners Republic of the Philippines,
represented by the DPWH; District Engr. Valdez of the Second Engineering
District of Camarines Sur; and Project Engr. Del Socorro, Jr. of the DPWH,
Baras, Canaman, Camarines Sur. 14 SDAaTC

The Spouses Regulto averred that the DPWH acted with deceit,
misrepresentation and evident bad faith in convincing them to sign on a
paper after relying on the assurance that they would be paid with just
compensation. 15 They also alleged that their property is outside the
coverage of Section 112, C.A. No. 141 because their land is a private
property, and that the same is situated beyond the 60-meter radius or width
from the public highways, railroads, irrigation ditches, aqueducts, telegraph
and telephone lines, airport runways, and other government structures. 16
On August 5, 2011, the petitioners, through the Office of the Solicitor
General (OSG), filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground that the Spouses
Regulto do not have a cause of action, and that their complaint failed to
state the same. 17 Petitioners asseverated that Section 112 of C.A. No. 141
is explicit on the encumbrance imposed upon lands originally covered by a
free patent or any other public land patent. 1 8 Petitioners also alleged that
the respondents failed to exhaust administrative remedies for not appealing
the findings of the Regional Infrastructure Right-of-Way (IROW) Committee
with the DPWH Regional Director or to the Secretary of Public Works and
Highways. 19
In an Order dated October 17, 2011, the RTC denied the motion filed by
the petitioners citing that the insufficiency of the cause of action must
appear on the face of the complaint to sustain a dismissal based on lack of
cause of action. 20 In this case, the complaint stated allegations of
nonpayment of just compensation. 21 Furthermore, the court mentioned that
one of the exceptions of the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative
remedies is when the issue is one of law and when circumstances warrant
urgency of judicial intervention, as in the case of the Spouses Regulto whose
portion of their property has already been occupied by the petitioners
without just compensation. 22
In the Answer 23 dated November 16, 2011, the petitioners reiterated
their defense that no legal right has been violated since C.A. No. 141, as
amended by P.D. No. 1361, 24 imposes a 60-meter wide lien on the property
originally covered by a Free Patent. 25 Petitioners also avowed that Section 5
of the Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) of the Republic Act (R.A.)
No. 8974 26 provides that if the private property or land is acquired under
the provisions of C.A. No. 141, the government officials charged with the
prosecution of the projects or their representative is authorized to take
immediate possession of the property subject to the lien as soon as the need
arises, and the government may obtain a quitclaim from the owners
concerned without the need for payment for the land acquired under the
said quitclaim mode except for the damages to improvements only. 27
Hence, petitioners maintained that the Spouses Regulto are not entitled to a
just compensation for the portion of their property affected by the
construction of the Naga City-Milaor Bypass Road. 28 AaCTcI

The petitioners, in a Motion dated December 19, 2011, prayed for the
issuance of the writ of possession of the subject property in their favor for
the construction of the project to finally proceed and be completed without
further delay. 29
On January 2, 2012, the RTC ordered the respondents spouses to
remove the obstructions that they erected on the subject property within
three days, or the petitioners may dismantle the same to proceed with the
construction of the bypass road project. 30 Likewise, the petitioners were
ordered to deliver the check already prepared in the amount of Three
Thousand Pesos (P3,000.00) for payment of the trees/improvements on the
property. 31 The petitioners were also ordered to deposit with any authorized
government depository bank the amount of Thirty-Six Thousand Four
Hundred Fifty Pesos (P36,450.00) equivalent to the assessed value of the
162 square meters of the subject property, which was assessed at
P67,500.00 by the 2010 tax declaration, that the road project will traverse.
32
 In an Order dated January 27, 2012, the RTC dismissed the motion for
reconsideration filed by the Spouses Regulto, and sustained its earlier order
that the petitioners deposit the amount of P36,450.00. 33 The RTC also
acknowledged the receipt of the Spouses Regulto of the check for the
payment of the improvements on the property affected by the project. 34
Consequently, the RTC, in its Order dated May 24, 2012, ordered the
petitioners to pay the Spouses Regulto the amount of P243,000.00 as just
compensation for the affected portion of their property. 35 The dispositive
portion of the Order reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby
rendered ordering the defendants Engr. Rolando F. Valdez and Engr.
Victorino M. del Socorro, Jr., Republic of the Philippines and the Dept.
of Public Works and Highways to pay plaintiffs-spouses Ildefonso and
Francia Regulto the amount of P243,000.00 as just compensation for
their property traversed by the Naga-Milaor Bypass Project.
SO ORDERED. 36

The RTC concluded that the government waived the encumbrance

provided for in C.A. No. 141 when it did not oppose the further subdivision of
the original property covered by the free patent or made an express intent
on making its encumbrance before the residential lots, which are part of the
said subdivision, were sold to other innocent purchasers for value, especially
after the 25-year period has lapsed since the free patent. 37

Hence, the petitioners, through the OSG, filed the instant petition
raising the following issues:
THE RTC ERRED IN HOLDING THAT RESPONDENTS ARE
ENTITLED TO AND IN ORDERING PETITIONERS TO PAY JUST
COMPENSATION DESPITE THE UNDISPUTED FACT THAT THE
LAND WAS ORIGINALLY PUBLIC LAND AWARDED TO
RESPONDENTS' PREDECESSORS-IN-INTEREST BY FREE
PATENT, AND THUS A LEGAL EASEMENT OF RIGHT-OF-WAY
EXISTS IN FAVOR OF THE GOVERNMENT.
THE TRIAL COURT'S RATIOCINATION — THAT THE SUBJECT
PROPERTY HAS IPSO FACTO CEASED TO BE "PUBLIC LAND" AND THUS
NO LONGER SUBJECT TO THE LIEN IMPOSED BY SAID PROVISION OF
C.A. NO. 141, BY VIRTUE OF THE SUBJECT PROPERTY BEING ALREADY
COVERED BY A TRANSFER CERTIFICATE OF TITLE IN THEIR NAME —
CONTRAVENES SECTION 44 OF P.D. NO. 1529 AND NATIONAL
IRRIGATION ADMINISTRATION VS. COURT OF APPEALS .
THE RTC ERRED IN HOLDING THAT SECTION 8
("EXPROPRIATION"), NOT SECTION 5 ("QUIT CLAIM"), OF THE
IMPLEMENTING RULES AND REGULATIONS OF R.A. NO. 8974 IS THE
APPLICABLE PROVISION REGARDING THE MODE OF ACQUISITION OF
RESPONDENTS' PROPERTY. 38
This Court finds the instant petition partially meritorious.
At the outset, it is noted that petitioners filed the instant petition
before this Court without appealing the said case before the Court of Appeals
(CA). A strict application of the policy of strict observance of the judicial
hierarchy of courts is unnecessary when cases brought before the appellate
courts do not involve factual but purely legal questions. 39 Section 2 (c), 40
Rule 41, of the Revised Rules of Court provides that a decision or order of
the RTC may, as done in the instant petition, be appealed to the Supreme
Court by petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45, provided that such
petition raises only questions of law. 41
The distinction between questions of law and questions of fact are
explained in the case of Navy Officers' Village Association, Inc. (NOVAI) v.
Republic of the Philippines 42 as follows:
A question of law exists when the doubt or controversy
concerns the correct application of law or jurisprudence on a certain
state of facts. The issue does not call for an examination of the
probative value of the evidence presented, the truth or falsehood of
the facts being admitted. In contrast, a question of fact exists when a
doubt or difference arises as to the truth or falsehood of facts or when
the query invites the calibration of the whole evidence considering
mainly the credibility of the witnesses; the existence and relevancy of
specific surrounding circumstances, as well as their relation to each
other and to the whole; and the probability of the situation.
In the case at bar, the petitioners raise questions of law in disputing
the denial by the RTC in the application of C.A. No. 141 to impose the legal
easement of right-of-way to the subject property, and the application of
Section 8 (Expropriation) of the IRR of R.A. No. 8974 instead of Section 5
(Quit Claim) in the acquisition of the said property. EcTCAD

Essentially, the issue for resolution of this Court is whether the

petitioners are liable for just compensation in enforcing the Government's
legal easement of right-of-way on the subject property which originated from
the 7,759 square-meter of public land awarded by free patent to the
predecessor-in-interest of the Spouses Regulto.
Petitioners allege that a legal easement of right-of-way exists in favor
of the Government since the land in controversy was originally public land
awarded by free patent to the Spouses Regulto's predecessors-in-interest.
The RTC, however, ruled that the provision of C.A. No. 141 regarding
the easement of right-of-way in favor of the government is not applicable to
the subject property since the law is clearly meant for lands granted
gratuitously by the government in favor of individuals tasked to make it
agriculturally productive. 43 It ruled that the subject property is already a
private property since the Spouses Regulto acquired the same through a
deed of absolute sale from the spouses Bienvenido and Beatriz Santos in
February 1994, and that the same originated from the property covered by
TCT No. 24027. 44
This Court finds that the RTC erroneously ruled that the provisions of
C.A. No. 141 are not applicable to the case at bar. On the contrary, this Court
held that "a legal easement of right-of-way exists in favor of the Government
over land that was originally a public land awarded by free patent even if the
land is subsequently sold to another." 45 This Court has expounded that the
"ruling would be otherwise if the land was originally a private property, to
which just compensation must be paid for the taking of a part thereof for
public use as an easement of right-of-way." 46
It is undisputed that the subject property originated from and was a
part of a 7,759-square-meter property covered by free patent registered
under OCT No. 235. 47 Furthermore, the Spouses Regulto's transfer
certificate of title, which the RTC relied, contained the reservation: "subject
to the provisions of the Property Registration Decree and the Public Land
Act, as well as to those of the Mining Law, if the land is mineral, and subject,
further, to such conditions contained in the original title as may be
subsisting." 48
Jurisprudence settles that one of the reservations and conditions under
the Original Certificate of Title of land granted by free patent is that the said
land is subject "to all conditions and public easements and servitudes
recognized and prescribed by law especially those mentioned in Sections
109, 110, 111, 112, 113 and 114, Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended."
49

Section 112 of C.A. No. 141, as amended, provides that lands granted
by patent shall be subjected to a right-of-way in favor of the Government, to
wit:
Sec. 112. Â Said land shall further be subject to a right-of-
way not exceeding sixty (60) meters on width for public
highways, railroads, irrigation ditches, aqueducts, telegraph and
telephone lines, airport runways, including sites necessary for
terminal buildings and other government structures needed for full
operation of the airport, as well as areas and sites for government
buildings for Resident and/or Project Engineers needed in the
prosecution of government-infrastructure projects, and similar works
as the Government or any public or quasi-public service or enterprise,
including mining or forest concessionaires, may reasonably require
for carrying on their business, with damages for the
improvements only.
Government officials charged with the prosecution of these
projects or their representatives are authorized to take immediate
possession of the portion of the property subject to the lien as soon as
the need arises and after due notice to the owners. It is however,
understood that ownership over said properties shall immediately
revert to the title holders should the airport be abandoned or when
the infrastructure projects are completed and buildings used by
project engineers are abandoned or dismantled, but subject to the
same lien for future improvements." 50
In other words, lands granted by patent shall be subject to a right-of-
way not exceeding 60 meters in width for public highways, irrigation ditches,
aqueducts, and other similar works of the government or any public
enterprise, free of charge, except only for the value of the improvements
existing thereon that may be affected. 51
 We are not persuaded with the ruling of the RTC that the government
waived the encumbrance imposed by C.A. No. 141 (Public Land Act) when it
did not oppose the subdivision of the original property covered by the free
patent. The reservation and condition contained in the OCT of lands granted
by free patent, like the origins of the subject property, is not limited by any
time period, thus, the same is subsisting. 52 This subsisting reservation
contained in the transfer certificate of title of the Spouses Regulto belies
such supposition that the Government waived the enforcement of its legal
easement of right-of-way on the subject property when it did not oppose to
the subdivision of the property in 1995.
Petitioners allege that since the property in controversy was originally
acquired under the provisions of special laws, particularly C.A. No. 141, then
Section 5 of the IRR of R.A. No. 8974 should be applied in the present case.
Petitioners insist that the acquisition of the portion of the subject property is
through execution of quitclaims.
Section 5 of the IRR of R.A. No. 8974 provides:
SECTION 5. Quit Claim. — If the private property or land is
acquired under the provisions of Special Laws, particularly
Commonwealth Act No. 141, known as the Public Land Act,
which provides a 20-meter strip of land easement by the government
for public use with damages to improvements only, P.D. No. 635
which increased the reserved area to a 60-meter strip, and P.D. No.
1361 which authorizes government officials charged with the
prosecution of projects or their representative to take immediate
possession of portion of the property subject to the lien as soon as the
need arises and after due notice to the owners, then a quit claim
from the owners concerned shall be obtained by the
Implementing Agency. No payment by the government shall
be made for land acquired under the quit claim mode. 53 HSAcaE

With the existence of the said easement of right-of-way in favor of the

Government, the petitioners may appropriate the portion of the land
necessary for the construction of the bypass road without paying for it,
except for damages to the improvements. Consequently, the petitioners are
ordered to obtain the necessary quitclaim deed from the Spouses Regulto for
the 162-square-meter strip of land to be utilized in the bypass road project.
It is noted that the 162 square meters of the subject property traversed
by the bypass road project is well within the limit provided by the law. While
this Court concurs that the petitioners are not obliged to pay just
compensation in the enforcement of its easement of right-of-way to lands
which originated from public lands granted by free patent, we, however, rule
that petitioners are not free from any liability as to the consequence of
enforcing the said right-of-way granted over the original 7,759-square-meter
property to the 300-square-meter property belonging to the Spouses
Regulto.
There is "taking," in the context of the State's inherent power of
eminent domain, when the owner is actually deprived or dispossessed of his
property; when there is a practical destruction or material impairment of the
value of his property or when he is deprived of the ordinary use thereof. 54
Using one of these standards, it is apparent that there is taking of the
remaining area of the property of the Spouses Regulto. It is true that no
burden was imposed thereon, and that the spouses still retained title and
possession of the property. The fact that more than half of the property shall
be devoted to the bypass road will undoubtedly result in material impairment
of the value of the property. It reduced the subject property to an area of
138 square meters.
Thus, the petitioners are liable to pay just compensation over the
remaining area of the subject property, with interest thereon at the rate of
six percent (6%) per annum from the date of writ of possession or the actual
taking until full payment is made.
The case of Republic v. Hon. Jesus M. Mupas 55 elucidated just
compensation in this language:
Just compensation is defined as "the full and fair equivalent of
the property taken from its owner by the expropriator." The word
"just" is used to qualify the meaning of the word "compensation" and
to convey the idea that the amount to be tendered for the property to
be taken shall be real, substantial, full and ample. On the other hand,
the word "compensation" means "a full indemnity or remuneration for
the loss or damage sustained by the owner of property taken or
injured for public use."
Simply stated, just compensation means that the former owner
must be returned to the monetary equivalent of the position that the
owner had when the taking occurred. To achieve this monetary
equivalent, we use the standard value of "fair market value" of the
property at the time of the filing of the complaint for expropriation or
at the time of the taking of property, whichever is earlier. 56
Consequently, the case is remanded to the court of origin for the
purpose of determining the final just compensation for the remaining area of
the subject property. The RTC is thereby ordered to make the determination
of just compensation payable to the respondents Spouses Regulto with
deliberate dispatch. The RTC is cautioned to make a determination based on
the parameters set forth by law and jurisprudence regarding just
compensation.
WHEREFORE, the petition for review on certiorari dated July 10, 2012
filed by the Republic of the Philippines as represented by the Department of
Public Works and Highways; Engineer Simplicio D. Gonzales, District
Engineer, Second Engineering District of Camarines Sur; and Engineer
Victorino M. Del Socorro, Jr., Project Engineer, DPWH, Baras, Canaman,
Camarines Sur, is hereby PARTIALLY GRANTED.
The case is hereby REMANDED to the Regional Trial Court of Naga
City, Branch 62 for the determination of the final just compensation of the
compensable area consisting of 138 square meters, with interest thereon at
the rate of six percent (6%) per annum from the date of writ of possession or
the actual taking until full payment is made.
 SO ORDERED. HESIcT

Velasco, Jr., Perez, Reyes and Perlas-Bernabe, * JJ., concur.

Â
Footnotes

*Â Designated Additional Member in lieu of Associate Justice Francis H. Jardeleza,

per Raffle dated September 14, 2014.

1. Penned by Judge Antonio C.A. Ayo, Jr., rollo, pp. 36-38.

2. Rollo , p. 46.

3. Id.

4. Id. at 54.

5. Id. at 47.

6. Id. at 38.

7. Id. at 60.

8. Id. at 61.

9. Id.

10. Id.

11. Id.

12. Id. at 62.

13. Id.

14. Id. at 45.

15. Id. at 47.

16. Id. at 49.

17. Id. at 64-72.

18. Id. at 66.

19. Id. at 69-70.

20. Id. at 73.

21. Id.

22. Id.

23. Id. at 74-92.

24. FURTHER AMENDING THE PROVISIONS OF SECTION ONE HUNDRED TWELVE

OF COMMONWEALTH ACT NUMBERED ONE HUNDRED FORTY-ONE, AS
 AMENDED BY PRESIDENTIAL DECREE NUMBERED SIX HUNDRED THIRTY-
FIVE.

25. Rollo , p. 78.

26. An Act to Facilitate the Acquisition of Right-of-Way, Site or Location for

National Government Infrastructure Projects and for Other Purposes.

27. Rollo , pp. 80-81.

28. Id. at 89.

29. Id. at 96-103.

30. Id. at 104.

31. Id.

32. Id.

33. Id. at 105.

34. Id.

35. Id. at 38.

36. Id.

37. Id.

38. Rollo , pp. 19-20.

39. Dio v. Subic Bay Marine Exploratorium, Inc. , G.R. No. 189532, June 11, 2014,
726 SCRA 244, 252.

40. Section 2. Modes of appeal. —

    (c) Appeal by certiorari. — In all cases where only questions of

law are raised or involved, the appeal shall be to the Supreme Court by
petition for review on certiorari in accordance with the Rule 45.

41. Dio v. Subic Bay Marine Exploratorium, Inc., supra note 39.

42. G.R. No. 177168, August 3, 2015. (Citations omitted)

43. Rollo , p. 38.

44. Id.

45. NIA v. Court of Appeals , 395 Phil. 48, 56 (2000).

46. Id.

47. Rollo , pp. 39-44, Annex B, OCT No. 235.

48. Id. at 54-55, Annex A-TCT No. 086-2010000231.

49. NIA v. Court of Appeals, supra note 45, at 55.

50. Emphasis supplied.

51. Republic v. Andaya, 552 Phil. 40, 45 (2007).

52. NIA v. Court of Appeals, supra note 45, at 55.

53. Emphasis supplied.

54. Republic of the Philippines, rep. by the National Power Corporation v. Heirs
of Saturnino Q. Borbon, et al., G.R. No. 165354, January 12, 2015, citing
Ansaldo v. Tantuico, Jr., 266 Phil. 319, 323 (1990).

55. G.R. Nos. 181892, 209917, 209696 & 209731, September 8, 2015.

56. Citation omitted. Â