HANDBOOK

CSDP
THE COMMON SECURITY AND DEFENCE POLICY
OF THE EUROPEAN UNION

SCHUTZ
& HILFE
www.bmlvs.gv.at
 Handbook on CSDP
The Common Security and Defence Policy of the European Union

edited by

Jochen Rehrl and Hans-Bernhard Weisserth

with forewords of

H.E. Catherine Ashton

High Representative of the Union for the Common Foreign and Security Policy
and Vice President of the European Commission

H.E. Norbert Darabos

Federal Minister of Defence and Sports of the Republic of Austria

with contributions of

Prof. Dr. Sven Biscop, Egmont Institut

Dr. Ernst Schmid, Austrian Military Representation in Brussels
Dr. Gustav Lindstrom, Geneva Centre for Security Policy
Nicolas Kerleroux, Press Service of the Council General Secretariat
Dr. Johann Frank, Austrian Federal Ministry of Defence and Sports
Dr. Gerard Quille, Secretariat of the European Parliament
LtCol Silviu Costache, European Union Military Staff
Céline Ruiz, Press Service of the Council General Secretariat
Dr. Jochen Rehrl, Austrian Federal Ministry of Defence and Sports
Mr. Hans-Bernhard Weisserth, European Security and Defence College

and others
Imprint:

Publication of the Federal Ministry of Defence and Sports of the Republic of Austria

Editors: Jochen Rehrl, Hans-Bernhard Weisserth

Layout: Axel Scala, Armed Forces Printing Shop, Vienna

Published by: Directorate for Security Policy of the Federal Ministry of Defence and Sports of the Republic of Austria

Photos: Austrian Federal Ministry of Defence and Sports, Council of the European Union, European Commission,
European Parliament, Jochen Rehrl

Charts/Graphs: Hans-Bernhard Weisserth, Gustav Lindstrom, Ernst Schmid, Johann Frank, Silviu Costache,
Jochen Rehrl

Printed and bound by:

Armed Forces Printing Shop,
Vienna/Austria, 2010
BMLVS R 10-0439

ISBN: 978-3-902275-31-8
Content

1 The development of CFSP and CSDP

1.1 European Integration: post World War II to CSDP.......................................................................... 12

2 European Security Strategy – A Secure Europe in a better world

2.1 Background and Development of the ESS in 2003 ........................................................................ 16
2.2 Main Themes of the ESS and Key Message for CSDP .................................................................. 18
2.3 Excursion: ESS: An Emerging System of Concepts and Sub-strategies –
An Academic View.............................................................................................................................. 21

3 CFSP/CSDP-related aspects of the Lisbon Treaty

3.1 Novelties of CFSP/CSDP ................................................................................................................... 26
3.2 Excursion: Permanent Structured Cooperation – An Academic View.......................................... 30

4 External Action of the European Union – Roles and Responsibilities

4.1 European Council and its President.................................................................................................34
4.2 High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy.................................. 36
4.3 European External Action Service.................................................................................................... 37
4.4 Overview of the main Council Bodies..............................................................................................38
4.5 Role of the European Commission...................................................................................................40
4.6 Role of the European Parliament ..................................................................................................... 41

5 Supporting Structures
5.1 Internal Crisis Management Structures...........................................................................................46
5.2 Agencies in the field of CSDP............................................................................................................ 51

6 The EU as an active player

6.1 CSDP Mission Spectrum – from Petersberg to Lisbon................................................................... 56
6.2 Decision Making in the Field of CSDP.............................................................................................. 59
6.3 Command and Control Options........................................................................................................ 62
6.4 Civilian Missions and Military Operations.......................................................................................63
6.5 Financing of CSDP Actions................................................................................................................64

7 Capability Development
7.1 The rationale for European Capability Development.....................................................................68
7.2 Development of Civilian Capabilities............................................................................................... 70
7.3 Development of Military Capabilities............................................................................................... 72

8 Civil-Military Co-ordination
8.1 Civil-Military Co-ordination – A Specific Requirement of the EU ................................................ 76

HANDBOOK CSDP   3
 9 Other important CSDP-related aspects
9.1 Co-operation with third states and international organisations.................................................80
9.2 Training and education in the field of CSDP................................................................................... 82
9.3 Human Rights and Gender Aspects................................................................................................. 87
9.4 Security Sector Reform......................................................................................................................88

10 Information policy in the field of CSDP

10.1 Communicating EU Common Security and Defence Policy – An Overview............................... 92

ANNEXES
Annex 1: Course on CSDP – Illustrative Course Programme.........................................................98
Annex 2: The European Security Strategy – A Secure Europe in a Better World,
Council of the European Union (2003)............................................................................ 103
Annex 3: Report on the implementation of the European Security Strategy – Providing
Security in a Changing World (2008)............................................................................... 119
Annex 4: Lisbon Treaty – CSDP-related articles (extract)............................................................. 131
Annex 5: ESDP@10: “What lessons for the future?”..................................................................... 139

4   HANDBOOK CSDP

List of abbreviations

AMM ACEH Monitoring Mission EU ISS EU Institute for Security Studies

ASSET Association for Security Sector EU MS EU Member State(s)
Education and Training EUSC EU Satellite Centre
AU African Union EU SITCEN EU Situation Centre
CEUMC Chairperson of the EUMC EU SSR EU Security Sector Reform (Mis-
CFSP Common Foreign and Security sion)
Policy EUBAM European Border Assistance Mis-
CIVCOM Committee for Civilian Aspects of sion
Crisis Management EUFOR European Force (Mission)
CMC Crisis Management Concept EUJUST European Justice Mission
CMCO Civil-Military Co-ordination EULEX European Rule of Law (Mission)
CMPD Crisis Management and Planning EUMC EU Military Committee
Directorate EUMCWG EUMC Working Group
CONOPS Concept of Operations EUMS EU Military Staff
COREPER Permanent Representatives Com- EUPOL European Police (Mission)
mittee (Abbreviation in French) FAC Foreign Affairs Council
CPCC Civilian Planning and Conduct GAC General Affairs Council
Capability GNI Gross National Income
CSDP Common Security and Defence HR High Representative
Policy (formerly ESDP) IDL Internet-based Distance Learning
CSDP HLC CSDP High Level Course IIA Inter-Institutional Agreement
CSDP OC CSDP Orientation Course INTEL Intelligence
DAC Development Assistance Com- ISSAT International Security Sector
mittee (OECD) Advisory Team
DDR Disarmament, Demobilisation LOG Logistics
and Reintegration MS Member State
DG Directorate General NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organisa-
DGEUMS Director General of the EU Mili- tion
tary Staff OECD Organisation for Economic Co-
DPKO Department for Peace-Keeping operation and Development
Operations (UN) OSCE Organisation for Security and Co-
DSACEUR Deputy Supreme Allied Com- operation in Europe
mander for Europe PMG Politico-Military Group
EAC European Armament Co-opera- pMS Participating Member States
tion Strategy PPI Press and Public Information
EC European Commission PSC Political and Security Committee
EDA European Defence Agency R&T Research and Technology
EEAS European External Action Service RELEX Working Party of Foreign Rela-
EP European Parliament tions Counsellors
ESDC European Security and Defence SC Special Committee (Athena)
College SSR Security Sector Reform
ESDC EAB ESDC Executive Academic Board TEU Treaty of the European Union
ESDC SC ESDC Steering Committee TFEU Treaty on the Functioning of the
ESDP European Security and Defence European Union
Policy (now CSDP) UN(O) United Nations (Organisation)
EU European Union VP Vice President

HANDBOOK CSDP   5
 Foreword

Council of the European Union

For more than 10 years, the Common Security and Defence Policy has been one of the crucial
topics within the European Union, in particular because this policy reflects the ambitions of the
Union and its Member States to be more active, more consistent and more capable.

The Union launched its first crisis management mission in 2003. Since then the Union has
deployed over 20 civilian and military missions and operations on three continents. From the start
of its operational engagement, the EU has tried to present its ability to deploy both civilian and
military instruments together as its particular strength, which is one of the main features of its
comprehensive approach to crisis management.

Training in general is an important aspect of such successful operational engagement and fol-
lowing its comprehensive approach, training in civil-military co-ordination and co-operation is a
special requirement for the EU which needs to be met through special training and combined civil-
ian and military participation.

The European Security and Defence College is providing such training at the strategic level with
a mixed civil-military participation in all its courses and is so playing a significant role in the imple-
mentation of the EU’s comprehensive approach to crisis management.

This Handbook on CSDP, made available under the ESDC, mirrors this approach and thus pro-
vides a sound documentation for trainers and trainees of the European Security and Defence Col-
lege and beyond. It is my hope that it will also help to promote a better and comprehensive under-
standing of the Common Security and Defence Policy.

Catherine Ashton
High Representative of the Union
for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy

6   HANDBOOK CSDP

Foreword

Ministry of Defence and Sports

With the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, the EU set itself new levels of ambition. New struc-
tures and procedures will make it easier for the Union to be more active and to be more coher-
ent. The newly-created post of High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security
Policy, who is at the same time Vice-President of the European Commission, will also facilitate
European external action.

The new structures will also give rise to a need to familiarise and train more personnel to enable
them to work more efficiently in the framework of Common Security and Defence Policy. In my
post as Minister of Defence and Sports, I know from personal experience that training and edu-
cation is of the utmost importance, sometimes even a sine qua non, for accomplishing missions
successfully. Therefore Austria supported from the beginning the development of the European
Security and Defence College in addition to other efforts aimed at enhancing the operability of
CFSP/CSDP.

I would like to thank the Secretariat of the European Security and Defence College for the work
done so far. I firmly believe that this present handbook will support the Common Security and
Defence Policy and the relevant training and will contribute to the further development a common
and shared European security culture.

Norbert Darabos
Federal Minister of Defence and Sports
of the Republic of Austria

HANDBOOK CSDP   7
 Preface of the editors

The first ever training course on ESDP given Distance Learning (IDL) System was set up,
at EU level was provided in 2003 under the strongly supported by Belgium and Romania.
Greek Presidency and its Presidency initiative
for a “Common Training”, the “Pilot ESDP Ori- With the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty,
entation Course”, as it is called. This pioneer- ESDP changed to CSDP. Training will continue
ing course was conducted in the basement of a to play an important role in its further devel-
Commission building in Brussels and provided opment. However, the lack of proper training
the basis for further work. material on CSDP has been raised as a major
concern by trainers and by course participants
An evolving European Security and Defence who wished to have general documentation on
Policy and the recognised need for training and CSDP to which they could refer .
education in this field led to the establishment
of the European Security and Defence College The development of CSDP-related training
(ESDC) in 2005 tasked to promote a common material is a specific task given to the ESDC but
European security culture. Since that time, due to the lack of resources, it has not yet been
thousands of civilian and military personnel possible to implement it. Austria, a strong sup-
within and outside the European Union have porter of the European Security and Defence
attended ESDP and ESDP-related courses pro- College, volunteered to draw up the present
vided by national training institutions, most of “CSDP Handbook” in close cooperation with
them under the umbrella of the ESDC. the ESDC Secretariat

The European Security and Defence College We, the editors, did not want to duplicate
developed into a key player in ESDP training. efforts which were already made , for example
Since 2003, the number and variety of course in the form of the “Guide to the European Secu-
offers have been extended in line with the rity and Defence Policy (ESDP)” developed by
ESDP development. In addition to the Orien- the French delegation in Brussels. Nor is this
tation Course, a High-Level Course was intro- handbook intended to duplicate the academic
duced aimed at personnel working in key posi- work of the EU Institute for Security Studies in
tions in the field of ESDP in the capitals and EU Paris or the publications of the Council Press
institutions. A “Press and Public Information” Service. All these publications have been of
(PPI) Course was introduced by Austria in close particular help in the development of CSDP
cooperation with the Council Press Service in and related training.
2006. Between 2007 and 2009, several other
courses were established, including courses The main aim of this handbook is twofold:
on “Capability Development”, “ESDP and firstly, it will serve as a reference book for the
Gender”, “Africa and ESDP”, “Security Sector course participants after they have attended
Reform”, “Mission Planning” and “Decision courses at the ESDC; secondly, it serves as a
Making Seminars”. Additionally, and in sup- first guide for trainers at national institutes in
port of the various courses, an Internet-based their preparations for CSDP-related courses.

8   HANDBOOK CSDP

 In line with this, the table of contents of this Without their help, assistance and contribu-
book largely reflects the CSDP Standard Cur- tions, this book would not have been possi-
riculum for a CSDP Orientation Course, supple- ble. We know the difficulties and challenges in
mented with elements of other types of train- times of change and therefore we very much
ing activity under the umbrella of the ESDC. appreciated any support that was given .

Thanks to all colleagues in the EU who We would also like to thank the Austrian Min-
assisted, directly or indirectly, with the compi- istry of Defence and Sports, in particular the
lation of this book. In particular, we would like Security Policy Director Major-General Johann
to thank Ernst Schmid (Austrian Military Rep- Pucher, who supported this project from the
resentation, Brussels), Sven Biscop (Egmont beginning. And, last but not least, many thanks
Institute, Brussels), Gustav Lindstrom (Geneva to Dirk Dubois and Dan Trifanescu from the
Centre for Security Policy, Geneva), Johann ESDC Secretariat, who helped to make this
Frank (Austrian Ministry of Defence and book possible.
Sports, Vienna), Silviu Costache (EU Military
Staff, Brussels), Nicolas Kerleroux and Céline
Ruiz (both Council Press Service, Brussels). Vienna/Brussels, in April 2010

Dr. Jochen Rehrl is the Austrian representa- Hans-Bernhard Weisserth, member of the Pol-
tive in the Steering Committee of the European icy Unit of the HR, is acting Head of the ESDC
Security and Defence College and Head of Unit Secretariat currently located in the Crisis Man-
for Defence Policy in the Directorate for Secu- agement and Planning Directorate in the Gen-
rity Policy in the federal Ministry of Defence eral Secretariat of the Council of the European
and Sports of the Republic of Austria. Union.

HANDBOOK CSDP   9
1 The development of
CFSP and CSDP

HANDBOOK CSDP   11
 1.1 European Integration:
post World War II to CSDP

The origins of the security and defence tion. For example, it breaks new ground via
architecture of Europe can be found in the its Article J.4 which states CFSP includes “all
post-World War II situation. Starting in the late questions related to the security of the Union,
1940s, a number of initiatives set the stage for including the eventual framing of a common
increased cooperation across Europe. Exam- defence policy, which might in time lead to a
ples include the signing of the Brussels Treaty common defence.”
(1948) – sowing the seeds for a Western Euro- While the European Union identified ambi-
pean Union – and the creation of the European tious objectives in the area of external security
Coal and Steel Community 1951 which placed and defence through the Maastricht Treaty, it
strategic resources under a supranational would not be until the late 1990s, in the after-
authority. math of the wars of secession in the Balkans,
In the late 1960s, the European Community that concrete provisions were introduced to
(EC) began to explore ways in which to harmo- endow the EU with tangible crisis manage-
nise members’ foreign policies. At the Hague ment capabilities. Following the St. Malo Dec-
Summit held in December 1969, European laration in 1998, numerous European Council
leaders instructed their respective foreign min- summit meetings defined the military and civil-
isters to examine the feasibility of closer inte- ian capabilities needed to fulfil the Petersberg
gration in the political domain. In response, for- tasks (humanitarian and rescue tasks, peace-
eign ministers introduced the idea of European keeping tasks, and tasks of combat forces in
Political Cooperation (EPC) in the Davignon crisis management, including peacemaking).
Report from October 1970. The report defined Examples include the Cologne European Coun-
its objectives (harmonization of positions, cil Meeting (1999) which laid the foundations
consultation and, when appropriate, common for European Security and Defence Policy
actions) and its procedures (six-monthly meet- (ESDP), the Helsinki European Council Meet-
ings of the Foreign Affairs Ministers, quarterly ing (1999), which introduced the Headline Goal
meetings of the Political Directors forming the 2003, and the Santa Maria da Feira European
Political Committee). Overall, EPC aimed to Council Meeting (2000) which identified four
facilitate the consultation process among EC civilian priority areas. In 2003, ESDP became
Member States. operational through the initiation of the first
European Political Cooperation served as ESDP missions. Since 2003, the EU has initi-
the foundation for the Common Foreign and ated over twenty crisis management opera-
Security Policy introduced in the Maastricht tions. In addition, the EU presented its first
Treaty. With its entry into force on 1 Novem- ever European Security Strategy in December
ber 1993, it created a single institutional frame- 2003, outlining key threats and challenges fac-
work (the European Union) based on three pil- ing Europe.
lars – the second of which was labelled Com- With the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty
mon Foreign and Security Policy. CFSP is more on 1 December 2009, ESDP was renamed Com-
far-reaching than European Political Coopera- mon Security and Defence Policy (ESDP). In

12   HANDBOOK CSDP

addition, the Lisbon Treaty established the post advice and assistance tasks, conflict preven-
of High Representative of the Union for Foreign tion and peace-keeping tasks, tasks of combat
Affairs and Security Policy. The post merges forces in crisis management, including peace-
the two positions of High Representative for making and post-conflict stabilisation’ (art.28B/
CFSP (held by Dr. Javier Solana between 1999- Article 43 (1) TEU). These tasks may contribute
2009) and of Commissioner for External Rela- to the fight against terrorism, including by
tions (held by Benita Ferrero-Waldner between ‘supporting third states in combating terrorism
2004 and early 2010) and symbolizes the disap- in their territories’. Finally, political and mili-
pearance of the pillar structure. tary solidarity among EU Member States is in
The Lisbon Treaty formally endorses the the Treaty via the inclusion of a mutual assist-
extension of the so-called ‘Petersberg Tasks’, ance clause (art.28A7/Article 42 (7) TEU), and
that now include ‘joint disarmament opera- a ‘solidarity clause’ (Title VII, art.188R1/Article
tions, humanitarian and rescue tasks, military 222 TFEU).

Year Event

1951 Signing of the Treaty of Paris establishing the European Coal and Steel Community

Failure of the European Defence Community

1954
Signing of the Modified Brussels Treaty formally creating the WEU

1957 Signing of the Treaties of Rome

1969 The Davignon Report introduces the idea of European Political Cooperation

1992 Signing of the Treaty on European Union (in force 1993)

1997 Signing of the Amsterdam Treaty (in force 1999)

1998 Franco-British Joint Declaration on European Defence (St. Malo)

1999 Cologne and Helsinki European Council Meetings lay the foundations for ESDP

2000 Santa Maria da Feira European Council

Adoption of the European Security Strategy

2003
Adoption of the Berlin-Plus Arrangements

2004 Headline Goal 2010/Civilian Headline Goal 2008 (updated in 2007 to CHG 2010)

2009 Entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty – ESDP becomes CSDP

HANDBOOK CSDP   13
2 European Security
Strategy

HANDBOOK CSDP   15
 2.1 Background and
Development of the ESS in 2003

Strategic Divisions arrive at a common policy. More often than

not, the EU has failed to achieve consensus on
When ESDP (now CSDP) was created in the how to respond to such crises, even when the
wake of the 1998 Franco-British meeting in St- instruments and means to do so were at hand.
Malo, there was strong agreement on the need A clear-cut strategy should be able to avoid
to tackle the military means, but there con- internal divides and ensure the EU’s participa-
sensus ended. Member States differed widely tion in international decision-making.
on the political-strategic dimension, a debate
which goes far beyond CSDP, beyond the CFSP
even, but which concerns the whole of EU 2003: A Favourable Context
external action, across the pillars. What should
be the scope of the EU’s foreign and security It seems as if the intra-European crisis over
policy ambitions? What degree of autonomy Iraq finally provided the stimulus that made a
should the EU have? And what then should breakthrough possible. On the one hand, the
be the precise role of the military instrument Member States supporting the invasion wanted
in EU external action? In order not to lose the to demonstrate that the EU does care about the
momentum, it was decided to push through security threats perceived by the US and that
with those elements on which an agreement the transatlantic alliance is viable still. Hence the
existed, i.e. the means and institutions of CSDP, similarity between the threat assessment in the
assuming that once these were in place the ESS and the 2002 US National Security Strategy
strategic debate would inevitably have to fol- (NSS), which must be seen as a political mes-
low. Accordingly, following the December 1999 sage to Washington, and the strong empha-
European Council in Helsinki, where the ‘Head- sis in the ESS on transatlantic partnership. On
line Goal’ was defined, the EU started building the other hand, the Member States opposing
military and civilian capabilities for crisis man- the invasion were equally eager to show that
agement, without possessing an overall strate- even though the threat assessment is to a large
gic framework for its external action. degree shared with the US – if not perhaps the
That is not to say that EU external action perception of the intensity of the threat – there
has been completely ad hoc. Over the years, are other options available to deal with these
a distinctive European approach to security threats. The context of mid-2003 partially also
has emerged, which can be characterised as favoured the adoption of the ESS: the success-
integrated, multidimensional or comprehen- ful conclusion of the European Convention and
sive. Yet the implicit assumptions on which the grand and – then still – promising undertak-
it was based needed to be substantiated and ing to draw up a Constitutional Treaty created
policy areas needed to be integrated in order a climate in which the preparation of a strategy
to arrive at a framework for maximally consist- seemed more feasible than before. The sum-
ent, coherent and effective external action. For mer of 2003 also witnessed the first EU military
when the EU is confronted with acute crises, operation without the use of NATO assets and
such as the one in Iraq in 2003, these implicit outside Europe: Operation Artemis in the DRC
assumptions have proved to be insufficient to (12 June – 1 September).

16   HANDBOOK CSDP

The Drafting Process

At the informal meeting of the General Affairs

and External Relations Council in Greece on

Council of the European Union

2 and 3 May 2003, High Representative Javier
Solana was thus – rather unexpectedly – tasked
with producing a draft strategic document. At
its meeting in Thessaloniki (19-20 June), the
European Council welcomed the document
submitted by Solana, A Secure Europe in a Bet-
ter World, and charged him with taking the work GS/HR Solana, the father of the ESS, with
forward with a view to completing a strategy by his successor, HR/VP Ashton
its next meeting. The EU then organised three
seminars, in Rome (19 September), Paris (6–7 and principles of policy. Based on an assess-
October) and Stockholm (20 October), bringing ment of past policies, it can safely be argued
together officials from the Member States, the e.g. that all Member States agree that in prin-
future Member States and the European insti- ciple the use of force is an instrument of last
tutions, as well as experts from the academic resort which requires a Security Council man-
world, NGOs and the media. This innovative date. As in 1999, the real issue at stake was still
process allowed the High Representative to col- the nature of the transatlantic partnership. If
lect comments and suggestions from a wide the US reverts to the use of force in a situation
variety of actors and observers, a number of in which the EU in principle would not do so, or
which found their way into the final European not yet, what then has priority for the EU: steer-
Security Strategy, which was duly adopted by ing an autonomous course, based on its own
the European Council meeting on 12 Decem- principles, or supporting its most important
ber 2003. At the same time, drafting by a select ally? Besides, it should not be forgotten that on
group of high-level collaborators of Solana, a number of foreign policy issues the EU had
rather than by committee and involving Mem- already unanimously taken positions contrary
ber States’ delegations, ensured a concise and to those of the US, e.g. on the ICC, on the Kyoto
very readable document. Protocol and on various trade issues.
The main reason why these partly contra- Naturally, the ESS is not perfect. It can only
dictory motivations led to results is that the build on consensus in areas where it existed.
EU was able to build on an extensive foreign On a number of issues it remains particularly
policy acquis. Many of the strategic choices vague because consensus was absent or not
contained in the ESS were already evident as yet strong enough. Many issues are mentioned
emerging strategic orientations in actual EU in the ESS, because not to do so would have
policies. Rather than adopting a fundamen- invoked strong criticism, but no more than
tally new orientation, to a large extent there- that: no real choices are made particularly
fore the ESS must be seen as the codification on the nature of the transatlantic partnership
of existing foreign policy guidelines. In other and the degree of autonomy of the EU as an
words, although the context of the Iraq crisis international actor. This divide remains a fun-
would suggest a deep division between Mem- damental obstacle to a fully cohesive and reso-
ber States, the ESS actually builds on a strong lute CFSP. Nevertheless, the ESS does contain
consensus on the basic orientations of EU for- a number of clear choices and thus has cer-
eign policy. Indeed, the real intra-European tainly strengthened the strategic framework
divide over Iraq did not concern the substance for EU foreign policy.

HANDBOOK CSDP   17
 2.2 Main Themes of the ESS and
Key Message for CSDP

Principles of EU Foreign Policy access to them all – and all are present, in dif-
fering degrees, in all threats and challenges.
From the ESS three main principles can be In the ESS: “none of the new threats is purely
deduced on which all EU external action is military, nor can any be tackled by purely mili-
based. tary means. Each requires a mixture of instru-
The first is prevention: “This implies that we ments”. Therefore every foreign policy must
should be ready to act before a crisis occurs. simultaneously address all dimensions, making
Conflict prevention and threat prevention can- use in an integrated way of all available instru-
not start too early”. A permanent strategy of ments: “Diplomatic efforts, development, trade
prevention and stabilisation, addressing the and environmental policies, should follow the
root causes of threats and challenges, aims same agenda”. This is perhaps the core phrase
to prevent conflict so that, ideally, coercion in the ESS: “The best protection for our security
and the use of force will not be necessary. is a world of well-governed democratic states.
Addressing the root causes means to close Spreading good governance, supporting social
the gap, both within and between countries, and political reform, dealing with corruption
between the haves and the have-nots in terms and abuse of power, establishing the rule of law
of access to the core public goods to which and protecting human rights are the best means
the EU feels everybody is entitled: security, of strengthening the international order”.
economic prosperity, political freedom and Such a holistic approach is best imple-
social well-being. For this gap generates feel- mented via multilateralism, the third princi-
ings of frustration and marginalisation on the ple: “We need to pursue our objectives both
part of those who are excluded economically through multilateral cooperation in interna-
or politically, radicalisation and extremism of tional organisations and through partnerships
various kinds, social and economic instability, with key actors”. Only in cooperation with oth-
massive migration flows, and tension and con- ers can our objectives be achieved peacefully,
flicts within and between States. Effective pre- only in cooperation with all global actors can
vention is an enormous challenge, for it means global challenges be successfully addressed,
addressing a much wider range of issues, at a and only in cooperation with a wide range of
much earlier stage, across the globe, because actors can complex issues be comprehensively
as the ESS says “the first line of defence will tackled. “The development of a stronger inter-
often be abroad”. national society, well functioning international
Closing the gap between haves and have- institutions and a rule-based international
nots of necessity demands a holistic approach, order is our objective”, declares the ESS under
the second principle, for the range of public the heading of “effective multilateralism”. Mul-
goods is comprehensive as such. The secu- tilateralism is “effective” to the extent that the
rity, economic, political and social dimensions ensemble of regimes, mechanisms and institu-
are inextricably related – an individual cannot tions manages to provide access to the core
enjoy any one core public good unless he has public goods to citizens worldwide.

18   HANDBOOK CSDP

Implications for CSDP egy, it is impossible to define what the success
of an operation means. A perfect example of a
The ESS constitutes an important strategic European priority is the operation against piracy
choice, but it mostly tells us how to do things – off the coast of Somalia, securing Europe’s lines
it is much vaguer on what to do, it is incomplete of communication with the world. Importantly,
in terms of objectives. Of course, a strategy the collective security system of the UN, and
must be translated into sub-strategies and poli- therefore of the EU as its main supporter and
cies for it to be put into action. With regard to with two permanent members on the Security
CSDP however, such a “sub-strategy” is miss- Council among its ranks, can only be legitimate
ing, hence there is a missing link between the if it addresses the threats to everyone’s security
ambition in the ESS – “to share in the respon- – too much selectivity undermines the system.
sibility for global security” – and the practice of The EU must therefore also shoulder its share
CSDP operations and capability development. of the responsibility by playing an active role in
As the 2008 Report on the Implementation of the the Security Council and by contributing capa-
European Security Strategy – Providing Security bilities to UN(-mandated) crisis management
in a Changing World states, “We need to priori- and peacekeeping operations.
tise our commitments, in line with resources”. Finally, the EU must decide what scale of
Three dimensions must be covered. effort to devote to these priorities. CSDP is
First of all, there is not even consensus about based on the 1999 Helsinki Headline Goal, i.e.
which tasks or types of operations the EU can 60,000 troops, but this has been overshadowed
undertake. Legally, the EU’s Petersberg tasks by the much more limited battle groups. The
include operations at the high end of the violence availability of the forces declared cannot be
spectrum, including combat operations, yet assessed, because Member States declare num-
politically the Member States are still extremely bers that in theory they are willing to deploy for
divided over the use of force under the EU flag. CSDP operation, but no pre-identified units, and
Secondly, priority regions and scenarios have often declared similar numbers to NATO
must be defined in relation to Europe’s vital as well. If all ongoing CSDP, NATO, UN and
interests: where and why should the EU deploy national operations in which EU Member States
troops and perhaps even go to war? Because participate are counted, Europe deploys more
of its proximity, “the neighbourhood” logically than 80,000 troops, but they obviously cannot
appears as a clear priority where the EU should mobilise 60,000 additional troops for expedi-
not only be active, but take the lead. It could be tionary operations. The combined armed forces
debated whether the “broader neighbourhood”, of the EU-27 total 2 million troops. There is no
including Central Asia and the Gulf, is a prior- vision about how many of those troops Europe
ity as well. Next to the neighbourhood, the ESS really needs.
singles out Iran as a priority. Other conflicts are These questions should be answered in a
mentioned in the ESS – Kashmir, the Great Lakes military or civil-military sub-strategy, or “white
Region, the Korean Peninsula – but whether the book,” specifically for CSDP. As Member States
EU should actively contribute to their resolution have but a single set of forces, the question is
is not clear at all. Sub-Saharan Africa has been not what the CSDP level of ambition is and what
an important area of focus for CSDP, though the is that of NATO; the question is what the EU, as
strategy behind it has not always been clear. the political expression of Europe and as a com-
For example, given that the EU twice intervened prehensive foreign policy actor, wants to con-
in the DRC at the request of the UN, in 2003 tribute as a global security provider, regardless
and 2006, why was the third request, in 2008, of whether a specific operation is undertaken
refused? This demonstrates that without a strat- under CSDP or NATO (or UN) command.

HANDBOOK CSDP   19
 The European Security Strategy – a summary overview

20   HANDBOOK CSDP

The Security Policy Implications
Strategic Objectives
Environment for Europe
Countering the threats
Global Challenges To be more active
The EU already actively tackles threats presented by terrorism, proliferation,
Poverty and bad governance is failed states, organised crime (most recently the proliferation of WMD). Development of a strategic culture that
often at the heart of the prob- With the new threats, the first line of defence will often be abroad. fosters early, rapid and, if necessary,
lem. There is a need to act before a crisis occurs – conflict and threat prevention robust intervention
Global warming! cannot start too early! Ability to sustain several operations
Competition for natural re­sour­ simultaneously.
ces! Energy dependence! Secu- None of the new threats can be tackled by military means alone. Eeach Preventive engagement can avoid more
rity is a precondition of devel- requires a mixture of instruments. serious problems in the future.
opment!

Building Security in our Neighbourhood To be more capable

Promotion of a ring of well-governed countries to the east of the EU and on More resources for defence and better
Key Threats use through pooled and shared assets,
the borders of the Mediterranean – close and co-operative relations.
Terrorism – willing to use avoid duplication. Stronger civilian
unlimited violence and cause The credibility of our foreign policy depends on consolidation of our achieve- resources and capabilities (combine
massive casualties – linkage to ments in the Western Balkans. resources of Member States and EU
violent religious fundamental- Institutions). EU-NATO arrangements!
Enlargement should not create new dividing lines in Europe but extend- Wider spectrum of missions including
ism. Europe is both target and ing the benefits of economic and political co-operation to our future neigh-
a base for such terrorists. inter alia disarmament operations.
bours in the East – stronger interest in the Southern Caucasus is necessary.
Resolution of Arab/Israeli conflict is a strategic priority. Continued engage-
Proliferation of WMD is the sin- ment with our Mediterranean partners through more effective economic,
gle most important threat to security and cultural co-operation in the framework of the Barcelona Process.
peace and security. The most And a broader engagement with the Arab world.
frightening scenario is one in To be more coherent
which terrorist groups acquire We are stronger when we act together!
WMD. Key: create synergy of EU’s and Mem-
International Order based on Effective Multilateralism ber States’ instruments!
Regional Conflicts threaten All our policies should follow the same
regional stability. Weakened or Our security/prosperity depends on an effective multilateral system. Stronger
international society, well-functioning international institutions and a rule- agenda (see Western Balkan!)
failed states in may parts of the
world – are often exploited by based international order is our objective.
criminal elements and are the The fundamental framework for international relations is the UN Charter.
basis for organised crime. Strengthening the United Nations is a European priority. We should be ready Working with Partners
to act when rules are broken. One of the core elements of the international
Taking these different ele- system is the transatlantic relationship – NATO is an expression of this rela- Key: International Co-operation!
ments together, we would be tionship. Transatlantic relationship is irreplace-
confronted with a very radical able! Closer relations with Russia/stra-
threat indeed. Strengthening global governance – regional organisations are signifi- tegic partnership! Develop strategic
cant! Trade and development policies can be powerful tools for promoting partnerships with Japan, China, Canada
reforms! and India!
2.3 Excursion:
ESS: An emerging system of
concepts and sub-strategies –
aN academic view

European Security Strategy: An emerging • strategies and programmes for safeguarding

system of concepts and sub-strategies internal security including the “solidarity clause”
which offers the option of using even military
Strategy defined as the art and science of develop- assets for internal purposes
ing, applying and coordinating all necessary instru- • counter-terrorism and combating radicalization
ments to deal with the relevant security challenges and recruitment strategies
must be based on a system of grand strategy and • CSDP concepts and processes like the civilian
complementing sub-strategies. Although the actual and military headline goal, the Battlegroup con-
system of “security strategies” of the European cept or the capability development plan.
Union is not equally precise on all aspects and does Most of the above-mentioned documents do not
not comprise all necessary sub-strategies 1 in a coor- directly deal with external countries but are aimed
dinated manner a comprehensive system of con- at coordinating internal policies between the EU
cepts, doctrines, policies and strategies is emerging. Member States.
The European Security Strategy is the corner-stone
document of strategic thinking and planning within
the EU. But the ESS in which the European Union Linkage of internal and external security
clarifies its security strategy which is aimed at achiev- policies
ing a secure Europe in a better world, identifying
the threats facing the Union, defining its strategic The main responsibility for internal security rests
objectives and setting out the political implications with the Member States. But with the “Solidarity
for Europe, is written on a rather abstract level. The clause” the EU has a complementary role in dealing
“Grand Strategic Chapeau” of the ESS must therefore with natural and technical disasters and terrorism.
be complemented by more specific sub-strategies. Internal and external security policies are inter-
The process of complementing the ESS is not a linked: an adequate “homeland security system”
strategic “top-down” project but more an evolving within the EU and within the Member States is a pre-
endeavour. Nevertheless it is possible to bring the condition for an active external security policy. And,
documents and “sub-strategies” in a logical and sys- vice versa, against the background of a globalised
tematic order (see diagram 1, next page). security landscape, the internal security of the EU can
The EU´s sub-strategies include amongst others: only be safeguarded through a preventive and com-
• regional and country specific strategies and poli- prehensive foreign and security policy which deals
cies with a special focus on the European Neigh- effectively with external risks. The predominately
bourhood, the Western Balkans and Africa transnational character of postmodern risks requires a
• horizontal strategies dealing with proliferation, more systematic linking of internal and external secu-
the nexus of security and development, security rity and an effect based employment of the necessary
implications of climate change or cyber security security instruments (see diagram 2, next page).

1 “Sub-strategy” is not an official term for a specific category of documents, but refers to those documents that deal with
certain security domains or elaborate on one aspect of the ESS.

HANDBOOK CSDP   21
 European Security Strategy
and important sub-strategies
• Solidarity Clause • Counter Terrorism Strategy
• The Hague Programme (10 priorities e.g.: • EU Plan of Action on Combating Terrorism
fight against terrorism, migration manage-
ment, borders and visas, privacy and • EU Terror Financing Prevention Guidelines
information security, organised crime) • Conceptual Framework on the ESDP-
• Strategy on the External Dimension of the Dimension of the fight against terrorism
Area of Freedom, Security and Justice • European Strategy for Combating Radica-
(Issues: human rights, fight against lisation and Recruitment to Terrorism
terrorism, OC, migration, good governance)
• European Border Control Agency
• European Programme for Critical
Infrastructure Protection

Security

• Non-Proliferation Strategy
• European Neighborhood Policy
• Security and Development
• Euro-Mediterranean Partnership
• Small Arms and Light Weapons
• Various Balkan Strategies and Policies
• Security Sector Reform
• EU Africa Strategy
• Central Asia Strategy • Climate Change and security

• Country specific strategies and policies • Cyber Security

• Battlegroup-Concept
Collective
• Headline Goal 2010 Defence

? ??
Grafik: Sandawi
/Frank 2010
??

Diagram 1

Linkage of internal and external Security

Domestic Level International Level Main Contributors
and Instruments
Homeland Security ambivalent External Security
Grafik: Sandawi 2006
ESS-Key Threats

International Terrorism

Proliferation of WMD

Regional Conflicts

State Failure

Organised Crime

Stabilization/
Reconstruction
Level Diffusion
Humanitarian Relief

Civil Protection/
Disaster Management
Additional Tasks

Conflict Prevention

Border Control

Migration Management
Military
Police

Economic

Diplomatic

CMCO ! Environment: Complex Emergencies/

Appreciating Complexity
Multi (civil/military)
- Player Game

Diagram 2

22   HANDBOOK CSDP

Culture of coordination ful assessment of the available sub-strategies would
be a helpful element in institutionalizing the strate-
The core policy challenge for the EU institutions gic debate within the EU. Such a process would also
and the Member States is the effective coordination make it possible to identify in which areas the ESS
of policies and instruments within a sound con- has not yet been translated into “sub-strategies” or
cept of civil military coordination (CMCO). Most policies.
of the tools which are necessary to deal with the One element in this discussion process might be
new security challenges – which require by nature the drafting of a “White Book on Defence” which
a comprehensive approach – are available within could comprise:
the European Union. But they belong to different • a common analysis of the strategic situation, risks
levels (Commission, Council Secretariat or Member and challenges
States). • a definition of the military level of ambition of
None of the objectives of the ESS can be achieved the EU derived from common defined European
without a coordinated approach and the contribu- security interests
tion of all relevant sectors of the EU. CSDP does • strategic guidelines for cooperation with partners
not only have an external crisis management func- • a definition of the possible role of the military in
tion but might be a helpful toolbox, capability and implementing the solidarity clause
knowledge provider for other security domains as • guidance for the harmonisation of national force
well. planning and capability development includ-
ing the “permanent structured cooperation” and
Drafting of a “White Book on Defence” “pooling and sharing” models
• guidance concerning the military implications of
Diagram 1 demonstrates that at least one central the “comprehensive approach”
sub-strategy is missing so far: a clear cut military • defining the dimension of the military in dealing
strategy. The development of a military strategy has with non-military threats and in implementing
been assessed as premature so far. But in the after- non-military sub-strategies
math of the Implementation Report (2008) a care- • cooperation with third countries and partners.

Elements of the
comprehensive security
domains within the EU
Overlapping Security Tasks Domestic Security
The Hague Programme (i.g. Area of Freedom,
Security and Justice Migration, Asylum)

Ext. Dimension of Domestic Security

Strategy on the External Dimension of the Area
of Freedom, Security and Justice (i.g. human rights,
Commission CSDP fight against terrorism, organized crime,)

Counter Terrorism
Counter Terrorism Strategy; Solidarity Clause
EU Plan of Action on Combating Terrorism
Framework Document on ESDP/Terrorism

Critical Infrastructure Protection

European Programme for CIP
EU CIP-Warning Information Network
Prev., Prep. and Conseq. Management of Terrorism
Security
Crisis Management
Civilian and Military Missions and Operations

nd
aw
i2
00
Civil Protection
Sa
fik
: Community Civil Protection Mechanism
Gra
(i.g. MIC, Common Emergency-CIS)

Capability Development
Civilian Headline Goal
Headline Goal
Humanitarian Capabilities of the Commission

Border Control
Main Focus European Agency for the Management of
Operational Cooperation at the External Borders
Broader Focus
Justice and Home of the Member States of the European Union
Affairs

HANDBOOK CSDP   23
3 CFSP/CSDP-related
aspects of the
Lisbon Treaty

HANDBOOK CSDP   25
 Council of the European Union 3.1 Novelties of CFSP/CSDP

Ceremony of the Signature of the Treaty of Lisbon: Lisbon, 13 December 2007

The Lisbon Treaty can be described as a of the Council and from the Diplomatic Serv-
milestone in the development of the “Common ices of EU Member States.
Foreign and Security Policy” (CFSP) and spe-
cifically of the “Common Security and Defence
Policy” (CSDP). In addition to the dual function The Foreign Affairs Council (FAC)
of the High Representative for CSFP, who is
at the same time Vice- President of the Com- The Foreign Affairs Council formulates pol-
mission, the main CFSP/CSDP-related aspects icy regarding the Union's external action on the
include: basis of strategic guidelines laid down by the
European Council and ensures that the Union's
action is consistent. The High Representative
The European External of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security
Action Service (EEAS) Policy, who chairs the Foreign Affairs Council,
contributes through her proposals towards the
The impact of EU foreign policy will be preparation of the Common Foreign and Secu-
enhanced by the creation of the European rity Policy and ensures implementation of the
External Action Service (EEAS), which will decisions adopted by the European Council
work for the High Representative. EEAS staff and the Council.
will come from the relevant departments of the The General Affairs Council (GAC) and the
European Commission & General Secretariat Foreign Affairs Council (FAC) are the only

26   HANDBOOK CSDP

Council formations which are laid down in
the Treaty of Lisbon. In fact, there is only one
Council of the European Union, which can meet
in 10 different formations. The Council forma-
tions can be extended or limited in numbers by
the Heads of State and Government.

The CSDP task catalogue

The CSDP task catalogue includes the

Petersberg tasks , namely humanitarian and

Council of the European Union

rescue tasks, peacekeeping tasks and crisis-
management tasks of combat forces , including
peacemaking. And additionally to the Peters-
berg tasks , the Treaty of Lisbon introduced the
joint disarmament operations, military advice
and assistance tasks, conflict prevention and
peace-keeping as well as post-conflict stabili- Aceh Monitoring Mission: 3rd Phase of Decom-
sation tasks. All these tasks should contribute missioning – Meulaboh, 15 November 2005
to the fight against terrorism, including by sup-
porting third countries in combating terrorism joining such a Permanent Structured Coop-
in their territories. eration are firstly the fulfilment of higher cri-
teria for military capabilities and secondly the
more binding commitments to one another in
The mutual assistance clause this area with a view to undertaking the most
demanding missions. In Protocol No 10 to
The mutual assistance clause follows the this Treaty, some more application criteria are
EU principle of solidarity. It guarantees the given:
EU Member States aid and assistance from all An EU Member State must
other partners in the event of armed aggres- (a) proceed more intensively to develop its
sion on the territory of a Member State. The defence capabilities through the development
assistance is not limited to civilian, military or of its national contributions and participation,
diplomatic efforts, but must be read as mean- where appropriate, in multinational forces, in
ing as comprehensive as is necessary (“by all the main European equipment programmes,
the means in their power”). Nevertheless, the and in the activity of the Agency in the field of
status of neutrals and of non-allied and NATO defence capabilities development, research,
partners will be respected. acquisition and armaments (European Defence
Agency), and
(b) have the capacity to supply by 2010 at the
Permanent Structured latest, either at national level or as a compo-
Cooperation nent of multinational force groups, targeted
combat units for the missions planned, struc-
Permanent Structured Cooperation should tured at a tactical level as a battle group, with
help Member States to build up closer links support elements including transport and
among each other. The preconditions for logistics, capable of carrying out the tasks

HANDBOOK CSDP   27
 Council of the European Union

EUFOR Tchad/RCA: Polish Patrol, March 2009

referred to in Article 43 of the Treaty on Euro- State. They will inform the Council immedi-
pean Union, within a period of five to 30 days, ately should the completion of the task entail
in particular in response to requests from the major consequences or require amendment
United Nations Organisation, and which can of the objective, scope and conditions set for
be sustained for an initial period of 30 days the task. The Council will then decide if further
and be extended to at least 120 days. steps are necessary.

Tasking of a group of Financing

Member States
The principles of financing CSFP/CSDP mis-
The Council may entrust the execution of a sions remains unchanged. The administrative
task, within the Union framework, to a group expenditure of the institutions arising from the
of Member States, which are willing and have implementation of the CSDP, both for civilian
the necessary capability for such a task, in missions and military operations, is charged to
order to protect the Union's values and serve the budget of the European Union. The same
its interests. Those Member States, in associa- applies, as a general rule, to operating expendi-
tion with the High Representative of the Union ture except for cases where the Council – acting
for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, agree unanimously – decides otherwise and for such
among themselves on the management of the expenditure arising from operations having mil-
task. Nevertheless, Member States participat- itary or defence implications. If expenditure is
ing in the task will keep the Council regularly not charged to the Union budget, it will be gen-
informed of its progress on their own ini- erally charged to the Member States in accord-
tiative or at the request of another Member ance with their gross national product (unless

28   HANDBOOK CSDP

 Council of the European Union
EUPOL Afghanistan: Police training, 18 June 2007

the Council unanimously decides otherwise). This clause relates to the prevention of ter-
The new aspect, which was introduced by rorist threats, the protection from any terrorist
the Treaty of Lisbon, is the creation of a so- attack and consequence management if such
called start-up fund. Preparatory activities for an attack occurs. Additionally, the solidarity
the tasks referred to in Article 42(1) and Arti- clause deals with events such as man-made or
cle 43 TEU which are not charged to the Union natural disasters. In all these above mentioned
budget will be financed by a start-up fund cases, the Union and its Member States will act
made up of Member States' contributions. The jointly in a spirit of solidarity. The Union shall
Council will then authorise the High Represent- mobilise all the instruments at its disposal,
ative to use the fund. The High Representative including the military resources made avail-
reports to the Council on the implementation able by the Member States.
of this remit.

Solidarity Clause
(not directly CSDP related)

The Solidarity Clause is not part of the CSDP

chapter of the Treaty on European Union, but
is laid down in Art. 222 of the Treaty on the
Functioning of the European Union. Although
there is no direct link with the CFSP/CSDP, the
same capabilities are addressed and it is there-
fore worth mentioning .

HANDBOOK CSDP   29
 3.2 Excursion:
Permanent Structured
Cooperation – an academic view

The Lisbon Treaty’s Main CSDP-related aspect: fulfil the criteria at the launching of PSCD: criteria
Permanent Structured Cooperation must be results-oriented, to be fulfilled by an agreed
deadline. Secondly, criteria that are unrealistic,
The Objective: More Deployed, More Quickly e.g. spending 2 % of GDP on defence, should be
avoided. Thirdly, PSCD must not just focus on the
The Protocol on Permanent Structured Coopera- input, i.e. the level and manner of spending, but on
tion on defence (PSCD) (Art. 1) sets out two objec- the desired output, i.e. on specific deployable capa-
tives, one of which, i.e. to supply or contribute to bilities. PSCD is a way of achieving the HG2010 in
a battle group, has already been achieved by most a reasonable timeframe – that is the desired output.
Member States. This leaves a single major objec- The following criteria can be envisaged – to be
tive: to proceed more intensively to develop defence seen as one set, to be pursued simultaneously:
capacities, which must of course be available and • Criterion 1: The overall objective of PSCD is that
deployable, as Art. 2 (c) says. The main problem pMS increase their current declared level of ambi-
of Europe’s armed forces is fragmentation: limited tion in terms of deployability and sustainability
defence budgets spent on a plethora of small-scale by an agreed % by an agreed deadline, e.g. by
capabilities result in disproportionately high spend- 25 % in 5 years and by 50 % in 10 years. Thus, if
ing on “overheads” (and useless intra-European PSCoop is launched in 2010, a pMS which now
duplications) and, consequently, less spending on has the ambition to always have 1000 troops in
deployable capabilities and actual operations. To the field should aim to continually field 1250 by
overcome this low cost-effectiveness, multinational 2015, and 1500 by 2020.
cooperation is a must. Hence PSCD must be inclu- • Criterion 2: pMS should harmonise their defence
sive: the more pMS, the more synergies and effects spending. At the very least, pMS spending less
of scale can be created. Thus, the challenge is to rec- than the EU average (at present 1,63 % of GDP)
oncile inclusiveness and ambition, i.e. to translate should commit not to further decrease their
the Protocol into quantitative criteria that allow all defence budget, neither in real terms nor in % of
MS to participate but that do entail a real commit- GDP.
ment. • Criterion 3: pMS will contribute as a ratio of
their GDP to the EDA-initiated projects aimed at
addressing the shortfalls identified by the CDM.
Criteria for Participation: Realistic but Real • Criterion 4: In the longer term, e.g. 10 years, pMS
strive to reach the EU average in terms of defence
Criteria for participation must be realistic, i.e. spending per military: € 111.198.–
they must be within reach of the majority of MS, The aim of PSCD is not to punish or exclude MS.
and must stimulate pMS to tackle the obstacles to Maximum effect requires encouraging all MS to
deployability and sustainability, notably by address- generate more deployable capabilities, by allowing
ing the capability shortfalls identified by the Capa- as many as possible to participate at their own level
bility Development Mechanism (CDM). This has of means, hence this proposal for realistic but real
3 implications. Firstly, pMS cannot be expected to criteria.

30   HANDBOOK CSDP

PSCD as a Permanent Capability Generation Generation Conference, it will be able to identify
Conference opportunities for cooperation.
Multinational cooperation does not imply that
In order to make sure that pMS, when making all pMS in PSCD cooperate in all capability areas.
policy on the basis of the criteria above, focus on the Rather a set of overlapping clusters will emerge, with
capabilities that at European level have been com- e.g. pMS 1, 2 and 3 cooperating in area X and pMS
monly identified as vital, inspiration can be found 2, 3, 4 and 5 cooperating in area Y. This coopera-
in the method used to launch CSDP operations: tion can take various forms, from joint procurement
a Force Generation Conference. Within PSCD or development projects but with the aim of after-
the EDA can organise a “Capability Generation wards equipping national formations, to pooling,
Conference” aimed at remedying each commonly i.e. the creation of permanent multinational forma-
identified shortfall within a reasonable timeframe. tions. The beauty of PSCD is its flexibility.
This implies that pMS are willing: to revisit their The model for pooling can be provided by EATC:
national defence planning, without any taboos; to deployable national assets, in this case transport air-
do away with national capability initiatives proven craft, remain clearly identifiable and manned by
to be redundant; to pool assets and capabilities in national personnel, but are co-located on one base,
order to generate savings; to contribute to the pro- where all support functions are multinationalised, as
grammes launched to fill the shortfalls in terms of are the command and control arrangements. Thus
GDP, as per criterion 3; and to actively contribute pooling can still offer great flexibility: each pMS has
to negotiations for as long as it takes to achieve suc- to guarantee that its personnel in the support and
cess. This would indeed result in a permanent con- command and control structures will be available
ference – but also in a permanently relevant EDA. whenever a pMS deploys its aircraft – but no pMS
is obliged to deploy its own actual aircraft each and
every time another pMS deploys its aircraft for a
“End-to-End” Multinational Cooperation: specific operation. The same model can be applied
Pooling to fighter wings or army divisions. Obviously, pool-
ing is easier when pMS use the same equipment,
The reality is that many MS will not be able to hence smaller pMS especially will inevitably take
meet the criteria and contribute significant capabili- into account whom they want to cooperate with as
ties if they maintain the same range of nationally a major factor in procurement decisions. For pool-
organised capabilities that they possess today. There- ing to increase cost-effectiveness, national structures
fore, identifying the opportunities for multinational and bases must naturally be cut.
cooperation is essential, in order to allow pMS to
maintain relevant capabilities in a cost-effective
way. The EDA will have a bird’s eye view: based on
the information which in the context of the CDP
pMS already provide (and must continually update)
about their plans and programmes, and in combi-
nation with the progressive results of the Capability

HANDBOOK CSDP   31
4 EXTERNAL ACTION OF
THE EUROPEAN UNION

HANDBOOK CSDP   33
 4.1 EUROPEAN COUNCIL AND ITS
PRESIDENT

The European Council was created in 1974

with the intention of establishing an informal
forum for discussion between Heads of State
or Government. It rapidly developed into the
body which fixed goals for the Union and set
the course for achieving them, in all fields of EU

European Commission
activity. It acquired a formal status in the 1992
Treaty of Maastricht, which defined its function
as providing the impetus and general political
guidelines for the Union's development.
With the entry into force of the Treaty of The President of the European Council:
Lisbon on 1 December 2009, it has become Herman Van Rompuy
an institution. Its President is Herman Van
Rompuy.
The European Council defines the general Except where the Treaties provide otherwise,
political direction and priorities of the European decisions of the European Council are taken by
Union. It provides the Union with the necessary consensus. In some cases, it adopts decisions
impetus for its development and defines its by unanimity or by qualified majority, depend-
general political directions and priorities. ing on what the Treaty provides for.
The European Council does not exercise leg- The European Council elects its President
islative functions. by a qualified majority. The President's term of
The European Council consists of the Heads office is two and a half years, renewable once.
of State or Government of the Member States, The European Council usually meets in Brus-
together with its President and the President of sels, in the Justus Lipsius building. It is assisted
the Commission. by the General Secretariat of the Council.
The High Representative of the Union for
Foreign Affairs and Security Policy takes part
in its work.
When the agenda so requires, the members
of the European Council may decide each to be
assisted by a minister and, in the case of the
President of the Commission, by a member of
the Commission.
The European Council meets twice every
six months and is convened by its President.
When the situation so requires, the President
will convene a special meeting of the European
Council.

34   HANDBOOK CSDP

The Council building “Justus Lipsius”

Council of the European Union

Meeting Room in the Justus Lipsius building

HANDBOOK CSDP   35
 4.2 HIGH REPRESENTATIVE of the
union FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND
SECURITY POLICY

At the informal meeting in Brussels on 19

November, ahead of the entry into force of the
Treaty of Lisbon on 1 December, EU Heads of
State or Government agreed on the appoint-
ment of Ms Catherine Ashton as the High

European Commission
Representative (HR) of the Union for Foreign
Affairs and Security Policy.

Duties of the HR The High Representative of the Union for

Foreign Affairs and Security Policy:
The HR exercises, in foreign affairs, the func- Catherine Ashton
tions which, have hitherto been performed by
the six-monthly rotating Presidency, the High
Representative for CFSP and the Commis- the Common Foreign and Security Policy,
sioner for External Relations. conduct political dialogue with third par-
In accordance with Articles 18 and 27 of the ties on the Union's behalf and expresses the
Treaty on the European Union, the High Repre- Union's position in international organisa-
sentative: tions and at international conferences.
• conducts the Union's Common Foreign and • exercises authority over the European Exter-
Security Policy (CFSP); nal Action Service (EEAS) and over the
• contributes by her proposals to the develop- Union delegations in third countries and at
ment of that policy, which she will carry out international organisations.
as mandated by the Council, and ensures
implementation of the decisions adopted in
this field; Supporting arrangements
• presides over the Foreign Affairs Council;
• is one of the Vice-Presidents of the Com- In fulfilling her mandate, the HR is assisted
mission. She ensures the consistency of the by a European External Action Service (EEAS).
Union's external action. She is responsible She also benefits from support from the Coun-
within the Commission for responsibilities cil and Commission services as appropriate.
incumbent on it in external relations and for
coordinating other aspects of the Union's
external action.
• represents the Union in matters relating to

36   HANDBOOK CSDP

4.3 European External Action
Service

General Organisational aspects

Article 27(3) TEU constitutes the legal basis The EEAS should have an organisational
for the Council decision on the organisation status reflecting and supporting its unique
and functioning of the EEAS. “In fulfilling his role and functions in the EU system. The EEAS
mandate, the HR shall be assisted by a EEAS. should be a service sui generis separate from
This service shall work in cooperation with the the Commission and the Council Secretariat. It
diplomatic services of the Member States and should have autonomy in terms of administra-
shall comprise officials from relevant depart- tive budget and management of staff.
ments of the General Secretariat of the Coun- EEAS staff will be appointed by the HR and
cil and of the Commission as well as staff sec- drawn from three sources: relevant depart-
onded from national diplomatic services of the ments of the General Secretariat of the Coun-
Member States …” cil, of the Commission and of national diplo-
matic services of the Member States.
A balanced representation between the dif-
Tasks of the EEAS ferent categories must be ensured. When the
EEAS has reached its full capacity, staff from
The EEAS will help the HR to ensure the con- Member States should represent at least one
sistency and coordination of the Union's exter- third of EEAS staff (AD level), including diplo-
nal action and prepare policy proposals and matic staff in delegations. In addition, some
implement them after their approval by Coun- supporting staff should also come from Mem-
cil. It will also assist the President of the Euro- ber States. Staff from Member States should
pean Council and the President as well as the be present in the EEAS from the outset, includ-
Members of the Commission in their respec- ing in senior positions in Brussels and EU del-
tive functions in the area of external relations egations.
and will ensure close cooperation with the The Commission's delegations will become
Member States. Union delegations under the authority of the
The EEAS should be composed of single HR and will be part of the EEAS structure. They
geographical (covering all regions and coun- will work in close cooperation with diplomatic
tries) and thematic desks, which will continue services of the Member States. They should
to perform under the authority of the HR the play a supporting role as regards diplomatic
tasks currently executed by the relevant parts and consular protection of Union citizens in
of the Commission and the Council Secretar- third countries.
iat. Trade and development policy as defined In order to enable the High Representative
by the Treaty should remain the responsibility to conduct the European Security and Defence
of the relevant Commissioners. Policy (ESDP), the Crisis Management and Plan-
ning Directorate (CMPD), the Civilian Planning
and Conduct Capability (CPCC) and the Military
Staff (EUMS) should be part of the EEAS while

HANDBOOK CSDP   37
 taking full account of the specificities of these sion on the organisation and functioning of
structures and preserving their particular func- the EEAS. The HR should submit his/her pro-
tions, procedures and staffing conditions. The posal with a view to it being adopted at the
Situation Centre (SitCen) should be part of the latest by the end of April 2010.
EEAS, while putting in place the necessary • A second stage for setting up the EEAS, from
arrangements to continue to provide other rel- the adoption of the Council Decision to full
evant services to the European Council, Coun- cruising speed. A first status report should
cil and the Commission. be made in 2012.
Effective consultation procedures should • When the EEAS has been functioning for
be established between the EEAS and the some time at full speed, there should be a
services of the Commission with external review of the functioning and organisation
responsibilities, including those in charge of the EEAS followed, if necessary, by a
of internal policies with significant external revision of the decision. This review should
dimensions. also cover the scope of the EEAS, including
The EU Special Representatives (EUSR) or delegations' role in consular affairs. Such a
their tasks should be integrated into the EEAS. review should take place in 2014.
The High Representative should regularly
consult the European Parliament on the main
Sources for more and
aspects and the basic choices of the CFSP/
updated information
CSDP. Close contacts with the European Parlia-
ment will take place at working level. The EEAS For more information and updated infor-

should therefore contain functions responsible mation you can consult two different

for relations with the European Parliament. homepages:

There will be several stages before the shape European Council/President:

of the EEAS is finalised. The Council will be http://www.european-council.europa.eu/

fully involved throughout the whole process. the-president.aspx

• A first stage from the entry into force of the European External Action Service:

Treaty to the adoption of the Council Deci- http://eeas.europa.eu/

4.4 OVERVIEW OF THE MAIN

COUNCIL BODIES

CSDP structures are under the authority of The Permanent Representatives Committee
the European Council and the Foreign Affairs (COREPER) and the Political and Security Com-
Council. They differ from structures support- mittee prepare the work of the Council, with
ing other European policies because of the COREPER preparing the work of the Council as
requirement for unanimity of decision-making a whole and the PSC dealing with political and
at all levels. security issues.

38   HANDBOOK CSDP

 structures in the field of CFSP/CSDP

European Council

r
ai Foreign Affairs Council
Ch

Committee of Permanent Representatives

(COREPER)

High Representative of the Union for

Foreign Affairs and Security Policy Political and Security Committee
and Vice-President of the European (PSC)
Commission (HR/VP)

European Relevant Relevant

External services services CIVCOM PMG EUMC
Action Service EU Military
in the of the
(EEAS) Committee for Committee
Commis- Council
sion Secretariat Civilian
when established Aspects of Politico- EUMCWG
includes i.a.: Crisis Military (Working
CMPD, CPCC policy-making body Management Group Group)
EUMS and SITCEN supporting/advisory body

The Political and Security Committee (PSC) gives its opinion to the PSC on civilian aspects
is the linchpin of CFSP and CSDP. It meets at of crisis management.
the ambassadorial level as a preparatory body The Politico-Military Group (PMG) is respon-
for the Council of the EU. Its main functions are sible for the politico-military aspects of the
keeping track of the international situation, and CSDP. Similar to the CIVCOM, it formulates
helping to define policies within the Common recommendations and advice for the PSC on
Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP including the politico-military aspects of crisis manage-
CSDP. It prepares a consistent EU response to ment.
a crisis and exercises its “political control and Another group, not mentioned in the dia-
strategic direction” in times of crisis. gram, is the Working Group of Foreign Rela-
The European Military Committee (EUMC) tions Counsellors (Relex Group). This group
is the highest military body set up within the deals with all horizontal aspects in particular
Council. It is composed of the Chief of Defence the institutional, legal and budgetary issues.
of the Member States, who are regularly rep- It prepares e.g. the Council Joint Actions
resented by their permanent Military Repre- required for the launching of the EU's crisis
sentatives. The EUMC provides the PSC with management missions and operations. It also
advice and recommendations on all military monitors the ATHENA mechanism (funding of
matters within the EU. The EUMC is supported military operations).
by the EU Military Staff.
In parallel with the EUMC, the PSC is advised
by the Committee for Civilian Aspects of Cri-
sis Management (CIVCOM). This committee
provides information, recommendations, and

HANDBOOK CSDP   39
 4.5 ROLE OF THE
EUROPEAN COMMISSION

The Commission is fully associated with

CFSP and it has the right to put forward initia-
tives on any question relating to CFSP. It par-

Council of the European Union

ticipates in decision-shaping, including at the
Political and Security Committee which is the
linchpin of CFSP. And it is always present in
political dialogue meetings with third coun-
tries.
Crisis management lies at the heart of the
CFSP. The Common Security and Defence Pol- The European Commission building
icy which is an integral part of CFSP, was given “Berlaymont”
a range of crisis management functions (known
as the “Petersberg tasks”) under the Amster- in the context of the European Initiative on
dam Treaty. They include inter alia humani- Democracy and Human Rights, and electoral
tarian and rescue operations, peace-keeping, assistance, observation and monitoring.
and combat operations in crisis management, The Commission's important role is to man-
including peace-making. Some of these are age the CFSP budget line. The Community
clearly military, and here the Commission has budget cannot be used to finance EU military
no role, except to ensure that civilian activities operations. But the money earmarked for
which follow on a military crisis operation pro- CFSP within the Community budget is allo-
ceed smoothly and coherently. cated inter alia to the financing of civilian crisis
At the Feira European Council in 2000, a management missions and it can thus provide
number of civilian crisis management tasks indirectly useful support to these operations.
were also attributed to ESDP. Since then, there This is possible in particular under the budget
is often no clear distinction between purely mechanism of the Instrument for Stability,
civilian ESDP “crisis management” operations used especially to provide support for CSDP
and activities which the Commission has been missions and operations.
carrying out, in some cases for years, as part of We have learned the lesson that military
development policy or humanitarian aid. This means do not suffice to get a society on its
is the case, for e.g., operations to reinforce the feet again. A long-term political solution for
rule of law such as those the Council has car- a region in crisis needs a long-term politi-
ried out in Georgia. cal, financial and administrative commitment
Furthermore, a whole range of topics which which normally has wider implications for the
come up in CFSP directly affect Community EU’s future relationships. In these situations,
policies. These include terrorism, sanctions the Commission can make a huge contribution
policy, human rights and democracy. The Com- to a successful CFSP and CSDP. Moreover, the
mission has specific tasks in all these areas, lion’s share of the civilian work after a conflict
and in some it has its own instruments – includ- – and during it – will often be done by the Com-
ing a whole range of micro and mini-projects munity.

40   HANDBOOK CSDP

4.6 ROLE OF THE
EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT

General

The European Parliament developed a strong

consensus in support of the European Secu-
rity and Defence Policy (as an integral part of

European Parliament
the Common Foreign and Security Policy)
during the 6 th legislative term (2004 to 2009).
This consensus can be seen in the adoption
of several Resolutions on CFSP and in Resolu-
tions approving specific ESDP Operations (incl. The European Parliament
EUFOR Althea, EUFOR RD Congo, and EUFOR
Chad). Already at the start of the 7th legisla-
tive term (2009 to 2014), the European Parlia- The role of the European
ment has shown its determination to use its Parliament in the area of CFSP/
new Lisbon Treaty powers to assert its parlia- CSDP – Policy-shaping not policy-
mentary prerogative over the development of making
both CFSP and the new Common Security and
Defence Policy 1. This is particularly evident in The formal role of the European Parliament
the role of the European Parliament in holding in relation to the Common Foreign and Secu-
a hearing for the Vice-President, who is also rity Policy (and, as an integral part of that pol-
the High Representative for Foreign Affairs icy, the Common Security and Defence Policy)
and Security Policy (VP/HR) and in giving its stems from its two main roles as stipulated in
approval of the VP/HR in a vote on the whole of the Treaties i.e. that of political scrutiny and
the Commission. Furthermore, the European budgetary authority.
Parliament is preparing its consultation with From the moment the European Parliament
the VP/HR (through the adoption of a Resolu- endorsed the High Representative as Vice Pres-
tion) on the European External Action Serv- ident of the Commission, the development of
ice as well as having to agree jointly with the a close working relationship between the HR/
Council amendments to legislation (on staffing VP and the European Parliament has become
and financing) and the Union's budget in order the focus of attention. Initially this centred on
for the EEAS to become operational. the setting up of the EEAS, which was estab-
lished by a European Council Decision follow-
ing consultation with the EP and the consent of

1 This is clearly stated in the recent adoption of the report by the Chair of AFET, Mr Albertini, “on the Annual
report from the Council to the European Parliament on the main aspects and basic choices of the Common
Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) in 2008, presented to the European Parliament in application of Part II,
Section G, paragraph 43 of the Interinstitutional Agreement of 17 May 2006 (2009/2057(INI))”. See also the
Report by the Chair of SEDE, Mr Danjean on “the Implementation of the European Security Strategy and the
CSDP (2009/2198(INI))”.

HANDBOOK CSDP   41
 spelt out as one of informing, consulting and
of ensuring the views of the EP are duly taken
into consideration.

Reinforcing Parliament's
prerogative: the power
of the purse

Although these consultative rights do not

European Commission
give the EP a decision-making role in the CFSP/
CSDP, they are supplemented by the European
Parliament role as a budgetary authority. Under
the Nice Treaty the (rotating) EU Presidency
Plenum of the European Parliament in Strasbourg took the lead on CFSP/ESDP and was respon-
sible for consulting the European Parliament.
As the number of civilian ESDP missions grew
the Commission (Article 27.3). The VP/HR has (military missions are funded by MS outside
a central role (reaching across the EU institu- the EU budget) from 2004 this made a greater
tions and to the Member States) in ensuring demand on the Union's CFSP budget (grow-
the consistent and effective formulation of EU ing from approx. 35 million euros prior to 2004
Foreign, Security and Defence Policy. In this to approx 280 million in 2010). The Presidency
respect the Lisbon Treaty tasks the HR/VP to therefore had to approach the European Par-
work with the European Parliament (Article 36 liament as a budgetary authority and regularly
of the Lisbon Treaty), whereby: request increases in the CFSP budget. As part of

“
The High Representative of the Union the negotiations on the macro financial budget
for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (i.e. the budget for all Community policy areas)
shall regularly consult the European an “Inter-Institutional Agreement (IIA) between
Parliament on the main aspects and the European Parliament, the Council and the
basic choices of the common foreign Commission on budgetary discipline and sound
and security policy and the common financial management” was adopted on 17
security and defence policy and inform may 2006. This agreement specified that for
it of how those policies evolve. She the CFSP budget (predominantly used for con-
shall ensure that the views of the Euro- tributing to civilian ESDP missions) the Presi-
pean Parliament are duly taken into dency represented by the Chair of the Political
consideration.....The European Parlia- and Security Committee should consult the EP
ment may ask questions of the Council (Foreign Affairs and Budget Committees) at
or make recommendations to it and to least five times a year in order to prepare for
the High Representative. Twice a year the adoption of the annual CFSP budget. These
it shall hold a debate on progress in “Joint Consultation Meetings” have been an
implementing the common foreign and important forum for the EP to discuss AFET
security policy, including the common and SEDE's views on ESDP missions along-
security policy.” side the Budget Committees oversight of CFSP
Therefore the VP/HR Catherine Ashton is the spending. The meetings symbolise the com-
new linchpin of EU external action and impor- ing together of Parliament's consultation/scru-
tantly her role in relation to the EP is clearly tiny role and budgetary authority in the area of

42   HANDBOOK CSDP

CFSP. With the adoption of the Lisbon Treaty ties (some Members of the Parliament even
and specifically the replacement of the rotating have voting rights in national political parties).
Presidency by the VP/HR for Foreign Affairs and This is important in bridging what is referred
Security Policy, this IIA will need to be amended to as the double democratic deficit, whereby
to reflect the new role of the VP/HR in relation to the EP has weak decision-making powers but
the European Parliament. very good insight (and increasingly a policy-
In addition, in order to ensure more flexible shaping role) on CSDP but where national
use of the CFSP budget the Lisbon Treaty (Arti- Parliaments have stronger formal powers but
cle 41.3 TEU) includes the provision for a deci- struggle to understand the complexities of EU
sion establishing the specific procedures for decision making on CFSP (and CSDP). Working
guaranteeing rapid access to appropriations in together the European Parliament and national
the Union budget for urgent financing of initia- Parliaments can play an important role in giv-
tives in the area of CFSP. The Article states that ing CSDP democratic legitimacy.
this Decision will be taken “after consulting the
European Parliament”.
Conclusion

Strengthening the The innovations in the Lisbon Treaty provide

parliamentary legitimacy of an opportunity to improve political consist-
CFSP/CSDP: cooperation with ency in the EU's external representation and
national Parliaments action. The key role of the VP/HR, supported
by the EEAS, is central in achieving the objec-
Another important innovation in the Lisbon tives of the Union. The political framework for
Treaty can be found in the role of National Par- consultation and dialogue with the European
liaments and in particular in Protocol Number Parliament continue to improve enabling it to
1 (in particular Articles 9 and 10) of the Treaty play a full role in the development of CFSP/
which specifies that: CSDP. As a partner in the development of the

“
The European Parliament and national Union's external relations, the Lisbon Treaty
Parliaments shall determine the organi- enables the European Parliament to play its
sation and promotion of effective and role in helping to address the challenge clearly
regular interparliamentary cooperation set out in the 2008 Report on the Implementa-
within the Union.” This could include tion of the European Security Strategy which
“... the exchange of information and states that:

“
best practice between national Parlia- Maintaining public support for our glo-
ments and the European Parliament, bal engagement is fundamental. In
including their special committees ... modern democracies, where media and
interparliamentary conferences on spe- public opinion are crucial to shaping
cific topics, in particular to debate mat- policy, popular commitment is essential
ters of the common foreign and secu- to sustaining our commitments abroad.
rity policy, including common security We deploy police, judicial experts and
and defence policy.” soldiers in unstable zones around the
The EP already invites national Parliaments world. There is an onus on govern-
for an annual exchange on the CFSP (includ- ments, parliaments and EU institutions
ing ESDP). Significanthy, through the political to communicate how this contributes to
groups, it also reaches national delegations security at home.”
and their Parliaments and Parliamentary Par-

HANDBOOK CSDP   43
5 SUPPORTING
STRUCTURES

HANDBOOK CSDP   45
 5.1 INTERNAL CRISIS MANAGEMENT
STRUCTURES

From the start of CSDP, the EU quickly devel- Crisis Management and
oped its crisis management structures to Planning Directorate (CMPD)
present its ability to deploy civilian and mili-
tary crisis management instruments as its spe- The Crisis Management and Planning Direc-
cific strength. The relevant internal services torate (CMPD) was created in November 2009
supporting the crisis management include in merging the former directorates dealing with
particular the Crisis Management and Planning defence issues and civilian aspects of crisis
Directorate, the Situation Centre, the Civil- management and the civ-mil cell of the EU
ian Planning and Conduct Capability and the Military Staff. The directorate is headed by a
Military Staff. The EU is a 'living organisation' Deputy Director-General.
and CSDP a process developed step by step. The CMPD is responsible for the politico-stra-
The EU's crisis management structures mirror tegic level planning of CSDP civilian and mili-
this process and will therefore further evolve tary missions, and also for supporting the vari-
in the future. The structures presented in this ous aspects of CSDP development. It represents
chapter are currently part of the General Sec- an integrated capability, seeking to develop and
retariat of the Council and will be transferred exploit the synergies between the civilian and
to the External Action Service when it is fully military elements of CSDP as part of the com-
established. prehensive approach to crisis management.

46   HANDBOOK CSDP

 The planning function covers the strategic works linking the foreign affairs, defence,
planning of missions from the advanced and intelligence and security communities of the
contingency stage through to the production Member States and the Institutions.
of the crisis management concept, and also the On the basis of open source and classified
subsequent strategic oversight of missions as information coming from Member States and
appropriate. This is undertaken by integrated the European institutions, SITCEN monitors
planning teams composed of civilian and mili- and assesses international events 24 hours a
tary planners, and including judicial, police, day, 7 days a week. The focus lies on sensitive
rule of law, gender and human rights experts. geographical areas, terrorism and the prolif-
The CSDP development function covers eration of weapons of mass destruction. The
a wide range of areas and is spread across 2 information and evaluations provided by EU
units. It includes both military and civilian SITCEN are of a civilian and military nature,
aspects of capabilities, partnerships with other covering all aspects of EU crisis management.
crisis management actors, including NATO, The SITCEN is also the EU focal point for Sit-
UN, AU and 3 rd
States, and finally exercises, uation Centres/Crisis Cells in Members States
training, concepts, lessons learned. CMPD also and in international organisations (UN, OSCE,
provides support to Council bodies on CSDP- NATO etc.), as well as in relevant third coun-
related issues. tries.
The CMPD is currently part of the General The SITCEN acquired its analysis and assess-
Secretariat of the Council and will be trans- ment functions in 2002. It has three units: the
ferred to the European External Action Service Operations Unit, the Analysis Unit and the
(EEAS) when it is established. Consular Unit.
The EU's SITCEN is currently part of the
General Secretariat of the Council and will be
EU Situation Centre (EU SITCEN) transferred to the European External Action
Service (EEAS) when it is established.
The EU needs timely intelligence to make wise
policy decisions in order to maintain “a secure
Europe in a better world” (ESS). The EU Situation Civilian Planning and
Centre (EU SITCEN) is providing early warning, Conduct Capability (CPCC) 
situational awareness and intelligence analysis
to assist policy development in the areas of the Established in August 2007, the Civilian
Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), the Planning and Conduct Capability (CPCC) has a
Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) mandate
and Counter Terrorism. • to plan and conduct civilian CSDP missions
The SITCEN contributes to the work of the under the political control and strategic
General Secretariat by: direction of the Political and Security Com-
• providing all-source assessment on CFSP mittee;
issues and assessment of the terrorist threat • to provide assistance and advice in particu-
to the Union and its Member States; lar to the High Representative of the Union
• providing 24/7 support for the day-to-day for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy,
conduct of CSDP crisis management opera- • to direct, coordinate, advise, support, super-
tions; vise and review civilian CSDP missions in
• providing support for the functioning of the the areas of police, border assistance man-
EU-Crisis Coordination Arrangements; agement, rule of law and security-sector
• operating the secure communications net- reform.

HANDBOOK CSDP   47
 CPCC is located in Brussels and currently part European Union Military
of the General Secretariat of the Council. It will Staff (EUMS)
be transferred to the European External Action
Service when it is established. As a result of the Nice Treaty which decided
It currently has a total staff of about 60, com- to establish permanent political and military
bining officials and seconded national experts structures, the European Union Military Staff
(largely senior police officers as well as rule (EUMS) was created to provide ‘military exper-
of law, procurement, logistics and finance tise and support to the CSDP, including the
experts). conduct of EU-led military crisis management
CPCC works in close cooperation with the operations.
European Commission. The EUMS operational mission is to perform
The CPCC Director, as EU Civilian Operations early warning and situation assessment and to
Commander, exercises command and control at participate in strategic planning for missions
strategic level for the planning and conduct of and tasks referred to in Article 17(2) of the
all civilian crisis management operations, under EU, including those identified in the European
the political control and strategic direction of the Security Strategy.
Political and Security Committee and the overall The role and tasks of the EUMS have some
authority of the High Representative. unique characteristics. On one hand, the EUMS
CPCC's main deliverable is a unified and clear is an integral part of the EU crisis management
chain of command for civilian CSDP missions. structures and directly attached to the HR, pro-
Some 3,000 men and women are currently serv- viding in-house military expertise. On the other
ing in three continents under the civilian CSDP. hand, it operates under the military direction of
CPCC is responsible for their well-being and pro- the EU Military Committee, to which it assists
tection on a 24/7 basis and supports them in the and reports. While this arrangement could be
day-to-day conduct of the missions. This support viewed as complex, it provides a critical link
ranges from administration and finance to the between the Armed Forces of the Member
processing of mission-related planning docu- States and the Council.
ments and regular reports through the Council The EUMS also works in close cooperation
preparatory bodies. with other EU crisis management bodies, nota-

48   HANDBOOK CSDP

bly the CMPD, SITCEN and CPCC. The EUMS ligence and also provides intelligence support
will be part of the European External Action for crisis response planning and assessments
Service (EEAS) as soon as it is established. for operations and exercises.
The EUMS's structure and organization The Operations Directorate plans EU-led
is fully multinational and comprises around military crisis management operations, assists
200 military personnel seconded by Member in strategic advance and crisis response plan-
States and acting in an international capacity, ning, including early military planning in sup-
as well as civil servants and it is headed by a port of informed decision-making. It monitors
Director General, a 3-star flag officer. all CSDP military operations and is responsible
The Concepts and Capabilities Directorate for generating the capacity to plan and run an
consists of 3 branches (Concepts, Force Capa- autonomous operation. Within Ops Directo-
bility, and Exercises/Training/Analysis) and rate there are 3 branches: Crisis Response/
is responsible for EUMS concepts, doctrine, Current Operations, Military Assessment and
capability development, including crisis man- Planning and Operations Centre/Watchkeeping
agement exercises, training, analysis and les- Capability. With effect from 1 January 2007,
son learnt, and it is the lead Directorate for co- the EU Operations Centre is considered the
operation with the European Defence Agency third option for commanding, from Brussels,
(EDA). missions and operations of limited size. Thus,
The Intelligence Directorate consists of some EUMS core staff, “double-hatted” EUMS
3 branches (Intelligence Policy, Intelligence officers and “augmentees” from the Member
Requirements, and Intelligence Production). It States, allow an increased capacity to respond
contributes to intelligence support for the work to crisis management situation.
of the EU. It provides intelligence input to early The Logistics Directorate serves as a focal
warning, situation assessment and advance point for all matters in the functional areas of
planning. It is responsible for geospatial intel- logistics, contributes to the EUMS planning

HANDBOOK CSDP   49
 through the provision of logistic planning The EU Cell at SHAPE prepares for EU
expertise, is responsible for logistic concepts operations having recourse to NATO common
and doctrine, provides the logistic element of assets and capabilities under the Berlin-Plus
crisis response planning and assessment for arrangements and supports DSACEUR in his
operations and exercises and provides support role as the potential operational commander
to the EUMS. The LOG Directorate consists of for an EU-led operation. It contributes to full
3 branches: Logistics Policy, Resource Support transparency between NATO and the EU and
and Administration. embodies their strategic partnership in crisis
The Communications and Information Sys- management.
tem Directorate contributes to the develop- In addition, an EUMS military liaison officer
ment of policies and guidance for the imple- to the United Nations is established in New
mentation, operation and maintenance of CIS, York to further enhance cooperation between
in support of CSDP activities. It contributes to the military parts of the two organisations
EUMS planning through the provision of CIS and a NATO liaison team is also present at the
planning expertise at the strategic and opera- EUMS.
tional level, and provides the CIS element of
crises response planning and assessment for
operations and exercises. It contributes to the
development of the GSC and CSDP CIS secu-
rity policy and architecture. It provides IT sup-
port and maintenance to the EUMS and the EU
Operation Centre. It consists of 2 branches:
CIS Policy and Requirements and Information
Technology Security.
The Executive Office coordinates the EUMS Sources for more and
internal staffing procedures and the flow of updated information
information both internally and externally.
For more and updated information see
The Chairman Military Committee Support
homepage European Council/CSDP:
Unit serves as the focal point for supporting
European Council/President:
the CEUMC and CEUMC WG in the prepara-
http://www.european-council.
tion, execution and evaluation of EUMC/EUM-
europa.eu/CSDP/CSDP
CWG meetings and acts as the interface/liaison
Structures and instruments/EU Military Staff
between CEUMC office and the EUMS.

50   HANDBOOK CSDP

5.2 AGENCIES IN THE FIELD OF CSDP

EUROPEAN DEFENCE AGENCY (EDA)

The European Defence Agency (EDA) was

established under a Joint Action of the Council
of Ministers on 12 July 2004,

“
to support the Member States and the
Council in their effort to improve Euro-
pean defence capabilities in the field of
crisis management and to sustain the
European Security and Defence Policy
as it stands now and develops in the
future”. defence performance, by promoting consist-
ency. A more integrated approach to capability
development will contribute to better defined
Functions and tasks future requirements on which co-operation – in
armaments or R&T or the operational domain
The European Defence Agency, within the – can be built. More co-operation will, in turn,
overall mission set out in the Joint Action, is provide opportunities for industrial restructur-
allocated four tasks, covering: ing and progress towards a continental-wide
• development of defence capabilities; demand and market, which industry needs.
• promotion of Defence Research and Techno­ The EDA is an agency of the European Union
logy (R&T); and therefore under the direction and authority
• promotion of armaments co-operation; of the Council, which issues guidelines to and
• creation of a competitive European Defence receives reports from the High Representative
Equipment Market and strengthening the (HR) of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security
European Defence, Technological and Indus- Policy  as Head of the Agency. Detailed control
trial Base. and guidance, however, is the job of the Steering
All these tasks relate to improving Europe's Board. 

HANDBOOK CSDP   51
 The HR chairs the Steering Board, the principal Sources for more and
decision-making body of the Agency, made up of updated information
Defence Ministers from 26 participating Member Further details are set out in the Joint
States (all EU members except Denmark) and a Action establishing the European
member of the European Commission. Defence Agency. This and more up-to-
date information can be found on the
In addition to ministerial meetings at least
EDA’s webpage: www.eda.europa.eu
twice a year, the Steering Board also meets at the
level of national armaments directors, national
research directors, national capability planners
and policy directors. EU SATELLITE CENTRE (EUSC)
The Chief Executive, his Deputies and
the Directors together form the Agency Manage- The Centre was founded in 1992 under the
ment Board (AMB), supported by the Planning & WEU and incorporated as an agency into the
Policy Unit. European Union on 1 January 2002. It is located
The Capabilities Directorate works with  par- in Torrejón de Ardoz, in the vicinity of Madrid,
ticipating Member States (pMS) to: Spain.
• develop defence capabilities to support CSDP In line with the European Security Strategy,
as it stands now and will evolve in the future, on the Satellite Centre supports decision-making
the basis of a Capability Development Plan; and in the field of the Common Foreign and Security
• pool efforts and resources in the development Policy (CFSP), in particular of the Common Secu-
of transformed, interoperable and cost effec- rity and Defence Policy (CSDP), including Euro-
tive armed forces. pean Union crisis management operations, by
Promoting and enhancing European Arma- providing products resulting from the analysis
ments Co-operation is central to the mission of of satellite imagery and collateral data, including
the European Defence Agency to improve Euro- aerial imagery and related services.
pean military capabilities. In October 2008 the Furthermore, the Centre ensures close coop-
European Armaments Co-operation Strategy eration with Community space-related service. It
(EAC) was approved by the Agency’s Steering also maintains contacts with other national and
Board. It provides a clear statement of intent on international institutions in the same field.
the part of the participating Member States to The staff of the Centre consists of experien­
promote and enhance more effective European ced image analysts, geospatial specialists
armaments co-operation in support of the Com- and support personnel from EU Member
mon Security Defence Policy (CSDP). States. The Centre also hosts seconded ex­
The Industry & Market Directorate works to perts from Member States and Third States.
create a more competitive defence equipment The EUSC Board, consisting of representatives
market and a stronger defence technological and from Member States and the EU Commission,
industrial base in Europe. appoints the Director and approves the annual
The Research and Technology (R&T) Directo- budget as well as the work programme of the
rate is responsible for the achieving Agency’s Centre. Furthermore, the Board serves as a fo-
goal of enhancing the effectiveness of European rum for discussion on issues related to the Cen-
Defence Research & Technology by: tre’s functioning, staff and equipment. It meets
• acting as a catalyst for more European R&T at least twice per year, but in practice more of-
collaboration, focussed on improving defence ten, and is chaired by the High Representative or
capabilities; and his representative.
• developing policies and strategies to The EU Satellite Centre may be tasked not
strengthen defence technology in Europe. only  by the Council and its bodies, but also

52   HANDBOOK CSDP

 support to EU operational deployment (such as
EUFOR in Bosnia and Herzegovina and EUFOR
R.D. Congo) and humanitarian aid missions and
peacekeeping missions. The Centre is also an
important early warning tool, facilitating infor-
mation for early detection and possible preven-
tion of armed conflicts and humanitarian crises.
The Centre carries out tasks in support of the
following activities:
• general security surveillance of areas of interest
• Petersberg type tasks,
• support for humanitarian and rescue tasks,
by  the EU Commission, EU Member States and • support for peacekeeping tasks,
Third States. If the request is relevant in the field • tasks of combat forces in crisis management,
of CFSP, in particular the CSDP,   international including peacemaking,
organisations such as the United Nations (UN), • treaty verification,
the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) • contingency planning,
and the Organisation for Security and Coopera- • arms and proliferation control (including
tion in Europe (OSCE) may also task the Centre. Weapons of Mass Destruction),
As regards the UN is the support provided to • support for exercises,
peacekeeping and humanitarian operations in • other activities, such as judicial investigations.
the Democratic Republic of Congo and in Sudan.
Sources for more and
The Satellite Centre’s areas of priority reflect
updated information
the key security concerns as defined by the
European Security Strategy, such as monitoring More information on the tasks of the dif-
regional conflicts, state failure, organized crime, ferent divisions and on the work and the

terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of projects of the EUSC in general can be
found on its webpage: www.eusc.europa.eu
mass destruction. For example, the EUSC gives,

HANDBOOK CSDP   53
 EU INSTITUTE FOR SECURITY
STUDIES (EU ISS)

The EU Institute for Security Studies (EU ISS)

was established by the Council Joint Action of
20 July 2001 (revised by Council Joint Action
of 21 December 2006) as a replacement for the
Western European Union Institute for Security
Studies (established in July 1990). It was inau-
gurated on 1 January 2002.
The European Union Institute for Security Seminars and conferences. The Institute
Studies (EUISS) is located in Paris, operating organises regular seminars and conferences.
in the framework of the Common Foreign and They bring together academics, EU officials,
Security Policy (CFSP). Its goals are to find a national experts, decision-makers and NGO
common security culture for the EU, to help representatives from the 27 Member States
develop and project the CFSP, and to enrich but also from the rest of the world. At the Insti-
Europe’s strategic debate. tute’s Annual Conference the EU High Repre-
The board of the EUISS is chaired by the sentative delivers his address on the state of
High Representative of the Union for Foreign the CFSP.
Affairs and Security Policy. Co-operation. The Institute co-operates with
The EUISS is an autonomous agency with numerous counterpart institutions in Europe
full intellectual freedom. As a think tank, it the United States and beyond, plays an essen-
researches security issues of relevance for tial role in the development of CFSP concepts.
the EU and provides a forum for debate. In its The EU ISS is also a permanent network
capacity as an EU agency, it also offers analy- member of the European Security and Defence
ses and forecasting to the Council of the Euro- College.
pean Union.
The Institute has two supervisory bodies:
Sources for more and
the Political and Security Committee is its
updated information
political interlocutor. A Board, chaired by the
High Representative, lays down its budgetary For more information on the EU ISS and its

and administrative rules. publications you can consult its webpage

Research. The EUISS covers all areas related http://www.iss.europa.eu.

to the Common Foreign and Security Policy You can also subscribe to be kept up to date

(CFSP), including the European Security and on the latest EUISS publications and analy-

Defence Policy (ESDP), and it approaches its sis with email alerts.

research from both geographic and thematic

perspectives. Its research fellows are comple-
mented by an extensive network of external
researchers who contribute to the Institute’s
research activities on an ad hoc basis.
Publications. The Institute’s flagship publica-
tion is its monograph series of Chaillot Papers.
The Institute also publishes occasional papers,
books, reports, and shorter policy briefs and
analyses, as well as a quarterly newsletter.

54   HANDBOOK CSDP

6 The EU as an
active player

HANDBOOK CSDP   55
 6.1 CSDP Mission spectrum –
From Petersberg to Lisbon
Council of the European Union

EUPM: Opening of the European Union Police Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina by Police
Commander Sven Frederiksen, Commissioner for the EUPM – Sarajevo, 1 January 2003

“
Historical Background 4. Apart from contributing to the com-
mon defence in accordance with Article
The Treaty of Maastricht, signed in Febru- 5 of the Washington Treaty and Article V
ary 1992 and establishing the European Union, of the modified Brussels Treaty respec-
was a milestone in the development of the EU’s tively, military units of WEU Member
involvement in the field of Foreign and Security States, acting under the authority of the
Policy. At that time the EU had no operational WEU, could be employed for:
capacities but a clear political will to evolve • humanitarian and rescue tasks;
into a global actor. Therefore the operational • peacekeeping tasks;
tasks were given to another organisation, the • tasks of combat forces in crisis man-
Western European Union (WEU), which was agement, including peacemaking.”
reactivated during the disintegration process These tasks were incorporated in the legal
of the Yugoslav Republic. framework of the European Union by the Treaty
In June 1992 at a Council of Ministers of the of Amsterdam in 1997. With the creation of the
Western European Union in Petersberg, a con- (Common) European Security and Defence
ference location near Bonn/Germany, the WEU Policy (ESDP) in 1999, the EU established its
gave itself their new tasks: own operational capabilities in the military and

56   HANDBOOK CSDP

civilian field. In 2003 the first ESDP missions
started, in January a civilian police mission in

Ministry of Defence and Sports

Bosnia (EUPM) and in March a military opera-
tion in FYROM (Concordia).
In the context of the Intergovernmental Con-
ference for a “Treaty establishing a Constitu-
tion for Europe”, the so-called “Petersberg
tasks” were revisited and extended. Besides
this task catalogue, some other missions were EUFOR Tchad/RCA: Austrian Patrol
included which will have an impact on the
capability development of the CSDP instru-
ments, namely the solidarity clause and a in crisis management, including peace-
mutual assistance clause. making and post-conflict stabilisation.
All these tasks may contribute to the
fight against terrorism, including by
CSDP mission spectrum supporting third countries in combat-
ing terrorism in their territories.”
Although the “Treaty establishing a Consti- Some argue that the scope of the CSDP
tution for Europe” was not ratified, the task task catalogue did not expand compared to
catalogue was transferred unchanged to the the Petersberg tasks from 1992. Taking into
Treaty of Lisbon. After the end of the ratifica- account the fact that the Petersberg tasks made
tion process and the entry into force of the a reference to a framework including missions
Treaty of Lisbon, from 1 December 2009 the from search and rescue to peace-making, eve-
mission spectrum is as follows: rything which is now stated in Art. 42 TEU was

“
Art. 42 TEU: “1. The common security already within this framework.
and defence policy shall be an integral Others argue that the scope expanded
part of the common foreign and secu- because new capabilities are addressed. For
rity policy. It shall provide the Union example disarmament operations, military
with an operational capacity drawing on advice and assistance tasks could require tools
civilian and military assets. The Union other than those which were planned to exe-
may use them on missions outside the cute the Petersberg tasks.
Union for peace-keeping, conflict pre- Regardless whether the original Petersberg
vention and strengthening international tasks were enlarged compared to the CSDP
security in accordance with the princi- task catalogue of Art. 43 (1) TEU, the new hori-
ples of the United Nations Charter. The zontal task “terrorism” was introduced, which
performance of these tasks shall be is new and will have an impact on the fight
undertaken using capabilities provided against terrorism.
by the Member States.” Besides this CSDP task catalogue, another
Art. 43 TEU: “1. The tasks referred to challenge for the CSDP is the newly introduced
in Article 42(1), in the course of which mutual assistance clause in Art. 42 (7) TEU:

“
the Union may use civilian and military 7. If a Member State is the victim of
means, shall include joint disarmament armed aggression on its territory,
operations, humanitarian and rescue the other Member States shall have
tasks, military advice and assistance towards it an obligation of aid and
tasks, conflict prevention and peace- assistance by all the means in their
keeping tasks, tasks of combat forces power, in accordance with Article 51 of

HANDBOOK CSDP   57
 Terrorism

Council of the European Union

Terrorism can be found within the CSDP task
catalogue of Art. 43 (1) TEU, implicitly in the
mutual assistance clause of Art. 42 (7) TEU and
explicitly in the solidarity clause of Art. 222
TFEU. Taking these rules all together, the Euro-
pean Union will face the phenomenon “terror-
EU Border Assistance Mission to Moldova and Ukraine: ism” within and outside the EU, preventively
Border Control – 19 February 2008 or in the form of consequence management.
There are no clear indications whether one rule
will be preferred in practice. One could argue
the United Nations Charter. This shall that the CSDP task catalogue and the mutual
not prejudice the specific character of assistance clause are designed for the fight
the security and defence policy of cer- against terrorism outside the territory of the
tain Member States. EU, whereas the solidarity clause will be the
Commitments and cooperation in this rule for the EU territory itself. The fight against
area shall be consistent with commit- terrorism in the sense of preventive engage-
ments under the North Atlantic Treaty ment remains an open question.
Organisation, which, for those States By including the task “fight against terror-
which are members of it, remains the ism” in all relevant paragraphs of the Treaty
foundation of their collective defence which will influence capability development in
and the forum for its implementation.” the EU, the Union made a clear and promising
The mutual assistance clause is based on statement that it will be ready and prepared
the UN principle of collective self-defence and to face the challenge and protect its citizens
underlines the EU guiding principle of solidar- worldwide against any kind of terrorist threat.
ity. The content differs compared to similar
paragraphs in other treaties (e.g. NATO, WEU).
For example the application of this clause is Geographical scope of
based on “armed aggression”, which is more the mission spectrum
extensive than an “armed attack”. The geo-
graphical area refers to the territory of the EU The CSDP task catalogue was created for
Member States, which could be seen as a vir- missions abroad, whereas the mutual assist-
tually worldwide responsibility. And finally the ance clause prioritises operations to fight
means for assistance are not limited to military armed aggression inside and preventively also
or civilian assets, but must be interpreted to be outside the EU.
as comprehensive as the full engagement of
the EU in the field of the Common Foreign and
Security Policy.
European Commission/ECHO

Nevertheless the various types of Member

States are respected: those which are neutral,
non-allied and members of NATO.

Civilian Missions

58   HANDBOOK CSDP

6.2 Decision making in the field
of CSDP

Council of the European Union

Council Meeting in Brussels

The EU is in a unique situation having at In 2000 to 2003, the EU evolved and gave
its disposal a wide range of instruments and itself Crisis Management Procedures to facili-
means (political, diplomatic, economic, finan- tate the effective co-ordination of the various
cial, civilian and military) necessary for effec- crisis management players and instruments
tive international crisis management. This is used.
an advantage but at the same time a real chal- The Crisis Management Procedures differ-
lenge, as described in the European Security entiate between the following phases (see text
Strategy (ESS): box).

“
The challenge now is to bring together
the different instruments and capa-
bilities: European assistance pro- Crisis Management Phases
grammes and the European Develop-
ment Fund, military and civilian capa- 1. Routine phase
2. Crisis build-up and elaboration of a Crisis
bilities from Member States and other
Management Concept
instruments. All this can have an 3. Approval of the Crisis Management
impact on our security and on that of Concept and development of Strategic
third countries … Diplomatic efforts, Options
4. Formal decision to take action and devel-
development, trade and environmen-
opment of planning documents
tal policies should follow the same 5. Implementation
agenda. In a crisis there is no substi- 6. Refocusing of EU action and termination
tute for unity of command …” of mission/operation.

HANDBOOK CSDP   59
 During Phase 1, the EU – within the Politi-
cal and Security Committee (PSC) as well as Main decisions
within the relevant geographic and thematic
1. EU action considered appropriate (PSC)
Council Working Groups – carries out moni- 2. Approval of the CMC (Council)
toring, exchange of information and policy- 3. Decision to take action (Council)
shaping. The relevant services in the Council 4. Approval of the CONOPS (Council)
Secretariat, and in the future in particulary the 5. Approval of the OPLAN (Council)
European External Action Service, contribute 6. Decision to launch the operation
(Council)
to monitoring, early warning including situa-
tion assessment, development of policy option
papers and advance planning.
Once the attention of the PSC is drawn to a including the possible exit strategy. This plan-
developing crisis, it discusses the situation in ning document in particular contributes to the
the light of input from relevant actors with a overall consistency of the EU action.
view to developing a common political under- Once finalised in the PSC, the CMC is adopted
standing of the crisis. In its regular meetings at by the Council (Phase 3). It then serves as the
least twice a week, the PSC analyses the situa- basis for developing strategic options. Depend-
tion and – and a certain stage – considers that ing on what the conflict context requires, these
EU action is appropriate. This is the start of the can be military (MSO), police (PSO) or other
planning processes. civilian strategic options (CSO). MSOs are pre-
When the PSC considers that EU action is pared by the EU Military Committee (EUMC),
appropriate (Phase 2), a Crisis Management PSOs and CSOs by the Committee for Civilian
Concept is drawn up, describing the EU's Aspects of Crisis Management (CIVCOM). The
political interests, the aims and final objec- PSC identifies which option will be pursued.
tive, together with the major politico-strategic The Council can then take a decision to act
options for responding to that particular crisis, (Phase 4) adopting a Council Joint Action drawn

60   HANDBOOK CSDP

up by the Working Group of Foreign Relations in a developing crisis. They guide the EU's
Counsellors (Relex Group). This is the legal act responses to a crisis in a co-ordinated way.
which establishes the mission or operation, However, the Crisis Management Procedures
appoints the Operation Commander or Head are rather a set of tools to be used in a flexible
of the Mission and decides on the financial way. They do not limit the EU to developing its
issues. The appointed Operation Commander approach to a crisis in all the sequences set
and/or Head of Mission are then responsible down in the procedures. As shown in the table,
for developing the operational planning docu- some of the processes may be skipped alto-
ments. The key documents in this regard are gether e.g. to shorten the process when rapid
the Concept of Operations (CONOPS) and the reaction is required as illustrated in the table.
Operation Plan (OPLAN). The first outlines how Closer co-operation with international organi-
it is intended to implement the operation and sations (e.g. with NATO, using the Berlin-Plus
the latter describes in detail how the operation arrangements) do also impact the processes.
is organised. Furthermore, many of the processes, such
Once the OPLAN has been approved, the as the development of the Crisis Management
Council can launch the operation (Phase 5). The Concept, are iterative in nature and specific
PSC then exercises “political control and stra- action such as the appointment of an OHQs
tegic direction” of the operation. On a regular and an Operation Commander may be made in
basis, the PSC assesses whether an operation the process at any suitable moment.
needs to be refocused or terminated (Phase
6). A decision by the Council to terminate an
operation is followed by a lessons-learned
process.
These Crisis Management Procedures are
suggestions for a coherent, comprehensive
EU crisis management covering every phase

HANDBOOK CSDP   61
 6.3 Command and Control
Options

ments. In this case, the preferred option is to

establish the EU Operation Headquarters at
SHAPE.
Secondly, the EU can have recourse to the
Member States' assets and capabilities. In this
case the OHQ will be provided by one of the
Member States (France, Germany, Greece,
Italy and UK).
Thirdly, the EU can activate its Operations
Centre in the EU Military Staff to plan and
conduct an autonomous EU operation when
the Council decides to draw on the collective
capacity of the EU Military Staff for an opera-
tion which requires a civilian as well as a mili-
In the absence of a permanent military com- tary response and when no national Operation
mand and control structure, the EU has three Headquarters has been identified.
strategic options for commanding and control- The following diagram illustrates the differ-
ling military operations. ent command and control structures which
Firstly, it can have recourse to NATO assets need to be identified for civilian missions and
and capabilities using the Berlin-Plus arrange- military operations.

62   HANDBOOK CSDP

6.4 Civilian miSSionS and
miliTary oPeraTionS

Following the development and establish- ducted more than 20 civilian and military oper-
ment of its structures and procedures, the EU ations. This handbook will not elaborate on the
started its operational engagement in 2003 details. The attached world map provides a
with first civilian missions (EU Police Missions general overview of all past and current civil-
in BiH) and military operations (Operation ian missions and military operations.
CONCORDIA in FYROM). Since then it con-

OVERVIEW OF THE MISSIONS AND OPERATIONS OF THE EUROPEAN UNION

February 2010

Civilian missions: ongoing missions / completed missions

Military operations: ongoing operations / completed operations

"Strenghts take into account international and local staff"

EUFOR
EUFORALTHEA
ALTHEA
EUPOLEUPOL PROXIMA
PROXIMA
Bosnia & Herzegovina,
Bosnia since
- Herzegovina, 2004
since 2004
Former
Former Yugoslav
Yugoslav Republic
Republic
Troop strength:
Troop g 2024
strength: 1920
EUPAT of Macedonia
of Macedonia (FYROM),
(FYROM), 2004-20055
2004-2005
EUPAT
Former
FormerYugoslav Republic
Yugoslav Republic
EUPM ofofMacedonia (FYROM), 2006 EUBAM
Macedonia (FYROM), 2006
Bosnia & Herzegovina, since 2003 Moldova and Ukraine
Mission strength: 271 Mission strength: 200

EUJUST
EUJUSTTHEMIS
THEMIS
EULEX KOSOVO Georgia,
Georgia,2004-2005
2004-2005
Since 2008
Mission strength: 2725
EUMM GEORGIA
Since 2008
Mission strength: 388

CONCORDIA EUPOL AFGHANISTAN

Former Yugoslav Republic Policing mission, since 2007
of Macedonia (FYROM), 2003 EUPOL COPPS
Palestinian territories, since 2006 Mission strength: 457
Mission strength: 75

EUEUSSR Guinea
SSR GuineaBissau
Bissau EUJUST LEX
EUBAMRafah
EUBAM Rafah
Since 2008
Since 2008 Iraq/Brussels, since 2005
Palestinian
Palestinian territories,
territories, since since
2005 2005
Mission strength:
Mission 33 33
strength: Mission
Mission strength:
strength: 28 26
Mission strength: 45

Support to AMIS II
Support to AMIS II
Sudan/Darfur,
EUFORTchad/RCA
EUFOR Tchad/RCA Sudan/Darfur,
2005-2006
2005-2006
2008-2009
2008-2009
Troop strength:
Effectifs: 3700 3700

ARTEMIS
ARTEMIS EUNAVFOR - Atalanta
RD Congo,
RD Congo,2003
2003 Since 2008
EUSEC RDRD Congo
Congo Troop strength:
Troop strength: 1800
1800 Troop strength: 1500
EUSEC
Since
Since2005
2005
Council of the European Union

Mission
Missionstrength:
strength:47 48 EUTM SOMALIA
(in preparation)

EUPOL Kinshasa EUFOR RD Congo

EUPOL Kinshasa 2006
RD Congo,
Congo,2005-2007
2005-2007
Troop strength: 2300
AMM Monitoring Mission
EUPOL RDRD Congo
Congo Aceh/indonesia
EUPOL 2005-2006
Since2007
Since 2007
Missionstrength:
Mission strength:
55 60

SourCeS for more and

uPdaTed informaTion

For each operational activity, detailed and

updated information, including video pres-
entations, can be found on the webpage of
the Council: www.consilium.europa.eu

HANDBOOK CSDP 63
 6.5 Financing of CSDP actions

Introduction
Legal basis
External actions of the European Union are
Articles 31 and 41 TEU, Council Deci-
– thematically and financially – much broader
sion 2008/975/CFSP of 18 December 2008
than the crisis management operations under
establishing a mechanism to administer the
CSDP. They comprise, among other measures,
financing of the common costs of European
the Development Cooperation Instrument,
Union operations having military or defence
the Instrument for Stability and Humanitarian
implications (Athena), Articles 313 ff TFEU.
Aid. In total the multiannual financial frame-
work provides for a maximum expenditure of
55.935 million euros for the “EU as a world or defence implications, a Member States
player” during 2007 – 2013. This chapter will, abstains in a vote and makes a formal declara-
however, focus specifically on the principles of tion (constructive abstention), it is not obliged
the financing of crisis management operations to contribute to the financing of the respective
stricto sensu, i.e., civilian missions and military expenditure.
operations.

Civilian missions
General rules
Civilian missions are funded from the gen-
The TEU lays down the basic rules on the eral budget of the European Union which is
financing of crisis management operations. decided upon by the Council and the Euro-
According to Article 41 (1) TEU administrative pean Parliament. Title 19 of the budget cov-
expenditure of the institutions arising from ers “External Relations”, and its Chapter 3 is
the implementation of the CSDP, both for civil- specifically dedicated to Common Foreign
ian missions and military operations, will be and Security Policy ( the “CFSP budget”, as it
charged to the budget of the European Union. is called). It is implemented by the European
The same applies, as a general rule, to oper- Commission.
ating expenditure under Article 41 (2) TEU, The CFSP budget amounts to just over 280
except for cases (a) where the Council – acting million euros in 2010. The relevant sub-divi-
unanimously – decides otherwise and (b) for sions (articles) are “Monitoring and imple-
such expenditure arising from operations hav- mentation of peace and security processes”
ing military or defence implications. (commitments of 3 million euros), “Conflict
If expenditure is not charged to the Union resolution and other stabilisation measures”
budget, it is generally charged to the Member (137 million euros), and “Police missions”
States in accordance with their gross national (approx. 61 million euros). In order to be able
product (unless, again, the Council unani- to respond flexibly and finance urgent needs 5
mously decides otherwise). If , on a decision million euros are provided for under the head-
to embark on an operation having military ing “Emergency measures”.

64   HANDBOOK CSDP

Military operations support and recovery of the forces will be con-
sidered as operational common costs. In addi-
After temporary financing mechanisms for tion, certain measures in the preparatory and
operations CONCORDIA and ARTEMIS, the winding-up phases of an operation are borne
Council, in February 2004, established a per- by ATHENA, as well as specific general costs
manent “mechanism to administer the financ- and joint costs of EU exercises.
ing of the common costs of European Union The 2010 ATHENA budget provides for (in
operations having military or defence impli- commitment appropriations) around 23,1 million
cations (Athena)”. ATHENA, in capital letters, euros for EUFOR ALTHEA and 9,95 million for
as it is usually referred to, has a permanent ATALANTA out of a total of 34,6 million euros. It
structure and functional legal capacity. It acts will, however, be adjusted if new operations are
on behalf of the participating Member States started. Overall, one has to bear in mind that the
(all MS of the EU, except Denmark), and third costs financed in common account for less than
States, if the latter contribute to the financing 10% of the total costs for an operation, the rest
of the common costs of a specific operation. follows the principle “costs lie where they fall”.
Given that the contributions are provided
by the MS based on a GNI scale (ranging cur-
rently from less than 0,5 % to more than 20 % Conclusion
per MS) it may be considered a logical conse-
quence that ATHENA is managed under the The ATHENA mechanism is a very flex-
authority of a Special Committee (SC) which is ible instrument for the financing of military
composed of a representative of each partici- operations. This also holds true of periodical
pating MS and takes decisions by unanimity. revisions of the mechanism as such. The EU
ATHENA basically, covers the incremental budget, in some respects, lacks this flexibility.
costs for headquarters, certain infrastructure Its advantage, however, lies in the democratic
works, medical services, and satellite images control at European level which is exercised by
during the active phase of an operation. Fur- the European Parliament as co-legislator of the
ther expenditure may be authorised by the SC budget.
upon request by the Operation Commander Above all, the political will to provide suf-
who bears the overall financial responsibility. ficient funding, both for civilian and military
If the Council so decides, also transport to and operations, in order to fulfil the respective
from the theatre of operations for deployment, tasks is of paramount importance.

HANDBOOK CSDP   65
7 Capability
Development

HANDBOOK CSDP   67
 7.1 The rationale for European
capability development

The European Union has played a central political aspirations of non-violent conflict pre-
role over recent decades in the construction of vention. Accordingly, the Helsinki European
an economic area. By contrast, Europe has yet Council in December 1999 reached agreement
to emerge as an equally powerful and credible on development of civilian and military assets
player at the level of external policies. It is vital required to take decisions across the full range
that the Europe of the future be more than a bit of conflict prevention and crisis resolution.
player on the world stage: Europe must be in As far as military capabilities are concerned,
a position to project and protect its core inter- the European Headline Goal provides the quan-
ests and shared values. That is the common titative and qualitative framework for armed
political goal of all Member States. intervention across the full range of the mis-
It follows that Europe must speak with one sion spectrum.
voice if its political aspirations are to be effec- On the non-military side, the European
tively articulated and clearly understood. For Union has built up over recent decades an
the European Union to emerge as a power- arsenal of political, diplomatic and civil instru-
ful political force at world level, however, it ments which are conducive to the attainment
must think and act as a Union with respect to of its foreign policy objectives. The crisis in
security and defence. And this is the basis of a the Balkans demonstrated the need to rein-
Common Security and Defence Policy. force and expand those instruments in order
Full implementation of the Union's Common to improve their effectiveness. The Council has
Security and Defence Policy is a sine qua non taken the view that a number of areas need to
if Europe's Common Foreign and Security Pol- be addressed including policing, promoting
icy is to be accepted as a credible instrument the rule of law, strengthening civil administra-
of international policy at the sharp end of cri- tions, ensuring protection for civilian popula-
sis management. Only then will the Common tions and monitoring.
Foreign and Security Policy be perceived as a
coherent and comprehensive political, diplo-
matic, economic, humanitarian, civil and mili- Need for civil-military
tary instrument. Articulation and implemen- capability development
tation of the Common Security and Defence
Policy thus emerges as a key priority for the Top-quality civil and military resources and
European Union. assets are indispensable to effective Euro-
If the European Union is to assert and sus- pean crisis management. The crises and con-
tain its political credibility and determination, flicts that beset the international community
it is imperative that it be able to act across today are, however, of an increasingly com-
the full spectrum of the Petersberg Tasks and plex nature. As a general rule, they are less
the new additional tasks defined in the Lis- susceptible to traditional military intervention;
bon Treaty. A credible capability for military moreover, questions of collective defence are
intervention is indispensable to underpin the increasingly less relevant to the majority of

68   HANDBOOK CSDP

 Council of the European Union
EUFOR Tchad/RCA: Tactical air transport

conflicts in today's world. As a result, peace- resources into a single institutional framework.
keeping operations frequently extend beyond This, in theory, should enable the articulation
mere separation of the belligerent parties by of concepts and methodologies that allow for
military means: they are progressively multi- efficient co-ordination of resources at all times
functional and are conducted in tandem with and at every level. While this is readily accept-
a series of civil initiatives, including the insti- able in theory, however, the fact remains that
tution or reinforcement of civil administra- practical implementation represents one of
tions in a crisis region. What is more, military the principal challenges facing the Union at
resources and capacities are often used in the present time, inasmuch as the roles and
support of essentially civil missions, as in the responsibilities of civilian and military play-
case, for example, of humanitarian missions ers are frequently high disparate and, in some
and rescue operations. Bundling and effective instances of civilian-military co-ordination,
co-ordination of available assets thus make a constitute entirely new territory.
vital contribution to the overall efficiency and The Swedish Presidency held a seminar in
effectiveness. Brussels on EU civil-military capability devel-
This is particularly true of the European opment in September 2009 to discuss experi-
Union and its announced intention within the ences from CSDP missions and operations and
framework of the Common Foreign and Secu- discussed prospects for future civilian and mil-
rity Policy and the Common Security and itary capability development. Key findings of
Defence Policy to use the full gamut of instru- the seminar were, inter alia that work is already
ments at its disposal in the best interests of ongoing and potential synergies between the
conflict prevention and crisis management. civilian and the military capability develop-
In effect, the Common Security and Defence ment processes should be further explored in
Policy has combined both civil and military areas where an added value can be achieved.

HANDBOOK CSDP   69
 7.2 Development of civilian
capabilities

Feira Council in June 2000 identified four areas for priority action
of civilian aspects of crisis management:

• police, to enable the EU to carry out all its missions, including substitution for failing local
authorities; 5000 police officers, 1000 of whom can be deployed within 30 days, were consid-
ered necessary;
• rule of law, in order to strengthen the judicial systems called on to supplement the action of
the police. The estimated need was for 3000 experts;
• civilian administration, in order to create a rapidly-deployable pool of experts to act wherever
local government authorities are deemed unable to do so during a crisis;
• civil protection, with the identification of three emergency assessment teams for crisis situa-
tions, and up to 2000 experts in various fields who could be deployed rapidly with their equip-
ment.

Since the Feira Council in 2000, progress has on virtual planning scenarios representing a
been reached in the development of civilian selection of possible situations calling for EU
capabilities based on a Civilian Headline Goal action under CSDP. Subsequently, a detailed
2008 set by the Council in 2004. Capability plan- list of personnel for possible civilian missions
ning under the Headline Goal 2008 was based to be launched in those situations was estab-
lished, and Member States were invited to
indicate personnel that could potentially be
made available. A comparison between the
member States' indications and the capabili-
ties required provided a comprehensive pic-
ture of the actual state of EU preparedness for
civilian CSDP missions.
Thoroughly evaluating the progress made
with the Headline Goal 2008 and the challenges
ahead, at the ministerial Civilian Capability
Improvement Conference in 2007, Ministers
Council of the European Union

have decided to adopt the new Headline Goal

2010. On the basis of this guidance, work on the
Headline Goal 2010 started in 2008 with a review
of illustrative scenarios, assessing new required
capabilities and surveying civilian capabilities.
The following priority areas were set:
EUPOL COPPS – Italy provides, through EUPOL COPPS, 28 • Strengthening the EU's capability to plan and
vehicles to the Palestinian Traffic Police, Ramallah, deploy several missions at the same time, in
22 December 2009 particular in rapid-response situations;

70   HANDBOOK CSDP

• Continuing to develop suitable management
tools for efficiently mobilising capabilities
needed for civilian missions;
• Improving training for personnel likely to
be deployed on missions, and continuing to
strengthen civilian response teams;
• Developing the administrative, financial,
logistical and human resources aspects of
the mission support function, including by
seeking to optimise the synergy between
civilian and military assets;
• Developing national strategies to facili-
tate the deployment of mission personnel
and encourage exchange of good practices Council of the European Union

between Member States;

• Strengthening coherence and synergies
between CSDP missions and other EU instru-
ments;
• Introducing a proper feedback system for
CSDP civilian missions.
While keeping the proven planning method- EUPOL RD Congo: Police officers attend a course
ology, the added value with the Headline Goal “sexual violence”, 29 January 2010
2010 is mainly in terms of new, more compre-
hensive scenarios, better exploring co-opera-
tion and co-ordination inside and outside the tual to very practical, would find their way into
EU, but also in developing and implementing Member States' national administrations. To
specific new concepts and civilian capability this end, several Civilian Capability Improve-
management tools, as well as addressing more ment Conferences were held enabling Minis-
quality issues at all levels. ters to guide the Headline Goal 2008 process
Furthermore, the Headline Goal 2010 sets and to enhance its political visibility.
the military and civilian capability develop- Several Member States managed to trans-
ment processes on a synchronised track, which late recommendations and guidelines emanat-
inherently facilitates synergy. ing from the Headline Goal process in practical
terms, often resulting in closer co-operation
between the different stakeholder ministries
Civilian Headline Goal involved. Several Member States declared that
2010 Perspectives they had created structures to better facilitate
the recruitment, training and deployment of
Most personnel in civilian crisis manage- personnel. There is a clear task for the EU to
ment missions under CSDP are seconded by facilitate and promote equal preparation of
Member States. Consequently, the wide range Member States so that all may usefully contrib-
of different ministries, services, judicial bod- ute to civilian CSDP. The Headline Goal 2008
ies etc., involved in the secondment process has certainly achieved encouraging results in
directly influence the EU's capacity to act. It is this respect but more needs to be done.
therefore important to ensure that the Headline
Goal process findings, ranging from concep-

HANDBOOK CSDP   71
 7.3 Development of military
capabilities

Helsinki Headline Goal

To develop European military capabilities, Member States set themselves the headline goal:
by the year 2003, co-operating together voluntarily, they will be able to deploy rapidly and then
sustain forces capable of the full range of Petersberg tasks as set out in the Amsterdam treaty,
including the most demanding, in operations up to corps level (up to 15 brigades or 50,000-
60,000 persons.
These forces should be militarily self-sustaining with the necessary command, control and
intelligence capabilities, logistics, other combat support services and additionally, as appropri-
ate, air and naval elements.
Member States should be able to deploy in full at this level within 60 days, and within this to
provide smaller rapid response elements available and deployable at very high readiness.
They must be able to sustain such a deployment for at least one year. This will require an
additional pool of deployable units (and supporting elements) at lower readiness to provide
replacements for the initial forces.

In June 2004, Member States set themselves and decisive action to the whole spectrum of
a new Headline Goal 2010 built upon the Hel- crisis management operations. The focus is in
sinki Headline Goal with a view to achieving particular on the qualitative aspects of capabil-
the objectives set by the European Security ity development and to improve the interoper-
Strategy. Under the new Headline Goal, the EU ability and deployability and support capacity
should be able by 2010 to respond with rapid for the forces.
In the context of the Headline Goal 2010, the
EU Military Committee is developing the mili-
tary capabilities in several stages (capability
development process):
1. The formulation of military capability
requirements to fulfil the EU's missions,
leading to the Requirements Catalogue.
2. The identification of the forces made avail-
able by Member States on a voluntary basis,
Council of the European Union

leading to the Force Catalogue.

3. The evaluation of contributions against cur-
rent requirements, identifying the principal
capability shortfalls, leading to the Progress
Catalogue. This leads also to conclusions for
crisis management operations and for future
EUFOR RD CONGO: Real Time Surveillance – capability development, formulated in the
2 August 2006 Capability Development Plan.

72   HANDBOOK CSDP

 Council of the European Union
EUFOR Tchad/RCA: Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) – 11 February 2009

The European Defence Agency (EDA) is play- ency and complementarity of proposed spe-
ing a major role in military capability develop- cific goals, commitments and priorities. It is up
ment. In October 2006, EU Defence Ministers to the EU, NATO and Member States of both
endorsed the “Long-Term Vision”, a paper organisations to draw conclusions from the
which defines the long-term technological group's discussions in the future development
developments depending on the nature of the of respective goals and capabilities.
EU's future operations. Based on this, the EDA
is working on the Capability Development Plan
aiming at
• identifying possibilities for co-operation
between Member States,
• encouraging harmonisation of national
defence planning, and finally
• rendering the Long-Term Vision operational.
EDA is making a significant contribution to
the strengthening of European military capa-
bilities by encouraging Member States to
Council of the European Union

increase their co-operation in this field.

The consistency between the EU's capabil-
ity development with that of NATO is ensured
through a joint EU-NATO Capability Group.
This group was established to ensure the
transparent and coherent development of
military capabilities and to provide a forum for EUFOR Tchad/RCA receives the Russian
addressing where relevant the overall consist- helicopters – 8 December 2008

HANDBOOK CSDP   73
74   HANDBOOK CSDP
8 Civil-military
co-ordination

HANDBOOK CSDP   75
 8.1 Civil-military co-ordination –
a specific requirement of the EU

The new strategic environment EU in a unique situation

One of the three strategic objectives defined In recent years the EU has created a number
in the European Security Strategy is to tackle of different instruments, each of which has its
the key threats identified, including terrorism, own structure and rationale. The EU is in such
the proliferation of weapons of mass destruc- a unique position to have at its disposal all the
tion, regional conflicts, state failure and organ- means and tools necessary for effective inter-
ised crime. The strategy further concludes that national crisis management. This is considered
none of these threats is purely military, nor can to be the comparative advantage of the EU. The
any be tackled by purely military means. Each challenge now is to bring together these differ-
requires a mixture of instruments. Prolifera- ent instruments and capabilities and to ensure
tion may be contained through export controls that they all follow the same agenda.
and combated through political, economic and From the start of its operational engagement
other pressures while the underlying political in international crisis management in 2003, the
causes are also tackled. Dealing with terrorism EU has tried to present its ability to deploy
may require a mixture of intelligence, police, both civilian and military instruments together
judicial, military and other means. In failed as its particular strength. However, despite all
states, military instruments may be needed co-ordination efforts, the civilian and military
to restore order, with humanitarian means structures have remained to great extent dif-
used to tackle the immediate crisis. Regional ferent worlds and the civilian and military crisis
conflicts need political solutions but military management missions and operations are still
assets and effective policing may be needed in separate. In this regard the Maastricht Treaty
the post- conflict phase. also had an impact, with the division of tasks
Hence, the new strategic environment calls between the Council and the Commission lead-
for the deployment of a mixture of instru- ing to the fragmentation of responsibilities,
ments, of civilian and military capabilities capacities and also budgets. The implementa-
together. Experiences with crisis management tion of the Lisbon Treaty is now a window of
operations in the recent past showed that an opportunity to improve the overall consistency
operation requires a combination of civilian of the EU's external actions.
and military tools from the outset. In many
cases military security is established quickly
but organised crime and other factors continue
to thwart a return to normality.

76   HANDBOOK CSDP

 Council of the European Union
EU SSR Guinea-Bissau: Head of Mission Verástegui visits Border Police, 30 June 2009

Progress made in the In the same context, an Operations Centre

institutional setting was established within the EU Military Staff
which became operational in 2007. The aim
In recent years the Council has taken a was to provide for an additional command
number of decisions to lay down the condi- option in particular in cases where a joint civil-
tions for better civil-military co-ordination and military response might be required and none
co-operation, aiming in particular to integrate of the national potential Operation Headquar-
the civilian and military planning structures ters might be available.
and to launch activities relating to civil-military In response to the lack of a planning and com-
capability development. mand structure for civilian missions, a Civilian
A first attempt to create civil-military struc- Planning and Conduct Capability (CPCC) was
tures for the planning and conduct of CSDP created and became operational in 2008. As a
missions and operations was made at the end matter of fact, it is an Operation Headquarters
of 2003. A Civil-Military Cell was established for civilian missions only, responsible for the
within the EU Military Staff to enhance its operational planning and command of civilian
capacity to conduct early warning, situation missions at the strategic level. The Director of
assessment and strategic planning. The cell the CPCC acts as the Civilian Operation Com-
was led by a military director and a civilian mander for all civilian missions.
deputy. All in all, it has proved to be a useful In 2009, a new decision was taken to further
step forward towards a better linkage between develop the relevant structures at the strategic
civil and military strategic planning but its level, namely to merge the relevant civilian and
location within the EU Military Staff has raised defence directorates in the Council Secretariat
doubts about its real civil-military character. with the Civ-Mil Cell to form a new Crisis Man-

HANDBOOK CSDP   77
 agement and Planning Directorate (CMPD). Training and exercises
This directorate now operates as an integrated
structure for strategic planning of CSDP opera- Following the EU's comprehensive approach
tions and missions and is also dealing with to crisis management, civil-military co-ordina-
CSDP policy and capability issues. tion is a recognised special training require-
All in all, these are useful organisational and ment for the EU and should be met through
institutional steps taken so far at the strate- special training courses and through combined
gic level which help to improve civil-military civilian and military participation whenever
co-ordination. However, whether this will be possible, in national and EU- level training.
the final solution is arguable. CSDP is and Aspects of civil-military co-ordination are also
will remain an evolving process, at least in regularly addressed in EU exercises.
the coming decades.. This process might cul- The European Security and Defence College
minate in unified civil-military structures as is playing a significant and important role in
underlined in 2009 by the former Chairman support of the EU's comprehensive approach
of the EU Military Committee, General Henri by providing training at strategic level for civil
Bentégeat. Referring to the progress made so and military personnel of the Member States
far in civil-military integration, he underlined and the EU Institutions. Training activities of
the importance of establishing an integrated the ESDC bring together diplomats, police, rule
Civil-Military Headquarters for CSDP missions of law and civil administration staff and mili-
which would, in his view, correspond to a spe- tary personnel, thereby contributing to a bet-
cific requirement of the European Union. ter mutual understanding. Under the aegis of
the college there are also training courses cov-
ering specifically civil-military co-ordination
Civil-military capability issues within the EU and in co-operation with
development international organisations and partners.

Apart from the institutional and organisa-

tional aspects, consideration is now given to
possible synergic effects in the field of Euro-
pean capability development. It is recognised
that further co-ordination of military and civil-
ian efforts is necessary, both at strategic level
Council of the European Union

and in theatre, in order to enhance the capabil-

ity of the EU to meet complex challenges in the
future. Finding synergies between civilian and
military efforts is also considered to be cost
efficient for the Member States.

EUPOL AFGHANISTAN: Carl Bildt visits

Sources for more and
EUPOL, 31 August 2009
updated information
Breaking Pillars – Towards a civil-military
security approach for the European Union,
Margriet Drent and Dick Zandee, Clingen-
dael Security Paper Nr 13, January 2010.
Available also via the internet:
www.clingendael.nl

78   HANDBOOK CSDP

9 oTHER IMPORTANT
csdp-RELATED ASPECTS

HANDBOOK CSDP   79
 9.1 Co-operation with third
states and international
organisations

“
There are few if any problems we can
European Security Strategy
deal with on our own. The threats
described are common threats, shared
“The transatlantic relationship is irreplace-
with all our closest partners. Interna-
able. Acting together, the EU and the United
tional co-operation is a necessity. We
States can be a formidable force for good
need to pursue our objectives both
in the world. Our aim should be an effec-
through multilateral co-operation in
tive and balanced partnership with the
international organisations and through
USA. This is an additional reason for the
partnerships with key actors.”
EU to build up further its capabilities and to
increase its coherence.”
This quote from the European Security Strat-
egy sets the scene for the EU's co-operation
with third states and international organisation
in crisis management. In general, partners interested in making a
In line with this, the EU is developing an effec- contribution to a EU mission and operation
tive and balanced partnership with the United are kept informed throughout the planning
States in particular in counter-terrorism, the and decision-making process using the exist-
fight against the proliferation of WMD and since ing structures for political dialogue. At a cer-
2007 also in crisis management. For the first tain stage, they are also invited to the relevant
time, the United States committed itself to par- force-generation conferences. Following the
ticipating in an CSDP mission (EULEX Kosovo). decision by the Council to launch the opera-
Special arrangements exists for the involve- tion, the Committee of Contributors starts its
ment of non-EU European allies (Iceland, Nor- work as the body responsible for the day-to-
way and Turkey) in EU military operations, in day conduct of the operation. Contributing
compliance with the EU's decision-making partners are represented in the Committee of
autonomy. Contributors with the same rights and obliga-
Special relations in the field of CSDP are also tions as the EU Member States.
developing with Canada, Russia and Ukraine. The strategic partnership in crisis manage-
As regards Russia, this has led to the develop- ment between the EU and NATO rests on the
ment of a roadmap on security identifying also so-called Berlin-Plus arrangements adopted in
practical measures for closer co-operation in December 2002, under which NATO's collec-
the field of CSDP. In 2003 Russia contributed to tive assets and capabilities can be made avail-
the first EU civilian mission (EU Police Mission able to the EU for operations.
in BiH). In November 2008, it formalised an The Berlin-Plus arrangements include:
agreement for its contribution to EUFOR Chad/ • guaranteed access for the EU to NATO plan-
CAR which represents Russia's first participa- ning capabilities for planning its own opera-
tion in an EU military operation. tions;

80   HANDBOOK CSDP

• presumption of availability to the EU of
NATO's collective capabilities and assets;
European Security Strategy
• identification of European command options
“The EU-NATO permanent arrangements, in
which recognise a special role for NATO's
particular Berlin-Plus, enhance the opera-
Deputy Supreme Allied Commander Europe
tional capability of the EU and provide the
(DSACEUR).
framework for the strategic partnership
These arrangements were first implemented
between the two organisations in crisis
in spring 2003 for the Operation CONCORDIA
management. This reflects our common
in FYROM and in the current operation ALTHEA
determination to tackle the challenges of the
in BiH.
new century.”
To support close co-operation in crisis man-
agement, an EU cell has been established at
SHAPE and a NATO liaison team is hosted in
the premises of the EU Military Staff in Brus- African Union (AU). As regards the UN, there
sels. are regular meetings of the EU-UN Steering
Between the two organisations, a regular Committee with the participation of the Euro-
dialogue takes place in non-decision mak- pean Commission and the UN Department of
ing meetings at various levels, in particular Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO).
between the Political and Security Commit- The partnership with the AU has three par-
tee (PSC) and the North Atlantic Council (NAC) ticular aspects: strengthening the political dia-
and between the two Military Committees. To logue, making the African peace and security
prevent unnecessary duplication and to ensure architecture fully operational and providing
overall coherence, the two organisations predictable funding for the AU's peacekeeping
meet also in the EU-NATO Capability Group to operations.
exchange information on capability develop- The EU also maintains an important dia-
ment processes. logue on crisis management with the Organi-
Apart from NATO, the EU has also developed sation for Security and Co-operation in Europe
close co-operation in the field of crisis man- (OSCE) and the Association of South-East Asia
agement with the United Nations (UN) and the Nations (ASEAN).

HANDBOOK CSDP   81
 9.2 Training and education in
the field of CSDP

EU Training Policy and Training level, with a particular focus on the

Concept in the field of CSDP interface between military and civilian
areas. Such a holistic and co-ordinated
When CSDP development started under the training policy would contribute to the
umbrella of the EU, it became obvious that the overall goal of improving civil-military
different aspects of crisis management would as well as civil-civil-co-ordination.”
require appropriate training, not only offered Based on the Training Policy and Concept,
at national level but complemented by training an annual training management cycle has been
at EU level, the latter focusing in particular on established including four phases:
the promotion of a European diplomatic cul- 1. an analysis of training needs and require-
ture and a European security culture. ments in the field of CSDP,
To this end, in 2003 and 2004, the Council 2. based on this, the design of an EU Train-
adopted an EU Training Policy and an EU Train- ing Programme listing all training activities
ing Concept in the field of CSDP. The key objec- offered at EU level,
tive defined is 3. the conduct of these training activities by the

“
the adoption of a holistic and co-ordi- various training actors at EU and at national
nated approach on training matters level,
which should aim at establishing links 4. an annual evaluation in the form of a “Com-
and strengthening synergies between prehensive Annual Report on Training Activ-
the different training initiatives at EU ities in the field of CSDP / CART”.

82   HANDBOOK CSDP

 The outer circle of the overview depicts Sources for more and
the external dimension. ESDP is an open and updated information
transparent process. Close cooperation with
Since 2009, the EU Training Programme has
third states and international organisations is
been run via the internet (“Schoolmaster”
a basic principle for the EU as regards the con-
application). The internet address is:
duct of crisis management operations.
https://esdp.consilium.europa.eu
The EU Training Programme lists training
activities of the EU actors (ESDC) and of the
Member States’ national institutes which they
open to participation by other nationals. It dif- The European Security
ferentiates between and Defence College
• courses of the European Security and
Defence College At EU level, the European Security and
• other security and defence policy courses, Defence College (ESDC), established in 2005,
• training activities in the field of civilian crisis plays a major role in the implementation of the
management, yearly training cycle relevant to CSDP. Not only
• specific civil-military training activities, also does the College contribute significantly to the
related to inter-pillar co-ordination, implementation of the training programme
• specific police training activities related to through the delivery of its courses, its Secre-
crisis management and tariat contributes to the analysis of the train-
• military training activities in the field of ing requirements, the development of the EU
CSDP training programme relevant to CSDP and the
Following the EU’s comprehensive approach, evaluation of this training programme through
training actors are encouraged to combine civil- the Comprehensive Annual Report on Training
ian and military participation whenever possible. (CART).

HANDBOOK CSDP   83
84   HANDBOOK CSDP
 The main objective of the ESDC is to provide
Member States and EU Institutions with knowl-
edgeable personnel able to work efficiently on
CSDP matters. In pursuing this objective, the
College makes a major contribution to a better
understanding of CSDP in the overall context
of CFSP and to promoting a common European
security culture. Helping to build professional
relations and contacts at European level, the Col-
lege activities promote a co-operative spirit and
co-operative methods at all levels. GS/HR Solana lectures at the European
The ESDC is a network college. Several Security and Defence College in 2006
national universities, academies, colleges and
institutes contribute to the success of the ESDC. bers but is supposed to grow to a total of 8 civil-
The network members are well-known national ian and military staff.
civilian and military educational and research The College established its own training con-
institutions in Europe. It also includes the EU cept addressing all levels of personnel from
Institute for Security Studies located in Paris. working level up to the level of decision- mak-
The College also co-operates with other exter- ers working in the field of CSDP. In line with
nal training actors such as the Geneva Centre for this concept, and, as shown in the overview, it
Security Policy (GCSP). offers a growing number and variety of train-
A three-tier governance structure has been ing activities including courses for specialised
established for the college’s functioning com- staff.
prising a Steering Committee, an Executive Aca- All training courses of the ESDC are sup-
demic Board and a Permanent Secretariat. The ported by an Internet-based distance learning
Secretariat currently has 3 full-time staff mem- system.

ESDC training activities

Standard Courses
• CSDP High Level Course (annual/4 Modules)
• CSDP Orientation Course (3 to 5 days)
• CSDP Course for PPI staff (2/3 days)
• Alumni Seminars (participants of the higher level courses)

New types of training activities

• Security Sector Reform/SSR (two types of courses, 3 days and 10 days)
• CSDP Mission Planning Procedures Course (3 days)
• Course on EU Military and Civilian Capability Development (3 days)
• CMCO – Civil Military Co-ordination in CSDP Missions and Operations (10 days)
• International Law for EU Military Legal Advisor (annual/3 Modules)
• Peace Building Course

Special Activities
• CSDP Training Modules in the context of exchange programmes of young military officers
• Symposium on Effectiveness of CSDP Operations: Gender Issues
• Annual Networking Conference on Training related to CSDP

HANDBOOK CSDP   85
 ESDC’s contribution to the EU’s comprehensive approach – Summary

• significant contribution to implement the EU’s overall training policy (holistic and co-ordi-
nated approach)
• network college including military, civilian and diplomatic training actors
• combined civilian and military participation in ALL ESDC training activities
• curriculum development – standard curricula of main courses and specialised courses
reflect the EU’s comprehensive approach
• specialised courses on specific aspects of the EU’s comprehensive approach to crisis manage-
ment
• training record: since 2005, about 2500 civilian and military personnel trained of which more
than 10 % came from third states and international organisations

Since its establishment in 2005, the college given a crucial role in the implementation of the
has provided training at strategic level for more initiative.
than 2200 diplomats, civilians and police and Building on the existing three-tier structure
military personnel from Member States and EU and the ESDC network, an Implementation Group
Institutions. In addition, since 2006, about 300 was created in February 2009 as a task-oriented
civilian and military staff from third states and structure of the ESDC’s Executive Academic
international organisations have attended CSDP Board, charged with implementing this initiative.
courses of the college. Since the start of this initiative, progress has
The success of the ESDC courses lies in a been reached on various aspects of it, includ-
mixture of making the best use of the academic ing the conduct of common CSDP modules
expertise, contacts and experience of our net- (already done in Portugal and Spain) based on
work members and bringing to the courses the the standard curriculum developed by ESDC.
practical knowledge of the specialists from the With the cooperation of the Faculty of Law and
European Institutions working on a day-to day Political Science of the University of Liège, a
basis on the important dossiers in the field of detailed stocktaking has been finalised which
ESDP. Applying the basic principle of mixed will allow the interested institutes to easily iden-
civilian and military audiences in almost all tify partners with whom organise exchanges.
ESDC course, the College makes a significant A framework arrangement has been agreed
effort in support of the EU’s comprehensive which should also facilitate the establishment
approach to crisis management. of exchange programmes for the interested
national institutes. Several other common cur-
ricula have meanwhile been put at the disposal
The European Initiative for the of the Member States and these courses will
Exchange of Military Young start to be held in 2010.
Officers inspired by Erasmus Thanks to the Bulgarian Military University, a
dedicated forum for the exchange of information
A specific task given to the ESDC is to pro- both between cadets and between the members
vide support for exchange programmes of the of the Implementation Group has been set up.
national training institutes.
More concretely, under the French Presi-
Sources for more and
dency in the second half on 2008, the Council
updated information
approved an initiative aimed at increasing the
number of international exchanges during the You can visit the dedicated forum for the
initial academic and professional training of Exchange of Military Young Officers on:
young officers. Subsequently, the ESDC was http ://www.emilyo.eu

86   HANDBOOK CSDP

 9.3 Human Rights and Gender
Aspects

European Security Strategy

“Spreading good governance, supporting

Council of the European Union

social and political reform, dealing with

corruption and abuse of power, establishing
the rule of law and protecting human rights
are the best means of strengthening the
international order.”

EUFOR RD Congo – First Aid

The European Union launched its first crisis • the development of standard training guide-
management operation in 2003. Since then it lines for CSDP training;
has conducted more than 20 military, police • the inclusion of human rights aspects in
and rule of law operations on three continents. CSDP exercises and in preparatory activities
The experience it has gained from earlier and such as fact-finding missions and planning
ongoing operations feeds into those currently teams.
at the planning stages. In this context, the EU Last but not least, a handbook has been com-
has learned that including Human Rights and piled and made available. The handbook com-
Gender approaches in all of its missions makes bines the documents that comprise the guid-
them more effective. ing principles for planners of EU operations.
CSDP operations are aimed at conflict man- It is intended to serve as a tool for those who
agement, preventing crises from unfolding cooperate with, plan, train, carry out, evaluate
and stabilizing post-conflict situations. Human and report on EU crisis management. Making
rights violations are part and parcel of crises this handbook widely accessible will help us
and conflicts. The promotion of human rights, to achieve better mutual understanding and
with special emphasis on gender and rights of raise awareness of human rights and gender
the child and the rule of law are key to sustain- aspects of the ESDP, thus enhancing the syner-
able conflict resolution and to lasting peace gies of our activities on the ground.
and security. The handbook is a living document, and as
In line with the European Security Strategy, CSDP evolves, it will be regularly updated.
over the last few years, a number of practical
and concrete steps have been taken in order Sources for more and
to ensure mainstreaming of human rights into updated information
ESDP.
The title of the handbook is “Mainstreaming
This includes inter alia
Human Rights and Gender into ESDP”. It is
• the appointment of a human rights advisor
available on the webpage of the Council:
to the Special Advisors, Operation/Force
www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms_
Commander or Head of Mission in CSDP-
Data/docs/hr/news144.pdf
missions and operations;

HANDBOOK CSDP   87
 9.4 Security Sector Reform

The reform of the security sector has become

one of the major topics of international con-
cern in connection with crisis management and

Council of the European Union

post-crisis recovery during the last decade.
The focus on traditional security actors such
as the police, the military, the judiciary, prison
personnel, border guards, and intelligence has
been complemented by a more comprehen-
sive view of human security, bringing the basic
needs and physical, social and economic secu- EU SSR Guinea-Bissau: Amura military
rity and safety of individuals and the popula- fort visit, 19 June 2009
tion to the centre of attention.

nies, guerrilla armies and private militia). It is

SSR Actors internationally acknowledged that civil society
organisations, international donors and the
The core security actors, together with all media have an important role to play in SSR
security management and oversight bodies, processes as well. In addition, a mainstreamed
the justice and law enforcement institutions gender focus needs to be included to make
as well as non-statutory security forces need SSR successful.
to act on the principles of human rights, local Several achievements to define common
ownership, accountability and sustainability goals for security sector reform have already
in co-operation and co-ordination with other been made. The UN Secretary General’s Report
national and international state and non-state on SSR (2008) provided an overarching frame-
actors for creating/developing a stable envi- work for countries and organisations aiming at
ronment. reforms of security systems. At the EU level,
The OECD DAC Reference Document Secu- both the Council of the European Union (2005)
rity System Reform and Governance agreed by and the European Commission (2006) have
ministers in 2004 defined the security system developed plans for SSR support.
as including: core security actors (e.g. armed
forces, police, gendarmerie, border guards,
customs and immigration, and intelligence and Pool of european SSR Experts
security services); security management and
oversight bodies (e.g. ministries of defence At the meeting on 17 Nov. 2009 the Council
and internal affairs, financial management of the European Union welcomed the consider-
bodies and public complaint commissions); able progress made in the implementation of
justice and law enforcement institutions (e.g. the agreement of November 2008 to enhance
the judiciary, prisons, prosecution service, tra- the capability of the EU in the area of Secu-
ditional justice systems); and non-statutory rity Sector Reform (SSR) by creating a pool of
security forces (e.g. private security compa- European SSR experts to be used in the con-

88   HANDBOOK CSDP

text of SSR activities carried out by the EU, than evident. Successful SSR missions require
within the framework of ESDP or Community well -educated and -trained experts, at the
external action. strategic political and administrative level as
The modalities for the setting up of the pool, well as in the field.
for the deployment of experts and for training Governments need to streamline their action
and related activities have been completed, on security sector reforms both at home and
enabling the creation of a community of through their development assistance. Unfor-
experts familiar with SSR questions as a whole tunately, too little preparation for experts
and sharing a common approach to SSR. The on SSR is offered. Most of the existing study
revised CRT concept takes into account the and training programmes still focus on exclu-
establishment of the pool. sive approaches of individual security actors
1. In this context, the Council noted work on rather than a concerted whole-of-government
developing a Guiding Framework for EU SSR approach.
Assessments aimed at providing a practi-
cal tool for the EU Institutions for assessing
and planning possible EU SSR actions both SSR training
within the framework of ESDP and in Com-
munity external actions, also with a view to Training for SSR programmes is only at the
strengthening the EU's capacity to imple- initial stage . The UN DPKO SSR Team devel-
ment such actions. ops training modules, but needs assistance
2. The Council encouraged the continuation of to serve the needs for capacity building in the
efforts to strengthen the EU’s SSR capacity, international community.
including through cooperation with other The International Security Sector Advisory
actors, especially the UN, and underlined the Team (ISSAT) at DCAF has developed a train-
importance that the expert pool becomes ing approach that is implemented on an ad
operational as soon as possible. hoc basis tailored to the needs of the recipi-
ent group or country. ISSAT has initiated the
foundation of the Association for Security Sec-
Implementation of SSR tor Education and Training (ASSET) compris-
ing training institutes which have started SSR
The current implementation of SSR is fac- training, partly in collaboration with the Euro-
ing several challenges: SSR calls into question pean Security and Defence College (ESDC).
per se existing power structures. Regions and Most recently, under the ESDC, curricula for
nation states with a very dominant security sec- two courses on SSR have been developed and
tor react critically to externally proposed reform will be completed through the ESDC relying on
strategies. Donor countries need to bridge the qualified national training institutes of the EU
gap between their own SSR policies and the Member States.
imperative of local ownership without which The curricula are designed for a basic SSR
reforms cannot become sustainable. Security course (3 days) and a core SSR course (7 days),
sector reform faces a divergence between its in particular to support the creation of an EU
holistic approach and various institutional prac- pool of experts for SSR missions.
tices so far. International organisations also
have different approaches to SSR.
The need to further develop a comprehen-
sive approach and training strategies is more

HANDBOOK CSDP   89
10 iNFORMATION pOLICY
IN THE FIELD OF csdp

HANDBOOK CSDP   91
 10.1 Communicating EU Common
Security and Defence Policy –
an overview

Information on CSDP operations … … and on CSDP structures

and capabilities
Operations are the most visible output of
the European Union Common Security and The CSDP press team in the Council Sec-
Defence Policy (CSDP). With 23 operations retariat, in contact with other partners, also
(and a 24th in preparation for Somalia at the actively communicates on developments
time of writing) launched since 2003, on four regarding the CSDP's civilian and military
continents, some of them complex missions in structures and the capability process. It does
challenging, high-profile environments, CSDP so notably in relation with events such as
has gained increasing recognition as a tangible meetings of EU defence ministers (informal or
dimension of the EU's foreign policy. For each in the framework of the Foreign Affairs Coun-
CSDP operation or mission, key aims include cil) or the launch of a given project: EU Battle-
on the one hand ensuring the coherence of the groups (on which it seeks to coordinate with
message among the different EU stakeholders Member States e.g. regarding media coverage
(definition of an information strategy, prepa- of BG exercises); Operations Centre (cf. press
ration of master messages), and on the other visit on the activation of the OpsCentre during
hand communicating towards the press and the exercise MILEX 07). Steering Board meet-
the public on the operation: ings and other events in the European Defence
Such activities include: Agency are opportunities to conduct informa-
• press information, technical briefings and tion activities on the EDA's work.
press conferences involving the main players
– political, military or civilian – in an opera-
tion, on the occasion of the main events (e.g. A wide range of products
decision, launch, termination); press trips; and resources
• press releases and High Representative
statements on the occasion of these or other Over the last years, the CSDP press team
events; has developed a range of information and
• production and circulation of print, Internet communication products on CSDP. It does so
and audiovisual material on each operation in cooperation with other stakeholders such
(see below). as the European Security and Defence College
(ESDC), the EU Institute for Security Studies
and the European Defence Agency, as well as
with the European Commission regarding the
EU's external action as a whole.

92   HANDBOOK CSDP

 Council of the European Union
EULEX Kosovo: Communicating CSDP – The Head of the EU Rule of Law mission in Kosovo,
Yves de Kermabon, during his visit to Kosovo on 14 and 15 March 2008

Print material • material produced by the EU Institute for

Institutional print material on CSDP includes Security Studies (EU-ISS Newsletter, quar-
the following items: terly, Chaillot Papers, Occasional Papers,
• ESDP newsletter (six-monthly, circulation books (e.g. “What ambitions for European
around 20,000 copies): 9 issues published defence in 2020?”);
since December 2005. The newsletter aims • material produced by the European Defence
to present CSDP operations and other activi- Agency (e.g. EDA bulletin, quarterly and spe-
ties in a clear, illustrative way for both a spe- cific leaflets).
cialised readership and the wider public;
• a range of booklets (cf. “the EU, an exporter Internet
of peace and security” since 2003, the Euro-
pean Security Strategy booklet, as well as The Council of the EU's web site hosts the
thematic/regional strategies cf. EU-Africa; CSDP homepage: www.consilium.europa.eu/
• a range of fact sheets and background docu- csdp, which contains information on:
ments produced for each CSDP operation • all CSDP operations and missions (including
and on specific topics (e.g. the EU Engage- links towards specific operation websites
ment in Afghanistan or in Somalia, the EU where applicable);
Battlegroups, military capabilities); • CSDP news;
• the EU Military Staff's bulletin, Impetus, • structures, notably the EU Military Staff, the
aimed primarily at a military readership; EU Military Committee, the Civilian Planning
• in cooperation with the European Commis- and Conduct Capability (CPCC);
sion, material on “EU in the world – working • capabilities;
for peace, security and stability”; • the European Security Strategy.

HANDBOOK CSDP   93
 Other institutional Internet resources Press trips
include:
• (EU Institute for Security Studies) Press visits to the theatre of CSDP opera-
• www.eda.europa.eu tions and missions have been organised since
(European Defence Agency) 2004 for European journalists. Visits to Bal-
• www.eusc.europa.eu kans, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Aceh
(EU Satellite Centre) (Indonesia), Chad (EUFOR TCHAD/RCA) or on
• www.eeas.europa.eu EUNAVFOR-Atalanta, have notably been organ-
(External action website) ised under the “Prince” programme in order to
highlight the EU's comprehensive activities on
the ground (CSDP operation and EU Delega-
Audiovisual material tion). Other visits are organised on the basis of
the resources of the operations themselves.
The development of an audiovisual offer on
CSDP has been a priority in recent years. A
range of resources are now available. Looking for synergies
• Video material (VNRs – Video News Releases and outreach: towards a
– and stock shots) is produced and made “CSDP public diplomacy”
available for televisions on specific occa-
sions such as the launch of an operation; The Council Secretariat has been trying to
such material can be found and downloaded develop synergies with and among Member
in broadcast quality on www.tvnewsroom. States, including through mutual information
consilium.europa.eu concerning products and initiatives.
• a YouTube CSDP page is available: www. • Meetings of officials in charge of informa-
youtube.com/EUSecurityandDefence tion and communication on CSDP have been
• some of the audiovisual material is released organised since 2001 in the framework of
in the form of DVDs for distribution to the the Council's Working Party on Information.
wider public (since 2003); These meetings provide opportunities to
• cooperation with productions by TV chan- exchange information, material and experi-
nels on CSDP; ence;
• a CSDP photo library is being developed. A • an extranet network – “Infonet CSDP” – is
selection is available online on the Council available to share information on CSDP
website. related communication activities among EU
• Arrangements are being developed with Member States and institutions;
individual Member States concerning the • regular information on communication
sharing of audiovisual resources notably in activities is given to Council bodies, includ-
the context of operations. ing the Political Security Committee and the
Military Committee.
Increasingly, outreach and awareness-rais-
ing activities have been developed by the Sec-
retariat and other stakeholders.
• The European Security and Defence Col-
lege contributes to raising the awareness
of CSDP in Member States but also beyond.
An annual CSDP Press and Public Informa-
tion Course has been established in 2006 in

94   HANDBOOK CSDP

 Council of the European Union
EUFOR Tchad/RCA: Communication of EUFOR to the local population, 4 December 2008

the framework of the ESDC. The course aims European Union. The Institute's output is
to provide press and information personnel distributed widely;
from EU Member States, EU institutions and • the Council Secretariat and the Commission
CSDP missions and operations with up-to- regularly co-organise seminars for journal-
date knowledge of CSDP and to facilitate the ists, think-tanks and NGOs on the topic “the
sharing of experience; EU in the world”, including CSDP;
• the EU Institute for Security Studies in Paris These activities are likely to be continued
is also a key player in outreach activities on under the new Lisbon Treaty notably by the
CSDP. As a European body where leaders, European External action service (due to be
the media, academics, industrialists and created in the course of 2010) with other part-
elected representatives rub shoulders on a ners.
day-to-day basis, it contributes to spread-
ing the ideas and values on which the EU’s Contact: [email protected]
foreign and security policy is founded.
Information and communication activities
are part of its work together with academic
research and policy analysis and the organi-
sation of seminars (including the Institute’s
Annual Conference, at which the High Rep-
resentative delivers an address on the state
of the Common foreign and security policy).
The Institute's work involves a network of
exchanges with other research institutes
and think-tanks both inside and outside the

HANDBOOK CSDP   95
ANNEXES

HANDBOOK CSDP   97
 ANNEX 1

Course on Common Security

and Defence Policy (CSDP)
Illustrative Course Programme

Main theme: The European Union/Institutional Framework

Session 1 EU Institutional Framework and Treaties / Role of the Council, European Parlia-
ment and the European Commission
The European Union has developed a Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP),
including the strengthening of the security of the European Union in all ways, pre-
serving peace, in accordance with the principles of the United Nations Charter.
Through the CFSP, the EU expresses its positions on the international scene and acts
consistently where the Member States share common interests. Within the context
of the CFSP, the Union is developing a common security and defence policy (CSDP),
covering all questions relating to its security, including the progressive framing of a
common defence, should the Council so decide.
The Council of the EU plays a vital role in implementing this policy and the European
Commission is fully associated with it. The role of the European Parliament in rela-
tion to CFSP/CSDP is to be further elaborated.
This session will provide an overview of the EU's institutional setting. Speakers will
in particular focus on the role of the relevant EU Institution in the field of the Com-
mon Foreign and Security Policy(CFSP) and the Common Security and Defence Pol-
icy (CSDP).

Session 2 “A Secure Europe in a Better World” – The European Security Strategy (ESS)
“Our ambition is a Europe more active and more capable; an articulate and persua-
sive champion of effective multilateralism; a regional actor and a global ally. The
preparation of the European Security Strategy has helped us to discover a remark-
able convergence of views on security issues between EU Member States and to
uncover an authentic and uniquely European voice on security issues. The challenge
ahead is to persuade and implement.” (Javier Solana former HR for the CFSP)
This session will provide an insight into the European Security Strategy, the risk
assessment, the main strategic objectives identified in the strategy and the policy
implications for Europe. It should also give an update on the state of affairs as
regards the implementation of the ESS.

Session 3 CSDP Development: Overview

This session will provide an overview of CSDP, its historical background, main politi-
cal decisions leading to the development of CFSP/CSDP within the European Union.
It will also discuss the areas in which progress has been made since the Cologne
European Council in June 1999.

98   HANDBOOK CSDP

 ANNEX 1

Main theme: CSDP Organisational Aspects

Session 1 Civilian and Military Structures

At the Cologne meeting in June 1999, the European Council decided that “the
Union must have the capacity for autonomous action, backed up by credible mili-
tary forces, the means to decide to use them, and a readiness to do so, in order to
respond to international crises without prejudice to actions by NATO”. It was on that
basis that continued efforts led to the establishment of permanent political, civilian
and military structures with the Political and Security Committee (PSC) playing a
central role in the field of CFSP/CSDP.
This session will provide a comprehensive overview of the existing civilian and mili-
tary structures, their functioning and inter-relationship.

Session 2 EU's Crisis Management Procedures and Decision Making Process

The European Union developed a set of crisis management procedures to enable
the Union to take decisions on operational engagement in international crisis man-
agement.
This session will introduce the key steps of EU decision making. It will also examine
“theory versus practice”, how decision making is done in practice in past and cur-
rent missions/operations.

Main theme: To Be More Capable (ESS)

Session 1 Development of Civilian Capabilities

ESS: “In almost every major intervention, military efficiency has been followed by
civilian chaos. We need greater capacity to bring all necessary civilian resources to
bear in crisis and post crisis situations.”
This session will provide an overview of the development of European civilian capa-
bilities in particular in the context of the Headline Goal 2010.

Session 2 Development of Military Capabilities

ESS: “A more capable Europe is within our grasp, though it will take time to real-
ise our full potential. Actions under way – notably the establishment of a defence
agency – take us in the right direction. To transform our militaries into more flexible,
mobile forces, and to enable them to address the new threats, more resources for
defence and more effective use of resources are necessary.”
This session will inform on the state of affairs as regards the development of the
military capabilities in particular in the context of the Headline Goal 2010.
Session 3 European Defence Agency (EDA)
The European Defence Agency (EDA) was established by a Joint Action of the Coun-
cil of Ministers on 12 July, 2004 “to support the Member States in their effort to
improve European defence capabilities in the field of crisis management and to sus-
tain the CSDP as it stands now and develops in the future”. This session will provide
an overview of the EDA's main functions, its organisation and current work.

HANDBOOK CSDP   99
 ANNEX 1

Main theme: Working With Partners (ESS)

Session 1 EU – NATO Relations

ESS: “The EU-NATO permanent arrangements, in particular Berlin-Plus, enhance the
operational capability of the EU and provide the framework for the strategic partner-
ship between the two organisations in crisis management.”
This session will consider the current state of affairs on co-operation between EU
and NATO in crisis management.

Session 2 EU – UN Relations
ESS: “The fundamental framework for international relations is the United Nations
Charter. The United Nations Security Council has the primary responsibility for the
maintenance of international peace and security. Strengthening the United Nations,
equipping it to fulfil its responsibilities and to act effectively, is a European prior-
ity.”
This session will provide a brief overview of EU-UN co-operation in the field of
CSDP.

Session 3 EU – AU Relations
ESS: “Regional organisations also strengthen global governance. For the European
Union … regional organisations such as … the African Union make an important
contribution to a more orderly world.” Over the past years, the EU developed suc-
cessfully co-operation with the African Union in many field of CSDP.
This session will provide a brief overview of past and current efforts to co-operate.

Session 4 Co-operation with Third States in the field of CSDP

ESS: “There are few if any problems we can deal with on our own. The threats … are
common threats, shared with all our closest partners. International co-operation is a
necessity. We need to pursue our objectives both through multilateral co-operation
in international organisations and through partnerships with key actors.”
This session will consider EU co-operation with third states like Canada, Ukraine,
Russia in the field of CSDP.

100   HANDBOOK CSDP

 ANNEX 1

Main theme: To Be More Active (ESS)

Session 1 EU Crisis Management – Past, Current and Potential Future Operations and
Missions overview
ESS: “We need to develop a strategic culture that fosters early, rapid, and when
necessary, robust intervention. As a Union of 27 members, spending more than 160
billion Euros on defence, we should be able to sustain several operations simultane-
ously. We could add particular value by developing operations involving both mili-
tary and civilian capabilities.” This session will provide an overview of EU's opera-
tional engagement in Civilian and Military Crisis Management.

Session 2 Human Rights and Gender Aspects

ESS: “Spreading good governance, supporting social and political reform, deal-
ing with corruption and abuse of power, establishing the rule of law and protecting
human rights are the best means of strengthening the international order.”
This session will examine human rights and gender aspects and their impact on sus-
tainable conflict resolution. It will inform on EU policies, concepts and action taken
to implement respective UNSC Resolutions in the context of CSDP in general and in
EU missions and operations in particular.

Main theme: To Be More Coherent (ESS)

Session Civil-Military Co-ordination (CMCO)

The EU is in an unique situation to have at its disposal all instruments (political,
diplomatic, economic, financial, civil and military) necessary for international crisis
management. The challenge is now to bring together the different instruments and
capabilities. Effective co-ordination of all the instruments is necessary for the EU to
achieve maximum impact and exert maximum political leverage through its crisis
management operations.
This session will inform on the principles of civil-military co-ordination (CMCO)
and practical measures taken so far in the field of CSDP to improve co-ordination
between all relevant instruments and actors.

Main theme: CSDP Future Perspectives

Session CSDP Development – Challenges and Prospects

This session will examine the future perspectives of the CSDP. The speaker will
consider essential factors which likely will impact the further development and will
draw from this conclusions how CSDP might further evolve.

HANDBOOK CSDP   101

 ANNEX 2

A SECURE EUROPE IN A BETTER WORLD

EUROPEAN SECURITY STRATEGY

Brussels, 12 December 2003

EN

HANDBOOK CSDP   103

 ANNEX 2

Introduction

Europe has never been so prosperous, so secure nor so free. The violence of the first half of the
20th Century has given way to a period of peace and stability unprecedented in European history.

The creation of the European Union has been central to this development. It has transformed the
relations between our states, and the lives of our citizens. European countries are committed to
dealing peacefully with disputes and to co-operating through common institutions. Over this
period, the progressive spread of the rule of law and democracy has seen authoritarian regimes
change into secure, stable and dynamic democracies. Successive enlargements are making a reality
of the vision of a united and peaceful continent.


The United States has played a critical role in European

 integration and European security, in particular through NATO.
 The end of the Cold War has left the United States in a dominant

position as a military actor. However, no single country is able
to tackle today’s complex problems on its own.

Europe still faces security threats and challenges. The outbreak of conflict in the Balkans was a
reminder that war has not disappeared from our continent. Over the last decade, no region of the
world has been untouched by armed conflict. Most of these conflicts have been within rather than
between states, and most of the victims have been civilians.


As a union of 25 states with over 450 million 

people producing a quarter of the world’s Gross

National Product (GNP), and with a wide range of 
instruments at its disposal, the European Union is 

inevitably a global player. In the last decade 
European forces have been deployed abroad to 

places as distant as Afghanistan, East Timor and the DRC. The increasing convergence of
European interests and the strengthening of mutual solidarity of the EU makes us a more credible
and effective actor. Europe should be ready to share in the responsibility for global security and in
building a better world.

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I. THE SECURITY ENVIRONMENT: GLOBAL CHALLENGES AND KEY THREATS

Global Challenges

The post Cold War environment is one of increasingly open borders in which the internal and
external aspects of security are indissolubly linked. Flows of trade and investment, the development
of technology and the spread of democracy have brought freedom and prosperity to many people.
Others have perceived globalisation as a cause of frustration and injustice. These developments
have also increased the scope for non-state groups to play a part in international affairs. And they
have increased European dependence – and so vulnerability – on an interconnected infrastructure in
transport, energy, information and other fields.

Since 1990, almost 4 million people have died in wars, 90% of them civilians. Over 18 million
people world-wide have left their homes as a result of conflict.

In much of the developing world, poverty and


 disease cause untold suffering and give rise to

pressing security concerns. Almost 3 billion

 people, half the world’s population, live on

less than 2 Euros a day. 45 million die every
year of hunger and malnutrition. AIDS is now
one of the most devastating pandemics in human history and contributes to the breakdown of
societies. New diseases can spread rapidly and become global threats. Sub-Saharan Africa is poorer
now than it was 10 years ago. In many cases, economic failure is linked to political problems and
violent conflict.

Security is a precondition of development. Conflict not only destroys infrastructure, including

social infrastructure; it also encourages criminality, deters investment and makes normal economic
activity impossible. A number of countries and regions are caught in a cycle of conflict, insecurity
and poverty.

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Competition for natural resources - notably water - which will be aggravated by global warming
over the next decades, is likely to create further turbulence and migratory movements in various
regions.

Energy dependence is a special concern for Europe. Europe is the world’s largest importer of oil
and gas. Imports account for about 50% of energy consumption today. This will rise to 70% in
2030. Most energy imports come from the Gulf, Russia and North Africa.

Key Threats

Large-scale aggression against any Member State is now improbable. Instead, Europe faces new
threats which are more diverse, less visible and less predictable.

Terrorism: Terrorism puts lives at risk; it imposes large costs; it seeks to undermine the openness
and tolerance of our societies, and it poses a growing strategic threat to the whole of Europe.
Increasingly, terrorist movements are well-resourced, connected by electronic networks, and are
willing to use unlimited violence to cause massive casualties.

The most recent wave of terrorism is global in its scope and is linked to violent religious extremism.
It arises out of complex causes. These include the pressures of modernisation, cultural, social and
political crises, and the alienation of young people living in foreign societies. This phenomenon is
also a part of our own society.

Europe is both a target and a base for such terrorism: European countries are targets and have been
attacked. Logistical bases for Al Qaeda cells have been uncovered in the UK, Italy, Germany, Spain
and Belgium. Concerted European action is indispensable.


Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction is 
potentially the greatest threat to our security. The 

international treaty regimes and export control arrangements 
have slowed the spread of WMD and delivery systems. We 

are now, however, entering a new and dangerous period that 
raises the possibility of a WMD arms race, especially in the 

Middle East. Advances in the biological sciences may 
increase the potency of biological weapons in the coming

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years; attacks with chemical and radiological materials are also a serious possibility. The spread of
missile technology adds a further element of instability and could put Europe at increasing risk.

The most frightening scenario is one in which terrorist groups acquire weapons of mass destruction.
In this event, a small group would be able to inflict damage on a scale previously possible only for
States and armies.

Regional Conflicts: Problems such as those in Kashmir, the Great Lakes Region and the Korean
Peninsula impact on European interests directly and indirectly, as do conflicts nearer to home,
above all in the Middle East. Violent or frozen conflicts, which also persist on our borders, threaten
regional stability. They destroy human lives and social and physical infrastructures; they threaten
minorities, fundamental freedoms and human rights. Conflict can lead to extremism, terrorism and
state failure; it provides opportunities for organised crime. Regional insecurity can fuel the demand
for WMD. The most practical way to tackle the often elusive new threats will sometimes be to deal
with the older problems of regional conflict.

State Failure: Bad governance – corruption, abuse of power, weak institutions and lack of
accountability - and civil conflict corrode States from within. In some cases, this has brought about
the collapse of State institutions. Somalia, Liberia and Afghanistan under the Taliban are the best
known recent examples. Collapse of the State can be associated with obvious threats, such as
organised crime or terrorism. State failure is an alarming phenomenon, that undermines global
governance, and adds to regional instability.

Organised Crime: Europe is a prime target for organised crime. This internal threat to our security
has an important external dimension: cross-border trafficking in drugs, women, illegal migrants and
weapons accounts for a large part of the activities of criminal gangs. It can have links with
terrorism.

Such criminal activities are often associated with weak or failing states. Revenues from drugs have
fuelled the weakening of state structures in several drug-producing countries. Revenues from trade
in gemstones, timber and small arms, fuel conflict in other parts of the world. All these activities
undermine both the rule of law and social order itself. In extreme cases, organised crime can come
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to dominate the state. 90% of the heroin in Europe comes from poppies grown in Afghanistan –
where the drugs trade pays for private armies. Most of it is distributed through Balkan criminal
networks which are also responsible for some 200,000 of the 700,000 women victims of the sex
trade world wide. A new dimension to organised crime which will merit further attention is the
growth in maritime piracy.

Taking these different elements together – terrorism committed to maximum violence, the
availability of weapons of mass destruction, organised crime, the weakening of the state system and
the privatisation of force – we could be confronted with a very radical threat indeed.

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II. STRATEGIC OBJECTIVES

We live in a world that holds brighter prospects but also greater threats than we have known. The
future will depend partly on our actions. We need both to think globally and to act locally. To
defend its security and to promote its values, the EU has three strategic objectives:

Addressing the Threats

The European Union has been active in tackling the key threats.

 It has responded after 11 September with measures that included the adoption of a European
Arrest Warrant, steps to attack terrorist financing and an agreement on mutual legal assistance
with the U.S.A. The EU continues to develop cooperation in this area and to improve its
defences.

 It has pursued policies against proliferation over many years. The Union has just agreed a
further programme of action which foresees steps to strengthen the International Atomic Energy
Agency, measures to tighten export controls and to deal with illegal shipments and illicit
procurement. The EU is committed to achieving universal adherence to multilateral treaty
regimes, as well as to strengthening the treaties and their verification provisions.

 The European Union and Member States have intervened to help deal with regional conflicts
and to put failed states back on their feet, including in the Balkans, Afghanistan, and in the
DRC. Restoring good government to the Balkans, fostering democracy and enabling the
authorities there to tackle organised crime is one of the most effective ways of dealing with
organised crime within the EU.

In an era of globalisation, distant threats may be 


as much a concern as those that are near at hand. 
Nuclear activities in North Korea, nuclear risks 

in South Asia, and proliferation in the Middle

East are all of concern to Europe. 


Terrorists and criminals are now able to operate

world-wide: their activities in central or south-
east Asia may be a threat to European countries or their citizens. Meanwhile, global
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communication increases awareness in Europe of regional conflicts or humanitarian tragedies

anywhere in the world.

Our traditional concept of self- defence – up to and including the Cold War – was based on the
threat of invasion. With the new threats, the first line of defence will often be abroad. The new
threats are dynamic. The risks of proliferation grow over time; left alone, terrorist networks will
become ever more dangerous. State failure and organised crime spread if they are neglected – as
we have seen in West Africa. This implies that we should be ready to act before a crisis occurs.
Conflict prevention and threat prevention cannot start too early.

In contrast to the massive visible threat in the Cold War, none of the new threats is purely military;
nor can any be tackled by purely military means. Each requires a mixture of instruments.
Proliferation may be contained through export controls and attacked through political, economic
and other pressures while the underlying political causes are also tackled. Dealing with terrorism
may require a mixture of intelligence, police, judicial, military and other means. In failed states,
military instruments may be needed to restore order, humanitarian means to tackle the immediate
crisis. Regional conflicts need political solutions but military assets and effective policing may be
needed in the post conflict phase. Economic instruments serve reconstruction, and civilian crisis
management helps restore civil government. The European Union is particularly well equipped to
respond to such multi-faceted situations.

Building Security in our Neighbourhood

Even in an era of globalisation, geography is still important. It is in the European interest that
countries on our borders are well-governed. Neighbours who are engaged in violent conflict, weak
states where organised crime flourishes,

dysfunctional societies or exploding population

 growth on its borders all pose problems for
 Europe.




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The integration of acceding states increases our security but also brings the EU closer to troubled
areas. Our task is to promote a ring of well governed countries to the East of the European Union
and on the borders of the Mediterranean with whom we can enjoy close and cooperative relations.

The importance of this is best illustrated in the Balkans. Through our concerted efforts with the US,
Russia, NATO and other international partners, the stability of the region is no longer threatened by
the outbreak of major conflict. The credibility of our foreign policy depends on the consolidation of
our achievements there. The European perspective offers both a strategic objective and an incentive
for reform.

It is not in our interest that enlargement should create new dividing lines in Europe. We need to
extend the benefits of economic and political cooperation to our neighbours in the East while
tackling political problems there. We should now take a stronger and more active interest in the
problems of the Southern Caucasus, which will in due course also be a neighbouring region.

Resolution of the Arab/Israeli conflict is a strategic priority for Europe. Without this, there will be
little chance of dealing with other problems in the Middle East. The European Union must remain
engaged and ready to commit resources to the problem until it is solved. The two state solution -
which Europe has long supported- is now widely accepted. Implementing it will require a united
and cooperative effort by the European Union, the United States, the United Nations and Russia,
and the countries of the region, but above all by the Israelis and the Palestinians themselves.

The Mediterranean area generally continues to undergo serious problems of economic stagnation,
social unrest and unresolved conflicts. The European Union's interests require a continued
engagement with Mediterranean partners, through more effective economic, security and cultural
cooperation in the framework of the Barcelona Process. A broader engagement with the Arab
World should also be considered.

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AN INTERNATIONAL ORDER BASED ON EFFECTIVE MULTILATERALISM

In a world of global threats, global markets and global media, our security and prosperity
increasingly depend on an effective multilateral system. The development of a stronger
international society, well functioning international institutions and a rule-based international order
is our objective.

We are committed to upholding and developing International Law. The fundamental framework for
international relations is the United Nations 
Charter. The United Nations Security Council 

has the primary responsibility for the 
maintenance of international peace and security. 

Strengthening the United Nations, equipping it 
to fulfil its responsibilities and to act effectively, 

is a European priority.


We want international organisations, regimes

and treaties to be effective in confronting threats to international peace and security, and must
therefore be ready to act when their rules are broken.

Key institutions in the international system, such as the World Trade Organisation (WTO) and the
International Financial Institutions, have extended their membership. China has joined the WTO
and Russia is negotiating its entry. It should be an objective for us to widen the membership of
such bodies while maintaining their high standards.

One of the core elements of the international system is the transatlantic relationship. This is not
only in our bilateral interest but strengthens the international community as a whole. NATO is an
important expression of this relationship.

Regional organisations also strengthen global governance. For the European Union, the strength
and effectiveness of the OSCE and the Council of Europe has a particular significance. Other
regional organisations such as ASEAN, MERCOSUR and the African Union make an important
contribution to a more orderly world.

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It is a condition of a rule-based international order that law evolves in response to developments

such as proliferation, terrorism and global warming. We have an interest in further developing
existing institutions such as the World Trade Organisation and in supporting new ones such as the
International Criminal Court. Our own experience in Europe demonstrates that security can be
increased through confidence building and arms control regimes. Such instruments can also make
an important contribution to security and stability in our neighbourhood and beyond.

The quality of international society depends on the quality of the governments that are its
foundation. The best protection for our security is a world of well-governed democratic states.
Spreading good governance, supporting social and political reform, dealing with corruption and
abuse of power, establishing the rule of law and protecting human rights are the best means of
strengthening the international order.

Trade and development policies can be powerful tools for promoting reform. As the world’s largest
provider of official assistance and its largest trading entity, the European Union and its Member
States are well placed to pursue these goals.

Contributing to better governance through assistance programmes, conditionality and targeted trade
measures remains an important feature in our policy that we should further reinforce. A world
seen as offering justice and opportunity for everyone will be more secure for the European Union
and its citizens.

A number of countries have placed themselves outside the bounds of international society. Some
have sought isolation; others persistently violate international norms. It is desirable that such
countries should rejoin the international community, and the EU should be ready to provide
assistance. Those who are unwilling to do so should understand that there is a price to be paid,
including in their relationship with the European Union.

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III. POLICY IMPLICATIONS FOR EUROPE

The European Union has made progress towards a coherent foreign policy and effective crisis
management. We have instruments in place that can be used effectively, as we have demonstrated
in the Balkans and beyond. But if we are to make a contribution that matches our potential, we
need to be more active, more coherent and more capable. And we need to work with others.

 More active in pursuing our strategic objectives. This

 applies to the full spectrum of instruments for crisis

 management and conflict prevention at our disposal,
 including political, diplomatic, military and civilian, trade

and development activities. Active policies are needed to

counter the new dynamic threats. We need to develop a
strategic culture that fosters early, rapid, and when
necessary, robust intervention.

As a Union of 25 members, spending more than 160 billion Euros on defence, we should be able to
sustain several operations simultaneously. We could add particular value by developing operations
involving both military and civilian capabilities.

The EU should support the United Nations as it responds to threats to international peace and
security. The EU is committed to reinforcing its cooperation with the UN to assist countries
emerging from conflicts, and to enhancing its support for the UN in short-term crisis management
situations.

We need to be able to act before countries around us deteriorate, when signs of proliferation are
detected, and before humanitarian emergencies arise. Preventive engagement can avoid more
serious problems in the future. A European Union which takes greater responsibility and which is
more active will be one which carries greater political weight.

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More Capable. A more capable Europe is within our grasp, though it will take time to realise our
full potential. Actions underway – notably the establishment of a defence agency – take us in the
right direction.

To transform our militaries into more flexible, mobile forces, and to enable them to address the new
threats, more resources for defence and more effective use of resources are necessary.

Systematic use of pooled and shared assets would reduce duplications, overheads and, in the
medium-term, increase capabilities.

In almost every major intervention, military efficiency has been followed by civilian chaos. We
need greater capacity to bring all necessary civilian resources to bear in crisis and post crisis
situations.

Stronger diplomatic capability: we need a system that combines the resources of Member States
with those of EU institutions. Dealing with problems that are more distant and more foreign
requires better understanding and communication.

Common threat assessments are the best basis for common actions. This requires improved sharing
of intelligence among Member States and with partners.

As we increase capabilities in the different areas, we should think in terms of a wider spectrum of
missions. This might include joint disarmament operations, support for third countries in
combating terrorism and security sector reform. The last of these would be part of broader
institution building.

The EU-NATO permanent arrangements, in particular Berlin Plus, enhance the operational
capability of the EU and provide the framework for the strategic partnership between the two
organisations in crisis management. This reflects our common determination to tackle the
challenges of the new century.

12
EN

HANDBOOK CSDP   115

 ANNEX 2

More Coherent. The point of the Common Foreign and Security Policy and European Security and
Defence Policy is that we are stronger when we act together. Over recent years we have created a
number of different instruments, each of which has its own structure and rationale.

The challenge now is to bring together the different instruments and capabilities: European
assistance programmes and the European Development Fund, military and civilian capabilities from
Member States and other instruments. All of these can have an impact on our security and on that
of third countries. Security is the first condition for development.

Diplomatic efforts, development, trade and environmental policies, should follow the same agenda.
In a crisis there is no substitute for unity of command.

Better co-ordination between external action and Justice and Home Affairs policies is crucial in the
fight both against terrorism and organised crime.

Greater coherence is needed not only among EU instruments but also embracing the external
activities of the individual member states.

Coherent policies are also needed regionally, especially in dealing with conflict. Problems are
rarely solved on a single country basis, or without regional support, as in different ways experience
in both the Balkans and West Africa shows.

Working with partners There are few if any problems we can 


deal with on our own. The threats described above are common

threats, shared with all our closest partners. International

cooperation is a necessity. We need to pursue our objectives

both through multilateral cooperation in international

organisations and through partnerships with key actors.


The transatlantic relationship is irreplaceable. Acting together,

the European Union and the United States can be a formidable force for good in the world. Our aim
should be an effective and balanced partnership with the USA. This is an additional reason for the
EU to build up further its capabilities and increase its coherence.

13
EN

116   HANDBOOK CSDP

 ANNEX 2

We should continue to work for closer relations with Russia, a major factor in our security and
prosperity. Respect for common values will reinforce progress towards a strategic partnership.

Our history, geography and cultural ties give us links with every part of the world: our neighbours
in the Middle East, our partners in Africa, in Latin America, and in Asia. These relationships are
an important asset to build on. In particular we should look to develop strategic partnerships, with
Japan, China, Canada and India as well as with all those who share our goals and values, and are
prepared to act in their support.

Conclusion

This is a world of new dangers but also of new opportunities. The European Union has the potential
to make a major contribution, both in dealing with the threats and in helping realise the
opportunities. An active and capable European Union would make an impact on a global scale. In
doing so, it would contribute to an effective multilateral system leading to a fairer, safer and more
united world.

14
EN

HANDBOOK CSDP   117

 ANNEX 3














































HANDBOOK CSDP   119

 ANNEX 3






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



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





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


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



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





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









120   HANDBOOK CSDP

 ANNEX 3















































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HANDBOOK CSDP   121

 ANNEX 3


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




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









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






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


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















122   HANDBOOK CSDP

 ANNEX 3


















































HANDBOOK CSDP   123

 ANNEX 3















































124   HANDBOOK CSDP

 ANNEX 3

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






































HANDBOOK CSDP   125

 ANNEX 3

























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
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





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
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







126   HANDBOOK CSDP

 ANNEX 3










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
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

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
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































HANDBOOK CSDP   127

 ANNEX 3



















































128   HANDBOOK CSDP

 ANNEX 3















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




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





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


















HANDBOOK CSDP   129

 ANNEX 3

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





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









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



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
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

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(c) the financial control procedures.

CONSOLIDATED VERSION
When the task planned in accordance with Article 42(1) and Article 43 cannot be charged to
the Union budget, the Council shall authorise theOF High Representative to use the fund. The
High Representative shall report to the Council on the implementation of this remit.
THE TREATY ON EUROPEAN UNION

SECTION 2
PROVISIONS ON THE COMMON SECURITY AND DEFENCE POLICY

Article 42
(ex Article 17 TEU)

1. The common security and defence policy shall be an integral part of the common foreign and
security policy. It shall provide the Union with an operational capacity drawing on civilian and military
assets. The Union may use them on missions outside the Union for peace-keeping, conflict prevention
and strengthening international security in accordance with the principles of the United Nations
Charter. The performance of these tasks shall be undertaken using capabilities provided by the Member
States.

2. The common security and defence policy shall include the progressive framing of a common
Union defence policy. This will lead to a common defence, when the European Council, acting
unanimously, so decides. It shall in that case recommend to the Member States the adoption of such a
decision in accordance with their respective constitutional requirements.

The policy of the Union in accordance with this Section shall not prejudice the specific character of the
security and defence policy of certain Member States and shall respect the obligations of certain
Member States, which see their common defence realised in the North Atlantic Treaty
Organisation (NATO), under the North Atlantic Treaty and be compatible with the common security
and defence policy established within that framework.

3. Member States shall make civilian and military capabilities available to the Union for the
implementation of the common security and defence policy, to contribute to the objectives defined by
the Council. Those Member States which together establish multinational forces may also make them
available to the common security and defence policy.

Member States shall undertake progressively to improve their military capabilities. The Agency in the
field of defence capabilities development, research, acquisition and armaments (hereinafter referred to
as ‘the European Defence Agency’) shall identify operational requirements, shall promote measures to
satisfy those requirements, shall contribute to identifying and, where appropriate, implementing any
measure needed to strengthen the industrial and technological base of the defence sector, shall
participate in defining a European capabilities and armaments policy, and shall assist the Council in
evaluating the improvement of military capabilities.

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4. Decisions relating to the common security and defence policy, including those initiating a
mission as referred to in this Article, shall be adopted by the Council acting unanimously on a proposal
from the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy or an initiative from
a Member State. The High Representative may propose the use of both national resources and Union
instruments, together with the Commission where appropriate.

5. The Council may entrust the execution of a task, within the Union framework, to a group of
Member States in order to protect the Union's values and serve its interests. The execution of such a
task shall be governed by Article 44.

6. Those Member States whose military capabilities fulfil higher criteria and which have made
more binding commitments to one another in this area with a view to the most demanding missions
shall establish permanent structured cooperation within the Union framework. Such cooperation shall
be governed by Article 46. It shall not affect the provisions of Article 43.

7. If a Member State is the victim of armed aggression on its territory, the other Member States
shall have towards it an obligation of aid and assistance by all the means in their power, in accordance
with Article 51 of the United Nations Charter. This shall not prejudice the specific character of the
security and defence policy of certain Member States.

Commitments and cooperation in this area shall be consistent with commitments under the
North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, which, for those States which are members of it, remains the
foundation of their collective defence and the forum for its implementation.

Article 43

1. The tasks referred to in Article 42(1), in the course of which the Union may use civilian and
military means, shall include joint disarmament operations, humanitarian and rescue tasks, military
advice and assistance tasks, conflict prevention and peace-keeping tasks, tasks of combat forces in
crisis management, including peace-making and post-conflict stabilisation. All these tasks may
contribute to the fight against terrorism, including by supporting third countries in combating
terrorism in their territories.

2. The Council shall adopt decisions relating to the tasks referred to in paragraph 1, defining their
objectives and scope and the general conditions for their implementation. The High Representative of
the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, acting under the authority of the Council and in close
and constant contact with the Political and Security Committee, shall ensure coordination of the
civilian and military aspects of such tasks.

Article 44

1. Within the framework of the decisions adopted in accordance with Article 43, the Council may
entrust the implementation of a task to a group of Member States which are willing and have the
necessary capability for such a task. Those Member States, in association with the High Representative
of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, shall agree among themselves on the management
of the task.

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2. Member States participating in the task shall keep the Council regularly informed of its progress
on their own initiative or at the request of another Member State. Those States shall inform the Council
immediately should the completion of the task entail major consequences or require amendment of the
objective, scope and conditions determined for the task in the decisions referred to in paragraph 1. In
such cases, the Council shall adopt the necessary decisions.

Article 45

1. The European Defence Agency referred to in Article 42(3), subject to the authority of the
Council, shall have as its task to:

(a) contribute to identifying the Member States' military capability objectives and evaluating
observance of the capability commitments given by the Member States;

(b) promote harmonisation of operational needs and adoption of effective, compatible procurement
methods;

(c) propose multilateral projects to fulfil the objectives in terms of military capabilities, ensure
coordination of the programmes implemented by the Member States and management of specific
cooperation programmes;

(d) support defence technology research, and coordinate and plan joint research activities and the
study of technical solutions meeting future operational needs;

(e) contribute to identifying and, if necessary, implementing any useful measure for strengthening the
industrial and technological base of the defence sector and for improving the effectiveness of
military expenditure.

2. The European Defence Agency shall be open to all Member States wishing to be part of it. The
Council, acting by a qualified majority, shall adopt a decision defining the Agency's statute, seat and
operational rules. That decision should take account of the level of effective participation in the
Agency's activities. Specific groups shall be set up within the Agency bringing together Member States
engaged in joint projects. The Agency shall carry out its tasks in liaison with the Commission where
necessary.

Article 46

1. Those Member States which wish to participate in the permanent structured cooperation
referred to in Article 42(6), which fulfil the criteria and have made the commitments on military
capabilities set out in the Protocol on permanent structured cooperation, shall notify their intention to
the Council and to the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy.

2. Within three months following the notification referred to in paragraph 1 the Council shall
adopt a decision establishing permanent structured cooperation and determining the list of
participating Member States. The Council shall act by a qualified majority after consulting the
High Representative.

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3. Any Member State which, at a later stage, wishes to participate in the permanent structured
cooperation shall notify its intention to the Council and to the High Representative.

The Council shall adopt a decision confirming the participation of the Member State concerned which
fulfils the criteria and makes the commitments referred to in Articles 1 and 2 of the Protocol on
permanent structured cooperation. The Council shall act by a qualified majority after consulting the
High Representative. Only members of the Council representing the participating Member States shall
take part in the vote.

A qualified majority shall be defined in accordance with Article 238(3)(a) of the Treaty on the
Functioning of the European Union.

4. If a participating Member State no longer fulfils the criteria or is no longer able to meet the
commitments referred to in Articles 1 and 2 of the Protocol on permanent structured cooperation, the
Council may adopt a decision suspending the participation of the Member State concerned.

The Council shall act by a qualified majority. Only members of the Council representing the
participating Member States, with the exception of the Member State in question, shall take part in the
vote.

A qualified majority shall be defined in accordance with Article 238(3)(a) of the Treaty on the
Functioning of the European Union.

5. Any participating Member State which wishes to withdraw from permanent structured
cooperation shall notify its intention to the Council, which shall take note that the Member State in
question has ceased to participate.

6. The decisions and recommendations of the Council within the framework of permanent
structured cooperation, other than those provided for in paragraphs 2 to 5, shall be adopted by
unanimity. For the purposes of this paragraph, unanimity shall be constituted by the votes of the
representatives of the participating Member States only.

TITLE VI
FINAL PROVISIONS

Article 47

The Union shall have legal personality.

Article 48
(ex Article 48 TEU)

1. The Treaties may be amended in accordance with an ordinary revision procedure. They may
also be amended in accordance with simplified revision procedures.

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 ANNEX 5

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

 

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



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
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




 



HANDBOOK CSDP   135

 ANNEX 5



             

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


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
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
          
              
             
             

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



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           
               
    

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
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                   

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
              

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




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


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

136   HANDBOOK CSDP

 ANNEX 5



               

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            



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               
            
               

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    
               


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



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

               

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
             

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
               

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
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
             
             


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
           

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
                

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HANDBOOK CSDP   137

 ANNEX 5




                


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

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
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

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138   HANDBOOK CSDP

 ISBN: 978-3-902275-31-8

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