BASIC JUDICIAL ETHICS

In re of the Integration of the Bar of the Phils.

GR No. 00 | January 9, 1973
Per Curiam:

FACTS:

 This case stemmed from Administrative Case No. 526 praying the Court to order the Integration
of the Philippine Bar.
 On August 16, 1962, arguments in favor of, as well as in opposition, to the petition were orally
expounded in the Court.
 In 1970, in response to the preliminary survey over a nationwide sentiment in favor of Bar
Integration, the Court created the Commission on Bar Integration for the purpose of
ascertaining the advisability of unifying the Philippine Bar.
 In September 1971, Congress passed HB No. 3277 (An Act Providing for the Integration of the
Philippine Bar and Appropriating Funds Thereof). This was signed by late President Ferdinand E.
Marcos on September 17, 1971, and took effect on the same day.
 The law provides that:
o Within two years from the approval of the Act, Supreme Court may adopt rules of court
to effect integration of the Philippine Bar.
o The sum of Php500,000 was appropriated to carry out the purpose of this Act.
 On December 1, 1972, the Commission on Bar Integration submitted its Report that the
Honorable Court ordain the Integration of the Philippine Bar.
 After submission of the report, it was faced with arguments on the constitutionality of the Bar
integration.

ISSUE/S:

Whether or not the Court has the power to integrate the Philippine Bar.

RULING:

The Court is of the view that Commission on Bar Integration may integrate the Philippine Bar in
exercise of its power under Article VIII, Sec. 13 [now Sec. 5 (5) of the 1987 Constitution] of the
Constitution to “promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice and procedure in all courts, and
admission to the practice of law.” Indeed, the power to integrate is an inherent part of the Court’s
constitutional authority over the Bar.
TERMS:

Integration of the Philippine Bar – official national unification of the entire lawyer population of the
Philippines

Bar – collectivity of all persons whose name appear in the Roll of Attorneys

Complete unification is not possible unless it is decreed by an entity with power to do so: the STATE
 BASIC JUDICIAL ETHICS
In the Matter of the Petitions for Admission to the Bar of Unsuccessful Candidates
of 1946 to 1953, Cunanan et. al.
March 18, 1954
Diokno, J:

FACTS:

 This case stemmed from RA No. 972 or also known as the Bar Flunkers Act of 1953.
 Under the Rules of Court (Rule 127, Sec. 14) governing the admission to the bar, in order that a
candidate may be deemed to pass the examination successfully, he/she must have obtained a
general average of at least 75% without falling below 50% in any subject.
 Considering the difficulties of the different bar examinations and varying strictness held since
1946, the Court passed and admitted to the bar those candidates who had obtained an average
of only 72%.
 A Senate Bill No. 12 was filed thereafter to lower the passing general average to 70% effective
since 1946. The President requested the views of this Court on the bill and the court, in
compliance with the request, submitted their adverse comments on the bill. The President
thereafter vetoed the bill. Congress did not override the veto. Instead, it approved SB No. 371
embodying substantially the provisions of the vetoed bill. The President allowed the bill to
become a law on June 21, 1953 without his signature.
 RA No. 972 has provided that passing general average as follows: (a) GA of 70% 1946-1951, (b)
71% in 1952, (c) 72% in 1953, (d) 73% in 1954, (e) 74% in 1955, without a candidate obtaining
50% in any subject.
 After the approval, many of the unsuccessful candidates filed a petition for admission to bar by
invoking its provisions and to reconsider their grades.

ISSUE/S:

Whether or not the admission, suspension, disbarment and reinstatement of the attorneys is a
judicial function.

RULING:

The Court ruled that in our judicial system, the admission, suspension, disbarment and
reinstatement of attorneys-at-law in the practice of profession and their supervision have been
indisputably a judicial function and responsibility.

Even if considering the power granted to Congress to repeal, alter and supplement rules
regarding admission to the practice of law, the proposition that the admission, suspension, disbarment
and reinstatement of attorney is a legislative function, is unacceptable. The function since requires: (1)
previously established rules and principles; (b) concrete facts affecting determinate individuals and (3)
decision as to whether these facts are governed by the rules and principles, which in effect is a judicial
function.

Considering the above, the Court ruled that RA No. 732 is unconstitutional on the following
grounds: (a) they are not within the legislative powers of Congress to enact, or the Congress exceeded its
powers, (b) because they create or establish arbitrary methods that infringe constitutional principles,
and (c) because their purposes or effect violate the Constitution.
 BASIC JUDICIAL ETHICS
Pimentel vs. Legal Education Board
GR Nos. 230642 & 242954 | September 10, 2019
J.C. Reyes, Jr., J:

FACTS:

 The Congress passed into law the RA No. 7662, also known as the Legal Education Reform Act,
on December 23, 1993.
 The Act created the Legal Education Board, an agency separate from the Department of
Education, Culture and Sports (DENCS).
 Among its issuances, LEB issued Memorandum Order No. 7-2016 requiring all those seeking
admission to law school to take and pass a nationwide uniform law school admission test known
as the PhiLSAT.
 The petitioners file for a petition for prohibition, and a petition for certiorari and prohibition
assailing constitutionality of the RA No. 7662 and its issuances including the PhiLSAT.
 The petitioner contended that LEB encroached upon the rule-making power of the Court
concerning admissions to the practice of law and requested for an issuance of TRO to prevent
LEB from conducting PhiLSAT.

Petitioners’ argument Respondents’ argument

In GR 230642 – OSG, representing LEB, argued that:
(a) RA No. 7662 and PhiLSAT are (a) Certiorari and Prohibition are not
offensive to the Court’s power to proper to assail the Constitutionality
regulate and supervise legal of the RA No. 7662;
profession pursuant to Sec. 5 (5), Art. (b) There is no grave of abuse discretion
VIII of the Constitution; since State has the power to regulate
(b) Congress cannot create an all educational institutions;
administrative office that exercises (c) In reply to petitioners’ argument on
the Court’s power over practice of additional powers of JBC, OSG
law; argued JBC was actually appointed
(c) RA No. 7662 gives JBC additional by Court to process applications for
functions to vet nominees for LEB in membership to the JBC;
violation of Art. VIII Sec 8 (5) of the (d) PhiLSAT is the minimum standard
Constitution for entrance to law schools and not
(d) PhilSAT violates the academic different from NMAT (medical
freedom of law schools and the right admission test) which the Court
to education. upheld as a valid exercise of police
In GR 242954 – power in Tablarin vs. Gutierrez;
(a) RA No. 7662 violates law schools’ (e) RA No. 7662 and PhiLSAT did not
exercise of freedom to choose who to violate academic freedom since the
admit. standards are fair, reasonable and
equitable
(f) RA enjoys presumption of
Constitutionality.
ISSUE/S:

Whether or not the supervision of legal education is an exercise of police power.

RULING:

The Supreme Court held that the Court laid down the powers which the Court can exercise.
Among these is the power to promulgate rules concerning admission to the practice of law. The
Congress, on the other hand, was given the power to repeal, alter or supplement the riles on pleading,
practice and procedure and the admission to the practice of law promulgated by the Court. The power to
promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice and procedure and admission to the practice of law is in
fact zealously guarded by the Court.
 BASIC JUDICIAL ETHICS
Cayetano vs. Monsod
GR No. 100113| September 3, 1991
Paras, J:

FACTS:

 Christian Monsod was nominated by President Corazon Aquino to the position of Chairman of
the COMELEC in a letter received on April 25, 1991.
 The petitioner opposed the nomination because allegedly Monsod does not possess the
required qualification of having been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years, as
provided in the Art. IX-C Sec 1 of the 1987 Constitution.
 On June 5, 1991, the Commission on Appointments confirmed the nomination of Monsod as
Chairman of the COMELEC. On June 18, 1991, he took his oath of office. On the same day, he
assumed office as Chairman of the COMELEC.
 His experience prior to the appointment are as follows:
o Worked in law office of his father;
o Worked as an operations officer (1963-1970) in World Bank Group in Costa Rica and
Panama (e.g., negotiating loans and coordinating legal, economic and project work of
bank);
o Served as CEO in Meralco;
o Served as CEO of an Investment bank;
o Secretary-General and National Chairman of NAMFREL;
o Former co-Chairman of the Bishops Businessmen’s Conference for Human Development;
o Member of Davide Commission (a quasi-judicial body) (1990);
o Member of Constitutional Commission (1986-1987);
o Chairman of the Committee on Accountability of Public Officers
 Petitioner filed an instant petition for Certiorari and Prohibition to declare the appointment of
Atty. Monsod as the chairman of COMELEC as null and void.

ISSUE/S:

Whether or not the prior work experiences of Atty. Monsod are considered as “practice of law”
for purpose of his appointment as the chairman of the COMELEC.

RULING:

The Court defined the “practice of law” as any activity, in or out of the court, which requires the
application of law, legal procedure, knowledge, training and experience. To engage in practice is to
perform those acts which are characteristics of the profession. Generally, to practice law is to give notice
or render any kind of service which device or service requires the use in any degree of legal knowledge
or skill. The Court ruled that lawyers play an important role in corporate setting e.g., debt restructuring
program, loan concessions and compromises etc.
 Thus, Atty. Monsod’s past work experience as a lawyer-economist, a lawyer-manager, a lawyer-
entrepreneur, lawyer-negotiator and a lawyer-legislator constitute as a practice of law. Hence, he met
the qualification for his appointment as the chairman of COMELEC.
 BASIC JUDICIAL ETHICS
Lim-Santiago vs. Sagucio
A.C. 6705| March 31, 2006
Carpio, J:
FACTS:

 This is a disbarment complaint against Atty. Carlos Sagucio for violating Rule 15.03 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility and for defying the prohibition against private practice of law while
working as government prosecutor.
 Ruthie Lim-Santiago is the daughter of Alfonso Lim and special administratix of his estate.
Alfonso Lim is a stockholder and the former President of Taggat Industries, Inc. (“Taggat”).
 Atty. Carlos Sagucio was the former Personnel Manager and Retained Counsel of Taggat.
 Taggat is a domestic corporation engaged in the operation of timber concessions from the
government. The PCGG sequestered it in 1986 and the operations ceased in 1987.
 The employees of Taggat filed a complaint against Ruthie Lim-Santiago, who took over the
management and control of Taggat after the death of his father. The employees alleged that she
withheld the payment of their compensation from Apr 1, 1996 to July 15 1997.
 Atty. Carlos Sagucio, as Assistant Provincial Prosecutor, was assigned to conduct the preliminary
investigation. He resolved the complaint by recommending the filing for violation of Art. 288 in
relation to Art. 116 of the Labor Code of the Philippines.
 The complainant charged the respondent with the following violations and sought for
disbarment:
o Rule 15.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
o Engaging in the private practice of law while working as government prosecutor

Complainant’s argument Respondents’ argument

 Respondent is guilty of representing  Refutes complainant’s argument by
conflicting interest; claiming that the complainant was
 Guilty of engaging in the private merely aggrieved by the resolution.
practice of law while working as a  Claimed that when the criminal
government prosecutor complaint was filed, he had resigned
from Taggat for more than five years.
 Asserts that he no longer owes his
undivided loyalty to Taggat
 It is his sworn duty to conduct the
necessary preliminary investigation.
 Contends that the complainant failed
to establish lack of impartiality when
he performed his duty.

 The IBP found Atty. Carlos Sagucio guilty of conflict on interest, failure to safeguard a former
client’s interest and violation of prohibition against private practice of law while being a
government prosecutor.
ISSUE/S:

Whether or not the render of consultancy services by Atty. Carlos to Taggat employees
constitutes a violation of prohibition of private practice of law while being a government prosecutor.

RULING:

The Court defined “practice of law” as a succession of acts of the same nature habitually or
customarily holding one’s self to the public as lawyer. The Court ruled that the respondent’s argument
has no merit since the law does not distinguish between consultancy services and retainer agreement.

Considering that Atty. Sagucio performed acts to Taggat employees that are usually rendered by
lawyers with the use knowledge and expertise, the same falls within the ambit of “practice of law”.
Hence, he is guilty in the violation of the prohibition of private practice while being a government
prosecutor. He is suspended from practice of law for SIX MONTHS.
 BASIC JUDICIAL ETHICS
People vs. Villanueva
GR No. L-19450| May 27, 1965
Paredes, J:
FACTS:

 On September 4, 1959, the Chief of Police of Alaminos, Laguna charged Simplicio Villanueva with
the crime of Malicious Mischief before the Justice of the Peace Court of said municipality.
 The accused was represented by a counsel de oficio but later on replaced by counsel de parte.
The complainant was represented by City Attorney Ariston Fule of San Pablo City, having entered
his appearance as private-prosecutor.
 The appearance of Atty. Fule as private prosecutor was questioned by the counsel for the accuse,
invoking the case of Aquino et. al. vs. Blanco et. al., where in it was ruled that “when an attorney
had been appointed to the position of Assistant Provincial Fiscal or City Fiscal and therein
qualified, by operation of law, he ceased to engage in private law practice. Counsel then argued
that the JP Court in entertaining the appearance of City Attorney Fule in the case.
 On December 17, 1960, JP issued an order sustaining the legality of the appearance of City
Attorney Fule.
 January 4, 1961, counsel for the accused presented a “Motion to Inhibit Fiscal Fule from Acting
as Private Prosecutor in this case”, this time invoking Sec. 32, Rule 127 (now Sec. 35 Rule 138,
Revised Rules) which bars certain attorneys from practicing.
 The Court ruled on the motion by upholding the right of Fule to appear and further stating that
Fule was not actually engaged in private law practice.
 This Order was appealed to the CFI – Laguna.

ISSUE/S:

Whether or not

RULING:

The Court
 BASIC JUDICIAL ETHICS
In the Matter of the Petition for Disbarment of Telesforo A. Diao vs. Severino G. Martinez
AC No. 244 | March 29, 1963
Bengzon, J:

FACTS:

 Telesforo A. Diao was admitted to the Bar after successfully passing the corresponding
examinations held in 1953.
 Two years later, Severino Martinez charged him with having falsely represented in his
application for such Bar examination, that he had the requisite academic qualifications.
 The matter was referred to the Solicitor-General who caused the charge to be investigated, and
later submitted a report recommending that Diao’s name be erased from the roll of attorneys.
Diao had not completed, before taking up law subjects, the required pre-legal education
prescribed by the Department of Private Legal Education, specially in the following:
o Diao did not complete his high school training; and
o Diao never attended Quisumbing College and never obtained his A.A. (Associate in Arts)
diploma – which contradicts the credentials he had submitted in support of his
application for examination.
 In reply, Diao admits the first charge but he claims that although he had left high school in his
third year, he entered US Army and passed the General Classification Test which according to
him is equivalent to high school diploma, and contended that his army service is equivalent to
3rd and 4th year high school. The Court find the second charge meritorious.

ISSUE/S:

Whether or not Diao’s failure to obtain pre-legal education is considered a valid ground for
revocation of his license. (PS. See Rules of Court Sec. 6)

RULING:

The Court held that Telesforo A. Diao was not qualified to take bar examinations; but due to his
false representations, he was allowed to take, luckily passed it and was thereafter admitted to the Bar.
The fact that he hurdled the Bar Examinations is immaterial. Passing such examination is not the only
qualification to become an attorney-at-law; taking the prescribed courses of legal study in the regular
manner is equally essential.

Hence, the Clerk is ordered to strike from the roll of attorneys, the name of Telesforo A. Diao.
 BASIC JUDICIAL ETHICS
In re: Petition to Re-acquire the Privilege to Practice Law in the Philippines
B.M. No. 2112| July 24, 2012
Reyes, J:

FACTS:

 On June 8, 2009, a petition was filed by Epifanio B. Muneses (petitioner) with the Office of the
Bar Confidant (OBC) praying that he be granted the privilege to practice law in the Philippines.
 The petitioner alleged that he became a member of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP)
on March 21, 1966; that he lost his privilege to practice law when he became a citizen of USA on
August 1981.
 On September 15, 2006, he re-acquired his Philippine citizenship pursuant to RA No. 9225
(“Citizenship Retention and Reacquisition Act of 2003”) by taking his oath of allegiance as a
Filipino Citizen before the Philippine Consulate General in Washington, D.C. USA.
 He intends to retire in the Philippines, if granted, to resume practice of law.
 In a similar case (Bar Matter No. 1678), the Court was confronted with similar petition filed by
Benjamin M. Dacanay who requested leave to resume his practice of law after availing benefits
of RA No. 9225. Dacanay was admitted to the Bar. Dacanay migrated to Canada to seek medical
attention for his ailments and acquired Canadian citizenship. Dacanay reacquired Philippine
citizenship pursuant to RA No. 9225.

ISSUE/S:

Whether or not Muneses can resume his practice of law after he re-acquired his Philippine
citizenship.

RULING:

The Court reiterated that Filipino citizenship is a requirement for admission to the bar and is, in
fact, a continuing requirement for the practice of law. Thus, the loss thereof means termination of the
petitioner’s membership in the bar.

Under RA No. 9225, a natural-born citizen who have lost Philippine citizenship by reason of their
naturalization as citizens of a foreign country are deemed to have reacquired their Philippine citizenship
upon taking oath of allegiance to the Republic.

As stated in Dacanay, the right to resume the practice of law is not automatic. RA No. 9225
provides that a person who intends to practice his profession in the Philippines must apply with proper
authority for a license or permit to engage in practice.

Hence, the Court granted the petition subject to a condition that he shall retake the lawyer’s
oath.