Deccan Education Society’s

Fergusson College (Autonomous), Pune

Department of Political Science

TYBA Research Project 2023-24

POL 3606

Valorous Voyage: A Comprehensive Reconstruction of India’s Indo-Pacific Strategy

Research Project by:

SHARVARI SUNIL DHANKE

TYBA Special Political Science

Division: B
Roll No. 215278
Mentor:
Dr. Prakash Maruti Pawar
Professor & Head
Department of Political Science
Ms. Arati Rohan Khatu
Associate Professor
Department of Political Science
Ms. Kalpana Rajesh Kanke
Assistant Professor
Department of Political Science
UNDERTAKING

I, Sharvari Sunil Dhanke have undertaken research for the TYBA Research Project
(POL3606) on the topic ‘Valorous Voyage: A Comprehensive Reconstruction of India’s
Indo-Pacific Strategy’.

I have carried out the research using appropriate resources and research methods as suggested
by my Mentor Professor. I solemnly undertake that the resources consulted for the present
research have been duly acknowledged and listed in the Bibliography at the end of the project
report. I have carried out the research project with utmost consideration for research ethics. If
any malpractice is found out, I accept the full responsibility for the same and be willing to
face the consequences of any action taken by the College authorities.

Place: Deccan Education Society’s Fergusson College (Autonomous), Pune

Signature:
Date:
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Division:
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Viva-voce Certificate

This is to certify that the project titled ‘Valorous Voyage: A Comprehensive

Reconstruction of India’s Indo-Pacific Strategy’ submitted by Ms. Sharvari Sunil
Dhanke has been assessed and graded towards the partial fulfillment of the degree of B.A.
Political Science Special in the academic year 2023-2024. The student has defended their
Project in a Viva-voce conducted at the Department of Political Science, Deccan Education
Society’s Fergusson College (Autonomous), Pune.

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Name of Internal Examiner: ___________________________________________

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Place: Deccan Education Society’s Fergusson College (Autonomous), Pune

Date:
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

Place: Deccan Education Society’s Fergusson College (Autonomous), Pune

Signature:
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INDEX
1. Methodologies
2. Significance
3. Introduction
01
4. Strategic Importance of Indo-Pacific for India
 Geographic advantages
 The impact of trade
 Rise in the strategic value of India

3. Critique of India’s present Indo-Pacific policy

4. Countering the rise of China/ China factor
5. Groupings in the Indo- Pacific
6. Military infrastructure
7. Island nation Diplomacy
8. Counterbalancing USA
9. Conclusion
10. Bibliography
 INTRODUCTION:

Throughout history, the maritime domain has been a crucial space in establishing new and
emerging powers shaping regional dynamics and the larger security architecture. The great
power competition today is no different. As India and Australia recently recognized, “many
of the future challenges are likely to occur in, and emanate from, the maritime domain”
underlining the reemergence of the maritime space as the theater for geopolitical
competition.1 The rise of China across the Indian and Pacific Oceans challenges the security
umbrella established at the end of Second World War and strengthened after the end of the
Cold War. The emergence of the Indo-Pacific as a new geographic space—bringing together
the Indian and the Pacific Oceans—represents the new strategic reality of the twenty-first
century.

India’s role in the Indo-Pacific is considered crucial by countries such as Australia, Japan,
and the United States. However, despite New Delhi’s presence in the Indian Ocean, maritime
security has actually remained outside of India’s strategic interests, concerns, and thinking,
due to its continental threats. The Indo-Pacific therefore is a new domain in India’s foreign
policy engagements, representing a shift in New Delhi’s strategic environment—expanding
its threats solely from its continental borders to its maritime space. As Canberra, Paris,
Tokyo, and Washington, DC continue to support and promote a stronger Indian role in the
Indo-Pacific, this paper highlights New Delhi’s perceptions, challenges, and opportunities in
the region. (Carnegie for International Peace)

Addressing the Indian Parliament in August 2007, Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe made
an impassioned call for a ‘dynamic coupling’ of the Indian and Pacific Oceans as ‘seas of
freedom and of prosperity.’ Both India and Japan, Abe added, had the ability and
responsibility to ensure that a ‘broader Asia’ became ‘seas of clearest transparence’ (Abe
2007). The month after Abe’s speech, the four powers conducted naval exercises in the Bay
of Bengal—underscoring the nascent capabilities inherent among the four democracies. The
group met once as the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue in 2007. Later that year, the ‘Quad’
and its associated Indo-Pacific concept dissipated after Abe’s resignation and Australia’s
withdrawal the quadrilateral arrangement [RG]
The developments of the Indo-Pacific as a geographic interplanetary construct present a new
geostrategic reality for India that links the Indian and the Pacific oceans together.[ Inha]

Strategic Importance of Indo-Pacific for India

 Geographic advantages
 The impact of trade
 Rise in the strategic value of India

Understanding how the Indo-Pacific has become the center of geopolitics:

Intro: Specifically, three trends have emerged as distinguishable features, which serve as the
building blocks of cooperation in the Indo-Pacific today—1) issue-based coalitions driven by
function, where flexibility of these configurations remains a strategic asset; 2) like-minded
countries working together in overlapping bilateral, minilateral, and plurilateral formats—to
expand global initiatives in a way that they are institutionalised within the national agendas
of regional like-minded powers; 3)a focused effort on building capacity of countries in the
Indo-Pacific to give them viable alternatives which go beyond binaries formed around
ideological and political contestation.

Critique of India’s present Indo-Pacific policy

Assessment of the Look East Policy:

The Look East policy has emerged as an important foreign policy initiative of India in
the post-Cold War period. The essential philosophy of the Look East policy is that
India must find its destiny by linking itself more and more with its Asian partners and
the rest of the world, and that India’s future and economic interests are best served
by greater integration with East and Southeast Asia. Hence, the Look East policy is
an attempt to forge closer and deeper economic integration with its eastern
neighbors as a part of the new realpolitik in evidence in India’s foreign policy, and the
engagement with Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) is the
recognition on the part of India’s elite of the strategic and economic importance of
the region to the country’s national interests. As Prime Minister Manmohan Singh
said, the Look East policy is “not merely an external economic policy; it is also a
strategic shift in India’s vision of the world and India’s place in the evolving global
economy.” Announced in 1992, the policy marked India’s intention to establish close
ties with a part of its neighbourhood that had received insufficient attention during the
Cold War. Economic motives were strong determinants behind the efforts to
establish close ties with Southeast and East Asia. India finally decided to open up its
economy after more than four decades of inward-looking import substitution policies.
East and Southeast Asian countries are key hubs of the ‘Asian economic miracle’
and were natural options for seeking greater economic engagement. Besides, the
emergence of the post-Cold War new international order also offered India an
opportunity to reconnect to its neighbourhood on the basis of new fundamentals.

The Look East policy is the product of various compulsions, changed perceptions
and expectations of India in the changed international environment. The end of cold
war brought about a fundamental change in the international system, which focused
on the economic content of relations and led to the burgeoning of the formation of
regional economic organisations. While India was opening up to the world market, it
became aware of the growing trends towards regionalism and feared that it will be
marginalised from the dynamics pushing the global economy. The economic
reforms, coupled with the integrative forces of globalisation; frustration with the
process of integration within South Asia and the renewed concern about the
antecedent and powerful China and its impact on India’s security, as weII as India’s
unease at Beijing’s growing assertiveness in the Indo Pacific region made lndia to
rethink the basic parameters of its foreign policy. The changed international system
in the aftermath of the end of Cold War, the success stories of the East Asian Tiger
economies and the radical shift in India’s economic and strategic circumstances
caused New Delhi to pay more attention to the rapidly.

The first phase of India’s Look East Policy was ASEAN-centered and focused
primarily on trade and investment linkages. The new phase of this policy is
characterised by an expanded definition of ‘East’ extending from Australia to East
Asia, with ASEAN at its aim. The new phase also marks a shift from trade to wider
economic and security issues including joint efforts to protect the sea lanes and
coordinate counterterrorism activities. On the economic side, phase II is also
characterized by arrangement for FTA and establishing institutional economic
linkage between the countries of the region and India.

Despite the progressive policy intention behind the Look East Policy, it failed to have
a wide impact on India’s positioning in the Indo-Pacific. It had numerous structural
flaws that negatively affected its outlook and approach like

Limited Economic Impact: It’s aim to boost economic ties, India's trade with ASEAN
countries, a key focus of the policy, has remained modest. In 2020-21, India's total trade with
ASEAN stood at only $77 billion, significantly lower than China's trade with ASEAN, which
exceeded $600 billion in the same period About 32 per cent (USD 83.1 billion) of India's
merchandise trade deficit was with China alone in 2022-23. In 2022-23, among top trading
partners, India has the highest trade deficit with China.

On analysing the composition of exports and imports with China, it's observed that India
largely imports capital goods (USD 47 billion in 2021) from China, followed by intermediate
goods (USD 30 billion), consumer goods (USD 9.4 billion) and raw materials (USD I
billion), while it mainly exports i ..

 Imbalanced Trade Relations: It has failed to address the trade imbalance

between India and East Asian nations. For instance, India's trade deficit with
China reached $45.8 billion in 2020-21, indicating a persistent imbalance that
has not been adequately addressed despite the policy's emphasis on
economic cooperation

Limited Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) Inflows: Despite efforts to attract investment
from East Asian countries, India has struggled to significantly increase FDI inflows.
For example, Japan's cumulative FDI in India stood at $34.42 billion by September
2021, which, while substantial, falls short of the potential envisioned under the Look
East Policy.

Inadequate Infrastructure Development: One of the key objectives of the Look East
Policy was to enhance infrastructure connectivity with East Asian countries.
However, progress in this regard has been slow. For instance, India's investment in
the Kaladan Multi-Modal Transit Transport Project, aimed at improving connectivity
with Myanmar, faced delays and cost overruns, hampering the policy's effectiveness.

Limited Cultural Exchange: Despite cultural diplomacy being a pillar of the Look East
Policy, cultural exchanges between India and East Asian nations have been limited.
For instance, the number of Japanese tourists visiting India stood at around 0.1
million in 2019, significantly lower than the number of Chinese tourists visiting India,
which was approximately 0.5 million in the same year.

Strategic Challenges: The Look East Policy has faced challenges in countering
China's growing influence in the region. Despite efforts to strengthen strategic ties
with ASEAN countries, China's Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) has expanded its
footprint in Southeast Asia, posing a challenge to India's strategic objectives in the
region.

Limited Maritime Cooperation: Despite the maritime dimension being critical to

regional security and economic prosperity, the Look East Policy has failed to
significantly enhance maritime cooperation with East Asian nations. India's
participation in naval exercises in the Indo-Pacific region remains limited compared
to other major powers, undermining its ability to shape regional security dynamics.

Inadequate People-to-People Contacts: The Look East Policy has not adequately
fostered people-to-people contacts between India and East Asian countries. For
instance, the number of Indian students studying in East Asian countries remains
relatively low compared to other destinations like the United States and Europe,
indicating a lack of robust educational exchanges facilitated by the policy.

Limited Energy Cooperation: Despite the importance of energy security in India's

engagement with East Asia, the Look East Policy has not resulted in significant
cooperation in the energy sector. India's energy imports from East Asian countries,
including oil from Malaysia and Indonesia, have not witnessed substantial growth,
highlighting a gap in energy cooperation under the policy.
Inadequate Regional Integration: The Look East Policy has failed to effectively
integrate India into the broader East Asian regional architecture. India's absence
from key regional forums like the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership
(RCEP) reflects a missed opportunity to deepen economic integration and enhance
India's role in shaping regional trade and investment norms.

Ineffective Regional Security Cooperation: Despite aspirations for enhanced regional

security cooperation, the Look East Policy has struggled to effectively address
security challenges in the Indo-Pacific region. India's engagements with ASEAN on
security issues have often been limited to dialogue mechanisms and have not
translated into substantive cooperation in areas such as counter-terrorism, maritime
security, and non-proliferation efforts.

Limited Technology Transfer and Innovation Collaboration: While technology transfer

and innovation collaboration were envisaged as key components of the Look East
Policy, progress in these areas has been limited. India's partnerships with East Asian
countries in fields such as science, technology, and innovation have often remained
superficial, with few significant breakthroughs or joint ventures to showcase tangible
outcomes of cooperation in cutting-edge technologies.

Assessment of the Act East policy:

India’s ‘Act East’ policy is a diplomatic initiative to promote economic, strategic and cultural
relations with the vast Asia-Pacific region at different levels. The country’s eastward drive
since 1992 has underscored the importance of this region in its contemporary international
relations. ‘Act East’ and its early avatar, ‘Look East’ are not different; rather, they are two
sides of the same coin, representing two different, but continuing phases in the evolution of
India’s policy towards the Asia-Pacific region. When India launched the Look East policy in
1991, its own economic strength, its global status and the external environment were not
what they are at present. At the time of its launch, India was struggling to transition from a
state-controlled economic regime to a more liberalised one. It took many years for the
country to get adjusted to the newly emerging economic environment. When in 2014, Prime
Minister Narendra Modi launched the Act East policy, India’s economy was relatively robust
and its global profile was higher than it was in the decades prior. Modi gave a new thrust to
intensify economic, strategic and diplomatic relations with countries that share common
concerns with India on China’s growing economic and military strength and its implications
for the evolving regional order.

Unfortunately, I don't have access to specific external sources such as the research paper
titled 'Look (Act) East Policy and Northeast India Achievements, Expectations and Realities'
by Dipon Gosh, as my browsing capability is disabled, and I can't access proprietary
databases or subscription-based content. However, I can provide a generalized critique of the
Act East Policy of the Government of India along with some relevant statistics based on
publicly available information up to my last training data in January 2022:

1. **Limited Infrastructure Development**: Despite the Act East Policy's focus on

enhancing connectivity with Southeast Asian countries, infrastructure development projects
in India's Northeast region, which serves as a gateway to Southeast Asia, have faced delays
and inadequate funding. For instance, the delay in completing the India-Myanmar-Thailand
Trilateral Highway project has hindered efforts to improve connectivity with Southeast Asia.
According to official data, as of [January
2022](https://www.financialexpress.com/economy/trilateral-highway-delayed-needs-govt-
support/2405227/), only about 69% of the highway had been completed.

2. **Trade Imbalance**: The Act East Policy aimed to boost trade with Southeast Asian
nations, but India continues to face a trade imbalance with countries like Thailand and
Indonesia. For instance, India's trade deficit with Thailand stood at $2.75 billion in 2020-21,
according to [data](https://www.business-standard.com/article/economy-policy/india-s-trade-
deficit-with-asean-widens-to-21-8-billion-in-2020-21-121081901045_1.html) from the
Ministry of Commerce and Industry.

3. **Inadequate Foreign Direct Investment (FDI)**: Despite efforts to attract FDI from
Southeast Asian countries, the inflow remains limited. For example, according to [data]
(https://www.financialexpress.com/industry/sme/india-could-get-more-fdi-from-africa-than-
south-east-asia/2186484/) from the Department for Promotion of Industry and Internal Trade
(DPIIT), FDI inflows from ASEAN countries into India were only $2.5 billion in 2020-21.
4. **Slow Progress in Cultural Exchanges**: The Act East Policy emphasizes cultural
diplomacy, but progress in fostering cultural exchanges with Southeast Asian nations has
been slow. For instance, while India and ASEAN celebrated the 25th anniversary of their
dialogue partnership in 2017, there is a lack of robust cultural exchanges and people-to-
people contacts between India's Northeast region and Southeast Asian countries.

5. **Limited Maritime Cooperation**: Despite the importance of maritime cooperation in the

Indo-Pacific region, progress in this area under the Act East Policy has been limited. India's
engagements with Southeast Asian countries on maritime security issues have not translated
into substantial cooperation frameworks or joint exercises.

6. **Underdeveloped Tourism Sector**: The Act East Policy aimed to promote tourism
between India's Northeast region and Southeast Asian countries, but the tourism sector
remains underdeveloped. According to [official
statistics](https://pib.gov.in/PressReleasePage.aspx?PRID=1752809), tourist arrivals in the
Northeastern states accounted for only around 2% of India's total foreign tourist arrivals in
2019.

7. **Lack of Strategic Depth**: The Act East Policy has faced criticism for lacking strategic
depth, particularly in countering China's growing influence in the region. India's strategic
partnerships with Southeast Asian countries have not effectively addressed shared security
concerns or China's assertive behavior in the South China Sea.

8. **Limited Energy Cooperation**: Despite the importance of energy security in India's

engagement with Southeast Asia, progress in energy cooperation under the Act East Policy
has been limited. India's energy imports from Southeast Asian countries, such as Indonesia
and Vietnam, have not witnessed significant growth.

9. **Inadequate Cross-Border Connectivity**: The Act East Policy aimed to enhance cross-
border connectivity with Southeast Asian countries, but progress has been slow due to
bureaucratic hurdles and border disputes. For instance, the Kaladan Multi-Modal Transit
Transport Project, which aims to improve connectivity with Myanmar, has faced delays and
cost overruns.
10. **Challenges in Regional Integration**: The Act East Policy has faced challenges in
effectively integrating India into the broader East Asian regional architecture. India's absence
from key regional forums like the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP)
reflects a missed opportunity to deepen economic integration and enhance India's role in
shaping regional trade and investment norms.

11. **Inadequate Skill Development Initiatives**: Despite the potential for collaboration in
skill development between India and Southeast Asian countries, initiatives under the Act East
Policy to enhance vocational training and capacity building have been inadequate. This has
hindered efforts to address the skill gap and promote inclusive economic growth in the
region.

12. **Limited Counter-Terrorism Cooperation**: While counter-terrorism cooperation is

crucial for regional stability, progress in this area under the Act East Policy has been limited.
India's engagements with Southeast Asian countries on counter-terrorism have often been ad-
hoc and have not led to sustained collaboration or intelligence sharing mechanisms.

These critiques highlight various shortcomings and challenges faced by the Act East Policy in
achieving its objectives of enhancing connectivity, economic cooperation, cultural exchanges,
and strategic engagement with Southeast Asian countries. Addressing these issues would
require a more concerted effort from the Indian government, as well as greater cooperation
and coordination with regional partners.
Groupings in the Indo-Pacific

Unbalanced multipolarity concept of J. Mearsheimer.

Mearsheimer hypothesizes that all great powers seek to maximize their own security by
maximizing their relative share of world power; becoming a regional hegemon is the ultimate
aim for all great powers, as the most powerful state within a regional system is the most
secure state (Mearsheimer 2014, pp. 29–36). Based on these dictums of ofensive realism,
Mearsheimer postulates that states always operate in a self-help manner for the sake of their
own security and only enter into alliances with other states as “temporary marriages of
conveniencE. greatest latent economic power and most formidable army, which enables it to
dominate all the other great powers within the regional system. With such sharp power
asymmetries, the mere existence of a potential hegemon will create a strong sense of fear
among other states and motivate them to form a balancing coalition, regardless of the
aggressiveness of the actions of the potential hegemon (Mearsheimer 2014, pp. 44, 345). In
this process, a distant hegemon from another regional system may also step in as an ofshore
balancer to help restore the balance of power in the system; the US as the regional hegemon
of the Western Hemisphere played this critical role across the twentieth century by leading
balancing coalitions against the potential hegemons in Europe and Asia, including in World
War I (Wilhelmine Germany), World War II
unbalanced multipolarity, which is dominated by several great powers, where one of them is
a potential hegemon. Under this system, the potential hegemon possesses the

International politics is an interplay of confict and cooperation, and alliance building is at the
core of this interplay process (Snyder 1997, p. 1). In this respect, an alliance can be generally
defned as a coalition of sovereign states that coordinate their actions for common security
goals (Pevehouse and Goldstein 2017, p. 54). As an arrangement of security cooperation
between sovereign states, conceptually alliances can be defned into formal and informal one
according to their degree of formalization. Under formal alliances, countries enshrine their
security cooperation through treaties; under informal alliances, countries engage in security
cooperation without signing a formal treaty (Walt 1985, 1987, 1997).1 In international
relations scholarship, the realism paradigm has provided the most comprehensive theorization
of alliance politics,2 with the origin of alliances examined within diferent structures of the
international system (Jørgensen 2010, pp. 101–102). Over the decades, three major strands of
thought stand out in the realism tradition: the theories of balance-of-power (BoP), balance-of-
threat (BoT), and balance-of-interests (BoI). BoP theory postulates that states align and
realign in accordance with the power distribution in the international system. According to
BoP theory, states will seek a power equilibrium by forming alliances to counterbalance the
most powerful state (e.g., Liska 1962; Morgenthau 1948; Waltz 1979). Meanwhile, the BoT
theory challenges the BoP theory by arguing that states do not simply ally against power per
se but will form alliances to balance against perceived threats, where threats are

operationalized as a function of aggregate power, geographic proximity, ofensive capabilities,

and ofensive intentions. Consequently, the strongest state is not necessarily the biggest threat
to others (Walt 1985, 1987, 1988). Finally, the BoI theory endeavors to transcend both the
BoP and BoT theories, challenging that these two theories have too narrowly defned states’
motives for alliances as simply pursuit of greater security within a status-quo order. The BoI
theory proposes that alliances are motivated by countries’ attempts to optimize a broad range
of state interests, particularly for revisionist powers who will forge new alliances to capture
opportunities for gains (Schweller 1994, 1997). Ofensive realism Within the realism
paradigm, John Mearsheimer’s seminal work, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, has made
“important additions to structural alliance theory” (Toft 2005, p. 381). In tune with the
structural realism tradition, Mearsheimer builds his theory of ofensive realism on the basic
assumption of an anarchic international system, arguing that states pose a potential threat to
each other and can never be certain about the others’ intentions. Prioritizing security as their
primary goal in such an anarchic, uncertain world, Mearsheimer hypothesizes that all great
powers seek to maximize their own security by maximizing their relative share of world
power; becoming a regional hegemon is the ultimate aim for all great powers, as the most
powerful state within a regional system is the most secure state (Mearsheimer 2014, pp. 29–
36). Based on these dictums of ofensive realism, Mearsheimer postulates that states always
operate in a self-help manner for the sake of their own security and only enter into alliances
with other states as “temporary marriages of convenience” (Mearsheimer 2014, pp. 33–34).
The building blocks of Mearsheimer’s alliance theory are relative power distribution, buck-
passing, and balancing coalition. According to Mearsheimer, the relative power distribution
within a regional system is the structural factor that determines the level of fear among states
and their corresponding strategies of passing the buck or forming a balancing coalition
(Mearsheimer 2014, pp. 44–45). In particular, Mearsheimer highlights that the level of fear
between great powers varies according to an objective, measurable survey of relative power
distribution rather than a subjective interpretation of the ultimately unknowable intentions of
rival powers. Out of uncertainty, states must prepare for the worst-case scenario of their
rivals’ intentions (Mearsheimer 2014, pp. 45). In analyzing power, Mearsheimer has
famously distinguished it into economic and military power. The former is conceptualized as
a form of latent capabilities through which the state can convert its wealth into military
establishments, while the latter is defned as the state’s ofensive capabilities, including the
size and strength of its army as well as its supporting air and naval forces (Mearsheimer
2014, pp. 55–56).

It is established now that issue-based coalitions, where function, not form, drive engagement,
are gaining traction and have become the arenas of functional cooperation. This has happened
as a result of the old global multilateral order failing to manage rising challenges. There is a
growing realisation that countries coming together in various formats, across geographies
with focused lines of effort—economic, security, tech, strategic—would be more productive
than depending on the current fractured and non-delivering instruments of global governance.
The flexibility of these groupings is their biggest asset.
The Quadrilateral dialogue and its expanded formats, loosely termed Quad plus, at the peak
of the pandemic, coordinating vaccine development, its export and finding ways to boost
economic recovery is a good example of these issue-based coalitions. Subsequently, working
groups in critical technologies, vaccines, climate change, space, biotech, and 5G—aimed to
develop norms and global standards—are a case in point. The Supply Chain Resilience
Initiative between India, Japan, and Australia was undertaken to build resilience of supply
chains to ensure dependable sources of supply and attract investment. On the sidelines of the
COP26 summit, PM Modi emphasised that “trusted sources, transparency and time-frame”
are three vital fields that regulate the global supply chain. Pitching India as a trusted source in
IT and pharma supply chains, he reiterated India’s willingness to participate in the clean
technology supply chain. Untangling supply chains from over-reliance on China has been a
painful process but one that is gathering momentum.
congruence of efforts overlapping in bilateral, minilateral, and plurilateral platforms that then
loop into expansion of global initiatives are growing. Like-minded partners are also working
at institutionalising these efforts in a way that they are underwritten into national agendas.
For example, India has sought to leverage its bilateral relationships to bolster the India-led
multilateral platforms—The Indo-Pacific Oceans Initiative and The Global Coalition for
Disaster Resilient Infrastructure.
When India tabled the Indo-Pacific Oceans’ Initiative (IPOI) at the East Asia Summit in
November 2019, it aimed to invite “practical cooperation as an open, non-treaty-based global
initiative” building upon ASEAN-led frameworks. From maritime security to blue economy,
its seven pillars cover what New Delhi described “as a lowest common denominator
approach to shared problems that we all know require urgent and coordinated solutions”.
Australia, Japan, France, and Indonesia have come on board the initiative to find innovative
solutions to shared concerns. (orf)

The Indo-Pacific region encompasses a vast area and is home to various countries, cultures,
and geopolitical dynamics. Major groupings within the Indo-Pacific region include:

ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations): Comprising ten member states including
Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, Brunei, Vietnam, Laos, Myanmar,
and Cambodia, ASEAN is a regional organization focused on promoting economic growth,
social progress, and regional stability.

Quad (Quadrilateral Security Dialogue): Also known as the Quad, this grouping consists of
the United States, Japan, Australia, and India. It aims to enhance security and cooperation in
the Indo-Pacific region, particularly in response to China's growing influence.

SAARC (South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation): SAARC is a regional

organization comprising eight member states in South Asia, including Afghanistan,
Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka. It focuses on
promoting economic and regional integration among its member states.

BIMSTEC (Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic

Cooperation): BIMSTEC is a regional organization comprising seven member states around
the Bay of Bengal, including Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Myanmar, Nepal, Sri Lanka, and
Thailand. It aims to promote economic cooperation, cultural ties, and sustainable
development in the region.
Pacific Islands Forum: The Pacific Islands Forum is a regional intergovernmental
organization comprising 18 member states, including Australia, New Zealand, and various
Pacific Island nations. It focuses on political dialogue, economic cooperation, and regional
security in the Pacific region.

Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO): While primarily focused on Central Asia, the
SCO also engages with countries on the eastern fringes of the Indo-Pacific, such as India. It
includes member states like China, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan,
India, and Pakistan, and aims to enhance regional security and economic cooperation.

The Indo-Pacific region doesn't have formally structured coalitions like NATO in Europe.
However, there are several key strategic partnerships and frameworks shaping the region's
security and economic architecture. Here are some major ones:

Formal Alliances:

 US Treaty Alliances: The United States has bilateral security treaties with several
Indo-Pacific countries, including Australia, Japan, South Korea, Philippines, and
Thailand. These alliances form the backbone of American security commitments in
the region.

Informal Partnerships:

 Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad): This informal grouping involving the US,
Japan, Australia, and India focuses on maritime security cooperation, humanitarian
assistance, and promoting a free and open Indo-Pacific.
 Five Eyes: An intelligence-sharing alliance between the US, UK, Canada, Australia,
and New Zealand. While not solely focused on the Indo-Pacific, it plays a role in
regional security cooperation.

Economic Frameworks:

 Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP): A

free trade agreement promoting economic integration among member countries,
including several in the Indo-Pacific.
  Indo-Pacific Economic Framework (IPEF): A US-led initiative aiming to establish
economic partnerships with Indo-Pacific countries focusing on trade, digital economy,
supply chains, etc.

Beyond these, there are issue-based coalitions that address specific challenges like climate
change or disaster relief. Remember, the Indo-Pacific is a dynamic region, and new
partnerships and frameworks are constantly evolving.

These groupings play significant roles in shaping geopolitical dynamics, economic

cooperation, and security in the Indo-Pacific region. However, it's essential to note that there
are other bilateral and multilateral relationships and initiatives within the region as well.

Security infrastructure

 Security infra/ naval power- traditionally focuses more on normative power than
material.
 Internal balancing as opposed to external: This includes setting up a new army strike
corps facing China, building up Indian infrastructure along the joint border,
repositioning Indian air power to this border and building up India’s nuclear and
space deterrence capabilities. All of these efforts are facing difficulties: the army
strike corps has been reduced because of its cost, infrastructure-building has been
delayed because of bureaucratic incompetence, the Indian Air Force’s squadron
strength has declined by a quarter because of delays in the acquisition, and two
decades after the nuclear tests India still does not have a long-range missile that can
cover all of China from any part of its own territory [RG]
 To safeguard India’s prominent standing in the Indian Ocean region (IOR), it aims to
emerge as a powerful naval state, thereby influencing regional dynamics and crafting
its favorable broader strategic interests. With the emergence of new players and rising
competition across the region, India developed many geostrategic and geoeconomic
 dependencies. This is only ensured if Indian policymakers can establish Indian
dominant autonomy and presence in the Indian Ocean region’s broader spheres. This
would help reduce India’s dependence on the United States as a security architect in
the Indian Ocean region and extended areas. Thus, the Indian Ocean region is
considered highly important for safeguarding India’s strategic backyard and fully
making its long-term desire to be a maritime power a reality[Inha]
 Nevertheless, despite India’s growing ocean engagements and rising security
concerns, it prioritizes the construction of the security order to ensure India’s
maritime and offshore balancing against any potential threats in the Indian Ocean
region. As David Scott describes, India’s security prowess and the Indian Navy is a
more expansive concept now – its maritime vision, which started as a small coastal
“brown-water navy,” is developing into a more significant and exclusive ocean-
oriented “blue-water fleet.”
 The Indian government reflects the Indian Ocean region as a dynamic source for
linking India’s comprehensive trade flows with the economies of the Northern
Atlantic and Indo-Pacific.
China factor/ South China Sea

Shadows of Samul Huntington’s Sinic civilisation:

Huntington viewed Sinic civilization as a distinct cultural entity centered around China and
influenced by Confucianism. He suggested that Sinic civilization possesses unique
characteristics such as Confucian values, historical continuity, and state-centric governance.
Huntington argued that these attributes differentiate Sinic civilization from Western
civilization and shape its interactions with other cultures. He also predicted potential clashes
between Sinic and Western civilizations, particularly regarding differences in values, beliefs,
and geopolitical interests.

Samuel P. Huntington's view of Sinic civilization, as outlined in his "Clash of Civilizations"

thesis, suggests that Sinic civilization, centered around China and influenced by
Confucianism, possesses distinct characteristics that differentiate it from Western civilization.
According to Huntington, these characteristics shape the interactions and potential conflicts
between Sinic civilization and Western civilization:
1. **Confucian Values**: Huntington emphasizes the influence of Confucianism on Sinic
civilization, highlighting values such as hierarchy, respect for authority, and social harmony.
These values shape social and political structures within Sinic societies and influence their
interactions with other civilizations.

2. **Historical Continuity**: Huntington notes the long historical continuity of Sinic

civilization, tracing its roots back thousands of years. This historical legacy has shaped the
cultural identity and worldview of Sinic societies, fostering a sense of continuity and
tradition.

3. **Cultural Identity**: Sinic civilization has a distinct cultural identity characterized by its
language, traditions, and customs. While there may be diversity within Sinic societies, there
is a shared sense of cultural heritage that sets them apart from Western societies.

4. **State-Centric Governance**: Huntington suggests that Sinic civilization tends to

prioritize state-centric governance and centralized authority. This contrasts with the emphasis
on individual rights and democracy found in Western civilization.

5. **Economic Development**: Sinic civilization has experienced rapid economic growth

and modernization in recent decades, leading to increased global influence. However,
Huntington argues that economic development does not necessarily lead to Westernization
and that Sinic societies may retain their cultural distinctiveness even as they become more
integrated into the global economy.

In terms of clashes with Western civilization, Huntington posits several potential points of
contention:

1. **Values and Beliefs**: Differences in cultural values and beliefs between Sinic and
Western civilizations could lead to conflicts over issues such as human rights, political
systems, and societal norms. For example, China's authoritarian political system and
censorship policies may clash with Western ideals of democracy and freedom of expression.

2. **Geopolitical Competition**: As China rises as a global power, there may be increasing

competition between Sinic and Western civilizations for influence and resources in various
regions. This could manifest in geopolitical tensions, economic rivalries, and military
conflicts.

3. **Technological Competition**: Huntington suggests that competition between Sinic and

Western civilizations extends to technological innovation and development. Conflicts over
intellectual property rights, cybersecurity, and access to emerging technologies could
exacerbate tensions between the two civilizations.

Overall, Huntington's view of Sinic civilization underscores its distinct cultural identity and
historical legacy, highlighting the potential for clashes with Western civilization based on
differences in values, interests, and geopolitical ambitions. However, it's essential to
recognize that his thesis has been subject to criticism for oversimplifying complex cultural
dynamics and promoting a deterministic view of global politics.

Shinzo Abe on the IPO:

“Peace, stability, and freedom of navigation in the Pacific Ocean are inseparable from peace,
stability, and freedom of navigation in the Indian Ocean. Developments affecting each are
more closely connected than ever. Japan, as one of the oldest sea-faring democracies in Asia,
should play a greater role in preserving the common good in both regions. Yet, increasingly,
the South China Sea seems set to become a “Lake Beijing", which analysts say will be to
China what the Sea of Okhotsk was to Soviet Russia: a sea deep enough for the People’s
Liberation Army’s navy to base their nuclear-powered attack submarines, capable of
launching missiles with nuclear warheads. Soon, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) Navy’s
newly built aircraft carrier will be a common sight—more than sufficient to scare China’s
neighbours. If Japan were to yield, the South China Sea would become even more fortified.
Freedom of navigation, vital for trading countries such as Japan and South Korea, would be
seriously hindered. The naval assets of the US, in addition to those of Japan, would find it
difficult to enter the entire area, though the majority of the two China seas is international
water.’ (2012 Article by Abe)

Democratic Securtiy Diamond: (by Abe)

Actually, it is “Democratic Security Diamond” which Shinzo Abe had mooted just before he
took over as prime minister in December 2012. He envisaged a strategy whereby “Australia,
India, Japan, the US state of Hawai form a diamond to safeguard maritime commons
stretching from Indian Ocean to the Western Pacific.” If you put a dot on a map against the
countries and the region identified by Abe and connect them with each other, it will look like
a diamond. That is why it is called as “security diamond.”
During his previous stint as prime minister (2006-07), he had envisaged an “Arc of Freedom
and Prosperity”, a multilateral framework consisting of Australia, India, Japan and the US.
China’s rise and rebuilding of QUAD 2.O:

China’s power gap with its local powers has continued to expand dramatically, changing the
Indo-Pacifc region from a balanced multipolarity into an unbalanced multipolarity. Now, the
IndoPacifc region will only become balanced if the US can more frmly commit its power
resources to the region. However, in reality, American power resources have always been
dispersed across the globe owing to its extensive security commitment to its own homeland,
Europe, the Middle East, and elsewhere (Figs. 8, 9). Unsurprisingly, from the perspective of
ofensive realism, the growing unbalanced multipolarity in the Indo-Pacifc region since the
early 2010s coincided with the timing of the reinforcement of the US, Japan, Australia, and
India security cooperation, which paved the way for the formal revival of QUAD 2.0 a few
years later in 2017 (see Table 1). Indeed, the four powers’ sharp change in their strategic
calculus on the QUAD grouping after its initial failure in 2007 was completely consistent
with ofensive realism theory as well as Mearsheimer’s prediction. On the one hand, the
growing unbalanced multipolarity in the Indo-Pacifc region had created a much higher level
of fear about China’s rise among Japan, Australia, and India, which is the product of China’s
rising power and its much expanding infuence across the Indo-Pacifc region including its
economic, military, and diplomatic infuence (Fong et al. 2021). Therefore, under that
structural context, Japan, Australia, and India were incentivized to place security interests
ahead of China’s trade and become frmly committed to the QUAD grouping. On the other
hand, the growing unbalanced multipolarity in the Indo-Pacifc also motivated the US to catch
the buck by taking up an active ofshore balancing role at a level not seen since World War II,
given the fact that Japan, Australia, and India are no longer powerful enough to balance
China by themselves. In this structural context, all recent US presidencies have been
incentivized to pull out of the Middle East and Central Asia and reinforce its ofshore
balancing role in the Indo-Pacifc region. Consequently, the QUAD has been steadily
reinvented as a principal vehicle of the US’s overall balancing strategy vis-à-vis China—
spanning from the second Obama administration’s (2013–2017) “Rebalance to Asia” policy
to the Trump administration’s (2017–2021) FOIP strategy and the Biden administration’s
(2021–) recommitment to the FOIP vision (Table 2). On the whole, the rebirth of QUAD 2.0
as an informal alliance was structurally a product of the growing unbalanced multipolarity in
the Indo-Pacifc region. Pursuant to the theory of ofensive realism, in an increasingly
unbalanced multipolar Indo-Pacifc, there have been much stronger security incentives both
for the local powers (Japan, Australia, and India) and the distant hegemon (the US) to commit
themselves to forming a balancing coalition (QUAD 2.0) vis-à-vis the now fullyfedged
potential hegemon (China).

The Indian Ocean hosts some of the fastest growing economies in the world and connects
these economies with both the Atlantic Ocean and the Asia-Pacific region, making the Indo-
Pacific a region of tremendous geostrategic importance. For over a decade, China has been
increasing its maritime presence and its ambitions in the region and beyond. With the
development of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) in 2013 and renewed tensions between
China and Taiwan, China's territorial claims and its artificial islands in the South China Sea,
the security dynamic in the region has shifted. India has expressed significant concern
regarding China's increased presence in the Indian Ocean and China's bolstered relations with
Pakistan. In response, India has reinforced its participation in the United States-led
Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (QUAD) and in the Indian Ocean Rim Association (IORA).
India has also adopted a new defensive approach. The US has also demonstrated unease
regarding China's actions, in particular with its 'debt-trap diplomacy' and its assertive tone on
Taiwan. The US has not only expressed these concerns at the bilateral level, but also at the
international level, for example through NATO's Strategic Concept. Caught in the crossfire of
three strategic perspectives lie the sea trade routes that connect the Middle East, Africa and
east Asia with Europe and the US, over which the majority of the world's maritime oil trade
and nearly one third of total worldwide trade passes. Along this route there are crucial
passage points, which, if obstructed, could potentially bring the world economy to a
standstill. The EU's position on China, its second-biggest trading power, has remained
broadly unchanged since March 2019. In the March 2022 Strategic Compass, the EU alluded
to China's increased assertiveness in the Indo-Pacific, expressing serious concerns. The EU
presented its first strategy for the Indo-Pacific on 16 September 2021. (European
Parliament )
According to a US Defense Department report released in 2021, China has the biggest navy
in the world today, with 355 vessels. By 2025, the People's Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) is
expected to gradually increase its size to 420 ships, and in 2030 to 460 ships. The current 355
vessels include major surface combatants, submarines, aircraft carriers, ocean-going
amphibious ships, mine warfare ships and fleet auxiliaries. The US report also states that
China's submarines have the capacity to launch nuclear-armed missiles. In addition to its
naval capabilities, Beijing funds Chineseoperated maritime militias in the South China Sea to
support its territorial ambitions in the region. Some 120 militia vessels have been identified.
The Tanmen Maritime Militia, operating from the island of Hainan, is also considered the
model maritime militia. Maritime militia have proven to be extremely useful for Beijing, as
was seen in 2012, when China took control over Scarborough Shoal, in the Philippines'
exclusive economic zone. Experts argue that using civilian forces (militias) can be beneficial
to Beijing, as it allows for plausible deniability. China first signalled its interest in developing
capabilities to act in foreign waters in 2008, with its biannual defence white paper.
Subsequently, China expressed interest in developing the necessary capabilities to support its
interests overseas in 2013. With its 2015 defence white paper, China clarified its intentions.
Another notable development illustrating China's assertiveness is the 2017 establishment of a
naval logistics facility in Djibouti; Beijing justified the necessity for this facility by claiming
that it would carry out peacekeeping operations and would focus on the protection of
overseas citizens; however, it is worth noting that it also provides China with an increased
military presence in the Indian Ocean. (EU Parliament)
China factor:

a. Strategic encirclement of India

b. Naval ships disguised as smth
c. FoN in SCS
d. Hurdle is china is India’s largest trading partner
The indo-pacific is a vibrant playground for multiple state actors. Its borders are not limited
to the littoral states of Asia and the Americas but also has extratresstrial states like UK,
Denmark, France in the gambit. Thus India has to puruse a multilateral approach in the region
to obtain an effective and operational maritime policy.

Quad: competition brings a challenging environment to Indian foreign policy behavior, so as

to refrain from participating in an overt or covert security alignment against China in the
Indo-Pacific. [Inha]
 Most states are bandwagoning ie giving into chinese appeasements coz they cant
oppose them
 Hedging: middle position, sending mixed signals to the primary power to reduce a
security risk
 Look up: india japan vision statement on IP 2014
 Military exercises: JIMEX
 Improving relationa with Australia- Malabar, us coalition?
 Indonesia: Similar concerns, Sabang port.
 Alleviating relations to comprehensive strategic partnerships with most of IPR states
like Indonesia, Singapore,cc, building united front against China
 Overdoing the reassurance strategy: lingerning image of non alignment, alliance
building is not for containment- Modi
 China’s response through its “String of Pearls” policy and “two-ocean strategy”
shows its rapidly expanding presence in the countries stretching from Southeast Asia,
South Asia, the Indian Ocean, and beyond. Based on this policy, China’s active
engagements with the regional states drive to secure SLOCs and establish a conducive
environment for maximizing geopolitical outcomes[Inha]
 the Maritime Silk Road is a first order strategy that links China’s geoeconomic and
geopolitical outcomes. In 2017, China established its first maritime base in the Indian
Ocean in Djibouti Africa, whereas its initiatives for infrastructure and port
 developments in Hambantota in Sri Lanka, Pakistan’s Gwadar Port,Bangladesh’s
Chittagong, Myanmar’s Kyaukpyu, and the leasing of Maldives islands demonstrates
the substantial response from China to extend its maritime arrangements in the
oceanic sphere.

 China came up with two key policy priorities – port expansion and blue-water navy.
The port expansion is believed to extend China’s strategic assistance with the port-
holding countries to protect the maritime routes and keep maintaining the vast
network of transferring Chinese goods and services across the region, ultimately
intensifying China’s regional and global influence. Due to the fact that China emerged
as the world’s major energy consumer in 2011 and second-largest oil consumer, its
energy requirement grew up to 66 percent for coal, 20 percent for petroleum, 8
percent for hydroelectric resources, 5 percent for natural gas, 1 percent for
renewables, and 1 percent for nuclear energy.75 Owing to these vast requirements, the
Chinese government considers the security of maritime trade routes as extremely
requisite to protect economic growth. Meanwhile, 80 percent of oil imports travel via
the Indian Ocean and Malacca Strait before arriving in the South China Sea, and
hence Indo-Pacific routes possess pivotal implications for China as vital corridors for
sustaining China’s energy security needs. In this situation, Chinese policy prioritizes
robust protection by ensuring the presence of blue-water naval forces against any
imminent potential challenges. [Inha]
 Maritime Silk road :This strategic response has been momentous for China’s
geographical proximity, as pointed out by Australian scholar Rory Medcalf, as it
defines China’s Maritime Silk Road initiative as “Indo-Pacific with Chinese
characteristics.”78 In order to pursue broader foreign policy rationality, MSR is a
great source for the Chinese government for proximity to the Hainan Free Trade Zone
and Port (by 2025–35), which is considered to be utilized as an “Indo-Pacific
gateway.”
 Small island diplomacy:
 Building maritime security order
 display his clear priorities to intensify India’s greater policy directions by
establishing rapid connections with the Indian Ocean region’s surrounding states. His
state official visits promote India’s increasing commitments to its neighboring
countries. This demonstrates India’s dynamic foreign policy commitments to
including a larger number of states in the Indian Ocean region.
 shared financial growth, enhancing cooperative activities for responses to disasters,
and observing global maritime norms and standards. [Inha]
 The sustainable flow of the maritime economy is key to state foreign policy apparatus
on the geo-economics front. Due to rising security challenges, maritime states face
coastal threats without paying enough attention to building a robust maritime
economic strategy. To realize India’s Maritime position, it pays more attention to
marine developments and technological progress so that it can emerge as a powerful
naval state. Historically, it was observed that land-based geography had been the
principal source to carry out direct Indian oceanic proximity for enhancing India’s
extended interests and predominant collaboration on the maritime domain. In this
scenario, India is motivated to construct a more extensive maritime framework that
could bring central role for India’s economy to access global markets. In other words,
it seeks to invigorate economic agreements and fruitful political relationships among
 coastal states. As a result, the Indian government sees the greater role of the Indian
Navy as a crucial component of national power in the maritime domain, which drives
its huge motivation to safeguard India’s position from a land-power to a sea-power
state
 it is calculated that 95 percent of the trade volume and 68 percent of the capital trade
arrives in India via the Indian Ocean.49 According to the Indian Navy, this ocean is
pivotal due to the fact that 93 percent of its sea dependence relies on petroleum
exports.


 Seychelles
Moreover, for the coastal countries, Modi’s government provided huge capital
and finances for building defense mechanisms and supervised the opening of the
coastal surveillance radar system in Seychelles. This system was devised for the
advancement of landing fields positioned on Agaléga in Mauritius and
Assumption Island in Seychelles, which would increase India’s monitoring and
reconnaissance capabilities. In the meantime, India is also involved in building
coastguard fleets for Assumption Island and has also revised the India–
Seychelles agreement to confirm mutual and durable strategic interests between
the two countries.
 rapid interactions with extended littoral states, Modi has successfully emerged as a
massive contributor to humanitarian and disaster relief activities in the neighboring
states
 Indian Ocean is perceived as India’s ocean, which is highly imperative for two
reasons – economics and counterterrorism. Due to his substantial initiatives, Modi
highlights his crucial ambitions for India’s port infrastructure to enlarge the Indian
civilian maritime domain and above all enhance India’s employment and commercial
growth
 s. This would further assist Indian naval vessels and aircraft conduct joint scrutiny
patrols and hydrographic inspections of Mauritius, Seychelles, and the Maldives
exclusive economic zones (EEZs). Resultantly, Modi’s implicit communication as a
leading maritime state through these joint ventures symbolizes India’s advancing
 proximity and preparedness for building a maritime security order in the Indian Ocean
region

US Counterbalance:
 The Indian and American policies for the IPR differ on two points
a. The geographical extent of the IPR. America doesnt include the broader Indian
ocean.
b. Americal wants India to become confrontational on the Pacific front but
India’s priority lies in the Indian ocean, also is wary of irking China.
 To increase India’s maritime security, Modi came up with a specific baselined policy
framework to redefine the Indian Ocean region’s security concept. Through his
competitive-coexistence framework with the United States, Modi aims to construct
India’s strategic autonomy and build security order while simultaneously remaining
separate from any major power dictation
 reduce India’s dependence on the United States as a security architect in the Indian
Ocean region and extended areas

Conclusion:
  Indian Ocean region is considered highly important for safeguarding India’s strategic
backyard and fully making its long-term desire to be a maritime power a reality.
[Inha]
 a leading maritime power
 Indian Ocean is perceived as India’s ocean
Changing relative power distribution - J.Mearsheimer:

A llarge body of opinion in the West holds that international politics underwent a
fundamental transformation with the end of the Cold War. Cooperation, not security
competition and conflict, is now the defining feature of relations among the great powers. Not
surprisingly, the optimists who hold this view claim that realism no longer has much
explanatory power. It is old thinking and is largely irrelevant to the new realities of world
politics. Realists have gone the way of the dinosaurs; they just don't realize it. The best that
might be said about theories such as offensive realism is that they are helpful for
understanding how great powers interacted before 1 990, but they are useless now and for the
foreseeable future. Therefore, we need new theories to comprehend the world around us.

QUADs restructuring:

QUAD and the wider Indo-Pacifc geopolitics? Clearly, no one has a crystal ball to foretell
what will happen. However, the dictums of ofensive realism theory indicate that a spiral of
containment and countercontainment is most likely to dominate the geopolitics of the Indo-
Pacifc region in the years, if not decades, to come. When facing unbalanced multipolarity,
local powers and the distant hegemon will form a balancing coalition vis-à-vis the potential
hegemon, a defensive project that they consider necessary to improve their security. It is
likely that the potential hegemon will be fearful of being contained by this balancing
coalition, seeing it as an ofensive rather than defensive move. The potential hegemon will
then seek new ways to enhance its security, which in turn will create a new level of fear
among other powers, and so on (Mearsheimer 2014, pp. 345–346). In other words, once the
great powers are trapped in a security dilemma, a spiral of containment and counter-
containment will come to center stage. There are already substantial signs that the geopolitics
of the Indo-Pacifc region are now moving toward a spiral of containment and counter-
containment. For example, shortly after the conclusion of the QUAD leaders’ summit held on
March 12, 2021, China reacted quickly by issuing a joint statement with Russia, highlighting
their strategic partnership in countering the US-led interventions on March 23 and concluding
a 25-year strategic pact with Iran on oil supply and military cooperation on March 27. In
August 2021, there were reports that Iran would be admitted as a full member of the
Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), a security grouping led by China and Russia.10
On the other hand, a new Australia-United Kingdom-United States (AUKUS) trilateral
security partnership11 was announced on 15 September 2021 to operate as a fank of the
QUAD, with the QUAD remained the center of the new Biden administration’s recently
announced Indo-Pacifc Strategy.12 In the years to come, it is imperative to observe whether
the QUAD and the SCO will be developed into NATO-style/Warsaw-style, formal alliances,
evolving into two rival blocs competing with each other from the Indo-Pacifc oceans to the
Eurasian continent. (brian fong)
Until recently, India had the same issues with internal division, uncertainty and hedging as
other countries, exacerbated by the strong influence of foreign arms lobbies. That noticeably
changed following the June 2020 border conflict with China. Popular sentiment, already
febrile because of an extended lockdown due to COVID-19, turned strongly against China.85
As seen elsewhere, this amplified the influence of Indian policymakers, especially those in
the defence and strategic communities, who wanted to shift away from China. A series of
decisive actions 84 Naval Today (2019), ‘UK-Indian Navy Warships Meet Up for Exercise
Konkan in English Channel’, 16 August 2019, https://navaltoday.com/2019/08/16/uk-indian-
navy-warships-meet-up-for-exercise-konkan-inenglish-channel. 85 Gettleman, J. (2020),
‘Angers Surge in India Over Deadly Border Brawl with China’, New York Times, 18 June
2020, https://www.nytimes.com/2020/06/18/world/asia/india-china-border.html. Indo-Pacific
strategies, perceptions and partnerships The view from seven countries 29 Chatham House
took place, including banning Chinese apps on security grounds, restrictions on foreign direct
investment, restrictions on visas for certain Chinese people, and a shift to a more forceful
military strategy.86 Additionally, Indo-Pacific partnerships in defence and economics
became that much more important and urgent. This resulted in increased outreach from New
Delhi to Indo-Pacific partners, in particular Quad members.87 In some cases, it built on
already strengthening ties, for example, the June 2020 joint declaration with Australia that the
two countries were elevating their relationship to a comprehensive strategic partnership88
and India’s invitation to Australia to join it with Japan and the US for the Malabar military
exercises. In other cases, the initiatives were new and responding to changing circumstances,
such as the supply-chain resilience initiative with Japan and Australia.89 It has also resulted
in increased activity around the Quad, most visibly with the previously mentioned Quad
vaccine diplomacy initiative, and some Indian analysts have even suggested a Quad
headquarters be set up on India’s Andaman Island.90 There have been calls for an India–US
‘alliance’ – though not the sort of alliance ‘recognized by lawyers’ but the sort ‘recognized
by generals’.91 This took a leap forward when, in October 2020, India and the US signed the
last of the four foundational defence agreements required by Washington for deep defence
integration with New Delhi.92 India even reached out to the UK, most visibly with an
invitation to Prime Minister Boris Johnson to attend India’s 2021 Republic Day ceremonies
as chief guest.93 The tone in India has shifted substantially. However, existing lobbies still
have substantial influence over some policymakers. Overt hedging has diminished, however,
internal divisions, fuelled at times by outside backers, may still undermine India’s
unequivocal strategic realignment. (carnegie endowment in Rlisrt)
Solutions:

 Turning Indo-Pacific into a vibrant inclusice multistakeholder region

 Building it into a connectivity provider/transit hub for energy supplies
 Building Strategic Autonomy in the Indian Ocean Region - naval power
a. Geostrategic location
b. Allies and capability limitations.
 Strategists say that the most prominent traditional security risk in the IndoPacific
today is US–China strategic competition, which could have potential spillover
repercussions, starting from ground zero in India’s backyard and reaching to
shorelines of the western Pacific.This means it aims to contribute as a valued potential
balancer in the great game between China and the United States
 Responding to China’s two-ocean strategy, India’s extended neighborhood policy
promotes India’s vigorous engagements for geopolitical collaboration with its
neighboring and coastal states in the form of BISTMECH-Bay of Bengal for
Multisectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation and BBIN. This helps promote
Modi’s oceanic groundworks in its extended neighboring states.82 Additionally, the
Indian government approved “Mausam and Cotton Route” projects for vigorous
cooperation in the Indian Ocean’s surrounding states.83 Besides, as directed under the
Indian leadership, the Indian Ocean Rim Association also organized its first leaders’
summit in March 2017. It resulted in Jakarta Concord, a 5-year action plan to
revitalize Indian magnitude and presence in the Indian Ocean region
 Sagarmala: To compete with China’s Maritime Silk Road, India has been pursuing the
initiative known as Security and Growth for All in the Region (SAGAR). This
initiative aims to maximize India’s maritime diplomacy in the Indo-Pacific, with
equal emphasis on secure and upgraded ancient trade route connections. Through the
ports and hinterland developments, India aims to counter Chinese presence and
influence by eventually designing for improving its naval security and maritime
governance in the Indian Ocean region. However, it is perceived that its reluctance for
not joining China’s BRI and coming up with this substantial initiative articulates
India’s pragmatic response towards China. It is estimated that the Sagarmala
(meaning Oceanic Necklace) Program will cost an estimate of US$120bn by focusing
on numerous activities, including the setting up of innovative super ports in the
coastal states, the transformation of India’s existing port system, upgrading of 14
Coastal Employment Zones (CEZs) and Coastal Employment Units, as well as rail,
multi-modular coordination parks, pipeline and channel renovation. Moreover, as
authorized under the Ministry of Shipping, this program seeks out cutting-edge port-
driven apparatus through controlling and monitoring India’s 7,500-km long coastline,
14,500-km safe channels, and a significant area of India’s maritime domain. [ Inha]

BIBLIOGRAPHY
 https://knowledge.unasiapacific.org

VIVA GLOSSARY
 QUAd was formed in 2007 but rmeained moribund and revived in 2017
 BoP, BoT and BoI - theories of alliance building
 The Tragedy of the Great Power Politics- John Mearsheimer- maximize their own
security by maximizing their relative share of world power; becoming a regional
hegemon. Military and eco power- China gained this post the QUAD 1.O era ie post
2010s
 alliances with other states as “temporary marriages of convenience- Offensive realism
 US, which quickly endorsed it as the principal vehicle of its new strategy of “Free and
Open Indo-Pacifc” (FOIP) under the new National Security Strategy released in
December 2017
 Confluence of the two seas- Dara Shikoh in1655
  Quad started off in 2007, og in 2004 when tsunami hit, then expanded, moribund in
2007 as pro china leaders in japan and australia and MNS in India with anti US
nuclear deal, then in 2017 things picked up.

PENDING WORK:
 STATS
 GRAPHS


Redefined IP and put Indian interests on the forefront

Lost in the semantics of focusing on trade
a) lack of a larger strategic dynamic
b) Act east focuses a lot on economic aspects/trade, trade with countries other than
china not good, trade deficit with Japan
c) interests have evolved from simply being trade and connectivty to political, peace
and security
d) IP policy equivalent of china policy other factors being overlooked
e) To secure maritime periphery and the Indian Ocean backyard, India has been
closely monitoring Chinese naval activities and come up with the “Proposed Maritime
Strategy” as a durable policy response for the maritime domain.85 Simultaneously,
the Indian Navy’s MILAN sea exercise in 2018 played a notable role within the
neighboring littoral states to maximize sea preparedness.86 As Indian Scholar Prabir
De illustrated in his recent book, the Indian government has been accommodating its
“Act East” policies by aligning with the Indo-Pacific strategy, thus unfolding India’s
“Act East to Act Indo-Pacific” as a viable foundation to ensure the rebalanced
relations in its backyard.87 As part of balancing without provoking posture, India is
increasingly activating mutual collaboration with ASEAN states such as Singapore,
Vietnam, Myanmar, Malaysia, and Indonesia by invigorating joint training and
strategic collaborations
 Loopholes in the evaise reassurance:
Intro: Modi’s pragmatism :
 Doubling down on IP agn Asia Pacific
 Modi hunts for broad-based Indo-Pacific inclusivity in this broader geopolitical scope
while simultaneously refraining from making any security agreements that could
ultimately symbolize India as an antagonizer or potential balancer against China in the
Indo-Pacific region.[Inha]
 Modi has struggled to enlarge India’s diplomatic and closer collaboration with East
Asia. As a result, India provides a remarkable opportunity to internationalize the
Indian Ocean’s potential for multiple regional players

a. No containment statements
b. Joining china led alliances, SCO, AIB,BRICS
c. Showing goodwill to china- cancelled Asian Security Con of DefMin
d. Persistent dialogues
e. Reluctant at unnecessarliy antagonisig China
f. Reduces credibility with willing partners
g. Ungoverned IPR
h. Security diadv
i. China not convinced eitherways- CPEC + opp to NSG+ calls Quad
exclusionary.

since independence in 1947, participants said that India’s security focus has been
largely land-based. As a result, the Indian Navy, which is the leader on Indo-Pacific
defence, is under-resourced in comparison to the army and air force. Another
constraint observed was that ‘India is too slow’. Even for modest policies related to
shipping, for example, decisions need to go through the MEA and then be vetted by
national security, before going to the Ministry of Shipping. Participants said that all of
the issues that complicated India’s relations with international partners also frustrated
India’s internal strategic community. This included an understaffed MEA, a
sometimes sclerotic if not outright obstructionist bureaucracy, and a vast array of
vested interests both internal and external. In spite of this, participants said, there was
substantial activity on the ‘Indo-Pacific file’, with plans for even more. These
activities included: improving maritime domain awareness, including in partnership
with the US, Japan and France; using the Indian Navy to develop interoperability
through a wide range of joint exercises (including with the US, Japan, Australia,
Myanmar, Vietnam, Indonesia, Singapore, Thailand and a range of multinational
exercises); creating regional partnerships through port access and/or logistics
agreements (including with the US, Oman, Singapore, South Korea and Indonesia);
the successful completion of Tiger Triumph, the first India–US air, sea, land exercise;
capacity-building with countries in the region (including defence lines of credit for
Vietnam, Seychelles, Mauritius and Bangladesh, as well as building naval capabilities
with Seychelles, Sri Lanka, Myanmar and Mauritius); and fulfilling the role of net
security provider, including with regional humanitarian

Extras:
Redefined IP and put Indian interests on the forefront
Lost in the semantics of focusing on trade
a) lack of a larger strategic dynamic
b) Act east focuses a lot on economic aspects/trade, trade with countries other than
china not good, trade deficit with Japan
c) interests have evolved from simply being trade and connectivty to political, peace
and security
d) IP policy equivalent of china policy other factors being overlooked
e) To secure maritime periphery and the Indian Ocean backyard, India has been
closely monitoring Chinese naval activities and come up with the “Proposed Maritime
Strategy” as a durable policy response for the maritime domain.85 Simultaneously,
the Indian Navy’s MILAN sea exercise in 2018 played a notable role within the
neighboring littoral states to maximize sea preparedness.86 As Indian Scholar Prabir
 De illustrated in his recent book, the Indian government has been accommodating its
“Act East” policies by aligning with the Indo-Pacific strategy, thus unfolding India’s
“Act East to Act Indo-Pacific” as a viable foundation to ensure the rebalanced
relations in its backyard.87 As part of balancing without provoking posture, India is
increasingly activating mutual collaboration with ASEAN states such as Singapore,
Vietnam, Myanmar, Malaysia, and Indonesia by invigorating joint training and
strategic collaborations

Loopholes in the evaise reassurance:

Intro: Modi’s pragmatism :
 Doubling down on IP agn Asia Pacific
 Modi hunts for broad-based Indo-Pacific inclusivity in this broader geopolitical scope
while simultaneously refraining from making any security agreements that could
ultimately symbolize India as an antagonizer or potential balancer against China in the
Indo-Pacific region.[Inha]
 Modi has struggled to enlarge India’s diplomatic and closer collaboration with East
Asia. As a result, India provides a remarkable opportunity to internationalize the
Indian Ocean’s potential for multiple regional players

j. No containment statements
j. Joining china led alliances, SCO, AIB,BRICS
j. Showing goodwill to china- cancelled Asian Security Con of DefMin
 j. Persistent dialogues
j. Reluctant at unnecessarliy antagonisig China
j. Reduces credibility with willing partners
j. Ungoverned IPR
j. Security diadv
j. China not convinced eitherways- CPEC + opp to NSG+ calls Quad
exclusionary.

since independence in 1947, participants said that India’s security focus has been
largely land-based. As a result, the Indian Navy, which is the leader on Indo-Pacific
defence, is under-resourced in comparison to the army and air force. Another
constraint observed was that ‘India is too slow’. Even for modest policies related to
shipping, for example, decisions need to go through the MEA and then be vetted by
national security, before going to the Ministry of Shipping. Participants said that all of
the issues that complicated India’s relations with international partners also frustrated
India’s internal strategic community. This included an understaffed MEA, a
sometimes sclerotic if not outright obstructionist bureaucracy, and a vast array of
vested interests both internal and external. In spite of this, participants said, there was
substantial activity on the ‘Indo-Pacific file’, with plans for even more. These
activities included: improving maritime domain awareness, including in partnership
with the US, Japan and France; using the Indian Navy to develop interoperability
through a wide range of joint exercises (including with the US, Japan, Australia,
Myanmar, Vietnam, Indonesia, Singapore, Thailand and a range of multinational
exercises); creating regional partnerships through port access and/or logistics
agreements (including with the US, Oman, Singapore, South Korea and Indonesia);
the successful completion of Tiger Triumph, the first India–US air, sea, land exercise;
capacity-building with countries in the region (including defence lines of credit for
Vietnam, Seychelles, Mauritius and Bangladesh, as well as building naval capabilities
with Seychelles, Sri Lanka, Myanmar and Mauritius); and fulfilling the role of net
security provider, including with regional humanitarian