SECRET WEAPONS OF THE

NAPOLEONIC WARS

T might not be amiss t o ask: what is a secret weapon? Dur-

ing the recent war we had all sorts of answers, usually in
the form of Nazi threats. A transatlantic rocket would indeed
have been a secret weapon, but we were sometimes told that
Hitler's secret weapon was hunger, applied t o enslaved peo-
ples, and that ours was America's know-how in back-yard
mechanics. But a secret weapon should be a t least reason-
ably secret, and something of a surprise t o the enemy when
it is used, and it should be a weapon.
For the period under discussion, I should like t o begin with
a few borderIine cases. I n 1795, an official regulation made
lemon juice a regular part of the diet of his Majesty's sailors.
It was about time, incidentally, since the virtues of the citrus
fruits in combating scurvy had been known, t o some a t least,
since the days of Elizabeth. Edward Jenner's smallpox vac-
cination, first convincingly demonstrated in 1796, was soon
put into the regulations as something constantly t o be rec-
ommended by military surgeons, although no one was t o be
vaccinated against his will. No doubt the British armed forces
benefited from these measures, and earlier than the men of
other countries, but no effort was made t o keep the discover-
ies from becoming common property, and they can hardly be
called secret weapons.
Toward the end of the Napoleonic War a British naval
architect designed a fighting ship with a rounded instead of a
20
Secret Weapons of the Napoleonic Wars 21
square stern. The idea was a t once taken up, since it made a
stronger and more seaworthy ship and permitted the mount-
ing of additional guns. This, however, comes under the head
of minor improvements, of which there were many, and in all
navies.
I n gunnery there were some changes, one especialIy which
shows an interesting tendency and should be noticed. During
the War of the American Revolution, a new gun, called the
carronade because i t was first manufactured in quantity a t
the Carron Iron Works in Scotland, was adopted by the
Royal Navy. It hardly came into its own until the Napoleon-
ic Wars. Like the others, it was a muzzle-loading smooth-
bore and was made in the standard calibres. It was, however,
much lighter in weight and shorter in the barrel-say one
ton against three, and four feet against ten, in comparison
with one of the big fellows throwing a shot of the same size.
This meant, of course, that the carronade was useless at
long range and required a reduced charge of powder, but a t
close quarters it was very effective. It was popular on small
ships, where maximum firepower with minimum weight was
wanted. During the war with Napoleon it became increasing-
ly customary t o substitute carronades of large calibre for the
standard guns of small calibre which all ships, even the
largest, necessarily carried on their upper decks. This simpli-
fied the supply problem because fewer sizes of ammunition
had t o be provided.
It was Napoleon, in one of those flashes of naval intuition
which he occasionally showed, who tried t o carry this antici-
pation of the all-big-gun principle t o its logical conclusion.
Early in 1805 he wrote t o his Minister of Marine: "I have
several times spoken of my project of arming ships of the line
with guns of the same calibre." Accordingly, only 36-pounder
guns and 36-pounder carronades were t o be retained. "In this
22 Public Lectures
war," continued the artillerist-emperor, "the English have
been the first t o use carronades, and everywhere they have
done us great harm." But the probIem was t o get the weap-
ons, though they were no longer secret, and here Napoleon
could not work a miracIe. H e tried t o expedite matters in
order after order. For example: "For God's sake, ship me
some carronades. . . . The English, without saying a word,
have practised this method. Here's ten years we are behind
.
their Admiralty. . .I see no attention being paid t o it." Here
was the all-big-gun principle, exploited by the British and
envied by the French, an anticipation of some of the argu-
ments used a hundred years later by Admirals Sims and
Fisher. Not entirely the same, of course, for the modern
Dreadnought and her progeny are armed not only on the
alEbig-gun but also on the few-big-gun principle, and no one
then proposed the use of a few monster guns only. But it was
a great day for some people; as one old sea-dog, Admiral
Howe, said, "Happy are those who have shares in the Carron
Company."
The examples which I have mentioned are not true secret
weapons, but the inventors were busy. It must have been a
difficult time for those in the top positions, for under the
stimulus of war, bright-minded people bombarded them from
arm-chairs and other points of vantage with strategical plans,
gadgets, and all sorts of devices for achieving victory. I have
seen the correspondence of the British Admiralty for only the
year 1806, but there is no reason t o think t h a t i t was dif-
ferent in any other year, or that the French mind was less
active. For example, a sampling of the mailbag for a period of
a few months will show something like this: a shallow draft
landing barge; a new type of block for the rigging; a project
for dismembering the Spanish empire in South America; a
new type of gun carriage; how t o beat a big ship, using only
Secret Weapons of the Napoleonic Wars 23
small craft; a simplified code of flag signals and semaphore
telegraph; a new cipher; a chemical solution for treating iron
t o prevent rust; proposals for a new naval academy; a
steamship, which could be loaded with explosives and direct-
ed against the enemy without having anyone on board; a new
type of frigate; a new method of finding longitude; and a
project for filling ships with stone and sinking them in
French harbors. The worried gentlemen at the Admiralty,
not accustomed t o dealing with such matters, had t o find
what was useful in a11 this and filter out t h e nuts. How the
job was done, in the case of a few famous inventions, should
next occupy our attention; though to set the stage, it is nec-
essary t o glance briefly a t the international situation as it
existed in 1803, when, after a short and uneasy truce, Brit-
ain and France renewed their struggle.
By this time Napoleon knewvery well who his chief antago-
nist was and that he would have t o deal with her directly.
With a good telescope one could see the tents of the French
troops camped on the opposite side of the Channel, waiting
for their opportunity t o invade. Landing craft were built
inland, then sent down the rivers and along the coast t o the
assembly points, under the protection of many batteries.
The word went out that I 50,000 men, a force larger than Brit-
ain's regular army, could be embarked on these craft in two
hours, t o be landed on the coast of England any dark night
when the wind was favorable.
On both sides of the Channel, peopIe who would nowadays
make a good living from the comic books foretold wonders
that were t o supplement the usual means of making war. A
tunnel was t o be dug under the Channel, t o be driven through
just when a French assault force in balloons drifted across t o
secure a beach-head. Englishmen armed with pistols and held
aloft by large kites were t o contest the landing of this air-
24 Public Lectures
borne force. Or, t o outfight the British vessels, great rafts,
with citadels mounting hundreds of guns, were t o bring the
army across, their motive power supplied by windmills har-
nessed t o paddle wheels.
One may be sure that such schemes were far from Napo-
leon's mind, but there can be no doubt that he seriously in-
tended t o stage an invasion. Some question has, indeed, been
raised as t o whether he really meant business; it has been
shown, for instance, t h a t instead of I 50,000 men embarked in
two hours, his utmost effort could have put 9o,ooo men afloat
in eighteen, taking advantage of two high tides. His units
were not a t full strength and his harbors silted up; he himself
said later, on thinking it over, that he really intended t o
crush the Austrians and the Russians and t h a t t h e great
force necessary for this plan could best be assembled a t the
Channel, so t h a t the intended victims would not be fore-
warned.
The invasion publicity contained two striking pieces of
evidence which are not, in themselves, entirely conclusive:
one is the medal, ostensibly struck a t London, which was
made t o commemorate the invasion, and the other the great
175-foot marble column, called the Colonne de la Grande
Armei, which was raised near the coast a few miles from
Boulogne. This shaft was topped by a statue of the Emperor,
and I am reliably informed that he points across the sea to-
ward England, above the inscription, "Veil; l'enemi!"-
"There is the enemy!" At least he did stand thus, but in
August, 1914, when the adjoining area was turned into a base
camp for the British Expeditionary Force, the Curators of
National Monuments had a twinge of embarrassment when
they realized the unfriendliness of this gesture. With truly
Gallic ingenuity and courtesy, and the help of a couple of
steeplejacks, they faced the Little Corporal t o the right,
Secret Weapons of the Napoleonic Wars 25
where he pointed now t o the advancing Germans-"Voil;
l'enemi!" I dare say Hitler had him turned back again. This
story certainly ought t o be true, and the column certainly
was built.
If Napoleon's campaign was a feint, it was a good one, and
no government in its senses could afford t o ignore the threat.
The British army and militia were increased, and t o these
were added, in a year's time, a home guard of 3 50,ooo volun-
teers. Strong points called Martello towers were built a11
along the threatened coast; the idea and the name seem t o
have come from a place called Mortella in Corsica, where
there was a tower which had given Hood and Nelson a lot of
trouble in their operations against t h e island in 1794.Work
was also pushed on a big ditch, called the Hythe Military
Canal. There were not lacking those who ridiculed the ditch
which was supposed t o stop the French after they had al-
ready crossed a much bigger one, but i t was, of course, in-
tended t o plug a vulnerable gap and slow up the invaders
long enough for the home guard t o rally, just as the towers
were supposed t o impede progress from the beach. Part of
the home guard, living in the ports, called themselves the Sea
Fencibles and were t o man various small gunboats in case of
attack. While always professing themselves ready t o spring
into the breach, they never allowed the call of duty t o inter-
fere with their private pursuits. T h e Royal Navy perforce
had t o allow them t o exist, but never placed tuppence worth
of reliance upon them.
T h e Navy felt t h a t i t had the situation well in hand. It re-
sisted the usual outcry t o have a battleship anchored off each
port and beach, and set up its defenses with a few ships of
force, called block ships, assigned t o certain in-shore stations.
The Channel was patrolled by squadrons of sloops and frig-
ates, entirely adequate t o cope with French invasion barges.
26 Public Lectures
The real defence, as well as the real danger, came from the
big ships, which seldom saw the shores of England. Napole-
on's plan evolved into one of decoying away the British ships
of the line blockading his harbors, and then getting into the
Channel with a real battle fleet for long enough t o cover the
crossing. It was this elaborately worked-out plan, which was
actually attempted, which I think proves that Napoleon was
deadly serious about the invasion. Hard work and alertness
frustrated the plan, and the shores of England were defended
far from home by those "distant, storm-beaten ships, upon
which the Grand Army fof Napoleon] never looked" t o use
Admiral Mahan's fine phrase.
But you never could tell, and the minds of many turned t o
novel ways of outwitting the enemy. Opportunity had
knocked first for the French in the person of Robert Fulton,
one of those international Americans of the period who was,
like Samuel F. B. Morse, a painter turned inventor. I n 1800,
mostly on his own, Fulton produced in France a submarine
which could dive, and, with the aid of a two-man power
motor, proceed under water, It was literally two-man power,
since two intrepid volunteers turned a crank which drove the
propeller. Armed with an official letter, stating that he was
acting under government orders and was not, if captured, t o
be treated as a pirate-on pain of reprisals-he started out
one day t o show them and gallantly but harmlessly pursued a
couple of English brigs which had ventured close t o shore.
T h e idea was to attach mines t o the bottoms of the enemy's
ships, but his little boat never had a chance.
FuIton aIso built a steamboat, in 1803, which moved up-
stream in the Seine "at the pace of a rapid pedestrian," It
sank one night a t its dock, and the incident quite unjustly
caused a loss of public confidence. It should be emphasized
t h a t t h e steamboat in itself was ~ o t e n t i a l l ya revolutionary
Secret Weapons of the Napoleonic Wars 27
weapon of war, because it could move in a calm which would
then stop even the biggest warship. Fulton was the first t o
perceive its possibilities in warfare, though hewas not in this
case, nor in t h a t of thesubmarine, the first inventor in thefield.
Napoleon's attitude toward FuIton's offerings is obscure.
Following the first submarine experiments, Fulton submitted
a plan for crossing the channel in a submarine and laying
mines in English harbors. T h e First Consul wanted t o see
the submarine and was informed t h a t it had been scrapped; a
new and better one would be forthcoming, however, in re-
turn for a satisfactory financial arrangement; Napoleon's
comment was that Fulton was a charlatan and a swindler
who wished solely t o make money. Fulton was not impris-
oned and tortured, showing that Napoleon had much t o learn
in order t o become a full-fledged dictator.
Napoleon was equally skeptical two years later, in 1803, on
being offered a prospectus for a steamboat t o tow troop
barges t o England. Napoleon always showed an aversion t o
long-hairs, whom he called ideologues, and apparently t o in-
ventors as well. "Bah!" he said, "these projectors are all
either intriguers or visionaries. Don't trouble me about the
busine~s.'~ But a year later, in July 1804, faced with the prac-
tical difficulties of his undertaking, the reaction was quite
different. By some chance Fulton's steamboat scheme was
resubmitted t o Napoleon, who immediately wrote t o t h e
head of his Marine Department: "I have just read the proj-
ect of Citizen Fulton, which you have sent me much too
late, since it is one that may change the face of the world.
. . .I desire that you immediately confide its examination to a
Commission. . . . A great truth, a physical, palpable truth is
before my eyes. It will be for these gentlemen t o t r y and seize
it and see it. . . . T r y t o let the whole be concluded within 8
days, as I am impatient."
 Public Lectures
But Citizen Fulton was not to be found; under the name of
Mr. Francis, he had reached London two months before. This
change of sides, for which no blame can be attached t o FuIton,
had been engineered by Fulton's friend the Earl of Stanhope.
T h e Earl was an inventor, too; he had designed a steamboat
that did not run, and a printing press that did; he took his
friend seriously enough so that: he produced a mine-sweeping
device to take up Fulton's mines.
Fulton's proposals, for which he soon received substantial
government backing, went much further than the manufac-
ture of isolated novelties. He had a Submarine System (with
capital letters), a plan for organizing special squadrons and
taking the offensive in a new way. This appealed t o William
Pitt, who was unquestionably seeking means ofchangingover
from the purely defensive; it wouId be a mistake to think of
Britain's leaders at this time as merely wondering what the
French would do next.
Fulton's system comprised explosive infernal machines and
the means of taking them t o their targets. An improved sub-
marine would be best, he thought, but when this failed of ap-
proval he was willing t o compromise on ordinary surface
craft. The weapons were what we should call mines, but which
were then referred to as submarine bombs, torpedoes, coffers,
or carcasses. These were to be of two main types: one, lighter
than water, to be anchored beneath the surface in enemy
harbors and t o explode on contact; the other, slightly heavier
than water and buoyed by a cork float, was to be attached by
a line to the anchor cabIe of an enemy ship. The tide or cur-
rent would then carry the mine under the ship's bottom,
where a clock-work mechanism, previously set, would cause
the explosion.
These ingenious plans did not escape the adverse criticism
of some who Iearned of them. Some, who were afraid that
Secret Weapons of the Napoleonic Wars 29
Fulton really had something, said t h a t Britain should not
sponsor inventions which might recoil upon her, and those
who had no faith said the whole thing was foolishness. N o
one apparently said anything about the ethics of the new
method. Fulton repeatedly claimed that his system would
mean the obsolescence of all fleets as they were then con-
stituted. When old Earl St. Vincent, the greatest adminis-
trative admiral of his day, heard what was going forward "he
reflected for some time and then said Pitt was t h e greatest
fool that ever existed, t o encourage a mode of war which
they who commanded the seas did not want: and which, if
successful, would deprive them of it."
T h e statement sometimes made that the British were more
interested in getting Fulton away from the French than in
backing his inventions is without foundation, although Ful-
ton sometimes complained of financial undernourishment.
Actually there were a t least seven attempts made in 1804 and
1805 t o use the new weapons, some on a large scale, some on
individual forays against a single ship. The large-scale attacks
were invariably carried out in such a way that all advantage
of surprise was lost, and, also invariably, they were carried
out with great dash and daring. The net result was niI, ex-
cept to teach the French t o keep their eyes open.
The original mines were copper spheres, but in the second
large attack a new type, called the coffer, was used. This was
a great watertight box, 21 feet long, filled with 40 barrels of
gunpowder, and weighted so that it floated barely awash. T o
get them in, catamarans were used; copied from native craft
in Indian waters, these were simply two large 9 by 9 timbers,
about 10 feet long, held parallel by struts. A sailor, wearing
a black jersey and with his face covered by a black mask of
the sort now favored by professional wrestlers, sat half im-
mersed amidships and sculled the thing along. It was sup-
30 Public Lectures
posed to be practically invisible, and the job of the operator
was that already indicated: t o attach his coffer, pull out a
pin actuating t h e clock-work detonator, paddle away and let
the tide do the rest. Despite the improbable sound of all this,
such an attack was actually carried out on one occasion, There
were terrific explosions, but no damage was done and the
Frenchmen were left with some interesting trophies. Appar-
ently Fulton had forgotten that a small explosion under wa-
ter would be more effective than a big one on the surface.
Something was always getting fouled up. On two occasions
when boats' crews dropped pairs of torpedoes perfectly,
again with no effective result, Fulton explained that the
French ships "owed their safety t o the trifling circumstance
of t h e torpedoes not being properly balanced when in water,
and t h e coupling lines not being tied t o a bridle, so as t o
make the torpedoes sheer under the bottoms of the brigs."
But trifling circumstances seemed more than trifling t o the
men who had risked their lives.
Once the attacks started, there could be no more secrecy
about the general features of the plan, and there was further
talk about foolish novelties. Mr. William Cobbett, who was
against the administration and a number of other things as
well, put a poem in his Political Register. The people men-
tioned in it, aside from that familiar nautical character, Jack
T a r or Tarpaulin, are civilian members of the Cabinet in
1804, notably the Scotsman Henry Dundas, who was Vis-
count Melville and for a short time First Lord of the Admi-
ralty; the following are a few stanzas:

Dundas is gone t o Boulogne;

H e has a pawky plan
T o burn the French flotiIla
'Tis called Catamaran.
Secret Weapons of the Napoleonic Wars 31
'Like ladies in romances
Their knights' exploits t o spy
Aloft in Walmer Castle
Stand Pitt and Harrowby.
Dundas our tars haranguing
Now shows his new-made wares.
As a t some peddler prating,
Jack turns his head and swears.

Your project new? Jack utters;

Avast; 'Tis very stale;
'Tis catching birds, landlubbers,
By salt upon the tail!
Pitt and t h e others are excitedly watching the fireworks:
There in the blaze go fifty!
And there go fifty more!
A hundred in disorder
There run upon the shore!
T h e light of dawn, however, reveals t h a t "the French are
laying, just where before they lay." And, in conclusion:
May Pitt from Colonelling
Retire upon half pay
And Admiral Lord Melville
The yellow flag display!
(The yellow flag carried none of its modern connotations; i t was simply
a figurative way of indicating retirement.)

I n truth there were faults on all sides, and in 1806, after

an acrimonious dispute about money, Fulton departed for
t h e United States. H e had what he most wanted, an export
license for a W a t t and Bolton engine, an engine which in the
32 Public Lectures
next year drove the famous North River Steamboat, usually,
but less accurately, called the Clermont.
Fulton was a man of enormous energy and capacity, and
naturally he tried t o interest his own government in the ideas
which, he felt, had received less than their due in England.
He had prophesied t h a t Britain would see the day when the
Thames mouth would be blocked with mines, and the Chan-
nel, too, with a barrage of mines from shore t o shore. H e was
too early by a hundred years or so, but this does not detract
from his abilities. H e had also pointed out t o the British
government "the bad policy of forcing me into a position
where I must apply them (my engines) t o the totaI subjuga-
tion of this country." This kind of utterance had not won him
many friends. Now the state of tension between Britain and
the United States gave him the chance t o show what he
could do.
H e was willing enough, but the United States government
adopted essentially the same attitude as that of His Britan-
nic Majesty. Jefferson, no mean inventor in his own right,
was interested, and eventually Fulton got $500 and the hulk
of an old ship t o practise on. Spectators were invited, and on
the third trial the hulk was blown up, but no one was much
impressed. Washington Irving paid his respects t o the new
warfare in the thirteenth issue of Salmagundi:
..
[It is] an excellent plan of defense. no need of batteries,
forts, frigates and gunboats: observe, sir, all that's necessary
is that the ship must come to anchor in a convenient place-
watch must be asleep, or so complacent as not t o disturb the
boats paddling around them-fair wind and no tide-no moon-
light-machines well directed-mustn't flash in the pan-
bang's the word, and the vessel's blown up in a moment!

Fulton was busy with steamboats, but he stopped long

enough in 1810 t o present each member of Congress with a
pamphIet entitled "Torpedo War & Submarine Explosions."
Secret Weapons of the Napoleonic Wars 33
But it was the same old story-no real interest, no money,
many scoffers, and several determined enemies of the inven-
tion. Nevertheless, Fulton inspired many followers, and the
War of 1812 abounds in minor episodes of men with more
daring than skill bobbing about in home-made submersibles
and other craft, trying to blow uptheBritish blockaders. Since
a t the moment they had none of these devices themselves,
the British naturally denounced the whole thing as piracy.
Fulton's last invention was the first steam warship ever to
get under weigh, a strange vessel with thick sides and pad-
dles well protected between a double hull, an anticipation of
the iron-clad. Besides other weapons, she carried a huge hose
worked by a steam pump, designed to wash the enemy's
sailors off his decks and dampen his guns. Rumor crossed
the Atlantic more quickly than this Demologos, or Peoples'
Yoice, as she was called, could be built; it was reliably re-
ported that her sides were 1 3 feet thick, with other dimen-
sions beyond anything ever known (actually she was rather
small); that she could discharge IOO gallons of boiling water
per minute to repel boarders and that she was fitted with a
mechanism to brandish 300 cutlasses over the side a t 15-
second intervals. On hearing all this the British staged a
commando raid t o seize Fulton in his bed, but he was luckily
delayed that night and was not at home. Unfortunately for
the romance of invention, the war ended before the new mon-
ster of the deep was fitted with her engines. She later moved,
but not in anger, and Fulton, who died just after the peace
treaty was signed, was not there to see her. But he died suc-
cessful, for he took the steamship out of the curiosity class.
The last British attempt, late in November, 1805, to use
Fulton's mine-torpedoes was a full-dress affair. It failed be-
cause of bad weather, and the season was too far advanced
for a furthe'r effort, but i t marked also the first use in modern
 Public Lectures
warfare of another very secret weapon, the rocket. The year
before, a certain William Congreve (not the playwright),
taking an idea from native warfare in India, had received
government encouragement t o carry out some experiments.
He was the son of the Comptroller of t h e Royal Ordnance
Laboratory a t Woolwich, and no doubt this helped him t o get
a hearing; he soon had as his backers the Prime Minister,
William Pitt, and another redoubtable amateur warrior, Lord
Castlereagh, the Secretary of State for War.
Mr. Congreve's weapon was a gigantic skyrocket with a
stick 25 feet long, filled with a highly combustible material
which is, so far as I know, still secret. A meeting of the brain-
trust for the new warfare is thus reported by one veteran ad-
miral t o another, Lord Keith to Lord Barham (October 12,
1805). Lord Keith was in command of the Channel forces
and was, understandably, feeling a little hurt: "My Lord-I
returned from Walmer this morning, where I met Lord Cas-
tlereagh, Mr. Pitt, Sir Sidney Smith, Mr. Francis, and Mr.
Congreve. The plans seem determined upon, and I was only
asked about the means of putting them into execution. Sir
Sidney seemed to have only one wish, which is to get all the
force in this coast put under his direction, to create an eclat
in the papers; Mr. Francis is full of coffers, carcasses, and
submarine boats, which will not answer here; and Mr. Con-
greve, who is ingenious, is wholly wrapt up in rockets from
which I expect little success, for Mr. Congreve has no idea
of the means of applying them professionalIy."
Sir Sidney Smith, whose career reads like a particularly ex-
citing novel about Mr. Forester's hero Captain Hornblower,
was the officer in immediate charge of the project. He was
far too brilliant a man to be left out of things and far too sure
of himself t o have many well-wishers. The new warfare was
made to order for him.
Secret Weapons of the Napoleonic Wars 35
Even while Sir Sidney's forces were moving out for the big
attempt, on t h e night of November 17, Lord Barham, eighty-
year-old First Lord of the Admiralty and still a doughty
fighter, was writing t o give Mr. Pitt the facts of naval war-
fare as he saw them. He pointed out that ships were escaping
from Dutch harbors, with more certain t o follow, and all be-
cause a third of the Channel forces have been waiting on Sir
Sidney Smith. "Much as I condemn this romantic kind of
warfare," he said, "I have suppressed my sentiments be-
cause you and Lord Castlereagh take so great a share in it";
but now t h a t he sees the enemy enjoying himself, he can
keep silent no longer.
Sir Sidney reported from mid-channel that Congreve was
having trouble, in a heavy sea, with his rocket frames and
with his willing but green assistants; "we can but try," he
concluded. They did try, but the waves were too high for the
attack t o be pressed home; t h e coffer-mines floated in all
directions; the rockets flared without taking off or perversely
headed back toward England. It was a fiasco, and Lord Keith
besought Lord Barham t o call off the amateurs. “interpose
your professional experience with the protectors of these
projects," he wrote, "and they will abandon them; for the
authors of them never will, so long as they are maintained
luxuriously a t the public expense."
Nevertheless Mr. Pitt still believed in the rocket, and the
next year, 1806, Congreve came up with an improved ver-
sion. T h e stick was reduced t o 15 feet; the body was of iron
instead of paper; the range was upwards of 3000 yards; some
rockets were incendiaries only, while others were headed
with 6- and rz-pound spherical shells filled with musket balls
"to burst in the air on Colonel Shrapnel's principle."
Congreve was obviously nervous about his brain-child and
bombarded the new First Lord, Thomas Grenville, with let-
 Public Lectures
ters about its advantages. Since the rocket had no recoil,
any vessel was capable of launching it; a smaIl craft might
thus have great firepower, and the massing of such ships for
one almost simultaneous discharge wouId achieve surprise
and necessarily produce a cumulative effect, with greater
safety for the users. I n every way i t compared favorably with
its rival, the mortar shelI; it was cheaper per unit, and far
cheaper if all the mountings were taken into account. It had
been objected that the enemy would simply extinguish or
drag away the incendiary rockets, but t o discourage such a
practise an explosive charge had been included in a certain
number of them.
On October 9, 1806, Commodore Owen gave Boulogne a
rocket treatment; Congreve reported t h a t 400 rockets had
been discharged in half an hour and great damage inflicted,
particularly on that part of the town where the naval store-
houses were. This estimate was reduced by t h e Commodore
t o read zoo rockets, most of which were caught in a cross
wind and carried off line; the town and shipping still seemed
t o be in good condition. As Owen reported: "I must add I
felt extreme vexation that Mr. Congreve suffered himself t o
be carried away by his sanguine feelings. .. . It is of this
sanguine disposition I have always had more fear than I had
of danger in the execution of the project."
A few months later a ship full of rocket equipment was
sent out t o Admiral Collingwood off Cadiz, for use in Admiral
Duckworth's expedition against Constantinople. Colfing-
wood did not refer t o the invention as "Mr. Congreve's
squibs,'' as some had done, but when he had looked them
over he felt grave doubts about their accuracy, although he
hopefully reported "if the ships lie very dose a t Constanti-
nople, chance may supply the place of accuracy." This was
something of a contradiction t o the instructions sent by
Secret Weapons of the Napoleonic Wars 37
Grenville, who had said: "I trust you will feel with me the
propriety of restraining the use of these destructive machines
entirely against armed shipping or military or naval prepara-
tions, because the mere burning of a town or village is a
species of warfare which is not worthy of, or fit for, the spirit
of our service." The rockets were too late for Constantinople,
but the spirit of the service was not so squeamish later in the
year a t Copenhagen, where the city was certainly burnt,
with the rocket men claiming the largest share of the credit.
Congreve adapted the rocket for use on land, and the weap-
on was later sent t o the Duke of Wellington in Spain. The
Duke, notoriously conservative in all matters of ordnance
and, indeed, in all matters, said "I don't want t o set fire t o
any town, and I don't know any other use of rockets." Never-
theless, rockets were used at the Battle of Leipzig in 1813,
where they had a t least a considerable moral effect, and at
Bayonne in February, 1814, they were credited with breaking
up a French counter-attack. Later in the same year, as every-
one knows, the rockets' red glare lighted up the Stars and
Stripes over Fort McHenry.
What the Iron Duke really liked was the bombs bursting
in air on Colonel Shrapnel's principIe. This projectile-not,
of course, a true flat-trajectory shell-was first adopted by
the British army in 1803 and later used with great effect in
the Spanish Peninsular campaign. Apparently it had an ad-
justable fuse which was ignited by the firing of the gun.
Wellington considered i t so important t o keep this weapon
secret that he asked that all honors and recognition be with-
held from its inventor until the end of the war. He wrote,
however, many personal letters of commendation, and one
of his staff officers added that the increased effectiveness of
the artillery had been cccomplimented both by the French
and b y our own general officers, in a way highly flattering
38 Public Lectures
t o us." Shrapnel shells figured a t t h e Battle of Waterloo and
perhaps decisively, for General Wood, who commanded the
British artillery, wrote t o Shrapnel that his invention had
been instrumental in regaining the position of L a Haye Sainte,
which was the key position of the whole battle. And the
ubiquitous Sir Sidney Smith, finding in 1813 that he could
not get enough shrapnel shells through official channels, or-
dered some a t his own expense from the Carron factory.
Looking over the field, Napoleon is perhaps more t o be
criticized than the British for failing t o go all out for secret
weapons, since by such means t h e great naval disparity
might have been equalized. But the truth is that the time had
not quite come. What we have here is the beginning of the
mechanical part of the industrial revolution as appIied t o
warfare. The day was dawning for the great applied inven-
tions-steam, armor, rifled ordnance, shell, real submarines
and real torpedoes, but even the stimulus of a twenty years'
war, though it could force the seed, could not bring about any
real growth.
Great Britain could have won the war without secret weap-
ons-indeed, she did win the war without secret weapons.
N o one can maintain that torpedo-mines or rockets or shrap-
nel in themselves turned the tide. Britain won because she
never imagined t h a t she could be defeated and because she
never gave up trying. Further, she never gave up thinking.
Besides the military genius of the enemy, there were mistakes
and stupidity fit t o take the heart out of the country, but
even these obstacles were surmounted.
It is perhaps along such a line that the significance of the
secret weapons lies. It is true that they were indecisive, so far
as the over-all course of the war was concerned, and that they
were generally ill-supported-no billion dollars was expended
on any one of them. They were usually employed in scanty
Secret Weapons of the Napoleonic Wars 39
numbers, without the benefit of surprise, and often under
adverse conditions. Their proponents, though in high places,
were amateurs and easy marks for the critics. The parallel
comes t o mind of Winston Churchill and his tanks, a tremen-
dous weapon put through in t h e face of a11 sorts of opposition
and then employed in small numbers, in a local operation,
in the late autumn of 1916, when success was improbable
and exploitation impossible.
I n the old days professional men mistrusted the mad
geniuses, sometimes leaving off the geniuses, and the civilians
who backed them. Nowadays this has all been changed and
nothing shows more clearly the progress of applied science
in the last hundred years than the respect shown t o OSRD,
NDRC, and other mysterious sources of national power.
But however mistrusted and misemployed, the work of the
pioneer inventors in Napoleonic days shows an intelligent
and aggressive spirit a t work. It was vitally necessary for
Britain t o regain the offensive-not merely t o stave off de-
feat each year. William Pitt tried hard; he backed the secret
weapons; and it was not his fault that the coalition of 1806
did not bring Napoleon down. A lesser man than Napoleon
would have fallen, but instead there was the Battle of Auster-
litz. Even with danger threatening a t home, forces despatched
by Pitt occupied South Italy and Sicily, and t h e Cape of
Good Hope: thus the outer lines were held and communica-
tions secured. Pitt died of disappointment and cirrhosis of
the liver in 1807, but there were others t o carry on.
At first they failed, and kept on failing. Sir John Duckworth
was sent t o bring the Turks into line in 1807, an expedition
not at all unlike the famous Dardanelles campaign of 1915.
Both were good ideas, t o begin with; both carried the same
potential benefits of taking Turkey out of the enemy camp
and bolstering the Russians; both failed because the com-
 Public Lectures
mander on the spot lacked the determination t o see the thing
through.
A big combined operation was mounted in 1809 t o cap-
ture the vital port of Antwerp. It had Sir Richard Strachan
as its admiral and the Earl of Chatham, Pitt's elder brother,
as its general. It got ashore but never got near Antwerp. It
is a long and a sad story but it may be summarized in a bit of
doggerel much quoted in London after the return of the

Great Chatham, with his sabre drawn,

Stood waiting for Sir Richard Strachan;
Sir Richard, longing t o be a t 'em,
Stood waiting for the Earl of Chatham.
But the search for the offensive had already given Welling-
ton his beach-head in Portugal. H e was aImost pushed into
the sea, but he had the famous defenses of Torres Vedras
ready-in themselves a secret of sorts, for his adversary was
unpleasantly surprised when he saw them. This time there
was no fiasco. When Wellington counter-attacked he still had
a long road t o travel, but the defensive part of the war was
definitely past.
HARDIN
CRAIG,JR.
NOTE
The author wishes t o express his very great debt to the following works, from
which he has drawn much of his material: Corbett, Julian S., T h e Campaign of
Trafalgar (London, 1910); Flexner, James Thomas, Steavzboats Come True: Ameri-
can Inoe?ttors i n Action (New York, 194.4); Laughton, J. K., ed., Letters and Papers
of Charles, Lord Barham, 1758-1813 (Navy Records Society, London, 1907-8); and
also to a most scholarly and enjoyable series of articles in the United States Naval
Inslitute Proceedings: Knox, Dudley W., "Early Naval Use of Rocket Weapons"
(Feb., 1946); Thomson, David Whittet, "The Catamaran Expeditions" (Feb., 194.4)
and "Robert Fulton's 'Torpedo Sysrem' in the War of 1812" (Sept., 1946). The
only sources not in published form are the Admiralty Papers (Stowe MSS.) in t h e
Hunrington Library, San Marino, California, from which several references and
quotations, particularly those relating t o William Congreve, are taken.