Freeman NicheWidthDynamics 1983
Freeman NicheWidthDynamics 1983
Freeman NicheWidthDynamics 1983
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access to American Journal of Sociology
John Freeman
University of California, Berkeley
Michael T. Hannan
Stanford University
I. INTRODUCTION
1 This research was supported by National Science Foundation grants SES79-12315 and
SES81-09382. It was begun with funding from the School of Business Administration,
University of California, Berkeley. We wish to acknowledge the assistance of Michael
G. Fisher and Jack Brittain in the data-acquisition phase of the research and of Charles
E. Denk in the data analysis. Glenn Carroll and the participants in the Conference on
Formal Theories of Organizations at Werner-Reimers-Stiftung, Bad Homburg, made
helpful comments on an early draft. Nancy Brandon Tuma has made a major contribu-
tion to the methods used in this research and has also made helpful suggestions. Requests
for reprints should be sent to John Freeman, School of Business Administration, Uni-
versity of California, Berkeley, California 94720.
(differential rates of birth and death). That is, the distributions of organiza-
tional characteristics reflect the underlying selection pressures. Therefore,
processes of change in biotic and organizational populations have important
similarities. Earlier (Hannan and Freeman 1977), we urged organizational
analysts to exploit these parallels and use the powerful and suggestive
models of population ecology.
Modern bioecology emphasizes evolutionary dynamics that underlie
patterns in nature. Organizational theory also focuses on structural arrange-
ments but lacks a satisfactory theory of change. Therefore, we emphasize
patterns of change in developing ecological theories of organizations. The
research reported here is part of that general effort.
In particular, our earlier work proposed that modern theories of niche
width, like Levins's (1968) fitness-set theory, be used to explain the distribu-
tion of specialist and generalist organizations across social environments.
We adapted Levins's model to suit organizational analysis and applied it
to populations of restaurants in 18 California cities. Our goal was to learn
whether our version of fitness-set theory describes selection processes in
these organizational populations.
In applying ecological theories to sociological ends, one important
strategic choice concerns the question whether to analyze equilibrium
distributions or the underlying dynamics. Modern ecological theory empha-
sizes the fact that environmental changes affect observed distributions
largely by altering birthrates and death rates of populations using different
adaptive strategies. Competition is invoked as a mechanism for linking
environmental change and changes in these vital rates. Despite this empha-
sis, much ecological analysis focuses on equilibrium distributions rather
than on rates. Such an emphasis may be appropriate when time scales are
long, competitive pressures are strong, and environments do not fluctuate.
Most interesting organizational populations face continually changing,
uncertain environments. Therefore, we doubt that equilibrium analysis is
appropriate for organizational ecology. Even if competitive pressures on
organizational populations are strong, equilibrium analysis of organization-
environment relations seems unlikely to be helpful. For this reason, we do
not follow Levins and other niche theorists exactly.
Theories that account for the full range of ecological phenomena, and
provide a comprehensive answer to the question of observed organizational
variability, presume rather detailed knowledge of the constituent processes
leading to evolution of organizational forms. Rates of birth and rates of
death must be studied separately if net mortality under various circum-
stances is to be explained. In this first effort we focus attention on mortality
rates.
A key element in our research strategy is an attempt to infer differences
in specialism/generalism from observed (or reported) organizational
1117
strategy and structure. Using data from interviews with key staff members,
we place each establishment in one of a series of types on a continuum
from specialism to generalism.
The important implication of Levins's model is that the advantages of
generalism depend in a complex way on the distribution of environmental
variations. We estimate models in which the relative death rates of special-
ists and generalists depend in a nonlinear way on overall variability and
the pattern or "grain" of variability. Estimates from this model permit
inferences about whether life expectancies of specialists and generalists
vary across environments in a manner that agrees with niche theory.
It is important to point out that our tests of hypotheses actually concern
three broad questions. Does our theory describe, at least approximately, the
processes governing organizational niche width? Do organizational niche-
width processes operate at least partly as a force of mortality? Are our
procedures for inferring differences in specialism/generalism of organiza-
tions from strategy and structure sound?
The paper is organized as follows. Section II reviews Levins's theory of
niche width, and Section III develops an extension appropriate for organiza-
tional analysis. Section IV explains why we test the model with data on
restaurant organizations, and Section V describes our research design.
Section VI tells how we measured organizational and environmental proper-
ties. Section VII describes how these measures are distributed in our sample.
Our objective is to estimate the effects of combinations of organizational
and environmental characteristics on death rates. Section VIII describes
how we used Tuma's (1980) RATE program to estimate such effects, and
Section IX reports our findings. The concluding section discusses implica-
tions of the findings.
The concept of niche plays a central role in modern ecology, expressing the
ways in which the growth rates of populations depend on resources and on
the actions of other populations. Although many niche dimensions can be
studied, most empirical work concentrates on one dimension-niche width.
Niche width refers to a population's tolerance for changing levels of re-
sources, its ability to resist competitors, and its response to other factors
that inhibit growth. A population which has wide tolerance, meaning that
it can reproduce in diverse circumstances, is said to have a broad niche.
Populations with broad niches are commonly called generalists. Populations
with more limited ranges of tolerance are called specialists. Niche-width
theories are formulated to explain how environmental variations affect the
life chances of specialists and generalists.
Niche-width theories address a Jack-of-all-trades problem. They consider
1118
1119
Fitness
(w)
Level of Trait Y
1120
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sents the fitness sets for the curves in figure 2a. This fitness set is convex
along the upper-right boundary. That is, all straight lines connecting
points in the set fall within the set. The case of dissimilar patches produces
a concave fitness set, as in figure 3b.
Levins introduced a graphical method for finding how optimal strategies
depend on patterns of environmental change. This method involves using
a so-called adaptive function, which tells how selection weights the fitnesses
in the various patches. Levins considered cases in which there are only two
kinds of patches which can be distributed with either fine grain or coarse
grain. In the case of fine grain, actors encounter the environment in small
patches. Since a given patch will be large for some forms and small for
others,2 patch size must be defined relatively. A patch is considered to be
small for some unit if the typical duration in the patch is short relative to
its life expectancy. Fine-grained environments are experienced as an average
of the various types of patches. For example, an environment fluctuating
rapidly between hot and cold may seem warm. Levins reasoned (see also
Roughgarden 1979, p. 269) that selection in fine-grained environments
weights fitnesses in the two patches additively. This reasoning implies that
overall fitness is a linear combination of the two fitnesses weighted by the
relative frequency of the patches: A(f) = Ow(Ei) + (1 - O)w(E2), where 0
is the probability that the environment is in patch type E1. When the
typical duration in a patch is long relative to life expectancy, the environ-
ment is not experienced as an average. Survival requires enduring long
spells of either kind of patch. Forms that are poorly suited to either kind
have a low probability of survival. This reasoning implies that selection
processes in coarse-grained environments respond to some multiplicative
function of fitnesses in the two patches. Levins chose the log-linear form,
ln A(c) = Ow(El) + (1 - O)w(E2). Roughgarden (1979, p. 269) gives a
population-genetic justification of this specification. In figures 4 and 5, the
two adaptive functions, A (f) and A (c), are represented by dashed lines.
Optimal populations in an environment are those points in the fitness set
that are tangent to the highest-valued adaptive function that intersects
the fitness set. A graphical analysis of the case of high variability (6- .5)
is shown in figure 4a. Variability is high in the sense that E1 and E2 are
equally likely at any time. This figure shows that generalism is favored in
all kinds of fluctuating environments when fitness sets are convex. Both the
linear and log-linear adaptive functions select populations with moderate
fitnesses in both kinds of patches, that is, generalists.
Suppose that typical fluctuations are large relative to tolerances, which
2 Judgments about the sizes of typical patches must consider the adaptive capacities and
life expectancies of forms. A short-term business cycle might be coarse grained for a small
business and fine grained for a large one.
1123
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means that fitness sets are concave. Fine-grained variations favor specialists,
but coarse-grained variations favor generalists, as is shown in figure 5.3
Finally, stable environments favor specialist organizations regardless of
grain and the shape of the fitness functions; that is, specialists will tend to
dominate all stable environments.
Earlier (Hannan and Freeman 1977) we proposed that the theory reviewed
in Section II be adapted and applied to the problem of explaining niche
width in organizational populations. We pointed out that not all of the
predictions of niche-width theory agree with the conventional wisdom
about organizations. Organizations supposedly manage their dependencies
in turbulent environments by expanding into new geographical areas,
integrating vertically, or diversifying products. Each of these adaptations
makes an organization more generalized. Thus received theory implies
that variable environments favor generalists.4 In contrast, we predict that
only coarse-grained variations favor generalism.
We do not apply fitness-set theory directly. Instead, as we pointed out
in the Introduction, we propose a model for environmental effects on
organizational death rates which agrees qualitatively with fitness-set
theory. Our model is less general since it pertains only to death rates of
organizations. At the same time, it adds some substantive meat to the bare
bones of fitness-set theory, telling more specifically how environmental
variations affect organizational niche width.
This study concentrates on the effects of variations in demand for services.
Restaurant sales fluctuate with seasons, business cycles, and consumer
income cycles. They also respond to purely local events and to fashions and
fads. Are typical demand variations large relative to the adaptive capacities
3 Actually, Levins concluded that coarse-grained variations favor polymorphic popula-
tions-single populations that include subforms specialized to alternative patches. Some
kinds of organizations are close analogues to polymorphs. Conglomerate multinational
firms are a good example. The possibility of organizational polymorphism must be con-
sidered in any completely general analysis. However, we are dealing with simple organi-
zations for which polymorphism is unlikely. Either restaurant establishments are spe-
cialized to a particular environmental dimension or they are not. Therefore, for the
application at hand, we conclude that generalists are favored in all coarse-grained, vari-
able environments. If we studied restaurant companies rather than establishments, the
problem of polymorphism would be more serious. Some corporations operate fast-food
establishments, dinner houses, and a variety of specialized restaurants in addition to
their other businesses. Furthermore, many corporations in the restaurant business are
diversified in lines of business having nothing to do with restaurants. Selection processes
working on the restaurants are not easily observed at the corporate level.
4Representative citations for arguments of this sort are to be found in Ashby's (1952)
Law of Requisite Variety, Katz and Kahn (1978, p. 131), Lawrence and Lorsch (1967,
p. 8), Chandler (1962, pp. 42-49), Thompson (1967, pp. 34-37), and Pfeffer and Salancik
(1978).
1126
'When fitness sets are convex, variable environments favor generalists regardless of
grain. Thus if restaurant organizations have convex fitness sets, grain will not play any
role in affecting death rates. Our hypothesis will fail.
6This model does not make any predictions about the main effects of variability and
grain. We do, however, include such effects in the empirical analysis reported below in
order to ensure that we do not confound main effects and interaction effects.
1127
hypothesis 1: 6 5z 0 and v - 0.
Hypothesis 2b requires that either -y > 0, or, if -y < 0, I yV(max) I < 11,
since V is a variance and cannot be negative.
Hypothesis 2a is common to all well-known theories of organization-
environment relations. It is widely assumed that stable environments favor
specialist organizations. Hypothesis 2b is distinctive to the model that we
have proposed. The more conventional view holds that increasing vari-
ability increases the relative advantage of generalists, that -y is negative.
The case of coarse grain is more complex. Figure 4 implies that specialists
are favored when seasonality (coarse grain) combines with low variability,
but that generalists are favored when seasonality combines with high
variability. When S equals unity, the relative death rates of generalists and
specialists in coarse-grained environments, A(c), have the form
1128
and
hypothesis 3b: y + r < 0.
Most important, the values of the four parameters must imply that the
expression in brackets in (6) changes from positive to negative within the
observed range of V.
1129
V. RESEARCH DESIGN
7 The refusal rate for the three years of study was 6%.
1130
VI. MEASUREMENT
8 This excludes establishments that appeared following the sale of an original sample
member at the same address. In an earlier report (Hannan and Freeman 1981), we ana-
lyzed the full set of 1,097 establishments. However, this number is somewhat deceptive
because we lack complete data on almost all of these new entrants. Therefore, we have
decided to concentrate here on the original sample members.
I Any resident, commuter, or visitor to a city is likely to purchase meals at several res-
taurants. Therefore, each person should be considered a multiple customer. Persons
presumably distribute their purchases across an array of establishments. Restaurants
should be considered specialized or not with respect to these patterns. Even if every
person eats once a year at a particular type of ethnic restaurant, the ethnic form may still
be quite specialized.
1131
try to appeal to the "average" consumer who occupies the middle of the
market range reflecting quality and price. After studying complete inter-
views and advertisements in the Yellow Pages, we classified establishments
into 33 forms. This coding relied heavily on menu specialization.10 It also
took account of hours of operation, number of entrees, and staff composi-
tion. We distinguished cafes, steakhouses, coffee shops, health food restau-
rants, taco stands, and Basque restaurants, to name only a few.
The measure used in this analysis collapses the 33 forms into three:
generalist, fast-food establishment, and other specialist. To be coded a
generalist, a restaurant had to meet three criteria: (1) offer a fairly general
menu, not limited to such items as pizza or hamburgers and not dominated by
a specific ethnic" cuisine; (2) employ at least one person in the differentiated
role of chef 12 or cook; and (3) offer seating in the restaurant. Of the restau-
rants in the sample, 31% are generalists. The fast-food form contains
establishments that specialize in one of the following: pizza, hamburgers,
hot dogs, fried chicken, tacos, doughnuts, or ice cream. This category
includes 34% of the establishments. The remaining 35%, the specialists,
tend to feature ethnic cuisine or have a very limited menu.
We assume that these broad forms respond differently to changing
demand, that they have different fitness functions. Demand for restaurant
services has many distinguishable components, such as the business lunch
trade, family dining, tourism, meetings, and banquets. We assume that
the various components do not change proportionately each time aggregate
sales rise or fall. Generalists are presumably less sensitive to fluctuations in
aggregate demand because they offer a greater range of services to more
diversified populations of consumers.
Environmental Characteristics
1132
8 - 1 - I - - t T i - I I l i ! t i i
Riverside
0 < ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~1
Palo Alto
4-4 -
.~Rodwood
(U city
2
- South Lake Tahoe
I I I I, I I I I , I l I l 1 ,
Time
FIG. 6.-Quarterly aggregate restaurant sales in thousands of constant dollars for se-
lected cities from fourth quarter of 1976 to first quarter of 1980.
13 We decided not to specify the model in terms of uncertainty because the certainty of
variations depends on an organization's information-processing capacity as well as on
the pattern of fluctuation. Introducing considerations of certainty will tend to shift the
focus toward decision making. We want to emphasize the role of environmental forces
rather than adaptation by individual organizations. Therefore, we focus on variability
of environments rather than the certainty of variations. Of course, we recognize that
obviously predictable patterns, such as the large increase in restaurant sales during the
1133
Covariates
Christmas season, may be anticipated by almost all organizations. Thus a realistic model
should include both variability and predictability. In the interest of simplicity, we do
not present such a model here.
14The patterns of estimates are similar with the two measures, but the standard errors
of estimates are considerably smaller with the self-report.
15 For example, the ski season in Lake Tahoe falls in two quarters, as does the spring
season in Palm Springs.
1134
TABLE 1
MEANS AND STANDARD DEVIATIONS OF AGE AND LOG SALES FOR THE
SAMPLE OF 466 ESTABLISHMENTS WITH COMPLETE DATA
SPECIALISTS GENERALISTS
Age. .... 10.7 (11.7) 14.0 (14.6) 10.7 (11.7) 10.8 (10.3)
Log sales .... 7.9 (1.2) 8.3 (1.7) 7.9 (1.2) 8.8 (1.5)
NOTE.-SDs in parentheses.
1135
Specialists are older than generalists but have slightly lower average sales.
The fact that the differences are small is substantively important. It suggests
that we are not comparing generally successful organizations with generally
unsuccessful ones when we compare specialists with generalists (or seasonal
with nonseasonal establishments).
Censoring Problems
We have only partial records-the data are censored on both left and right.
Figure 7 illustrates the three types of cases we must consider. The time
marked tb is the date on which three illustrative establishments were
founded. The times, Ti, T2, and T3 are the dates of interviews for the three
cases.-" The td's are times at which failures occur.
tb d (1) 1 d (2) 2 3
FIG. 7.-Illustration of three types of data records: tb denotes the date of birth, the
td's are dates of deaths, and the T, are dates of interviews.
16 It might seem more direct to calculate crude death rates for specialists and generalists
across combinations of environmental conditions. Unfortunately, crude death rates can
be very misleading when the lengths of observation periods vary and more than one kind
of event (such as a sale or a refusal to continue participation) can end an observation.
17 We use t to denote the timing of an event and T to denote the timing of observations.
1136
The case indicated by a solid line in figure 7 dies before the first interview.
Not only is the date of failure unknown, but we have no information on this
establishment. The case indicated by the dashed line dies between waves
of observations. We have recorded structural information on this case from
the first interview, but it has closed before the second interview. We cannot
determine the death date exactly. We know only that the date falls between
the two interview dates. The case indicated by the dotted line is right
censored. This establishment is still alive at the last interview, so we do not
observe its death date. We merely record that it had not yet failed by T3.
We do not know any straightforward procedure for dealing with left
censoring in this type of study. Since we have no information about the
establishments that died prior to observation, other than names and ad-
dresses, we cannot include them in analysis.
To minimize the damage caused by left censoring, we use age of the
establishment at ri as a covariate. This procedure allows us to examine the
pattern of age dependence in the selected portion of the sample. These
results may guide future work on the problem of left censoring.
In the case of right censoring, we note the date at which the establishment
is censored and use the information that it survived to that date in esti-
mating effects on death rates (see Tuma and Hannan [1978] for illustrations
of alternative approaches to dealing with right censoring).
The fact that we do not learn the exact timing of failures during the
study does not hamper attempts to estimate effects in a continuous-time
model, as we demonstrate below.
The death rate is not directly observable. It must be estimated from infor-
mation on lengths of lifetimes or distributions of times of deaths. The condi-
tional survivor function G(t I z, to) tells the probability that an organization
with characteristics summarized in the vector z and founded at time to
will not die before t. That is, if T denotes the time of failure,
G(tf z) = Pr [T > t - to z] .
1137
If the covariates are fixed, as we assume here,'8 the parameters of the death
rate function are closed-form functions of the survivor function.
In order to estimate effects on rates, one must specify how the rates
depend on exogenous variables. We assume that the death rate is constant
over time and depends log linearly on the exogenous variables: ln r = z'a.
Then
G(tl z) =-exp (z'a)t (8)
is the probability of not dying by time t. In other words, equation (8) gives
the probability under the model that an observation will be censored on
the right at time t. Suppose the second wave of interviews took place at r2.
The probability of dying between the first and second waves of interviews
equals 1 - G(r2J z), the probability of dying before T2, given that the
restaurant was still alive at the first interview. If the establishment closes
between the second and third waves, its likelihood is just G(r2 z)[1 -
G(r3 - T21 z)]. These simple rules and obvious extensions yield likelihoods
for each type of observation.
Because restaurants in a city compete for customers and staff, survival
of restaurants attempting to occupy the same niche is probably not com-
pletely independent. At the extreme, there is no independent variation in
rates within cities and the effective sample size is only 18. But this is not
realistic. Knowing the timing of the death of one establishment probably
does not help much in predicting the dates of events for others. We assume
as a first approximation that competition is diffuse, that all establishments
compete for common resources but do not face strong head-on competition.
This assumption implies that cases within a city are approximately pair-
wise independent. With this assumption, the likelihood for the entire sample
is the product of the likelihoods of all observations. We use Tuma's (1980)
RATE program to choose parameter estimates that maximize this likelihood
function.
We actually observe two kinds of transitions. Establishments may die (go
out of business) or be sold. Since we do not want to treat sales and deaths
alike, we analyze transitions among three states: alive, dead, sold. However,
we specify that the states dead and sold are absorbing states. We use
information on the timing of transitions to death to estimate death rates.
A sale is a censoring event with respect to this transition. Restaurants that
are sold during the study contribute information about death rates during
the time they are alive-the information that they have not yet died.
Tuma, Hannan, and Groeneveld (1979) give full details on estimation of
three-state and more general models using event-history data. These prin-
ciples carry over directly to the case considered here, for which exact
timing of events is unknown.
18 Since the observation times are short, it is not unreasonable to assume that the covari-
ates are fixed. In fact, there is some observable change in some of them. We ignore changes
in covariates in this paper but will address the issue in subsequent reports.
1138
IX. RESULTS
Death Rates
Our analysis of death rates used the model in equation (1). We began by
exploring the effects of various control variables, including measures of the
size of the establishment (number of employees, number of seats, number
of meals served per week), its age, the logarithm of its gross sales, and
characteristics of its local environment such as total restaurant sales, sales
per establishment, and measures of growth and decline in aggregate sales.
Only age at time of first observation and the log of gross sales had system-
atic effects on death rates. Therefore, we include age and sales volume in
some of the following analyses. However, because the maximum likelihood
estimator did not converge when both age and log size were included in the
model, we report estimates of models containing the two variables sepa-
rately. Since we lose many cases when these variables are included, we also
report estimates of models that exclude them.
We also studied differences between fast-food and other specialist forms
by including four terms in the model in equation (1): a main effect for the
fast-food form and the three interactions involving grain, variability, and
the dummy variable for the fast-food form. None of the four effects is
either large or significant at the 10% level. The likelihood ratio test of the
null hypothesis that all four fast-food effects are zero has a likelihood ratio
x2 statistic of only 2.61 with 4 df. As we had suspected initially, restaurants
specializing in fast food do not differ from other specialists regarding selec-
tion processes. Therefore, we do not include any terms for the distinction
between fast food and specialism in subsequent steps. In effect, we collapse
the three-category measure into a two-category distinction, specialist versus
generalist.
With these preliminaries, we arrive at our final specification:
where A contains the main'9 V and S and, in some models, the effects of
age or of the log of sales.20 The subscripts in equation (9) are a reminder
that seasonality, generalism, age, and sales vary among establishments
but that variability varies only among cities.
19 We have also introduced an interaction between V and S. We do not report the results
of models with this term because we have not always obtained convergent solutions.
However, in those cases in which the iterative maximum likelihood routine does converge,
we find that the VS interaction is small and not significantly different from zero. More
important, presence of a VS interaction does not change the qualitative patterns of
effects reported below (including levels of significance).
20 A referee wondered why we do not report estimates for a model estimated on the 466
cases but without either age or log size. The reason is that we are not intrinsically inter-
ested in the smaller sample. However, the pattern of estimates for such a model is very
similar to that reported for eqq. (3) and (4) in table 2.
1139
TABLE 2
MODELS
INDEPENDENT PARAMETER IN
VARTABLE EQUATION (1) (2) (3) (4)
21 We used one-tailed tests for the directional hypothesis stated in Sec. III. We report
two-tailed tests for other parameters since we did not make directional predictions.
1140
TABLE 3
V = lo V= 20
1141
Sale Rates
It is instructive to learn that the sale process differs from the death process.
There was no reason to suspect that grain and variability would have
systematic effects on the rate at which establishments are sold. After all,
establishments may be sold as often because of success as because of failure.
It turns out that none of the variables that affect death rates has any
effect on the sale rate. This is true even for age.22 This difference increases
our confidence that we have identified an important process. It is not
simply the case that restaurants turn over more rapidly in some cities and
that those cities happen to have certain combinations of grain and vari-
ability.
X. DISCUSSION
22 This difference illustrates the danger of combining the outcome states. For examp
if we combine sales and deaths into one analysis with end of establishment as the out-
come state, we find no apparent pattern of effects.
1142
1143
implications of such strategies for the internal structure of the firms and
the careers of their employees. Such arguments clarify the processes that
govern organizational niche width.
Our treatment does not elaborate on the systemic properties of environ-
ments. In this paper, we have focused on such sources of environmental
variation as seasonality. It is obvious that for many purposes, such patterns
are generated by the social, political, and economic system in which organi-
zations operate. Ecologically dominant organizations in an area create
patterned environmental variation for subdominant organizations. Uni-
versity towns show just such characteristics, and patterns of university
operations can be expected to have effects on the restaurant population
much like those attributed to seasonality in general here. More broadly,
though, such large-scale changes as modifications in government procure-
ment and accounting policies, changes in legislation and operations of the
courts all have an obvious impact on the selection processes of organiza-
tional populations. We do not preclude such views of the environment. In
fact, we hope this work leads in that direction. It is useful, however, to
start with simpler conceptions.
Clearly the research reported here is just a first step in developing an
organizational ecology theory with predictive power. But, since organiza-
tional ecology has contained such a high ratio of promises to evidence, it
is an important first step. It shows that at least some of the fundamental
processes identified in ecological theories can be tested in a straightforward
manner.
REFERENCES
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