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Cyberattacks in Smart Grids: Challenges and Solving the Multi-Criteria

Decision-Making for Cybersecurity Options, Including Ones That Incorporate
Artiﬁcial Intelligence, Using an...
Article in Journal of Cybersecurity and Privacy · September 2023

DOI: 10.3390/jcp3040031
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Journal of
Cybersecurity
and Privacy
Article
Cyberattacks in Smart Grids: Challenges and Solving the
Multi-Criteria Decision-Making for Cybersecurity Options,
Including Ones That Incorporate Artificial Intelligence, Using
an Analytical Hierarchy Process
Ayat-Allah Bouramdane
Laboratory of Renewable Energies and Advanced Materials (LERMA), College of Engineering and Architecture,
International University of Rabat (IUR), IUR Campus, Technopolis Park, Rocade Rabat-Salé,
Sala Al Jadida 11103, Morocco; [email protected]
Abstract: Smart grids have emerged as a transformative technology in the power sector, enabling
efficient energy management. However, the increased reliance on digital technologies also exposes
smart grids to various cybersecurity threats and attacks. This article provides a comprehensive
exploration of cyberattacks and cybersecurity in smart grids, focusing on critical components and
applications. It examines various cyberattack types and their implications on smart grids, backed by
real-world case studies and quantitative models. To select optimal cybersecurity options, the study
proposes a multi-criteria decision-making (MCDM) approach using the analytical hierarchy process
(AHP). Additionally, the integration of artificial intelligence (AI) techniques in smart-grid security
is examined, highlighting the potential benefits and challenges. Overall, the findings suggest that
“security effectiveness” holds the highest importance, followed by “cost-effectiveness”, “scalability”,
and “Integration and compatibility”, while other criteria (i.e., “performance impact”, “manageability
and usability”, “compliance and regulatory requirements”, “resilience and redundancy”, “vendor
support and collaboration”, and “future readiness”) contribute to the evaluation but have relatively
Citation: Bouramdane, A.-A. lower weights. Alternatives such as “access control and authentication” and “security information and
Cyberattacks in Smart Grids: event management” with high weighted sums are crucial for enhancing cybersecurity in smart grids,
Challenges and Solving the while alternatives such as “compliance and regulatory requirements” and “encryption” have lower
Multi-Criteria Decision-Making for weighted sums but still provide value in their respective criteria. We also find that “deep learning”
Cybersecurity Options, Including emerges as the most effective AI technique for enhancing cybersecurity in smart grids, followed by
Ones That Incorporate Artificial
“hybrid approaches”, “Bayesian networks”, “swarm intelligence”, and “machine learning”, while
Intelligence, Using an Analytical
“fuzzy logic”, “natural language processing”, “expert systems”, and “genetic algorithms” exhibit
Hierarchy Process. J. Cybersecur. Priv.
lower effectiveness in addressing smart-grid cybersecurity. The article discusses the benefits and
2023, 3, 662–705. https://doi.org/
drawbacks of MCDM-AHP, proposes enhancements for its use in smart-grid cybersecurity, and
10.3390/jcp3040031
suggests exploring alternative MCDM techniques for evaluating security options in smart grids. The
Academic Editor: Danda B. Rawat
approach aids decision-makers in the smart-grid field to make informed cybersecurity choices and
Received: 24 July 2023 optimize resource allocation.
Revised: 22 August 2023
Accepted: 31 August 2023 Keywords: analytical hierarchy process; artificial intelligence; cyberattacks; cybersecurity;
Published: 27 September 2023 multi-criteria decision-making; smart grids
Copyright: © 2023 by the authors. 1. Introduction

Licensee MDPI, Basel, Switzerland.
1.1. Research Motivation
This article is an open access article
distributed under the terms and The ever-growing reliance on interconnected technologies in modern power systems
conditions of the Creative Commons has led to the emergence of smart grids, promising enhanced efficiency and sustainabil-
Attribution (CC BY) license (https:// ity [1,2] to combat the impacts of climate change [3,4] (SMRY [5]) [6–11] [Chapter 5] [12]
creativecommons.org/licenses/by/ (SMRY [13]). However, this increased complexity also exposes these critical infrastructures
4.0/). to a myriad of cyber threats [14,15]. In light of the escalating frequency and sophistication
J. Cybersecur. Priv. 2023, 3, 662–705. https://doi.org/10.3390/jcp3040031 https://www.mdpi.com/journal/jcp

J. Cybersecur. Priv. 2023, 3 663
of cyberattacks on smart grids, a comprehensive understanding of their components, vul-

nerabilities, and potential impacts becomes imperative. This research endeavor seeks to
address this pressing concern by delving into multifaceted dimensions. It aims to unravel
the intricate interplay between smart-grid components and cyber vulnerabilities, analyze
the diverse spectrum of cyber threats and their short-term and long-term consequences,
investigate cascading effects on grid components, draw insights from real-world case
studies, and develop quantitative models to assess cyberattack impacts. By exploring the
techno–economic–safety–social implications of cybersecurity measures and delving into
the application of artificial intelligence (AI) techniques, this study aspires to contribute
valuable insights to the field of smart-grid cybersecurity, ultimately fortifying the resilience
of critical energy infrastructure.
1.2. Existing Research

There is extensive research on cyberattacks and cybersecurity in smart grids, with nu-
merous studies focusing on understanding the threats, vulnerabilities, and countermea-
sures.
Researchers have developed various models and frameworks to assess the potential
cyber threats and risks in smart grids [16,17]. These studies aim to identify the attack
vectors, vulnerabilities, and potential consequences to guide the development of effective
cybersecurity strategies.
Research has been conducted on developing advanced techniques for detecting
and preventing cyberattacks in smart grids [18,19]. This includes anomaly detection
algorithms [20,21], intrusion detection systems (IDS) [22,23], machine-learning-based ap-
proaches [24,25], and data analytics to detect and respond to suspicious activities in real
time [26,27]. Securing communication channels and implementing robust authentica-
tion mechanisms are crucial for protecting smart-grid infrastructure [28]. The research
has focused on encryption algorithms [29], secure protocols [30], access control mecha-
nisms [31,32], and authentication schemes to ensure the confidentiality, integrity, and au-
thenticity of the data transmitted in smart grids [33,34].
The researchers have explored resilient system architectures for smart grids to mitigate
the impact of cyberattacks [35,36]. This includes decentralized architectures [37,38], re-
dundancy [39,40], distributed control systems [41,42], and fault-tolerant designs to ensure
continuous operation and quick recovery from cyber incidents [43].
The studies have analyzed the existing security standards and regulations applicable
to smart grids and proposed improvements [44]. The researchers have also examined the
gaps and challenges in standardization efforts [45], aiming to establish comprehensive
security guidelines [46] and best practices specific to smart-grid deployments [47,48].
Understanding the role of insider threats [22,49] and human factors [50,51] in smart-grid
cybersecurity is an emerging area of research. These studies investigate the impact of hu-
man behavior [52,53], social engineering [54,55], training and awareness programs [56,57],
and policy frameworks to address the human element in cybersecurity [58,59]. Given the
large amount of data generated by smart grids, the research has focused on secure data
management, privacy-preserving techniques, and anonymization approaches to protect
sensitive information while enabling data analysis for grid optimization and energy man-
agement [60,61]. The research has explored incident response and recovery strategies
in smart grids [62,63]. This includes developing effective incident handling procedures,
recovery mechanisms, backup systems, and disaster recovery plans to minimize the im-
pact of cyber incidents and ensure the rapid restoration of services. The research has
investigated the importance of threat intelligence and information sharing mechanisms
to enhance cybersecurity in smart grids. This includes the development of collaborative
platforms, information sharing networks, and sharing protocols to facilitate timely and
effective responses to emerging cyber threats [64,65].
There is a growing body of research on the application of artificial intelligence (AI) in

cybersecurity for smart grids [66]. AI techniques, such as machine learning (ML) [67] and
deep learning [68,69], have shown promise in enhancing the security of smart-grid systems.
The researchers have explored the use of AI algorithms to detect and predict cyber
threats in smart grids. ML models are trained on historical data to identify patterns and
anomalies that indicate potential attacks or malicious activities [70,71]. AI-based anomaly
detection techniques are being developed to identify unusual behavior or deviations from
normal operations in smart grids. These methods leverage machine learning algorithms
to establish baseline behavior and detect abnormal activities that may signify a cyberat-
tack [72,73]. AI is being applied to enhance the intrusion detection systems in smart grids.
Machine learning algorithms can analyze network traffic and system logs to identify and
classify potential intrusions or suspicious activities [74,75]. AI techniques enable intelligent
decision-making in real-time security operations [76,77]. This includes automated response
mechanisms [78], adaptive access control [79,80], and dynamic security policies that adjust
based on the evolving threats and system conditions [81]. AI is employed to ensure secure
communication and protect data privacy in smart-grid networks [82,83]. AI algorithms can
be used to encrypt sensitive data [84], authenticate communication channels [85], and iden-
tify potential vulnerabilities in the communication infrastructure [86]. The researchers
are studying adversarial machine learning techniques to identify and mitigate attacks
targeting AI-based cybersecurity systems in smart grids. Adversarial models simulate
attack scenarios to test the robustness of AI algorithms and develop countermeasures [87].
1.3. Knowledge Gaps

The existing research has identified several knowledge gaps in the fields of cyberat-
tacks and cybersecurity in smart grids.
First, there is a need for a comprehensive overview of smart-grid components and
applications, including the identification of vulnerable components and potential types of
cyberattacks. Furthermore, understanding the short-term and long-term techno–economic–
safety–social impacts of cyberattacks on smart grids, including the cascading effects on
interconnected components, is crucial. The real-world case studies of cyberattacks on
operational smart grids and the development of quantitative models and metrics to assess
the impacts of cyberattacks are necessary. Additionally, the implications of cybersecurity
measures on operational smart grids and the development of quantitative models and
metrics to assess the implications of cybersecurity on smart grids need further exploration.
Second, research on the use of the analytical hierarchy process (AHP) to solve multi-
criteria decision-making (MCDM) problems in the context of cybersecurity in smart grids
is relatively limited, as AHP is not commonly associated with cybersecurity specifically.
However, AHP is a widely used decision-making tool that can be applied to various
domains—such as renewable energy integration [88], the performance of residential en-
ergy management control algorithms [89], a day-ahead scheduling of electric vehicles and
electrical storage systems in smart homes [90], optimization of the advanced metering
infrastructure (AMI) customer ecosystem [91], including cybersecurity [92,93]. Therefore,
the optimal cybersecurity options for smart grids, such as access control, authentication,
encryption, intrusion detection systems (IDS), firewalls, security information and event
management (SIEM), and others, need to be evaluated based on multiple criteria. These cri-
teria include security effectiveness, scalability, integration, and compatibility; performance
impact; cost-effectiveness; manageability and usability; compliance and regulatory require-
ments; resilience and redundancy; vendor support and collaboration; future readiness;
network segmentation; patch management; threat intelligence; and vendor and supply
chain security.
Third, understanding the potential and challenges of AI techniques, such as machine
learning, deep learning, natural language processing (NLP), genetic algorithms (GA), fuzzy
logic, expert systems, swarm intelligence, Bayesian networks, and hybrid approaches,
is important. The use of MCDM-AHP to find the optimal cybersecurity option that in-
corporates AI techniques and methods needs to be explored. The criteria for evaluation
may include security effectiveness, scalability, integration, and compatibility; performance
impact; cost-effectiveness; manageability and usability; compliance and regulatory require-
ments; resilience and redundancy; vendor support and collaboration; future readiness;
network segmentation; and explainability and transparency.
The advantages and drawbacks of employing AHP to assess cybersecurity options in
smart grids need to be discussed. Furthermore, it is essential to propose enhancements for
its application in smart-grid cybersecurity and to explore alternative MCDM techniques for
evaluating security options in smart grids.
1.4. Research Questions

This study aims to address this existing knowledge gap (Section 1.3) and make a
significant contribution by exploring the following research questions:
1. (a) What are the components and applications of smart grids, and how do they
contribute to the vulnerability of cyberattacks? (b) What are the different types of
cyberattacks that can target smart grids, and what are their short-term and long-term
technological, economic, safety, and social impacts? (c) How do cyberattacks on
smart grids result in cascading effects and interconnected impacts on various grid
components? (d) What are the real-world case studies of cyberattacks on operational
smart grids, and what can be learned from them? (e) How can quantitative mod-
els and metrics be developed to assess the impacts of cyberattacks on smart grids?
(f) What are the short-term and long-term techno–economic–safety–social implica-
tions of cybersecurity in smart grids, emphasizing the importance of confidentiality,
integrity, and availability? (g) How do cybersecurity measures implemented in op-
erational smart grids affect their real-world implications? (h) How can quantitative
models and metrics be used to assess the implications of cybersecurity in smart grids?
2. (a) What are the main criteria for evaluating cybersecurity options in smart grids?
(b) What are the key cybersecurity options for protecting smart-grid infrastructure?
(c) How can AHP be employed to assess and prioritize these cybersecurity options
based on multiple criteria?
3. (a) What are the differences between artificial intelligence (AI) and machine learning
(ML), and how do they apply to cybersecurity in smart grids? (b) What is the potential
of AI techniques for enhancing smart-grid cybersecurity? (c) What are the challenges
associated with implementing AI techniques in smart-grid cybersecurity, and how
can they be addressed? (d) How can MCDM-AHP be used to find the optimal
cybersecurity option that incorporates AI techniques and methods? (e) What are
the key criteria for evaluating AI-based cybersecurity options in smart grids using
MCDM-AHP?
We also discuss both the strengths and constraints of using AHP for MCDM in as-
sessing cybersecurity options in smart grids. Additionally, we suggest improvements to
its application in smart-grid cybersecurity and explore alternative MCDM methods for
assessing security options in smart grids.
1.5. Methodology
The methodology employed in this study encompasses four main areas related to
cybersecurity in smart grids. First, it involves conducting a comprehensive analysis of
smart-grid components and applications, examining the various types of cyberattacks
that target these systems, and assessing their short-term and long-term impacts on the
technological, economic, safety, and social aspects of smart grids. Real-world case studies
are investigated to provide practical insights into the effects of cyberattacks on operational
smart grids (Section 3.1). Second, the study uses the analytical hierarchy process (AHP) as
a multi-criteria decision making (MCDM) technique to determine the optimal cybersecurity
option. A set of cybersecurity measures, such as access control, authentication, encryption,
IDPS, firewalls, SIEM, vulnerability assessment, and others, are evaluated based on mul-
tiple criteria, including security effectiveness, scalability, integration, and compatibility;

performance impact; cost-effectiveness; manageability and usability; compliance and regu-
latory requirements; resilience and redundancy; vendor support and collaboration; future
readiness; network segmentation; patch management; threat intelligence; and vendor and
supply chain security (Section 3.2). Third, the research explores the difference between
artificial intelligence (AI) and machine learning (ML), addressing their potential and chal-
lenges. AHP-MCDM is applied to find the optimal cybersecurity option that incorporates
AI techniques and methods, such as machine learning, deep learning, natural language
processing (NLP), genetic algorithms (GA), fuzzy logic, expert systems, swarm intelligence,
Bayesian networks, and hybrid approaches. The criteria considered in this evaluation in-
clude security effectiveness, scalability, integration, and compatibility; performance impact;
cost-effectiveness; manageability and usability; compliance and regulatory requirements;
resilience and redundancy; vendor support and collaboration; future readiness; network
segmentation; explainability; and transparency (Section 3.3). Finally, the study discusses
the advantages (Section 4.1) and limitations of AHP-MCDM (Section 4.2), suggests im-
provements to its application in smart-grid cybersecurity (Section 4.3), and explores other
MCDM techniques (Section 4.4) that can be implemented to assess cybersecurity options in
smart grids.
1.6. Practical Implications

This study provides insights for researchers, policymakers, and practitioners in the
field of smart-grid cybersecurity, guiding them in understanding the challenges, making
informed decisions, and implementing effective cybersecurity measures.
1.7. Outline
This article follows a structured outline, starting with an introduction (Section 1) that
establishes the research motivation (Section 1.1), existing studies (Section 1.2), knowledge
gaps (Section 1.3), research questions (Section 1.4), methodology overview (Section 1.5),
and practical implications (Section 1.6). In the methodology section (Section 2), the research
approach and the methodology employed are described in detail. The application of
the analytical hierarchy process (AHP) as a decision-making framework (Section 2.2) for
evaluating cybersecurity options in smart grids is explained, emphasizing its ability to
consider multiple criteria and prioritize options. The results section (Section 3) presents
the key findings obtained through the application of the methodology described earlier.
The discussion section (Section 4) delves deeper into the implications and significance
of the research findings. It examines the advantages and limitations of the methodology
employed, addressing potential challenges and areas for improvement. The conclusion
section (Section 5) summarizes the key findings, insights, and implications discussed
throughout the article.
2. Methodology
The methodology employed in this study combines the principles of multi-criteria
decision-making (MCDM) with artificial intelligence (AI) techniques to address the chal-
lenges of cyberattacks in smart grids and facilitate the selection of effective cybersecu-
rity options.
First, a comprehensive analysis of the cybersecurity landscape in smart grids is con-
ducted to identify the key challenges and potential threats. This analysis includes an
examination of the different types of cyberattacks, their potential impacts on smart-grid
infrastructure, and the specific vulnerabilities that need to be addressed (Section 3.1).
Next, a set of relevant criteria is identified to evaluate the cybersecurity options
available for smart grids. These criteria encompass factors such as security effectiveness,
scalability, integration, and compatibility; performance impact; cost-effectiveness; manage-
ability and usability; compliance with regulatory requirements; resilience and redundancy;
vendor support and regulation; and future readiness. The analytical hierarchy process
(AHP) (Section 2.2) is then used as the core methodology for the MCDM process. AHP
allows for the systematic comparison and prioritization of the cybersecurity options based
on their performance against each criterion (Section 3.2).
To incorporate AI techniques, MCDM-AHP is applied to choose between different
AI options. These options include machine learning, deep learning, swarm intelligence,
Bayesian networks, etc. (Section 3.3).
Overall, the methodology employed in this study combines MCDM principles, and AI
techniques to create a robust framework for evaluating and selecting cybersecurity options
in smart grids, thereby mitigating the risks associated with cyberattacks and safeguarding
the integrity and security of smart grid systems.
2.1. Motivation for Employing MCDM-AHP in Enhancing Cybersecurity Resilience for

Smart Grids
The use of multi-criteria decision making (MCDM) with the analytical hierarchy
process (AHP) methodology in smart-grid cybersecurity is driven by its effectiveness in
handling the complex and diverse security decisions within this critical field. Smart grids
involve interconnected elements, numerous stakeholders, and a wide range of potential
cybersecurity risks. MCDM-AHP provides a structured way to assess and prioritize
cybersecurity choices by considering multiple criteria, encompassing both technical and
non-technical factors.
For smart-grid cybersecurity, MCDM-AHP enables a systematic evaluation of various
security measures, considering aspects such as effectiveness, feasibility, cost, and po-
tential impacts. This approach integrates expert insights, quantifies qualitative criteria,
and accounts for the interdependencies between different security options. By utilizing
MCDM-AHP, the intricate landscape of smart-grid cybersecurity can be navigated, ensur-
ing a well-informed decision-making process that aligns with the ever-changing nature of
cyber threats and grid operations.
To sum up, the motivation for using MCDM-AHP in smart-grid cybersecurity stems
from its capacity to offer a robust, comprehensive, and adaptable framework for assessing
and selecting optimal cybersecurity strategies. This methodology aids in addressing the
complex challenges presented by cybersecurity threats in smart grids, ultimately contribut-
ing to improved grid resilience, reliability, and security.
2.2. Theoretical Framework of Multi-Criteria Decision-Making (MCDM) Using the Analytical

Hierarchy Process (AHP)
Multi-criteria decision-making (MCDM) is a decision-making approach that ad-
dresses complex problems involving multiple criteria and options. In traditional decision-
making, a single criterion is often used to evaluate alternatives, but MCDM recognizes
that real-world decisions are influenced by multiple factors. MCDM provides a systematic
framework for evaluating and comparing alternatives based on multiple criteria simul-
taneously, taking into account their relative importance and interdependencies. It helps
decision-makers incorporate diverse perspectives, consider trade-offs, and make informed
decisions that align with their goals and preferences [94].
MCDM is applied across various fields due to its ability to handle complex decision
problems with multiple criteria and alternatives. Some of the fields where MCDM has
found extensive applications include business and management (i.e., project or supplier
selection, investment decisions, facility location decisions and risk management, etc.) [95],
industry [96,97], economics [98,99], environment [100], water treatment [101], transporta-
tion and logistics (i.e., route planning, network design, etc.) [102,103], renewable energy
development [104,105] and planning [106,107]—such as suitable areas for photovoltaic
and concentrated solar power [108], onshore wind [109], offshore wind [110], and offshore
floating photovoltaic systems [111]—, healthcare and medicine (i.e., patient treatment or
medical equipment selection, resource allocation in hospitals, etc.) [112,113], and education
(i.e., performances, teachers’ recruitment process, etc.) [114,115].
In the energy sector, particularly in the context of smart grids, various multi-criteria
approaches are employed to address complex decision problems [116]. While the ana-
lytical hierarchy process (AHP) is recognized as a significant and widely used MCDM
technique [117,118], its application specifically to cybersecurity in smart grids is relatively
limited (Section 1.3).
AHP provides a structured and systematic approach to decision-making when mul-
tiple criteria or factors need to be considered. It allows decision-makers to evaluate and
prioritize alternatives based on their relative importance and preferences [119,120]. Thomas
Saaty was the one who initially proposed this technique [121,122], and it has been consider-
ably improved since then. In AHP, the problem is constructed as a hierarchy and broken
down into elements. The overall goal is located at the top level, the criteria and sub-criteria
are at the middle level, and the alternatives are at the bottom of the hierarchy [123,124].
The use of AHP typically involves five fundamental steps to facilitate a structured
decision-making process. These steps are as follows [125,126]:
1. Define the decision problem and establish the hierarchy: The first step in using
AHP is to decompose the decision-making problem into a hierarchy of elements,
with the goal to be achieved at the highest level, criteria and sub-criteria at interme-
diate levels, and alternatives to be considered at the lowest level. This hierarchical
structure (Figure 1) helps organize and decompose the problem into manageable com-
ponents.
Figure 1. Hierarchical evaluation framework for cybersecurity measures in smart grids, which
includes distinct levels: a top-level overarching goal, intermediate evaluation criteria, and a bottom
level containing various cybersecurity measures. Source: The author’s own elaboration.
2. Perform Pairwise Comparisons: Pairwise comparison matrices are performed be-

tween elements at the same level of the hierarchy. These matrices capture the relative
importance or preference of one element compared to another at a specific level.
Specifically, pairwise comparison matrices are performed:
• Between Criteria: decision-makers compare the criteria to determine their rel-
ative importance in achieving the overall goal. Each criterion is compared to
every other criterion to assess their relative weights or priorities. The resulting
pairwise comparison matrix represents the importance of criteria relative to one
another.
• Between Alternatives: decision-makers compare the alternatives against each
other based on specific criteria. Each alternative is compared to every other
alternative to evaluate its relative performance or desirability. The pairwise com-
parison matrix represents the preference of alternatives relative to one another
for each criterion.
• Between Criteria and Sub-Criteria: In some cases, the AHP hierarchy may
include sub-criteria within each criterion. Pairwise comparison matrices can
also be performed between the criteria and their respective sub-criteria. This
allows decision-makers to assess the relative importance or preference of each
sub-criterion within its parent criterion.
These matrices serve as the basis for deriving priority weights and aggregating prefer-
ences within the AHP process.
Let C be the pairwise comparison matrix with elements cij representing the importance
of criterion i compared to criterion j (1).
 
c11 c12 c13 ... c1n
 c21 c22 c23 ... c2n 
C = [Cij ]nxn = . (1)
 
.. 
 .. ... ... ... . 
cn1 cn2 cn3 ... cnn
Cij is the pairwise comparison rating for the ith and the jth criteria. n is the number
of criteria.
The matrix C is reciprocal, meaning that the elements satisfy the property of reci-
procity: Cij = 1/Cij for all i and j. Reciprocity ensures that the judgments made in
the pairwise comparisons are consistent. It implies that if element A is considered,
for example, twice as important as element B, then B is considered half as important
as A.
Additionally, the diagonal elements of the pairwise comparison matrix are in unity
(Cij = 1 for i = j). This indicates that an element is perfectly equal to itself, which is a
logical requirement.
The entries in the pairwise comparison matrix C are typically taken from a ratio-scale
based on the values 1/9 to 9 [121]. In fact, in the AHP, decision-makers assign numer-
ical values to represent the relative importance or preference between elements in the
pairwise comparisons. The scale is as follows: 1 (equally important), 3 (moderately
more important), 5 (strongly more important), 7 (very strongly more important),
9 (absolutely more important). The reciprocals of these values are used for the re-
verse comparisons: 1/3, 1/5, 1/7, and 1/9. Table 1 shows Saaty’s comparison scale,
also known as the AHP scale of relative importance. It includes the rating scale, its
definition, and an explanation of each rating.
Table 1. Saaty’s comparison scale [121]. Decision-makers use these ratings to express the relative
importance or preference between elements in pairwise comparisons (1).
Rating Scale Definition Explanation

Both elements are considered to have equal
Equally
1 importance or preference. There is no
preferred
significant difference between them.
One element is moderately preferred or has a
Moderately
3 moderate advantage over another. The difference in
preferred
importance or preference is noticeable but not substantial.
One element is strongly preferred or has a significant
Strongly
5 advantage over another. The difference in importance or
preferred
preference is substantial and clearly noticeable.
One element is very strongly preferred or has a substantial
Very strongly
7 advantage over another. The difference in importance or preference
preferred
is considerably large and easily distinguishable.
One element is absolutely preferred or has an overwhelming
Absolutely
9 advantage over another. The difference in importance or preference
preferred
is extremely significant and essentially indisputable.
Intermediate values between
2, 4, 6, 8 When compromise is needed
the two adjacent judgment
Pairwise comparisons can be performed using different methods, such as direct judg-
ment, expert opinions, surveys, or historical data. The key is to elicit and capture the
decision-makers’ subjective judgments regarding the relative importance or preference
of the elements being compared.
3. Calculate Priority Weights: Calculate the priority weights for each element in the
hierarchy based on the pairwise comparison judgments. Several methods can be used,
including the geometric mean and the eigenvector method. The priority weights
reflect the relative importance of each element within its level and enable quantitative
comparison and analysis.
Let gi be the geometric mean of the ith row in the pairwise comparison matrix C. It
can be calculated as (2).
gi = (ci1 ∗ ci2 ∗ . . . ∗ cin )1/n (2)
Let N be the normalized pairwise comparison matrix obtained by dividing each

element of C by its corresponding geometric mean. The normalized element is given
by (3).
cij
nij = (3)
gi
Let A be the average column vector obtained by calculating the average of each
column in the normalized pairwise comparison matrix N. The average of the jth
column is given by (4).
a j = (1/n) ∗ (n1j + n2j + . . . + nnj ) (4)
The average column vector A represents the relative weights of each criterion. The
weights wi can be obtained by normalizing the average column vector (5).
wi = a i / ( a1 + a2 + . . . + a n ) (5)
Let O be the matrix representing the options evaluated. Each row ok corresponds to
the values of the options for each criterion. The weighted sum for the kth option is
calculated as (6).
sk = (w1 ∗ ok1 ) + (w2 ∗ ok2 ) + . . . + (wn ∗ okn ) (6)
Calculate the eigenvalue (λmax ) and the corresponding eigenvector (V) of the pairwise
comparison matrix C. The eigenvalue equation is given by (7).
(C − λmax ∗ I ) ∗ V = 0 (7)
λmax represents the eigenvalue that we want to solve for; I is the identity matrix
of size nxn; V is the eigenvector associated with the eigenvalue (λmax ). To solve
for the eigenvalue (λmax ), we need to find the values of λ) that satisfy the above
Equation (7). This can be carried out using numerical methods or software tools that
can compute eigenvalues.
4. Check for Consistency: Assess the consistency of the pairwise comparison judgments.
Inconsistencies occur when the assigned values do not meet certain mathematical
properties. Calculate the consistency ratio (CR) using a consistency index (CI) and
a random index (RI). If the CR exceeds a predefined threshold (e.g., 0.10), further
examination or adjustments to the pairwise comparisons are needed. The consistency
index (CI) is calculated using the formula (8):
λmax − n
CI = (8)
( n − 1)
where λmax is the maximum eigenvalue and n is the number of criteria.

The random index (RI) is a reference value based on the size of the matrix (Table 2).
It helps determine whether the consistency of the pairwise comparison matrix is
acceptable or not.
Table 2. Random Consistency Index (RI).
n 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11
RI 0 0 0.58 0.90 1.12 1.24 1.32 1.41 1.45 1.49 1.51
The consistency ratio (CR) is the ratio of the CI to the RI. It is calculated as (9):
CI
CR = (9)
RI
If the CR is less than or equal to 0.1, the consistency of the matrix is considered
acceptable. If the CR exceeds 0.1, the consistency should be re-evaluated (Figure 2).
Figure 2. Analytical hierarchy process (AHP) algorithm: A methodical approach for assessing and
ranking cybersecurity measures in smart grids. Source: the author’s own elaboration.
5. Interpretation and Decision-Making: By examining the priority weights, it becomes

apparent which criteria are more influential in achieving the overall goal. Moreover,
the alternatives with higher weighted scores indicate better overall performance
or desirability.
3. Results
In this section, we delve into a comprehensive examination of the various aspects
related to cybersecurity in smart grids. First, we provide an overview of smart grids,
including their components and applications (Section 3.1.1). We explore the different types
of cyberattacks (Section 3.1.2) and their potential short-term and long-term impacts on
smart grids, considering their techno–economic–safety–social dimensions (Section 3.1.3).
This examination encompasses the identification of vulnerable components, the cascad-
ing effects of cyberattacks on smart-grid elements (Section 3.1.4), and real-world case
studies of operational smart grids that have been targeted (Section 3.1.5). Additionally,
we discuss the quantitative models and metrics that enable the assessment of cyberat-
tack impacts (Section 3.1.5) and the associated implications for smart-grid cybersecurity
(Sections 3.1.7–3.1.10).
Moving forward, we address the second point by investigating the utilization of the
analytical hierarchy process (AHP) in solving the multi-criteria decision making (MCDM)
problem for selecting the optimal cybersecurity option. We explore a range of cybersecurity
measures such as access control, encryption, intrusion detection and prevention systems,
firewalls, security incident responses, and more. These measures are evaluated based on
multiple criteria, including security effectiveness, scalability, performance impact, cost-
effectiveness, compliance with regulatory requirements, resilience, and vendor support
(Section 3.2).
Furthermore, we explore the differences between artificial intelligence (AI) and ma-
chine learning (ML) and their potential contributions to cybersecurity in smart grids
(Section 3.3.1). By integrating AI techniques and methods such as machine learning, deep
learning, genetic algorithms, and Bayesian networks, we aim to identify the optimal cy-
bersecurity option. The application of the MCDM-AHP approach enables us to assess the
performance of different AI-based techniques against multiple criteria such as security
effectiveness, scalability, explainability, and transparency (Section 3.3.2).
Through this exploration, we aim to provide insights into the selection of the most
suitable cybersecurity option that effectively addresses the challenges faced in securing
smart grids.
3.1. Cyberattacks in Smart Grids: Challenges and Implications of Cybersecurity

3.1.1. Overview of Power Generation, Transmission, and Distribution in Smart Grids
A smart grid is an advanced electrical power system that integrates cutting-edge
technologies, sensors, and communication networks to optimize the efficiency, reliability,
and sustainability of electricity generation, transmission, distribution, and consumption
(Figure 3). Its objective is to revolutionize the conventional grid into a dynamic, automated,
and adaptable network for enhanced performance [127,128].
Smart grids operate in two distinct modes: stand-alone and grid-tied [129,130]. In stand-
alone mode, the smart grid functions independently, generating and managing electricity
locally, often in remote areas, using sources such as solar and wind, along with energy
storage [131]. In grid-tied mode, the smart grid is interconnected with the main power
grid, enabling bidirectional electricity flow and supporting stability through imports and
exports of power. The choice between these modes depends on factors such as location,
infrastructure, energy goals, and regulations [132].
Power generation within smart grids encompasses a diverse mix of sources, including
traditional fossil fuel plants and renewables such as solar, wind, hydro, and biomass. The
concept of distributed generation is central to smart grids, fostering smaller-scale facilities
close to consumption points such as rooftop solar panels and micro-hydro setups. This
approach bolsters grid resilience, reduces transmission losses, and encourages private in-
vestment, diversifying ownership and financing beyond utilities [133,134]. Energy storage
systems, including batteries and pumped hydro, play a pivotal role by storing the excess
electricity for peak demand, thus, enhancing grid stability and enabling the integration of
renewables [12,135]. Smart grids employ demand–response programs to actively manage
electricity consumption, allowing users to voluntarily adjust usage during peak demand or
grid stress, promoting grid stability and energy efficiency. Home energy management sys-
tems enable the remote control of smart appliances via user-friendly interfaces, optimizing
energy consumption based on preferences and occupancy patterns [136,137]. Time-of-use
pricing models incentivize off-peak consumption [138], while smart grids also facilitate
electric vehicle charging infrastructure and vehicle-to-grid technology, enabling EVs to
contribute back to the grid [139]. Employing technologies such as supervisory control
and data acquisition (SCADA) [140] and the Internet of Things (IoT) [141], smart grids
optimize power generation through real-time data collection, analytics, and predictive
algorithms, enhancing grid management and decision-making for load forecasting, demand
management, and maintenance scheduling.
Smart grids optimize long-distance electricity transportation by employing high-

voltage transmission lines, thereby minimizing losses [142]. These grids integrate sensors
along these lines to gather real-time data on parameters such as power flow and voltage,
which is transmitted to control centers for proactive analysis. Wide-area monitoring
systems (WAMS) employing phasor measurement units (PMUs) enable comprehensive
grid behavior monitoring, aiding with a swift response to disturbances [143,144]. The
advanced control systems within smart grids optimize power flow and voltage, leveraging
real-time data and mathematical algorithms. These systems adjust power flows, reduce
losses, and maintain grid stability. Flexible AC transmission systems (FACTS) devices, such
as static VAR compensators (SVC) and unified power flow controllers (UPFC), enhance
voltage stability and power flow control [145,146]. The seamless coordination among power
generation, transmission, and distribution is enabled by robust communication networks
and information communication technologies (ICTs) [81,147].
Smart grids encompass substations that receive high-voltage electricity, stepping it
down for distribution through networks involving overhead lines, underground cables,
and transformers [148]. Utilizing distribution automation (DA) systems, smart grids mon-
itor and control distribution networks in real time, leveraging data such as voltage and
current to optimize operations, detect faults, and ensure prompt responses [149]. Fault
detection mechanisms integrated into smart grids swiftly identify issues, enabling self-
healing capabilities to isolate faults and reconfigure the network for uninterrupted power
supply, enhancing distribution reliability and reducing outages [150,151]. The deployment
of advanced metering infrastructure (AMI), featuring smart meters and communication
infrastructure, is pivotal for power distribution. Smart meters facilitate two-way commu-
nication between utilities and consumers, offering real-time insights into consumption,
load profiles, and power quality. These data empower utilities to optimize distribution,
implement demand response programs, and enhance customer services [152,153].
Figure 3. A schematic representation of the smart grid. Source: Own Elaboration.
3.1.2. Exploring the Landscape of Cyberattacks in Smart Grids

Smart grids are susceptible to various types of cyberattacks (Figure 4) that target
their interconnected systems and infrastructure [154]. Here are some common types of
cyberattacks in smart grids [155,156]:
Figure 4. A visual representation depicting the interconnected relationship between production

plants, transmission and distribution lines, consumption, and the integration of information, control,
and communication technologies. Source: Own Elaboration.
• Denial-of-Service (DoS) Attacks: These attacks aim to temporarily make the targeted
system inaccessible to legitimate users by overwhelming the smart grid’s resources,
such as communication networks or control systems, with an excessive volume of
requests and flooding them with a high volume of traffic, launched from a single
device. This disrupts the grid’s operations and may result in service outages [157].
• Distributed Denial-of-Service (DDoS) Attacks: Similar to DoS attacks, DDoS attacks
involve multiple compromised devices, located worldwide, forming a botnet that
collectively overwhelms the grid’s resources. DDoS attacks are more challenging to
mitigate due to their distributed nature [158,159].
• Malware Attacks: Malware attacks in the context of smart grids refer to the infiltration
of malicious software into the grid’s systems, devices, or networks. Malware infects
the smart grid’s control systems, or human machine interfaces (HMIs), disrupts
operations, compromises data integrity, and potentially gains unauthorized control
over critical infrastructure. Here are some common types of malware attacks in smart
grids [160,161]:
– Viruses: viruses are self-replicating programs that attach themselves to legitimate
files or programs and spread across the grid’s systems. Once activated, viruses
can cause system malfunctions, data corruption, or unauthorized access.
– Worms: worms are standalone programs that replicate and spread across com-
puter networks without requiring a host file. Worms can rapidly infect multi-
ple devices within the smart grid, causing network congestion, system crashes,
or unauthorized activities [162,163].
– Ransomware: ransomware is a type of malware that encrypts files or locks users
out of their systems, demanding a ransom payment in exchange for restoring
access. Ransomware attacks can disrupt smart-grid operations, leading to service
interruptions or financial losses [164,165]. Ransomware attacks have been on
the rise in recent years. According to a report by SonicWall [166], there were
304.7 million ransomware attacks globally in 2020, representing a 62% increase
compared to the previous year. The financial impact of ransomware attacks is
substantial. Cybersecurity Ventures [167] estimated that ransomware costs will
reach 20 billion dollars in 2021, with a ransomware attack occurring every 11 s.
– Trojan Horses: Trojans disguise themselves as legitimate software or files and
trick users into executing them. Once activated, Trojans can perform various
malicious activities, such as data theft, system control, or backdoor creation for
remote access [168,169].
– Botnets: botnets are networks of compromised devices that are controlled by a
central command and control (C&C) server. Smart-grid devices infected with
botnet malware can be used for coordinated attacks, such as DDoS attacks or
spreading other forms of malware [170,171].
– Keyloggers: keyloggers capture keystrokes on infected devices, including pass-
words, login credentials, or other sensitive information. These data can be used
to gain unauthorized access to smart-grid systems or compromise user accounts.
– Spyware: spyware is designed to collect information about a user’s activities
without their knowledge or consent. In the context of smart grids, spyware
can monitor system operations, gather sensitive data, or capture user behavior,
potentially compromising grid security.
The number of unique malware variants continues to grow rapidly. According to
AV-TEST [172], an independent antivirus testing organization, more than 1 billion new
malware variants were detected in 2020 alone.
• Phishing Attacks: phishing attacks involve the use of deceptive techniques to trick
individuals or organizations into revealing sensitive information, such as login cre-
dentials, financial details, or personal data, or performing malicious actions. These
attacks often come in the form of fraudulent emails, text messages, or websites that
mimic trusted entities or institutions [173]. Phishing attacks continue to be a prevalent
threat. In the 2021 Verizon Data Breach Investigations Report [174], phishing attacks
accounted for 36% of all data breaches analyzed.
• Insider Threats: insider threats refer to attacks perpetrated by individuals who have
authorized access to the smart grid’s systems and misuse their privileges. These
insiders may intentionally or inadvertently compromise the grid’s security, privacy,
or operational integrity [175,176]. Insider threats pose a significant risk to smart
grids. The U.S. Industrial Control Systems Cyber Emergency Response Team (ICS-
CERT) [177] reported that insider threats accounted for approximately 20% of the
cybersecurity incidents in the energy sector.
• Man-in-the-Middle (MitM) Attacks: in MitM attacks, attackers can exploit insecure
or unencrypted Wi-Fi networks to position themselves between the sender and the
recipient, allowing them to eavesdrop on the communication, manipulate the data
exchanged, or even impersonate one or both parties without their knowledge [178,179].
• Advanced Persistent Threats (APTs): APTs are sophisticated, long-term cyberattacks
aimed at gaining stealthy and persistent unauthorized access to the smart grid’s
systems (i.e., login credentials, financial details, or other confidential data being
transmitted). APTs involve multiple stages and often target specific entities or or-
ganizations with the goal of gathering valuable information or sabotaging critical
operations [179,180].
• Data Manipulation Attacks: these attacks involve the unauthorized modification
or manipulation of data within the smart grid. Attackers may alter meter readings,
billing information, or control signals, leading to inaccurate billing, load balancing,
or compromised grid stability [181].
• Supply Chain Attacks: supply chain attacks exploit vulnerabilities in the software or
hardware components used in smart-grid infrastructure. The attackers compromise
these components during the manufacturing or distribution process, allowing them to

introduce backdoors or malicious functionalities into the grid’s systems [182].
• Physical Attacks with Cyber Components, also known as cyber-physical attacks,
refer to instances where physical systems or infrastructures are targeted through cyber
means. These attacks exploit vulnerabilities in both the physical and cyber domains to
cause disruptions, damage, or safety risks [183,184].
• SQL Injection Attacks: while smart grids primarily focus on power generation, trans-
mission, and distribution, there are web-based applications and databases that support
various functions and services within the grid. SQL injection attacks are a type of
cyberattack that targets a vulnerability in a web application’s database layer. It occurs
when an attacker is able to manipulate or inject malicious SQL statements into the
application’s input fields that are later executed by the database. The objective of an
SQL injection attack is to exploit poorly sanitized input data and gain unauthorized
access to the database or perform malicious actions [185].
• Zero-Day Exploits: zero-day exploits are cyberattacks that target previously unknown
vulnerabilities in software or systems, exploiting them before the vendor has a chance
to develop and release a patch or fix. In the context of smart grids, zero-day exploits
can have severe consequences due to the critical nature of the infrastructure [186].
It is important to note that the landscape of cyberattacks is continuously evolving,
and new attack vectors may emerge over time. To mitigate these risks, robust cybersecurity
measures are essential for smart-grid operators and stakeholders.
3.1.3. Short-Term and Long-Term Techno–Economic–Safety–Social Consequences of

Cyberattacks on Smart Grids
Cyberattacks on smart grids have both immediate and lasting consequences across
technological, economic, safety, and societal dimensions [187,188]. In the short term, attacks
can cause power outages, disrupt operations, and compromise data integrity, undermining
trust and reliability. This leads to financial losses, operational inefficiencies, and a hin-
drance to real-time grid monitoring. Economically,the attacks burden utility providers
with recovery costs, potentially deterring sustainable energy investments. Safety-wise, the
manipulation of grid components poses hazards to personnel and the public, impeding
safety mechanisms. Attacks erode public trust, impacting technology adoption and critical
services such as healthcare. In the long term, the cumulative effects hinder technological
advancements, diverting resources from innovation. Cyberattacks, thus, challenge grid
stability, functionality, and social acceptance, necessitating robust cybersecurity measures
and comprehensive strategies for sustained resilience and progress.
3.1.4. Vulnerable Components and Cascading Consequences of Cyberattacks in the

Smart Grid
A smart grid’s susceptibility to cyberattacks spans multiple components [189], includ-
ing control systems such as supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) systems and
energy management systems (EMS), communication networks, smart meters, customer
systems, distributed energy resources (DER) (e.g., solar panels, energy storage), and data
systems. Interconnected and reliant on information technology, these areas are vulnerable,
potentially causing operational disruptions, data issues, privacy breaches, and physical
harm. Cyberattacks can also trigger cascading effects, disrupting control systems, commu-
nication networks, device operations, data integrity, and DER stability, possibly leading
to a chain of attacks [190,191]. These cascades underscore the need for comprehensive
cybersecurity measures that address interdependencies to ensure the overall resilience and
security of the smart grid system.
3.1.5. Examining the Real-World Impacts: Case Studies of Cyberattacks on Operational

Smart Grids
Real-world case studies examine the actual effects of cyberattacks on operational
smart grids:
• Ukraine Power Grid Cyberattack (2015): analyzes a sophisticated attack on
Ukraine’s power grid, leading to widespread outages. The lessons learned encompass
the methods used, impacts, and incident response [192].
• BlackEnergy and CrashOverride Attacks (2016): focuses on malware-driven attacks
in Ukraine causing power grid disruptions. Explores technical aspects, implications,
and mitigation strategies [193,194].
• NotPetya Ransomware Attack (2017): explores how the NotPetya attack impacted
smart grids globally, disrupting grid management, communication, and billing sys-
tems [195].
• Dragonfly/Energetic Bear Attacks (2011–2014): investigates a series of cyberattacks
on energy companies, emphasizing tactics, motives, and consequences for smart
grids [196].
• Israel Electric Corporation Cyberattacks (2016–2018): studies cyberattacks on Israel
Electric Corporation’s grid infrastructure, highlighting disruptions and cybersecurity
measures [197].
These case studies showcase the tangible impacts of cyberattacks on operational smart
grids, emphasizing the significance of cybersecurity measures, incident response planning,
and collaboration among utilities to safeguard critical infrastructure.
3.1.6. Quantitative Models and Metrics for Assessing the Impacts of Cyberattacks
Various quantitative models and metrics are available to assess the impacts of
cyberattacks on smart grids [198]. Some examples include:
• Economic Impact Model: evaluates financial consequences by quantifying direct and
indirect costs, considering lost revenue, recovery expenses, legal liabilities, and repu-
tation damage.
• Availability and Reliability Metrics: measure cyberattack effects on critical systems’
availability and reliability, including downtime, failure rates, mean time between
failures (MTBF), and mean time to repair (MTTR).
• Risk Assessment Models: assess attack probability and severity using vulnerabil-
ity, threat, and consequence considerations, employing risk matrices, attack trees,
and threat modeling.
• Operational Impact Metrics: gauge cyberattack impact on operational efficiency, en-
compassing performance degradation, response delays, data integrity issues, and work-
flow disruptions.
• Customer Satisfaction Metrics: measure customer trust and satisfaction impact, us-
ing customer complaints, service level agreement (SLAs) violations, churn rates,
and surveys to assess perception.
• Resilience and Recovery Metrics: evaluate recovery effectiveness against cyberat-
tacks by tracking system recovery time, backup capabilities, redundancy levels, and in-
cident response success.
Importantly , the specific models and metrics may vary based on assessment goals
and context. Organizations can adapt existing frameworks or create customized models to
align with their needs.
3.1.7. Securing Information Assets: The Importance of Confidentiality, Integrity,

and Availability in Cybersecurity
The CIA triad, encompassing confidentiality, integrity, and availability, is a foundational
concept in information security across various domains, including smart grids [199,200].
• Confidentiality ensures authorized access by safeguarding data from unauthorized

exposure using encryption, access controls, and secure communication protocols.
• Integrity maintains data accuracy by preventing unauthorized alterations through
data validation, checksums, digital signatures, and audit trails.
• Availability guarantees system and data access, preventing disruptions with redun-
dancy, backup systems, disaster recovery, and network resilience techniques.
The CIA triad offers a comprehensive framework for security strategies, safeguarding
against cyber threats, breaches, and unauthorized access. It extends beyond information
security, guiding physical, personnel, and operational security. By integrating these princi-
ples into systems and processes, organizations mitigate risks and ensure valuable assets’
confidentiality, integrity, and availability.
3.1.8. Short-Term and Long-Term Techno–Economic–Safety–Social Implications of

Cybersecurity Measures on Smart Grids
The implementation of cybersecurity measures in smart grids has multi-faceted
implications across various timeframes and aspects [201,202].
In the short term, robust cybersecurity measures ensure immediate safety and security
by mitigating cyber risks and preserving the integrity, availability, and confidentiality of
critical grid components. These measures yield techno–economic benefits by reducing
disruptions and financial losses and maintaining efficient grid operations.
In the long term, cybersecurity measures extend beyond the technical and economic
realms. They enhance smart-grid resilience, reliability, and sustainability by countering
evolving cyber threats. This protection safeguards power supply stability, lessens infrastruc-
ture vulnerability, and builds public trust. Moreover, it has safety implications, preventing
accidents and harm to personnel.
Socially, robust cybersecurity cultivates consumer trust and privacy. It shields personal
information, maintains energy data confidentiality, and upholds privacy rights. By ensuring
smooth smart-grid operations, cybersecurity enhances the well-being and quality of life of
individuals and communities.
In conclusion, cybersecurity measures’ short-term and long-term implications in smart
grids are interconnected, offering immediate safety, operational efficiency, and long-term
benefits of resilience, sustainability, public trust, and privacy protection. Prioritizing
cybersecurity enables smart grids to effectively address cyber threats and establish a secure,
reliable, and sustainable energy future.
3.1.9. Quantitative Models and Metrics for Assessing the Implications of Cybersecurity in
Smart Grids
Various models and metrics offer a quantitative approach to measuring the implica-
tions of cybersecurity in smart grids [203]:
• Risk Assessment Models: frameworks such as the National Institute of Standards
and Technology (NIST) Cybersecurity Framework or ISO/IEC 27005 quantify risks
and impacts by evaluating threats and vulnerabilities. They estimate the overall risk
exposure, aiding in risk prioritization and mitigation.
• Economic Impact Models: these assess the financial consequences of cybersecurity
incidents, factoring in downtime, disruptions, data breaches, recovery costs, penalties,
and reputation damage. These models guide investment decisions and assess the
return on investment (ROI) of security measures.
• Availability and Reliability Metrics: metrics such as mean time between failures
(MTBF), mean time to repair (MTTR), system uptime, and service-level agreements
(SLAs) gauge system availability amidst cybersecurity threats. They help evaluate the
impact on performance and customer service.
• Incident Response Metrics: mean time to detect (MTTD), mean time to respond
(MTTR), and mean time to recover (MTTR) assess the response efficiency to incidents,
guiding improvements in incident management capabilities.
• User Awareness and Training Metrics: these measure the effectiveness of cybersecu-
rity education programs through completion rates, campaign frequency, and policy
adherence.
• Compliance Metrics: these assess adherence to the cybersecurity standards, regula-
tions, and best practices. These metrics cover security controls, patch management,
vulnerability assessments, and audits.
• Resilience Metrics: these evaluate the system’s ability to withstand and recover from
incidents, including redundancy, backup, recovery capabilities, and service restoration
time.
The customization of these models and metrics for specific smart-grid implementa-
tions is crucial. The regular monitoring, analysis, and refinement enable the continuous
improvement of the cybersecurity posture and ensure smart-grid resilience.
3.1.10. Analyzing the Real-World Implications of Cybersecurity Measures on Operational

Smart Grids: Case Studies and Insights
Two case studies offer insights into cybersecurity implementation in operational
smart grids:
• Fortinet’s Security Fabric Solution: this study analyzes the implementation of
Fortinet’s Security Fabric in a smart grid. It assesses the cybersecurity implications,
including protecting critical assets, detecting and responding to threats, and enhancing
system resilience. The study evaluates how these measures mitigate risks and ensure
secure grid operation [204].
• National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) Cybersecurity Framework
Adoption: another case study focuses on a smart-grid utility adopting the NIST
Cybersecurity Framework. It explores aligning cybersecurity practices with NIST,
covering risk assessment, incident response, and continuous monitoring. The study
examines how these measures impact operational efficiency, grid resilience, and cyber
threat protection [205].
3.2. Cybersecurity Options in Smart Grids: Solving Multi-Criteria Decision-Making (MCDM)

Using the Analytical Hierarchy Process (AHP)
Smart grids, being highly interconnected and reliant on digital technologies, face
significant cybersecurity challenges that require careful consideration and decision-making.
The multi-criteria decision-making (MCDM) approach provides a systematic frame-
work to assess and compare different cybersecurity options based on multiple criteria.
These criteria may include effectiveness, cost, feasibility, comparability with existing sys-
tems, regulatory compliance, and impact on grid performance. By employing MCDM
techniques, decision-makers can quantitatively evaluate the trade-offs between different
cybersecurity options and make informed decisions.
We first identify the cybersecurity options available for smart grids, which may include
encryption mechanisms, access controls, intrusion detection systems, incident response
plans, and others. Next, we define the criteria that are used to evaluate these options,
considering both technical and non-technical aspects (Section 3.2.1).
Once the criteria are established, we conduct pairwise comparisons to determine the
relative importance or weight of each criterion. This can be performed through expert
judgment, surveys, or data analysis. The analytical hierarchy process (AHP) technique is
used in this study to structure these comparisons and derive the priority scales. With the
criteria weights determined, we then assess the performance of each cybersecurity option
against the identified criteria. The results are then used to rank the cybersecurity options
and identify the most suitable ones for implementation in the smart-grid environment
(Section 3.2.2).
By applying the MCDM-AHP approach, decision-makers can make well-informed
decisions regarding cybersecurity options in smart grids. The methodology helps in
considering multiple factors, addressing the complexity and uncertainties associated with
cybersecurity, and selecting the most effective and appropriate measures to protect the
smart-grid infrastructure from cyber threats.
3.2.1. Alternatives and Criteria

There are several different cybersecurity options that can be implemented in smart
grids to enhance their security and protect against cyber threats [206]. Here are some key
cybersecurity options:
1. “A1” Access Control and Authentication: implementing strong authentication mech-
anisms, authorization controls, and user access restrictions to ensure only authorized
individuals can access critical systems and data.
2. “A2” Encryption: utilizing encryption techniques to secure data transmission and
storage, ensuring that sensitive information remains confidential and protected from
unauthorized access.
3. “A3” Intrusion Detection and Prevention Systems (IDPS): deploying IDPS solu-
tions that monitor network traffic, detect suspicious activities or intrusion attempts,
and take preventive actions to mitigate potential threats.
4. “A4” Firewalls: deploying firewalls to establish network security boundaries and
control incoming and outgoing traffic based on predefined security policies.
5. “A5” Security Information and Event Management (SIEM): implementing SIEM
solutions to collect, analyze, and correlate security events and log data, enabling early
detection and response to potential cyber threats.
6. “A6” Vulnerability Assessment and Penetration Testing: conducting regular vul-
nerability assessments and penetration testing, implementing timely patching and
updates to identify potential vulnerabilities and weaknesses in the smart-grid infras-
tructure, software, and hardware components and proactively addressing them.
7. “A7” Security Incident Response: establishing a comprehensive incident response
plan to effectively respond to and manage cybersecurity incidents, minimizing the
impact of attacks and facilitating recovery.
8. “A8” Security Monitoring and Logging: implementing monitoring and logging
mechanisms to track and record activities within the smart-grid infrastructure, en-
abling the detection and investigation of potential security breaches.
9. “A9” Security Awareness and Training: conducting regular cybersecurity awareness
programs and training sessions for employees and stakeholders to educate them
about potential threats, best practices, and their role in maintaining a secure smart-
grid environment.
10. “A10” Data Backup and Recovery: implementing robust data backup and recovery
mechanisms to ensure that critical data can be restored in the event of a cyberattack or
system failure.
11. “A11” Secure Software Development Lifecycle (SSDL): following secure SDLC
practices to develop and maintain secure software solutions, including secure coding
practices, code reviews, and vulnerability testing.
12. “A12” Incident Response Coordination: establishing effective coordination and col-
laboration with relevant stakeholders, including government agencies, law enforce-
ment, and industry partners, to address and mitigate cybersecurity incidents effec-
tively.
13. “A13” Compliance and Regulatory Requirements: ensuring compliance with the
relevant cybersecurity standards, regulations, and industry best practices specific to
the smart-grid sector.
It is important to note that the specific implementation of these cybersecurity options
may vary depending on the smart grid’s architecture, size, complexity, and risk profile.
However, it is important to note that cybersecurity is a complex and evolving field, and there
may be additional measures and technologies that can be employed based on specific smart-
grid requirements and risk assessments.
When evaluating cybersecurity options for smart grids, several relevant criteria need
to be considered. These criteria help assess the effectiveness, feasibility, and suitability of
different cybersecurity measures [207]. Here are some important criteria to consider:
1. “C1”: Security Effectiveness: the ability of the cybersecurity solution to detect and
prevent cybersecurity threats accurately and effectively.
2. “C2” Scalability: the capability of the solution to scale and accommodate the grow-
ing complexity and size of the smart-grid systems, including the ability to handle
increased data volumes, growing infrastructure requirements, and network traffic.
3. “C3” Integration and Compatibility: the ease with which the cybersecurity solution
can integrate with the existing smart-grid infrastructure, technologies, and tools,
ensuring compatibility and minimal disruption to operations.
4. “C4” Performance Impact: the impact of cybersecurity solutions on the performance
and efficiency of smart-grid systems, including factors such as latency, response time,
and system availability.
5. “C5” Cost-Effectiveness: the overall cost–benefit ratio of implementing the cyberse-
curity solution, considering both upfront costs and ongoing maintenance expenses,
and evaluating the value it brings in terms of risk mitigation.
6. “C6” Manageability and Usability: the ease of managing and administering the
cybersecurity solution, including the user interface, configuration options, and the
ability to monitor and analyze security events effectively.
7. “C7” Compliance and Regulatory Requirements: the extent to which the cybersecu-
rity solution aligns with the relevant industry standards, regulations, and compliance
requirements specific to smart grids, ensuring adherence to legal and operational
obligations.
8. “C8” Resilience and Redundancy: the ability of the cybersecurity solution to provide
resilience and redundancy measures, such as backup systems and failover capabilities,
to ensure continuous operations even in the event of a security breach or system
failure.
9. “C9” Vendor Support and Collaboration: the level of support and collaboration
provided by the cybersecurity solution vendor, including the availability of updates,
patches, and technical assistance, as well as the commitment to the ongoing research
and development.
10. “C10” Future Readiness: the solution’s ability to adapt and evolve with emerging
technologies, threat landscapes, and evolving cybersecurity best practices, ensuring
long-term viability and protection.
11. “C11” Network Segmentation: the ability to segment the smart-grid network into
separate zones or segments to minimize the impact of a security breach and limit the
lateral movement of attackers.
12. “C12” Patch Management: the capability to efficiently manage and apply software
patches and updates to address vulnerabilities and ensure the system is up to date
with the latest security measures.
13. “C13” Threat Intelligence: the use of advanced techniques and tools and access
to timely and accurate threat intelligence information, including real-time threat
detection, analysis, and sharing of indicators of compromise, to enhance the proactive
cybersecurity measures.
14. “C14” Vendor and Supply Chain Security: assessing the security practices and con-
trols of the vendors and suppliers involved in the smart-grid ecosystem to mitigate
risks associated with third-party access and potential supply chain vulnerabilities.
Considering these criteria will help in making informed decisions when selecting and
implementing cybersecurity options in smart grids, ensuring a comprehensive and robust
cybersecurity framework, taking into account various aspects such as the effectiveness
of the security measures, the ability to scale and adapt to evolving threats, integration
with existing systems, performance impact on grid operations, cost-effectiveness, ease
of management and usability, compliance with regulations, resilience and redundancy
to withstand attacks or failures, vendor support and adherence to regulations, future

readiness, network segmentation, patch management, threat intelligence, and vendor and
supply chain security.
3.2.2. Pairwise Comparison Matrix, Relative Weights of Criteria, and Weighted Sum
of Alternatives
In this section, we explore the evaluation of cybersecurity options by comparing them
against a set of described criteria (Section 3.2.1). We construct a pairwise comparison matrix
(Table 3), which allows us to assess the relative importance of each criterion compared to
the others (Table 4). Using these relative weights, we compute the weighted sum for each
cybersecurity option (Table 5), providing an overall score that considers the importance of
each criterion.
Each element of the matrix (Table 3) represents the relative importance or preference
of one criterion over another. The values in the matrix are the pairwise comparison
judgments based on a scale of 1 to 9, where 1 represents equal importance or preference
and 9 represents extreme importance or preference. For instance, the value of 7 in the cells
C1–C2 indicates that the criterion “Security Effectiveness (C1)” is considered to be seven
times more important than the criterion “Scalability (C2)”. Similarly, the value of 5 in the
cells C4–C10 suggests that the criterion “Performance impact (C4)” is considered to be five
times more important than the criterion “Future Readiness (C10)”.
Table 3. The pairwise comparison matrix between criteria. We assume a scale from 1 to 9, where 1
represents equal importance and 9 represents significantly more importance (Section 2.2). This is a
subjective assessment, and individual opinions may vary based on their perspectives and priorities.
Criteria C1 C2 C3 C4 C5 C6 C7 C8 C9 C10 C11 C12 C13 C14

C1 1 7 6 5 8 8 7 9 8 7 6 7 7 6
C2 1 1 3 4 6 5 6 4 7 4 5 4 6 5
7
C3 1 1 1 3 5 5 5 6 7 5 6 5 6 5
6 3
C4 1 1 1 1 5 4 4 6 6 5 5 4 5 5
5 4 3
C5 1 1 1 1 1 3 4 6 6 4 5 4 4 4
8 6 5 5
C6 1 1 1 1 1 1 4 6 7 4 5 4 5 4
8 5 5 4 3
C7 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 5 6 3 4 4 4 4
7 6 5 4 4 4
C8 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 5 2 4 4 3 4
9 4 6 6 6 6 5
C9 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 3 5 4 4 4
8 7 7 6 6 7 6 5
C10 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 4 3 4 4
7 4 5 5 4 4 3 2 3
C11 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 3 4 4
6 5 6 5 5 5 4 4 5 4
C12 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 4 4
7 6 5 5 5 5 4 4 4 3 3
C13 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 4
7 6 6 5 4 4 4 3 4 4 4 4
C14 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
6 5 5 5 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4
The values in Table 4 indicate the relative contribution of each criterion in the decision-
making process. Higher weights indicate greater importance, while lower weights indicate
lesser importance.
From Table 4, we can categorize the criteria as follows:
• The criteria with high relative weights (above 10%): “Security effectiveness (C1)”
has the highest relative weight (25%), indicating its significant importance in cyber-
security options for smart grids. Emphasizing security effectiveness ensures that the
chosen options can accurately and effectively detect and prevent cybersecurity threats.
• The criteria with medium relative weights (between 7% and 10%) suggest that they
are moderately important in the evaluation process. They should be considered
alongside other factors to ensure the overall suitability and performance of the cyber-
security options.
– “Cost-effectiveness (C5)” (10.18%) holds significant importance in evaluating
cybersecurity options. It indicates the need to consider the overall cost–benefit
ratio, ensuring that the chosen options provide effective security enhancements
while being cost-effective”.
– “Scalability (C2)” (7.89%): this criterion highlights the importance of considering
the ability of the options to scale and accommodate the growing complexity and
size of the smart-grid systems.
– “Integration and compatibility (C3)” (7.89%): this criterion emphasizes the need
for seamless integration with the existing smart-grid infrastructure and technolo-
gies, minimizing disruptions and ensuring compatibility.
• The criteria with low relative weights (below 7%):
– “Performance impact (C4)” (6.93%): this criterion suggests that the performance
impact of cybersecurity options is relatively less influential but still important to
consider.
– C6 to C14: these criteria, including manageability and usability “C6” (6.32%),
compliance and regulatory requirements “C7” (5.93%), resilience and redundancy
“C8” (4.97%), vendor support and collaboration “C9” (4.84%), and future readiness
“C10” (1.76%), have relatively lower weights but still contribute to the overall
evaluation. While their impact is slightly smaller compared to higher-weighted
criteria, they should be considered in conjunction with other factors.
Table 4. Relative Weights (RWs) of criteria (i.e., the importance or priority assigned to each criterion
in the evaluation of the cybersecurity options). These weights indicate the relative significance of
each criterion in determining the overall effectiveness of the options.
Criteria Relative Weights (RWs)

C1 “Security Effectiveness” 25%
C2 “Scalability” 7.89%
C3 “Integration and Compatibility” 7.89%
C4 “Performance Impact” 6.93%
C5 “Cost-Effectiveness” 10.18%
C6 “Manageability and Usability” 6.32%
C7 “Compliance and Regulatory Requirements” 5.93%
C8 “Resilience and Redundancy” 4.97%
C9 “Vendor Support and Collaboration” 4.84%
C10 “Future Readiness” 1.76%
C11 “Network Segmentation” 4.7%
C12 “Patch Management” 4.59%
C13 “Threat Intelligence” 4.59%
C14 “Vendor and Supply Chain Security” 4.47%
After performing the calculations, the consistency ratio (CR) for the obtained pairwise
comparison matrix (Table 3) is approximately 0.063. The CR value indicates that the matrix
is consistent since it is below the threshold of 0.1. Therefore, the pairwise comparison
matrix satisfies the consistency requirements.
The weighted sums (Table 5) represent the overall scores or evaluations of each
alternative based on the criteria and their corresponding relative weights. The alternatives
with higher weighted sums are considered more suitable or preferable in terms of meeting
the cybersecurity needs of smart grids, while the alternatives with lower weighted sums
may have some limitations or may not perform as strongly in the evaluated criteria.
Based on the weighted sums (Table 5), we can categorize the alternatives as follows:
• The alternatives with high weighted sums (above 5):
– “Access Control and Authentication (A1)” (6.25) has the highest weighted sum,
indicating its effectiveness and importance in enhancing cybersecurity in smart
grids. Implementing strong authentication mechanisms and access controls is
crucial for ensuring only authorized individuals can access critical systems and
data.
– “Security Information and Event Management (SIEM) (A5)” (5.762) has a rela-
tively high weighted sum, suggesting its significance in smart-grid cybersecurity.
Implementing SIEM solutions enables the collection, analysis, and correlation of
security events and log data, enabling early detection and response to potential
cyber threats.
• The alternatives with medium-weighted sums (between 5 and 5.5) suggest that they
offer a solid performance in the evaluated criteria. They are important components
for detecting and responding to security incidents.
– “Intrusion Detection and Prevention Systems (IDPS) (A3)” (5.487): this alternative
falls within the medium range, indicating its effectiveness in monitoring network
traffic, detecting suspicious activities, and taking preventive actions against
potential threats.
– “Security Incident Response (A7)” (5.297): this alternative also falls within the
medium range, highlighting the importance of establishing a comprehensive inci-
dent response plan to effectively respond to and manage cybersecurity incidents,
minimizing their impact.
• The alternatives with low weighted sums (below 4.5) compared to others. While
they still provide value in their respective criteria, they may not excel as strongly over-
all.
– “Compliance and Regulatory Requirements (A13)” (4.349): this alternative has the
lowest weighted sum among the alternatives, indicating that while compliance
with cybersecurity standards and regulations is important, it may not have as
high a priority as other options in the context of smart-grid cybersecurity.
– “Encryption (A2)” (3.739): this alternative has a relatively low weighted sum,
suggesting that while encryption is important for securing data transmission
and storage, it may not have as significant an impact as other alternatives in the
evaluated criteria.
Overall, the alternatives with high weighted sums (A1 and A5) are considered critical
for enhancing smart-grid cybersecurity, while those with medium- and low-weighted sums
still provide value but may have relatively less impact or priority in the evaluated criteria.
Table 5. Weighted sum for each option. Higher weighted sums indicate better overall performance.
Alternatives Weighted Sum

A1 “Access Control and Authentication” 6.250
A2 “Encryption” 3.739
A3 “Intrusion Detection and Prevention Systems (IDPS)” 5.487
A4 “Firewalls” 4.838
A5 “Security Information and Event Management (SIEM)” 5.762
A6 “Vulnerability Assessment and Penetration Testing” 5.256
A7 “Security Incident Response” 5.297
A8 “Security Monitoring and Logging” 4.688
A9 “Security Awareness and Training” 4.706
A10 “Data Backup and Recovery” 4.690
A11 “Secure Software Development Lifecycle (SSDL)” 4.661
A12 “Incident Response Coordination” 4.730
A13 “Compliance and Regulatory Requirements” 4.349
3.3. Enhancing Cybersecurity of Smart Grids: Unveiling the Difference between AI and ML,
Exploring their Potential and Addressing Challenges, and Leveraging MCDM-AHP for Optimal
AI Selection
In this section, we analyze artificial intelligence (AI) techniques for cybersecurity
options in smart grids to enhance the security and decision-making processes.
3.3.1. Understanding the Difference between AI and ML: Benefits and Challenges for
Cybersecurity in Smart Grids
Indeed, AI and ML are two related concepts that play significant roles in cybersecurity
but have distinct differences [208]. Key differences:
• Scope: AI is a broader field of computer science that encompasses various techniques
to develop intelligent machines or systems capable of performing tasks that typically
require human intelligence and cognitive functions—such as reasoning, problem
solving, decision-making, perception, and natural language processing—while ML is
a specific approach within AI that focuses on learning from data.
• Programming vs. Learning: AI often involves explicitly programming intelligent
behavior or rules, whereas ML is a sunset or application of AI that focuses on training
models to learn patterns and make predictions based on data without being explicitly
programmed.
• Data Dependency: ML heavily relies on large datasets for training models and im-
proving performance. The quality and quantity of data play a crucial role in ML
algorithms’ effectiveness. AI, on the other hand, can utilize various data sources but
may not be solely dependent on them.
• Human Intervention: AI may involve human intervention in designing and speci-
fying rules or heuristics for intelligent systems. ML, however, aims to automate the
learning process and reduce human intervention by allowing models to learn from
data independently.
• Flexibility: ML algorithms are flexible and can adapt to new data and patterns, en-
abling them to handle complex and dynamic tasks. AI, as a broader field, encompasses
both rule-based systems and learning-based systems, providing a wider range of ap-
proaches for different types of problems.
Artificial intelligence (AI) can significantly enhance cybersecurity in smart grids by
providing advanced capabilities for threat detection, prevention, and response. They can
analyze large volumes of data from various sources, such as network traffic, system logs,
and sensor data, to detect anomalies, identify potential cyber threats in real-time, and auto-
mate incident response processes. AI techniques power intrusion detection and prevention
systems (IDPS), predict equipment failures, and optimize maintenance schedules. They
can also analyze threat intelligence data, use behavioral analysis, and employ user and
entity behavior analytics (UEBA) to identify emerging threats, detect unauthorized access,
and mitigate risks. Overall, AI enables smarter threat management, reduces response times,
and enhances the resilience and security of the smart-grid infrastructure [209].
While artificial intelligence (AI) offers significant benefits in enhancing the cybersecu-
rity of smart grids, there are also several challenges that need to be addressed [210]. Here
are some potential challenges:
• Data Quality and Availability: AI algorithms heavily rely on high-quality and rep-
resentative data for training and decision-making. In the context of smart grids,
obtaining labeled and diverse cybersecurity data can be challenging. Collaborating
with smart-grid operators, cybersecurity organizations, and researchers to collect and
share cybersecurity data to ensure the availability, accuracy, completeness, and re-
liability of the data is crucial for the effective training of AI models. Establishing
mechanisms for continuous acquisition and the labeling of training data to keep AI
models updated with the latest threats and attack patterns is also important.
• Adversarial Attacks: AI models can be susceptible to adversarial attacks where mali-
cious actors intentionally manipulate or deceive the models to bypass security defenses.
Adversarial attacks in the context of the smart grid can have severe consequences,
such as disrupting power distribution or causing physical damage. Developing robust
defenses against adversarial attacks is an ongoing challenge.
• Model Interpretability and Explainability: AI models often operate as black boxes,
making it difficult to understand their decision-making processes. In the context
of smart grids, where the consequences of incorrect decisions can be significant,
the interpretability and explainability of AI models are crucial to gain trust and
enable effective human oversight. Prioritizing the development of interpretable and
explainable AI models for cybersecurity in smart grids enables human analysts to
understand the reasoning behind model decisions and ensures transparency and
accountability in the decision-making process.
• Privacy Concerns: smart-grid systems handle sensitive and personal data, including
energy consumption patterns and user behavior. The application of AI may involve
collecting and processing such data, raising privacy concerns. Ensuring proper data
anonymization, encryption, and compliance with privacy regulations is essential to
protect user privacy.
• Scalability and Performance: Smart grids generate massive amounts of data in real-
time, requiring AI models to process and analyze the data efficiently. Ensuring the
scalability and performance of AI algorithms to handle the volume and velocity of the
data in smart-grid environments is a significant challenge.
• Ethical and Bias Concerns: AI models can inadvertently inherit biases present in
the training data, leading to discriminatory or unfair outcomes. Biases in smart-grid
systems can have societal implications, such as uneven energy distribution or unfair
treatment of certain user groups. Addressing bias and ensuring ethical considerations
in AI models are essential.
• Human Expertise and Collaboration: AI technologies augment human capabilities
but do not replace the need for human expertise in cybersecurity. Collaboration
between domain experts, cybersecurity professionals, and data scientists is crucial
to effectively apply AI techniques to smart-grid cybersecurity. Developing hybrid
systems that combine the strengths of AI algorithms with human expertise for better
decision-making, threat hunting, and incident response is essential.
• Regulatory Compliance: Smart grids are subject to regulatory requirements and stan-
dards to ensure the security and privacy of energy systems. Integrating AI solutions
in compliance with regulatory frameworks, such as data protection and cybersecurity
regulations, presents a challenge that requires careful implementation and validation.
• System Complexity and Integration: smart grids consist of interconnected and hetero-
geneous systems, making the integration of AI solutions complex. Ensuring seamless
integration with the existing infrastructure, legacy systems, and diverse components
while maintaining interoperability and reliability is a challenge when deploying AI in
smart- grid cybersecurity.
Addressing these challenges requires a multidisciplinary approach, involving cyberse-
curity experts, data scientists, policymakers, and industry stakeholders to develop robust
and trustworthy AI solutions that effectively protect smart-grid systems from cyber threats
while addressing privacy, fairness, and regulatory requirements.
3.3.2. Leveraging MCDM-AHP for Selecting the Optimal AI Option for Cybersecurity in
Smart Grids
In this section, we delve into the evaluation of cybersecurity options using AI in the
context of smart grids. We begin by establishing a set of criteria to assess the effectiveness
of these options for ensuring robust cybersecurity. We then employ a pairwise comparison
matrix (Table 6) to determine the relative importance of each criterion when compared to
others (Table 7). These relative weights are used to calculate the weighted sum for each
cybersecurity option (Table 8), yielding a comprehensive score that takes into account the
significance of each criterion. Through this evaluation process, we gain valuable insights
into the strengths and weaknesses of different cybersecurity options considering AI in
addressing the specific needs of smart grids.
In the field of cybersecurity for smart grids, a variety of AI techniques and methods
can be applied to enhance security measures [211]. Here are several types and methods of
AI commonly used in cybersecurity for smart grids:
1. “A1” Machine Learning (ML):
• Supervised Learning: ML models are trained on labeled data to make predic-

tions or classifications based on known patterns.
• Unsupervised Learning: ML models analyze unlabeled data to identify patterns,
anomalies, or clustering structures without prior knowledge.
• Semi-Supervised Learning: a combination of labeled and unlabeled data is
used to train ML models, making use of both supervised and unsupervised
techniques.
• Reinforcement Learning: ML models learn to make decisions by interacting
with an environment and receiving feedback in the form of rewards or penalties.
2. “A2” Deep Learning (DL):
• Convolutional Neural Networks (CNNs): DL models designed for processing
structured grid-like data, such as image or time-series data.
• Recurrent Neural Networks (RNNs): DL models that handle sequential or time-
series data by maintaining internal memory.
3. “A3” Natural Language Processing (NLP):
• Sentiment Analysis: NLP techniques are used to analyze text data and deter-
mine the sentiment or opinion expressed.
• Named Entity Recognition: NLP models identify and classify named entities,
such as person names, locations, or organizations, in text data.
• Text Classification: NLP algorithms classify text documents into predefined
categories based on their content.
4. “A4” Genetic Algorithms (GA): GA methods can be employed to optimize complex
problems, such as finding optimal security configurations or identifying optimal
control parameters.
5. “A5” Fuzzy Logic: fuzzy logic models capture and reason with imprecise or uncertain
data, enabling decision-making in scenarios with ambiguity or vagueness.
6. “A6” Expert Systems:
• Rule-Based Systems: expert systems use predefined rules and knowledge bases
to mimic the decision-making processes of human experts.
• Knowledge Representation: techniques for capturing and representing domain-
specific knowledge to support decision-making and inference.
7. “A7” Swarm Intelligence:
• Particle Swarm Optimization (PSO): swarm intelligence methods are used for
optimization problems where a group of particles iteratively searches for the
optimal solution.
• Ant Colony Optimization (ACO): swarm intelligence techniques inspired by
the foraging behavior of ants to solve complex optimization problems.
8. “A8” Bayesian Networks: probabilistic models that represent uncertain relationships
between variables using directed acyclic graphs are useful for modeling and reasoning
under uncertainty.
9. “A9” Hybrid Approaches: combinations of different AI techniques, such as integrat-
ing ML algorithms with expert systems or using hybrid models that combine DL and
traditional ML methods.
These are some of the prominent types and methods of AI used in cybersecurity for
smart grids. The selection and application of specific techniques depend on the specific
cybersecurity challenges, available data, and desired outcomes of the smart-grid secu-
rity system.
When evaluating cybersecurity options for smart grids that incorporate artificial
intelligence (AI) techniques and methods, several relevant criteria should be considered.
These criteria help assess the effectiveness, feasibility, and suitability of cybersecurity
options. Here are the key criteria considered in this study:
1. “C1” Security Effectiveness:
• Detection Accuracy: the ability of the AI system to accurately detect and identify
security threats and attacks.
• False Positive Rate: the frequency of incorrectly flagging legitimate activities as
security threats.
• False Negative Rate: the frequency of failing to detect actual security threats or
attacks.
2. “C2” Scalability:
• Ability to Handle Large Volumes of Data: the capacity of the AI system to
process and analyze a high volume of data generated by smart-grid systems in
real-time.
• Computational Efficiency: the ability of the AI algorithms to perform complex
computations within acceptable time frames.
3. “C3” Integration and Compatibility:
• Compatibility with Existing Infrastructure: the extent to which the AI cyberse-
curity solution can integrate with the existing smart-grid infrastructure, including
hardware, software, and communication protocols.
• Interoperability: the ability of the AI system to work seamlessly with other
cybersecurity tools and systems in the smart-grid environment.
4. “C4” Performance Impact:
• System Overhead: the additional computational and resource requirements
imposed by the AI cybersecurity solution on the smart-grid system.
• Latency: the delay introduced by the AI system in detecting and responding to
security threats.
5. “C5” Cost-Effectiveness:
• Implementation Costs: the upfront costs associated with acquiring, deploying,
and maintaining the AI cybersecurity solution.
• Operational Costs: the ongoing expenses related to the operation, monitoring,
and maintenance of the AI system.
6. “C6” Manageability and Usability:
• Ease of Deployment: the simplicity and efficiency of deploying the AI solution
within the smart-grid environment.
• User-Friendliness: the intuitiveness and ease of use for the cybersecurity per-
sonnel responsible for managing and monitoring the AI system.
7. “C7” Compliance and Regulatory Requirements:
• Alignment with Industry Standards: the extent to which the AI cybersecurity
solution complies with the relevant industry standards and best practices.
• Adherence to Legal and Regulatory Requirements: the ability of the AI sys-
tem to meet the specific legal and regulatory obligations governing smart-grid
cybersecurity.
8. “C8” Resilience and Redundancy:
• Robustness: the AI system’s ability to withstand and recover from security
incidents or cyberattacks.
• Redundancy: the availability of backup mechanisms or redundant AI compo-
nents to ensure continuous operation and protection.
9. “C9” Vendor Support and Collaboration:
• Availability of Support: the level of technical support and assistance provided
by the AI solution vendor.
• Collaboration Opportunities: the vendor’s willingness to collaborate with smart-
grid operators, cybersecurity experts, and researchers to enhance the AI system’s
capabilities.
10. “C10” Future Readiness:

• Adaptability and Flexibility: the AI system’s capability to adapt to evolving
security threats, technologies, and regulatory changes in the smart-grid domain.
• Upgradability: the ease with which the AI solution can be upgraded or enhanced
with new features or improved algorithms.
11. “C11” Network Segmentation: the ability of the cybersecurity solution to effectively
implement network segmentation and isolation to limit the spread of threats and
contain potential breaches.
12. “C12” Explainability and Transparency: the ability of the AI system to provide
explanations and justifications for its decisions and actions, ensuring transparency
and accountability in the cybersecurity processes.
These criteria provide a comprehensive framework for evaluating cybersecurity op-
tions that incorporate AI techniques and methods in the context of smart grids. By con-
sidering these criteria, decision-makers can assess and compare different options to make
informed choices that align with the specific needs and requirements of their smart-grid
cybersecurity initiatives.
The pairwise comparison matrix between criteria is presented in the Table 6.
Table 6. Pairwise comparison matrix between criteria.
Criteria C1 C2 C3 C4 C5 C6 C7 C8 C9 C10 C11 C12

C1 1 3 3 3 5 3 5 3 5 3 3 3
C2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
C3 1 3 1 1 3 3 3 3 5 3 3 3
3
C4 1 3 1 1 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
3
C5 1 3 1 1 1 1 3 3 5 3 3 3
5 3 3 3
C6 1 3 1 1 3 1 3 3 3 3 3 3
3 3 3
C7 1 3 1 1 1 1 1 3 3 3 1 1
5 3 3 3 3
C8 1 3 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
C9 1 3 1 1 1 1 1 3 1 1 1 1
5 5 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
C10 1 3 1 1 1 1 1 3 3 1 1 1
3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
C11 1 3 1 1 1 1 1 3 3 3 1 1
3 3 3 3 3
C12 1 3 1 1 1 1 1 3 3 3 1 1
3 3 3 3 3
Based on the calculated relative weights of criteria (Table 7), we can categorize them
into three groups:
• High Relative Weights: C1 “Security Effectiveness” (26.6%) has the highest relative
weight, indicating its significant importance in evaluating cybersecurity options that
incorporate artificial intelligence (AI) techniques. This criterion focuses on the accuracy
of threat detection, false positive, and false negative rates, which are crucial for
effective security measures in smart grids.
• Medium Relative Weights: C3 “Integration and Compatibility” (21.5%) and C4 “Per-
formance Impact” (21.5%) have relatively high weights. These criteria emphasize the
seamless integration of AI cybersecurity solutions with the existing infrastructure and
the impact on system performance, both of which are important considerations in
evaluating options.
• Low Relative Weights: criteria such as C6 “Manageability and Usability” (15.8%)
(i.e., the ease of managing and using the cybersecurity options within the smart-grid
environment, emphasizing user-friendliness and efficient management practices), C5
“Cost-Effectiveness” (8.5%) (i.e., considering the balance between cost and the value of
security enhancements), C8 “Resilience and Redundancy” (8.3%) (i.e., the ability for
the cybersecurity options to provide resilience and redundancy, ensuring the continu-
ity and availability of smart-grid operations even in the face of cyber threats or failures),
C10 “Future Readiness” (7.6%) (i.e., the preparedness of the cybersecurity options to
adapt and evolve in response to future cybersecurity challenges and advancements

in smart-grid technologies), C7 “Compliance and Regulatory Requirements” (7.6%)
(i.e., the adherence to relevant compliance and regulatory standards and requirements
in the deployment of cybersecurity solutions for smart grids), C2 “Scalability” (7.5%)
(i.e., ability of the cybersecurity options to handle increased demands and expanding
smart-grid networks effectively), C9 “Vendor Support and Collaboration” (5.9%), C11
“Network Segmentation” (5.9%), and C12 “Explainability and Transparency” (5.9%)
have lower relative weights. While these criteria are still important, they are relatively
less influential compared to the higher-weighted criteria.
Overall , the results suggest that security effectiveness, integration and compatibility,
and performance impact are key considerations when evaluating cybersecurity options
in smart grids. However, it is important to consider all the criteria holistically to make
informed decisions that align with the specific needs and requirements of the smart-grid
cybersecurity initiatives.
Table 7. Relative weights of the criteria.
Criteria Relative Weights (RWs) of Criteria

C1 “Security Effectiveness” 26.6%
C2 “Scalability” 7.5%
C3 “Integration and Compatibility” 21.5%
C4 “Performance Impact” 21.5%
C5 “Cost-Effectiveness” 8.5%
C6 “Manageability and Usability” 15.8%
C7 “Compliance and Regulatory Requirements” 7.6%
C8 “Resilience and Redundancy” 8.3%
C9 “Vendor Support and Collaboration” 5.9%
C10 “Future Readiness” 7.6%
C11 “Network Segmentation” 5.9%
C12 “Explainability and Transparency” 5.9%
We find that the consistency ratio (CR) is 0.857, which is less than the threshold value
of 0.1. This indicates acceptable consistency in the pairwise comparison matrix.
Based on the calculated weighted sums (Table 8), which represent the overall evalua-
tion of each AI technique or method in addressing the cybersecurity needs of smart grids,
considering the given criteria and their relative weights, we can categorize the alternatives
into three groups:
• High Weighted Sum: “Deep Learning (A2)” emerges as the alternative with the high-
est weighted sum (0.635), indicating its strong potential in enhancing cybersecurity in
smart grids. It demonstrates favorable performance across multiple criteria and aligns
well with the specific requirements of the evaluated criteria.
• Medium Weighted Sum:
– “Hybrid approaches (A9)” show a relatively medium weighted sum (0.574),
suggesting their effectiveness in addressing cybersecurity challenges in smart
grids. These approaches combine multiple AI techniques and methods to leverage
their respective strengths and overcome limitations.
– “Bayesian Networks (A8)” (0.531) also fall into the medium-weighted sum cate-
gory, indicating their relevance and potential in addressing cybersecurity needs.
They use probabilistic modeling to capture dependencies and uncertainties in
smart-grid systems.
– “Swarm Intelligence” (A7): This alternative also falls within the medium range of
weighted sums (0.405). Swarm intelligence techniques, such as particle swarm
optimization and ant colony optimization, offer potential benefits for optimizing
cybersecurity solutions in smart grids.
– “Machine Learning (ML) (A1)”: This alternative has a moderate weighted sum
(0.453), indicating that machine learning techniques have some value but are not
ranked as highly as deep learning or hybrid approaches.
• Low Weighted Sum:
– “Fuzzy Logic (A5)”: This alternative has a relatively lower weighted sum (0.324),
suggesting that fuzzy logic methods may have limited applicability or effective-
ness compared to other alternatives.
– “Natural Language Processing (NLP) (A3)”: this alternative also falls within the
lower range of weighted sums (0.312). While NLP techniques can be useful for
certain cybersecurity tasks, they may not be as prominent or effective as other
alternatives in the context of smart-grid security.
– “Expert Systems (A6)”: this alternative has a lower weighted sum (0.247), indicat-
ing that expert systems may have limitations or are perceived to have less impact
on smart-grid cybersecurity compared to other approaches.
– “Genetic Algorithms (GA) (A4)”: This alternative has the lowest weighted sum
(0.148) among the options, suggesting that genetic algorithms may have limited
applicability or effectiveness for addressing smart-grid cybersecurity challenges.
Table 8. Weighted sum of alternatives.
Alternatives Weighted Sum of Alternatives

A1 “Machine Learning (ML)” 0.453
A2 “Deep Learning (DL)” 0.635
A3 “Natural Language Processing (NLP)” 0.312
A4 “Genetic Algorithms (GA)” 0.148
A5 “Fuzzy Logic” 0.324
A6 “Expert Systems” 0.247
A7 “Swarm Intelligence” 0.405
A8 “Bayesian Networks” 0.531
A9 “Hybrid Approaches” 0.574
4. Discussion: Advantages, Limitations, Enhancements of MCDM-AHP in Evaluating

Cybersecurity Options in Smart Grids: Exploring Alternative MCDM Approaches
This study employs the multi-criteria decision-making analytical hierarchy process
(MCDM-AHP) methodology to evaluate and determine the most effective cybersecurity
options for smart grids. While the AHP approach offers various advantages (Section 4.1), it
also presents several challenges (Section 4.2) and improvements (Section 4.3) that need to
be addressed in the evaluation process [212].
4.1. Advantages of the Analytical Hierarchy Process (AHP)

The analytical hierarchy process (AHP) offers several advantages, such as:
• Structured Decision-Making: AHP provides a structured framework for decision-
making by breaking down complex problems into a hierarchical structure of criteria,
sub-criteria, and the alternatives. This helps decision-makers systematically evaluate
and compare different options.
• Pairwise Comparisons: AHP allows decision-makers to make pairwise comparisons
between the criteria and the alternatives based on their relative importance. This
enables a more nuanced assessment of the criteria and facilitates the consideration of
multiple factors in the decision-making process.
• Consistency Checking: AHP incorporates a consistency checking mechanism to
ensure that decision-makers provide reliable and consistent judgments during the
pairwise comparisons. This helps to enhance the credibility and validity of the decision-
making process.
• Flexibility and Adaptability: AHP can accommodate changes in the decision problem
by allowing decision-makers to revise their judgments and priorities. This flexibility
enables the adjustment of criteria weights and the reassessment of alternatives as new
information becomes available.
• Transparency and Communication: AHP provides a clear structure for decision-
making and facilitates transparent communication among decision-makers. The hier-
archical representation and pairwise comparisons enable stakeholders to understand
the decision rationale and engage in meaningful discussions.
4.2. Limitations of the Analytical Hierarchy Process (AHP)

Despite its advantages, the analytical hierarchy process (AHP) also has several
disadvantages, including:
• Subjectivity: AHP heavily relies on subjective judgments and pairwise comparisons
made by decision-makers. The accuracy and consistency of these judgments can vary,
introducing potential bias and uncertainty into the decision-making process.
• Complexity: AHP can become complex when dealing with a large number of criteria
and alternatives. The hierarchical structure and pairwise comparisons require signif-
icant effort and time from decision-makers, making it challenging to handle highly
complex decision problems.
• Sensitivity to Input: small changes in the pairwise comparison judgments can lead
to significant variations in the final results. AHP’s sensitivity to input can make the
decision outcomes vulnerable to individual biases or inconsistencies in judgment.
• Lack of Quantifiability: AHP relies on qualitative judgments and does not provide a
quantitative measurement of the decision criteria or alternatives. This can limit the
ability to conduct precise numerical analysis or statistical inference in the decision-
making process.
• Limited Representation of Interactions: AHP assumes independence between the
criteria and does not explicitly capture interactions or dependencies among them. This
can oversimplify the decision problem and overlook the complex relationships that
exist between the criteria.
While AHP offers a structured and systematic approach to decision-making, it is
important to consider these limitations and apply the method judiciously, taking into
account the specific characteristics and requirements of the decision problem at hand.
4.3. Enhancing MCDM-AHP for Smart-Grid Cybersecurity: Exploring Strategies for Improvement
Improving the multi-criteria decision making with the analytical hierarchy process
(MCDM-AHP) methodology for smart-grid cybersecurity involves enhancing its effec-
tiveness, adaptability, and robustness in addressing the complex and evolving challenges
posed by cyber threats. Below are several approaches to enhancing MCDM-AHP for
smart-grid cybersecurity:
• Incorporate More Comprehensive Criteria: expand the list of evaluation criteria to
encompass a broader range of factors relevant to smart-grid cybersecurity. Consider
including technical, economic, social, environmental, and regulatory criteria to capture
a holistic view of the cybersecurity landscape.
• Quantify Qualitative Criteria: develop methods to quantify qualitative criteria, such
as expert opinions, using appropriate scales or weights. This allows for a more
objective assessment and comparison of cybersecurity measures.
• Dynamic Weight Adjustments: implement dynamic weight adjustments to reflect
the changing significance of criteria over time or in response to evolving cyber threats.
This ensures that the decision-making process remains adaptable and aligned with
the emerging challenges.
• Consider Uncertainty and Risk: integrate methods to handle uncertainty and risk,
such as probabilistic modeling and sensitivity analysis. This enhances the robustness
of the decision-making by accounting for the inherent uncertainties in the cybersecu-

rity scenarios.
• Integrate Real-Time Data: incorporate real-time data feeds and analytics into the
MCDM-AHP framework to enable continuous monitoring and adjustment of the
cybersecurity measures based on the current threat landscape.
• Include Machine Learning: integrate machine learning algorithms to enhance predic-
tive capabilities and automate the identification of potential threats and vulnerabilities.
ML can assist in identifying patterns and anomalies that may not be evident through
traditional approaches.
• Scenario Analysis: conduct a comprehensive scenario analysis to evaluate the per-
formance of the cybersecurity measures under various attack scenarios. This helps
identify potential weaknesses and prioritize measures that demonstrate robustness
across different threats.
• Stakeholder Engagement: involve a diverse group of stakeholders, including cyber-
security experts, grid operators, regulators, and end-users, in the decision-making
process. Their insights can contribute to a more holistic and informed assessment.
• Feedback Mechanisms: implement feedback mechanisms that allow for continuous
learning and improvement of the MCDM-AHP model based on the outcomes of
previous decisions and their real-world impacts.
• Interdisciplinary Collaboration: foster collaboration between cybersecurity experts,
power engineers, data scientists, and decision analysts to ensure a well-rounded and
multidisciplinary approach to improving MCDM-AHP for smart-grid cybersecurity.
By implementing these strategies, the MCDM-AHP methodology can be enhanced
to provide more accurate, adaptable, and effective decision support for selecting optimal
cybersecurity measures in smart grids.
4.4. Exploring MCDM Approaches for Evaluating Cybersecurity Options in Smart Grids
There are several other multi-criteria decision-making (MCDM) methods [94] that
can be implemented to compare the results obtained from the analytical hierarchy process
(AHP) and provide a broader perspective. Here are a few additional MCDM methods:
• Elimination Et Choix Traduisant la Realite (ELECTRE): ELECTRE is a family of
MCDM methods that rank alternatives based on outranking relations. It considers
multiple criteria and assesses the relative performance of alternatives through pairwise
comparisons. The ELECTRE methods are particularly useful when dealing with
imprecise or qualitative data.
• VIseKriterijumska Optimizacija I Kompromisno Resenje (VIKOR): VIKOR is a
multi-criteria decision-making method that combines compromise programming and
outranking techniques. It determines a compromise solution by considering the
maximum “group utility” and the minimum “individual regret”. VIKOR can handle
both quantitative and qualitative criteria.
• Preference Ranking Organization METHod for Enrichment Evaluations II (PROMETHEE
II): PROMETHEE II is an extension of the PROMETHEE method that incorporates
preference functions and pairwise comparisons. It evaluates alternatives based on the
net outranking flows and provides a ranking of alternatives. PROMETHEE II accounts
for both positive and negative preference information.
• Data Envelopment Analysis(DEA): DEA is a non-parametric method that evaluates
the relative efficiency of alternatives. It considers multiple inputs and outputs to
assess the efficiency of the alternatives and identify the most efficient ones. DEA can
be particularly useful when there are limited or imprecise data available.
• Grey Decision-Making Models: grey decision-making models, such as grey rela-
tional analysis (GRA) and grey analytical network process (GANP), consider the
uncertainty and limited information available in decision-making processes. These
models can handle situations where the data are incomplete or imprecise, providing a
different perspective on evaluating alternatives.
• Technique for Order of Preference by Similarity to Ideal Solution (TOPSIS): TOP-

SIS is a decision-making method that aims to find the alternative that is closest to the
ideal solution and farthest from the negative ideal solution. It calculates the relative
closeness of the alternatives based on their similarity to the positive ideal solution
and their dissimilarity to the negative ideal solution. TOPSIS takes into account both
positive and negative aspects of the criteria to determine the ranking of alternatives.
• Weighted Sum Model (WSM): The weighted sum model (WSM) is a straightforward
and widely used MCDM method. It involves assigning weights to criteria and ag-
gregating the scores of the alternatives based on these weights. Each criterion is
multiplied by its corresponding weight, and the results are summed to obtain a final
score for each alternative. The alternative with the highest score is considered the
best option. WSM is simple to implement and interpret, but it does not capture the
interactions or trade-offs between criteria.
Implementing these additional MCDM methods alongside AHP can provide a com-
parative analysis and enhance the robustness of the decision-making process in evaluating
cybersecurity options for smart grids. It allows for a more comprehensive understanding
of the results and aids in making informed decisions.
5. Conclusions
5.1. Research Motivation
Smart grids have revolutionized the power sector through the introduction of trans-
formative technologies, enabling efficient energy management, grid optimization, and the
seamless integration of renewable energy sources, thereby fostering a climate-resilient
energy transition [213–217]. Nonetheless, this digitization and increased connectivity also
render smart grids susceptible to a wide range of cybersecurity threats and attacks.
5.2. Research Questions and Methodology

This article provides a comprehensive examination of cyberattacks and cybersecurity
in smart grids, exploring various aspects and proposing optimal solutions.
First, it offers an overview of smart-grid components and applications, highlighting
their importance in modern power systems. It delves into the types of cyberattacks that pose
threats to smart grids, emphasizing the potential short-term and long-term technological,
economic, safety, and social impacts on grid infrastructure and operations. It identifies the
vulnerable components in smart grids that are susceptible to cyber threats and highlights
the cascading effects that cyberattacks can have on different components of the grid. Quan-
titative models and metrics are examined to assess the impacts of cyberattacks on smart
grids, with real-world case studies of cyberattacks on operational smart grids providing
valuable insights. Furthermore, the study examines the short-term and long-term techno-
logical, economic, safety, and social implications of implementing cybersecurity measures
in smart grids. It emphasizes the importance of confidentiality, integrity, and availability as
key aspects of cybersecurity in protecting smart-grid infrastructure. Quantitative models
and metrics are explored to assess the implications of cybersecurity measures on smart
grids, and real-world examples demonstrate the practical implications of implementing
cybersecurity measures on operational smart grids.
Second, the article addresses the challenge of selecting the optimal cybersecurity
option using a multi-criteria decision-making (MCDM) approach. Specifically, the analyti-
cal hierarchy process (AHP) is employed to weigh and prioritize different cybersecurity
options (i.e., access control and authentication, encryption, intrusion detection and pre-
vention systems “IDPS”, firewalls, security information and event management “SIEM”,
vulnerability assessment and penetration testing, security incident response, security mon-
itoring and logging, security awareness and training, data backup and recovery, secure
software development lifecycle “SSDL”, incident response coordination, compliance and
regulatory requirements) based on multiple criteria (i.e., security effectiveness, scalability,
integration and compatibility, performance impact, cost-effectiveness, manageability and
usability, compliance and regulatory requirements, resilience and redundancy, vendor

support and collaboration, future readiness, network segmentation, patch management,
threat intelligence, vendor and supply chain security).
Third, the article explores the distinction between artificial intelligence (AI) and machine
learning (ML). It examines their potential in the context of smart-grid cybersecurity, highlight-
ing their roles in threat detection, anomaly detection, and incident response. The challenges
associated with implementing AI techniques are also addressed, including issues of data
quality, interpretability, and algorithm bias. Moreover, the article employs MCDM-AHP to
determine the optimal AI option (i.e., machine learning, deep learning, natural language
processing “NLP”, genetic algorithms “GA”, fuzzy logic, expert systems, swarm intelligence,
Bayesian networks, and hybrid approaches) for smart-grid cybersecurity.
5.3. General Findings and Discussion

Based on the relative weights of the criteria, we can categorize them into three groups:
criteria with high relative weights (above 10%), including “security effectiveness” with the
highest weight, indicating its significant importance; criteria with medium relative weights
(between 7% and 10%), such as “cost-effectiveness”, “scalability”, and “integration and
compatibility”, which are moderately important; and criteria with low relative weights
(below 7%), including “performance impact” and several others (i.e., manageability and
usability, compliance and regulatory requirements, resilience and redundancy, vendor
support and collaboration, future readiness), which contribute to the overall evaluation but
have relatively less influence. While the impact of the lower-weighted criteria is smaller,
they should still be considered alongside other factors.
Based on the weighted sums of the alternatives, we can categorize them into three
groups: alternatives with high weighted sums (above 5), including “access control and au-
thentication” and “Security Information and Event Management (SIEM)”, which are crucial
for enhancing smart-grid cybersecurity; alternatives with medium weighted sums (between
5 and 5.5), such as “Intrusion Detection and Prevention Systems (IDPS)” and “security
incident response”, which offer solid performance in detecting and responding to security
incidents; and alternatives with low weighted sums (below 4.5), such as “compliance and
regulatory requirements” and “encryption”, which provide value in their respective criteria
but may not excel as strongly overall.
Based on the relative weights of the criteria, we can categorize them into three groups
for evaluating cybersecurity options that incorporate artificial intelligence (AI) techniques
in smart grids. The criteria with high relative weights, such as “security effectiveness”,
emphasize the accuracy of threat detection and the importance of AI in effective secu-
rity measures. The criteria with medium relative weights, including “integration and
compatibility” and “performance impact”, highlight the need for seamless integration
and the impact on system performance. The criteria with low relative weights, such as
“manageability and usability”, “cost-effectiveness”, “resilience and redundancy”, “future
readiness”, “compliance and regulatory requirements”, “scalability”, “vendor support
and collaboration”, “network segmentation”, and “explainability and transparency”, con-
tribute to the evaluation but have less influence compared to higher-weighted criteria.
Overall, security effectiveness, integration and compatibility, and performance impact are
key considerations when evaluating AI-based cybersecurity options for smart grids, while
also taking into account the other criteria to make well-rounded decisions aligned with
smart-grid cybersecurity needs.
Based on the weighted sums, the alternatives for addressing the cybersecurity needs
of smart grids can be categorized into three groups. The alternatives with high weighted
sums, such as “deep learning”, demonstrate strong potential and favorable performance
across multiple criteria. The alternatives with medium weighted sums, including “hybrid
approaches”, “Bayesian networks”, “swarm intelligence”, and “machine learning”, offer
effectiveness and relevance in addressing cybersecurity challenges. The alternatives with
low weighted sums, such as “fuzzy logic”, “natural language processing (NLP)”, “expert
systems”, and “genetic algorithms (GA)”, may have limited applicability or effectiveness
compared to other options. These findings provide insights into the effectiveness and
suitability of AI techniques and methods for enhancing smart-grid cybersecurity.
The advantages and limitations of MCDM-AHP are addressed, highlighting its po-
tential shortcomings in capturing the full complexity of cybersecurity decision-making
and the subjective nature of assigning weights to criteria. The article also proposes future
directions on how to enhance MCDM-AHP for smart-grid cybersecurity and acknowledges
the need for alternative MCDM techniques that can provide a more comprehensive and
robust assessment. These alternative techniques may include the technique for order of
preference by similarity to ideal solution (TOPSIS), preference ranking organization method
for enrichment evaluations (PROMETHEE), and others. Each technique offers unique ad-
vantages and considerations in evaluating and comparing different cybersecurity options,
addressing the limitations of MCDM-AHP.
5.4. Practical Implications

The article’s examination of cyberattacks and cybersecurity in smart grids, solving the
MCDM problem using AHP for optimal cybersecurity options, and exploring the potential
benefits and challenges of AI, has several practical implications:
• Enhanced Awareness and Preparedness: the article’s overview of smart-grid compo-
nents, applications, and the types of cyberattacks helps raise awareness about potential
vulnerabilities. Grid operators and cybersecurity professionals can use this knowledge
to enhance their understanding of the risks and develop proactive measures to protect
smart-grid infrastructure.
• Prioritizing Optimal Cybersecurity Options: the application of MCDM-AHP to find
the optimal cybersecurity option provides a systematic approach for decision-making.
Grid operators and policymakers can use this methodology to evaluate and prioritize
various cybersecurity options based on multiple criteria, thereby allocating resources
efficiently to the most effective solutions.
• Strengthening Cybersecurity Measures: the implications of cybersecurity for smart
grids underscore the need for robust security measures. Grid operators can leverage
the insights from this article to implement access controls, authentication protocols,
encryption mechanisms, and other cybersecurity solutions to safeguard critical infras-
tructure against cyber threats.
• Leveraging AI for Improved Security: understanding the difference between AI
and exploring its potential and challenges enables grid operators to make informed
decisions about leveraging these technologies. By using AI algorithms for threat
detection, anomaly detection, and incident response, smart grids can enhance their
resilience and response capabilities.
• Addressing the Limitations and Exploring Alternatives: Acknowledging the limita-
tions of MCDM-AHP and considering alternative MCDM techniques allows decision-
makers to make more comprehensive assessments. This knowledge empowers them
to evaluate different cybersecurity options and make well-informed decisions, consid-
ering a broader range of factors and trade-offs.
By embracing these practical implications, stakeholders in the smart-grid domain can
enhance their cybersecurity posture, minimize vulnerabilities, and improve the overall
resilience and reliability of the grid infrastructure in the face of evolving cyber threats.
Funding: This research was supported by the Laboratory of Renewable Energies and Advanced
Materials (LERMA) and the College of Engineering and Architecture of the International University
of Rabat (IUR).
Institutional Review Board Statement: Not applicable.
Informed Consent Statement: Not applicable.
Data Availability Statement: The data used in this study, along with the details of the methodology
adopted, are comprehensively described in the methodology section (Section 2) of this article
Acknowledgments: The author extends sincere gratitude to the editorial office and the dedicated
reviewers for their insightful feedback and meticulous review, which have enhanced the clarity of
this article.
Conflicts of Interest: The author declares no conflict of interest.
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Cyberattacks in Smart Grids: Challenges and Solving the Multi-Criteria

Article in Journal of Cybersecurity and Privacy · September 2023

The user has requested enhancement of the downloaded file.

Copyright: © 2023 by the authors. 1. Introduction

J. Cybersecur. Priv. 2023, 3, 662–705. https://doi.org/10.3390/jcp3040031 https://www.mdpi.com/journal/jcp

of cyberattacks on smart grids, a comprehensive understanding of their components, vul-

1.2. Existing Research

There is a growing body of research on the application of artificial intelligence (AI) in

1.3. Knowledge Gaps

1.4. Research Questions

tiple criteria, including security effectiveness, scalability, integration, and compatibility;

1.6. Practical Implications

2.1. Motivation for Employing MCDM-AHP in Enhancing Cybersecurity Resilience for

2.2. Theoretical Framework of Multi-Criteria Decision-Making (MCDM) Using the Analytical

2. Perform Pairwise Comparisons: Pairwise comparison matrices are performed be-

Rating Scale Definition Explanation

gi = (ci1 ∗ ci2 ∗ . . . ∗ cin )1/n (2)

Let N be the normalized pairwise comparison matrix obtained by dividing each

a j = (1/n) ∗ (n1j + n2j + . . . + nnj ) (4)

sk = (w1 ∗ ok1 ) + (w2 ∗ ok2 ) + . . . + (wn ∗ okn ) (6)

where λmax is the maximum eigenvalue and n is the number of criteria.

Table 2. Random Consistency Index (RI).

5. Interpretation and Decision-Making: By examining the priority weights, it becomes

3.1. Cyberattacks in Smart Grids: Challenges and Implications of Cybersecurity

Smart grids optimize long-distance electricity transportation by employing high-

Figure 3. A schematic representation of the smart grid. Source: Own Elaboration.

3.1.2. Exploring the Landscape of Cyberattacks in Smart Grids

Figure 4. A visual representation depicting the interconnected relationship between production

these components during the manufacturing or distribution process, allowing them to

3.1.3. Short-Term and Long-Term Techno–Economic–Safety–Social Consequences of

3.1.4. Vulnerable Components and Cascading Consequences of Cyberattacks in the

3.1.5. Examining the Real-World Impacts: Case Studies of Cyberattacks on Operational

3.1.7. Securing Information Assets: The Importance of Confidentiality, Integrity,

• Confidentiality ensures authorized access by safeguarding data from unauthorized

3.1.8. Short-Term and Long-Term Techno–Economic–Safety–Social Implications of

3.1.10. Analyzing the Real-World Implications of Cybersecurity Measures on Operational

3.2. Cybersecurity Options in Smart Grids: Solving Multi-Criteria Decision-Making (MCDM)

3.2.1. Alternatives and Criteria

to withstand attacks or failures, vendor support and adherence to regulations, future

Criteria C1 C2 C3 C4 C5 C6 C7 C8 C9 C10 C11 C12 C13 C14

Criteria Relative Weights (RWs)

Alternatives Weighted Sum

• Supervised Learning: ML models are trained on labeled data to make predic-

10. “C10” Future Readiness:

Table 6. Pairwise comparison matrix between criteria.

Criteria C1 C2 C3 C4 C5 C6 C7 C8 C9 C10 C11 C12

adapt and evolve in response to future cybersecurity challenges and advancements

Table 7. Relative weights of the criteria.

Criteria Relative Weights (RWs) of Criteria

Table 8. Weighted sum of alternatives.

Alternatives Weighted Sum of Alternatives

4. Discussion: Advantages, Limitations, Enhancements of MCDM-AHP in Evaluating

4.1. Advantages of the Analytical Hierarchy Process (AHP)

4.2. Limitations of the Analytical Hierarchy Process (AHP)

of the decision-making by accounting for the inherent uncertainties in the cybersecu-

• Technique for Order of Preference by Similarity to Ideal Solution (TOPSIS): TOP-