Ogunbadejo 1980

Nigeria's Foreign Policy under Military Rule 1966-79
Author(s): Oye Ogunbadejo

Source: International Journal, Vol. 35, No. 4, Africa's Prospects (Autumn, 1980), pp. 748-
765
Published by: Sage Publications, Ltd. on behalf of the Canadian International Council
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OYE OGUNBADEJO
Nigeria's foreign policy

under military rule 1966-79
At independence in October i960, Nigeria had one of the most con-

servative administrations in Africa. True, the Northern People's
Congress (npc) and the National Convention of Nigerian Citizens
(ncnc) which formed the coalition government had a few pro-
gressive elements, but both Alhaji Ahmadu Bello, the leader of
the npc and premier of the then Northern Region, and his deputy,
Alhaji Abubakar Tafawa Balewa, who was the federal prime min-
ister from i960 to 1966, were conservative to the core. The Balewa
administration held tenaciously to the Western values it had in-
herited from Britain, the former colonial master. In part because
of this factor and in part because Balewa was a devoutly religious
statesman, he adopted a normative approach to foreign relations.
To him, foreign policy was clear cut: either support the West and
be in good and respectable company, or support the communist
powers and be in the company of the devil. 'Non-alignment/ the
declared foundation of Nigerian foreign policy, was therefore noth-
ing more than a facade.1 There were no genuine conscious efforts
to move closer to any of the communist powers.2 In African affairs,
the foreign policy principles enunciated by Prime Minister Balewa
Senior Lecturer in the Department of Political Science at the University of Ife,

Ile-Ife, Nigeria.
1 There is a fair amount of literature on Nigeria's foreign relations from i960

to 1966. For the major publications, see C.S. Phillips, The Development of
Nigerian Foreign Policy (Evanston, 111, 1964), Gordon J. Idang, Nigeria: Internal
Politics and Foreign Policy (1960-1966) (Ibadan 1973), and A.B. Akinyemi,
Foreign Policy and Federalism (Ibadan 1974).
2 For a detailed analysis of this issue, see Oye Ogunbadejo, 'Ideology and prag-
matism: The Soviet Role in Nigeria, 1960-1977' Orbis, xxi (winter 1978), 803-30.
Nigeria's foreign policy 1966-79 749
- the legal equality of states, non-interference in the internal affairs

of other states, good neighbourliness, and the inviolability of na-
tional boundaries happened to be shared by other conservative
African states. Indeed, it is often stated that one of the achieve-
ments of the Balewa regime was the incorporation of these cardinal
principles into the charter of the Organization of African Unity
(oau) when it was established in May 1963.3
One might be tempted to ask why the Balewa regime was able
to maintain such a strongly pro- Western posture from i960 to
1966. Surely, if there were some progressive elements in the Fed-
eral coalition government, they should have been able to play an
active role in steering the country towards a more balanced outlook
in its foreign policy. And what of the role of the Federal parlia-
ment or the foreign policy £lite?
In the first place, one of the hazards of a coalition government
is that the junior partners in such an alliance may not always be
in a position to achieve what they want or, rather, to impose their
views on the senior partners. Thus, the radical elements in the
ncnc were unable to impose their desire for a more militant and
aggressive foreign policy on the npc. In the event, the concept of
non-alignment, upon which both parties agreed, became a con-
venient symbol under which to promote what all the high-ranking
members of the npc favoured: a strongly pro- Western posture.
Secondly, the making of the country's foreign policy was exclusive-
ly an executive responsibility which was concentrated in the hands
of a very few people, with the prime minister himself as the
principal and dominant actor. With Balewa's cast-iron control of
foreign affairs, the foreign policy £lite had little opportunity to
exercise their talents, at least in terms of being active in the for-
mulation and implementation of a more balanced and aggressive
policy. Thirdly, the Federal parliament, which might have re-
dressed the one-sided nature of Nigerian foreign policy, never had
a chance; it played a peripheral role, constantly rubber stamping
the key decisions of the Federal Executive Council. Parliament
3 Sec, for instance, Idang, Nigeria: Internal Politics and Foreign Policy.
75O INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL
could not however have behaved any differently given the con-
straints under which it operated. For example, there was no power-
ful 'watchdog' parliamentary committee on foreign relations and,
even worse, parliament met infrequently. Moreover, the members
of parliament themselves did not sufficiently understand the proper
place and role of the legislature in a parliamentary democracy,
nor did they effectively utilize the opportunity provided by the
question period to deal with the inadequacies of the Federal gov-
ernment's foreign policy.4
If parliament was ineffective, what of the impact of domestic
pressures? There were indeed some well-organized and powerful
pressure groups during the Balewa regime, and they articulated
diverse and at times contradictory views on the shape and form
that Nigeria's foreign policy should take;5 but pressure groups
and public opinion were on the whole ineffective in influenc-
ing public policy. The only major exception was the successful
campaign mounted by the Action Group, the Nigerian Youth
Congress, the labour unions, and student groups against the Anglo-
Nigerian Defence Pact.0
A further constraint on any attempt to move Nigeria towards
a more truly non-aligned policy lay in the neo-colonial dependency
of the Nigerian economy which no doubt further restricted the
extent to which the Federal government could flex its muscles in
international relations. Finally, the fragility of Nigeria's political
system provided a further inhibition. It was so weak that the cen-
trifugal forces it generated plunged the country into successive
crises which led in the end to military intervention. The steady
and stable base which might have enabled the Balewa administra-
tion to pursue a more active foreign policy was simply not there;
4 For more analysis on the role of the Nigerian parliament in the country's for-
eign policy, see R.A. Akindele, 'Nigerian Parliament and Foreign Policy, 1966-
1966,' Quarterly Journal of Administration (April 1975), 279-91.
5 Cf Akinyemi, Foreign Policy and Federalism.
6 For the details, see Gordon J. Idang, 'The Politics of Nigerian Foreign Policy:
The Ratification and Renunciation of the Anglo-Nigerian Defence Agreement,'
African Studies Review (September 1970).
Nigeria's foreign policy i 96^-79 751
and, any attempt to provide the semblance of one was increasingly

geared towards managing the various internal crises.
Thus, when the military intervened in January 1966, Nigeria's
foreign policy remained what it had been when the country at-
tained its independence from Britain in i960: it was openly pro-
West and lacked any initiative, creativity, or leadership of any
consequence in African affairs.
THE CIVIL WAR AND FOREIGN POLICY 1967-70

The Aguiyi Ironsi regime, which finally emerged from the confu-
sion that surrounded the military coup d'£tat of 15 January 1966,
adopted the same foreign policy principles as its predecessor. It too
declared 'non-alignment' to be the central theme of Nigeria's for-
eign policy. But, unlike the Balewa regime which had stayed in
office for six years, the Ironsi administration did not last long
enough to give critics a good opportunity to assess its brand of
non-aligned policy. In July 1966, after barely six months in power,
it was overthrown in a military counter-coup, and, after three days
of intense national anxiety, Yakubu Gowon emerged as the new
head of state.
No sooner did the Gowon administration assume office than
the country was plunged into a round of crises which culminated,
first, in the secession of the Eastern region (as Biafra) and subse-
quently in hostilities between the Federalists and the Biafrans.
Throughout the trying months of the crisis - particularly dur-
ing the war of words and nerves between Lagos and Enugu which
preceded the outbreak of actual hostilities - the Western powers
maintained, in varying degrees, wary postures. Each country was
busy weighing the repercussions of the various options at its dis-
posal: which side to support, when to do so, the degree and extent
of that support, and whether openly or covertly. The Soviet Union,
however, saw in the crisis a potential opportunity for redressing
the age-long imbalance in Nigeria's non-aligned policy. Moscow
was quick, therefore, to send trade and technical missions to all
the regions, with each mission promising to assist some of the
752 INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL
regional governments in their development programmes. The

Federal government was even assured of major Soviet technical
assistance in the setting up of Nigeria's proposed iron and steel
complex.7
Once hostilities broke out between the Federalists and the se-
cessionists in July 1967, Nigerian foreign policy was less concerned

about technical assistance, however desirable, and was swiftly gear-
ed towards seeking and retaining the support of foreign nations,
particularly in the context of the procurement of arms and am-
munition for waging the campaign. The Western powers remained
quite wary of taking sides in the early days of the civil war. In fact
the United States, France, and Britain all formally prohibited or re-
fused to send arms shipments to either belligerent. It was this
attitude in the West that forced the Nigerians to turn to Moscow,
and the ussr quickly came down on the Federal side.
Given the traditional East- West rivalry in international pol-
itics, the Soviet willingness to supply arms to Lagos at once posed
a new problem for the West. Moreover, the Federalists' early
military superiority, as demonstrated in their ability to flush out
the Biafran secessionist forces from the mid- West, meant that they
were worth backing. In the face of these two developments, some of
the Western powers could no longer stand aloof. Britain, for one,
quickly descended from the fence and came down on the side of
the Federalists. And throughout the war years Britain and the
Soviet Union remained Nigeria's major allies, supplying arms and
ammunition to the Federalists at a staggering pace. Although there
was some public outcry in Britain over the arms supplies, the
Wilson administration stood firm in its support for the Lagos gov-
ernment. The ussr, because of the closed nature of its political
system, was able to supply massive materiel to the Federalists with-
out a similar barrage of bitter attacks and condemnation from its
citizens. At first, many in the West nervously felt that Moscow was,
in fact, gradually edging out Western interests in Nigeria, par-
ticularly in the first two years of the civil war when the Soviet
7 For details of the various Soviet missions, see Ogunbadejo, 'Ideology and Prag-
matism/ pp 81 1-12.
Union was prominent in cultural and economic activities in the

country.8 However, by March 1969, Soviet influence seemed to
have passed its peak, and from this time onwards, Western activities
in Nigeria again increased steadily. Prime Minister Wilson even
paid a well-publicized official visit to the country.
Other Western powers were also drawn into the complexities
of the civil war. France, for its part, teamed up with the secession-
ists and remained Biafra's main prop throughout the conflict. But,
this action notwithstanding, Nigeria's traditional overwhelming
desire for maintaining close relationships with Western countries
ensured that economic relations between France and Lagos actual-
ly prospered during the civil war years.9 The United States was
content to leave Britain to protect, and indeed hold, the Western
front against any Soviet threat in Nigeria. Although the Americans
never supplied arms to Lagos, they were actively involved in the
field of relief operations and eventually became the largest con-
tributor to the relief efforts.10 The Federalists were naturally in-
censed by this low-profile policy on the part of the United States
but, with the ussr on their side and aware of the need not to pro-
voke Cold War manoeuvres in the country, the Nigerians took
every precaution not to antagonize Washington.
Just as Nigeria did not enjoy the total support of the Western
powers, so it did not receive the full support of all the communist
powers. China, for one, carried its bitterness over the Sino-Soviet
conflict into the Nigerian civil war by backing the Biafran seces-
sionists. There had been no existing cordial links (diplomatic or
otherwise) between Lagos and Beijing which could have made the
latter more sympathetic to the Federal cause, and, once the Soviet
Union had stepped in on the Federal side, it became convenient,
for sheer political expediency, for China to be on the other side.
Like its relations with the great powers, Nigeria's relations with
the African states during this period were dominated by the civil
8 See ibid, pp 816-18.

9 For the overall trade figures for this period, see Oye Ogunbadejo, 'Nigeria and
the Great Powers: The Impact of the Civil War on Nigerian Foreign Rela-
tions,' African Affairs, lxxv (January 1976), 23.
10 Ibid, p 19.
war. Indeed, the conflict was perhaps more important at the Afri-
can level than at the international level. In a diplomatic sense, the
war was viewed, first, as an internal Nigerian affair and, secondly,
as an African affair. Before non-African states would feel free to
accord formal recognition to Biafra, it would have to secure the

support of many African states. By and large, this notion was gen-
erally respected by the great powers. Even France found it political-
ly inexpedient to grant formal diplomatic recognition to Biafra.
President de Gaulle insisted that Paris, in spite of any sympathy
it might have for the secessionists, could not take such a step unless
and until many African states had done so. In the event, Nigeria's
success in winning and holding a commitment from the oau to the
maintenance of its territorial integrity played a vital part in Biafra's
diplomatic isolation. (And because the Federal blockade of the
secessionist enclave was generally respected, it played an important
role in the outcome of the conflict.) Only four member-states of
the oau - Tanzania, Ivory Coast, Zambia, and Gabon - did break
ranks and recognize the secessionists. On balance, therefore, the
oau's broad pro-Federal consensus on the conflict limited the scale
of international involvement. Moreover, the organization's assump-
tion of responsibility for attempting to bring about peace talks
between the two sides contributed to the view of many non- African
states that the war was essentially an African problem and that, so
long as the oau was assuming responsibility, not even the United
Nations could properly make a formal intervention in the dispute.
Some of the great powers, particularly Britain, consistently used
the oau's stand to justify their own policies towards the conflict.11
Thus, the broad African support that the Federal government
received helped their case at the international level, because many
states thought it impolitic to ignore the oau stance and embrace
the Biafran cause. It was natural, given the bitter civil strife it was
grappling with, that Lagos should gear its foreign policy towards
the central objective of winning the war. Only by achieving this
1 1 For a detailed analysis of Nigeria's diplomacy in Africa during the civil war,
see Oye Ogunbadejo, 'General Gowon's African Policy,' International Studies,
xvi (January-March 1977), 35-50.
feat, would Nigeria succeed in remaining a united country. Thus,

the country's foreign policy posture, at least for the duration of
the civil war, was dictated almost entirely by the nature of the
domestic situation.1-
THE GOWON ADMINISTRATION'S PEACETIME FOREIGN POLICY 1970-5

Once the Biafran secessionists had surrendered and renounced se-
cession in January 1970, the Federal government faced the task of

internal reconciliation. For all the faults of the Gowon regime,
many would readily concede that one of its major successes was the
way it resolved the problem of national reconciliation. The spirit
of reconciliation was also extended to those foreign countries which
had pursued policies detrimental to the Federal cause. But, despite
the warmth of the external reconciliation, it was generally felt that
the war was bound to affect certain aspects of Nigerian foreign
policy. In particular, many wanted to know the direction in which
the Lagos-Moscow honeymoon which seemed to have thrived so
well during the war would evolve.
It soon became clear that the honeymoon had lost some of its
lustre. Soviet-Nigerian relations remained stagnant; there was no
major positive evidence to show that Lagos was prepared to flirt
unnecessarily with the ussr. Indeed, General Gowon seemed to
have prepared the ground for this state of affairs, since he had
repeatedly warned the Kremlin throughout the war years that
'Nigerian development could be attained only by remaining in
the system of world capitalism.'13
Nonetheless, as long as Lagos was still holding to the concept
of 'non-alignment' in the field of international relations, the occa-
sional flirtation with the communist powers was essential. So in
1974 Gowon paid a state visit to the Soviet Union. The Nigerian
head of state thanked the Kremlin leaders for the materiel and
diplomatic assistance which the ussr had given his country and
12 For a series of essays on the interdependence of foreign policy decisions and

domestic political activities, see, for instance, James N. Rosenau, ed, Domestic
Sources of Foreign Policy (New York 1967).
13 See Ogunbadejo, 'Ideology and Pragmatism, p 819.
held detailed discussions with his hosts on many issues, including

possible further Soviet-Nigerian co-operation in the fields of eco-
nomics, science, technology, trade, and culture. In the joint com-
munique issued at the end of the visit, the two countries pledged
to conclude co-operation agreements in the areas of oil exploration
and geology, the petroleum industry, agriculture, technical educa-
tion, public health, and the training of Nigerian personnel as well
as to seek the further development of trade on a long-term basis.
Once again, the Soviet Union reaffirmed its readiness and commit-
ment to assist Nigeria in building the iron and steel complex. As
might have been expected, it became clear that Gowon had merely
agreed to these projected areas of further co-operation for reasons
of protocol. The much heralded iron and steel project never made
any significant progress until he left office, and, aside from the
Soviet technical assistance in the petroleum industry (particularly,
in connection with the setting up of the Petroleum Technical Col-
lege in Warri, Bendel state), there were no developments in the
other areas mentioned in the communique.14
The Federal Military government also seemed to have taken a
similar stance on China, the other communist power which had
been deeply enmeshed in the international politics of the Nigerian
civil war. Although Beijing was on the side of the secessionists,
China and Nigeria had quickly mended fences after the conflict.
Diplomatic relations were established in February 1971, and, in
the following year, the two countries concluded two agreements,
one on economic and technical co-operation and the other on
trade. Gowon even undertook an eight-day state visit to China in
September 1974. He was well received and had an audience with
Chairman Mao Zedong.15 But, all in all, Nigeria moved no closer
to Beijing than it did to Moscow. Gowon's visits to China and the
ussr and the various agreements concluded during them did not
lead to any major shift in Nigeria's foreign policy. They were mere-
ly a cosmetic treatment, aimed no doubt at misleading the Nigerian
14 For the text of the joint communique, see the Africa Research Bulletin (1974),
PP 3246-7.
15 See Ogunbadejo, 'Nigeria and the Great Powers,' pp 27-8.
public and giving a false impression as to the actual orientation

of the country's foreign policy.
The Western powers themselves realized that no matter how
many trips Gowon paid to the East or how many agreements
Nigeria might have concluded with the communist states, the Fed-
eral Military leaders were fundamentally more Atlantic-centred
than anything else. In fact, Gowon had taken the precaution of
commencing his series of state visits in the West with an official
visit to Britain in June 1973. In any case, the Nigerian economy
was much too tied to the world capitalist system to conceive of
Lagos making a total break with the West. Britain remained
Nigeria's major trading partner throughout the Gowon era, and
the Federal Military government consistently placed a high pre-
mium on Nigeria's membership of the Commonwealth, a view
which Gowon never sought to disguise. He was an ardent anglo-
phile who believed that his country should not take any major step
in international relations or in the running of the local economy
without British clearance. So, after the initial nervousness in the
West about the Soviet threat in Nigeria and all the talk about the
Russian 'presence' in Lagos, Roy Jenkins, a leader of the British
Labour party, was pleasantly surprised to discover not only that
the Gowon regime was strongly pro-West, but also that Nigeria
'still thinks of the developed world in terms of Britain. 'lfi
At the African level, however, the civil war had a more notice-
able impact on Nigeria's foreign relations. During that conflict,
as noted, the majority of African states backed the Federalists. But,
as well as those four states which openly declared for the secession-
ist cause, there was another Biafran base of support in the 'white
South.' All the white minority regimes in Southern Africa backed
the Biafran separatists: Portugal (at the time, colonial master in
Mozambique and Angola), Rhodesia, and South Africa.17 The fact
that they all came down on one side to work against the oau con-
sensus was carefully digested in Lagos. The Federal Military gov-
16 Ibid,p 31.
17 For the main reasons why these nations backed Biafra, see Ogunbadejo, 'Gen-
eral Gowon's African Policy,' p 37.
ernment took the view that not only were these states out to work
against Nigeria, they were also anxious to fan any flames of crisis
in black African states in hopes of creating instability in the latter
and in the process diverting attention from the more pressing
problems of decolonization in Southern Africa. Because of these
actions during the war, Lagos took the position that any meaning-
ful postwar foreign policy ought to be aggressively militant on
issues affecting the 'white South/ insofar as they concerned working
towards the attainment of black majority rule in Namibia and
Zimbabwe and removing the worst aspects of apartheid in South
Africa. To be able to achieve these objectives, a strong and united
oau was essential. Without such an organization Africa could not,
Lagos felt, be insulated from the more abrasive pressures of inter-
national politics. With this in mind, Gowon visited most of the
states of black Africa in the first two years after the war; he thanked
them for their steadfast support during the Nigerian crisis and also
emphasized the importance to all African states of striving towards
the achievement of the ideals and principles of the oau, especially
as they related to decolonization. Lagos itself promptly began to
harmonize its own foreign policy with that of the oau. The Nige-
rian head of state issued uncompromising messages on decoloni-
zation to all the racist regimes and repeatedly urged the oau to
co-ordinate its efforts to assist the liberation movements in their
wars of independence.18 The Federal Military government itself

gave generous technical, diplomatic, financial, and material assist-
ance to the liberation movements.
Nigeria's international role in Africa was not, however, con-

fined to the decolonization issue. Lagos also cultivated bilateral
economic relations with many countries and provided some lead-
ership to the continent in the negotiations between the African,
Caribbean, and Pacific countries (acp) and the European Economic
Community (eec) which culminated in the signing of the Lom£
convention in February 1975. Nigeria's economic leadership was
also evident at the regional level. Thus, in 1972 it initiated the idea
18 Sec, in particular, ibid, pp 38-41.
of an all-embracing regional economic grouping, the Economic

Community for West African States (ecowas), and worked energet-
ically, in close association with Togo, to bring the organization
into being. On 28 May 1975, several heads of state and government
gathered in Lagos and signed the ecowas treaty.19
It is clear that the Gowon administration favoured a functional
approach to African unity. While the regime made efforts in its

own way to promote economic and political stability in Africa, it
did so within the framework of the main oau guideline: non-
interference in the internal affairs of other states. Lagos also en-
sured that, in spite of the provocations of some neighbouring states,
particularly Cameroun, the organization remained opposed to the
use of force to revise external boundaries. Indeed, the Gowon ad-
ministration felt so concerned about African issues that it declared
Africa to be the cornerstone of its foreign policy.
FOREIGN POLICY UNDER THE MUHAMMED-OBASAN JO REGIME 1975*9

The Gowon administration was overthrown in a military coup in
July 1975; it was succeeded by the Murtala Muhammed regime.
One of the main reasons for the coup was a general sense of frustra-
tion and feeling of helplessness among the people about the ex-
cesses of the Gowon regime. Many felt, for instance, that Nigeria's
posture on some international issues was simply not right; many
wanted to see a more balanced and vigorous non-aligned for-
eign policy. It was little wonder then that the new administration
pledged that it would genuinely seek to make the country's foreign
policy more non-aligned and to 'defend Africa's interests without
equivocation.'-"
The first major event which would demonstrate the new direc-
tion in Nigeria's foreign policy was the Angolan issue. In the post-
independence civil strife in that country, the Federal Military gov-
ernment, once it was sure that Pretoria had waded into the conflict
by supporting the unita-fnla joint front, backed the mpla to the
19 For a detailed analysis of the background to the setting up of kcowas. sec the
subsection, 'Nigeria and West African Issues.' in ibid, pp 44-8.
20 Wes t A frica ( 1 976) , p 153.
hilt. Nigeria recognized the latter group despite Washington's se-

cret request not to do so. In the past, of course, the American wish
would have prevailed, but General Muhammed was determined
to make a clean break with that past. The new administration not
only committed Nigeria to the mpla cause, it also lobbied many
African states to ignore the United States directive and adopt
Nigeria's policy. The general took advantage of an oau summit
meeting to mount a bitter attack on what he considered to be an
undue American interference in African affairs. He spoke in such
belligerent tones that Nigeria's other Western allies were taken
aback. Furthermore, the administration gave generous material,
military, and financial support to the mpla government in Luanda,
including a cash grant of $20 million.21 Because Nigeria was so
militant on the Angolan issue, and because the ussr (via Cuba) also
provided massive material and financial support to the mpla, the
Western powers naturally felt that Nigeria's foreign policy had
taken a new turn.
Although General Muhammed's term was quite brief - he was

assassinated in an abortive coup in February 1976 - it was clear to
most observers that, if the Angolan issue was a true pointer, he had
fulfilled his primary objective of making Nigeria's foreign policy
much more non-aligned than hitherto. He was succeeded as the
head of state by his deputy, General Olusegun Obasanjo.
The new leader reaffirmed his commitment to maintain the
momentum of Muhammed's foreign policy. On African issues, par-

ticularly on decolonization, the Obasanjo regime carried on from
where General Muhammed left oft. It stressed, in the most uncom-
promising terms, the necessity of working towards the achievement
of majority rule in Namibia and Zimbabwe and of radically modi-
fying South Africa's apartheid policy. So strongly did Nigeria feel
about the situation in Southern Africa that it played host to the
World Anti-Apartheid Conference in August 1977. Nigeria was
equally involved in other African issues. It remained the driving
force behind ecowas, it strove to put life into the fifteen-year-old
21 See Oye Ogunbadejo, 'Efficiency in the Conduct of Nigerian Foreign Relations/

in M.J. Balogun, ed, Managerial Efficiency in the Public Sector: Patterns and
Problems in Nigeria (Ile-Ife forthcoming), chapter vm.
River Niger Commission, it assisted in the pacific settlement of

African disputes, it consistently sought to advance African interests
at international conferences, it provided technical and financial
assistance to many African states, it awarded numerous scholarships
to young Africans to study in Nigeria, it remained one of the stabi-
lizing powers at the oau, and it identified itself very closely with
the promotion of black consciousness.-1' In short, Nigeria still re-
garded Africa as the centrepiece of its international relations; so
much so that its relations with the great powers were governed by
the policies of these states to Africa.
Nigeria's warm relations with the United States under the
Obasanjo regime, for instance, were brought about by Carter's new
African policy which, unlike the Ford administration's policy,
seemed on balance to be quite progressive, especially on the issue
of decolonization. Relations between the two countries rose dra-
matically from the low point to which they had sunk during the
Muhammed regime (largely as a result of the Angolan issue) to a
high level when President Carter assumed the presidency and
changed the tack of United States African policy. To some extent,
this explains why Nigeria's foreign policy seemed to have reverted
to the pro-Western version of 'non-alignment.' Indeed, Lagos-
Washington relations were so cordial that General Obasanjo paid
a state visit to the United States in October 1977, and the visit was
reciprocated by President Carter in March 1978.23 Moreover, eco-
nomic relations between the two countries kept pace with political
relations. In 1977, for example, the United States took about 50
per cent of Nigeria's oil exports and sold $958 million worth of
goods to the Nigerians.24 The trade figures were quite beneficial
from the Lagos perspective, because there was normally a huge
imbalance in Nigeria's favour.25
22 Witness, for instance, its role in staging the African Festival of Arts and Cul-
ture (festac) in 1977, particularly the heavy expense which Lagos incurred in
promoting the exercise.
23 For an analysis of Lagos-Washington relations during the Obasanjo regime, see
Oye Ogunbadejo, 'A New Turn in us-Nigerian Relations/ World Today, xxxv
(March 1979), 117-26.
24 Business Times (Lagos), 2 May 1978, p 1, and West Africa (1978), p 948.
25 See, for instance, Africa (May 1978).
7(>2 INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL
For their part, the communist powers seemed increasingly re-

signed to the fact that the West would always hold the upper hand
in Nigeria. They also knew that the attainment of socialism in
the country was, at best, a distant dream. They therefore adapted
their strategy to the situation. They became less doctrinaire and
concentrated more on achieving good relations with an eye to a
corresponding increase in trade opportunities. The Soviet Union
in particular subordinated ideological adventurism to good rela-
tions with Lagos. The iron and steel project was kept alive, and
in June 1977 Ahmed Joda, the permanent secretary of the Federal
Ministry of Industries, led a delegation to the ussr to discuss it. The
delegation, which included the project manager of the Nigerian
Steel Development Authority, Akin Adegboye, familiarized itself
with the design of the iron and steel complex and with the method
and organization of production in the Soviet Union's own iron and
steel plants, thus resolving some of the preliminary difficulties con-
nected with establishing the complex in Nigeria.20 By November
1978 the Nigerian Steel Development Authority was able to an-
nounce that the planning, design, and survey of the project had
been completed.-7 Furthermore, the ussr became more actively in-
volved in the petroleum industry. Aside from the ussr's assistance
in setting up the Petroleum Technical College at Warri, men-
tioned earlier, the Soviet Union was able, under a $i2o-million
contract, to participate in the construction of part of a nationwide
oil-product distribution network. Altogether, the Soviet Union
provided 900 kilometers of a 2800-kilometer pipeline system.28
CONCLUSION
There is an element of continuity in Nigerian foreign policy in

that all the various regimes subscribed to 'non-alignment' at
26 Daily Times (Lagos), 18 June 1977.

27 See 'Progress at Ajaokuta Steel Complex, in ibid, 14 November 1978, and New
Nigerian (Kaduna), 11 November 1978.
28 See Daily Times, 29 January 1979, p 9. Note that the other contracts were
awarded to Western companies: Italy's Montubi Montaggi Material Tubolari
and America's Williams International. See Ogunbadejo, 'Ideology and Pragma-
tism,' p 825.
the international level and good neighbourliness in Africa. What

varied was the way successive regimes interpreted these cardinal
principles and the extent to which other intra- and extra-Nigerian
events shaped the execution of these policies. The Balewa adminis-
tration, for the reasons discussed earlier, was able to pursue a
pro-Western foreign policy. The Ironsi regime maintained a simi-
lar posture. The exigencies of the civil war, however, forced the
Gowon administration to redress this bias, insofar as they enabled
Lagos to fraternize with the Soviet Union, but this development
did not, per se, lead to any major Soviet influence on the direction
of Nigerian foreign policy.
The Muhammed regime steered Nigeria's foreign relations on-
to a more militant path and redressed the lopsided nature of the
country's non-aligned policy. The momentum was maintained in
a somewhat reduced form by the Obasanjo regime; it slackened
largely because common ground emerged in the African policies
of Lagos and the United States under Carter's presidency, and this
facilitated a rapprochement in American-Nigerian relations. Be-
cause Lagos and Washington resumed close and cordial relations
Nigeria's foreign policy seemed to have moved back, once again,
to its traditional pro- Western course. Yet, it should be noted that
this posture has not resulted in a display of hostility towards the
communist powers. Indeed, many of these states have assisted, and
some are still assisting, Nigeria on many important development
projects, and trade relations, too, have flourished.
It is hardly surprising, of course, that successive Federal gov-
ernments have, in varying degrees, pursued a pro- Western non-
aligned policy. In the first place, the neo-colonial nature of the
Nigerian economy dictated this policy. As well, Nigerian leaders
since independence, save for Murtala Muhammed, were not only
Atlantic-centred but also committed anglophiles. Many Nigerian
leaders genuinely believed that fraternizing unduly with the com-
munist powers might have some internal repercussions - not least,
that it would lead progressive elements in the country to urge that
the status quo should be radically transformed. Because these lead-
ers were not socialist-oriented, they were not prepared to allow
such a situation to develop. Even the Muhammed administration's

radical policy over Angola should not be taken as positive evi-
dence that the regime was intent on permanently shifting Nigeria's
foreign policy posture to be more in line with that of the ussr; nor
did it mean that the regime was socialist-oriented. Support for the
mpla resulted from the administration's strong response to South
Africa's intervention on the side of the fnla-unita. What incensed
Lagos against the Western powers, particularly the United States,

was that they endorsed Pretoria's adventures in Angola. In other
words, Nigeria and the Soviet Union were in the same camp - back-
ing the mpla - by default rather than by design; certainly there
was no conscious ideological inclination on the part of Lagos
towards Moscow. Had General Muhammed not been assassinated,
it is highly probable that he, too, would have mended fences with
the West (like General Obasanjo) once it was clear that United
States policy on Africa had changed and that, in broad terms,
President Carter's position on Africa was more in line with that of
Nigeria than that of the Ford administration had been. The bed-
rock of my argument here is that from i960 to 1979 Nigeria's
leaders felt that the country's national interests could best be ad-
vanced by remaining in the Western powers' sphere of influence.
To say there is an element of continuity in Nigerian foreign
policy raises the issue of why the various regimes subscribed, in
broad terms, to the same principles in the country's external rela-
tions? The obvious answer, as I have just indicated, is simply that
they felt that only these principles could advance or promote
Nigeria's national interests. But it should not be forgotten that
most of Nigeria's foreign policy principles are in any case external-
ly determined. Admittedly, there is now a shift of emphasis from
the old international politics of the balance of power and the bi-
polar domination of the superpowers to the new politics of inter-
national pluralism;29 yet, one could argue that non-alignment was
an attractive policy to a young state that wanted neither to be
29 Cf, for instance, Karl W. Deutsch, The Analysis of International Relations

(2nd ed; Englewood Cliffs, nj, 1978).
drawn into Cold War politics nor to become an easy pawn in the
more direct East- West conflict and rivalry. As well, the ideas of the
legal equality of states and non-interference in the internal affairs
of other states are important principles of international law, which
Nigeria ought to respect, and had, in fact, respected during this
period. And, finally, in an increasingly interdependent world, and
in the quest for an orderly global system, the membership of states
in international organizations is normally regarded as essential,
and, to this extent, Nigeria's membership of the United Nations,
the Commonwealth, or even the oau, merely respects this inter-
national norm. Thus, while it is important to consider Nigeria's
foreign relations in a linkage context, especially the reciprocal
influence between national-domestic and international environ-
ments in the formulation of Nigerian foreign policy principles, it
is equally important to recognize the external bases upon which
the retention of some of these principles rest.
Clearly, the record of the military in the field of the country's
foreign relations, is, in varying degrees, much better than that of
the Balewa regime. But then, this could be explained to some ex-
tent by way of Lagos' increased capability for influence. Its oil
wealth, particularly in the years after the civil war, provided
Nigeria with the economic base, and thus the confidence, to give
more substance to its foreign policy of non-alignment.

Ogunbadejo 1980

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Nigeria's Foreign Policy under Military Rule 1966-79

Author(s): Oye Ogunbadejo

Nigeria's foreign policy

At independence in October i960, Nigeria had one of the most con-

Senior Lecturer in the Department of Political Science at the University of Ife,

1 There is a fair amount of literature on Nigeria's foreign relations from i960

- the legal equality of states, non-interference in the internal affairs

and, any attempt to provide the semblance of one was increasingly

THE CIVIL WAR AND FOREIGN POLICY 1967-70

regional governments in their development programmes. The

cessionists in July 1967, Nigerian foreign policy was less concerned

Union was prominent in cultural and economic activities in the

8 See ibid, pp 816-18.

accord formal recognition to Biafra, it would have to secure the

feat, would Nigeria succeed in remaining a united country. Thus,

THE GOWON ADMINISTRATION'S PEACETIME FOREIGN POLICY 1970-5

cession in January 1970, the Federal government faced the task of

12 For a series of essays on the interdependence of foreign policy decisions and

held detailed discussions with his hosts on many issues, including

public and giving a false impression as to the actual orientation

wars of independence.18 The Federal Military government itself

Nigeria's international role in Africa was not, however, con-

18 Sec, in particular, ibid, pp 38-41.

of an all-embracing regional economic grouping, the Economic

approach to African unity. While the regime made efforts in its

FOREIGN POLICY UNDER THE MUHAMMED-OBASAN JO REGIME 1975*9

hilt. Nigeria recognized the latter group despite Washington's se-

Although General Muhammed's term was quite brief - he was

momentum of Muhammed's foreign policy. On African issues, par-

21 See Oye Ogunbadejo, 'Efficiency in the Conduct of Nigerian Foreign Relations/

River Niger Commission, it assisted in the pacific settlement of

For their part, the communist powers seemed increasingly re-

There is an element of continuity in Nigerian foreign policy in

26 Daily Times (Lagos), 18 June 1977.

the international level and good neighbourliness in Africa. What

such a situation to develop. Even the Muhammed administration's

Lagos against the Western powers, particularly the United States,

29 Cf, for instance, Karl W. Deutsch, The Analysis of International Relations

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