Chapter 1

Introduction
Power systems are composed of transmission, sub-transmission, distribution
and generation systems. Transmission systems may contain large numbers
of substations which are interconnected by transmission lines, transformers,
and other devices for system control and protection. Power may be injected
into the system by the generators or absorbed from the system by the loads
at these substations. The output voltages of generators typically do not
exceed 30-kV. Hence, transformers are used to increase the voltage levels
to levels ranging from 69-kV all the way up to 765-kV at the generator
terminals for efficient power transmission. High voltage is preferred at
the transmission system for different reasons one of which is to minimize
the copper losses that are proportional to the ampere Rows along lines.
At the receiving end, the transmission systems are connected to the sub-
transmission or distribution systems which are operated at lower voltage
levels ranging from 115-KV to 4.16-KV. Distribution systems are typically
configured to operate in a radial configuration, where feeders stretch from
distribution substations and form a tree structure with their roots at the
substation and branches spreading over the distribution area.

1.1 Operating States of a Power System

The operating conditions of a power system at a given point in time can be
determined if the network model and complex phasor voltages at every sys-
tem bus are known. Since the set of complex phasor voltages fully specifies
the system, it is referred to as the static state of the system. According to
[1], the system may move into one of three possible states, namely normal,
emergency and restorative, as the operating conditions change.
A power system is said to operate in a normal state if all the loads in the
system can be supplied power by the existing generators without violating

Copyright 2004 by Marcel Dekker, Inc. All Rights Reserved.

 any operational constraints. Operational constraints include the limits on
the transmission line flows, as well as the upper and lower limits on bus
voltage magnitudes. A normal state is said to be secwre if the system can
remain in a normal state following the occurrence of each contingency from
a list of critical contingencies. Common contingencies of interest are trans-
mission line or generator outages due to unexpected failures of equipment
or natural causes such as storms. Otherwise, the normal state is classified as
msecwe where the power balance at each bus and all operating inequality
constraints are still satisfied, yet the system remains vulnerable with re-
spect to some of the considered contingencies. If the system is found to be
in a normal but msecwe operating state then, preventive actions must be
taken to avoid its move into an emergency state. Such preventive controls
can be determined typically by the help of a security constrained optimal
power flow program which accounts for a list of critical contingencies.
Operating conditions may change significantly due to an unexpected
event which may cause the violation of some of the operating constraints,
while the power system continues to supply power to all the loads in the
system. In such a situation the system is said to be operating in an emer-
gency state. Emergency state requires immediate corrective action to be
taken by the operator so as to bring the system back to a normal state.
While the system is in the emergency state, corrective control measures
may be able to avoid system collapse at the expense of disconnecting various
loads, lines, transformers or other equipment. As a result, the operating
limit violations may be eliminated and the system may recover stability
with reduced load and reconfigured topology. Then, the load versus gener-
ation balance may have to be restored in order to start supplying power to
all the loads. Such an operating state is called the restorative state, and the
actions to be taken in order to transform it into a normal state are referred
to as restorative controls. The state diagram in Figure 1.1 illustrates the
possible transitions between the different operating states defined above.

1.2 Power System Security Analysis

Power systems are operated by system operators from the area control
centers. The main goal of the system operator is to maintain the system in
the normal secure state as the operating conditions vary during the daily
operation. Accomplishing this goal requires continuous monitoring of the
system conditions, identification of the operating state and determination
of the necessary preventive actions in case the system state is found to be
msecwe. This sequence of actions is referred to as the security analysis of
the system.
The first stop of security analysis is to monitor the current state of the
system. This involves acquisition of measurements from all parts of the

Copyright 2004 by Marcel Dekker, Inc. All Rights Reserved.

 SECURE
NORMAL STATE or
INSECURE

RESTORATIVE EMERGENCY
STATE STATE

PARTIAL OR OPERATIONAL LIMITS

TOTAL BLACKOUT ARE VIOLATED

Figure 1.1. State Diagram for Power System Operation

system and then processing them in order to determine the system state.
The measurements may be both of analog and digital (on/off status of
devices) type. Substations are equipped with devices called remote terminal
units (RTU) which collect various types of measurements from the field
and are responsible for transmitting them to the control center. More
recently, the so-called intelligent electronic devices (IED) are replacing or
complementing the existing RTUs. It is possible to have a mixture of these
devices connected to a local area network (LAN) along with a SCADA
front end computer, which supports the communication of the collected
measurements to the host computer at the control center. The SCADA
host computer at the control center receives measurements from all the
monitored substations' SCADA systems via one of many possible types of
communication links such as fiber optics, satellite, microwave, etc. Figure
1.2 shows the configuration of the EMS/SCADA system for a typical power
system.
Measurements received at the control center will include line power
Hows, bus voltage and line current magnitudes, generator outputs, loads,
circuit breaker and switch status information, transformer tap positions,
and switchable capacitor bank values. These raw data and measurements
are processed by the state estimator in order to filter the measurement noise
and detect gross errors. State estimator solution will provide an optimal
estimate of the system state based on the available measurements and on
the assumed system model. This will then be passed on to all the energy
management system (EMS) application functions such as the contingency
analysis, automatic generation control, load forecasting and optimal power
now, etc. The same information will also be available via a LAN connection

Copyright 2004 by Marcel Dekker, Inc. All Rights Reserved.

 PLANNING ENERGY MANAGEMENT
Contro] Center
ANALYSIS LocaiArea FUNCTtONS
FUNCTIONS Network
A]
t Communications
^Network

SCADAFrontEnd
Loca!Area
Network
1
RTU RTU !ED !ED RTU

Monitored Devices Substation

Figure 1.2. EMS/SCAOA system configuration.

to the corporate offices where other planning and analysis functions can be
executed off-line.

Initially, power systems were monitored only by supervisory control sys-

tems. These are control systems which essentially monitor and control the
status of circuit breakers at the substations. Generator outputs and the sys-
tem frequency were also monitored for purposes of Automatic Generation
Control (AGC) and Economic Dispatch (ED). These supervisory control
systems were later augmented by real-time system-wide data acquisition
capabilities, allowing the control centers to gather all sorts of analog mea-
surements and circuit breaker status data from the power system. This led
to the establishment of the first Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition
(SCADA) Systems. The main motivation behind this development was the
facilitation of security analysis. Various application functions such as con-
tingency analysis, corrective real and reactive power dispatch could not be
executed without knowing the real-time operating conditions of the system.
However, the information provided by the SCADA system may not always
be reliable due to the errors in the measurements, telemetry failures, com-
munication noise, etc. Furthermore, the collected set of measurements may
not allow direct extraction of the corresponding A.C. operating state of the
system. For instance, bus voltage phase angles are not typically measured,
and not all the transmission line flows are available. Besides, it may not be
economically feasible to telemeter all possible measurements even if they
are available from the transducers at the substations.

Copyright 2004 by Marcel Dekker, Inc. All Rights Reserved.

 1.3 State Estimation
The foregoing concerns were first recognized and subsequently addressed
by Fred Schweppe, who proposed the idea of state estimation in power sys-
tems [2, 3, 4]. Introduction of the state estimation function broadened the
capabilities of the SCADA system computers, leading to the establishment
of the Energy Management Systems (EMS), which would now be equipped
with, among other application functions, an on-line State Estimator (SE).
In order to identify the current operating state of the system, state
estimators facilitate accurate and efficient monitoring of operational con-
straints on quantities such as the transmission line loadings or bus voltage
magnitudes. They provide a reliable real-time data base of the system,
including the existing state based on which, security assessment functions
can be reliably deployed in order to analyze contingencies, and to determine
any required corrective actions.
The state estimators typically include the following functions:
* Topology processor: Gathers status data about the circuit breakers
and switches, and configures the one-line diagram of the system.
* Observability analysis: Determines if a state estimation solution for
the entire system can be obtained using the available set of mea-
surements. Identifies the unobservable branches, and the observable
islands in the system if any exist.
< State estimation solution: Determines the optimal estimate for the
system state, which is composed of complex bus voltages in the en-
tire power system, based on the network model and the gathered
measurements from the system. Also provides the best estimates for
all the line Hows, loads, transformer taps, and generator outputs.
* Bad data processing: Detects the existence of gross errors in the mea-
surement set. Identifies and eliminates bad measurements provided
that there is enough redundancy in the measurement configuration.
< Parameter and structural error processing: Estimates various net-
work parameters, such as transmission line model parameters, tap
changing transformer parameters, shunt capacitor or reactor param-
eters. Detects structural errors in the network configuration and
identifies the erroneous breaker status provided that there is enough
measurement redundancy.
Thus, power system state estimator constitutes the core of the on-line
security analysis function. It acts like a filter between the raw measurements
received from the system and all the application functions that require the
most reliable data base for the current state of the system. Figure 1.3

Copyright 2004 by Marcel Dekker, Inc. All Rights Reserved.

 describes the data and functional interfaces between the various applica-
tion functions involved in the on-line static security assessment procedure.
Raw measurements which include the switch and circuit breaker positions
in the substations, are processed by the topology processor, which in turn
generates a bus/branch model of the power system. This model not only in-
cludes all buses within the area of the control center EMS, but also selected
buses from the neighboring systems. The information and measurements
obtained from the neighboring systems are used to build and update the
external system model. Furthermore, there may be unobservable pockets
within one's own area due to temporary loss of telemetry, rejected bad
data or other unexpected failures. Such areas whether physically located
within the control area or part of the external system, will be estimated via
the use of pseudo measurements. Pseudo measurements can be generated
based on short term load forecasts, generation dispatch, historical records
or other similar approximation methods. Naturally, they are assigned high
variances (low weights) or they can be forced to be critical measurements
by design. Definition and properties of a critical measurement will be dis-
cussed in detail in chapter 5. In addition, there may be passive buses with
no generation or load, having net zero real and reactive power injection.
Such bus injections, even though not measured, can be used as error free
measurements in the state estimation formulation and referred to as "vir-
tual" measurements. The results obtained by the state estimator will be
checked in order to classify the system state into one of the three categories
shown in Figure 1.1. If it is found to be in the normal state, then contin-
gency analysis will be carried out to determine the system security against a
set of predetermined contingencies. In case of insecurity, preventive control
actions have to be calculated via the use of a software tool such as a security
constrained optimal power flow. Implementing these preventive measures
will move the system into the desired normal and secwe state. Figure 1.3
also indicates the emergency and restorative control actions which will be
deployed under a&nonnaZ operating conditions, however these topics are
beyond the scope of this book and will not be discussed any further.

1.4 Summary
Power systems are continuously monitored in order to maintain the oper-
ating conditions in a normal and secure state. State estimation function is
used for this purpose. It processes redundant measurements in order to pro-
vide an optimal estimate of the current operating state. State estimation
problem has been investigated by several researchers since its introduc-
tion in the late 1960s. Being an on-line function, computational issues re-
lated to speed, storage and numerical robustness of the solution algorithms
have been carefully studied. Measurement configuration and its effect on

Copyright 2004 by Marcel Dekker, Inc. All Rights Reserved.

 Figure 1.3. On-line Static Security Assessment: Functional Diagram

state estimation have been addressed by the developed observability anal-

ysis methods. State estimators also function as filters against incorrect
measurements, data and other information received through the SCADA
system. Hence, the subject of bad data processing has been investigated
and detection/identification algorithms for errors in analog measurements
have been developed. Special methods also exist for the identification of
those errors related to the topology information and/or network parame-
ters. On the other hand, the use of ampere measurements present some
problems which do not exist in their absence from the measurement set.
In the following chapters, these issues will be presented in more detail and
methods which are developed to address them will be described.

References
[1] Dy Liacco T.E., "Real-Time Computer Control of Power Systems",
Proceedings of the IEEE, Vol. 62, No.7, July 1974, pp.884-891.

[2] Schweppe F.C. and Wildes J., "Power System Static-State Estimation,
Part I: Exact Model", IEEE Transactions on Power Apparatus and
Systems, Vol.PAS-89, January 1970, pp. 120-125.

Copyright 2004 by Marcel Dekker, Inc. All Rights Reserved.

 [3] Schweppe F.C. and Rom D.B., "Power System Static-State Estima-
tion, Part II: Approximate Model", IEEE Transactions on Power Ap-
paratus and Systems, Vol.PAS-89, January 1970, pp.125-130.
[4] Schweppe F.C., "Power System Static-State Estimation, Part III: Im-
plementation" , IEEE Transactions on Power Apparatus and Systems,
Vol.PAS-89, January 1970, pp. 130-135.
[5] Fink L.H. and Carlsen K., "Operating under Stress and Strain", IEEE
Spectrum, March 1978.
[6] N. Balu et al. "On-line Power System Security Analysis", Proc. of the
IEEE, vol. 80(2), pp. 262-280.

Copyright 2004 by Marcel Dekker, Inc. All Rights Reserved.