G.R. No. 224026.

February 03, 2020 ]

DELIA B. BORRETA AS WIDOW OF DECEASED MANUEL A.

BORRETA, JR., PETITIONER, VS. EVIC HUMAN RESOURCE
MANAGEMENT, INC., ATHENIAN SHIP MANAGEMENT INC.,
AND/OR MA. VICTORIA C. NICOLAS, RESPONDENTS.

DECISION
REYES, J. JR., J.:

The Facts and The Case

Before this Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari[1] seeking to annul and set aside
the October 13, 2015 Decision[2] and the April 12, 2016 Resolution[3] of the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 139455 which modified the February 2, 2015
Decision[4] of the Panel of Voluntary Arbitrators (Panel) of the National Conciliation and
Mediation Board (NCMB) in VA Case No. AC-73-RCMB-NCR-MVA-094-03-09-2014
by affirming only the $89,100.00 death benefit, and P162,080.00 transportation and
burial expenses awarded to petitioner Delia B. Borreta, the widow of Manuel A. Borreta,
Jr. (Manuel), and deleting the awards for insurance proceeds, uncollected salary,
overtime pay, unpaid leave credits, unpaid daily subsistence allowance, owner's bonus,
moral damages, exemplary damages and attorney's fee.

On June 19, 2013, Manuel was employed by respondent Evic Human Resource
Management, Inc. (Evic), for and in behalf of its foreign principal, respondent Athenian
Ship Management, Inc. (Athenian), as cook on board M/V Sea Lord. Respondent Ma.
Victoria C. Nicolas is the president of Evic. [5] The terms and conditions of his
employment are as follows:

1. That the seafarer shall be employed on board under the following terms and
conditions:

1.1 Duration of Contract: 7 MONTHS + 1 MONTH UPON MUTUAL

CONSENT OF BOTH PARTIES

1.2 Position: Cook

1.3 Basic Monthly Salary: ALL FIGURES IN USDOLLARS: 746.00

1.4 Hours of Work: HRS/WEEK 40.

1.5 Overtime: /FIXED G.O.T: 554.00 (103 HRS)/OWNER BONUS:

100.00

1.6 Vacation Leave with Pay: /SUB. ALLOW.: 126.00/LV. WAGES:174

1.7 Point of Hire: MANILA PHILIPPINES

1.8 Collective Bargaining Agreement, if any:[6]

On June 25, 2013, Manuel joined the vessel M/V Sealord and commenced his duties.[7]

On October 8, 2013, while M/V Sea Lord was cruising along the waters of Brazil towards
Dammam, Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, Manuel was found lifeless inside the toilet of the
vessel's hospital cabin. Because of this tragic incident, the vessel changed course and set
sail to Galle, Sri Lanka instead, where Manuel's remains were unloaded.[8]

On October 18, 2013, Senior Counsel Murshid Maharoof (Maharoof) and Junior Counsel
Shamir Zavahir (Zavahir) conducted an investigation on the death of Manual. In the
Investigation Report on the Death of Manuel Augastine Borreta, Jr. [9] (Investigation
Report) they prepared, the investigators stated that the statements of the master, chief
officer, crew members, logged in the vessel log book as well as the details on the medical
assistance record showed that Manuel had not been acting like his usual self. On October
7, 2013, he failed to report for work and locked himself in the vessel's gymnasium and
then later shut himself inside the hospital. When they tried to communicate with him,
Manuel sounded distraught, talked non-sense and fearful that someone was going to kill
him. They could only talk to him through the ship's phone. Manuel was offered food the
following day but he refused to partake of the same. When Manuel stopped
communicating with them, the crew decided to force open the door to the hospital room
but found it unlocked and empty. The crew eventually found Manuel inside the vessel's
hospital lavatory, with a nylon cord tied around his neck and hanging on a hook, dead.
These facts notwithstanding, the investigators failed to identify the cause of Manuel's
death. As such, the Death Certificate that was issued indicated the cause of death as
"Under investigations."[10]

On October 23, 2013, the remains of Manuel was repatriated to the Philippines. [11] Upon
the request of the sister of the deceased, Dr. Roberto Rey C. San Diego, M.D., Medico-
Legal Officer of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI), autopsied the remains of
Manuel on October 24, 2013.[12] In Autopsy Report No. N-13-1056 that was subsequently
issued, the NBI stated that the cause of death was "CONSISTENT WITH ASPHYXIA
BY LIGATURE."[13]

On December 7, 2013, Dr. Rohan Ruwanpura (Dr. Ruwanpura), Consultant Judicial

Medical Officer at Galle, Sri Lanka issued a post-mortem report on the post-mortem
examination he conducted on Manuel on October 19, 2013,[14] with the following
observations:

A ligature prepared from white twisted nylon rope was present around the
upper neck. It was tied around the neck with a sliding knot [running noose]
positioned over the left mastoid region of back of the head.

Removal of the ligature revealed a parchment like abraded mark, mostly

regular in shape and about 0.5 cm in width. The mark was deeper and mostly
horizontal on right side of the neck, then taking upwards course on front and
back aspect of upper part of the neck to form united inverted "V" mark over
left mastoid region, in relation to position of the knot.[15]

From the foregoing, Dr. Ruwanpura remarked that "the circumstantial data and [his]
autopsy findings are in keeping with self suspension." Thus, pronounced the cause of
death to be asphyxia due to hanging.[16]

Subsequently, petitioner filed her claim for benefits arising from the death of Manuel, but
the respondents refused to grant her any. Respondents averred that Manuel's death was
not compensable because he took his own life.[17] This prompted petitioner to file a Notice
to Arbitrate[18] on August 7, 2014, before the NCMB of the Department of Labor and
Employment (DOLE) demanding for payment of the following:

1. Compensation for Loss of Life pursuant to the applicable CBA in the amount of
US$89,100.00:

2. Death Benefit in the amount of US$50,000.00 and Burial Expenses in the amount
of US$1,000.00 pursuant to the Standard Terms and Conditions Governing the
Employment of Filipino Seafarers On-Board Ocean-Going Vessels:

3. Mandatory Insurance Benefit of at least US$10,000.00 pursuant to R.A. 10022:

4. Moral damages in the amount of [PhP] 2,500,000.00;

5. Exemplary damages in the amount of [PhP] 2,500,000.00;

6. Attorney's fees equivalent to ten (10) per cent of the total monetary award.[19]

In asking for compensation for loss of life, petitioner averred that under Article 25 of the
Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) which covers Manuel's employment contract,
respondents unconditionally bound themselves to pay the same in the event of death of a
seafarer through any cause while employed by them. The Philippine Overseas
Employment Administration's (POEA's) Standard Terms and Conditions Governing the
Employment of Filipino Seafarers On-Board Ocean-Going Vessels, furthermore entitled
her to death and burial benefits. Her claim for insurance benefits was likewise supported
by Republic Act (R.A.) No. 10022.[20] The wanton and oppressive manner by which
respondents refused to accord to her the benefits due her made respondents liable for
moral and exemplary damages, as well as attorney's fees.[21]

Respondents, for their part, insisted that they were not liable to pay compensation with
respect to the death of Manuel since the POEA's Standard Employment Contract (POEA-
SEC), as well as the CBA specifically exclude from the payment of benefits for death that
are directly attributable to the seafarer. As proof that Manuel committed suicide,
respondents presented the following pieces of evidence: (a) Investigation Report on the
death of Manuel conducted by Maharoof and Zavahir on October 18, 2013, on board M/V
Sea Lord which included the individual statements of Manuel's co-workers regarding his
death;[22] (b) photocopy of pictures taken of the room where Manuel hanged himself and
the retrieval of his body from where he was suspended; [23] (c) Cause of Death Form
stating the cause of Manuel's death was under investigation; [24] and (d) Post-Mortem
Report issued by Dr. Ruwanpura stating Manuel's cause of death as asphyxia due to
hanging.[25] Inasmuch as Manuel committed suicide, petitioner, clearly, is not entitled to
any benefits arising therefrom. Even if death by suicide was ruled out, respondents
argued that no benefits can still be granted to the petitioner because she failed to present
proof that Manuel's death during his employment was due to any work-related cause as
required under the POEA-SEC or the CBA.[26]

Moreover, respondents posited that the petitioner cannot claim insurance benefits under
R.A. No. 10022 because only death through natural and accidental causes are covered by
the said law. Since suicide is neither natural nor accidental, the same is not compensable
under R.A. No. 10022.[27] Since respondents are justified in denying petitioner's claims,
there is also no cogent reason to award moral damages, exemplary damages and
attorney's fees in her favor.[28]

On February 2, 2015, the Panel rendered a Decision [29] in favor of the petitioner. The
individual accounts of Manuel's co-workers of his bizarre attitude failed to convince the
Panel that Manuel took his own life. It also found unworthy of belief the reports of the
various investigators given that the same were prepared 10 days after Manuel's death. The
Panel likewise made much of the NBI Autopsy Report which made no mention of the
word "hanging" or "suicide," but only concluded the cause of death as "consistent with
asphyxia by ligature." Thus, the Panel ruled that petitioner's narration of her warm and
happy telephone conversations with Manuel where the latter shared his dreams for her
and his siblings contradicted respondents' claim of suicide. [30] Since there is no substantial
evidence to warrant a finding of suicide, the Panel held that petitioner was entitled to
death benefits under the CBA.[31] Even assuming that it had been duly proved that Manuel
took his own life, petitioner would still be entitled to death benefits considering that
Manuel died while in respondents' employ and because the CBA makes them liable
therefor, regardless of the cause of death. In addition to death benefits, Section 25.1 of
the CBA makes respondents' liable to the petitioner for transportation and burial
expenses.[32] As for the insurance benefits, the Panel held that petitioner must be granted
the same since suicide had not been established. [33] The Panel also awarded to the
petitioner uncollected salaries due to Manuel given that the respondents' did not deny the
same. It also found that substantial evidence had been presented showing Manuel's
entitlement to guaranteed overtime pay, unpaid leave pay, unpaid daily allowance and
owner's bonus. Hence, awarded the same to the petitioner. [34] The Panel disposed in this
wise:

WHEREFORE, all the foregoing premises being duly considered, in the light
of the facts as borne by the evidence on record, as well as based on the law
and jurisprudence, [judgment] is hereby rendered as follows:

First, Death Benefits are hereby granted in the Philippine currency equivalent
to US $89,100.00 in accordance with the CBA covering the late [Manuel] A.
[Borreta], Jr.

Second, the proceeds of the AWWA RA 10022-mandated insurance in the

Philippine currency equivalent of US $15,000.00

Third, the following are likewise awarded:

1. US $670.03 representing Borreta Jr. s uncollected salary: (if there is

proof by original receipt of payment, this should be deleted)

2. Reimbursement of the [total] burial and transport expenses in the

amount of [P]162,080.00

3. [Guaranteed] overtime pay for four (4) months in the amount of US

$3,730.00

4. Unpaid leave credit/pay in the amount of US $696.00

5. Unpaid duly subsistence allowance US $504.00

6. Owner's Bonus in the amount of US $400.00

All awards in dollars shall be delivered in Philippine Currency equivalent at

current rate of exchange at the time [this] decision is promulgated.
Fourth, Moral damages in the amount of [PhP] 1.5 Million are also awarded
in their Philippine currency equivalent.

Fifth, Exemplary damages in the amount of [PhP] 1.5 Million are likewise
granted in [their] Philippine currency equivalent.

Sixth[,] Attorney's fees in the amount of 10% of all the monetary awards, as
follows:

a. Peso Award:

i. Award: [PhP] 3,162,080.00

ii. Attorney's fees [PhP] 316,208.00

b. U.S. Dollar Awards:

i . Total Awards: $ 109,4030

ii. Attorney's fees: $ 10,943

Seventh, [r]espondents are directed to pay interest from the death of M.A.
Borreta Jr., on 08 Oct 2013 up to finality of this DECISION, and 12% interest
from finality of this DECISION up to [the] full satisfaction of judgment.

Eight[,] all the respondents are jointly and severally liable to satisfy the
judgment, in accordance with law.

Parties are hereby reminded that in their SUBMISSION AGREEMENT dated

18 September 2014, they have obligated themselves, "inter alia", "TO ABIDE
BY AND COMPLY WITH THE DECISION OF THE ARBITRATORS ON
THE ISSUES AND CONSIDER SAID DECISION AS FINAL AND
BINDING UPON THE PARTIES HEREIN."

The spirit of the law governing voluntary arbitration is to effect a voluntary

implementation of the decision rendered by the arbitrators, who, after all,
were selected by the parties themselves. This is precisely what makes
voluntary arbitration different from compulsory arbitration. Let then the
parties herein remain faithful to that intent.

Let the parties be true to their commitment. And let the difference of this
mode of dispute settlement be upheld as distinguished from the other modes,
in the higher interest of substantive justice, as enshrined in the Philippine
Constitution.

SO ORDERED.[35]
Respondents moved for reconsideration but the Panel denied it in a Resolution [36] dated
January 23, 2015.[37] Aside from denying the motion for lack of merit, the Panel also ruled
that the same was filed out of time. Considering that respondents received the February 2,
2015 Decision on February 5, 2015, the motion should have been filed on February 15,
2015, the last day for the filing of the same even if the 10 th day fell on a Sunday. Since
respondents filed their motion for reconsideration the following day, the filing thereof
was already a day late, rendering the Panel's assailed Decision final and executory.

On April 23, 2015, petitioner moved for the resolution of her motion for execution of the
Decision of the Panel.[38]

On March 3, 2015, respondents filed a Manifestation with Opposition to Complainant's

Motion for Execution (Manifestation with Opposition).[39] Records disclosed that the
Panel had not acted on the same.

Aggrieved, respondents filed on March 12, 2015 a Petition for Review (with Urgent
Prayer for the Issuance of Temporary Restraining Order and/or Writ of Preliminary
Injunction) before the CA.[40]

Subsequently, or sometime in May 2015, respondents filed with the Panel a pleading
entitled Reiterative Motion to Set Case for Clarificatory Conference (Reiterative Motion).
[41]

On appeal, the CA recognized the suppletory application of the Rules of Court and
prevailing jurisprudence in the computation of periods in the filing of pleadings in court.
Since the last day of the 10-day period to appeal fell on a Sunday, the CA held that the
respondents timely filed their motion for reconsideration the next working day, or on
February 16, 2015. It also held that respondents did not engage in forum shopping when
they filed their Manifestation with Opposition as the same was just a response to
petitioner's motion for execution, and not a second motion for reconsideration. In the
same vein, respondents' Reiterative Motion only addressed petitioner's motion to resolve
her motion for execution.

Contrary to the ruling of the Panel, the CA found that respondents have successfully
proved by substantial evidence that Manuel killed himself on October 8, 2013. Such
notwithstanding, respondents remain liable under the parties' CBA tor death benefits,
particularly Section 25.1 thereof. Since the same provision provides that the employer
will shoulder the costs for the transportation and burial of Manuel's body in the
Philippines, the CA ordered the respondents to, reimburse petitioner the transportation
and burial expenses she incurred.

As for the other awards, the CA held that petitioner was not entitled to the same. It held
that life insurance may only be awarded in case of accidental death. Since death by
suicide cannot in any way be ruled as accidental, petitioner was not entitled to claim the
life insurance benefit under R.A. No. 10022. The CA deleted the awards for unpaid
salary, guaranteed overtime pay, leave pay, daily allowance/subsistence allowance and
owner's bonus in light of the evidence presented by the respondents that the same had
already been paid to, and received by the petitioner.[42]

The CA also ruled that petitioner was not entitled to moral and exemplary damages, and
attorney's fees, and thus deleted the same.[43] The CA disposed in this wise:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the APPEAL is PARTLY

GRANTED. The assailed Decision dated 2 February 2015 is hereby
MODIFIED, to the extent that the awards for insurance proceeds, amounting
to US$15,000[,] uncollected salary amounting to US$670.03, overtime pay
amounting to US$3730.00, unpaid leave credits/pay in the amount of
US$696.00, unpaid daily subsistence allowance in the amount for US$504.00,
[owners' bonus in the amount of] US$400.00 are all DELETED.

The awards for moral and exemplary damages and attorney's fees, for lack of
factual and legal basis, are likewise DELETED.

[Respondents] REMAIN LIABLE to pay US$89,100.00 for death benefits

and [PhP] 162,080.00 for transportation and burial expenses as provided by
their CBA with their seafarers. As ruled above, these are subject to an interest
of 6% per annum reckoned from the date of filing of the Notice to Arbitrate
on 7 August 2014 until the finality of this Decision. Thereafter, the interest of
6% per annum shall be imposed on these amounts until fully paid.

SO ORDERED.[44]

Aggrieved, the petitioner moved for reconsideration, but the CA denied it in a

Resolution[45] dated April 12, 2016.

Not accepting defeat, petitioner is now before the Court via the present petition.

The Issues Presented

Petitioner raises the following issues for the Court's consideration:

I.

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED UNDER

THE CONSTITUTION, THE LAW AND ESTABLISHED
JURISPRUDENCE WHEN IT DID NOT DISMISS THE PETITION FOR
REVIEW FILED BEFORE IT BY HEREIN RESPONDENTS FOR LACK
OF APPEL[L]ATE JURISDICTION OVER THE SAME.
 II.

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED UNDER

THE RULES AND PREVAILING JURISPRUDENCE WHEN IT DID NOT
ALSO DISMISS THE PETITION FOR REVIEW FILED BEFORE IT BY
HEREIN RESPONDENTS FOR THEIR WILLFUL AND DELIBERATE
ACTS OF FORUM SHOPPING.

III.

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED UNDER

THE LAW AND THE RULES WHEN IT DID NOT DISMISS
RESPONDENTS' PETITION FOR REVIEW ON THE ADDITIONAL
GROUND THAT RESPONDENTS MOTION FOR THE
RECONSIDERATION OF THE VA PANEL'S DECISION OF 02
FEBRUARY 2015 WAS NOT DULY FILED.

IV.

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED UNDER

THE RULES AND COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION
WHEN IT DISREGARDED THE WELL-ENTRENCHED RULE THAT
FACTUAL FINDINGS OF QUASI-JUDICIAL BODIES ARE ACCORDED
NOT ONLY GREAT RESPECT BUT EVEN FINALITY.

A. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY

ERRED AND COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF
DISCRETION WHEN IT REVERSED THE FINDING OF
THE VA PANEL A QUO THAT NO ADEQUATE
EVIDENCE EXITS THAT SEAFARER BORRETA, JR.
COMMITTED SUICIDE.

B. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY

ERRED UNDER THE LAW AND COMMITTED GRAVE
ABUSE OF DISCRETION WHEN IT REVERSED THE
FINDING OF THE VA PANEL A QUO HOLDING
RESPONDENTS LIABLE TO PAY INSURANCE
BENEFIT[S] UNDER R.A. 10022.
C. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY
ERRED AND COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF
DISCRETION WHEN IT REVERSED THE RULING OF
THE VA PANEL A QUO HOLDING RESPONDENTS
LIABLE FOR CBA MANDATED OVERTIME PAY,
LEAVE PAY, SUBSISTENCE ALLOWANCE AND
OWNER’S BONUS.

D THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY

. ERRED UNDER THE LAW AND JURISPRUDENCE
AND COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION
WHEN IT REVERSED THE VA PANEL’S AWARD OF
MORAL AND EXEMPLARY DAMAGES AND
ATTORNEY’S FEES.[46]

The Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner contends that the CA should not have entertained the appeal for being filed out
of time. She points out that since respondents have only 10 days from receipt on February
26, 2015 of the Panel's January 23, 2015 Resolution, they should have filed their appeal
on March 8, 2015. The 15-day period to appeal under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court is not
applicable to voluntary arbitration cases under the Labor Code. Since respondents' appeal
was filed only on March 12, 2015, the same was filed four days late, rendering the
assailed Decision and Resolution of the Panel final and executory; hence, not appealable.
Perforce, the CA should have dismissed the appeal outright.[47]

Moreover, the appeal should have been dismissed at once for respondents' failure to move
for the reconsideration of the Panel's Decision. Petitioner explains that respondents
motion for reconsideration before the Panel had not been duly filed inasmuch as their
motion was not filed within 10 days from their receipt of the Panel's Decision, and the
same was not filed directly with the Panel. It is of no moment that the 10 th day within
which respondents have to file their motion falls on a Sunday. The rule which states that
when the last day to file a pleading falls on a Saturday, Sunday or Holiday, the same may
be filed on the next business day finds no application in this case considering that the
Voluntary Arbitrators that comprised the Panel were private individuals, and there is no
law or rule that prohibits them from holding office on a Saturday, Sunday or holiday.
Since respondents' motion for reconsideration was not filed in accordance with the
mandatory law and rules governing voluntary arbitration proceedings, the CA should
have dismissed their appeal straightway.[48]
Petitioner disagrees with the CA that respondents did not engage in forum shopping.
Contrary to the view of the CA, the Manifestation with Opposition was not filed to
oppose the motion for execution she filed, but was in reality a second motion for
reconsideration as it sought the reversal and setting aside of the Panel's Decision despite
the denial of respondents' earlier motion for reconsideration. Without waiting for the
resolution of the said Manifestation with Opposition, respondents filed with the CA their
appeal, which also sought for the reversal and setting aside of the very same February 2,
2015 Decision of the Panel. Their contumacious acts, however, did not end there. After
filing their appeal with the CA and failing to obtain the Temporary Restraining Order
(TRO) or injunctive writ they prayed for, they filed their Reiterative Motion before the
Panel, which in substance was just another second motion for reconsideration.
Respondents did not inform the CA about it and even lied in their Compliance [49] when
they stated that, " to the best of their knowledge, NO other cases and/or proceedings
involving the same parties and issues are pending before the Honorable Court or other
courts." All the actions actively and simultaneously pursued by the respondents before
the Panel and the CA involved the same and related issues and are all aimed at obtaining
the same relief — the reversal of the Decision of the Panel in two fora. Such is clearly a
case of forum shopping warranting the outright dismissal of respondents' appeal before
the CA.[50]

On the merits, petitioner asseverates that the factual findings of the Panel should have
been respected by the CA because the same were in accord with the law and evidence on
record. She staunchly maintains that there was nothing on record which showed that
Manuel committed suicide. Like the Panel, petitioner avers that the statements of the
crew members about the actuations of Manuel do not lead to a logical conclusion that he
took his own life for being hazy, equivocal, and non-committal. The reports
(Investigation Report;[51] Master's Report[52]) relative to the said incident were also not
worthy of belief because they lack spontaneity as they were prepared 10 days after the
incident. Even the Cause of Death Form issued by the Sri Lankan authorities failed to
conclude Manuel's death as suicide, as in fact it only stated the cause thereof to be under
investigation. The subsequent December 7, 2013 Post-Mortem Report released by Dr.
Ruwanpura finding the cause of death as "asphyxia due to hanging" was also suspected
for being issued some two months after the incident. It could not even be verified whether
the said Post-Mortem Report had been properly translated. The statements of the crew
members, Investigative Report, Master's Report and the December 7, 2013 Post-Mortem
Report actually lacked probative value for being mere photocopies. No police
investigation report conducted by the harbor authorities of Galle, Sri Lanka was
presented. The NBI Autopsy Report made no mention of the words "hanging" or
"suicide," but merely labelled the cause of Manuel's death as "consistent with asphyxia by
ligature." The findings that Manuel did not sustain any injuries are not supported by the
evidence on record as the NBI Autopsy Report [53] showed otherwise. In fact, said findings
appear to be more consistent with strangulation, a clear indication of foul play. Viz.:
 EXTERNAL INJURIES:

Head and Neck: Ligature mark, antero-lateral aspect, contused and abraded,
48.0 cm. long. The right extremity is directed involving upwards and
backwards, towards the right auricural area and ending at a point 15.0 cm.
behind and 4.0 cm. below the right external auditory meatus. Widest area of
1.0 cm. and narrowest at 0.4 cm.

Upper Extremities:

Contusion :
1.) 5.0 x 1.0 cm., dorsal aspect on the lateral side of the right thumb and index
finger.

xxxx

Lower Extremities:

Contusion:
1.) 10.0 x 5.0 cm., antero-medial aspect on the middle 3rd of the right leg.

Since respondents fail to prove their claim of suicide, they are liable not only for death
benefits, transportation expenses and burial expenses, but they must also pay the
insurance benefits pursuant to R.A. No. 10022. Anent her claims for other monetary
benefits, petitioner maintains that respondents must be made to pay the CBA mandated
guaranteed overtime pay, leave pay, daily allowance/subsistence allowance and owner's
bonus for their failure to present competent and credible evidence showing payment of
the same to Manuel. She claims that the US$670.03 paid to Manuel only covers the
period from October 1, 2013 to October 8, 2013, leaving the mandated benefits of
Manuel from June 2013, the start of his employment, up to the whole month of
September 2013, unpaid. While the respondents presented documents showing payment
of Manuel's wages for the months prior to October 2013, the same did not reflect that the
same were in fact payments for Manuel's guaranteed overtime pay, leave pay, daily
allowance/subsistence allowance and owner's bonus for June 2013, until the end of
September 2013.

Petitioner insists that respondents' bad faith had been duly established by the following
circumstances - (a) concealment and refusal to furnish the petitioner with a copy of the
CBA in order to mislead Manuel and his widow, petitioner herein, into thinking that no
CBA applied to the former; (b) suppression of Police Investigation Report which could
have shown that Manuel had been killed; (c) failure to procure the mandatory life
insurance policy for Manuel and refusal to pay the life insurance benefit thereunder; (d)
refusal to provide any form of assistance to Manuel's next of kin when his remains were
repatriated; (e) withholding of Manuel's last earned salary unless a quitclaim is signed by
the petitioner freeing respondents from liability arising out of her husband's death; (f)
eventual release of the said last earned salary only after five long months from the death
of Manuel; (g) berating petitioner for seeking the Government's help in the repatriation of
Manuel; and (h) the sudden decision to bring Manuel's remains to Galle, Sri Lanka
despite the fact that the ship's destination is Dammam, Kingdom of Saudi Arabia - all
justify the award in her favor of moral and exemplary damages. Furthermore, their
unjustified refusal to grant her legitimate claims compelled her to litigate, therefore,
entitles her to attorney's fees.

Respondents, for their part, averred that the petitioner should stop her insatiable quest for
financial gain as the CA only removed the highly questionable benefits she had been
awarded by the Panel but retained the US$89,100.00 death benefits and P162,080.00
transportation and burial expenses awarded in her favor, and which amounts they no
longer contest.[54]

Contrary to petitioner's supposition on forum shopping, respondents contend that their

recourse had been valid and legally justifiable. There is nothing in their Manifestation
with Opposition that would even suggest that the same was a second motion for
reconsideration. Respondents explain that their "Manifestation" merely expressed their
displeasure with the violation of their right to due process, while their "Opposition"
conveyed their disapproval to petitioner's motion for the execution of the assailed
Decision rendered by the Panel. It is inconsequential that respondents also pray for the
reversal of the decision of the Panel in the said pleading. It must be taken into account
that the petitioner moved for the execution of the Panel's Decision on the very same day
the Panel denied respondents' Motion for Reconsideration with Urgent Motion for
Clarificatory Conference.[55] It is precisely for that reason why they filed a
"Manifestation" with an "Opposition." Respondents add that it is very unlikely that
conflicting decisions will arise given that what was pending before the NCMB is
petitioner's motion for execution and not any of respondents' motion.[56]

Respondents assert that they timely moved for the reconsideration of the Panel's
Decision. Contrary to the contention of the petitioner, the Panel is bound by the
provisions of the Civil Code and the Rules of Court pertaining to the computation of the
period within which an act must be performed. Following Section 1, Rule 22 of the Rules
of Court, their motion was timely filed the next working day, since the last day of the
filing of the same falls on a Sunday. There is also no rhyme or reason for petitioner's
insistence that the motion must be filed directly with any Panel member inasmuch as all
proceedings were conducted through the facilities of the NCMB. They likewise maintain
that Philippine Electric Corporation v. Court of Appeals [57] which provides for a 10-day
period to appeal before the CA from receipt of the Decision of the Panel that was cited by
the petitioner does not apply in this case in light of the pronouncement of the Supreme
Court En Banc in a number of cases declaring the appeal period to be 15 days.[58]

While respondents claim that petitioner is not entitled to death benefits, transportation
and burial expenses, they asseverate that the benefits awarded by the CA to the petitioner
should no longer be disturbed as the same represent the most judicious and fair
interpretation of the law and contracts under the circumstances.[59]

The Ruling of the Court

Respondents' appeal before the

CA had been duly filed pursuant
to Rule 43 of the Rules of Court

Petitioner avers that since respondents filed their appeal with the CA 14 days from their
receipt of a copy of the Decision of the Panel, the same was filed out of time considering
that pursuant to Article 276 of the Labor Code, the appeal must be brought within 10
days. Article 276, formerly Article 262-A, of the Labor Code provides:

ART. 276. Procedures. The Voluntary Arbitrator or panel of Voluntary

Arbitrators shall have the power to hold hearings, receive evidences and take
whatever action is necessary to resolve the issue or issues subject of the
dispute, including efforts to effect a voluntary settlement between parties.

All parties to the dispute shall be entitled to attend the arbitration proceedings.
The attendance of any third party or the exclusion of any witness from the
proceedings shall be determined by the Voluntary Arbitrator or panel of
Voluntary Arbitrators. Hearings may be adjourned for cause or upon
agreement by the parties.

Unless the parties agree otherwise, it shall be mandatory for the Voluntary
Arbitrator or panel of Voluntary Arbitrators to render an award or decision
within twenty (20) calendar days from the date of submission of the dispute to
voluntary arbitration.

The award or decision of the Voluntary Arbitrator or panel of Voluntary

Arbitrators shall contain the facts and the law on which it is based. It shall be
final and executory after ten (10) calendar days from receipt of the copy of the
award or decision by the parties.

Upon motion of any interested party, the Voluntary Arbitrator or panel of

Voluntary Arbitrators or the Labor Arbiter in the region where the movant
resides, in case of the absence or incapacity of the Voluntary Arbitrator or
 panel of Voluntary Arbitrators, for any reason, may issue a writ of execution
requiring either the sheriff of the Commission or regular courts or any public
official whom the parties may designate in the submission agreement to
execute the final decision, order or award.

In not a few instances, the Court has variably applied the 10-day period provided in
Article 276 of the Labor Code and the 15-day period in Section 4, Rule 43 of the Rules of
Court in determining the proper period of appeal from a decision or award rendered by a
Voluntary Arbitrator or a Panel thereof to the CA.

In 2004, the Court in Sevilla Trading Company v. Semana;[60] Manila Midtown Hotel v.
Borromeo;[61] and Nippon Paint Employees Union-Olalia v. Court of Appeals [62] ruled that
the decision of the Voluntary Arbitrator becomes final and executory after the lapse of
the 15-day reglementary period within which to file a petition for review under Rule 43.
In 2005, the Court made reference for the first time to the 10-day period for the filing of a
petition for review from decisions or awards of Voluntary Arbitrators in Coca-Cola
Bottlers Philippines, Inc., Sales Force Union-PTGWO-Balais v. Coca-Cola Bottlers
Philippines, Inc.[63] This 10-day period was then applied in the same year in Philex Gold
Philippines, Inc. v. Philex Bulawan Supervisors Union[64] in declaring the appeal to have
been timely filed. The 15-day reglementary period to appeal under Rule 43 was reiterated
in 2007 in Leyte IV Electric Cooperative, Inc. v. LEYECO IV Employees Union-ALU;[65]
in 2008 in AMA Computer College-Santiago City, Inc. v. Nacino; [66] and Mora v. Avesco
Marketing Corporation;[67] in 2009 in Samahan ng mga Manggagawa sa Hyatt-
Nuwhrain-APL v. Voluntary Arbitrator Bacungan;[68] in 2010 in Saint Luis University,
Inc. v. Cobarrubias,[69] in 2011 in Samahan Ng Mga Manggagawa sa Hyatt v. Hon.
Voluntary Arbitrator Magsalin;[70] and in 2013 in Royal Plant Workers Union v. Coca-
Cola Bottlers Philippines, Inc.-Cebu Plant.[71] However, in the 2014 case of Philippine
Electric Corporation (PHILEC) v. Court of Appeals;[72] 2015 case of Baronda v. Court of
Appeals;[73] and 2017 case of NYK-FIL Ship Management, Incorporated v. Dabu,[74] the
Court applied the 10-day appeal period.[75]

The period to be followed in appealing decisions or awards of Voluntary Arbitrators or

Panel of Arbitrators had been settled once and for all by the Court sitting en banc in
Guagua National Colleges v. Court of Appeals.[76] In this case, the Court ruled that the
10-day period stated in Article 276 of the Labor Code should be understood as the period
within which the party adversely affected by the ruling of the Voluntary Arbitrator or the
Panel may file a motion for reconsideration.[77] This is in line with the pronouncement in
Teng v. Pahagac[78] where the Court had clarified that the 10-day period set in Article 276
of the Labor Code gave the aggrieved parties the opportunity to file their motion for
reconsideration, in keeping with the principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies.
Viz.:
 In the exercise of its power to promulgate implementing rules and regulations,
an implementing agency, such as the Department of Labor, is restricted from
going beyond the terms of the law it seeks to implement; it should neither
modify nor improve the law. The agency formulating the rules and guidelines
cannot exceed the statutory authority granted to it by the legislature.

By allowing a 10-day period, the obvious intent of Congress in amending

Article 263 to Article 262-A is to provide an opportunity for the party
adversely affected by the VA's decision to seek recourse via a motion for
reconsideration or a petition for review under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court
filed with the CA. Indeed, a motion for reconsideration is the more
appropriate remedy in line with the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative
remedies. For this reason, an appeal from administrative agencies to the CA
via Rule 43 of the Rules of Court requires exhaustion of available remedies as
a condition precedent to a petition under that Rule.

The requirement that administrative remedies be exhausted is based on the

doctrine that in providing for a remedy before an administrative agency, every
opportunity must be given to the agency to resolve the matter and to exhaust
all opportunities for a resolution under the given remedy before bringing an
action in, or resorting to, the courts of justice. Where Congress has not clearly
required exhaustion, sound judicial discretion governs, guided by
Congressional intent.

By disallowing reconsideration of the VA's decision, Section 7, Rule XIX of

DO 40-03 and Section 7 of the 2005 Procedural Guidelines went directly
against the legislative intent behind Article 262-A of the Labor Code. These
rules deny the VA the chance to correct himself and compel the courts of
justice to prematurely intervene with the action of an administrative agency
entrusted with the adjudication of controversies coming under its special
knowledge, training and specific field of expertise. In this era of clogged court
dockets, the need for specialized administrative agencies with the special
knowledge, experience and capability to hear and determine promptly
disputes on technical matters or intricate questions of facts, subject to judicial
review, is indispensable. In Industrial Enterprises, Inc. v Court of Appeals,
we ruled that relief must first be obtained in an administrative proceeding
before a remedy will be supplied by the courts even though the matter is
within the proper jurisdiction of a court.[79] (Citation omitted)

The Court further clarified in Guagua that once the motion for reconsideration interposed
had been resolved, the aggrieved party may now opt to appeal to the CA by way of a
petition for review under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court. Pursuant to Section 4 of the said
Rule, the aggrieved party has 15 days to file the same.[80]
There is no dispute that respondents received on February 26, 2015, a copy of the January
23, 2015 Resolution of the Panel which denied their motion for reconsideration, and filed
their appeal to the CA on March 12, 2015. Given that their appeal had been filed 14 days
from their receipt of the assailed Resolution of the Panel, respondents' appeal had clearly
been filed within the reglementary period provided in Rule 43.

But petitioner contends that there is no motion for reconsideration which could have been
considered as duly filed in this case that may be appealed to the CA as provided in
Section 4,[81] Rule 43 of the Rules of Court since respondents' motion for reconsideration
had not been filed directly with the Panel in violation of Section 2, Rule III of the
Revised Procedural Guidelines in the Conduct of Voluntary Arbitration Proceedings (VA
Procedural Guidelines) which provides:

SEC. 2. Where to file Pleadings. - All pleadings relative to the voluntary

arbitration case shall be filed directly with the chosen voluntary arbitrator at
his designated business or professional office copy furnished the Regional
Branch of the board having jurisdiction over the workplace of the
complainant.

For the petitioner, in order for the filing of the motion for reconsideration to be proper, it
must be filed at the Voluntary Arbitrators' private addresses or offices. [82] It is also for this
reason why the petitioner posits that Section 1 [83] of Rule 22 of the Rules of Court does
not apply here because "there is no rule or requirement that the offices of Voluntary
Arbitrators should be closed on Saturdays, Sundays and Holidays. "[84]

By no stretch of the imagination can Section 2, Rule III of the VA Procedural Guidelines
can be given a meaning as that advanced by the petitioner. Nothing is better settled than
that courts are not to give words a meaning which would lead to absurd or unreasonable
consequence.[85] A voluntary arbitrator by the nature of his or her functions acts in a
quasi-judicial capacity.[86] Even assuming that the Voluntary Arbitrator or the Panel may
not strictly be considered as a quasi-judicial agency, still both the Voluntary Arbitrator
and the Panel are comprehended within the concept of a quasi-judicial instrumentality. [87]
An "instrumentality" is anything used as a means or agency. Thus, the terms
governmental "agency" or "instrumentality" are synonymous in the sense that either of
them is a means by which a government acts, or by which a certain government act or
function is performed.[88]

Since the Panel performs a state function pursuant to a governmental power delegated to
them under the Labor Code provisions,[89] it therefore stands to reason that as a
governmental instrumentality, the Panel holds office at the NCMB Office and the motion
for reconsideration respondents filed thereat had been proper.[90] There is no reason to rule
otherwise. The motion was received by the Panel, as in fact it immediately convened
upon receipt thereof and acted on the same. While respondents' motion for
reconsideration was denied, the denial was not premised on the failure to directly file the
motion with the Panel as the term is understood by the petitioner, but because the Panel
found the motion to be lacking in merit and filed a day late.[91]

However, as ruled correctly by the CA, respondents motion for reconsideration of the
Panel's Decision had been timely filed. Section 3 of the VA Procedural Guidelines which
provides:

SEC. 3. Directory and Suppletory Application of the Guidelines and Rules of

the Court. - The rules governing the proceedings before a voluntary arbitrator
shall be the subject of agreement among the parties to a labor dispute and
their chosen arbitrator. In the absence of agreement on any or various aspects
of the voluntary arbitration proceedings, the pertinent provisions of these
Guidelines and the Revised Rules of Court shall apply by analogy or in a
directory and suppletory character and effect.[92]

clearly recognizes that the Rules of Court shall apply suppletorily or by analogy to
arbitration proceedings. As such, Section 1, Rule 22 of the Rules of Court had been
properly appreciated in determining the timeliness of the filing of respondents' motion for
reconsideration. The said section provides:

SEC. 1. How to compute time. - In computing any period of time prescribed

or allowed by these Rules, or by order of the court, or by any applicable
statute, the day of the act or event from which the designated period of time
begins to run is to be excluded and the date of performance included. If the
last day of the period, as thus computed, falls on a Saturday, a Sunday, or a
legal holiday in the place where the court sits, the time shall not run until the
next working day.

In this case, respondents have 10 days from February 5, 2015, the day they received a
copy of the Panel's Decision, within which to file their motion for reconsideration.
However, given that February 15, 2015, falls on a Sunday, respondents have until the
next business day, pursuant to Section 1, Rule 22 of the Rules of Court, to file their
motion for reconsideration. Hence, when respondents filed their motion on February 16,
2015, the same had been filed within the reglementary period.

Respondents are not guilty of

forum shopping

Petitioner insists that respondents resorted to forum shopping when they filed before the
Panel a Manifestation with Opposition after their motion for reconsideration was denied,
and another motion entitled Reiterative Motion after they had already filed their petition
for review with the CA and before the Panel can rule on its Manifestation with
Opposition, as they actively sought the review and reversal of the ruling of the Panel with
the latter and the CA simultaneously and successively.

Section 5, Rule 7 of the Rules of Court embodies the rule against forum shopping. It
provides:

SEC. 5. Certification against forum shopping. - The plaintiff or principal

party shall certify under oath in the complaint or other initiatory pleading
asserting a claim for relief, or in a sworn certification annexed thereto and
simultaneously filed therewith: (a) that he has not theretofore commenced any
action or filed any claim involving the same issues in any court, tribunal or
quasi-judicial agency and, to the best of his knowledge, no such other action
or claim is pending therein; (b) if there is such other pending action or claim,
a complete statement of the present status thereof; and (c) if he should
thereafter learn that the same or similar action or claim has been filed or is
pending, he shall report that fact within five (5) days therefrom to the court
wherein his aforesaid complaint or initiatory pleading has been filed.

Failure to comply with the foregoing requirements shall not be curable by

mere amendment of the complaint or other initiatory pleading but shall be
cause for the dismissal of the case without prejudice, unless otherwise
provided, upon motion and after hearing. The submission of a false
certification or non-compliance with any of the undertakings therein shall
constitute indirect contempt of court, without prejudice to the corresponding
administrative and criminal actions. If the acts of the party or his counsel
clearly constitute willful and deliberate forum shopping, the same shall be
ground for summary dismissal with prejudice and shall constitute direct
contempt, as well as a cause for administrative sanctions.

Citing City of Taguig v. City of Makati,[93] the Court, in Zamora v. Quinan, Jr.,[94] has
exhaustively discussed the concept of forum shopping in this wise:

In City of Taguig v. City of Makati, this Court was able to thoroughly discuss
the concept of forum shopping through the past decisions of this Court, thus:

Top Rate Construction & General Services, Inc. v. Paxton

Development Corporation explained that:

Forum shopping is committed by a party who institutes

two or more suits in different courts, either
simultaneously or successively, in order to ask the
courts to rule on the same or related causes or to grant
the same or substantially the same reliefs, on the
supposition that one or the other court would make a
 favorable disposition or increase a party's chances of
obtaining a favorable decision or action.

First Philippine International Bank v. Court of Appeals recounted

that forum shopping originated as a concept in private
international law:

To begin with, forum shopping originated as a concept

in private international law, where non-resident
litigants are given the option to choose the forum or
place wherein to bring their suit for various reason s or
excuses, including to secure procedural advantages, to
annoy and harass the defendant, to avoid overcrowded
dockets, or to select a more friendly venue. To combat
these less than honorable excuses, the principle of
forum non conveniens was developed whereby a court,
in conflicts of law cases, may refuse impositions on its
jurisdiction where it is not the most "convenient" or
available forum and the parties are not precluded from
seeking remedies elsewhere.

In this light, Black’s Law Dictionary says that forum

shopping "occurs when a party attempts to have his
action tried in a particular court or jurisdiction where
he feels he will receive the most favorable judgment or
verdict." Hence, according to Words and Phrases, "a
litigant is open to the charge of 'forum shopping'
whenever he chooses a forum with slight connection to
factual circumstances surrounding his suit, and
litigants should be encouraged to attempt to settle their
differences without imposing undue expense and
vexatious situations on the courts."

Further, Prubankers Association v. Prudential Bank and Trust Co.

recounted that:

The rule on forum shopping was first included in

Section 17 of the Interim Rules and Guidelines issued
by this Court on January 11, 1983, which imposed a
sanction in this wise: "A violation of the rule shall
constitute contempt of court and shall be a cause for
the summary dismissal of both petitions, without
prejudice to the taking of appropriate action against the
 counsel or party concerned." Thereafter, the Court
restated the rule in Revised Circular No. 28-91 and
Administrative Circular No. 04-94. Ultimately, the rule
was embodied in the 1997 amendments to the Rules of
Court.

Presently, Rule 7, Section 5 of the 1997 Rules of Civil

Procedure requires that a Certification against Forum
Shopping be appended to every complaint or initiatory
pleading asserting a claim for relief. x x x

xxxx

Though contained in the same provision of the 1997 Rules of Civil

Procedure, the rule requiring the inclusion of a Certification
against Forum Shopping is distinct from the rule against forum
shopping. In Korea Exchange Bank v. Gonzales:

The general rule is that compliance with the certificate

of forum shopping is separate from and independent of
the avoidance of the act of forum shopping itself.
Forum shopping is a ground for summary dismissal of
both initiatory pleadings without prejudice to the
taking of appropriate action against the counsel or
party concerned.

Top Rate Construction discussed the rationale for the rule against
forum shopping as follows:

It is an act of malpractice for it trifles with the courts,

abuses their processes, degrades the administration of
justice and adds to the already congested court
dockets. What is critical is the vexation brought upon
the courts and the litigants by a party who asks
different courts to rule on the same or related causes
and grant the same or substantially the same reliefs and
in the process creates the possibility of conflicting
decisions being rendered by the different fora upon the
same issues, regardless of whether the court in which
one of the suits was brought has no jurisdiction over
the action.

Jurisprudence has recognized that forum shopping can be

committed in several ways:
 (1) filing multiple cases based on the same cause of
action and with the same prayer, the previous case not
having been resolved yet (where the ground for
dismissal is litis pendentia); (2) filing multiple cases
based on the same cause of action and the same prayer,
the previous case having been finally resolved (where
the ground for dismissal is res judicata); and (3) filing
multiple cases based on the same cause of action but
with different prayers (splitting of causes of action,
where the ground for dismissal is also either litis
pendentia or res judicata). (Emphasis in the original)

Similarly, it has been recognized that forum shopping exists

"where a party attempts to obtain a preliminary injunction in
another court after failing to obtain the same from the original
court."

The test for determining forum shopping is settled. In Yap v.

Chua, et al.:

To determine whether a party violated the rule against

forum shopping, the most important factor to ask is
whether the elements of litis pendentia are present, or
whether a final judgment in one case will amount to
res judicata in another; otherwise stated, the test for
determining forum shopping is whether in the two (or
more) cases pending, there is identity of parties, rights
or causes of action, and reliefs sought.

For its part, litis pendentia "refers to that situation wherein another
action is pending between the same parties for the same cause of
action, such that the second action becomes unnecessary and
vexatious." For litis pendentia to exist, three (3) requisites must
concur:

The requisites of litis pendentia are: (a) the identity of

parties, or at least such as representing the same
interests in both actions; (b) the identity of rights
asserted and relief prayed for, the relief being founded
on the same facts; and (c) the identity of the two cases
such that judgment in one, regardless of which party is
successful, would amount to res judicata in the other.
 On the other hand, res judicata or prior judgment bars a
subsequent case when the following requisites are satisfied:

(1) the former judgment is final; (2) it is rendered by a

court having jurisdiction over the subject matter and
the parties; (3) it is a judgment or an order on the
merits; (4) there is - between the first and the second
actions - identity of parties, of subject matter, and of
causes of action. (Emphasis in the original)

These settled tests notwithstanding:

Ultimately, what is truly important to consider in

determining whether forum shopping exists or not is
the vexation caused the courts and parties-litigant by a
party who asks different courts and/or administrative
agencies to rule on the same or related causes and/or to
grant the same of substantially the same relicts, in the
process creating the possibility of conflicting decisions
being rendered by the different fora upon the same
issue. (Citations omitted)

By filing with the Panel a second motion for reconsideration in the guise of a
Manifestation with Opposition, and without awaiting the result thereof, appealing before
the CA, and thereafter filing once again with the Panel a Reiterative Motion, petition
avers that respondents committed forum shopping.

While the Court agrees with the petitioner that respondents' Manifestation with
Opposition is in reality a second motion for reconsideration and its Reiterative Motion is
another motion for reconsideration, as they both principally seek for the setting aside of
the Decision of the Panel, there are good reasons which militate against the finding of
forum shopping in this case.

Ultimately, the primary consideration in the determination if forum shopping is obtaining

in a case is whether the filing of the actions would result in the very evil the rule on
forum shopping seeks to prevent, that is, the rendition of conflicting decision by different
tribunals.[95] The Manifestation with Opposition, being a second motion for
reconsideration, and the Reiterative Motion, being technically a third motion for
reconsideration, their filing thereof are prohibited under Section 2, [96] Rule 52 of the
Rules of Civil Procedure. Being prohibited pleadings, they are regarded as mere scrap of
paper that do not deserve any consideration and do not have any legal effect. [97] In
addition, the Reiterative Motion is no longer within the Panel's competence to decide. It
must be taken into account that when respondents filed the same, they had already filed
their petition for review before the CA, [98] and the CA had in fact acted upon it by
requiring the petitioner to file her comment thereon. [99] Hence, the Panel had lost its
jurisdiction over the case at this stage, and therefore, it can no longer afford any kind of
relief to the respondents. For these reasons, there can clearly be no forum shopping in this
case.

Suicide had been duly established

A careful review of the records would show that suicide had been indubitably established.
As aptly ruled by the CA:

The signed statements of Manuel's co-workers who were with him on the
vessel on that fateful day allow Us to reconstruct with clarity the events
leading to his death. Rather than being hazy, unequivocal, and non-committal,
they were detailed, categorical, and certain, having been based on their actual
experiences on the day Manuel died and with their personal interactions with
the deceased. More importantly, We have found no fatal inconsistency that
would warrant a different conclusion, that there was a cover-up of another
cause of death, or that there was motive for all of Manuel’s co-workers to lie
about the death of their fellow seaman. A number of them even found him to
be a nice and quiet person who prefers spending time alone.

Relevantly, judging from the noticeable variations in handwriting, writing

styles, and the content of the narratives of Manuel's co-employees, We can
only find their statements to have been executed voluntarily and willfully.
Particularly even more credible are the detailed reports of the ship's Chief
Officer and the Chief Engineer executed on 9 October 2013. The Chief
Officer's Report was even signed and witnessed by crew members.

There is thus every reason to seriously consider and believe all their signed
statements.

To elaborate, Manuel's co-workers commonly agreed that Manuel did not

report to work on 7 October 2013; that he had shut himself inside the
gymnasium; that having been informed [of] Manuel's behavior, the master of
the ship called for a meeting to inform everyone of the developments; that
while everyone was gathering, Manuel moved from the gymnasium into the
hospital.

His co-workers then narrated that while Manuel was locked in the hospital
room, some of them talked to him through the telephone, which included the
Chief Engineer, Leo Odio, seafarers Richard Lamug, Deneb Jake Alcantara
and Dennis Tinaja. These persons attested that Manuel did not sound calm or
stable at all, but that he was fearful that somebody was going to kill him.
 The seamen continued that Manuel's room remained locked, so that none of
them could enter the same. On 8 October 2013, Manuel was offered food
which he declined, after which he refused to talk to anyone. His companions
knocked but received no reply; later in the day, following Manuel's
continuous silence, the crew forced their way in the hospital room but found it
unlocked.

As to Manuel's demise, We can infer from the statements of Rolando

Leonardo, the Chief Officer, and the Chief Engineer the grim circumstances
thereof. These officers corroborate each other’s statements that having
discovered that Manuel was no longer in the room, they found the hospital
restroom locked; with their co-workers, they then peered into a ventilation
whereupon Engineer Ohio beheld Manuel "standing motionless with a small
nylon rope tied on his neck and hanging to the Hat's hooks." Leonardo's
words paint a starker picture, as he was able to describe that "Manuel's tongue
is already outside of his mouth about 1 cm and his hands almost violet." The
crew members then forced the door open and took Manuel's body down.

These employees’ statements are corroborated by the meticulous Investigative

Report immediately conducted by two lawyers when the ship managed to
dock on October 18, 2013, by the Log Book Entries and email
correspondence with the Medical Office, and the photographs of the crew
taking down Manuel’s body.

Lingering doubts are then dispelled by the final Post Mortem Report dated 7
December 2013, executed by one Dr. Rohan Ruwanpura, a Judicial Medical
Officer in Sri Lanka, x x x.

The Report concluded that Manuel died from asphyxia due to hanging and
informed that there were no injuries present upon Manuel's body.

Significantly, all these - that Manuel had isolated himself, that no one else
entered the rooms wherein he had concealed his person, that he had no other
injuries, and that he was later found hanging – make foul play or any other
conclusion implausible.[100]

However, according to the petitioner, the documentary submissions of the respondents

cannot be believed for they lacked probative value since they are mere photocopies. She
also alludes to a certain police investigation report of the harbor authorities in Galle, Sri
Lanka that proves the circumstances of the death of Manuel but which she claims
respondents suppressed. Thus, for the petitioner, the CA erred when it sets aside the
ruling of the Panel which found that no adequate evidence exists to prove that Manuel
committed suicide.
The Court does not agree. In ruling that suicide had not been duly proved, the Panel
relied on the "consistent, coherent and spontaneous narration by [the petitioner] of her
pleasant, joyful and very happy telephone conversation with the deceased x x x. "[101]
From her statement, the Panel was able to conclude that Manuel could not have possibly
taken his own life since he and the petitioner did not have a dysfunctional family as in
fact, they had a very close, warm and loving relationship,[102] and Manuel was a very
caring husband, filled with beautiful dreams and plans for his wife and siblings.[103] Apart
from these general statements, no proof whatsoever could be found on the records that
would sufficiently establish the veracity of the same. As correctly observed by the CA,
the petitioner "could have supported her allegations with text messages and emails[,] or
could have narrated her conversations with her husband and the frequency thereof to at
least lend her version some credibility and weight. Absent these, [the court is] bound to
uphold the well-settled rule that bare allegations are unworthy of belief."[104]

It must be emphasized that technical rules of procedure are not binding in labor cases, [105]
and that the quantum of proof required here is only substantial evidence, defined as "that
amount of relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to justify
a conclusion."[106] Thus, while it may be true that the documentary evidence adduced by
respondents were photocopies, the Court cannot discount the fact that the statements of
the crew members of the vessel as well as the autopsy report issued by the Sri Lankan
authority coincide with the NBI autopsy report which concluded that the cause of death to
be "consistent with asphyxia by ligature." As such, the NBI autopsy report lends credence
to and bolsters the account of the respondents that Manuel took his own life. In other
words, the NBI autopsy report, autopsy report prepared by Dr. Ruwanpura and
Investigation Report, taken together, substantially prove that Manuel's death was due to
his deliberate act of killing himself by committing suicide. It is of no moment that the
NBI Autopsy Report did not categorically state that suicide or hanging was the cause of
death. The fact remains that the same report found no evidence of foul play in the death
of Manuel. Perforce, the Court must agree that death by suicide had been sufficiently
proved.

Petitioner is entitled to death

benefits and reimbursement for
transportation and burial
expenses

Crucial to the determination of petitioner's entitlement to death benefits as well as her

right to get reimbursement for transportation and burial expenses she incurred are
Sections 18.1 b, 21, 22, and 25 of the CBA. However, as observed by the CA, the copy of
the CBA attached to the petition filed before it did not completely cite Section 21, while
Section 25 was missing. As such, the CA adopted the parties' citation of Section 25 and
lifted from the copy of the CBA submitted to it the available portions of Section 21. [107]
Viz.:

[SEC. 25.1] - If a seafarer dies through any cause whilst in the employment of
the Company including death from natural causes and death occurring whilst
traveling to and from the vessel, or as a result of marine or other similar peril,
the Company shall pay the sums specified in the attached Annex 4 (four) to a
nominated beneficiary and to each dependent child up to a maximum of 4
(four) under the age of 18. The Company should also transport at its own
expense the body to Seafarer's home where practical and at the families'
request and pay the cost of burial expenses. If the seafarer shall leave no
nominated beneficiary, the aforementioned sum shall be paid to the person
empowered by law or otherwise to administer the estate of the Seafarer. For
the purpose of this clause, a seafarer shall be regarded as "in employment of
the company" for as long as the provision[s] of Article[s] 21 and 22 apply and
provided the death is directly attributable to sickness or injury that caused the
seafarer's employment to be terminated in accordance with Article 18.1b

xxxx

[SEC.] 21.2 A seafarer who is hospitalized abroad owing to sickness or injury

shall be entitled to medical attention (including hospitalization) at the
company's expense for as long as such attention is required or until the
seafarer is repatriated to the port of engagement, whichever is the earlier.

[Section] 21.3 A seafarer repatriated to their port of engagement, unfit as a

result of sickness or injury, shall be entitled to medical attention (including
hospitalization) at the company's expenses:

1. in case of sickness, for up to 130 days after repatriation, subject to the

submission of satisfactory medical reports;
2. in the case of injury, for so long as medical attention is required or
until a medical determination is made in accordance with clause 24.2
concerning permanent disability.

[Section] 21.4 Proof of continued entitlement to medical attention shall be

submission of satisfactory medical reports, endorsed, where necessary, by a
company appointed doctor.[108]

On the other hand, [Section] 22 provides:

When a seafarer is landed at any port because of sickness or injury

a pro rata payment of their basic wages plus guaranteed or, in the
case of officers, fixed overtime, shall continue until [they] have
 been repatriated at the company's expense as specified in Article
19.

22.1 Thereafter the seafarer shall be entitled to sick pay at the rate
equivalent to their basic wage while they remain sick up to a
maximum rate of 130 days after repatriation.

22.2 However, in the event if incapacity due to an accident the

basic wages shall be paid until the injured seafarer has been cured
or until a medical determination is made in accordance with clause
24.2 concerning permanent disability.

22.3 Proof of continued entitlement to sick pay shall be by

submission of satisfactory medical reports, endorsed, where
necessary, by a company appointed doctor. If a doctor appointed
by or on behalf of the seafarer disagrees with the assessment, a
third doctor may be nominated jointly between the company and
the seafarer and the decision of this doctor shall be final and
binding on both parties.

xxxx

18.1 The employment shall be terminated:

xxxx

b. when signing off owing to sickness or injury, after medical

examination in accordance with Article 21.

The cause of death of the seafarer is immaterial to the determination of petitioner's

entitlement to the said benefits. It is clear from the express provision of Section 25.1 of
the CBA that respondents hold themselves liable for death benefits for the death of the
seafarer under their employ for any cause. Under Annex 4 of the CBA, the same shall be
in the amount of US$89,100.00.[109] Aside from death benefits, respondents also obligated
themselves to pay the transportation expenses for the repatriation of the body of the
deceased, as well as the burial expenses. In this case, the petitioner was able to show that
the expenses she incurred for the repatriation of Manuel as well as his burial amounted to
P162,080.00.[110] Sections 21 and 22 of the CBA did not limit the liability of the
respondents to deaths that are directly attributable to sickness or injury, but rather widens
its coverage to also include seafarers who died or signed off due to sickness of injury.
Thus, the Court agrees with the following pronouncement of the CA:

Now brought to light and in consideration of Articles 21 and 22, the CBA, in
defining "in employment of the company" actually expanded the coverage of
 Section 25.1. Without this qualification, "in the employment of the
company" simply means those who are actively working in the employ of
Athenian Ship Management, Inc. However, the "for the purpose" clause "in
employment of the company" widens its coverage to also include (a)
employees who died as a result of sickness or injury during their employment
as provided under Articles 21 and 22 of the CBA; and (b) employees who had
to sign off due to sickness or injury under Articles 21 and 22 of the
agreement.

Otherwise stated, rather than limiting the scope of coverage of Section 25.1,
the last sentence of its first paragraph widens it. It never affected or narrowed
the phrase "any cause" in Section 25.1. To further make it simpler, the part of
Section 25.1 pertaining to ''any cause" responds to the question, "what causes
of deaths are covered?", while "in the employment" answers to the query,
"given that all causes of death are covered, who else are considered
employed?"[111]

Respondents cannot also validly argue that the POEA-SEC takes precedence over the
terms of the CBA, in that, death must be work-related in order to be compensable. The
Court has already settled that, in the event that the clauses in the CBA provide for greater
benefits to the seafarer, the same must prevail over the standard terms and benefits
formulated by the POEA in its Standard Employment Contract inasmuch as a contract of
labor is so impressed with public interest that the more beneficial conditions must be
endeavored in favor of the laborer. This is in keeping with the avowed policy of the State
to give maximum aid and full protection to labor as enshrined in Article XIII of the 1987
Constitution.[112] Thus, the CA ruled correctly when it held that petitioner is entitled to
death benefits, transportation expenses and burial expenses.

Petitioner is not entitled to

insurance benefits under R.A.
No. 10022

Section 23 of R.A. No. 10022 provides for the compulsory insurance coverage of migrant
workers. It reads:

Section 23. A New Section 37-A of Republic Act No. 8042, as a mended, is
hereby added to read as follows:

SEC. 37-A. Compulsory Insurance Coverage of Agency Hired

workers. - In addition to the performance bond to be filed by the
recruitment/manning agency under Section 10, each migrant
worker deployed by a recruitment /manning agency shall be
covered by a compulsory life insurance policy which shall be
 secured at no cost to the said worker. Such insurance policy shall
be effective for the duration of the migrant worker's employment
contract and shall cover, at the minimum:

(a) Accidental death, with at least fifteen thousand

United States dollars (US$15,000.00)
survivor's benefit payable to the migrant
worker's beneficiaries;

Without question, respondents become liable for the payment of the compulsory life
insurance benefit of US$15,000.00 only when the employee died of an accidental death.
Inasmuch as the Court had already ruled that Manuel committed suicide, the CA correctly
deleted the award of US$15,000.00 by way of life insurance in favor of the petitioner.

Even assuming that respondents failed to procure a life insurance coverage for Manuel as
mandated by R.A. No. 10022, such failure does not merit the automatic award of the
aforementioned sum to the petitioner as the same pertains to the minimum of the life
insurance policy coverage to be paid by the insurance company only to qualified
beneficiaries and for such causes as specified therein, and is not a penalty or fine to be
paid by the manning agency.

Petitioner is entitled to overtime

pay, owner's bonus, and unpaid
leave pay plus daily allowance
pay

Articles 6[113] and 11[114] of the CBA provide for the guidelines to a seafarer's entitlement
to overtime pay as well as to leave benefits. The articles state:

Overtime
[Sec.] 6

6.1 Any hours of duty in excess of the 8 (eight) shall be paid by overtime, the
hourly overtime rate shall be 1.25 the basic hourly rate calculated by
reference to the basic wage for the category concerned and the weekly
working hours (Annex 2).

6.2 At least 103 (one hundred three) hours guaranteed overtime shall be paid
monthly to each seafarer.

6.3 Overtime shall be recorded individually and in duplicate either by the

Master or Head of the Department.
 6.4 Such record shall be handed to the seafarer for approval every month or at
shorter intervals. Both copies must be signed by the Master and /or Head of
the department as well as the seafarer, after which the record is final. One
copy shall be handed over the seafarer. x x x

6.5 If no overtime records are kept as required in 6.3 and 6.4 above, the
seafarer shall be paid monthly a lump sum for overtime worked calculated at
160 hours at the hourly overtime rate without prejudice to any further claim
for payment for overtime hours worked in excess of this figure. x x x

Leave
[Sec.] 11

11.1 Each seafarer shall, on the termination of employment for whatever

reason, be entitled to payment of 7 days' leave for each completed month of
service and pro rata for a shorter period.

11.2 Payment for leave shall be at the rate of pay applicable at the time of
termination plus a daily allowance as specified in ANNEX 4. x x x

Under 11.2 of the CBA, aside from leave pay, the seafarer shall also be entitled to a daily
allowance as specified in Annex 4 thereof. Annex 4[115] of the CBA provides:

ANNEX 4
Schedule of Cash Benefits

xxxx

Article 11 Leave:

Daily Allowance whilst on paid leave: US$ 18

The terms and conditions of Manuel's employment contract [116] mentioned above would
readily show that respondents indeed committed to give him guaranteed overtime pay for
103 hours; leave pay of seven days for each completed month in the sum of US$174.00
per month plus daily allowance/subsistence allowance of US$18 while on paid leave or a
total of US$126.00 per month, as well as owner's bonus in the amount of $100.00 a
month.

With respect to the guaranteed overtime pay, considering that no overtime records were
presented by the respondents, following Article 6.5 of the CBA, the same shall be pegged
at 160 hours per month at the rate of 1.25 of Manuel's basic hourly rate.
At this juncture, the Court must note that the aforesaid Articles 6 and 11 are nowhere to
be found in the copy of the CBA that is attached to the records of this case. Be that as it
may, the Court cannot simply disregard the same. It bears stressing that respondents were
fully apprised of these claims at the outset since these claims were already included and
fully discussed by the petitioner in her Position Paper. [117] Respondents, in fact, responded
thereto by filing their Reply (To Complainant's Position Paper) [118] and their Rejoinder.[119]
In the said pleadings, respondents never denied that the CBA as well as Manuel's
Employment Contract provided for these benefits. Their defense is that they are no longer
liable for these benefits since they had already been paid. As proof, they adduced the
following pieces of evidence: (a) acknowledgement receipt for the payment of wages in
the amount of US$670.30, duly signed by the petitioner;[120] (b) check voucher for the
said amount;[121] (c) Wages Account[122] for the period covering October 1, 2013 to
October 8, 2013 itemizing the benefits included in the US$670.30 payment as follows:
(1) basic wage; (2) fixed overtime; (3) owner's bonus; (4) leave pay; and (5) EWA; and
(d) proof of remittance of allotment to Manuel's bank account.[123]

Contrary to the claim of respondents, the evidence they presented only prove payment of
the aforementioned benefits from October 1 to October 8, 2013. The remittance of
allotment to Manuel's bank account they made on August 6, 2013, September 6, 2013 and
October 1, 2013 do not establish payment of the subject benefits as respondents failed to
show what these payments had been for. If these allotments were for the guaranteed
overtime pay, leave pay plus daily allowance and owner's bonus, respondents could have
easily presented a similar Wages Account like the one they presented for the October 1 to
8, 2013 payment for the subject benefits considering that the Wages Account form
appears to be a standard form issued by the respondents to its employees whenever they
release payments to them.

For these reasons, the CA erred in deleting the awards for overtime pay, leave pay, daily
allowance/subsistence allowance and owner's bonus. However, considering that Manuel
commenced working for the respondents on June 25, 2013, and the petitioner had already
received the said benefits for the period covering October 1 to October 8, 2013,
respondents shall be liable for overtime pay, leave pay, daily allowance/subsistence
allowance and owner's bonus for 3 months and 5 days only, instead of four months.

Petitioner is not entitled to

uncollected: salary, moral
damages, exemplary damages
and attorney's fee.

As discussed above, since respondents were able to duly prove, and the petitioner had
already received the amount of US$670.03 representing Manuel's uncollected salary, the
CA correctly deleted the same.
Petitioner is also not entitled to moral damages, exemplary damages and attorney's fees as
these forms of indemnity may only be imposed on a concrete showing of bad faith or
malice on the part of the respondents.[124] In this case, the refusal of the respondents to
pay the benefits being claimed by the petitioner, and the delay in the eventual release of
the last salary of Manuel, did not arise out of bad faith, but brought about by their firm
belief of petitioner's lack of entitlement thereto and the merits of their cause. The mere
failure of the respondents to furnish the petitioner with a copy of the CBA does not
establish bad faith. It must be taken into account that the terms of the employment
contract of Manuel had been faithful to the benefits spelled out in the said CBA, thereby
negating petitioner's claim that respondents intended to conceal and mislead her into
thinking that no CBA applied to Manuel's employment. Petitioner also failed to
substantiate her claim that there indeed had been a police investigation report proving
that Manuel had been killed which respondents suppressed. As with the said police
investigation report, there is also no showing that respondents did not procure the
mandatory life insurance policy for Manuel. No proof was also shown to support
petitioner's claim that respondents did not extend any form of assistance in the
repatriation of Manuel or that they berated her when she sought the assistance of the
government for the said repatriation. Petitioner's contention that respondents' decision to
bring the remains of her husband to Sri Lanka, instead of Dammam, Saudi Arabia had
been sudden and tainted with bad faith is belied by her very own written consent where
she agreed that the autopsy of the remains of the deceased shall be performed by the
authorities in Sri Lanka.[125] For these reasons, the CA had been correct in deleting the
said awards.

The monetary benefits awarded

to the petitioner shall earn legal
interest at the rate of 6% per
annum from the date of the
finality of the Decision until fully
paid

The case of Lara's Gifts & Decor, Inc. v. Midtown Industrial Sales, Inc.[126] clarified the
correct rate of imposable interest, thus:

To summarize the guidelines on the imposition of interest as provided in

Eastern Shipping Lines and Nacar are further modified for clarity and
uniformity, as follows:

With regard to an award of interest in the concept of actual and compensatory

damages, the rate of interest, as well as the accrual thereof is imposed, as
follows:
1 . When the obligation is breached, and it consists in the payment of a
sum of money, i.e., a loan or forbearance of money, goods, credits or
judgments, the interest due shall be that which is stipulated by the parties
in writing, provided it is not excessive and unconscionable, which, in the
absence of a stipulated reckoning date, shall be computed from default,
i.e., from extrajudicial or judicial demand in accordance with Article
1169 of the Civil Code, UNTIL FULL PAYMENT, without compounding
any interest unless compounded interest is expressly stipulated by the
parties, by law or regulation. Interest due on the principal amount
accruing as of judicial demand shall SEPARATELY earn legal interest at
the prevailing rate prescribed by the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas, from
the time of judicial demand UNTIL FULL PAYMENT.

2. In the absence of stipulated interest, in a loan or forbearance of money,

goods, credits or judgments, the rate of interest on the principal amount
shall be the prevailing legal interest prescribed by the Bangko Sentral ng
Pilipinas, which shall be computed from default, i.e., from extrajudicial
or judicial demand in accordance with Article 1169 of the Civil Code,
UNTIL FULL PAYMENT, without compounding any interest unless
compounded interest is expressly stipulated by law or regulation. Interest
due on the principal amount accruing as of judicial demand shall
SEPARATELY earn legal interest at the prevailing rate prescribed by
the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas, from the time of judicial demand UNTIL
FULL PAYMENT.

3. When the obligation, not constituting a loan or forbearance of money,

goods, credits or judgments, is breached, an interest on the amount of
damages awarded may be imposed in the discretion of the court at the
prevailing legal interest prescribed by the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas,
pursuant to Article 2210 and 2011 of the Civil Code. No interest,
however, shall be adjudged on unliquidated claims or damages until the
demand can be established with reasonable certainty. Accordingly, where
the amount of the claim or damages is established with reasonable
certainty, the prevailing legal interest shall begin to run from the time the
claim is made extrajudicially or judicially (Art. 1169, Civil Code) UNTIL
FULL PAYMENT, but when such certainty cannot be so reasonably
established at the time the demand was made, the interest shall begin to
run only from the date of the judgment of the trial court (at which time
the quantification of damages may be deemed to have been reasonably
ascertained) UNTIL FULL PAYMENT. The actual base for the
computation of the interest shall, in any case, be on the principal amount
finally adjudged, without compounding any interest unless compounded
 interest is expressly stipulated by law or regulation. (Emphases in the
original; citations omitted)

Based on the prevailing jurisprudence, the actual base for the computation of 6% per
annum legal interest (the prevailing legal interest prescribed under Bangko Sentral ng
Pilipinas Monetary Board Circular No. 799, Series of 2013) [127] of the total monetary
awards shall be the amount finally adjudged, that is from the finality of this judgment
until their full satisfaction.[128]

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The

assailed October 13, 2015 Decision and the April 12, 2016 Resolution of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP. No. 139455 are AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION, in that
aside from the US$89,100.00 death benefits and reimbursement for transportation and
burial expenses in the amount of P162,080.00, respondents are also adjudged liable to
pay the petitioner the following: (a) guaranteed overtime pay for 160 hours a month at the
rate of 1.25 of Manuel's basic hourly rate for three (3) months and five days; (b) leave
pay of (7) seven days for each completed month in the sum of US$174.00 per month for
three (3) months and five (5) days; (c) daily allowance/subsistence allowance of
US$18.00 while on paid leave or a total of US$126.00 per month for three (3) months
and five (5) days; and (d) owner's bonus of US$100.00 a month for three (3) months and
five (5) days. The monetary awards granted shall earn legal interest at the rate of 6% per
annum from the date of the finality of this Decision until fully paid.

The case is REMANDED to the Panel of Voluntary Arbitrators for the proper
computation of the monetary benefits awarded.

SO ORDERED.