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Activity 1 Group 2

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Activity 1 Group 2

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GROUP 2:

BUGTONG, Valery
CARANTES, Rine Lee
COBCOBO, Rachel
COLTE, Jilianne Kaye
ESCOTE, Ma. Joanna

ASEAN POLITICAL-SECURITY COMMUNITY

Significance of ASC in present time


In building a peaceful, secure and stable region, ASEAN adopts a comprehensive
approach to security to enhance the capacity to deal with current and emerging challenges.
It pursues peaceful settlement of disputes and renounces aggression and the threat or use of
force or other actions inconsistent with international law. Relevant bodies in the APSC
continue to work in addressing non-traditional security challenges to include drug
trafficking, terrorism, trafficking in persons, people smuggling, cybercrime, illicit trafficking
of wildlife and timber, disaster relief and pandemics, among others.

1. Building Regional Security Order


ASEAN’s convening power or its ability to bring regional and extra-regional powers
into its dialogue and consultation processes is a truly unique contribution and a valuable role
that other more powerful parties would not have been able to play, given the persistent
distrust amongst them.
The ARF, the ADMM, and the ASEAN Defense Ministers Meeting Plus (ADMM Plus)
demonstrate how ASEAN-led regional security dialogues have successfully evolved into
platforms for policy coordination and, increasingly, collective action. Through these
dialogues, the ASEAN were able to create agreements and achieve their goals.
- ASEAN introduced a regional-multilateral dimension to regional order that previously did
not exist.
- ASEAN has also managed to ‘condition’ great powers to be ‘more attentive to local and
regional concerns and priorities’
- small and middle powers have ‘an equal and even central standing’ in the determination of
participants, priorities, parameters, and frameworks for security cooperation.
ADMM and ADMM Plus, on the other hand, brought defense professionals of the
region into processes that had long been dominated by diplomats, and in so doing led
regional states towards more focused, task-oriented activities with both technical and
political deliverables.

2. Peaceful Settlement of Disputes


a. South-China Sea dispute
The South China Sea disputes are no longer just a litmus test of China’s cooperative
or aggresive behaviour towards its smaller neighbours, particularly those in ASEAN whose
claims overlap with those of China. They are a test of its attitude towards ASEAN as a whole
because of the prominence both ASEAN and China have given the issue in their relations over
the years. Although China had previously claimed that the sovereignty issues should only be
resolved bilaterally by itself and other claimant states, it progressively changed its approach
to one where the disputes might be brought up with ASEAN if they threaten the stability of
the area.
Thus, China and ASEAN had agreed in 2002 on the Declaration of Conduct of Parties in the
South China Sea, and continue to work towards a legally binding Code of Conduct in the South
China Sea.
b. Declaration of Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea (DOC)
In 2002, ASEAN and China signed the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the
South China Sea (DOC) that applies the same principles as the 1967 ASEAN Charter to
territorial disputes and uses UNCLOS (United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea) as
a basis for dealing with claims and disputes between ASEAN members and China.
The Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea (DOC) is the first political
document signed by China and ASEAN countries on the South China Sea issue, which
establishes the basic principles and common norms for all parties to handle the South China
Sea issue.
The DOC is a non-binding document, however, and does not have a dispute resolution
mechanism, leaving its signatories to resolve their disagreements on a voluntary basis
without taking the disputes to international institutions. The DOC was unable to gather a
common position among ASEAN countries on China’s claims against ASEAN members’
territory, due largely to those members having different interests in the matter.
Thus, without being able to move toward the desired Code of Conduct (COC), which has been
under negotiation since 1999, and which would be binding and include dispute resolution
mechanisms, the DOC remains an ineffective instrument. China is the main obstacle to the
adoption of a COC, since any such code would restrict Beijing’s claims.
Given the level of tensions over the past few years, principally between the Philippines and
China, as well as between Vietnam and China, a new attempt was made in 2017 to reach a
basic agreement on the nature and scope of a new COC. A framework for a new South China
Sea Code of Conduct, mostly based on the 2002 DOC, was approved in August of that year by
the foreign ministers of China and ASEAN. A framework for a new South China Sea Code of
Conduct, mostly based on the 2002 DOC, was approved in August 2017 by the foreign
ministers of China and ASEAN. The draft of the agreement nevertheless implies that it, like
its predecessor, would not be legally binding despite the fact that it particularly addressed
conflict prevention and the assurance of freedom of navigation.
ASEAN’s contributions to the construction of a new regional security order, and the
significance of the parallel multilateral cooperative security arrangements ASEAN had built
since the end of the Cold War, will be measured and judged by success in dialing down the
growing militarization of the South China Sea, scaling back any excessive assertiveness of
rising powers or excessive interventionism of established ones, developing balanced and
cooperative relations with all its dialogue partners, and seizing the initiative to reclaim
centrality, preserve autonomy, and, in the long run, keep to the path of neutrality that has
long been a foundation of its identity.
c. Promoting maritime cooperation
ASEAN has worked to promote maritime cooperation, particularly in the South China
Sea. In 2002, ASEAN and China signed the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South
China Sea (DOC). Their commitment to fostering peace, stability, and mutual trust as well as
ensuring the peaceful settlement of conflicts in the South China Sea is embodied in the
document The Post-Ministerial Conference (PMC) with China in July 2016 also supported a
Joint Statement on the Full and Effective Implementation of the DOC. According to the Work
Plan on the Implementation of the DOC for 2016–2021, numerous initiatives and activities
are being carried out as part of the continuous implementation of the DOC.
The Work Plan identifies projects and activities that ASEAN and China would conduct to
implement the DOC, with a view to enhancing trust and confidence among parties and
creating a conducive environment for the COC negotiations. The activities in recent years
focus on the following topics, among others
(1) marine environmental protection;
(2) building military-to-military confidence;
(3) cooperation among maritime law enforcement agencies/coast guards; and
(4) cooperation in ensuring just and humane treatment of fishermen in the South
China Sea.
Moving forward, ASEAN and China have also been in negotiations in regard to a Code
of Conduct (COC) in the South China Sea since 2018, with the first reading of the Single Draft
COC Negotiating Text (SDNT) being completed in July 2019. Notwithstanding the challenges
presented by the COVID-19 pandemic, ASEAN and China remain committed in pursuing
the negotiations.
The South China Sea disputes have been amongst the most divisive of security issues
for ASEAN, at certain points pitting claimants versus non-claimants; maritime versus
mainland states; member states with close links to one power versus those who support the
other power instead. Efforts to build unity of approach on the South China Sea disputes are
expected to continue. More importantly, however, the unity and credibility of ASEAN must
be pursued through its own effective and consistent compliance with its agreements to
cooperate on maritime security, to strengthen the capacity of its institutions, and to keep a
balance in its relations with other states.

3. Addressing Non-Traditional Security Issues


a. Transnational Crime
The work towards a Treaty on Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters
(MLAT) was initially explored by Malaysia at the 8th ASLOM held on 15 – 16 June 2002 in
Bangkok, Thailand. The proposal aimed to support and strengthen ASEAN Member States’
effort and capacity to combat transnational crimes and other transnational challenges by
enhancing cooperation in law enforcement and mutual legal assistance in criminal matters.
In light of the various legal systems and procedural requirements of the ASEAN Member
States, it was also a response to the demand to increase the efficiency of judicial assistance
as well as to regularize and facilitate the process of mutual legal help.
In recent years, the Philippine government has been treating the Mutual Legal
Assistance as a very reliable ally in pursuing transnational cases in the region, especially
those involving high-profile individuals. One example is the case of Mary Jane Veloso.
To convince Indonesia to delay the execution of Filipina worker Mary Jane Veloso, the
Philippines invoked a key regional treaty to fight transnational crimes in Southeast Asia.
The case would basically prove that Veloso is a human trafficking victim, not a drug
trafficker. Veloso said Maria Kristina Sergio (alleged illegal recruiter) duped her into
smuggling 2.6 kilograms of heroin into Indonesia.
This was when the then Justice Secretary Leila De Lima suggested invoking the ASEAN MLAT.
An ASEAN handbook describes the ASEAN MLAT as a means “to facilitate and enhance efforts
to combat transnational crime in the ASEAN region.”
Senior officials also consider the ASEAN MLAT a major instrument in “ending impunity for
traffickers.”
Under the ASEAN MLAT, states can exchange the following forms of mutual legal assistance,
among others:
- taking of evidence or obtaining voluntary statements from persons
- making arrangements for persons to give evidence or to assist in criminal matters
- executing searches and seizures
- locating and identifying witnesses and suspects
This is what happened in Veloso’s case.
The threat of transnational crime in the region continues to evolve. Given this, ASEAN
law enforcement agencies under the ambit of the ASEAN Ministerial Meeting on
Transnational Crime (AMMTC), remains committed to address terrorism, cybercrime,
illicit drug trafficking, trafficking in persons, arms smuggling, sea piracy, money
laundering, international economic crimes, illicit trafficking of wildlife and timber and
people smuggling.
Despite the difficulties brought on by the pandemic, the work program for
completing the ASEAN Plan of Action in Combating Transnational Crime 2016–2025 is being
renewed and implemented. New modalities have been explored for continued cooperation
under the ASEAN Senior Officials Meeting on Transnational Crime (SOMTC) and its working
groups.

b. Combating Terrorism
ASEAN has taken significant measures to address the growing threat of terrorism,
radicalism and violent extremism in the region. These measures not only enhance ASEAN’s
cooperation and commitment but also ensure that ASEAN’s efforts remain relevant to new
and emerging dimensions of this threat.
Transnational crime and terrorism became major concerns as the international
community expanded. Following the September 11 attacks in the United States, extreme
organizations, including ISIS, spread terrorism throughout Southeast Asia. ISIS is a new
security threat in the Southeast Asia region because there are issues that ISIS has planned to
make Southeast Asia their new target, but ASEAN leaders are more responsive to respond to
this incident by holding meetings to discuss terrorism issues, such as:
-ASEAN Declaration on Transnational Crime (adopted 20 December 1997);
-ASEAN Declaration on Joint Action to Counter Terrorism (adopted November 5, 2001);
-ASEAN Work Program to Combat Transnational Crime (adopted 17 May 2002); ASEAN
Convention on Counter Terrorism (adopted 13 January 2007, entered into force 27 May
2011);
-Charter of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (adopted November 20, 2007, entered
into force 15 December 2008);
-2014 ASEAN Foreign Ministers' Statement on 'the Rise of Violence and Brutality Committed
by Terrorist / Extremist Organizations in Iraq and Syria' (26 September 2014);
-2015 Special ASEAN Ministerial Meeting on the Rise of Radicalization and Violent
Extremism (2 October 2015);
-Manila Declaration to Counter the Rise of Radicalisation and Violent Extremism (adopted
by the 11th ASEAN Ministerial Meeting on Transnational Crime on 20 September 2017);
ASEAN 'Comprehensive Plan of Action on Counter Terrorism (adopted by the 11th ASEAN
Ministerial Meeting on Transnational Crime on September 20, 2017).
With the meetings that have been carried out along with the ratification of
international treaties especially in the field of terrorism, it is hoped that ASEAN will be able
to reduce and even eradicate terrorism occurring in Southeast Asia.
c. ASEAN cooperation against Illicit Drugs
ASEAN has adopted a zero-tolerance approach against illicit drugs and remains
steadfast towards a drugs-free region, as evident in the collective efforts through the ASEAN
Ministerial Meeting on Drug Matters (AMMD) and its mechanisms. Under the framework of
ASEAN-Narcotics Cooperation Center (ASEAN-NARCO), the annual ASEAN Drugs Monitoring
(ADM) Report 2019 was successfully published in 2020 and work is on-going towards an
ADM Report 2020.
Upon the completion of the first internal review of the ASEAN Work Plan on Securing
Communities Against Illicit Drugs 2016-2025, which highlighted a successful
implementation rate of 79%, the Mid-Term Review of the Work Plan is expected to be
completed in 2021. Considering the extension given to implementation period of the ASEAN
Cooperation to Tackle Illicit Drug Production and Trafficking in the Golden Triangle from
2020 to 2022, efforts in mitigating drug problem in the Golden Triangle continue. The Mid-
Term Review of ASEAN Cooperation Plan is currently underway.
d. Response on Public Health Emergencies
Notwithstanding the political and economic challenges posed by the COVID-19
pandemic, ASEAN has continued to fight for regional peace and stability even while adopting
specific measures to address the pandemic. These include (1) the COVID-19 ASEAN
Response Fund; (2) ASEAN Regional Reserves of Medical Supplies (RRMS) for Public Health
Emergencies; (3) ASEAN Strategic Framework on PHE (ASF-PHE); (4) ASEAN
Comprehensive Recovery Framework (ACRF); (5) ASEAN Travel Corridor Arrangement
Framework (ATCAF); and (6) ASEAN Regional Centre for Public Health Emergencies and
Emerging Diseases (ACPHEED).
To date, progress have been noted in regard to these initiatives. Resources from the
COVID-19 ASEAN Response Fund has enabled ASEAN to collaborate with the United Nations
Children’s Fund (UNICEF) in regard to the procurement of vaccines for ASEAN Member
States and the ASEAN Secretariat. Following the launching in 2020 of the ASEAN RRMS,
which will stockpile and distribute essential medical supplies to support affected ASEAN
Member States in need, a proposal to set up the ASEAN Plus Three Reserve of Medical
Supplies for Public Health Emergencies (APT RMS) is currently being considered.
The ASEAN Strategic Framework on PHE (ASF-PHE), adopted in 2020, is meant to
enhance ASEAN’s preparedness and resilience to public health emergencies. Likewise
adopted last year is the ASEAN Comprehensive Recovery Framework (ACRF) and its
attendant Implementation Plan, which provides a whole-of-community strategy to address
the pandemic and recover from its effects. The initiatives outlined in the Framework are on
track of being implemented. More recently, the ASEAN Travel Corridor Arrangement
Framework (ATCAF) has been finalized. Work to establish the ACPHEED is also ongoing with
a number of ASEAN’s external partners having provided relevant resource support for its
establishment.

4. Other Developments in Promoting Peace, Stability, and Security in ASEAN


a. Women, peace, and security
The Women, Peace and Security (WPS) agenda has likewise gained momentum in
security cooperation. To recall, the Joint Statement on Promoting Women, Peace and Security
adopted at the 31st ASEAN Summit in 2017, recognized the importance of women’s
participation in the political, security, and justice sectors as well as the importance of
women's full participation in peace processes as negotiators, mediators, and first
responders, including the prevention of violent extremism.
To support the WPS agenda, the first Regional Symposium on Implementing Women,
Peace and Security Agenda in ASEAN was held in 2019, which led to the establishment of an
Advisory Group on Women, Peace and Security consisting of representatives from the ASEAN
Committee on Women (ACW) and the ASEAN Commission on the Promotion and
Protection of the Rights of Women and Children (ACWC). In March 2021, the ACW and the
ACWC in consultation with relevant ASEAN Sectoral Bodies and Entities launched the ASEAN
Regional Study on WPS, which proposes WPS policy and program level recommendation to
achieve greater stability and peace in the ASEAN region.
In 2020, two significant undertakings relative to the WPS agenda were held. These
include the ASEAN Ministerial Dialogue on Strengthening Women’s Role for Sustainable
Peace and Security, which reiterated ASEAN’s commitment to promote gender equality
and empowerment of all women, and the ASEAN Women Leaders’ Summit with “Women’s
Role in Building a Cohesive, Dynamic, Sustainable and Inclusive ASEAN Community in a Post
COVID-19 World” as its theme.
The ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) also expressed commitment to advance the WPS
agenda through its Joint Statement on Promoting the Women, Peace and Security Agenda,
which was adopted in 2019. Likewise, the issue of WPS is also included in the ARF Ha Hoi
Plan of Action II (2020-2025), adopted in September 2020. As a follow-up to the Joint
Statement, Indonesia, Thailand and Canada co-chaired ARF Workshop on Women, Peace and
Security held in March 2021. The Workshop exchanged views on methodologies to advance
the WPS agenda in the ARF as well as to strengthen regional coordination mechanisms on
WPS. Notably, the East Asia Summit (EAS) also issued an EAS Leaders’ Statement on Women,
Peace, and Security in 2020.

b. Cybersecurity Cooperation
The ASEAN Leaders issued the ASEAN Leaders’ Statement on Cybersecurity
Cooperation and called for greater cooperation and coordination among ASEAN Member
States on cybersecurity policy development and capacity building initiatives. In November
2020, ASEAN established the ASEAN Cybersecurity Coordinating Committee (Cyber-CC)
with the goal of enhancing cross-sectoral and cross-pillar coordination on cybersecurity
policies and on multidisciplinary measures to address the rapidly expanding challenges in
cyberspace. This was done in recognition of the need to strengthen collective effort to
address cybersecurity challenges.
Meanwhile, sectoral bodies under the political security community pillar continue to
contribute in addressing cybersecurity. SOMTC, for example, has a Working Group on
Cybercrime and has operationalized multi-year programs of the ASEAN Cyber Capability
Desk (ASEAN Desk) lodged at the INTERPOL Global Complex for Innovation in Singapore.
The defense sector for its part has the ASEAN Cyber Defense Network and the ADMM
Cybersecurity and Information Centre of Excellence (COE). By establishing this center, the
ASEAN Cyber Defense Network will be able to better support regional cybersecurity
dialogue, interaction, and cooperation. The center will support information exchange and
ASEAN military institutions' capacity building against cyberattacks, disinformation, and
misinformation.

c. Human Rights
Human right is important in sustaining peace, security and stability. In accordance
with the ASEAN Charter, the ASEAN Intergovernmental Commission on Human Rights
(AICHR) was inaugurated in October 2009 and vested with the mandate of an ASEAN human
rights body.
Since then, AICHR has developed into a significant human rights forum, significantly
influencing the regional human rights agenda and advocacy. It identifies emerging rights
issues and advocates for rights-based policy responses and remedies, including but not
limited to stopping human trafficking, assisting victims of such crimes, halting the spread of
radicalization and violent extremism, and more from a human rights perspective.
Given the COVID-19 pandemic, AICHR has raised the matters of challenges about
protecting the rights of vulnerable groups and recommended rights-based measures to
mitigate the pandemic’s negative impact. Respect for human rights, including economic,
social, cultural, and civil and political rights has proven to be vital to the success of the public
health response and recovery from the pandemic. AICHR has contributed to regional
dialogues on the economic and societal challenges brought about by the pandemic, measures
for integration and contribution to the Implementation Plan of the ASEAN Comprehensive
Recovery Framework (ACRF) as well as initiatives to the future implementation of the
Strategic and Holistic Initiative to Link ASEAN Response to Emergencies and Disasters
(ASEAN SHIELD), a key deliverable of Brunei Darussalam’s ASEAN chairmanship. Forging
ahead with the Five-Year Work Plan of AICHR 2021-2025, AICHR pledges to retain its public
outreach and increase impact in mainstreaming human rights, and thus reinforcing a culture
of respect for human rights in ASEAN.
REFERENCES:

ASEAN POLITICAL-SECURITY COMMUNITY (APSC). (2018). https://asean.org/wp-


content/uploads/2018/11/32.-November-2018-Fact-Sheet-on-APSC1.pdf
ASEAN Political-Security Community Outlook 2021. (2022, January 21). ASEAN; asean.org.
https://asean.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/10/ASEAN-Security-Outlook-ASO-
2021.pdf
ASEAN treaty helps save Mary Jane Veloso. (2015, April 29). RAPPLER.
https://www.rappler.com/nation/91573-asean-treaty-mary-jane-veloso/
Maizland, L., & Albert, E. (2020, November 24). What Is ASEAN? Council on Foreign Relations.
https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/what-asean
Preventing War, Building a Rules-based Order: Challenges Facing the ASEAN Political-Security
Community Glass Half-Empty or Glass Half-Full. (n.d.).
https://www.eria.org/ASEAN_at_50_4A.0_Baviera_final.pdf
The Role of ASEAN in the South China Sea Disputes. (2022, June 23). E-International Relations.
https://www.e-ir.info/2022/06/23/the-role-of-asean-in-the-south-china-sea-
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