MODULE 3

GAME THEORY
 GAME THEORY
INTRODUCTION
• We studied LPP & IPP problems, which was related to
individual industrial concern, where aim was to find
the decision variables which satisfy the objective of
industrial unit.
Decision variables: (𝒙𝟏 , 𝒙𝟐 … … . . )
1. No. of labors required p/d

2. No. hrs. machine should work p/d

3. No. production p/d

etc……..
 CONTD…
• BUT there are certain problems where two or more
industrial units are involved in decision making
under conflict situation. This means that decision-
making is done to maximize the benefits and
minimize the losses.
WINNING
MAN 1
COMPANY 1 WINNING COMPANY 2
MAN 2

LOOSING
LOOSING
 CONTD…
• In our discussion in Theory of Games, we are not
concerned with pleasure giving games(FOOT BALL,
CRICKET ETC.) but we are concerned with business
games.
• Managers competing for share of the market, army chief
planning or execution of war, union leaders and
management involved in collective bargaining uses
different strategies to fulfill their objective or to win over
the opponent. All these are known as business games.
• Game theory is a body of knowledge that deals with
making decisions when two or more intelligent and
rational opponents are involved under conditions of
conflict or competition. The competitors in the game
are called players.
 CONTD…
A competitive situation is called a game if it has the
following characteristics (Assumption made to define a
game):
• The number of competitors is finite.
• There is a conflict in interest between the participants.
• Each participants has a finite set of course of action.
• The rules governing these choices are specified and
known to all players.
• The game begins when each player chooses a single
course of action from the list of course available.
• The outcome of the game is affected by the choices
made by all player.
• The outcome for the specific set of choices, by all players,
is known in advance and is numerically defined.
 CONTD…
Definitions:
1. Strategy: A strategy is defined as a complete
plan of action a player will follow throughout
the game, for every possible situation they
could face.
2. Pure strategy: where a player consistently
follows a single course of action..
3. Mixed strategy: where a player chooses
among several possible actions based on a
predetermined probability distribution.
 Types of games:
1. Two-person game and n-person game: A two-
person game refers to a scenario where two
players are involved in a strategic interaction
2. Zero-sum game: In this the sum of the payments
to all the competitors is zero. Sum of the points
won is equal sum of the point lost.
3. Two-person zero-sum game: A game of two
player, where the gain of one player equals to
loss of the other. It is also called rectangular
game.
 CONTD…
• Pay- off: It is the outcome of playing game. A pay-off
matrix is a table showing the amount received by
the player named at the left hand side after all
possible plays of the game. The payment made by
the player named at the top of the table.
 CONTD…
Example: In a game of matching coins with two
players, suppose A wins one unit of value when
there are two heads, wins nothing when there
are two tails and losses ½ units of value when
there are one head and one tail. Determine the
pay off matrix.

PLAYER B
H T
PLAYER A H 1 -1/2
T -1/2 0
 MAXIMIN-MINIMAX PRINCIPLE:
It is used for the selection of optimal strategy by two
players.(player A & B).
Player A---- Maximize his minimum gains( we find
Maximin value)
Player B---- Minimize his maximum losses ( we find
Minimax value)
Saddle point: Maximin value = Minmax value. It is
called value of the game
Note: i. A game is said to be fair if
ഥ ) = Minmax value(𝑽)=0
Maximin value (𝑽
ii. A game is strictly determinable if
ഥ ) = Minmax value(𝑽) = 𝐯𝐚𝐥𝐮𝐞 𝐨𝐟 𝐭𝐡𝐞 𝐠𝐚𝐦𝐞(𝐕) ≠ 𝟎
Maximin value (𝑽
Problem 1: Solve the game whose pay off matrix is
given below. PLAYER B
B1 B2 B3
PLAYER A A1 1 3 1
A2 0 -4 -3
A3 1 5 -1
Solution:
PLAYER B
B1 B2 B3 Row min
A1 1 3 1 1 Maximum is row minima
PLAYER A
ഥ) = 1
Maximin (𝑽
A2 0 -4 -3 -4
A3 1 5 -1 -1
Col max 1 5 1
Minimax (𝑽)= = 1 Minimum in col maxima

Maximin value (𝑽ഥ ) = Minmax value(𝑽) = Value of the game = 1

Optimal strategy is position of saddle point (A1, B1).
 Problem 2: Solve the game whose pay off matrix is
given below. PLAYER B
B1 B2 B3 B4 B5
A1 -2 0 0 5 3

PLAYER A A2 3 2 1 2 2
A3 -4 -3 0 -2 6
A4 5 3 -4 2 -6

Solution: PLAYER B
B1 B2 B3 B4 B5 Row min
A1 -2 0 0 5 3 -2 Maximum is row minima
PLAYER A
A2 3 2 1 2 2 1 ഥ) = 1
Maximin (𝑽
A3 -4 -3 0 -2 6 -4
A4 5 3 -4 2 -6 -6
Col max 5 3 1 5 6

Minimax (𝑽)= = 1 Minimum in col maxima

Maximin value (𝑽ഥ ) = Minmax value(𝑽) = Value of the game = 1

Optimal strategy is position of saddle point (A2, B3).
Problem 3: Solve the game whose pay off matrix is
given below. PLAYER B
B1 B2 B3
PLAYER A A1 -3 -2 6
A2 2 0 2
A3 5 -2 -4
Solution:
PLAYER B
B1 B2 B3 Row min
A1 -3 -2 6 -3 Maximum is row minima
PLAYER A
ഥ) = 0
Maximin (𝑽
A2 2 0 2 0
A3 5 -2 -4 -4
Col max 5 0 6
Minimax (𝑽)= = 0 Minimum in col maxima

Maximin value (𝑽ഥ ) = Minmax value(𝑽) = Value of the game = 0

Optimal strategy is position of saddle point (A2, B2). Fair game.
 Problem 4: Player A can choose his strategy from A1, A2, A3 only,
while player B can choose from the set B1 & B2 only. The rules of
the game state that the payments should be made in accordance
with the selection strategy:
Strategy pair selected Payment to be made
A1 B1 Player A pays Rs. 1 to player B. What strategy
A1 B2 Player B pays Rs. 6 to player A. should A & B play
A2 B1 Player B pays Rs. 2 to player A. in order to get the
A2 B2 Player B pays Rs. 4 to player A. optimum benefit
A3 B1 Player A pays Rs. 2 to player B. of the paly?
A3 B2 Player A pays Rs. 6 to player B.

Solution: PLAYER B
B1 B2
PLAYER A A1 -1 6
A2 2 4
A3 -2 -6
 PLAYER B
B1 B2 Row min
PLAYER A A1 -1 6 -1 Maximum is row minima
ഥ) = 2
Maximin (𝑽
A2 2 4 2
A3 -2 -6 -6

Col max 2 6
Minimax (𝑽)= = 2 Minimum in col maxima

Maximin value (𝑽ഥ ) = Minimax value(𝑽) = Value of the game = 2

Optimal strategy is position of saddle point (A2, B1).

Conclusion:

1. The best strategy for player A in A2.

2. The best strategy for player B in B1.

3. The value of the game is Rs. 2 for player A and Rs.-2 for player B.
Problem 5: For what value of 𝜇 , is the game with the
following matrix strictly determinable?
PLAYER B
B1 B2 B3
PLAYER A A1 𝜇 6 2
A2 -1 𝜇 -7
Solution:
A3 -2 4 𝜇
PLAYER B
B1 B2 B3 Row min
PLAYER A A1 2 Maximum is row minima
𝜇 6 2
ഥ) = 2
Maximin (𝑽
A2 -1 𝜇 -7 -7
A3 -2 4 𝜇 -2
Col max -1 6 2
Minimax (𝑽)= = -1 Minimum in col maxima

ഥ )= (𝑽)=V≠ 𝟎
The game is strictly determinable if (𝑽
ഥ ) = 2 and (𝑽)= = -1
(𝑽
therefore −𝟏 ≤ 𝝁 ≤ 𝟐
 GAMES WITHOUT SADDLE POINT
2 X 2 Games without saddle point
Consider 2 × 2 two person zero sum game without any
saddle point, having pay off matrix for player A as,
PLAYER B
Where,
B1 B2 𝒂𝟐𝟐 − 𝒂𝟐𝟏
𝒑𝟏 =
𝒂𝟏𝟏 + 𝒂𝟐𝟐 − 𝒂𝟏𝟐 + 𝒂𝟐𝟏
PLAYER A A1 𝑎11 𝑎12
A2 𝑎21 𝑎22 𝒑𝟐 = 𝟏 − 𝒑𝟏

The optimum mixed strategies; Where,

𝒂𝟐𝟐 − 𝒂𝟏𝟐
𝐴1 𝐴2 𝐵1 𝐵2 𝒒𝟏 =
𝑆𝐴 = And 𝑆𝐵 = 𝒂𝟏𝟏 + 𝒂𝟐𝟐 − 𝒂𝟏𝟐 + 𝒂𝟐𝟏
𝑝1 𝑝2 𝑞1 𝑞2
𝒒𝟐 = 𝟏 − 𝒒𝟏

Where,
𝒂𝟏𝟏 𝒂𝟐𝟐 − 𝒂𝟏𝟐 𝒂𝟐𝟏
𝒗𝒂𝒍𝒖𝒆𝒐𝒇 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒈𝒂𝒎𝒆(𝑽) =
𝒂𝟏𝟏 + 𝒂𝟐𝟐 − 𝒂𝟏𝟐 + 𝒂𝟐𝟏
 Short cut method
Example: Solve the following pay-off matrix. Also
determine the optimal strategies and value of the
game. PLAYER B
B1 B2 No saddle point
Check !!!
PLAYER A A1 5 1
A2 3 4

Solution:
PLAYER B
B1 B2 Oddments
A1 5 1 1 (second row) 4-3=1
PLAYER A
A2 3 4 4 (First row) 5-1=4

Oddments 3 2

2nd col 1 col

4-1=3 5-3=2
 PLAYER B Probabilities;
B1 B2 Oddments 𝟏 𝟏
𝒑𝟏 = =
A1 5 1 1 𝟏+𝟒 𝟓
PLAYER A
A2 3 4 4 𝟒 𝟒
𝒑𝟐 = =
Oddments 3 2 𝟏+𝟒 𝟓

Probabilities;
𝟑 𝟑 𝟐 𝟐
𝒒𝟏 = 𝟑+𝟐 = 𝟓 𝒒𝟐 = 𝟑+𝟐 = 𝟓

1st column: 2nd column:

𝟓×𝟏 + 𝟑×𝟒 𝟏𝟕 𝟏×𝟏 + 𝟒×𝟒 𝟏𝟕
Value of the game V = = Value of the game V = =
𝟏+𝟒 𝟓 𝟏+𝟒 𝟓

1st row: 2nd row:

𝟓×𝟑 + 𝟏×𝟐 𝟏𝟕 𝟑×𝟑 + 𝟒×𝟐 𝟏𝟕
Value of the game V = = Value of the game V = =
𝟑+𝟐 𝟓 𝟑+𝟐 𝟓

Therefore optimum mixed strategies;

𝐴1 𝐴2 𝐵1 𝐵2
𝑆𝐴 = And 𝑆𝐵 =
1/5 4/5 3/5 2/5
 Problem 6: solve the following game and determine its
value. PLAYER B
B1 B2

PLAYER A A1 4 -4
A2 -4 4

Solution: PLAYER B
Probabilities;
B1 B2 Oddments 𝟖
𝒑𝟏 =
PLAYER A A1 4 -4 8 𝟏𝟔
A2 -4 4 8 𝟖
𝒑𝟐 =
Oddments 8 8 𝟏𝟔
𝟖 𝟖
Probabilities; 𝒒𝟏 = 𝒒𝟐 =
𝟏𝟔 𝟏𝟔

Therefore, optimum mixed strategies;

1st column:
𝟒×𝟖 + −𝟒×𝟖 𝐴1 𝐴2 𝐵1 𝐵2
Value of the game V = 𝟖+𝟖
=𝟎 𝑆𝐴 = And 𝑆𝐵 =
1/2 1/2 1/2 1/2
 Problem 7: solve the following game and determine its
value. PLAYER B
B1 B2

PLAYER A A1 1 -1/2
A2 -1/2 0

Solution: PLAYER B
Probabilities;
B1 B2 Oddments 𝟏/𝟐 𝟏
𝒑𝟏 = =
A1 1 -1/2 1/2 𝟏 𝟒
PLAYER A + 𝟑/𝟐
𝟐
A2 -1/2 0 3/2
Oddments 1/2 3/2 𝟑
𝒑𝟐 =
𝟒
𝟏 𝟑
Probabilities; 𝒒𝟏 = 𝒒𝟐 =
𝟒 𝟒

Therefore optimum mixed strategies;

1stcolumn:
𝐴1 𝐴2 𝐵1 𝐵2
Value of the game V = And 𝑆𝐵 =
𝑆𝐴 =
𝟏×𝟏/𝟐 + −𝟏/𝟐×𝟑/𝟐 𝟏 1/4 3/4 1/4 3/4
= −
𝟏/𝟐+𝟑/𝟐 𝟖
 Dominance Property
Sometimes it is observed that one of the pure
strategy of either player is always inferior to at
least one of the remaining. The superior
strategies are said to be dominate the inferior
ones. In such cases of dominance, we reduce
the size of pay-off matrix by deleting those
strategies, which are dominated by others.
 Rules of Dominance
• Dominance property for rows:
𝑹𝑶𝑾 𝑬𝑳𝑬𝑴𝑬𝑵𝑻𝑺 𝑶𝑭 𝑿 ≤ 𝑹𝑶𝑾 𝑬𝑳𝑬𝑴𝑬𝑵𝑻𝑺 𝑶𝑭(𝒀)
Then Delete the row X. (Delete the least)

• Dominance property for COLUMN:

COLUMN 𝑬𝑳𝑬𝑴𝑬𝑵𝑻𝑺 𝑶𝑭 𝑿 ≥ 𝑪𝑶𝑳𝑼𝑴𝑵𝑬𝑳𝑬𝑴𝑬𝑵𝑻𝑺 𝑶𝑭(𝒀)
Then Delete the COLUMN X.( Delete the highest)

reduce it to 𝟐 × 𝟐 and solve by known method.

 Problem 8: Using the principle of dominance, solve the
following game. PLAYER B
B1 B2 B3 B4 B5
Check for saddle
A1 4 6 5 10 6 point.
PLAYER A A2 7 8 5 9 10
A3 8 9 11 10 9
A4 6 4 10 6 4

Solution:
PLAYER B STEP 1: If all the entries in a row
B1 B2 B3 B4 B5 Row sum is lesser than or equal to the
corresponding entries of another
A1 4 6 5 10 6 31
row, if yes that row can be
PLAYER A A2 7 8 5 9 10 39 deleted.
A3 8 9 11 10 9 47
A4 6 4 10 6 4 To start: find the sum of each
30
row.
A4 row is dominated by A3 row so Delete A4. Compare the row which has
𝐴4 ≤ 𝐴3 lesser sum with other row one
by one for dominance.
 PLAYER B Compare the row which has
B1 B2 B3 B4 B5 Row sum lesser sum with other row, one
by one for dominance.
A1 4 6 5 10 6 31
PLAYER A A2 7 8 5 9 10 39 𝐴1 ≤ 𝐴3
DELETE A1
A3 8 9 11 10 9 47

PLAYER B
B1 B2 B3 B4 B5 STEP2: If all the entries in a
A2 7 8 5 9 10 COLUMN ARE GREATER than or
equal to the corresponding
PLAYER A A3 8 9 11 10 9
entries of another COLUMN, if
Col SUM 15 17 16 19 19 yes that row can be deleted.

FIND THE COLUMN SUM:

SIMILARLY Compare the COLUMN which has
• 𝐵4 ≥ 𝐵1 HIGHEST sum with other
DELETE B4 COLUMN, one by one for
dominance.
• 𝐵2 ≥ 𝐵1 𝐵5 ≥ 𝐵1
DELETE B2 DELETE B5
 PLAYER B

B1 B3 Row sum A2≤ 𝐴3

A2 7 5 12 DELETE A2
PLAYER A A3 8 11 19

PLAYER B

B1 B3 B3 ≥ 𝐵1
PLAYER A DELETE B3
A3 8 11

VALUE OF THE GAME = 8

OPTIMAL STRATEGIES ARE (A3,B1)

Therefore optimum mixed strategies;

𝑨𝟏 𝑨𝟐 A3 A4 𝑩𝟏 𝑩𝟐 B3 B4 B5
𝑆𝐴 = And 𝑆𝐵 =
0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0
Problem 9: solve the following game by dominance rule.
PLAYER B
B1 B2 B3 Check for saddle
PLAYER A
point.
A1 1 7 2
A2 6 2 7
A3 5 1 6

PLAYER B
Solution: 𝐴3 ≤ 𝐴2
B1 B2 B3 Row sum
DELETE A3
PLAYER A A1 1 7 2 10 Go for column
A2 6 2 7 15
A3 5 1 6 12
PLAYER B B3 ≥ 𝐵1
B1 B2 B3 DELETE B3
PLAYER A A1 1 7 2
Go for row
A2 6 2 7

Col SUM 7 9 9
 PLAYER B
B1 B2 Row sum Cannot delete any row. Solve by 𝟐 ×
PLAYER A A1 1 7 𝟐 method.
8
A2 6 2 8

Probabilities;
PLAYER B
𝟒
B1 B2 Oddments 𝒑𝟏 =
𝟏𝟎
PLAYER A A1 1 7 4
A2 6 2
𝟔
6 𝒑𝟐 =
𝟏𝟎
Oddments 5 5
𝟓 𝟓
Probabilities; 𝒒𝟏 = 𝟏𝟎 𝒒𝟐 = 𝟏𝟎

Therefore optimum mixed strategies;

1st column: 𝑨𝟏 𝑨𝟐 A3 𝑩𝟏 𝑩𝟐 B3
𝟏×𝟒 + 𝟔×𝟔 𝑆𝐴 = And 𝑆𝐵 =
Value of the game V = =𝟒 2/5 3/5 0 1/2 1/2 0
𝟒+𝟔
Problem 10: Use the dominance rule to solve the
following game. PLAYER B
B1 B2 B3 B4 B5
A1 4 4 2 -4 -6

PLAYER A A2 8 6 8 -4 0
A3 10 2 4 10 12
Solution:
PLAYER B
B1 B2 B3 B4 B5 Row sum
A1 4 4 2 -4 -6 0
PLAYER A A2 8 6 8 -4 0 18
A3 10 2 4 10 12 38
A1<A2, Delete A1, Go for column
PLAYER B
B1 B2 B3 B4 B5
A2 8 6 8 -4 0

PLAYER A A3 10 2 4 10 12

Col SUM 18 8 12 6 12

B1>B2, Delete B1, B3>B2, Delete B3, B5>B4, Delete B5,

 PLAYER B Probabilities;
B2 B4
𝟖
Oddments 𝒑𝟏 =
𝟏𝟖
A2 6 -4
8
PLAYER A A3 2 10 𝟏𝟎
10 𝒑𝟐 =
𝟏𝟖
Oddments 14 4
𝟏𝟒 𝟒
Probabilities; 𝒒𝟏 = 𝟏𝟖 𝒒𝟐 = 𝟏𝟖

Therefore, optimum mixed strategies;

1st column: 𝑨𝟏 𝑨𝟐 A3
𝟔×𝟖 + 𝟐×𝟏𝟎 𝟑𝟒 𝑆𝐴 =
Value of the game V = = 0 4/9 5/9
𝟖+𝟏𝟎 𝟗

𝑩𝟏 𝑩𝟐 B3 B4 B5
𝑆𝐵 =
0 7/9 0 2/9 0
Problem 11: Use the dominance rule to solve the
following game. PLAYER B
B1 B2 B3 B4
A1 3 2 4 0

PLAYER A A2 3 4 2 4
A3 4 2 4 0
Solution:
A4 0 4 0 8

PLAYER B
PLAYER B
B1 B2 B3 B4 Row sum
B1 B2 B3 B4
A1 3 2 4 0 9
A2 3 4 2 4
PLAYER A A2 3 4 2 4 13
PLAYER A A3 4 2 4 0
A3 4 2 4 0 10
A4 0 4 0 8
A4 0 4 0 8 12
Col SUM 7 10 6 12
A1<A3, Delete A1, Go for column
B1>B3, Delete B1,

Further not possible reduce the matrix. Now take the average of 2 or more columns or rows
B2≥ 𝑨𝒗𝒆𝒓𝒂𝒈𝒆(B3,B4). Delete B2,
A2 ≤ 𝑨𝒗𝒆𝒓𝒂𝒈𝒆(𝐀3,A4). Delete A2,
Go for row
 PLAYER B Probabilities;
𝟖
B3 B4 Oddments 𝒑𝟏 =
𝟏𝟐
A3 4 0 8
PLAYER A A4 0 8 𝟒
4 𝒑𝟐 =
𝟏𝟐
Oddments 8 4
𝟖 𝟒
Probabilities; 𝒒𝟏 = 𝒒𝟐 =
𝟏𝟐 𝟏𝟐

Therefore optimum mixed strategies;

1st column: 𝑨𝟏 𝑨𝟐 A3 A4
𝟒×𝟖 + 𝟎×𝟒 𝟖 𝑆𝐴 =
Value of the game V = =𝟑 0 0 2/3 1/3
𝟖+𝟒

𝑩𝟏 𝑩𝟐 B3 B4
And 𝑆𝐵 =
0 0 2/3 1/3
 Graphical method for 𝟐 × 𝒏 or 𝒎 × 𝟐 games:
Consider the following 𝟐 × 𝒏 games.
STRATEGY FOR PLAYER B
STRATEGY B1 B2 …. … Bn
FOR
PLAYER A A1 𝑎11 𝑎12 …. … 𝑎1𝑛
A2 𝑎21 𝑎22 𝑎2𝑛
Let the mixed strategy for playerA

𝐴1 𝐴2 Now, for each of the pure strategies available to B, expected pay-off

𝑆𝐴 = For player A would be as follows;
𝑝1 𝑝2
𝑝2 = 1 − 𝑝1
The lowest boundary of these lines
B’s pure move A’s expected pay-off
will give minimum expected pay-off.
B1 𝑎11 𝑝1 + 𝑎21 𝑝2
B2 𝑎12 𝑝1 + 𝑎22 𝑝2 The highest point on this lowest
. . boundary would then give the
. . maximin expected pay-off and the
.. . optimum value.
Bn 𝑎1𝑛 𝑝1 + 𝑎2𝑛 𝑝2
Procedure:
1. Construct two vertical axis, Axis-I & Axis-II
(parallel to each other)
2. The pay-off in the first row plotted on axis-II and
those in second row on axis-I.
3. Join the points of axis-II and axis-I by straight
lines representing expected pay-off
4. Shade the lowest boundary, and highest point
on the shaded boundary gives the maximum
point. Which identifies two critical strategy for
player B.
 Problem 12: solve the following game by graphical
method. PLAYER B
B1 B2 B3 Check for saddle
PLAYER A
point.
A1 3 -3 4
A2 -1 1 -3

Solution:
PLAYER B 4 4
B1 B2 B3 3 3
PLAYER A A1 3 -3 4 2 2
A2 -1 1 -3 1 1
0 0
Maximin -1 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 -1

PLAYER B
-2 -2
B2 B3 -3 -3

PLAYER A A1 -3 4
-4 -4
Lowest
-5 -5
A2 1 -3 boundary
-6 -6
Axis-I Axis-II
 Probabilities;
PLAYER B
𝟒
B2 B3 Oddments 𝒑𝟏 =
𝟏𝟏
PLAYER A A1 -3 4 4
A2 1 -3
𝟕
7 𝒑𝟐 =
𝟏𝟏
Oddments 7 4
𝟕 𝟒
Probabilities; 𝒒𝟏 = 𝟏𝟏 𝒒𝟐 = 𝟏𝟏

1st column:
−𝟑×𝟒 + 𝟏×𝟕 𝟓
Value of the game V = = − 𝟏𝟏
𝟒+𝟕

Therefore, optimum mixed strategies;

𝑨𝟏 𝑨𝟐 𝑩𝟏 𝑩𝟐 B3
𝑆𝐴 = And 𝑆𝐵 =
4/11 7/11 0 7/11 4/11
 Problem 13: solve the following game by graphical
method. PLAYER B
B1 B2 B3
PLAYER A A1 6 4 3
A2 2 4 8

Solution:
10 10

9 9

8 8

7 7

6 6
Maximin
5 5

4 4

3 3

2 2
Lowest
1 1
boundary
0 0
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9

Axis-I Axis-II
 CASE-1 CASE-2
PLAYER B Oddmen Prob; PLAYER B Oddmen Prob;
B1 B2 ts 𝟐
𝒑𝟏 = B2 B3 ts 𝟒
2 𝟒 𝒑𝟏 =
PLAYER A A1 6 4 𝟓
PLAYER A A1 4 3 4
A2 2 𝟐
2 4 𝒑𝟐 = A2 1 𝟏
𝟒 4 8 𝒑𝟐 =
Oddments 0 4 𝟓
Oddments 5 0
𝟒
Probabilities; 𝒒𝟏 = 𝟎 𝒒𝟐 = 𝟒 = 𝟏 Probabilities; 𝒒𝟏 = 𝟏 𝒒𝟐 = 𝟎

1st column:
𝟔×𝟐 + 𝟐×𝟐 1st column:
Value of the game V = =𝟒 𝟒×𝟒 + 𝟒×𝟏
𝟐+𝟐 Value of the game V = =𝟒
𝟒+𝟏

Therefore optimum mixed strategies;

Therefore optimum mixed strategies;
𝑨𝟏 𝑨𝟐 𝑩𝟏 𝑩𝟐 B3
𝑨𝟏 𝑨𝟐 𝑩𝟏 𝑩𝟐 B3
𝑆𝐴 = And 𝑆𝐵 =
1/2 1/2 0 0 1 And 𝑆𝐵 =
4/5 1/5 0 1 0
 Problem 14: solve the following game by graphical
method. PLAYER B
B1 B2 B3
PLAYER A A1 3 -1 0
A2 2 1 -1

Solution:
4 4
3 3
2 2
1 1
0 0
-1 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 -1
Maximin
-2 -2
-3 -3
-4 -4
Lowest -5 -5
boundary -6 -6

Axis-I Axis-II
 Probabilities;
PLAYER B
𝟐
B2 B3 Oddments 𝒑𝟏 =
𝟑
PLAYER A A1 -1 0 2
A2 1 -1
𝟏
1 𝒑𝟐 =
𝟑
Oddments 1 2
𝟏 𝟐
Probabilities; 𝒒𝟏 = 𝟑 𝒒𝟐 = 𝟑

Therefore optimum mixed strategies;

1st column: 𝑨𝟏 𝑨𝟐 𝑩𝟏 𝑩𝟐 B3
−𝟏×𝟐 + 𝟏×𝟏 𝟏 𝑆𝐴 = And 𝑆𝐵 =
Value of the game V = = −𝟑 2/3 1/3 0 1/3 2/3
𝟐+𝟏
 Graphical method for 𝟐 × 𝒏 or 𝒎 × 𝟐 games:
Consider the following 𝐦 × 𝟐 games.
STRATEGY
FOR PLAYER B
The procedure is same as
B1 B2 the 𝟐 × 𝒏.
STRATEGY
FOR A1 𝑎11 𝑎12 Except that the Minimax
PLAYER A A2 𝑎21 𝑎22 point is the lowest point
. . . on the upper most
.. . .
. . . boundary.
An 𝑎𝑚1 𝑎𝑚𝑛

𝐵1 𝐵2
𝑆𝐴 =
𝑞1 𝑞2
Problem 15: solve the following game by graphical
method.
PLAYER B
Solution:
B1 B2
4 4
PLAYER A A1 1 -3
A2
3 3
3 5
A3 2 2
-1 6
A4 4 1 1 1
A5 2 2 0 0
A6 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
-5 0 -1 -1

-2 -2
MINMAX
-3 -3

-4 -4

-5 -5
UPPER
boundary -6 -6

Axis-I Axis-II
 Probabilities;
PLAYER B
𝟑
B1 B2 Oddments 𝒑𝟏 =
𝟓
PLAYER A A2 3 5 3
A4 4 1
𝟐
2 𝒑𝟐 =
𝟓
Oddments 4 1
𝟒 𝟏
Probabilities; 𝒒𝟏 = 𝟓 𝒒𝟐 = 𝟓

Therefore optimum mixed strategies;

1st column: 𝑩𝟏 𝑩𝟐
𝟏𝟕 And 𝑆𝐵 =
Value of the game V = = 𝟓 4/5 1/5

𝑨𝟏 𝑨𝟐 A3 𝑨𝟒 𝑨𝟓 A6
𝑆𝐴 =
0 3/5 0 2/5 0 0
Problem 16: solve the following game by graphical
method. Solution:
PLAYER B
B1 B2
4 4
PLAYER A A1 1 2
A2
3 3
5 6
A3 2 2
-7 -9
A4 -4 -3 1 1
A5 2 1 0 0
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
-1 -1

-2 -2
B1 B2
-3 -3
A2 5 6
-4 -4

-5 -5
UPPER
VALUE OF THE boundary -6 -6
GAME IS = 5
Axis-I Axis-II
Problem 17: solve the following game by graphical
method. Solution:
PLAYER B
B1 B2
4 4
PLAYER A A1 -6 7
A2
3 3
4 -5
A3 2 2
-1 -2
A4 -2 5 1 1
A5 7 6 0 0
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
-1 -1

-2 -2

-3 -3

-4 -4

-5 -5
UPPER
boundary -6 -6

Axis-I Axis-II
 Probabilities;
PLAYER B
𝟏
B1 B2 Oddments 𝒑𝟏 =
𝟏𝟒
PLAYER A A1 -6 7 1
𝟏𝟑
A5 7 6 13 𝒑𝟐 =
𝟏𝟒
Oddments 1 13
𝟏 𝟏𝟑
Probabilities; 𝒒𝟏 = 𝟏𝟒 𝒒𝟐 = 𝟏𝟒

Therefore optimum mixed strategies;

1st column: 𝑩𝟏 𝑩𝟐
𝟖𝟓 And 𝑆𝐵 =
Value of the game V = 𝟏𝟒 1/14 13/14

𝑨𝟏 𝑨𝟐 A3 𝑨𝟒 𝑨𝟓
𝑆𝐴 =
1/14 0 0 0 13/14
 Solving game by Linear Programming.
• When the given pay of matrix cannot be reduced into
lesser degree, (in case it does not have pure strategy
for players), the mixed strategy game can easily be
solved by applying the principles of linear
programming.
• If the problem of maximizing player is primal one,
the problem of minimizing player will be the dual of
the primal.
• Hence by solving either primal or dual, we can get
the answer of the problem.
• As the linear programming problem insists on non-
negativity constraint, we must take care to see that
all the elements in the given matrix are positive
elements.
 CONTD…
• In case, there are negative elements in the given
matrix, we can add a suitable, large and positive
number to the matrix, so that all the elements in
the matrix will become positive elements. Or
• by writing the row minimums and column
maximums, we can know that the range of the
value of ‘v’ and to keep the v as positive, a
positive, sufficiently large number is added to the
all elements of the matrix, so that we can satisfy
the non - negativity constraint of the linear
programming inequalities.
 Problem 18: solve the game by linear programming
problem. PLAYER B
B1 B2 B3 Check for
PLAYER A A1 4 1 -3 saddle point.

A2 3 1 6
A3 -3 4 -2

Solution: Step 1: Find the Maximin and

Minmax value, which shows
PLAYER B the range of value of the game
B1 B2 B3 Row min
PLAYER A A1 4 1 -3 -3
A2 3 1 6 1 Maximin = 1

A3 -3 4 -2 -3
Column max 4 4 6
value of the game lies between 1 and 4. (both
Minmax = 4
are positive)
Step 2: Let us assume that A plays Step 3: Now divide all the
his strategies with probabilities of inequalities and equations by ‘v’
𝑥1, 𝑥2, 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑥3. Similarly B plays his and keep (𝑥𝑖 / 𝑣) = 𝑋𝑖 and
strategies with probabilities of (𝑦𝑗 / 𝑣) = 𝑌𝑗 and write the
𝑦1, 𝑦2 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑦3. The inequalities inequalities and equations.
are (Note: Dividing the above relations
by ‘v’ is valid only if v > 0. )
The inequalities of A when
The inequalities of A when
B plays his different strategies are,
B plays his different strategies are,
𝑥1 + 𝑥2 + 𝑥3 = 1
X1 + 𝑋2 + 𝑋3 = 1/𝑣
4𝑥1 + 3𝑥2 − 3𝑥3 ≥ 𝑣
4𝑋1 + 3𝑋2 − 3𝑋3 ≥ 1
𝑥1 + 𝑥2 + 4𝑥3 ≥ 𝑣
X1 + 𝑋2 + 4𝑋3 ≥ 1
−3𝑥1 + 6𝑥2 − 2𝑥3 ≥ 𝑣
−3𝑋1 + 6𝑋2 − 2𝑋3 ≥ 1

The inequalities of B when

The inequalities of B when
A plays his different strategies are,
A plays his different strategies are,
𝑦1 + 𝑦2 + 𝑦3 = 1
𝑌1 + 𝑌2 + 𝑌3 = 1/𝑣
4𝑦1 + 𝑦2 − 3𝑌3 ≤ 𝑣
4𝑌1 + 𝑌2 − 3𝑌3 ≤ 1
3𝑦1 + 𝑦2 + 6𝑦3 ≤ 𝑣
3𝑌1 + 𝑌2 + 6𝑌3 ≤ 1
−3𝑦1 + 4𝑦2 − 2𝑦3 ≤ 𝑣
−3𝑌1 + 4𝑌2 − 2𝑌3 ≤ 1
STEP 4: If B want to minimize ‘v’ he has to maximize (1 / v), This
means he has to maximize 𝑌1 + 𝑌2 + 𝑌3 which is the
objective function for B.
𝑴𝒂𝒙 𝒁 = 𝒀𝟏 + 𝒀𝟐 + 𝒀𝟑 = 𝟏/𝒗
𝟒𝒀𝟏 + 𝒀𝟐 − 𝟑𝒀𝟑 ≤ 𝟏
𝟑𝒀𝟏 + 𝒀𝟐 + 𝟔𝒀𝟑 ≤ 𝟏
−𝟑𝒀𝟏 + 𝟒𝒀𝟐 − 𝟐𝒀𝟑 ≤ 𝟏
𝒀𝟏, 𝒀𝟐, 𝒀𝟑 ≥ 𝟎

Writing in simplex form:

𝑴𝒂𝒙 𝒁 = 𝒀𝟏 + 𝒀𝟐 + 𝒀𝟑 + 𝟎𝑺𝟏 + 𝟎𝑺𝟐 + 𝟎𝑺𝟑
𝟒𝒀𝟏 + 𝒀𝟐 − 𝟑𝒀𝟑 + 𝑺𝟏 = 𝟏
𝟑𝒀𝟏 + 𝒀𝟐 + 𝟔𝒀𝟑 + 𝑺𝟐 = 𝟏
−𝟑𝒀𝟏 + 𝟒𝒀𝟐 − 𝟐𝒀𝟑 + 𝑺𝟑 = 𝟏
𝒀𝟏, 𝒀𝟐, 𝒀𝟑, 𝑺𝟏, 𝑺𝟐, 𝑺𝟑 ≥ 𝟎

Initial Basic Feasible solution starts with

𝒀𝟏 = 𝟎, 𝒀𝟐 = 𝟎, 𝒀𝟑 = 𝟎, 𝑺𝟏 = 𝟏, 𝑺𝟐 = 𝟏, 𝑺𝟑 = 𝟏
SIMPLEX TABLE

Cj 1 1 1 0 0 0
B.V Y1 Y2 Y3 S1 S2 S3 Xb MRT
0 S1 4 1 -3 1 0 0 1 1/4
0 S2 3 1 6 0 1 0 1 1/3
0 S3 -3 4 -2 0 0 1 1 1/-3
Zj-Cj -1 -1 -1 0 0 0 0

Cj 1 1 1 0 0 0
B.V Y1 Y2 Y3 S1 S2 S3 Xb MRT
0 Y1 1 1/4 -3/4 1/4 0 0 1/4 -1/3
0 S2 0 1/4 33/4 -3/4 1 0 1/4 1/33
0 S3 0 19/4 -17/4 3/4 0 1 7/4 -7/17
Zj-Cj 0 -3/4 -7/4 1/4 0 0 0
 Cj 1 1 1 0 0 0
B.V Y1 Y2 Y3 S1 S2 S3 Xb MRT
0 Y1 1 3/11 0 2/11 1/11 0 3/11 1
0 Y3 0 1/33 1 -1/11 4/33 0 1/33 1
0 S3 0 161/33 0 4/11 17/33 1 62/33 62/161
Zj-Cj 0 -23/33 0 1/11 7/33 0

Cj 1 1 1 0 0 0
B.V Y1 Y2 Y3 S1 S2 S3 Xb MRT
0 Y1 1 0 0 27/161
0 Y3 0 0 1 3/161
0 Y2 0 1 0 62/161
Zj-Cj 0 0 0 23/161 46/161 23/161

𝟐𝟕 𝟑 𝟔𝟐 𝟐𝟑 𝟒𝟔 𝟐𝟑
𝒀𝟏 = , 𝒀𝟐 = , 𝒀𝟑 = , 𝑺𝟏 = , 𝑺𝟐 = , 𝑺𝟑 =
𝟏𝟔𝟏 𝟏𝟔𝟏 𝟏𝟔𝟏 𝟏𝟔𝟏 𝟏𝟔𝟏 𝟏𝟔𝟏
𝑴𝑨𝑿 𝒁 = 𝟏/𝒗 = 𝟒/𝟕
 𝟐𝟕 𝟑 𝟔𝟐
𝒀𝟏 = , 𝒀𝟐 = , 𝒀𝟑 = ,
𝟏𝟔𝟏 𝟏𝟔𝟏 𝟏𝟔𝟏

𝟐𝟑 𝟒𝟔 𝟐𝟑
𝑺𝟏 = , 𝑺𝟐 = , 𝑺𝟑 =
𝟏𝟔𝟏 𝟏𝟔𝟏 𝟏𝟔𝟏

A’s best strategies we can get from net evaluation row and
the elements under slack variables column. We have:
Therefore; Therefore;
𝟐𝟕 𝟕 𝟐𝟕 𝟐𝟑 𝟕 𝟏
𝒚𝟏 = 𝒀𝟏 × 𝒗 = × = x𝟏 = 𝑿𝟏 × 𝒗 = 𝟏𝟔𝟏
× 𝟒
=𝟒
𝟏𝟔𝟏 𝟒 𝟗𝟐
Similarly, ` Similarly,
𝟔𝟐 𝟏
𝒚𝟐 = 𝟗𝟐 𝐱𝟐 = 𝟐

𝟑 𝟏
𝒚𝟑 = 𝒙𝟑 = 𝟒
𝟗𝟐

Therefore the optimal strategies of A and B are

A (1/4, 1/2 , 1/4)
B ( 27 / 92, 62 / 92, 3 / 92)
and value of the game is (7 / 4) for A.
 Problem 19: solve the game by linear programming
problem. PLAYER B
B1 B2 B3 Check for
PLAYER A A1 3 -4 2 saddle point.

A2 1 -3 -7
A3 -2 4 7

Solution: Step 1: Find the Maximin and

PLAYER B Minmax value, which shows
the value of the game lies
B1 B2 B3 between.
Row min
PLAYER A A1 3 -4 2 -4 value of the game lies between
A2 1 -3 -7 -7 -2 and 4. (The constant value
A3 -2 4 7 (L=3, L ≥ 2) is added to all the
-2
elements of the matrix, so that
Column max 3 4 7 Maximin = -2 the value of the game will be
positive
Minmax = 3
Step 2: Let us assume that A plays Step 3: Now divide all the
his strategies with probabilities of inequalities and equations by ‘v’
𝑥1, 𝑥2, 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑥3. Similarly B plays his and keep (𝑥𝑖 / 𝑣) = 𝑋𝑖 and
strategies with probabilities of (𝑦𝑗 / 𝑣) = 𝑌𝑗 and write the
𝑦1, 𝑦2 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑦3. The inequalities inequalities and equations.
are (Note: Dividing the above relations
by ‘v’ is valid only if v > 0. )
The inequalities of B when
A plays his different strategies are, The inequalities of B when
𝑦1 + 𝑦2 + 𝑦3 = 1 A plays his different strategies are,
6𝑦1 − 𝑦2 + 5𝑦3 ≤ 𝑣 𝑌1 + 𝑌2 + 𝑌3 = 1/𝑣
3𝑦1 + 0𝑦2 − 4𝑦3 ≤ 𝑣 6𝑌1 − 𝑌2 + 5𝑌3 ≤ 1
𝑦1 + 7𝑦2 + 10𝑦3 ≤ 𝑣 3𝑌1 + 0𝑌2 − 4𝑌3 ≤ 1
𝑌1 + 7𝑌2 + 10𝑌3 ≤ 1

PLAYER B
B1 B2 B3
PLAYER A A1 3 -4 2
A2 1 -3 -7
A3 -2 4 7
 STEP 4: If B want to minimize ‘v’ he has to maximize (1 / v), This
means he has to maximize 𝑌1 + 𝑌2 + 𝑌3 which is the
objective function for B.
𝑴𝒂𝒙 𝒁 = 𝒀𝟏 + 𝒀𝟐 + 𝒀𝟑 = 𝟏/𝒗
𝟔𝒀𝟏 − 𝒀𝟐 + 𝟓𝒀𝟑 ≤ 𝟏
𝟑𝒀𝟏 + 𝟎𝒀𝟐 − 𝟒𝒀𝟑 ≤ 𝟏
𝒀𝟏 + 𝟕𝒀𝟐 + 𝟏𝟎𝒀𝟑 ≤ 𝟏
𝒀𝟏, 𝒀𝟐, 𝒀𝟑 ≥ 𝟎
Writing in simplex form:
𝑴𝒂𝒙 𝒁 = 𝒀𝟏 + 𝒀𝟐 + 𝒀𝟑 + 𝟎𝑺𝟏 + 𝟎𝑺𝟐 + 𝟎𝑺𝟑
𝟔𝒀𝟏 − 𝒀𝟐 + 𝟓𝒀𝟑 + 𝑺𝟏 = 𝟏
𝟑𝒀𝟏 + 𝟎𝒀𝟐 − 𝟒𝒀𝟑 + 𝑺𝟐 = 𝟏
𝒀𝟏 + 𝟕𝒀𝟐 + 𝟏𝟎𝒀𝟑 + 𝑺𝟑 = 𝟏
𝒀𝟏, 𝒀𝟐, 𝒀𝟑, 𝑺𝟏, 𝑺𝟐, 𝑺𝟑 ≥ 𝟎
Initial Basic Feasible solution starts with
𝒀𝟏 = 𝟎, 𝒀𝟐 = 𝟎, 𝒀𝟑 = 𝟎, 𝑺𝟏 = 𝟏, 𝑺𝟐 = 𝟏, 𝑺𝟑 = 𝟏

SOLVE BY SIMPLEX METHOD;

Optimal strategies for A = A (6 / 13, 0, 7 / 13), For B = (8 / 13, 5 / 13, 0) and value of the
game = v = (43 / 13) – 3 = 4 / 13. (The element 3 was added to get the value of the v as
positive).
 Algebraic method of solving Game:

References:
Operations Research, S kalavathy
Operations Research, J K sharma
Operations Research, P Rama murthy.