THE STORY OF THE MIND,

CHAPTER I.
THE SCIENCE OF THE MIND-PSYCHOLOGY.

P S Y C H O L O G Y is the science of the mind. It

aims to find out all about the Mind-the whole
story-just as the other sciences aim to find out
all about the subjects of which they treat-as-
tronomy, of the stars ; geology, of the earth;
physiology, of the body. And when we wish to
trace out the story of the mind, as psychology
has done it, we find that there are certain general
truths with which we should first acquaint our-
selves; truths which the science has been a very
long time finding out, but which we can now re-
alize without a great deal of explanation. These
general truths, we may say, are preliminary to
the story itself; they deal rather with the need
of defining, first of all, the subject or topic of
which the story is to be told.
I. The first such truth is that the mind is not
the possession of man alone. Other creatures have
minds. Psychology no longer confines itself, as it
formerly did, to the human soul, denying to the
animals a place in this highest of all the sciences.
It finds itself unable to require any test or evi-
dence of the presence of mind which the animals
do not meet, nor does it find any place at which
the story of the mind can begin higher up than
I
2 THE STORY OF THE MIND.

the very beginnings of life. For as soon as we

ask, (‘ How much mind is necessary to start with ? ”
we have to answer, “ Any mind at all “; and all
the animals are possessed of some of the actions
which we associate with mind. Of course, the
ascertainment of the truth of this belongs-as the
ascertainment of all the truths of nature belongs
-to scientific investigation itself. It is the scien-
tific man’s rule not to assume anything except as
he finds facts to support the assumption. So we
find a great department of psychology devoted to
just this question-i. e., of tracing mind in the
animals and iu th,e child, and noting the stages of
what is called its “evolution ” in the ascending
scale of animal life, and its ‘L development ” in the
rapid growth which every child goes through in
the nursery. This gives us two chapters of the
story of the mind. Together’ they are called
“ Genetic Psychology,” having two divisions, “ Ani-
mal or Comparative Psychology ” and “Child
Psychology.”
a. Another general truth to note at the outset
is this: that we are able to get real knowledge
about the mind. This may seem at first sight a
useless question to raise, seeing that our minds
are, in the thought of many, about the only things
we are really sure of. But that sort of sureness
is not what science seeks. Every science requires
some means of investigation, some method of
procedure, which is more exact than the mere
say-so of common sense; and which can be used
over and again by different investigators and
under different conditions. This gives a high de-
gree of verification and control to the results once
obtained. The chemist has his acids, and re-
agents, and blowpipes, etc. ; they constitute his in-
 THE SCIENCE OF THE MIND-PSYCHOLOGY. 3
struments, and by using them, under certain con-
stant rules, he keeps to a consistent method. So
with the physiologist; he has his microscope, his
staining fluids, his means of stimulating the tis-
sues of the body, etc. The physicist also makes
much of his lenses, and membranes, and electrical
batteries, and X-ray apparatus. In like manner
it is necessary that the psychologist should have
a recognised way of investigating the mind, which
he can lay before anybody saying: “There, you
see my results, you can get them for yourself’ by
the same method that I used.”
In fulfilling this requirement the psychologist
resorts to two methods of procedure. He is
able to investigate the mind in two ways, which
are of such general application that anybody of
sufficient training to make scientific observations
at all can repeat them and so confirm the results,.
One of these is what is called Introspection. It
consists in taking note of one’s own mind, as all
sorts of changes are produced in it, such as emo-
tions, memories, associations of events now gone,
etc., and describing everything that takes place.
Other persons can repeat the observations with
their own minds, and see that what the first re-
ports is true. This results in a body of knowl-
edge which is put together and called “ Introspec-
tive Psychology,” and one chapter of the story
should be devoted to that.
Then the other way we have is that of experi-
menting on some one else’s mind. We can act on
our friends and neighbours in various ways, mak-
ing them feel, think, accept, refuse this and that,
and then observe how they act. The differences
in their action will show the differences in the feel-
ings, etc., which we have produced. In pursuing
4 THE STORY OF THE MIND,

this method the psychologist takes a person-

called the (( subject ” or the “ re-agent “-into his
laboratory, asks him to be willing to follow cer-
tain directions carefully, such as holding an elec-
tric handle, blowing into a tube, pushing a but-
ton, etc., when he feels, sees, or hears certain
things; this done with sufficient care, the results
are found recorded in certain ways which the
psychologist has arranged beforehand. This sec-
ond way of proceeding gives results which are
gathered under the two headings (‘ Experimental ”
and ‘( Physiological Psychology.” They should
also have chapters in our story.
3. There is besides another truth which the
psychologist nowadays finds very fruitful for his
knowledge of the mind ; this is the fact that minds
vary much in different individuals, or classes of
individuals. First, there is the pronounced differ-
ence between healthy minds and diseased minds.
The differences are so great that we have to pur-
sue practically different methods of treating the
diseased, not only as a class apart from the
well minds-putting such diseased persons into
institutions-but also as differing from one an-
other. Just as the different forms of bodily dis-
ease teach us a great deal about the body-its
degree of strength, its forms of organization and
function, its limitations, its heredity, the inter-
connection of its parts, etc.-so mental diseases
teach us much about the normal mind. This gives
another sphere of information which constitutes
“ Abnormal Psychology ” or “ Mental Pathology.”
There are also very striking variations between
individuals even within normal life; well people
are very different from one another. All that is
commonly meant by character or temperament as
 THE SCIENCE OF THE MIND-PSYCHOLOGY. 5

distinguishing one person from another is evi-

dence of these differences. But really to know
all about mind we should see what its variations
are, and endeavour to find out why the variations
e x i s t . T h i s g i v e s , t h e n , a n o t h e r t o p i c , (‘Indi-
v i d u a l o r V a r i a t i o n a l P s y c h o l o g y . ” This sub-
ject should also have notice in the story.
4. Allied with this the demand is made upon
the psychologist that he show to the teacher how
to train the mind; how to secure its development
in the individual most healthfully and produc-
tively, and with it all in a way to allow the varia-
tions of endowment which individuals show each
to bear its ripest fruit. This is “Educational or
Pedagogical Psychology.”
5. B e s i d e s a l l t h e s e g r e a t u n d e r t a k i n g s o f
the psvchologist, there is another department of
fact which he must some time find very fruitfu!,
although as yet he has not been able to investl-
gate it thoroughly : he should ask about the place
of the mind in. the world at large, If we seek to
know what the midd has done in the world, what
a wealth of story comes to us from the very be-
ginnings of history ! Mind has done all that has
been done : it has built human institutions, indited
literature, made science, discovered the laws of
Nature, used the forces of the material world, em-
bodied itself in all the monuments which stand to
testify to the.presence of man. What could tell
us more of what mind is than this record of what
mind has done? The ethnologists are patiently
tracing the records left by early man in his uten-
sils, weapons, clothing, religious rites, architec-
tural remains, etc., and the anthropologists are
seeking to distinguish the general and essential
from the accidental and temporary in all the his-
6 THE STORY OF THE MIND.

tory of culture and civilization, They are mak-

ing progress very slowly, and it is only here and
there that principles are being discovered which
reveal to the psychologist the necessary modes
of action and development of the mind. All this
comes under the head of ‘( Race Psychology.”
6. Finally, another department, the newest of
all, investigates the action of minds when they
are thrown together in crowds. The animals
herd, the insects swarm, most creatures live in
companies ; they are gregarious, and man no less
is social in his nature. So there is a psychology
of herds, crowds, mobs, etc., all put under the
h e a d i n g o f “ Social Psychology.” I t a s k s t h e
q u e s t i o n , W h a t n e w p h a s e s o f t h e m i n d d o we
find when individuals unite in common action ?-
or, on the other hand, when they are artificially
separated ?
We now have with all this a faiily complete
idea of what The Story of the Mind should in-
clude, when it is all told. Manypen are spend-
ing their lives each at one or two of these great
questions. But it is only as the results are all
brought together in a consistent view of that won-
derful thing, the mind, that we may hope to find
out all that it is. We must think of it as a grow-
ing, developing thing, showing its stages of evo-
lution in the ascending animal scale, and also in
the unfolding of the child ; as revealing its nature
in every change of our daily lives which we ex-
perience and tell to one another or find ourselves
unable to tell; as allowing itself to be discovered
in the laboratory, and as willing to leave the
marks of its activity on the scientist’s blackened
drum and the dial of the chronoscope; as subject
to the limitations of health and disease, needing
 THE SCIENCE OF THE MIND-PSYCHOLOGY. 7

to be handled with all the resources of the asy-

lum, the reformatory, the jail, as well as with the
delicacy needed to rear the sensitive girl or to
win the love of the bashful maid; as manifesting
itself in the development of humanity from the
first rude contrivances for the use of fire, the first
organizations for defence, and the first inscrip-
tions of picture writing, up to the modern inven-
tions in electricity, the complex constitutions of
government, and the classic productions of liter-
ary art ; and as revealing its possibilities finally in
the brutal acts of the mob, the crimes of a lynch-
ing party, and the deeds of collective righteous-
ness performed by our humane and religious SO-
cieties.
It would be impossible, of course, within the
limits of this little volume, to give even the main
results in so many great chapters of this ambitious
and growing science. I shall not attempt that;
but the rather select from the various departments
certain outstanding results and principles. F r o m
these as elevations the reader may see the moun-
tains on the horizon, so to speak, which at his
leisure, and with better guides, he may explore.
The choice of materials from so rich a store has
depended also, as the preface states, on the writ-
er’s individual judgment, and it is quite. probable
that no one will find the matters altogether wisely
chosen. All the great departments now thus
briefly described, however, are represented in the
following chapters.
8 THE STORY OF THE MIND.

CHAPTER II.

WHAT OUR MINDS HAVE IN COMMON-INTRO-

SPECTIVE PSYCHOLOGY.

O F all the sources now indicated from which

the psychologist may draw, that of so-called In-
trospective Psychology-the actual reports of
what we find going on in our minds from time to
time-is the most important. This is true for two
great reasons, which make Psychology different
from all the other sciences. The first claim which
the introspective method has upon us arises from
the fact that it is only by it that we can examine
the mind directly, and get its events in their
purity. Each of us knows himself better than he
knows any one else. So this department, in which
we deal each with his own consciousness at first
hand, is more reliable, if free from error, than any
of those spheres in which we examine other per-
sons, so long as we are dealing with the psychol-
ogy of the individual. T h e s e c o n d r e a s o n t h a t
this method of procedure is most important is
found in the fact that all the other departments
of psychology-and with them all the other sci-
ences-have to use introspection, after all, to
make sure of the results which they get by other
methods. For example, the natural scientist, the
botanist, let us say, and the physical scientist,
the electrician, say, can not observe the plants or
the electric sparks without really using his intro-
spection upon what is before him. The light from
the plant has to go into his brain .and leave a cer-
tain effect in his mind, and then he has to use in-
trospection to report what he sees. T h e astrono-
 WHA’T OUR MINDS HAVE IN COMMON. 9
mer who has bad eyes can not observe the stars
well or discover the facts about them, because
his introspection in reporting what he sees pro-
ceeds on the imperfect and distorted images com-
ing in from his defective eyesight. So a man
given to exaggeration, who is not able to report
truthfully what he remembers, can not be a good
botanist, since this defect in introspection will
render his observation of the plants unreliable.
In practice the introspective method has been
most important, and the development of psychol-
ogy has been up to very recently mainly due to
its use. As a consequence, there are many gen-
eral principles of mental action and many laws of
mental growth already discovered which should
in the first instance engage our attention. They
constitute the main framework of the building;
and-we should master them well before we go on
to find the various applications which they have
in the other departments of the subject.
The greater results of “ Introspecti.ve ” or, as
it is very often called, ‘( General ” psychology
may be summed up in a few leading principles,
which sound more or less abstract and difficult,
but which will have many concrete illustrations in
the subsequent chapters. The facts of experience,
the actual events which we find taking place in
our minds, fall naturally into certain great divi-
sions. These are very easily distinguished from
one another. The first distinction is covered
by the popularly recognised difference between
‘(thought and conduct,” or ‘(knowledge and life.”
On the one hand, the mind is looked at as receiv-
ing, taking in, learning ; and on the other hand, as
acting, willing, doing fhis or that. Another great
distinction contrasts a third mental condition,
IO THE STORY OF THE MIND.

“ feeling,” with both of the other two. We say a

man has knowledge, but little feeling, head but
no heart; or that he knows and feels the right
but does not live up to it.
I. On the side of Reception we may first point
out the avenues through which our experiences
come to us: these are the senses-a great num-
ber, not simply the five special senses of which
we were taught in our childhood. Besides Sight,
Hearing, Taste, Smell, and Touch, we now know of
certain others very definitely. There are Muscle
sensations coming from the moving of our limbs,
Organic sensations from the inner vital organs,
Heat and Cold sensations which are no doubt dis-
tinct from each other, Pain sensations probably
having their own physical apparatus, sensations
from the Joints, sensations of Pressure, of Equili-
brium of the body, and a host of peculiar sensa-
tional conditions which, for al! we know, may be
separate and distinct, or may arise from combi-
nations of some of the others. Such, for exam-
ple, are the sensations which are felt when a cur-
rent of electricity is sent through the arm.
All these give the mind its material to work
upon ; a n d i t g e t s n o m a t e r i a l i n t h e f i r s t i n -
stance from any other source. All the things we
know, all our opinions, knowledges, beliefs, are
absolutely dependent at the start upon this sup-
ply of material from our senses; although, as we
shall see, the mind gets a long way from its first
subjection to this avalanche of sensations which
come constantly pouring in upon it from the ex-
ternal world. Yet this is the essential and capital
function of Sensation : to supply the material on
which the mind does the work in its subsequent
thought and action.
 WHAT OUR MINDS HAVE IN COMMON. II

Next comes the process by which the mind

holds its material for future use, the process of
Memory ; and with it the process by which it com-
bines its material together in various useful forms,
making up things and persons out of the material
which has been received and remembered-called
Association of Ideas, Thinking, Reasoning, etc. All
these processes used to be considered as separate
“ faculties ” of the soul and as showing the mind
doing different things. But that view is now com-
plete7y given up. &.ychology now treats the ac-
tivitv of the mind in a much more simnle wav. I t
says: Mind does only one thing; in all these so-
called faculties we have the mind doing this one
thing only on the different materials which come
and go in it. This one thing is the combining, or
holding together, of the elements which first come
to it as sensations, so that it can act on a group
of them as if they were only one and represented
only one external thing. Let me illustrate this
single and peculiar sort of process as it goes on in
the mind.
We may ask how the child apprehends an
orange out there on the table before him. It
can not be said that the orange goes into the
child’s mind by any one of its senses. By sight
he gets only the colour and shape of the orange,
by smell he gets only its odour, by taste its sweet-
ness, and by touch its smoothness, rotundity, etc.
Furthermore, by none of these senses does he
find out the individuality of the orange, or dis-
tinguish it from other things which involve the
same or similar sensations-say an apple. It is
easy to see that after each of the senses has sent
in its report something more is necessary: the
combining of them all together in the same place
12 THE STORY OF THE MIND.

and at the same time, the bringing up of an ap-

propriate name, and with that a sort of relating
or distinguishing of this group of ,sensations from
those of the apple. Only then can we say that
the knowledge, “ here is an orange,” has been
reached. Now this is the one typical allay t?ze ~nnind
/zas of actiq, this combining of all the items or
groups of items into ever larger and more fruit-
ful combinations. This is called Apperception.
The mind, we say, ‘( apperceives” the orange
when it is able to treat all the separate sensations
together as standing for one thing. And the va-
rious circumstances under which the mind does
this give the occasions for the different names
which the earlier psychology used for marking
off different (‘ faculties.”
These names are still convenient, however,
and it may serve to make the subject clear, as
well as to inform the reader of the meaning of
these terms, to show how they all refer to this
one kind of mental action.
The case of the orange illustrates what is usu-
ally called Perception. It is the case in which the
result is the knowledge of an actual object in the
outside world. When the same process goes on
after the actual object has been removed it is
Memory. When it goes on again in a way which
is not controlled by reference to such an outside
object-usually it is a little fantastic, as in dreams
or fancy, but often it is useful as being so well
done as to anticipate what is really true in the
outside world-then it is Imagination. If it is
actnalIy untrue, but still believed in, we caI1 it II-
lusion or Hallucination. When it uses mere sym-
bols, such as words, gestures, writing, etc., to
stand for whole groups of things, it is Thinking
 WHAT OUR MINDS HAVE IN COMMON. 13
or Reasoning. So we may say that what the mind
arrives at through this its one great way of act-
ing, no matter which of these forms it takes on,
except in the cases in which it is not true in its
results to the realities, is Knowledge.
Thus we see that the terms and faculties or
the older psychology can be arranged under this
doctrine of Apperception without the necessity of
thinking of the mind as doing more than. the one
thing. It simply groups and combines its mate-
rial in different ways and in ever higher degree;
of complexity.
Apperception, then, is the one principle of
mental activity on the side of its reception and
treatment of the materials of experience.
There is another term very current in psychol-
ogy by which this same process is sometimes in-
dicated: the phrase Association of Ideas. This
designates the fact that when two things have
been perceived or thought of together, they tend
to come up together in the mind in the future;
and when a thing has been perceived which re-
sembles another, or is contrasted with it, they
tend to recall each other in the same way. It is
plain, however, that this phrase is applied to the
single thoughts, sensations, or other mental ma-
terials, in their relations or connections among
themselves. They are said to be “associated ”
with one another. This way of speaking of the
mental materials, instead of speaking of the
mind’s activity, is convenient; and it is quite
right to do so, since it is no contradiction to
say that the thoughts, etc., which the mind “ ap-
perceives ” remain cl associated ” together. From
this explanation it is evident that the Association
of Ideas also comes under the mental process
14 THE STORY OF THE MIND.

of Apperception of which we have been speak-

ing.
There is, however, another tendency of the
mind in the treatment of its material, a tendency
which shows us in actual operation the activity
with which we have now become familiar. When
we come to look at any particular case of apper-
ception or association we find that the process
must go on from the platform which the mind’s
attainments have already reached. The passing
of the mental states has been likened to a
stream which flows on from moment to moment
with no breaks. It is so continuous that we can
n e v e r s a y : “ I will start afresh, forget the past,
and be uninfluenced by my history.” However
we may wish this, w e c a n n e v e r d o i t ; f o r t h e
oncoming current of the stream is just what we
speak of as ourselves, and we can not avoid
bringing the memories, imaginations, expecta-
tions, disappointments, etc., up to the present,
So the effect which any new event or experience,
happening for the first time, is to have upon us
depends upon the way it fits into the current of
these onflowing influences. The man I see for
the first time may be so neutral to me that I pass
him unregarded. But let him return after I have
once remarked him, or let him resemble a man
whom I know, or let him give me some reason to
observe, fear, revere, think of him in any way,
then he is a positive factor in my stream. He
has been taken up into the flow of my mental life,
and he henceforth contributes something to it.
For example, a little child, after learning to
draw a man’s face, with two eyes, the nose and
mouth, and one ear on each side, will afterward,
when told to draw a profile, still put in two eyes
 WHAT OUR MINDS HAVE IN COMMON. 15

and affix an ear to each side. The drift of men-

tal habit tells on the new result and he can not
escape it.
He will still put in the two eyes and two ears
when he has before him a copy showing only one
ear and neither eye.
In all such cases the new is said to be Assimi-
lated to the old. The customary figure for man
in the child’s memory assimilates the materials of
the new copy set before him.
Now this tendency is universal. The mind
must assimilate its new material as much as pos-
sible, thus making the old stand for the new.
Otherwise there would be no containing the frag-
mentary details which we should have to remem-
ber and handle. Furthermore, it is through this
tendency that we go on to form the great classes
of objects-such as man, animal, virtue-into
which numbers of similar details are put, and
which we call General Notions or Concepts.
We may understand by Assimilation, there-
fore, the general tendency of new experiences to
be treated by us in the ways which similar ma-
terial has been treated before, with the result
that the mind proceeds from the particular case
to the general class.
Summing up our outcome so far, we find that
general psychology has reached three great prin-
ciples in its investigation of knowledge. First,
we have the combining tendency of the mind, the
grouping together and relating of mental states
and of things, called Apperce~tioz. Then, second,
there are the particular relations established
among the various states, etc., which are com-
bined ; these are called Associations of Ideas.
And, third, there is the tendency of the mind to
16 THE STORY OF THE MIND.

use its old experiences and habits as general pat-

terns or nets for the sorting out and distributing
of all the new details of daily life; this is called
AssimiZdion.
II. Let us now turn to the second great aspect
of the mind, as general or introspective psychol-
ogy considers it, the aspect which presents itself
in Action or conduct. The fact that we act is of
course as important as the fact that we think or
the fact that we feel; and the distinction which
separates thought and action should not be made
too sharp.
Yet there is a distinction. To understand
action we must again go to introspection. T h i s
comes out as soon as we ask how we reach our
knowledge of the actions of others. Of course,
we say at once that we see them. A n d t h a t i s
true; we do see them, while as to their thoughts
we only infer them from what we see of their
action. B u t , o n t h e o t h e r h a n d , w e m a y a s k :
How do we come to infer this or that thought
from this or that action of another? The only
reply is: Because when we act in the same way
this is the way we feel. So we get back in any
case to our own consciousness and must ask how
is this action related to this thought in our own
mind.
To this question psychology has now a gen-
eral answer: Our action is always the result of
our thought, of the elements of knowledge which
are at the time present in the mind. Of course,
there are actions which we do from purely nerv-
ous reasons. These are the Instincts, which come
up again when we consider the animals. But
these we may neglect so long as we are investi-
gating actions which we consider our own. Apart
 WHAT OUR MINDS HAVE IN COMMON. 17

from the Instincts, the principle holds that behind

every action which our conduct shows there must
be something thought of, some sensation or
knowledge then in mind, some feeling swelling
within our breast, which prompts to the action.
This general principle is Motor Suggestion.
It simply means that we are unable to have any
thought or feeling whatever, whether it comes
from the senses, from memory, from the words,
conduct, or command of others, which does not
h a v e a d i r e c t i n f l u e n c e u p o n o u r c o n d u c t . We
are quite unable to avoid the influence of our own
thoughts upon our conduct, and often the most
trivial occurrences of our daily lives act as sug-
gestions to deeds of very great importance to our-
selves and others., For example, the influence of
the newspaper reports of crime stimulate other
individuals to perform the same crimes by this
principle of suggestion; for the fact is that the
reading of the report causes us to entertain the
thoughts, and these thoughts tend to arouse in us
their corresponding trains of suggested action.
The most interesting and striking sphere of
operation of the principle of Suggestion (of other
sorts as well as motor) is what is commonly known
simply as Hypnotism. T o t h a t , a s w e l l a s t o
further illustrations of Suggestion, we will return
later on.
We are able, however, to see a little more in
detail how the law of Motor Suggestion works
by asking what sort of action is prompted in each
case of thought or feeling, at the different levels
of the mind’s activity which have been distin-
guished above as all illustrating Apperception-
e.g., the stages known as Perception, Imagina-
tion, Reasoning, etc.
IS THE STORY OF THE MIND.

We act, of course, on our perceptions constant-

lY ; most of our routine life is made up of such ac-
tion on the perceptions of objects which lie about
us. The positions of things in the house, in the
streets, in the office, in the store, are so well
known that we carry out a series of actions with
reference to these objects without much super-
vision from our consciousness. Here the law of
Motor Suggestion works along under the guidance
of Perception, Memory, and the Association of
Ideas. Then we find also, in much of our action,
an element due to the exercise of the Imagination.
We fill in the gaps in the world of perception by
imagining appropriate connections ; and we then
act as if we knew that these imaginations were
realities. T h i s i s e s p e c i a l l y t r u e i n o u r i n t e r -
course with our fellow-men. \ We never really
know what they will do from time to time. T h e i r
action is still future and uncertain; but from
our familiarity with their character, we surmise or
imagine what they expect or think, and we then
act so as to make our conduct fit into theirs.
Hete is suggestion of a personal kind which de-
pends upon our ability, in a sense, to reconstruct
the character of others, leading us out into appro-
priate action. This is the sphere of the most im-
portant affairs of our lives. It appears especially
so when we consider its connection with the next
great sort of action from suggestion.
This next and highest sphere is action from
the general or abstract thoughts which we have
been able to work up by the apperceiving activity
of the mind. In this sphere we have a special
name for those thoughts which influence us directly
and lead us to action : we call such thoughts
Motives. We aiso have a special name for the
 WHAT OUR MINDS HAVE IN COMMON. 19

s o r t o f a c t i o n w h i c h i s p r o m p t e d b y clearly-
thought-out motives : Will. But in spite of this
emphasis given to certain actions of ours as spring-
ing from what is called Will, we must be careful
to see that Will is not a new faculty, or capacity,
added to mind, and which is different from the
ways of action which the mind had before the
Will arose. Will is only a name for the action
upon suggestions of conduct which are so clear in
our minds that we are able to deliberate .upon
them, acting only after some reflection, and so
having a sense that the action springs from our
own choice. The real reasons for action., how-
ever, are thoughts, in this case, just as m the
earlier cases they were. In this case we call them
Motives: but we are dependent upon these Mo-
tives, these Suggestions; we can not act without
Motives, nor can we fail to act on those Motives
which we have; just as, in the earlier cases, we
could not act without some sort of Perceptions
or Imaginations or Memories, and we could not
fail to act on the Perceptions or other mental
states which we had. Voluntary action or Will is
therefore only a complex and very highly con-
scious case of the general law of Motor Sugges-
tion ; it is the form which suggested action takes
on when Apperception is at its highest level.
The converse of Suggestion is also true-that
we can not perform an action without having in
the mind at the time the appropriate thought, or
image, or memory to suggest the action. T h i s
dependence of action upon the thought which the
mind has at the time is conclusively shown in
certain patients having partial paralysis. T h e s e
patients find that when the eyes are bandaged
they can not use their limbs, and it is simply be-
20 THE STORY OF THE MIND.

cause they can not realize without seeing the limb

how it would feel to move it; but open the eyes
and let them see the limb-then they move it
freely. A patient can not speak when the cor-
tex of the brain is injured in the particular spot
which is used in remembering how the words feel
or sound when articulated. Many such cases lead
to the general position that for each of our inten-
tional actions we must have some way of thinking
about the action, of remembering how it feels,
looks, etc. ; w e m u s t h a v e s o m e t h i n g i n m i n d
eguival’ezt t o t h e e x p e r i e n c e o f t h e m o v e m e n t .
This is called the principle of Kinaesthetic Equiv-
alents, an expression which loses its formidable
s o u n d w h e n w e r e m e m b e r t h a t ‘( kinzesthetic”
means having the feeling of movement; so the
principle expresses the truth that we must in
every case have some thought or mental picture
in mind which is equivalent to the feeling of the
movement we desire to make; if not, we can not
succeed in making it.
What we mean by the ‘( freedom ” of the will
is not ability to do anything without thinking,
but ability to think all the alternatives together
and to act on this larger thought. Free action
is the fullest expression of thought and of the
Self which thinks it.
It is interesting to observe the child getting
his Equivalents day by day. He can not perform
a new movement simply by wishing to do so; he
has no Equivalents in his mind to proceed upon.
But as he learns the action, gradually striking
the proper movements one by one-oftenest by
imitation, as we will see later on-he stores the
necessary Equivalents up in his memory, and after-
ward only needs to think how the movements
 WHAT OUR MINDS HAVE IN COMMON. 21

feel or look, or how words sound, to be able to

make the movements or speak the words forth-
with.
III. Introspection firids another great class of
conditions in experience, again on the receptive
side-conditions which convert the mind from the
mere theatre of indifferent changes into the vital-
ly interested, warmly intimate thing which our
rnental life is to each of us. This is the sphere
of Feeling. We may see without more ado that
while we are receiving sensations and thoughts
and suggestions, and acting upon them in the va-
riety of ways already pointed out, we ourselves
are not indifferent spectators of this play,, this
come-and-go of processes. We are directly impli-
cated; indeed, the very sense of a self, an ego, a
me-and-mine, in each consciousness, arises from
the fact that all this come-and-go 1s a personal
growth, The mind is not a mere machine doing
what the laws of its action prescribe. We find
that nothing happens which does not affect the
mind itself for better or for worse, for richer or
for poorer, for pleasure or for pain; and there
spring up a series of attitudes of the mind itself,
according as it is experiencing or expecting to
experience what to it is good or bad. This is,
then, the great tneaning of Feeling; it is the sense
in the mind that it is itself in some way influ-
enced for good or for ill by what goes on within
it. It stands midway between thought and ac-
tion, We feel with reference to what we think,
and we act because we feel. All action is guided
by feeling.
Feelingshowstwowell-markedcharacters: first,
the Excitement of taking a positive attitude ; and,
second, the Pleasure or Pain that goes with it.
22 THE STORY OF THE MIND.

Here, again, it may suffice to distinguish the

stages which arise as we go from the higher to the
lower, from the life of Sensation and Perception
up to that of Thought. This w.as our method in
b o t h o f t h e o t h e r p h a s e s o f t h e m e n t a l life-
Knowledge and Action. Doing this, therefore, in
the case of Feeling also, we find different terms
applied to the different phases of feeling. In
the lowest sort of mental life, as we may s u p -
pose the helpless newborn child to have it, and
as we also think it exists in certain low forms
of animal life, feeling is not much more than
Pleasures and Pains depending largely upon the
physical conditions under which life proceeds.
It is likely that there are both Pleasures and
Pains which are actually sensations with special
nerve apparatus of their own; and there are also
states of the Comfortable and the Uncomfortable,
or of pleasant and unpleasant feeling, due to the
way the mind is immediately affected. These are
conditions of Excitement added to the Sensations
of Pleasure and Pain.
Coming up to the life of Memory and Imagina-
tion, we find many great classes of Emotions tes-
tifying to the attitudes which the mind takes
toward its experiences. T h e y a r e r e m a r k a b l y
rich and varied, these emotions. Hope gives
place to its opposite despair, joy to sorrow, and
regret succeeds expectation. No one can enumer-
ate the actual phases of the emotional life. T h e
differences which are most pronounced-as be-
tween hope and fear, joy and sorrow, anger and
love-have special names, and their stimulating
causes are so constant that they have also cer-
tain fixed ways of showing themselves in the
body, the so-called emotional Expressions. It is
 WHAT OUR MINDS HAVE IN COMMON. 23

by these that we see and sympathize with the

emotional states of other persons. The most that
we have room here to say is that there is a con-
stant ebb and flow, and that we rarely attain a
state of relative freedom from ‘the influence of
emotion.
The fixed bodily Expressions of emotion are
largely hereditary and common to man and the
animals. I t i s h i g h l y p r o b a b l e t h a t t h e y f i r s t
arose as attitudes useful in the animal’s environ-
ments for defence, flight, seizure, embrace, etc.,
and have descended to man as survivals, so be-
coming indications of states of the mind.
The final and highest manifestation of the
life of feeling is what we call Sentiment. Senti-
ment is aroused in response to certain so-called
ideal states of thought. T h e t r e n d o f m e n t a l
growth toward constantly greater adequacy in its
knowledge leads it to-anticipate conditions when
its attainments will be made complete. There
are certain sorts of reality whose completeness,
thus imagined, arouses id us emotional states of
the greatest power and value. The thought of
God gives rise to the Religious sentiment, that of
the good to the Ethical or Moral sentiment, that
of the beautiful to the Esthetic sentiment. T h e s e
sentiments represent the most refined and noble
fruitage o f t h e l i f e o f f e e l i n g , a s t h e t h o u g h t s
which they accompany refer to the most elevated
and ideal objects. And it is equally true that the
conduct which is performed under the inspiration
of Sentiment is the noblest and most useful in
which man can engage.