Regional Economic Outlook

INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND
REGIONAL
ECONOMIC
OUTLOOK
SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA
A Tepid and Pricey Recovery
2024
APR
INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND
REGIONAL
ECONOMIC
OUTLOOK
SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA
2024
APR
Copyright ©2024 International Monetary Fund
Cataloging-in-Publication Data
IMF Library
Names: International Monetary Fund, publisher.

Title: Regional economic outlook. Sub-Saharan Africa: a tepid and pricey recovery.
Other titles: Sub-Saharan Africa : a tepid and pricey recovery. | A Tepid and pricey recovery. | Regional economic
outlook: Sub-Saharan Africa.
Description: Washington, DC : International Monetary Fund, 2024. | Apr. 2024. |
Includes bibliographical references.
Identifiers: ISBN 9798400267895 (English Paper)

9798400269769 (ePub)
9798400269783 (Web PDF)

Subjects: LCSH: Africa, Sub-Saharan—Economic conditions. | Economic forecasting—Africa, Sub-Saharan. | Economic
development—Africa, Sub-Saharan. | Africa, Sub-Saharan—Economic policy.
Classification: LCC HC800.R44 2024
The Regional Economic Outlook: Sub-Saharan Africa is published twice a year, in the spring and fall, to review
developments in sub-Saharan Africa. Both projections and policy considerations are those of the IMF staff
and do not necessarily represent the views of the IMF, its Executive Board, or IMF Management.
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A TEPID AND PRICEY RECOVERY iii
Contents
Acknowledgments. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . v
Country Groupings.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . vi
Assumptions and Conventions. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . vii
Executive Summary. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . viii
A Tepid and Pricey Recovery. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

Recent Development: Global Markets Reopen at a Steep Price . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
The Outlook: A Long-Awaited but Tepid Rebound . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
Policy Priorities for Adapting to High Borrowing Costs in a Shock-Prone World . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
Calling for International Support and Solidarity. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
References. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
Statistical Appendix.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
APRIL 2024 • INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND

iv REGIONAL ECONOMIC OUTLOOK—Sub-Saharan Africa
TABLES
Sub-Saharan Africa: Member Countries of Groupings. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . vi
Sub-Saharan Africa: Member Countries of Regional Groupings. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . vi
Sub-Saharan Africa: Country Abbreviations. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . vii
BOX
Box 1. Breaking Down the African Premium. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
Box Figure 1.1. Côte d’Ivoire: Yield to Maturity at Issuance, 2014–24. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
Box Figure 1.2. Regression Estimates, African Premium. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
FIGURES
Figure 1. Sovereign Spreads, 2022–24. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
Figure 2. External Funding Flows of the Public Sector. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
Figure 3. Change in Banks’ Holdings of Government Debt and Private Sector Credit. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
Figure 4. Real Prime Lending Rates, 2021–24. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
Figure 5. Change in GDP Growth Between 2023 and 2024. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
Figure 6. Real GDP Per Capita, 2000–25. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
Figure 7. Geopolitical Risk and Shipping Costs, 2016–23.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
Figure 8. Fiscal Balance Including Grants, 2019–25. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
Figure 9. Median Inflation, December 2021–February 2024. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
Figure 10. Real Monetary Policy Rates, February 2024. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
Figure 11. Actual versus Target Inflation, February 2024 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
Figure 12. Exchange Rates, January 2023–February 2024. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
Figure 13. Stock Exchange Market Capitalization, 2023. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
Figure 14. Sub-Saharan African Low-Income Countries: Gross External Financing Needs, 2020–28.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
STATISTICAL APPENDIX TABLES

SA1. Real GDP Growth and Consumer Prices, Average. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
SA2. Overall Fiscal Balance, Including Grants and Government Debt. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
SA3. Broad Money and External Current Account, Including Grants. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
SA4. External Debt, Official Debt, Debtor Based and Reserves.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND • APRIL 2024

A TEPID AND PRICEY RECOVERY v
Acknowledgments
The April 2024 issue of the Regional Economic Outlook: Sub-Saharan Africa was prepared under the supervision
of Wenjie Chen, Luc Eyraud, and Catherine Pattillo.
Regional Economic Outlook: Sub-Saharan Africa—A Tepid and Pricey Recovery , was prepared by Adrian Alter
(team lead), Cleary Haines, Grace Li, and Thibault Lemaire, under the guidance of Wenjie Chen.
Three analytical notes accompany the April 2024 Regional Economic Outlook: Sub-Saharan Africa:
“Cutting Budget Deficits in Sub-Saharan Africa without Undermining Development”

was prepared by Arthur Sode (team lead) and Jimena Montoya, under the guidance of Antonio David.
“Digging for Opportunity: Harnessing Sub-Saharan Africa’s Wealth in Critical Minerals”

was prepared by Paola Ganum, Athene Laws, Hamza Mighri, Balazs Stadler, Nico Valckx (team lead), and
David Zeledon, under the guidance of Wenjie Chen.
“Building Tomorrow’s Workforce: Education, Opportunity, and Africa’s Demographic Dividend”

was prepared by Michele Fornino (team lead), under the guidance of Andrew Tiffin.
Charlotte Vazquez was responsible for document production.
The editing and production were overseen by Cheryl Toksoz of the Communications Department.

vi REGIONAL ECONOMIC OUTLOOK—Sub-Saharan Africa
Country Groupings
Sub-Saharan Africa: Member Countries of Groupings
Oil Exporters Other Resource- Non-Resource- Middle-Income Low-Income Countries in Fragile

Intensive Intensive Countries Countries and Conflict-Affected
Countries Countries Situations1
Angola Botswana Benin Angola Burkina Faso Burkina Faso
Cameroon Burkina Faso Burundi Benin Burundi Burundi
Chad Central Cabo Verde Botswana Central Cameroon
Congo, African Republic Comoros Cabo Verde African Republic Central African Republic
Republic of Congo, Democratic Côte d’Ivoire Cameroon Chad Chad
Equatorial Guinea Republic of the Eswatini Comoros Congo, Comoros
Gabon Eritrea Ethiopia Congo, Republic of Democratic Congo, Democratic
Nigeria Ghana Gambia, The Côte d’Ivoire Republic of the Republic of the
South Sudan Guinea Guinea-Bissau Equatorial Guinea Eritrea Congo, Republic of
Liberia Kenya Eswatini Ethiopia Eritrea
Mali Lesotho Gabon Gambia, The Ethiopia
Namibia Madagascar Ghana Guinea Guinea-Bissau
Niger Malawi Kenya Guinea-Bissau Mali
Sierra Leone Mauritius Lesotho Liberia Mozambique
South Africa Mozambique Mauritius Madagascar Niger
Tanzania Rwanda Namibia Malawi Nigeria
Zambia São Tomé Nigeria Mali São Tomé and Príncipe
Zimbabwe and Príncipe São Tomé Mozambique South Sudan
Senegal and Príncipe Niger Zimbabwe
Seychelles Senegal Rwanda
Togo Seychelles Sierra Leone
Uganda South Africa South Sudan
Zambia Tanzania
Togo
Uganda
Zimbabwe
1
Fragile and conflict-affected situations as classified by the World Bank, Classification of Fragile and Conflict-Affected Situations, FY2024.
Sub-Saharan Africa: Member Countries of Regional Groupings
The West Economic Common East African Southern African Southern Economic
African and Monetary Market for Community Development African Community of
Economic and Community of Eastern and Community Customs West African
Monetary Union Central African Southern Africa Union States1
States
(WAEMU) (CEMAC) (COMESA) (*EAC-5) (SADC) (SACU) (ECOWAS)
Benin Cameroon Burundi *Burundi Angola Botswana Benin
Burkina Faso Central Comoros Congo, Botswana Eswatini Burkina Faso
Côte d’Ivoire African Republic Congo, Democratic Comoros Lesotho Cabo Verde
Guinea-Bissau Chad Democratic Republic of the Congo, Namibia Côte d’Ivoire
Mali Congo, Republic of Republic of the *Kenya Democratic South Africa Gambia, The
Niger Equatorial Guinea Eritrea *Rwanda Republic of the Ghana
Senegal Gabon Eswatini Somalia Eswatini Guinea
Togo Ethiopia South Sudan Lesotho Guinea-Bissau
Kenya *Tanzania Madagascar Liberia
Madagascar *Uganda Malawi Mali
Malawi Mauritius Niger
Mauritius Mozambique Nigeria
Rwanda Namibia Senegal
Seychelles Seychelles Sierra Leone
Uganda South Africa Togo
Zambia Tanzania
Zimbabwe Zambia
Zimbabwe
1
Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger announced their withdrawal from the Economic Community of West African Sates (ECOWAS) on January 28, 2024.

A TEPID AND PRICEY RECOVERY vii
Assumptions and Conventions

The following conventions are used in this publication:
In tables, ellipsis points (. . .) indicate “not available,” and 0 or 0.0 indicates “zero” or “negligible.” Minor
discrepancies between sums of constituent figures and totals are due to rounding.
An en dash (–) between years or months (for example, 2011–12 or January–June) indicates the years or
months covered, including the beginning and ending years or months; a slash or virgule (/) between
years or months (for example, 2011/12) indicates a fiscal or financial year, as does the abbreviation FY
(for example, FY 2012).
“Billion” means a thousand million; “trillion” means a thousand billion.
“Basis points (bps)” refer to hundredths of 1 percentage point (for example, 25 basis points are equivalent
to ¼ of 1 percentage point).
As used in this publication, the term “country” does not in all cases refer to a territorial entity that is a state as
understood by international law and practice. As used here, the term also covers some territorial entities that are
not states but for which statistical data are maintained on a separate and independent basis.
The boundaries, colors, denominations, and any other information shown on the maps do not imply, on the part
of the International Monetary Fund, any judgment on the legal status of any territory or any endorsement or
acceptance of such boundaries.
Sub-Saharan Africa: Country Abbreviations
AGO Angola CPV Cabo Verde LSO Lesotho SLE Sierra Leone
BDI Burundi ERI Eritrea MDG Madagascar SSD South Sudan
BEN Benin ETH Ethiopia MLI Mali STP São Tomé and Príncipe
BFA Burkina Faso GAB Gabon MOZ Mozambique SWZ Eswatini
BWA Botswana GHA Ghana MUS Mauritius SYC Seychelles
CAF Central African Republic GIN Guinea MWI Malawi TCD Chad
CIV Côte d’Ivoire GMB Gambia, The NAM Namibia TGO Togo
CMR Cameroon GNB Guinea-Bissau NER Niger TZA Tanzania
COD Congo, Democratic Republic of the GNQ Equatorial Guinea NGA Nigeria UGA Uganda
COG Congo, Republic of KEN Kenya RWA Rwanda ZAF South Africa
COM Comoros LBR Liberia SEN Senegal ZMB Zambia
ZWE Zimbabwe

viii REGIONAL ECONOMIC OUTLOOK—Sub-Saharan Africa
Executive Summary
After four turbulent years, sub-Saharan Africa appears finally on the mend. With the easing of global financial conditions,
Côte d’Ivoire, Benin, and Kenya issued Eurobonds earlier this year, ending a two-year hiatus from international markets
for the region. Public debt ratios have broadly stabilized, and some capital flows are making a tentative comeback.
The overall regional outlook is gradually improving, with economic activity tepidly picking up. Growth will rise from
3.4 percent in 2023 to 3.8 percent in 2024, with nearly two thirds of countries anticipating higher growth. Economic
recovery is expected to continue beyond this year, with growth projected to reach 4.0 percent in 2025. In parallel,
median inflation has almost halved from nearly 10 percent in November 2022 to about 6 percent in February 2024.
However, not all is rosy, and the funding squeeze continues. The region’s governments continue to grapple with
financing shortages, high borrowing costs, and rollover risks amid persistently low domestic resource mobilization.
Significant debt repayments are looming this year and next. The financing challenges are forcing countries to cut
essential public spending and redirect development funds to debt service, thereby endangering growth prospects for
future generations.
The funding squeeze partly reflects a reduction in the region’s traditional funding sources, particularly Official
Development Assistance. Gross external financing needs for low-income countries in sub-Saharan Africa are estimated
to exceed $70 billion annually (6 percent of GDP) over the next four years. As concessional sources have become
scarcer, governments are seeking alternative financing options, which are typically associated with higher charges, less
transparency, and shorter maturities.
The cost of borrowing—both domestic and external—has increased and continues to be elevated for many. In 2023,
government interest payments took up 12 percent of its revenues (excluding grants) for the median sub-Saharan
African country, more than doubling from a decade ago. The private sector has also started to feel the pinch from
higher interest rates.
Risks to the outlook remain tilted to the downside. The region continues to be more vulnerable to global shocks,
particularly from weaker external demand and elevated geopolitical risks. Moreover, countries in sub-Saharan Africa face
rising political instability and frequent climate shocks. The region faces a critical year with 18 national elections in 2024.
Similarly, climate shocks are becoming more frequent and widespread, including droughts of unparalleled severity.
Amid current financing constraints and cascading shocks, the international community needs to play a more active role
in assisting the region. In addition, three policy priorities can help countries adapt to these challenges:
Improved public finances focused on revenue mobilization is still the first line of defense against a world of higher
borrowing costs and narrowing funding options. But top priority should be given to minimizing the impact of fiscal
consolidation on lives and livelihoods. On the financing side, there is still a pressing need for concessional funding.
Monetary policy should remain focused on ensuring price stability. As inflation eases, more countries will have space
to cut interest rates. Enhanced coordination between fiscal, monetary, and exchange rate policies is crucial.
Implementing structural reforms such as expediting trade integration and improving the business environment
to attract more foreign direct investments could diversify funding sources and the economy. Sub-Saharan African
countries will need more support from the international community, with multilateral and regional development
banks potentially exploring options to further leverage their balance sheets to support a more inclusive, sustainable,
and prosperous future.
Regional Economic Outlook Notes. A series of analytical notes explore (1) strategies for implementing necessary fiscal
adjustment with minimal negative impact on socio-economic conditions “Cutting Budget Deficits in Sub-Saharan Africa
without Undermining Development”; (2) ways to capitalize on region’s abundant critical mineral resources “Digging
for Opportunity: Harnessing Sub-Saharan Africa’s Wealth in Critical Minerals”, and (3) the importance of stepping
up investment in education “Building Tomorrow’s Workforce: Education, Opportunity, and Africa’s Demographic
Dividend”.

A TEPID AND PRICEY RECOVERY 1
After four turbulent years, the outlook for sub-Saharan Africa is gradually improving. Growth will rise from
3.4 percent in 2023 to 3.8 percent in 2024, with nearly two thirds of countries anticipating higher growth.
Economic recovery is expected to continue beyond this year, with growth projections reaching 4.0 percent
in 2025. Additionally, inflation has almost halved, public debt ratios have broadly stabilized, and several
countries have issued Eurobonds this year, ending a two-year hiatus from international markets. However,
not all is favorable. The funding squeeze persists as the region’s governments continue to grapple with
financing shortages, high borrowing costs, and impending debt repayments. Risks to the outlook remain
tilted to the downside. The region continues to be more vulnerable to global external shocks, as well as the
threat of rising political instability, and frequent climate events. Three policy priorities can help countries
adapt to these challenges: improving public finances without undermining development; monetary policy
focused on ensuring price stability; and implementing structural reforms to diversify funding sources and
economies. Amid these challenges, sub-Saharan African countries will need additional support from the
international community to develop a more inclusive, sustainable, and prosperous future.
A Slow Climb
The region has recovered its footing, but governments are still grappling
with the funding squeeze, high borrowing costs, and rollover risks.
Adapting to a world with tight 2025:

financing conditions and more Continued
prone to shocks requires: recovery
2024:
A tepid
4.0%
rebound
3.8% International
support & solidarity
Diversifying financing sources
and growth opportunities
Maintaining price stability
while supporting growth
Improving public finances without
undermining development

2 REGIONAL ECONOMIC OUTLOOK—Sub-Saharan Africa
Recent Development: Global Markets Reopen at a Steep Price

Emerging from four turbulent years, sub-Saharan Africa appears on the mend …
Figure 1. Sovereign Spreads, 2022–24
At last, the light on the horizon for sub-Saharan Africa’s Figure(Basis
1. Sovereign Spreads,
points, simple average)2022–24
economy seems to shine a little brighter. The region’s (Basis points, simple average)
nearly two-year hiatus from international capital markets
ended with Côte d’Ivoire’s successful Eurobond issuance
1,000 Last Sub-Saharan
in January 2024. Benin and Kenya quickly followed suit, Africa
issuance
capitalizing on the renewed global appetite for African before
debt. This resurgence is further highlighted by the hiatus
750
narrowing in sovereign spreads, following the easing of
Return to
global financial conditions (Figure 1). Eurobond market
500
Similarly, the region has seen a continued improve-
ment in macroeconomic imbalances, a sign of optimism EMBIG
250
highlighted in the October 2023 Regional Economic Jan-22 Jan-23 Jan-24
Outlook: Sub-Saharan Africa—Light on the Horizon? In Sources: Bloomberg Finance, L.P.; and IMF staff calculations.
particular, inflation has come down significantly, with the Note: Sub-Saharan Africa includes Angola, Côte d’Ivoire, Gabon,
Sources: Bloomberg Finance, L.P.; and IMF staff calculations.
Ghana, Kenya, Mozambique, Namibia, Nigeria, Senegal, South
median headline inflation dropping to about 6 percent Note:EMBIG
Sub-Saharan Africa includes
Africa. = Emerging Market BondAngola, Côte d'Ivoire,
Index Global. Data up to
in February 2024 from a peak of nearly 10 percent in Gabon,
March 29, Ghana,
2024. Kenya, Mozambique, Namibia, Nigeria,
November 2022, in part reflecting the effects of monetary Senegal, South Africa. EMBIG = Emerging Market Bond Index
policy tightening across many countries. On the fiscal situation,Global.
theData up to March
authorities 29, 2024.
have continued consolidation
efforts, with the median fiscal deficit narrowing to 4.0 percent of GDP in 2023, the lowest since the onset of the
pandemic. Consequently, public debt ratios have largely stabilized at around 60 percent of GDP in 2023 and are
projected to ease this year.
There are also tentative signs that select capital flows are making a comeback to the region. After several years
of sluggish inflows, foreign direct investment (FDI) into the region rose to 2.0 percent of GDP in 2023, indicating
a continuation of the post-pandemic recovery. Even more promising is the increase in the number of announced
FDI projects in sub-Saharan Africa, which increased by about 10 percent in 2023 from the previous year.
… but the region’s governments are still grappling with a shortage in financing,
high borrowing costs, and rollover risks, …
Unfortunately, not all is rosy. The region is still facing an acute funding squeeze, a situation highlighted in previous
reports. Debt service obligations continue to swell. Preliminary data from last year show a decrease in external
financing sources for the public sector coupled with an uptick in external debt service, leading to the lowest
net external flows for the region’s governments since the Global Financial Crisis (Figure 2). In 2023, government
interest payments took up 12 percent of its revenues (excluding grants) for the median sub-Saharan African
country, more than doubling from a decade ago. Significant external debt repayments are looming this year and
next, including $5.9 billion on Eurobonds in 2024, increasing to $6.2 billion in 2025, along with significant bank
loan repayments—syndicated and bilateral—over the next two years.
This funding squeeze partly reflects a reduction in the region’s traditional funding sources, particularly Official
Development Assistance (ODA)—a critical support for most countries in the region—which has steadily declined
as a percentage of GDP over the past 15 years. This reduction is compounded by the redirection of aid towards
conflicts in Ukraine and Gaza. Moreover, China’s official bilateral lending is also significantly lower than its peak
in 2016. As traditional funding sources have declined over time, governments have sought alternative funding
options. Increased integration in international debt markets and deepening of local financial markets have
made it easier to contract more commercial debt, both domestically and externally, on non-concessional terms.

Figure 2. External Funding Flows of the Public

This significant financial market progress has provided Figure
Sector2. External Funding Flows of the Public
useful access to financing, but they often come with Sector
(Percent of GDP)
higher costs. In the case of syndicated and bilateral (Percent of GDP)
loans from international commercial banks, they are 6
often associated with shorter repayment periods, higher

4 IMF/WB
charges, less transparency, and, in some cases, tied to
collateral pledges, adding to future fiscal burdens and Net ODA
2 external
potentially elevating fiscal risks. flows China
Bonds/loans
0
Even for countries that have re-accessed international Principal
markets, borrowing costs remain high. As of end-March, –2 Interest
the average yield on the region’s Eurobonds for
non-distressed countries was close to 11 percent, –4
significantly higher than the pre-pandemic average Avg. 2010–19 Avg. 2020–22 2023
of 7.3 percent, making it still unaffordable for many. Sources: Dealogic; IMF, World Economic Outlook database;
World Bank, International Debt Statistics database, and IMF
Kenya, for instance, issued a bond at 10.4 percent staff calculations.
yield to maturity, significantly above the 6.9 percent Sources: Dealogic; IMF, World Economic Outlook database; World
Note: Excludes South Africa due to data constraints; but tentative
Bank, International
estimates suggest thatDebt Statistics
adding database.;
the country and IMF
to the sample staffnot
would
yield at issuance of its bond due this year. This allowed
calculations.
change the overall results. Data for 2023 are estimates. “Bonds”
the country to clear most of its immediate debt and pertain to Eurobonds issued before May 2022. “Loans” cover both
Note: Excludes South Africa due to data constraints; but tentative
syndicated and bilateral bank loans. Principal and interest denote
push back repayments by seven years. Similarly, Côte
estimatesonsuggest
payments thatpublicly
public and addingguaranteed
the countrydebt.
to the sample would not
d’Ivoire faced its highest borrowing cost in a decade
change the overall results. Data for 2023 are estimates. "Bonds"
with a USD-denominated Eurobond.1 Sub-Saharan African sovereign issuers have generally been paying higher
pertain to Eurobonds issued before May 2022. "Loans" cover both
yields than equally-risky issuers in other regions, although the often-referenced “African premium” appears to be
syndicated
relatively small. Furthermore, this premium essentially disappears when andcomparing
bilateral banksub-Saharan
loans. PrincipalAfrican
and interest denote
state-
owned enterprises (SOEs) and corporates with similar issuers elsewhere (see Box 1).
… with the private sector also feeling the pinch.

Figure 3. Change in Banks' Holdings of Government Debt
and Private Sector Credit
In recent years, local banks have shown a stronger Figure
(Percent3.
of Change in Banks’ Holdings of
assets; average)
preference to lend to the government than to the private Government Debt and Private Sector Credit
sector. Before the pandemic, banks’ exposure to the (Percent of assets, average)
private sector increased much faster than their exposure 8
to the government, highlighting the region’s progress in

financial development. In contrast, since the pandemic, 6 Public Private
private sector credit as a share of bank assets remained
broadly unchanged, while lending to the government 4
has seen continued increase (Figure 3). This increasing
bank-sovereign nexus could pose financial stability risks 2
in some countries (for example, the Central African
Economic and Monetary Community [CEMAC]),
0
stemming from issues like maturity mismatches, asset Pre-pandemic 2015–19 Post-pandemic 2020–23
concentration, and illiquidity. Sources: IMF, International Financial Statistics; and IMF staff
Sources: IMF, International Financial Statistics; and IMF staff
calculations.
Relatedly, firms’ borrowing costs have increased. calculations.
Note: Data as of December 2023 or latest available.
Domestically, across over half of the region’s countries Note: Data as of December 2023 or latest available.
with available data, the median prime lending rate more than doubled, in real terms, by the end of 2023 from
about 2.5 percent a year earlier (Figure 4). The prime lending rate is usually an indicator of domestic borrowing
1
This bond issuance includes two tranches: 1) a $1.5 billion traditional Eurobond with a 13-year maturity at a yield of 8.5 percent; and
2) a $1.1 billion ESG bond with a 9-year maturity at 7.875 percent. Considering the USD-EUR hedges that were simultaneously
secured, the effective coupon rates in euro terms are 6.85 percent and 6.3 percent, respectively. Following the Eurobond issuance,
Côte d’Ivoire was upgraded to Ba2 stable outlook by Moody’s.

Box 1. Breaking Down the African Premium

Countries from sub-Saharan Africa with market access have historically faced somewhat higher borrowing costs
compared to similar issuers. For instance, Côte d’Ivoire’s (CIV) $2.6 billion Eurobond issuance in January 2024 (at a
weighted-average spread of about 400 basis points) was its most expensive to date, although recent surges in costs can
largely be attributed to the increase in US bond yields (Figure 1.1). CIV’s spread at issuance was 50 basis points above
the pricing of a similar bond from a developing country outside sub-Saharan Africa, with the same rating. This raises
the question of whether there could be an “African premium”—defined as the extra cost African countries pay when
borrowing from international markets that cannot be explained by differences in macroeconomic fundamentals.
However, the analysis in this box finds that the “African premium” is quite modest for sovereigns, and virtually non-
existent for corporations and SOEs. By controlling for issuer-specific fundamentals (proxied by the issuer’s credit rating),
global factors, and bond characteristics, the premium for sovereign Eurobond issuances ranges between 53 and 88
basis points, with a midpoint of 70 basis points (Figure 1.2). This gap widens during global shocks to 120 basis points,
underscoring potential constraints in terms of investor demand and liquidity. However, when focusing on Eurobonds
issued by sub-Saharan African SOEs and corporations, this premium disappears, indicating no significant borrowing
cost differences from counterparts outside the region. One plausible explanation is that most sub-Saharan African
corporations issuing Eurobonds, relative to sovereigns, are generally rated higher, as investment grade, a reflection of
better governance and management standards and healthier balance sheets.
Notably, this box does not address the question of the objectivity of credit ratings, which are taken as given in the
analysis.1 The ratings debate remains inconclusive, with data availability being one of the main obstacles. Moving away
from ratings, Gbohoui and others (2023) and Presbitero and others (2016) have found that, in the secondary market,
the disparities in bond spreads between sub-Saharan African countries and their counterparts elsewhere are primarily
due to weaker economic and political fundamentals, including the risk of conflict, default history, and structural issues.
Specifically, challenges related to governance, transparency, and public finance management in sub-Saharan Africa are
significant factors that contribute to higher spreads.
Figure 1.1. Côte d'Ivoire: Yield to Maturity at Figure 1.2. Sub-Saharan Africa: Regression
Box Figure 2014–24
Issuance, 1.1. Côte d’Ivoire: Yield to Maturity at Box Figure 1.2. Regression Estimates,
Estimates, African Premium
Issuance, 2014–24
(Percent, annual) African Premium
(Basis points)
(Percent, annual) (Basis points) 2014
9 140 15
8 120
16
Non-crisis Crisis Over the cycle
7 CIV yield-to-maturity 17
418 bps 100
6 18
CIV historical average yield 80
5 19
4 60 20
3 329 bps 40 21
2 22
20
1 US 10-year yield 23
0
0 24
Sovereigns State-owned Corporates
2014 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 enterprises
Sources: Bloomberg Finance, L.P.; and IMF staff calculations. Sources: Dealogic; and IMF staff calculations.
Note: The average intrayear 10-year bond yield is used for Note: The coefficients depicted in this figure are from pooled
Sources: Dealogic; and IMF staff calculations.
the United States, which is the proxy for the risk-free rate with regressions with time (quarter) and rating
Sources:
similar Bloomberg
maturity as Côte Finance, L.P.; and bps
d’Ivoire issuances. IMF=staff
basis points;
Note: The coefficients depicted in this figure are fixed effects, where
from pooled
the dependent
regressions with timevariable
(quarter)isandthe yield
rating fixedtoeffects,
maturity fortheeach
where
CIVcalculations.
= Côte d’Ivoire. Eurobondvariable
issuance.
Note: The average intrayear 10-year bond yield is used for dependent is theThe
yield set of countries
to maturity considered are
for each Eurobond
all emerging markets and developing ecoonomies. Other
issuance. The set of countries considered are all emerging markets
the United States, which is the proxy for the risk-free rate controls include tranche size and maturity and a Group of
and developing ecoonomies. Other controls include tranche size and
with similar
This box maturity as
was prepared byCIV issuances.
Adrian Alter. BPS = basis points. Twenty (G20) dummy. Robust standard errors are utilized.
maturity and a Group of Twenty (G20) dummy. Robust standard
Crisis years refer to 2008–09, 2015–16, and 2020–21. Sample
CIV = Côte d'Ivoire. errors are utilized. Crisis years refer to 2008–09, 2015–16, and 2020–
period: 2006–24.
21. Sample period: 2006–24.
1
For more details about this debate see Griffith-Jones and Kraemer (2021) and Fofack (2021), which discuss potential perception
biases by credit rating agencies in the context of Africa and EMDEs, more generally.

Figure 4. Real Prime Lending Rates, 2021–24
(Percent, median)
costs for top-rated corporations, thus, interest rates Figure 4. Real Prime Lending Rates, 2021–24
for loans to smaller enterprises are likely even higher, (Percent, median)
10
reflecting lower access to financial services, lack of strong
8
collateral, and greater default risks. In parallel, firms with Interquartile range
international market access have borrowed more from 6
abroad, increasing their leverage and borrowing costs. 4
For instance, the median corporate spread for syndicated 2
loans (over the respective benchmark) increased from 350 0
basis points prior to the pandemic to 580 basis points in
–2
2023. Going forward, a prolonged period of elevated
–4
interest rates could affect corporate credit quality by
raising borrowing costs, and impairing firms’ profitability –6
Jan-21 Jul-21 Jan-22 Jul-22 Jan-23 Jul-23 Jan-24
and their capacity to repay debt.
Sources: Haver Analytics; and IMF staff calculations.
Moreover, several countries are facing challenges like foreignSources: Haver Analytics;
currency and IMF or
shortages staffimport
calculations.
restrictions
(for example, Angola, Chad, Ethiopia, Kenya, and Nigeria) which have complicated business operations. This
comes at a time when companies in the region have just turned a leaf and returned to pre-pandemic profitability.
The ability of countries to respond to current challenges is further constrained by

rising uncertainty and shocks.
These financing challenges have forced many countries to reduce essential public spending, including capital
investments, and diverted resources critical for development to debt service. The liquidity squeeze is imperiling
the growth prospects of the region’s future generations, as funds are sorely lacking to address the vast develop-
ment needs, intensified by the pandemic’s scarring effects. For instance, nearly 3 in 10 school-age children are
not attending primary and secondary education. Of those who do enroll in primary school, only about 65 percent
complete it, compared to the global average of 87 percent (Analytical Note “Building Tomorrow’s Workforce:
Education, Opportunity, and Africa’s Demographic Dividend”). Beyond health, education, and infrastructure, food
insecurity remains a key challenge in the region. As of 2023, an estimated 140 million people across the region,
including a significant number in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Nigeria, are grappling with acute
food insecurity, with policymakers facing constraints in their ability to respond effectively given limited fiscal space.
Meanwhile, the region also faces rising political instability and climate shocks that hinder growth, strain limited
resources, and could increase social tensions:
Political instability is intensifying the challenges in sub-Saharan Africa, dampening growth through height-
ened policy uncertainty and diminished investor confidence. Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger left the Economic
Community of West African States (ECOWAS) in January 2024, following prolonged political discord stemming
from recent coups. This move exacerbates uncertainty and geoeconomic fragmentation in a region already
struggling with fragility, poverty, and food insecurity. Sub-Saharan Africa faces a critical year in 2024 with 18
national elections, including presidential, scheduled mainly in its western and southern parts. The delay in the
presidential election in Senegal created further political uncertainties in the region. More generally, political
instability surrounding elections has been found to not only incur macroeconomic costs but also trigger longer-
term fiscal adjustments at the expense of public investment (Ebeke and Ölçer 2013). Additionally, it also poses
risks of policy reversals (Gaspar, Gupta, and Mulas-Granados 2017).
Climate change is also exacerbating sub-Saharan Africa’s struggles, weighing on agricultural yields and labor
productivity in an already-vulnerable region. Last year, the hottest on record globally, hit the region hard.
Malawi and Mozambique faced devastating cyclones, while long and severe droughts in the Horn of Africa
gave way to sudden flash floods in November. South Sudan’s prolonged floods have aggravated food scarcity.
Parts of southern Africa are now suffering from an unprecedented drought, with the early months of 2024—
a crucial period for cultivating crops—recording the lowest levels of rainfall in the last 40 years. In central Africa,

the Congo Basin has been experiencing its worst flooding in nearly six decades. These weather extremes take a
heavy toll on human lives and stymie development, stretching government resources thin and leaving the most
vulnerable to suffer disproportionately.
The Outlook: A Long-Awaited but Tepid Rebound

Despite a projected growth rebound this year, the5. upturn
Figure Change inisGDP
modest, andBetween
Growth from the
recovery remains markedly uneven, … 2023 and 2024
(Percentage
Figure 5.points)
Change in GDP Growth Between 2023
After two years of slow growth, the region’s outlook is
mildly improving as a whole, with growth expected to and 2024
(Percentage points)
rise from 3.4 percent in 2023 to 3.8 percent in 2024.
Two thirds of countries in the region anticipate faster Sub-Saharan Africa
growth compared to 2023, with a median growth
Oil exporters excluding Nigeria
acceleration of 0.6 percentage point. The growth pick-up
in 2024 varies significantly across country groups, Nigeria
primarily driven by a rebound among oil exporters, Other resource-intensive
excluding Nigeria, with growth for that group projected countries
to increase by 1.5 percentage points to 3.1 percent Non-resource-intensive countries
(Figure 5). Meanwhile, diversified economies, which
–0.5 0.0 0.5 1.0 1.5
have been enjoying persistently high growth rates, are
Sources: IMF, World Economic Outlook database; and IMF staff
expected to see their growth remain unchanged. calculations.
Sources: IMF, World Economic Outlook database; and
For 2024, growth rates also vary widely by country. South Africa’s growth
IMF staff is projected at only 0.9 percent for 2024,
calculations.
hampered by persistent energy shortages and logistical challenges at ports and railways. Nigeria is expected
to grow by 3.3 percent in 2024, a slight improvement from 2023, supported by its oil sector. Notably, Niger and
Senegal are among the region’s fastest-growing economies, projected to expand by 10.4 percent and 8.3 percent
in 2024, respectively, thanks to oil and gas projects coming online. Overall, the growth divergence between
resource-intensive and non-resource-intensive (diversified) countries is expected to persist—a long-standing
pattern, becoming particularly entrenched since the commodity-price shock of 2015, with the former group of
countries projected to grow at 3.0 percent, and the latter at 5.7 percent in 2024.
In 2025, sub-Saharan Africa is projected to grow by 4.0 percent, with private consumption and investment
continuing their recovery. In the baseline, other frontier markets beyond Côte d’Ivoire, Benin, and Kenya are
expected to start issuing in 2025 or later. This will help ease the funding squeeze in those countries and support
the recovery. In the medium term, the region’s growth is anticipated to stabilize at around 4.3 percent, with
non-resource-intensive countries expected to grow almost twice as fast as their resource-heavy counterparts,
6.2 percent compared to 3.5 percent.
… and when accounting for population growth, the income gap with the rest of
the world is widening.
The growth pick-up masks another critical concern: the stalled progress in per capita income convergence, a
challenge magnified by the region’s unparalleled population growth. From 2000 to 2024, sub-Saharan Africa’s
real income per person grew by almost 75 percent, outstripping that of advanced economies, who only saw a
35 percent increase. Nonetheless, this achievement dims when comparing to emerging market and developing
economies (EMDEs) outside the region, where real income per person more than tripled over the same period
(Figure 6). More worryingly, since 2014, growth in sub‑Saharan Africa’s real per capita income has seen a marked
slowdown, diverging further away from other EMDEs.

The expected rebound is subject to significantFigure

risks6. and uncertainties.
Real GDP Per Capita, 2000–25
Importantly, the growth pick-up is linked intricately Figure
(Index,6. Real
2000 GDP Per Capita, 2000–25
= 100) 0
to domestic and global developments. Domestically, (Index, 2000 = 100) 0
the economic outlook hinges on the effectiveness of 380 0
Other emerging market and 0
ongoing domestic reforms. In South Africa, efforts to 330 developing economies
mitigate the energy crisis through improved electricity 0
280 Non-resource-
supply are underway but electoral uncertainties loom intensive 0
countries 0
large which could derail the reform momentum. Nigeria 230
Sub-
0
is developing a comprehensive private sector-led 180
Saharan
Africa 0
growth agenda, by addressing long-standing distortions
130 Resource-intensive 1
in the foreign exchange market, boosting oil production, countries 1
and enhancing revenue mobilization. 80 1
2000 5 10 15 20 25 Proj.
1
With the likelihood of a hard landing receding as adverse Sources: IMF, World Economic Outlook database; and IMF
staff calculations. 1
supply shocks unwind, risks to the global outlook are
Note: The series show the evolution of GDP per capita in Pconstant 1
broadly balanced. There is scope for further upside local currency. Country group composites are calculated as the 1
surprises to global growth, including faster disinflation, arithmetic average of data for individual countries weighted by GDP
Sources: IMF, Worldpower
Economic
valued at purchasing parityOutlook database;
as a share and GDP.
of total group 1
and faster economic recovery in China. However, risks to IMF staff calculations. 1
the outlook for sub-Saharan Africa seem more tilted to the downside,
Note: Thewith the
series following
show global
the evolution shocks
of GDP per particularly
capita 1
relevant for the region:2 in constant local currency. Country group composites 2
are calculated as the arithmetic average of data for 2
A faltering global economy. In a downside scenario where individual
majorcountries weighted
economies likebyChina
GDP valued
and theat European 2
purchasing
Union underperform, global growth would suffer a substantial and power parity
lasting as a shareThis
slowdown. of total group GDP.
external demand 2
SSA = sub-Saharan Africa.
shock would have notable repercussions for sub-Saharan Africa, affecting the region through several channels 2
including lower export demand, exchange rate depreciation, a decline in remittances sent by the African 2
diaspora, and lower commodity prices. As a result, growth in sub-Saharan Africa would be about 1 percentage
point lower than in the baseline for 2024 and 2025, with oil exporters being hit the hardest. However, with
declining commodity prices and quicker disinflation, monetary policies would relax more rapidly, setting the
stage for a modest growth recovery in 2026.
Elevated geopolitical risks. An escalation of the conflict in theFigure
Middle 7. East
Geopolitical Risk in
would result and Shipping
further Costs, to
disruptions
supply chains, transportation routes, and commodity 2016–23
Figure 7. Geopolitical Risk and Shipping Costs,
production, ultimately driving up the prices of (Index, 2022 = 100)
2016–23
commodities and shipping costs (Figure 7). Relative to (Index, 2022 = 100)
the baseline, oil and gas prices would be (on average) 500
15 percent higher in both 2024 and 2025. At the same
time, prices of agricultural goods and processed food 400
would rise. Model simulations suggest that the overall Geopolitical

300
negative growth impact on sub-Saharan Africa would
be relatively muted. However, countries in the region 200
that are less reliant on natural resources would expe-
rience a significant downturn, with growth lower by 100
about 1.3 percentage points in 2024. Importantly, Baltic dry index
0
inflation would remain elevated for a longer period Dec-15 Dec-17 Dec-19 Dec-21 Dec-23
across the region, deviating upward from baseline Sources: Caldara and Iacoviello (2022); Haver Analytics; and IMF
projections by about 1.9 and 1.5 percentage points in staffSources: Caldara and Iacoviello (2022); Haver
calculations.
2024 and 2025, respectively. Analytics;
Note: Caldara and Iacoviello
IMF staff calculations.
(2022) data downloaded on February
16, Note:
2024, Caldara
from https://matteoiacoviello.com/gpr.htm.
and Iacoviello (2022) data downloaded
2 on February
The two downside risk scenarios are consistent with the global risk scenarios presented16, in
2024, from 2024 World Economic Outlook
the April
https://matteoiacoviello.com/gpr.htm.
report. To quantify the downside scenarios, model simulations are presented in this section based on the AFRMOD—a module part
of the flexible system of global models developed by Andrle and others (2015)— which is one of the IMF’s workhorse macroeconomic
models.

On top of the global economic risks, sub-Saharan Africa faces increasing region-specific risks (see also IMF 2024).
The risk of social and political tensions has increased significantly because of mounting geopolitical fragmenta-
tion, coups d’état, and a cost-of-living crisis that has left many behind, worsened by the effects of climate change.
Rising social tensions and many upcoming elections raise concerns that efforts to reforms may slow, undercutting
momentum. In particular, growth may be adversely affected by the following:
Heightened security risks: The region now has one of the highest rates of terrorist attacks worldwide.3 Social
tensions and the prospect of further violence remain elevated in Ethiopia despite a peace deal. The security
situation also remains challenging in several other countries including Burkina Faso, Chad, the Democratic
Republic of the Congo, Mali, Mozambique, and Nigeria. Moreover, the intensifying conflict in Sudan could
further harm the economy and humanitarian conditions in nearby countries. As of March 2024, the UNHCR has
reported that since the conflict began in April 2023, almost 1.3 million refugees, asylum-seekers, and returnees
have arrived in South Sudan, Chad, Ethiopia, and the Central African Republic. Beyond the tragic human losses
and disruptions to economic activity, violence and conflict further strain tight budgets, including because of the
surge in security spending.
Climate risks: If the drought in southern Africa continues, the negative impact on the 2024 economic outlook
could be significant in some countries, and the drought would also put pressures on external balances and
public spending. Moreover, this could exacerbate the food insecurity situation in sub-Saharan Africa, posing a
major humanitarian challenge and weighing on productivity and economic prospects.
Policy Priorities for Adapting to High Borrowing Costs in a Shock-Prone

World
Although the region is finally showing signs of recovery, many countries face high borrowing costs and continue
to grapple with tight financing constraints and ongoing debt vulnerabilities. These difficulties are compounded by
a more shock-prone world.4 Adapting to these challenges requires a resolute package of strong domestic reforms
and external support. Domestically, there is a need for continued tightening in fiscal policy, while minimizing
the harm on economic development. Monetary policy should remain focused on ensuring price stability, while
complementing fiscal efforts and supporting growth provided inflation is easing. Implementing structural reforms
targeted at broadening funding sources and diversifying the economy will be crucial to adapt to a high interest
rate environment and build resilience. Recognizing that these reforms will take time to deliver results, there is
pressing need for countries to mobilize funding at lower costs, including from international partners.
Fiscal policy: improving public finances without undermining development

Over the past decade, the fiscal position of many sub-Saharan African countries has deteriorated, a trend
exacerbated by repeated shocks and the ensuing demand for fiscal support. This has led to heightened debt
vulnerabilities across the region. In response, policy efforts are now focusing on rebuilding fiscal buffers and
reducing debt to strengthen borrowing capacity. Some countries face more urgency for fiscal tightening due
to an acute funding squeeze, driven by rising debt service costs and limited access to financing. Together with
currency depreciations, this has intensified funding constraints. For instance, Ethiopia became the latest country in
the region to default, failing to make a Eurobond coupon payment in December 2023.
Most countries in sub-Saharan Africa have started adjusting their public finances. About two thirds of countries
have already improved their fiscal balances in 2023, with expectations for fiscal deficits to fall from a median of
5.2 percent of GDP in 2022 to 3.7 percent of GDP in 2024 (Figure 8). Although the approaches to fiscal adjustment
3
Sub-Saharan Africa accounted for nearly 50 percent of global terrorism deaths in 2022 (Vision of Humanity’s Global Terrorism Index
2022 report).
4
See also Box 1.1 in the April 2024 World Economic Outlook.

Figure 8. Fiscal Balance Including Grants, 2019–

vary by country, about 40 percent of those undergoing Figure 8. Fiscal Balance Including Grants,
25
consolidation are frontloading their efforts. For instance, 2019–25
(Median, percent of GDP)
among the group of countries reducing their fiscal deficit (Median, percent of GDP)
over a three-year period from 2022 to 2025, the median 0
Interquartile range
country undertook almost half of the total adjustment in the
initial year, 2023.
–3
In terms of composition, the ongoing fiscal adjustment efforts
are roughly evenly split: nearly half are focused on increasing
revenue, whereas the other half consist in reducing spending. –6
On the latter, about half of the countries in consolidation,
such as Botswana, Cameroon, and Kenya, are focusing on
preserving their investment-to-GDP ratios while cutting –9
current spending. The rest intends to reduce capital expen- 2019 20 21 22 23 24 Proj. 25 Proj.
ditures by an average of 1.4 percent of GDP, which may slow Source: IMF, World Economic Outlook database.
future growth.
Source: IMF, World Economic Outlook database.
With rising needs, limited financing options, and borrowing costs remaining high, fiscal tightening in sub-Saharan
Africa has to be carried out in a way that meets the country-specific needs while minimizing harm to its economy
and people. This will require, in particular:
Boosting revenues. To implement the necessary adjustment, while protecting economic growth and social
welfare, it is key to focus on boosting revenues rather than cutting essential spending (although there is also
scope to improve expenditure efficiency as discussed further below). Emphasizing tax increases offers a way to
raise more funds without hurting investments in key areas like infrastructure, health, and education. The region
faces a tax gap, defined as the difference between the levels of tax potential and tax collection, estimated at
around 5 percent of GDP (Analytical Note “Cutting Budget Deficits in Sub-Saharan Africa Without Undermining
Development”). This suggests a big opportunity to increase revenue through smarter tax policies and better
administration. Simplifying the tax system, widening the tax base, improving tax compliance, and using tech-
nology can make tax collection more effective. The success of electronic sales registers in Ethiopia is a good
example of how technology can help. Creating a medium-term revenue strategy that outlines both policy changes
and administrative improvements can guide reforms, making them easier to implement and more credible. With
technical support from the IMF, countries such as Benin, Cameroon, Ethiopia, Rwanda, and Togo are developing
these strategies, while Kenya, Liberia, Senegal, and Uganda are already putting them into action. An additional
benefit from higher revenues is that it boosts a country’s borrowing capacity and credit-worthiness, thus, lowering
its future borrowing costs.
Pacing the adjustment. Ideally, spreading out fiscal tightening over time would prevent sudden, disruptive
changes. A more backloaded adjustment path would also allow for more time to implement important reforms
and establish measures to ease the impact. However, many countries face urgent fiscal pressures due to the
ongoing funding squeeze. Taking immediate steps towards fiscal consolidation may not only be unavoidable but
could also strengthen confidence in the region’s adjustment efforts. The specific approach to reducing deficits will
vary by country. For instance, for countries rich in natural resources, a more gradual approach to fiscal tightening
may be warranted given that fuel commodity prices are projected to remain relatively low in the medium term.
Building public trust. Gaining public support is pivotal for the success of fiscal consolidation plans. This involves
clear communication about the importance of fiscal adjustments, their potential benefits, and the risks of delaying
action, despite some short-term downsides for certain groups. Strategies for winning over the public include
targeted support to help those most affected, carefully planning the order of reforms, and demonstrating the
government’s dedication to managing finances responsibly and transparently.

Dealing with elevated debt burdens. There are significant debt vulnerabilities in the region, with 19 out of 35
low-income countries in sub-Saharan Africa either in debt distress or at high risk of distress as of end-2023. Besides
fiscal consolidation, some countries can also adopt additional measures including enhancing debt reporting, refi-
nancing and—in collaboration with creditors—extending loan maturities and spreading out repayments. Improving
public financial management and risk management, boosting fiscal transparency, and monitoring state-owned
enterprises are key to help control “stock-flow adjustments,” triggered by issues like accrued arrears, increased
off-budget spending, and expanded guarantees. However, several countries (Chad, Ethiopia, Ghana and Zambia)
in the region are currently in the process of restructuring their debt under the G20 Common Framework for Debt
Treatment. The coordination among creditors has been challenging but there has been some progress as well.
Ghana reached an agreement-in-principle on a debt treatment with its official bilateral creditors in January 2024,
in under half the time required for Chad two years prior, and Ethiopia’s debt standstill at the end of 2023 was also
a positive development. After reaching an agreement with official creditors in June 2023, the Zambian authorities
and the Eurobond holders’ Steering Committee agreed on a debt treatment in line with program parameters and
comparability of treatment set under the G20 Common Framework, in March 2024. Steps to improve this process
further include the introduction of the Global Sovereign Debt Roundtable created by the IMF, World Bank, and
the G20 to better coordinate creditors and address restructuring issues.
Monetary policy: maintaining price stability while supporting growth

Headline inflation in sub-Saharan Africa has been Figure
Figure 9. 9. MedianInflation,
Median Inflation, December
December 2021–
2021–
declining since reaching its peak in November 2022, February
February 20242024
with the situation varying across countries (Figure 9). (Percent, year over year)
(Percent, year over year)
Ideally, monetary policy can complement fiscal efforts 26
Countries where inflation
and support growth. However, based on latest available is still increasing or volatile
22
data from February 2024, roughly a third of the countries
still face double-digit inflation, largely due to signifi- 18
cant currency depreciations (notably in Angola, Malawi,
14
Nigeria, Zambia and Zimbabwe). Even among countries Sub-Saharan Africa
with a marked decline in inflation, only a select few have 10
reduced policy interest rates over the past 12 months
6 Countries where inflation
(Botswana, Ghana, and Mozambique). The majority have is declining
opted to continue tightening or maintain elevated policy 2
Dec-21 Jun-22 Dec-22 Jun-23 Dec-23
rates, even after inflation has passed its peak.
Sources: Country authorities; Haver Analytics; and IMF staff
calculations.
This cautious stance in monetary policy stems from two
Note: CountryCountry
Sources: groupings, consisting
authorities; of a fixed
Haver set of and
Analytics; countries,
IMF
key factors. First, median core inflation only recently are categorized based on the evolution of inflation over the past
staff calculations.
three months. In over half of the countries, inflation is declining.
approached the levels seen before the pandemic. Second,
Note: Country groupings are based on evolution of inflation
sub-Saharan African countries started their monetary for the last 3 months. In over half of the countries, inflation
tightening cycles later than other EMDEs, leaving them to play catch-up
is declining.while many EMDEs have started easing
since the second half of 2023. This timing has resulted in a delayed cycle of tight monetary conditions, with the
region’s median policy rate peaking roughly 12 months later than in other EMDEs.
Nonetheless, signs are growing that more countries in the region could soon have more space to lower interest
rates. This is demonstrated by monetary policy rates in real terms becoming increasingly positive across the region
(Figure 10). Furthermore, about half of the countries with an implicit or explicit inflation target have already seen
inflation return below or within their target bands as of February 2024 (Figure 11).
Policymakers grappling with high borrowing costs, repercussions of fiscal adjustments, and mediocre growth face
the delicate task of balancing price stability and cushioning the negative impact of fiscal consolidation where
possible. In particular:

Figure 10. Real Monetary Policy Rates, February

About half of the countries in 2024
the region show Figure 10. Real Monetary Policy Rates,
(Percent)
clear signs of easing inflationary pressures, with February 2024
inflation already below or within their target bands. (Percent)
Central banks may consider gradually easing to a Ghana
Congo, Dem. Rep.
more neutral policy stance. This move would allow Mozambique
for more accommodative financing conditions, Malawi
Kenya
boosting private investment and mitigating the Uganda
impact of fiscal consolidation. CEMAC
Eswatini
In nearly one third of the countries, inflation is The Gambia
Tanzania
trending lower but moderately exceeds targets.
Zambia
A “pause” in policy tightening may be warranted to Based on end-2024
South Africa
inflation
ensure confidence in achieving price stability. Namibia
Lesotho Based on end-2023
Rwanda inflation
As for the rest, where inflation significantly exceeds
Seychelles
target policy rate and continues to rise, policymakers Angola
should decisively tighten monetary policy until WAEMU
Guinea
inflation is firmly on a downward trajectory and Mauritius
projected to return to the central bank’s target Nigeria
Botswana
range. Maintaining price stability should be the Sierra Leone (-30)
immediate goal, and policies to reduce inflation –20 –15 –10 –5 0 5 10 15
can be accompanied by measures to alleviate the
Sources: Haver Analytics; IMF International Financial Statistics
cost-of-living crisis. Where monetary financing
Sources: Haver Analytics;isand IMF International
database; Financial
and IMF staff calculations.
Statistics
common, ending this practice and implementing database; and IMF staff calculations.
Note: CEMAC = Central African Economic and Monetary
Note: CEMAC = Central African Community,
Economic andWAEMUMonetary= West African Economic and Monetary Union.
sterilization are essential (for example,
Community, Ethiopia). In African Economic and
WAEMU = West
cases where monetary policy is Monetary
too accommodative
Union.
Figure 11. Sub-Saharan Africa: Actual versus
and contributing to inflation, central banks should Figure 11.Inflation,
Actual versus Target
Target February 2024Inflation,
withdraw excess liquidity, particularly if monetary February 2024
(Number of countries)
policy transmission is impaired (Angola, CEMAC, (Number of countries)
Nigeria). 20
18
More generally, enhanced coordination between 16
fiscal, monetary, and exchange rate policies is crucial 14
12
to prevent excessively loose monetary conditions
10
that might restart inflationary pressures. For instance, 8
monetary policy tightening could be particularly 6
relevant when fiscal adjustments lead to higher inflation 4
(for example, due to the removal of energy subsidies). 2
0
However, higher monetary policy rates could raise Below or within band Moderately above Markedly above
financing costs, contributing to higher government Sources: Country authorities; Haver Analytics; and IMF staff
interest payments. This needs to be accommodated Sources: Country authorities; Haver Analytics; and
calculations.
within the existing budget. Clear forward-looking Note:IMF staff calculations.
Inflation data refers to February 2024, or the latest available.
Moderately above = between the upper bound of band and twice
communication on policy goals including by disclosing the upper bound. Markedly above = exceeding twice the upper
details about the timing of policy actions could bound of band.
effectively manage market expectations and minimize uncertainty.
Exchange rate pressures and foreign currency shortages remain major concerns for policymakers. In 2023, most
currencies in the region depreciated against the US dollar (Figure 12). The slower increase in monetary policy
rates in sub-Saharan African countries compared to advanced economies contributed to the region’s exchange
rate depreciations. Other factors include decreased capital inflows, headwinds to exports, and the monetization
of high fiscal deficits in few countries.

g g
For countries with a flexible exchange rate regime and Figure 12. Exchange Rates, January 2023–
Rates, January 2023–February 2024
persistent exchange rate pressures, a combination of February 2024
(Percent change versus US dollar)
exchange rate adjustment, monetary policy tightening (Percent change versus US dollar)
and targeted measures to alleviate the adverse CEMAC/WAEMU
effects continues to be needed. The policy response Guinea
Mozambique
is constrained by the modest level of external buffers, Madagascar
with about 80 percent of the countries having reserves Seychelles
Mauritius
below 5 months of imports at end-2023. Moreover, the Uganda
use of import restrictions and administrative measures Ethiopia
Botswana
are particularly discouraged as they are distortive and The Gambia
deter economic activity and investment. For countries Tanzania
South Africa
with pegged regimes, the main objective is to maintain Kenya
an adequate level of foreign exchange reserves, aligning Sierra Leone
Rwanda
policy rates with their respective anchor currency policy Liberia
rate to preserve external stability. Ghana
Zambia
Congo, Dem. Rep.
Structural reforms: broadening Burundi
Malawi
financing sources and diversifying Angola
growth opportunities Nigeria
-80 -70 -60 -50 -40 -30 -20 -10 0
Past reports’ recommendations on structural reforms
Sources: Bloomberg Finance L.P.; and IMF staff calculations.
remain relevant for driving growth and development
Note: CEMAC = Central African Economic and Monetary
in sub-Saharan Africa. However, in a context marked by Community; WAEMU = West African Economic and Monetary Union.
higher borrowing costs and a more shock-prone world,
the structural policy priorities outlined below target these specific challenges.
Navigating higher borrowing costs entails finding more affordable and stable alternative financing sources but
also spending more wisely:
Attracting foreign direct investment. The role of FDI has been vital for development in many emerging market
economies, where it has provided stable financing, technology access, and job creation. However, sub-Saharan
Africa captures a mere 3 percent of global FDI. Given high borrowing costs, prioritizing cost-effective and viable
reforms becomes essential to mobilize more FDI. Focusing on reforms that ensure macroeconomic stability and
reduce policy uncertainty can already elevate investor confidence. Other effective measures include enhancing
the business environment, leveling the playing field between public and private firms, reducing red tape, and
improving governance. For instance, Senegal dramatically shortened the setup time for new businesses from
two months to just 48 hours by streamlining administrative processes and reducing transactions costs. This
move greatly contributed to enhancing its attractiveness to investors, as seen in the rise of net FDI inflows from
1.6 percent of GDP in 2012 to 9.3 percent in 2022, including in the hydrocarbon sector.
Fostering domestic financial markets. Developing domestic markets could also offer an alternative funding source
for the region. So far, these markets are less developed compared to other regions. Excluding South Africa, the
average stock exchange market capitalization is less than 20 percent of a country’s GDP, significantly lower than
the 50 percent in other EMDEs and far below the 126 percent in advanced economies (Figure 13). Strengthening
financial markets requires building strong institutional frameworks that safeguard property rights and contract
enforcement, promoting bank competition, and enhancing financial infrastructure. Like in the case of attracting
FDI, governments also need to ensure economic stability as well as increase transparency and reduce risks. In
turn, better domestic financial markets would allow for more productive use of savings—often kept as nonfinancial
assets—by converting them into investment capital. Given that small and medium enterprises constitute the
majority of the region’s private sector, fostering financial inclusion through the development of mobile banking,
microfinance and financial literacy would improve these enterprises’ access to funding.

Figure 13. Stock Exchange Market

Capitalization, 2023 Improving the quality and efficiency of public
Figure 13. Stock Exchange Market Capitalization,
(Percent of GDP, average)
2023 spending. Facing higher borrowing costs and tighter
(Percent of GDP, average) financing constraints, it is vital to spend every penny
120 wisely to ensure the highest return possible. However,
sub-Saharan African countries have to bridge a signifi-
100
cant gap in public spending efficiency, with nearly half
80 of the potential value from public investments going
60 unrealized—significantly worse than the 34 percent inef-
ficiency found in other emerging market economies
40
in 2020.5 This calls for a more strategic approach in
20 project selection, ensuring transparent procurement,
0 and minimizing project management costs. Investments
Advanced economies Emerging market and Sub-Saharan Africa ² should prioritize sectors with high private and social
developing economies¹
returns including infrastructure, education, and health-
Sources: IMF, World Economic Outlook database; World Federation
of Exchanges; and IMF staff calculations. care, aligning with sustainable development goals.
Note: The sample
Sources: includes
IMF, World 79 stockOutlook
Economic exchanges from 70 World
database; countries. Moreover, fighting corruption can enhance investment
1
Excluding
Federationsub-Saharan Africa.
of Exchanges; andExcluding
2
IMF staffSouth Africa.
calculations. quality and bolster public trust.
Note: The sample includes 79 stock exchanges from 70
Incountries.
a shock-prone world, diversifying sources of economic growth is vital to lessen volatility and build resilience:
1 Excluding sub-Saharan Africa.
Accelerating economic
2 Excluding South Africa. diversification. Natural resource-intensive countries in the region represent nearly
three quarters of the region’s aggregate GDP as of 2022. This heavy reliance exposes them to the volatility of
global commodity prices. Moreover, the eight oil exporters are expected to see a significant reduction in their
oil revenues, projected to be only half of their 2020 levels by 2050, under a conservative transition scenario
towards clean energy (Analytical note “Managing Oil Price Uncertainty and the Energy Transition”, October 2022).
To mitigate these risks and build resilience, diversifying their economies away from oil is crucial. This includes
expanding into manufacturing, services, and technology. For countries in the region rich in critical minerals that
are essential for the clean energy transition, diversification could entail moving from extracting and exporting
raw minerals to processing them, thereby increasing value added, creating higher-skilled jobs, and fostering
technological spillovers (Analytical Note “Digging for Opportunity: Harnessing Sub-Saharan Africa’s Wealth in
Critical Minerals”). Over the medium term, encouraging policies that support innovation, skill development, and
better logistics and connectivity are key to achieving a structural transformation that makes the economy more
competitive and resilient.
Integrating with regional trade partners. By expanding trade relationships beyond traditional partners,
African countries can diversify export destinations and import sources, mitigating the risks associated with
economic downturns in any single region. The African Continental Free Trade Area offers a significant oppor-
tunity in this regard, but its success hinges on substantial reduction in tariff and non-tariff trade barriers, robust
trade facilitation, as well as improvement in trade environment and infrastructure. To date, the implementation
of these measures has been slow and narrow, confined to a few countries and a limited range of actions. If fully
implemented, the median goods trade within Africa could increase by 53 percent and with the rest of the world
by 15 percent (El-Ganainy and others, 2023). Bolstering regional integration can also forge a larger and more
interconnected market, enhancing the region’s investment appeal.
Calling for International Support and Solidarity

Reforms will take time to deliver results. In the meantime, countries in sub-Saharan Africa will need support from
the international community. The estimated gross external financing needs for low-income countries (LICs) in the
region amount to about $70 billion annually (6 percent of GDP) from 2024 to 2028 (Figure 14). It is crucial that
5
Based on analysis using IMF Public Investment and Capital Stock Database and IMF Fiscal Affairs Department PIMA database.

both multilateral and official bilateral creditors continue to Figure

Figure14.
14.Sub-Saharan
Sub-SaharanAfrican
AfricanLow-Income
Low-Income
play a key role in providing financing to the region and Countries:
Countries:Gross
GrossExternal
ExternalFinancing
FinancingNeeds,
Needs,
supporting domestic policy and reform efforts. However, 2020–28
2020–28
(Billions of US dollars)
this comes at a time when these creditors and donors (Billions of US dollars)
have been struggling with many competing global 80 External debt amortization Current account deficit
demands. Ongoing discussions on how to enhance the
use of multilateral and regional development banks’ 60
balance sheets could help deliver more financing to LICs
(Holland and Pazarbasioglu 2024). Likewise, continued 40
reevaluations of country engagements by official bilateral
donors and creditors—traditional providers of ODA and 20
non-Paris creditors—could enhance the allocation of
limited concessional funds and grants, including to the
0
poorest. 2020 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28
Projections
For some countries facing external financing gaps,
Sources: IMF, World Economic Outlook database; and IMF
seeking assistance from the IMF might be necessary. In staff calculations.
Sources: IMF, World Economic Outlook database; and
fact, over the past four years, the IMF has emerged as a Note: Aggregate gross external financing needs for low-income
IMF staff calculations.
countries correspond to the sum of all positive gross external
key supporter of sub-Saharan Africa. Since 2020, there has Note: Aggregate
financing grossthe
needs within external
group.financing needs for low-
been a surge in demand for financial assistance across income countries correspond to the sum of all positive
gross external
the region, with the IMF disbursing $34 billion in financing, much of it onfinancing needs within
concessional terms.theThe
group.
2021 Special
Drawing Rights (SDR) allocations contributed another $23 billion, bringing the total support to approximately
$58 billion, which also includes $0.8 billion from the Catastrophe Containment and Relief Trust. Currently, more
than half of sub-Saharan African countries (27 out of 45) benefit from IMF financing arrangements, with around
$6 billion distributed in 2023 alone.
The IMF is placing stronger emphasis on inclusive growth, including more support to help countries increase
social spending. In recent years, nearly all new IMF programs in sub-Saharan Africa have included social spending
targets, with an estimated median set at around 2 percent of GDP over 2022 and 2023. Attention to climate
issues has grown as well. Since December 2022, nine sub-Saharan African nations (Benin, Cabo Verde, Cameroon,
Côte d’Ivoire, Kenya, Niger, Rwanda, Senegal, and Seychelles) have secured arrangements under the new
Resilience and Sustainability Facility. The IMF also plays a crucial role in capacity development (CD), providing
technical assistance and training. Notably, sub-Saharan Africa received nearly 40 percent of the IMF’s direct CD
delivery in 2023. The forthcoming Domestic Resource Mobilization Initiative, designed to help tackle funding
challenges and assist member countries securing resources for development needs, should prove especially
valuable for the region.
Finally, three key milestones highlight the IMF’s concerted efforts to meet the evolving needs of the region. First,
IMF member countries’ quotas were increased by 50 percent following the completion of the 16th General Review
of Quotas, which was accompanied by a collective commitment to explore strategies for quota realignment by
June 2025. A second major development was enhancing sub-Saharan Africa’s voice within the IMF by adding
a 25th seat to the Executive Board, allowing for a third representative for African countries. This decision
underscored the importance of ensuring diverse voices and perspectives at the highest levels of decision-making.
These developments align with global efforts to amplify Africa’s influence in the global arena, highlighted by
the African Union’s permanent membership in the G20 and South Africa’s upcoming G20 chairmanship in 2025.
Lastly, first-stage fundraising goals for the Poverty Reduction and Growth Trust (PRGT), the IMF’s concessional
lending instrument, were achieved. By March 2024, a total of $19.5 billion had been raised for PRGT lending
resources, along with $3.1 billion for PRGT subsidy resources. Later this year, the IMF will review its PRGT facilities
and financing to enhance its concessional financing for LICs, many of which are in sub-Saharan Africa. Amidst a
volatile global economy, the goal of the review is to strike a balance between ensuring adequate financial support
to LICs and restoring the PRGT’s long-term financial sustainability.

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Statistical Appendix
Unless otherwise noted, data and projections presented in this Regional Economic Outlook are IMF staff estimates
as of March 29, 2024, consistent with the projections underlying the April 2024 World Economic Outlook.
The data and projections cover 45 sub-Saharan African countries in the IMF’s African Department. Data defini-
tions follow established international statistical methodologies to the extent possible. However, in some cases,
data limitations limit comparability across countries.
Country Groupings
Countries are aggregated into three (nonoverlapping) groups: oil exporters, other resource-intensive countries,
and non-resource-intensive countries (see table on page vi for the country groupings).
The oil exporters are countries where net oil exports make up 30 percent or more of total exports.
The other resource-intensive countries are those where nonrenewable natural resources represent 25 percent
or more of total exports.
The non-resource-intensive countries refer to those that are not classified as either oil exporters or other
resource-intensive countries.
Countries are also aggregated into four (overlapping) groups: oil exporters, middle-income, low-income, and
countries in fragile and conflict-affected situations. (see table on page vi for the country groupings).
The membership of these groups reflects the most recent data on per capita gross national income (averaged
over three years) and the World Bank, Classification of Fragile and Conflict-Affected Situations.
The middle-income countries had per capita gross national income in the years 2020–22 of more than $1,135.00
(World Bank, using the Atlas method).
The low-income countries had average per capita gross national income in the years 2020–22 equal to or lower
than $1,135.00 (World Bank, Atlas method).
The countries in fragile and conflict-affected situations are classified based on the World Bank, Classification of
Fragile and Conflict-Affected Situations, FY2024.
The membership of sub-Saharan African countries in the major regional cooperation bodies is shown on page
vi: CFA franc zone, comprising the West African Economic and Monetary Union (WAEMU) and CEMAC; the
Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA); the East Africa Community (EAC-5); the Economic
Community of West African States (ECOWAS); the Southern African Development Community (SADC); and
the Southern African Customs Union (SACU). EAC-5 aggregates include data for Rwanda and Burundi, which
joined the group only in 2007.
Methods of Aggregation
In Tables SA1 and SA3, country group composites for real GDP growth and broad money are calculated as
the arithmetic average of data for individual countries, weighted by GDP valued at purchasing power parity
as a share of total group GDP. The source of purchasing power parity weights is the World Economic Outlook
(WEO) database.
In Table SA1, country group composites for consumer prices are calculated as the geometric average of data
for individual countries, weighted by GDP valued at purchasing power parity as a share of total group GDP. The
source of purchasing power parity weights is the WEO database.
In Tables SA2–SA4, country group composites, except for broad money, are calculated as the arithmetic average
of data for individual countries, weighted by GDP in US dollars at market exchange rates as a share of total
group GDP.

List of Sources and Footnotes for Statistical Appendix Tables SA1-SA4
Tables SA1.,SA3.
Sources: IMF, Common Surveillance database; and IMF, April 2024, World Economic Outlook database.
1
Data and projections for 2020–29 are excluded from the database due to constraints in data reporting.
2
In 2019 Zimbabwe authorities introduced the real-time gross settlement (RTGS) dollar, later renamed the
Zimbabwe dollar, and are in the process of redenominating their national accounts statistics. Current data are
subject to revision. The Zimbabwe dollar previously ceased circulating in 2009, and between 2009–19, Zimbabwe
operated under a multicurrency regime with the US dollar as the unit of account.
Note: “...” denotes data not available.
Table SA2.
1
2
For Zambia, government debt projections for 2024–25 are omitted due to ongoing debt restructuring.
3
Table SA4.
1
As a member of the West African Economic and Monetary Union (WAEMU), see WAEMU aggregate for
reserves data.
2
As a member of the Central African Economic and Monetary Community (CEMAC), see CEMAC aggregate for
reserves data.
3
4
Official Reserves include foreign assets held by Ghana Petroleum and Stabilization Fund and exclude
encumbered assets.
5
For Zambia, external debt projections for 2024–25 are omitted due to ongoing debt restructuring.
6

Table SA1. Real GDP Growth and Consumer Prices

Real GDP Consumer Prices, Annual Average
(Annual percent change) (Annual percent change)
2011–19 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025 2011–19 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025
Angola 2.0 –5.6 1.2 3.0 0.5 2.6 3.1 16.3 22.3 25.8 21.4 13.6 22.0 12.8
Benin 5.1 3.8 7.2 6.3 5.8 6.0 6.0 1.2 3.0 1.7 1.4 2.8 3.0 2.0
Botswana 4.1 –8.7 11.9 5.8 3.2 3.6 4.6 4.6 1.9 6.7 12.2 5.1 4.0 4.5
Burkina Faso 5.7 1.9 6.9 1.8 3.6 5.5 5.8 1.0 1.9 3.9 13.8 0.9 2.1 2.0
Burundi 1.9 0.3 3.1 1.8 2.7 4.3 5.4 7.1 7.3 8.3 18.9 27.0 22.0 20.0
Cabo Verde 3.0 –20.8 5.6 17.1 4.8 4.7 4.7 1.1 0.6 1.9 7.9 3.1 2.0 2.0
Cameroon 4.4 0.5 3.6 3.6 4.0 4.3 4.5 1.9 2.5 2.3 6.3 7.2 5.9 5.5
Central African Republic –0.7 1.0 1.0 0.5 0.7 1.3 1.7 4.9 0.9 4.3 5.6 3.2 4.7 4.6
Chad 2.8 –2.1 –0.9 3.1 4.4 2.9 3.7 1.9 5.3 –1.6 6.9 2.7 3.1 3.1
Comoros 3.1 –0.2 2.0 2.6 3.0 3.5 4.0 1.8 0.8 –0.0 12.4 8.5 2.0 2.2
Congo, Democratic Republic of the 5.9 1.7 6.0 8.8 6.1 4.7 5.7 10.2 11.4 9.0 9.3 19.9 17.2 8.5
Congo, Republic of 0.3 –6.3 1.1 1.7 4.0 4.4 3.2 2.3 1.4 2.0 3.0 4.5 3.6 3.0
Côte d'Ivoire 6.6 0.7 7.1 6.9 6.2 6.5 6.4 1.5 2.4 4.2 5.2 4.4 3.8 3.0
Equatorial Guinea –2.7 –4.8 –0.4 3.2 –5.9 0.5 –4.6 2.5 4.8 –0.1 4.9 2.5 4.4 1.8
Eritrea1 4.6 … … … … … … 2.6 … … … … … …
Eswatini 2.5 –1.6 10.7 0.5 5.1 3.7 3.3 5.9 3.9 3.7 4.8 4.9 3.9 3.1
Ethiopia 9.5 6.1 6.3 6.4 7.2 6.2 6.5 14.4 20.4 26.8 33.9 30.2 25.6 18.2
Gabon 3.7 –1.8 1.5 3.0 2.3 2.9 2.7 2.3 1.7 1.1 4.3 3.6 2.1 2.2
The Gambia 2.5 0.6 5.3 4.9 5.6 6.2 5.8 6.3 5.9 7.4 11.5 17.0 15.1 10.5
Ghana 6.5 0.5 5.1 3.1 2.3 2.8 4.4 11.8 9.9 10.0 31.7 37.5 22.3 11.5
Guinea 6.2 4.7 5.6 4.0 5.7 4.1 5.6 11.4 10.6 12.6 10.5 7.8 11.0 10.2
Guinea-Bissau 3.9 1.5 6.4 4.2 4.2 5.0 5.0 1.3 1.5 3.3 7.9 7.2 3.0 2.0
Kenya 4.7 –0.3 7.6 4.8 5.5 5.0 5.3 7.4 5.3 6.1 7.6 7.7 6.6 5.5
Lesotho 1.3 –5.3 1.7 1.6 1.9 2.4 2.5 5.1 5.0 6.0 8.3 6.3 6.4 5.4
Liberia 2.8 –3.0 5.0 4.8 4.6 5.3 6.2 12.5 17.0 7.8 7.6 10.1 6.3 5.1
Madagascar 3.2 –7.1 5.7 4.0 3.8 4.5 4.6 7.0 4.2 5.8 8.2 9.9 7.8 7.3
Malawi 4.1 0.9 4.6 0.8 1.6 3.3 3.8 17.2 8.6 9.3 20.8 30.3 27.9 14.7
Mali 4.3 –1.2 3.1 3.5 4.5 4.0 4.5 1.1 0.5 3.8 9.7 2.1 1.0 2.0
Mauritius 3.7 –14.5 3.4 8.9 6.9 4.9 3.7 3.0 2.5 4.0 10.8 7.0 4.9 3.6
Mozambique 5.5 –1.2 2.4 4.4 6.0 5.0 5.0 7.0 3.1 5.7 9.8 6.1 4.4 5.5
Namibia 2.8 –8.1 3.5 4.6 3.2 2.6 2.6 5.2 2.2 3.6 6.1 5.9 4.8 4.8
Niger 5.9 3.5 1.4 11.9 1.4 10.4 6.1 0.7 2.9 3.8 4.2 3.7 6.4 4.6
Nigeria 3.0 –1.8 3.6 3.3 2.9 3.3 3.0 11.6 13.2 17.0 18.8 24.7 26.3 23.0
Rwanda 7.1 –3.4 10.9 8.2 6.9 6.9 7.0 3.9 7.7 0.8 13.9 14.0 5.8 5.0
São Tomé & Príncipe 3.6 2.6 1.9 0.1 –0.3 2.9 4.1 8.1 9.8 8.1 18.0 21.2 14.2 7.8
Senegal 5.0 1.3 6.5 4.0 4.1 8.3 10.2 1.0 2.5 2.2 9.7 5.9 3.9 2.0
Seychelles 6.6 –11.7 0.6 15.0 3.7 3.2 3.8 3.0 1.2 9.8 2.6 –1.0 -0.2 2.6
Sierra Leone 5.0 –2.0 4.1 3.5 3.4 4.0 4.5 10.0 13.4 11.9 27.2 47.7 39.1 21.7
South Africa 1.6 –6.0 4.7 1.9 0.6 0.9 1.2 5.3 3.3 4.6 6.9 5.9 4.9 4.5
South Sudan –5.3 –6.5 5.3 –5.2 –0.1 5.6 6.8 98.6 24.0 30.2 –3.2 40.2 54.8 21.7
Tanzania 6.7 4.5 4.8 4.7 5.0 5.5 6.0 7.3 3.3 3.7 4.4 4.0 4.0 4.0
Togo 5.4 2.0 6.0 5.8 5.4 5.3 5.3 1.4 1.8 4.5 7.6 5.1 2.7 2.0
Uganda 5.3 –1.1 5.5 6.3 4.8 5.6 6.5 6.8 2.8 2.2 7.2 5.4 3.8 4.9
Zambia 4.3 –2.8 6.2 5.2 4.3 4.7 4.8 9.0 15.7 22.0 11.0 11.0 11.4 7.8
Zimbabwe2 4.6 –7.8 8.4 6.5 5.3 3.2 3.2 30.2 557.2 98.5 193.4 667.4 561.0 554.7
Sub-Saharan Africa 3.8 –1.6 4.7 4.0 3.4 3.8 4.0 8.3 10.2 11.0 14.5 16.2 15.3 12.4
Median 4.4 –1.2 4.9 4.0 4.1 4.4 4.6 4.5 3.6 4.6 8.2 6.7 4.9 4.8
Excluding Nigeria and South Africa 5.0 –0.1 5.2 5.0 4.5 4.9 5.3 8.0 11.2 10.7 15.2 16.0 14.1 10.6
Resource-intensive countries 3.1 –2.5 4.1 3.4 2.5 3.0 3.2 8.8 11.0 11.5 14.7 17.5 17.2 14.2
Oil-exporting countries 2.7 –2.3 3.1 3.2 2.5 3.3 3.0 11.1 12.9 15.7 17.1 20.1 22.4 18.6
Excluding Nigeria 2.1 –3.6 1.6 3.0 1.6 3.1 3.2 10.0 12.2 12.7 12.8 9.5 13.0 8.3
Other resource-intensive countries 3.4 –2.7 5.1 3.5 2.4 2.8 3.3 6.5 9.2 7.7 12.5 15.0 12.5 10.2
Excluding South Africa 5.6 0.4 5.5 5.0 4.1 4.5 5.1 8.1 15.4 10.9 18.1 24.2 19.8 15.4
Non-resource-intensive countries 5.9 0.8 6.5 5.7 5.8 5.7 6.1 7.1 7.9 9.8 14.1 12.9 10.7 8.1
Middle-income countries 3.1 –2.9 4.5 3.4 2.6 3.2 3.3 8.2 8.5 10.5 13.1 14.3 14.0 11.4
Low-income countries 6.0 1.8 5.3 5.6 5.4 5.4 5.7 8.8 14.9 12.5 18.3 21.3 18.6 15.1
Countries in fragile and conflict-affected
situations 4.1 –0.2 4.2 4.2 4.0 4.2 4.1 10.2 15.6 16.3 20.3 25.6 25.1 21.2
CFA franc zone 4.4 0.3 4.5 4.8 4.2 5.5 5.4 1.6 2.5 2.7 6.5 4.2 3.7 3.1
CEMAC 2.5 –1.5 1.8 3.1 2.7 3.4 3.1 2.2 2.9 1.2 5.6 5.1 4.5 4.0
WAEMU 5.7 1.3 6.0 5.7 4.9 6.6 6.6 1.2 2.2 3.5 7.0 3.8 3.4 2.6
COMESA (SSA members) 5.9 0.4 6.5 5.9 5.7 5.3 5.6 9.4 17.3 14.7 19.6 23.9 20.6 16.4
EAC-5 5.5 0.9 6.5 5.2 5.3 5.4 5.9 7.1 4.4 4.4 7.1 6.8 5.5 5.1
ECOWAS 4.0 –0.7 4.4 3.9 3.4 4.1 4.1 9.3 10.2 12.7 16.9 20.1 19.4 15.8
SACU 1.7 –6.1 5.0 2.1 0.9 1.1 1.5 5.2 3.2 4.6 7.1 5.9 4.8 4.5
SADC 2.8 –4.2 4.6 3.4 2.2 2.6 3.0 7.7 10.8 9.6 11.7 13.3 13.0 10.7
See sources on page 18.

Table SA2. Overall Fiscal Balance, Including Grants and Government Debt
Overall Fiscal Balance, Including Grants Government Debt
(Percent of GDP) (Percent of GDP)
2011–19 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025 2011–19 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025
Angola –0.5 –1.9 3.8 0.7 –0.1 2.7 3.1 59.8 138.7 83.7 64.8 84.5 70.3 61.8
Benin –2.4 –4.7 –5.7 –5.6 –4.5 –3.7 –2.9 30.1 46.1 50.3 54.2 54.2 53.4 52.4
Botswana –0.9 –10.9 –2.4 0.0 –0.6 –3.6 –0.7 17.6 18.7 18.7 17.8 19.4 17.9 16.8
Burkina Faso –3.3 –5.2 –7.5 –10.7 –6.8 –5.7 –4.7 31.1 43.8 55.6 58.4 61.9 63.3 63.4
Burundi –5.1 –6.3 –5.2 –10.6 –9.1 –5.9 –3.3 45.1 66.0 66.6 68.4 62.8 72.7 62.7
Cabo Verde –5.0 –9.3 –7.7 –4.3 –0.3 –3.2 –2.1 102.1 148.1 153.1 127.5 115.4 112.2 108.0
Cameroon –3.5 –3.2 –3.0 –1.1 –0.7 –0.4 –0.4 27.6 44.9 46.8 45.3 41.9 39.2 36.5
Central African Republic –0.9 –3.4 –6.0 –5.3 –3.5 –3.1 –1.9 47.5 44.4 48.5 54.2 55.7 55.6 54.4
Chad –0.7 1.2 –1.4 4.2 –1.3 –1.0 –0.7 30.7 41.2 42.1 35.9 35.1 32.3 31.4
Comoros 0.5 –0.5 –2.8 –4.0 –4.5 –3.4 –2.4 18.1 24.3 26.3 28.1 33.2 35.5 36.3
Congo, Democratic Republic of the 0.5 –3.2 –1.8 –0.5 –2.2 –1.6 –1.2 18.0 16.2 15.7 14.3 14.3 11.1 8.9
Congo, Republic of –2.1 –1.1 1.6 8.9 3.6 4.9 3.6 59.7 102.5 97.8 92.5 100.8 94.6 89.4
Côte d'Ivoire –2.4 –5.4 –4.8 –6.6 –5.2 –4.0 –3.0 32.4 46.3 50.2 55.3 57.1 57.7 56.9
Equatorial Guinea –5.0 –1.8 2.6 13.6 1.7 3.3 0.6 25.2 49.4 42.1 34.6 42.4 37.7 36.8
Eritrea1 –2.3 … … … … … … 235.6 … … … … … …
Eswatini –4.5 –4.5 –4.5 –3.8 –1.1 –0.9 –2.7 22.5 41.0 40.2 41.0 37.8 37.2 38.0
Ethiopia –2.3 –2.8 –2.8 –4.2 –2.5 –2.0 –2.5 49.2 53.7 53.8 47.1 38.0 30.5 28.6
Gabon 0.5 –2.2 –1.9 –0.7 –1.8 –4.2 –6.4 44.5 78.3 65.8 63.6 70.5 73.1 78.9
The Gambia –4.2 –2.4 –4.8 –4.9 –3.0 –2.6 –1.3 70.2 85.9 83.1 82.9 71.7 64.3 59.7
Ghana –6.6 –17.4 –12.0 –11.8 –4.6 –5.0 –4.3 49.6 72.3 79.2 93.3 86.1 83.6 80.9
Guinea 0.6 –3.1 –1.7 –0.8 –1.6 –3.0 –2.6 40.2 47.8 42.7 40.2 40.3 35.1 32.6
Guinea-Bissau –2.9 –9.6 –5.9 –6.1 –7.6 –3.8 –3.0 55.0 77.7 78.8 80.4 77.8 76.5 74.0
Kenya –6.2 –8.1 –7.2 –6.1 –5.3 –4.0 –3.2 46.7 68.0 68.2 68.4 73.3 73.0 70.3
Lesotho –3.1 –0.0 –5.4 –5.2 3.1 2.8 –2.2 43.7 54.7 58.4 62.9 63.6 63.2 62.3
Liberia –3.9 –4.0 –2.5 –5.3 –6.4 –5.0 –5.0 28.7 58.7 53.3 53.9 55.7 56.5 57.7
Madagascar –2.1 –4.0 –2.8 –5.5 –4.9 –3.8 –4.6 38.1 51.9 51.8 53.4 56.6 56.1 55.6
Malawi –3.8 –8.2 –8.6 –9.4 –7.6 –6.6 –7.5 35.5 54.8 61.5 75.8 81.3 74.9 74.6
Mali –2.7 –5.4 –4.8 –4.9 –4.8 –4.2 –3.6 31.5 46.9 50.3 52.9 53.0 55.1 55.7
Mauritius –3.3 –10.5 –4.1 –3.1 –3.3 –3.7 –3.0 62.2 94.7 88.8 84.2 81.1 81.0 80.8
Mozambique –4.2 –4.6 –3.9 –5.2 –2.7 –3.3 –1.2 78.0 120.0 104.3 99.3 91.9 96.9 94.7
Namibia –6.1 –8.1 –8.7 –6.0 –3.7 –2.1 –3.3 38.2 64.3 70.4 70.5 67.2 65.4 64.2
Niger –3.7 –4.8 –5.9 –6.8 –5.5 –4.1 –3.0 27.8 45.0 51.3 50.7 51.8 48.9 47.4
Nigeria –3.1 –5.6 –5.5 –5.4 –4.2 –4.6 –4.2 21.7 34.5 35.7 39.4 46.3 46.6 46.8
Rwanda –2.6 –9.5 –7.0 –5.7 –5.5 –7.0 –3.4 33.0 65.6 66.7 61.1 62.1 69.9 71.7
São Tomé & Príncipe –5.2 2.9 –1.5 –2.2 0.9 0.9 1.5 78.4 70.8 62.4 58.1 49.5 42.6 37.4
Senegal –3.9 –6.4 –6.3 –6.6 –4.9 –3.9 –3.1 47.2 69.2 73.3 76.0 79.6 72.5 67.6
Seychelles 1.5 –14.8 –5.6 –0.8 –1.5 –1.4 –0.4 65.0 77.4 71.2 58.9 56.7 58.3 57.2
Sierra Leone –5.1 –5.8 –7.3 –10.3 –7.3 –3.0 –3.6 51.5 76.3 79.4 94.1 80.0 69.7 67.8
South Africa –4.0 –9.6 –5.5 –4.3 –6.0 –6.1 –6.3 44.9 68.9 68.8 71.1 73.9 75.4 77.9
South Sudan –5.7 –5.5 –9.3 4.2 8.0 4.1 3.8 53.0 49.3 52.2 39.9 54.1 48.3 42.1
Tanzania –2.7 –2.6 –3.5 –3.9 –3.5 –2.7 –2.6 36.7 41.3 43.4 44.9 46.3 46.1 44.4
Togo –3.8 –7.0 –4.7 –8.3 –6.6 –6.0 –3.0 48.3 62.2 64.9 66.5 67.2 68.3 66.5
Uganda –3.0 –7.8 –7.5 –6.3 –5.0 –4.1 –3.6 27.8 46.3 50.4 49.9 49.9 49.7 48.6
Zambia2 –6.3 –13.8 –8.1 –7.8 –6.8 –6.1 –5.4 50.9 140.0 111.0 99.5 115.2 … …
Zimbabwe3 –3.3 0.8 –2.2 –6.0 –7.8 –9.9 –9.8 51.5 84.5 58.6 100.6 90.2 98.5 86.8
Sub-Saharan Africa –3.3 –6.5 –4.9 –4.4 –4.1 –3.7 –3.4 37.6 57.0 56.2 57.2 60.1 58.5 56.8
Median –3.1 –5.0 –4.8 –5.2 –4.0 –3.7 –3.0 40.6 56.7 58.5 58.6 59.5 58.3 57.7
Excluding Nigeria and South Africa –3.0 –5.7 –4.4 –4.1 –3.4 –2.8 –2.5 42.5 63.2 59.8 59.7 60.0 55.8 52.7
Resource-intensive countries –3.2 –6.7 –4.7 –4.0 –4.0 –3.9 –3.7 36.1 55.9 54.5 56.1 60.8 60.6 59.3
Oil-exporting countries –2.6 –4.6 –3.7 –3.0 –2.6 –1.9 –1.7 30.1 48.4 44.9 45.8 53.9 52.4 50.5
Excluding Nigeria –1.7 –2.0 0.5 1.7 0.1 1.2 1.0 47.7 87.2 66.6 58.4 67.4 59.2 54.5
Other resource-intensive countries –3.8 –8.4 –5.6 –4.9 –5.0 –5.0 –4.8 42.4 62.4 62.1 65.4 65.9 65.3 64.3
Excluding South Africa –3.5 –7.2 –5.6 –5.5 –4.2 –4.1 –3.5 38.8 55.7 54.7 59.4 58.5 56.5 52.9
Non-resource-intensive countries –3.6 –6.0 –5.4 –5.7 –4.2 –3.4 –2.9 43.5 60.3 61.3 60.6 58.3 54.2 51.9
Middle-income countries –3.5 –7.4 –5.2 –4.5 –4.3 –4.0 –3.7 37.1 59.0 58.1 59.3 65.2 65.6 64.9
Low-income countries –2.5 –3.7 –3.9 –4.2 –3.7 –3.2 –2.9 39.2 51.3 50.5 51.2 48.4 45.1 42.4
situations –2.8 –4.4 –4.4 –4.3 –3.4 –3.1 –2.9 28.7 42.6 42.8 44.9 46.9 44.4 42.1
CFA franc zone –2.7 –4.2 –4.0 –3.3 –3.5 –2.8 –2.4 34.6 53.0 55.3 56.4 58.1 56.8 55.5
CEMAC –2.4 –2.0 –1.4 2.5 –0.3 –0.2 –0.9 35.2 57.2 55.3 52.5 53.8 51.3 49.8
WAEMU –3.0 –5.5 –5.5 –6.8 –5.3 –4.2 –3.2 34.7 50.5 55.3 58.8 60.6 59.9 58.6
COMESA (SSA members) –3.4 –5.6 –4.8 –4.9 –4.2 –3.5 –3.3 42.4 60.6 57.7 58.1 55.6 50.8 47.3
EAC-5 –4.4 –6.5 –6.2 –5.6 –4.7 –3.8 –3.1 39.3 56.2 57.7 57.6 59.5 59.4 57.3
ECOWAS –3.3 –6.7 –6.1 –6.3 –4.5 –4.4 –3.7 27.6 43.2 46.2 49.9 55.2 56.4 55.7
SACU –4.0 –9.5 –5.5 –4.1 –5.5 –5.8 –5.9 43.5 66.3 66.4 68.3 70.6 71.6 73.6
SADC –3.2 –7.1 –4.0 –3.4 –4.4 –4.1 –4.0 45.1 70.4 63.9 64.4 68.0 66.3 64.7

Table SA3. Broad Money and External Current Account, Including Grants
Broad Money External Current Account, Including Grants
(Percent of GDP) (Percent of GDP)
2011–19 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025 2011–19 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025
Angola 34.6 38.4 24.4 20.0 21.6 20.1 20.0 3.0 1.5 11.2 9.6 3.1 4.9 4.6
Benin 28.1 30.5 32.7 33.4 30.7 30.7 30.7 –4.9 –1.7 –4.2 –6.0 –5.6 –5.0 –4.6
Botswana 44.7 52.5 45.4 40.0 40.7 42.1 42.0 2.0 –10.3 –1.3 3.0 –0.4 –1.2 2.5
Burkina Faso 32.4 44.1 48.6 46.1 42.5 43.5 44.7 –5.1 4.2 0.4 –7.2 –7.9 –5.7 –4.1
Burundi 27.0 46.3 50.6 56.6 55.7 54.7 53.5 –14.1 –9.7 –11.6 –16.2 –13.3 –17.3 –15.3
Cabo Verde 85.5 116.9 114.3 95.9 95.5 96.2 95.4 –6.3 –15.3 –12.2 –3.4 –5.3 –6.1 –6.3
Cameroon 21.7 26.6 29.1 29.4 29.9 30.1 29.8 –3.3 –3.7 –4.0 –3.4 –2.8 –2.8 –2.8
Central African Republic 24.0 30.3 33.3 31.9 31.9 31.0 30.7 –7.1 –8.2 –11.1 –12.7 –9.0 –7.7 –6.7
Chad 11.0 15.3 17.1 18.8 20.6 22.4 23.5 –3.8 –2.8 –1.9 5.4 –2.5 –2.3 –3.0
Comoros 25.1 31.2 37.1 37.1 38.2 38.9 38.7 –3.1 –1.8 –0.3 –0.5 –6.0 –5.8 –5.3
Congo, Democratic Republic of the 11.5 19.9 21.6 19.5 21.3 21.8 22.2 –4.4 –2.1 –1.0 –5.0 –5.4 –4.1 –3.2
Congo, Republic of 26.6 32.7 30.8 27.5 31.8 34.3 34.7 –2.2 12.6 12.8 18.5 3.2 2.5 –0.1
Côte d'Ivoire 10.9 13.5 14.9 14.1 11.4 11.7 11.6 –0.3 –3.1 –3.9 –7.7 –6.0 –3.8 –2.6
Equatorial Guinea 13.2 17.5 14.7 16.4 19.7 19.2 19.3 –8.4 –0.8 4.2 2.4 –1.3 –2.7 –2.7
Eritrea1 207.6 … … … … … … 14.9 … … … … … …
Eswatini 26.8 32.3 29.7 28.1 27.9 27.5 27.5 6.0 7.1 2.6 –2.7 2.2 2.1 1.1
Ethiopia 29.2 30.8 31.1 27.9 24.9 22.5 23.3 –7.1 –4.6 –3.2 –4.3 –2.9 –2.6 –1.7
Gabon 23.7 27.9 23.1 22.8 26.4 26.4 26.4 5.2 –0.5 3.3 10.4 4.2 4.0 3.0
The Gambia 38.6 56.0 59.2 54.6 49.3 45.5 43.8 –7.6 –3.0 –4.2 –4.2 –4.1 –4.4 –3.1
Ghana 24.1 30.8 29.4 29.5 29.4 27.9 28.2 –5.6 –2.5 –2.7 –2.1 –1.7 –1.9 –2.2
Guinea 24.2 27.8 25.5 29.1 25.7 26.3 24.7 –16.3 –16.2 –2.5 –8.6 –8.7 –10.6 –10.0
Guinea-Bissau 38.5 45.6 50.5 46.7 46.1 45.2 44.4 –2.4 –2.6 –0.8 –9.6 –9.4 –5.6 –4.6
Kenya 36.8 37.2 35.2 33.9 34.0 34.0 34.0 –6.9 –4.7 –5.2 –5.2 –3.9 –4.3 –4.2
Lesotho 35.6 41.1 39.1 38.7 40.1 38.4 37.4 –6.2 –1.8 –5.4 –9.6 –2.9 –1.1 –7.0
Liberia 20.2 25.5 24.6 25.0 26.8 27.0 27.2 –20.1 –16.4 –17.8 –19.0 –26.5 –24.8 –24.5
Madagascar 23.4 28.7 28.6 28.9 30.1 32.1 33.6 –2.7 –5.4 –4.9 –5.4 –4.5 –4.8 –4.7
Malawi 17.2 17.5 20.1 23.6 23.6 23.6 23.6 –10.2 –13.8 –14.1 –3.2 –6.9 –7.1 –9.4
Mali 26.9 31.3 39.5 41.1 37.8 37.8 37.8 –5.2 –2.2 –7.4 –8.0 –9.0 –5.1 –4.4
Mauritius 104.3 156.7 159.9 140.9 132.9 132.2 135.5 –5.8 –8.8 –13.0 –11.5 –5.9 –5.3 –4.8
Mozambique 44.7 59.0 56.2 55.0 50.9 51.3 51.2 –30.9 –27.4 –22.6 –34.7 –11.0 –38.7 –42.9
Namibia 58.3 71.5 70.6 63.0 63.2 63.7 63.8 –8.1 3.0 –11.2 –13.1 –10.9 –7.2 –6.6
Niger 17.5 19.2 20.1 19.4 18.4 18.5 18.8 –12.6 –13.2 –14.1 –16.2 –12.8 –5.1 –4.3
Nigeria 24.3 25.2 25.2 25.8 33.6 30.0 30.5 1.2 –3.7 –0.7 0.2 0.3 0.6 –0.1
Rwanda 22.4 29.0 29.9 29.2 29.2 27.4 28.6 –10.5 –12.1 –11.2 –9.8 –11.7 –12.1 –9.8
São Tomé & Príncipe 41.1 32.5 29.5 28.1 25.4 23.4 23.4 –17.4 –11.2 –12.1 –13.1 –12.9 –9.2 –8.9
Senegal 34.6 45.3 48.2 51.9 50.1 47.9 61.3 –7.2 –10.9 –12.1 –19.9 –15.1 –8.9 –4.8
Seychelles 64.4 101.6 93.4 80.5 82.8 86.5 85.9 –15.3 –12.3 –10.1 –6.9 –7.3 –8.4 –8.5
Sierra Leone 22.2 29.5 32.4 35.5 32.5 26.4 25.0 –23.0 –7.9 –9.5 –11.0 –4.0 –2.8 –3.7
South Africa 66.4 74.0 70.1 71.1 72.1 74.3 75.6 –3.5 1.9 3.7 –0.5 –1.6 –1.8 –1.9
South Sudan 22.3 23.2 17.6 14.4 14.9 13.1 13.0 4.5 –18.9 –9.4 9.7 1.7 3.9 5.7
Tanzania 22.3 21.7 22.0 22.8 23.4 23.5 23.7 –7.1 –2.5 –3.8 –5.6 –5.3 –4.2 –3.6
Togo 37.2 46.6 48.1 50.4 50.4 51.0 51.5 –4.9 –0.3 –2.2 –4.2 –3.4 –3.9 –3.6
Uganda 17.4 22.5 21.8 20.4 20.6 20.7 20.5 –5.6 –9.5 –9.3 –8.8 –7.7 –7.3 –7.6
Zambia 21.7 31.2 24.3 27.1 29.4 29.4 29.7 0.3 10.6 9.7 3.7 –1.8 3.7 5.2
Zimbabwe2 23.9 14.8 14.9 18.8 15.9 15.8 15.6 –7.9 2.5 1.0 1.0 0.4 0.2 1.0
Sub-Saharan Africa 35.3 38.6 37.2 36.7 38.3 37.4 37.8 –2.7 –2.7 –1.0 –2.0 –2.8 –2.8 –2.6
Median 26.4 31.0 30.3 29.3 30.4 30.0 30.2 –5.3 –3.4 –4.1 –5.3 –5.3 –4.4 –4.2
Excluding Nigeria and South Africa 28.2 32.7 31.4 30.3 29.8 29.3 29.8 –4.4 –3.9 –3.0 –3.5 –4.1 –3.7 –3.3
Resource-intensive countries 36.8 40.0 38.1 38.1 41.0 40.0 40.3 –1.7 –1.4 0.8 –0.0 –1.6 –1.3 –1.3
Oil-exporting countries 25.1 27.0 25.0 24.8 30.9 28.3 28.6 1.0 –2.9 0.9 2.5 0.6 1.1 0.6
Excluding Nigeria 26.9 31.2 24.5 22.5 24.3 23.9 23.9 0.6 –0.5 4.6 7.1 1.1 1.7 1.3
Other resource-intensive countries 48.3 52.3 50.2 50.3 50.3 50.8 51.1 –4.4 –0.1 0.7 –2.4 –3.3 –2.7 –2.4
Excluding South Africa 26.3 30.8 30.6 30.4 30.2 29.9 30.0 –5.8 –2.3 –2.5 –4.3 –4.8 –3.5 –2.7
Non-resource-intensive countries 30.2 34.7 34.6 33.1 31.5 30.8 31.7 –6.9 –6.3 –6.4 –7.9 –5.6 –5.8 –5.2
Middle-income countries 38.4 42.1 39.9 39.6 42.3 41.2 41.9 –1.4 –1.7 0.4 –0.5 –1.6 –1.3 –1.3
Low-income countries 24.9 28.9 29.8 29.0 27.9 27.3 27.6 –7.8 –5.5 –5.0 –6.3 –5.4 –5.5 –5.0
situations 25.2 27.7 28.3 28.0 31.8 29.5 29.9 –1.6 –3.7 –1.9 –2.0 –2.1 –2.8 –2.8
CFA franc zone 21.6 26.9 29.0 29.1 28.1 28.2 29.8 –3.3 –2.8 –3.5 –4.8 –5.6 –3.7 –3.0
CEMAC 19.6 24.6 25.0 25.2 27.1 27.7 27.8 –2.4 –0.9 0.5 3.7 –0.8 –1.0 –1.6
WAEMU 22.9 28.3 31.2 31.1 28.6 28.5 30.8 –4.3 –4.0 –5.8 –10.0 –8.4 –5.2 –3.7
COMESA (SSA members) 30.1 34.4 33.7 32.0 31.2 30.6 30.9 –5.7 –4.1 –3.8 –4.6 –4.1 –3.5 –2.9
EAC-5 27.4 29.5 28.7 28.1 28.4 28.3 28.3 –7.0 –5.3 –5.9 –6.4 –5.7 –5.5 –5.2
ECOWAS 24.2 26.9 27.4 27.9 32.0 29.5 30.4 –1.0 –4.0 –2.4 –2.8 –3.0 –2.7 –2.5
SACU 64.6 72.3 68.3 68.8 69.6 71.6 72.7 –3.4 1.5 3.0 –0.7 –1.8 –1.9 –1.8
SADC 49.9 55.1 51.0 50.3 50.8 51.5 51.9 –3.4 –0.2 1.8 –0.8 –2.3 –2.5 –2.5

Table SA4. External Debt, Official Debt, Debtor Based and Reserves
External Debt, Official Debt, Debtor Based Reserves
(Percent of GDP) (Months of imports of goods and services)
2011–19 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025 2011–19 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025
Angola 33.6 91.2 69.2 43.2 54.6 52.9 46.5 9.3 9.5 6.5 7.3 7.7 7.7 7.7
Benin1 15.6 30.3 35.2 37.8 41.0 44.7 45.8 … ... ... ... ... ... ...
Botswana 15.4 12.5 10.1 9.3 10.1 9.2 7.6 11.4 6.4 6.6 7.0 7.0 6.2 6.2
Burkina Faso1 21.0 23.1 24.5 26.1 26.1 25.9 25.6 ... ... ... ... ... ... ...
Burundi 19.5 17.5 19.9 19.6 19.8 31.9 31.1 2.5 1.0 2.2 1.5 0.7 1.7 2.4
Cabo Verde 78.4 132.9 123.9 105.7 95.2 93.3 90.6 5.7 7.6 6.7 5.6 5.9 6.2 6.1
Cameroon2 18.4 32.5 30.3 30.9 28.9 28.8 27.6 ... ... ... ... ... ... ...
Central African Republic2 29.3 37.3 33.7 36.1 34.6 33.1 31.9 ... ... ... ... ... ... ...
Chad2 18.2 20.7 17.9 16.5 14.9 13.1 14.6 ... ... ... ... ... ... ...
Comoros 17.1 23.5 25.4 27.3 32.6 34.8 35.5 7.1 7.9 8.6 6.6 6.4 6.9 6.5
Congo, Democratic Republic of the 17.8 15.5 16.3 14.9 16.6 16.8 15.8 0.9 0.4 1.1 1.7 2.0 2.2 2.3
Congo, Republic of 2 24.4 29.2 23.3 24.5 24.6 22.3 21.4 ... ... ... ... ... ... ...
Côte d'Ivoire1 19.6 33.5 30.3 35.1 36.0 37.7 36.7 ... ... ... ... ... ... ...
Equatorial Guinea2 8.5 15.4 12.2 10.0 10.0 8.2 6.6 ... ... ... ... ... ... ...
Eritrea3 62.2 … … … … … … 2.8 … … … … … …
Eswatini 8.8 15.2 14.9 17.4 19.2 20.4 21.7 3.7 3.1 3.0 2.4 3.0 3.1 3.0
Ethiopia 25.4 28.8 29.1 23.3 17.4 13.9 11.7 2.0 2.0 1.5 0.8 … … …
Gabon2 29.8 49.0 36.1 34.6 34.4 30.0 28.5 ... ... ... ... ... ... ...
The Gambia 37.5 49.4 47.2 47.6 43.7 39.2 35.2 3.6 5.8 7.7 5.4 4.9 4.9 4.6
Ghana4 29.8 42.0 41.7 42.7 43.8 46.5 47.7 3.0 3.7 4.0 1.2 1.6 2.2 2.8
Guinea 23.2 27.2 24.5 21.9 19.7 18.1 18.3 2.2 1.9 2.6 3.2 2.5 2.2 2.3
Guinea-Bissau1 30.0 43.9 38.5 39.4 35.5 33.0 31.2 ... ... ... ... ... ... ...
Kenya 22.8 30.6 31.1 31.2 33.9 38.3 37.6 4.6 4.6 4.7 4.4 3.7 4.1 4.1
Lesotho 35.4 47.5 43.1 44.0 47.1 46.8 45.9 4.8 4.1 5.0 4.0 4.2 4.7 4.5
Liberia 18.4 41.1 37.2 35.3 35.1 35.3 36.4 2.1 2.2 3.9 2.9 2.0 1.9 1.9
Madagascar 23.5 35.9 33.2 33.2 36.6 38.2 39.0 3.4 4.8 4.5 4.6 5.4 5.3 5.4
Malawi 19.4 31.8 30.9 32.0 27.9 31.8 31.9 2.5 0.8 0.5 0.5 1.8 2.9 3.9
Mali1 22.8 31.5 27.1 27.2 24.6 24.1 24.2 ... ... ... ... ... ... ...
Mauritius 13.3 20.2 23.2 19.3 20.6 17.5 16.7 8.4 14.4 12.8 11.4 9.7 9.7 9.5
Mozambique 63.1 90.2 82.9 73.9 66.7 65.5 63.1 3.5 4.6 2.6 3.1 2.2 2.1 2.0
Namibia 12.2 18.8 14.5 17.2 18.0 17.2 15.4 3.4 4.0 4.5 4.5 4.4 5.0 5.2
Niger1 18.4 33.0 31.5 32.9 32.0 29.1 28.7 ... ... ... ... ... ... ...
Nigeria 3.7 8.0 9.1 9.4 11.6 18.0 19.6 6.1 6.5 6.3 6.0 5.4 5.8 6.1
Rwanda 28.0 54.8 53.5 47.0 51.0 60.2 65.2 3.9 5.3 4.6 3.6 3.8 3.9 4.2
São Tomé & Príncipe 84.3 65.1 59.5 57.8 50.6 46.5 44.4 3.7 4.4 3.7 2.3 1.0 1.9 2.6
Senegal1 32.9 48.9 45.9 47.0 43.2 39.4 36.2 ... ... ... ... ... ... ...
Seychelles 34.4 35.3 38.6 28.1 28.0 32.2 34.0 3.6 3.7 3.7 3.2 3.2 3.4 3.6
Sierra Leone 31.6 48.3 48.3 47.6 51.4 43.8 44.4 3.2 4.5 5.6 3.7 2.7 2.6 2.5
South Africa 15.0 23.4 18.6 18.8 21.0 21.9 22.6 5.8 6.4 5.5 6.2 5.7 5.2 4.8
South Sudan 50.0 49.9 50.1 42.8 51.0 44.9 42.1 1.7 0.1 1.0 0.9 0.8 1.4 1.9
Tanzania 26.0 29.4 29.6 29.2 29.4 30.6 28.8 4.8 5.3 4.0 3.7 3.9 3.9 3.9
Togo1 13.3 29.5 26.0 26.4 25.6 26.8 27.0 ... ... ... ... ... ... ...
Uganda 16.6 30.0 29.5 26.7 26.5 27.3 26.9 4.6 4.3 4.7 3.1 3.0 3.6 4.0
Zambia5 26.4 66.5 54.1 39.2 40.1 … … 2.7 1.3 2.8 3.1 3.1 3.6 4.6
Zimbabwe6 31.6 26.6 19.7 22.6 22.0 20.4 19.9 0.5 0.1 1.1 0.7 0.1 0.2 0.4
Sub-Saharan Africa 16.7 26.6 24.8 23.8 25.6 27.2 26.5 5.2 5.0 4.6 4.6 4.0 3.9 3.9
Median 22.7 31.6 30.6 31.1 30.7 31.8 31.1 3.6 4.4 4.2 3.4 3.2 3.6 4.0
Excluding Nigeria and South Africa 24.7 36.6 34.0 31.6 31.5 30.6 28.9 4.3 3.8 3.6 3.4 3.0 3.2 3.2
Resource-intensive countries 14.9 23.9 21.8 20.9 23.5 25.8 25.5 5.5 5.5 5.0 5.1 4.6 4.5 4.5
Oil-exporting countries 11.1 20.2 19.6 18.1 21.6 26.7 26.2 6.3 6.2 5.7 5.9 5.5 5.8 5.9
Excluding Nigeria 27.0 54.0 44.3 35.6 39.2 36.8 33.5 6.6 5.5 4.4 5.8 5.7 5.8 5.7
Other resource-intensive countries 18.8 27.2 23.5 23.3 24.8 25.2 25.1 4.7 4.8 4.5 4.4 4.0 3.8 3.8
Excluding South Africa 24.1 31.1 29.0 28.0 28.4 28.1 27.1 3.3 3.2 3.3 2.5 2.4 2.5 2.8
Non-resource-intensive countries 24.1 34.5 33.9 32.5 30.9 30.2 28.6 3.6 3.7 3.5 2.9 2.3 2.7 2.7
Middle-income countries 14.8 25.2 23.2 22.5 25.6 28.9 28.7 5.8 5.8 5.3 5.4 4.9 4.9 4.9
Low-income countries 24.7 30.7 29.4 27.4 25.5 24.0 22.7 2.8 2.8 2.7 2.1 1.9 2.1 2.2
situations 11.3 17.4 17.6 16.9 18.2 20.2 19.7 4.8 4.8 4.5 4.2 3.4 3.2 3.2
CFA franc zone 20.6 33.0 30.1 31.7 31.3 31.0 30.2 4.6 4.7 4.4 4.2 3.5 3.4 3.4
CEMAC 19.9 31.3 26.8 26.6 25.6 24.1 23.3 4.3 3.4 3.3 4.2 4.0 4.2 3.8
WAEMU 21.4 34.0 32.1 34.9 34.6 34.8 34.0 4.9 5.5 5.1 4.2 3.2 3.0 3.1
COMESA (SSA members) 22.4 30.0 29.0 26.5 25.3 24.3 22.7 3.2 3.1 3.1 2.7 2.3 2.7 2.7
EAC-5 22.7 31.1 31.2 30.4 31.7 34.6 33.8 4.6 4.7 4.4 3.9 3.6 3.9 4.0
ECOWAS 10.3 18.8 19.5 19.6 22.9 28.7 29.4 5.1 5.3 5.2 4.5 3.7 3.6 3.8
SACU 14.9 22.9 18.2 18.4 20.5 21.2 21.7 5.9 6.2 5.4 6.1 5.7 5.2 4.9
SADC 20.6 32.4 27.0 25.4 27.7 27.8 26.8 5.7 5.6 4.8 5.3 5.0 4.8 4.7

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INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND

A Tepid and Pricey Recovery

A Tepid and Pricey Recovery

Names: International Monetary Fund, publisher.

Identifiers: ISBN 9798400267895 (English Paper)

\Publication orders may be placed online or through the mail:

Find all published Regional Economic Outlook: Sub-Saharan Africa

Assumptions and Conventions. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . vii

Executive Summary. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . viii

A Tepid and Pricey Recovery. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

APRIL 2024 • INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND

STATISTICAL APPENDIX TABLES

INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND • APRIL 2024

“Cutting Budget Deficits in Sub-Saharan Africa without Undermining Development”

“Digging for Opportunity: Harnessing Sub-Saharan Africa’s Wealth in Critical Minerals”

“Building Tomorrow’s Workforce: Education, Opportunity, and Africa’s Demographic Dividend”

Charlotte Vazquez was responsible for document production.

APRIL 2024 • INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND

Oil Exporters Other Resource- Non-Resource- Middle-Income Low-Income Countries in Fragile

Sub-Saharan Africa: Member Countries of Regional Groupings

INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND • APRIL 2024

Assumptions and Conventions

Sub-Saharan Africa: Country Abbreviations

APRIL 2024 • INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND

INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND • APRIL 2024

A Tepid and Pricey Recovery

Adapting to a world with tight 2025:

APRIL 2024 • INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND

Recent Development: Global Markets Reopen at a Steep Price

INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND • APRIL 2024

Figure 2. External Funding Flows of the Public

often associated with shorter repayment periods, higher

… with the private sector also feeling the pinch.

to the government, highlighting the region’s progress in

APRIL 2024 • INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND

Box 1. Breaking Down the African Premium

INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND • APRIL 2024

The ability of countries to respond to current challenges is further constrained by

APRIL 2024 • INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND

The Outlook: A Long-Awaited but Tepid Rebound

INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND • APRIL 2024

The expected rebound is subject to significantFigure

would rise. Model simulations suggest that the overall Geopolitical

APRIL 2024 • INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND

Policy Priorities for Adapting to High Borrowing Costs in a Shock-Prone

Fiscal policy: improving public finances without undermining development

INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND • APRIL 2024

Figure 8. Fiscal Balance Including Grants, 2019–

APRIL 2024 • INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND

Monetary policy: maintaining price stability while supporting growth

INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND • APRIL 2024

Figure 10. Real Monetary Policy Rates, February

effectively manage market expectations and minimize uncertainty.

APRIL 2024 • INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND

INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND • APRIL 2024

Figure 13. Stock Exchange Market

Calling for International Support and Solidarity

APRIL 2024 • INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND