DOCTRINE OF PLEASURE IN SERVICES

ASHISH MISHRA
LLM 2023-24
10580

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 ABSTRACT

The Doctrine of Pleasure, rooted in English Common Law, pertains to the tenure of civil or
public servants appointed by the Crown. Under this principle, such servants hold their positions
at the discretion of the Crown, subject to termination whenever deemed necessary by the Crown.
In India, this doctrine is enshrined in Article 310 of the Constitution and has been a subject of
considerable debate. While Articles 309 to 323 outline detailed provisions for Central and State
services, Article 311 serves as an exception to the pleasure doctrine, providing constitutional
safeguards to civil servants.

Civil servants play a crucial role in contemporary governance, tasked with implementing
policies and laws formulated by ministers and legislatures. Despite their importance, the
termination of civil servants under the pleasure doctrine has been scrutinized by courts for its
potential violation of fundamental rights and contravention of the Principles of Natural Justice.
This paper aims to critically examine the implications of the Doctrine of Pleasure, tracing its
evolution in both England and India through case law analysis.

Key words: Doctrine of Pleasure, Common Law, Fundamental Rights, Principles of

Natural Justice

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 I. INTRODUCTION
In News

 Kerala Governor and the State government have major differences over multiple
issues.

About Controversy

 The latest controversy arose after the Governor sought the resignation of several
vice-chancellors following a Supreme Court judgement setting aside the
appointment of the Vice-Chancellor of a technology university.
 As a fallout of comments made by the State’s Finance Minister, K. N. Balagopal, the
Governor, has also sought his dismissal from his Cabinet, declaring that he
has withdrawn the pleasure of having him in the Council of Ministers.

 Article 310 of Indian Constitution:

o It says every person in the defence or civil service of the Union holds
office during the pleasure of the President, and every member of the civil
service in the States holds office during the pleasure of the Governor.
 Article 311:
o It imposes restrictions on the removal of a civil servant.
o It provides for civil servants being given a reasonable opportunity for a
hearing on the charges against them.
o There is also a provision to dispense with the inquiry if it is not practicable
to hold one, or if it is not expedient to do so in the interest of national
security.
o In practical terms, the pleasure of the President referred to here is that of
the Union government, and the Governor’s pleasure is that of the State
government.

 Article 164:
o The Chief Minister is appointed by the Governor; and the other Ministers
are appointed by the Governor on the CM’s advice.
o It adds that Ministers hold office during the pleasure of the Governor.
o In a constitutional scheme in which they are appointed solely on the CM’s
advice, the ‘pleasure’ referred to is also taken to mean the right of the
Chief Minister to dismiss a Minister, and not that of the Governor.

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 oIn short, the Governor of an Indian State cannot remove a Minister on his
own.
Supreme Court on one Vice-Chancellor’s appointment

 In a case challenging the appointment of Dr. M.S. Rajasree as V-C of the APJ Abdul
Kalam Technological University, Thiruvananthapuram, the Supreme Court held
that her appointment was contrary to the regulations of the University Grants
Commission (UGC).
 Protocol was not followed:
o The particular infirmity was that the Search Committee had identified only
one candidate and recommended the name to the Chancellor for
appointment.
o Under UGC regulations, a panel of three to five names should be
recommended so that the Chancellor has a number of options to choose
from.

Governor’s Reaction

 The Governor, in his capacity as Chancellor of universities, responded by directing

the V-Cs of nine universities to resign the very next day, contending that the
infirmities pointed out by the Supreme Court in one case also vitiated their
appointments.
 The apex court had declared that an appointment not in line with the UGC
regulations would be ab initio void that is invalid from the very beginning.
 Each of those appointments were either made on the basis of a single
recommendation or were recommended by a panel in which the Chief Secretary was a
member (contrary to the Regulations that say its members should be persons of
eminence in the field of higher education).

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DOCTRINE OF PLEASURE

In Britain, traditionally, a servant of the Crown holds office during the pleasure of the
Crown1. This is the Common Law Doctrine. The justification for the rule is that the Crown
should not be bound to continue in public service any person whose conduct is not
satisfactory.2 This Doctrine is absolute in Britain and can only be restricted by an Act of the
Parliament.3
The „Pleasure Doctrine‟ is a principle of the common law, the origins of which may be traced
back to the development of the Concept in the British. It is a historical rule of common law
that a public servant under the British Crown had no fixed tenure, but held his/her position at
the absolute discretion of the Crown. The Court in Firrty v. Odlum,4held that a Civil Servant
could not claim arrears of salaries due or any damage arising out of the wrongful dismissal
against the Crown.
The Law relating to tenure of Civil Servants is stated in Halsbury‟s Laws of England as follows:
“except where it is otherwise provided by Statute all public officers and servants of the Crown hold
their appointment at the pleasure of the Crown and are generally subject to dismissal at any time
without cause assigned, nor will an action for wrongful dismissed be entertained even though a
special contract be proved”
The scope of this doctrine was again considered in the case of Shenton v. Smith5 wherein
the Privy Council held:
“The difficulty of dismissing servants whose continuance in office is detrimental to the State would
if it were necessary to prove some offense to the satisfaction of a jury, be such as to seriously impede
the working of the public service.”
In this case, the Privy Council Observed that the Doctrine of Pleasure is a „necessity‟.
Further, Lord Hobhouse observed that the Doctrine of Pleasure is devised to ensure that civil
servants need to be reciprocal towards the government and there should be organic unity
between civil servants and the Crown.6
The Doctrine has its origins in the Latin phrase „durante bene placito‟ which translates to „during
good pleasure‟ or, „durante bene placito regis‟ „during good pleasure of the king‟. The same was

1 M P Jain, Indian Constitutional Law (7th edn, Lexis Nexis 2016) 1480
2 Shenton v. Smith, (1895) AC 229; Gould v. Stuart, (1896) AC 575; Reilly v. The King, (1934) AC 176; Terreil v.
Secy. of State, (1953) 2 QB 482; Chelliah Kodeeswaran v. Attorney-General of Ceylon, (1970) AC 1111
3 M P Jain, Indian Constitutional Law (7th edn, Lexis Nexis 2016) 1480
4 (1790) 3 TR 68
5 1895 AC 229 (PC)

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6 Shenton v. Smith, 1895 AC 229 (PC)

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affirmed for the first time by the Court of Appeals of the United Kingdom in Dunn. v. R7. In
this case, the Court held:
“… I take it that persons employed as the petitioner was in the service of the Crown except in
cases where there is some statutory provision for a higher tenure of office are ordinarily engaged in
the understanding that they hold their employment at the pleasure of the Crown. So I think that
there must be imported into the contract for the employment of the petitioner, the term which applies
to civil servants in general, namely that the Crown may put an end to the employment at
its pleasure.”
The Court in this case was of the opinion the employment is held at the pleasure of the
Crown and the Crown may put an end to the same.
Over time this doctrine has evolved as a common-law doctrine. In England a civil servant
holds his office during the Pleasure of the Crown and his services may be terminated at any
time by the Crown without assigning any reason for the same and this is based on public
policy. Even if there exists a special contract regarding the tenure of an office between the
Crown and the civil servant, the Crown is not bound by it on the ground that the Crown could
not fetter its future executive actions by entering into a contract in matters concerning the
welfare of the Country.8
In India, Article 310 envisages the doctrine of pleasure, the evolution of the doctrine of
pleasure in India will be analysed in the next chapter.

II- EVOLUTION OF THE DOCTRINE IN INDIA

Part XIV of the Constitution of India deals with services under the Union and the State.
Article 310 of the Indian Constitution expressly provides that all persons who are members of
the Defence Services or the Civil Services of the Union or All-India Services hold office
during the pleasure of the President.9
The Adoption of the concept of the Doctrine of Pleasure in India can be Traced to the Charter
Act of 1833. Before this the Act of 1793 in sections 35 and 36 provided for the removal or
recall of any person holding any office, employment or commission in a civil or military
capacity in the company, at the will and pleasure of His Majesty, heirs or successors and the
Court of Directors respectively. The Statute of William the IV introduced the doctrine in
India as follows:

7 (1896) 1 QB 116
7
8 Om Prakash Motiwal, „Doctrine of pleasure and the Services in Indian Constitution‟ [1963] Indian Journal of
Public Administration 64
9 Art. 310, Constitution of India, 1950

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 “Nothing in this Act shall take away the powers of the said Court of Directors, to
remove or dismiss any of the officers or servants of the said company, but the
said court shall and may at times have full liberty to remove or dismiss away such
officer or servant at their will and pleasure.”

2.1. THE GOVERNMENT OF INDIA ACT 1833

All servants of the East India Company held offices during the Pleasure of the Crown and
they could be dismissed without any reason being assigned for such dismissal by virtue of
Section 74 of the Government of India Act, 1833.10

2.2. THE GOVERNMENT OF INDIA ACT, 1858

By virtue of Section 16 of the Government of India Act, 1858 the Doctrine was yet again
given statutory recognition.11 The Act did not provide any remedy to a Civil Servant even if
the dismissal was arbitrary. The Act of 1858 vested the power of framing rules with the
Secretary of State in Council but this power was however subject to the Crown's power to
dismiss any employee at pleasure.

2.3. RESOLUTION OF 1879

The resolution adopted by the Government of India on 27th June 1879 provided that in all
cases of dismissal or removal of Civil Servants, the charges should invariably be reduced to
writing. It further provided that witnesses shall be examined to the possible extent and this
examination shall be in the presence of delinquent officers. It also provided for a right to
cross-examine. It can be seen that this resolution aimed at removing any arbitrary exercise of
power while dismissing a Civil Servant and upheld rule of law while also abiding by the
Principles of Natural

10 Section 74, Government of India Act, 1833 “74. It shall be lawful for his Majesty, by any writing under his
manual, to remove or dismiss any person holding any office, employment or commission, civil or military, under
the said company in India, and to vacate any appointment or commission of any person to any such office or
employment” <https://www.legalcrystal.com/act/133614/government-of-india-act-1833-complete-act> accessed
02 November 2020
11 Section 16, Government of India Act, 1858 “16. Removal Of Officers And Supply Of Vacancies In The

Establishment: After the First Formation of the Establishment, it shall be lawful for the Secretary of State in
Council to remove any Officer or Servant belonging thereto, and also to make all Appointments and. Promotions
to and in such Establishment; provided that the Order of Her Majesty in Council of the Twenty-first Day of May
One thousand eight hundred and fifty-five, or such other Regulations as may be from Time to Time established
by Her Majesty for Examinations, Certificates, Probation, or other Tests of Fitness, in relation to Appointments
to junior Situations in the Civil Service, shall apply to such Appointments on the said
9
Establishment.”
<https://lawsisto.com/Read-Central-Act/996/GOVERNMENT-OF-INDIA-ACT-1858#> accessed 2 November
2020

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Justice. However, this resolution remained only on paper and it was not implemented in its true
spirit.12

2.4. GOVERNMENT OF INDIA ACT, 1919

The Doctrine of Pleasure continued its operation in the same form as it existed in the
Government of India Act, 1858 until certain safeguards were introduced by the Government
of India Act, 1919. Section 96 of the Government of India Act, 1919 circumscribed the
Doctrine of Pleasure by introducing certain safeguards. The Act in Section 96B13 made it
clear that a Civil Servant could not be dismissed by an authority subordinate to the appointing
authority.14 The Act of 1919 also provided an opportunity to the Civil Servants to represent
their case to the Governor of the respective province for grievances.15
It can be observed that this was the first Act to place a restriction on the unfettered power of
the Crown. The Government of India Act further provided for rulemaking power by virtue of
section 96(2)16. The rules were framed by the Government through the Secretary of State in
Council and these rules came to be known as the Classification Rules in December 1920.
After several amendments, the rules were published as Civil Service (Classification, Control,
and Appeal) Rules, 1930. The Rules further provided for safeguards to the Civil Servants. An
order

12 OP Motiwal, „Development of Legal Rights of Civil Servants in India‟ (1975) 17 Journal of Indian Law
Institute 437, 438
13 Section 96-B(1), Government of India Act, 1919 “96.B(1)Subject to the provisions of this Act and of rules

made thereunder, every person in the civil service of the Crown in India holds office during His Majesty's
pleasure, and may be employed in any manner required by a proper authority within the scope of his duty but no
person in that service may be dismissed by any authority subordinate to that by which he was appointed, and the
Secretary of State in Council may (except so far as he may provide by rules to the contrary) reinstate any person
in that service who has been dismissed.” <https://www.legalcrystal.com/act/32232/government-of-india-act-
1915-19-repealed- section-96b>accessed 2 November 2020
14 This is the position even today, Cite the case law
15 Section 96-B(1), Government of India Act, 1919 “96.B(1)… If any such person appointed by the Secretary of

State in Council thinks himself wronged by an order of an official superior in a governor's province, and on due
application made to that superior does not receive the redress to which he may consider himself entitled, be
may, without prejudice to any other right of redress, complain to the governor of the province in order to obtain
justice, and the governor is hereby directed to examine such complaint and require such action to be taken
thereon as may appear to him to be just and equitable.” <https://www.legalcrystal.com/act/32232/government-
of-india-act-1915- 19-repealed-section-96b>accessed 2 November 2020
16 Section 96-B(2), Government of India Act, 1919 “96.B(2) (2) The Secretary of State in Council may make

rules for regulating the classification of the civil services in India, the methods of their recruitment, their
conditions of services, pay and allowances, and discipline and conduct. Such rules may, to such extent and in
respect of such matters as may be prescribed, delegate the power of making: rules to the Governor-General in
Councilor to local governments, or authorise the Indian legislature or local legislatures to make laws regulating
the public services: Provided that every person appointed before the commencement of the Government of India
Act, 1919, by the Secretary of Stale in Council to the civil service of the Crown in India shall retain all his
existing or accruing rights, or shall receive such compensation, for the loss of any of them as the Secretary of
11
State in Council may consider just and equitable.”<https://www.legalcrystal.com/act/32232/government-of-
india-act-1915-19-repealed-section- 96b>accessed 2 November 2020

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of dismissal or removal of a Civil Servant could be passed only after informing the Civil
Servant the grounds for rejection in writing and giving him an opportunity of defending
himself.
Following the Classification Rules, The Fundamental Rules which came into force in January
1922. With the introduction of these rules several cases came up before the Courts for the
Interpretation of the Rules.

SATISH CHANDRA DAS V. SECRETARY OF STATE17

In this case, the dismissal of a Police Official was in question. The Calcutta High
Court held that the dismissal was not in accordance with the procedure in rule 14 of
the Fundamental Rules and that the officer had a proper cause of Action.
R.T. RANGACHARI V. SECRETARY OF STATE FOR INDIA18
In this case, the petitioner was dismissed from service based on an inquiry but the
order for dismissal was issued by a subordinate authority. The Privy Council held that
his removal was illegal as this power could not be exercised by a subordinate official.

R VENKATA RAO V. SECRETARY OF STATE19

In this case, the petitioner challenged his order of dismissal to be in contravention of
Section 96B. The Privy Council rejected this contention and held that the rules did not
in any manner fetter the Pleasure of Crown except in special circumstances that are
otherwise provided.
The words “subject to the rules” indicated statutory and solemn assurance that the tenure of
office though on pleasure, would not be subject to capricious or arbitrary removal. 20 It can be
said that while the Courts were of the opinion that the rules will have to be followed while
dismissing a Civil Servant but even the rules would not lay any restriction to the Crowns
Pleasure.

2.5. GOVERNMENT OF INDIA ACT, 1935

The Government of India Act, 1935 set up a federal structure. It laid down elaborate provisions
respect of the civil servants of the crown in India in section 240. Section 240(1) provided for the

17 A.I.R 1927, Cal 311

18 A.I.R (1973), P.C., 27
19 A.I.R. (1937), P.C., 31

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20Om Prakash Motiwal, „Doctrine of Pleasure and the Services in Indian Constitution‟ [1963] Indian Journal of
Public Administration 66

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„Doctrine of Pleasure.21 Sections 240(2)22 and 240(3)23 made elaborate provisions conferring
upon the Civil Servants safeguards against the arbitrary exercise of power. These safeguards
are as follows: (i) A Civil servant cannot be dismissed by a subordinate authority; (ii) A civil
servant cannot be dismissed without providing a reasonable opportunity of showing cause
before initiating any such disciplinary actions. 24 It was for the first time that the “reasonable
opportunity” was introduced. However, this was restricted through the proviso to section
240(3)
(a) and (b)25 restricted the scope of reasonable opportunity in specified cases. Further, the
power to frame rules for the Government Servants was provided under Section 241(2) and
241(5)26 empowered the Governor-General and the governor to deal with the case of any
person serving his Majesty in a Civil capacity in such a manner as may appear to him to be
just and equitable. From a combined reading of section 96-B of the Government of India Act,
1919, and Section 240 of the Government of India Act, 1935 it can be seen that there is no
material difference between the two. Section 240 introduced that a Civil Servant was to be
given a „reasonable opportunity” and this is the only substantial difference between the two.
The Interpretation of Section 240 of the 1935 Act came up before the Privy Council in the
27
case of The High Commissioner of India and another v. I.M. Lall, . In this case, the
respondent on appeal contended that the two grounds on which his dismissal was based were

21 Section 240(1), Government of India Act 1935 “240(1) Except as expressly provided by this Act, every
person who is a member of a civil service of the Crown in India, or holds any civil post under the Crown in
India, holds office during His Majesty's pleasure.”
<https://www.constitutionofindia.net/historical_constitutions/government_of_india_act_1935_2nd%20August%2
01935> accessed 2 November 2020
22 Section 240(2), Government of India Act 1935 “240(2) No such person as aforesaid shall be dismissed from

the service of His Majesty by any authority subordinate to that by which he was
appointed.”
<https://www.constitutionofindia.net/historical_constitutions/government_of_india_act_1935_2nd%20August%2
01935> accessed 2 November 2020
23 Section 240(3), Government of India Act 1935 “240(3) No such person as aforesaid shall be dismissed or

reduced in rank until he has been given a reasonable opportunity of showing cause against the action proposed to
be taken in regard to him”
<https://www.constitutionofindia.net/historical_constitutions/government_of_india_act_1935_2nd%20August%2
01935> accessed 2 November 2020
24 See, Sections 240(2) and 240(3) of the Government of India Act 1935
<https://www.constitutionofindia.net/historical_constitutions/government_of_india_act_1935_2nd%20August%2
01935> accessed 2 November 2020
25 Section 240(3) (a) and (b) of the Government of India Act 1935 “(a) where a person is dismissed or reduced

in rank on the ground of conduct which has led to his conviction on a criminal charge ; or
(b) where an authority empowered to dismiss a person or reduce him in rank is satisfied that for some reason, to
be recorded by that authority in writing, it is not reasonably practicable to give to that person an opportunity of
showing cause.”
<https://www.constitutionofindia.net/historical_constitutions/government_of_india_act_1935_2nd%20August%2
01935> accessed 2 November 2020
26 See, Section 241 of the Government of India Act 1935
15
<https://www.constitutionofindia.net/historical_constitutions/government_of_india_act_1935_2nd%20August%2
01935> accessed 2 November 2020
27 A.I.R. (1948), P.C. 121

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not shown to him and that this is a violation of Section 240(3) of the Government of India
Act, 1935. The Privy Council clarified that sub-section 3 was mandatory and that the remedy
available against any dismissal in contravention of this section would be declared such orders
as void.
However, in the Indian context the doctrine was not adopted in its entirety and the same can
be concluded from the Hon‟ble Supreme Court‟s observations in the Case of Purshottam
Lal Dhingra v. Union of India28:
“Under the English Common Law all servants of the Crown held office during the Pleasure of the
Crown and were liable to be dismissed at any time and without any reason being assigned for such
dismissal but the Indian Law has not adopted this rule in its entirety”
The Doctrine of Pleasure in The Indian Constitution will be analysed in the next chapter.

III. DOCTRINE OF PLEASURE IN THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA

The Constitution of India adopted more or less the same pattern laid down in the Government
of India Act, 1935. This was pointed out by the Hon‟ble Supreme Court in the case of
Purshottam Lal Dhingra v. Union of India29where the courts observed as follows:
“As under Section 96-B(1) of the 1915 Act and Section 240(1) of the 1935 Act, the persons
specified therein held office during the pleasure of the Crown so under Article 310(1) they hold
their office during the pleasure of the President or of the Governor, as the case may be. The opening
words of Article 310(1), namely except as expressly provided by this Constitution, reproduce the
opening words of Section 240(1) of the 1935 Act, substituting the words „Constitution‟ for the
word „Act‟…”

3.1. CONSTITUTIONAL ASSEMBLY DEBATES

Article 282(A) of the Draft Constitution moved by Dr. B.R. Ambedkar, there were only 2
minor amendments that were moved during the debate on Draft Article 282(A). One was by
Brajeshwar Prasad who sought for the substitution of pleasure doctrine by security up to 68
years of age, and the other sought a modification, calling for exercise of pleasure only by the
President.30 However, both these amendments were rejected and Section 240(1) was
reproduced in Article 310 of the Constitution of India. The Doctrine of Pleasure has often
been regarded as a right conferred on the Government over its servants.

28 AIR 1958 SC 36
29 (1958) S.C.R. 828
30 Constituent Assembly of India Debates (Proceedings) – Volume IX, 23August 1949, available at

<https://www.constitutionofindia.net/constitution_assembly_debates/volume/9/1949-08-23> accessed 8
17
November 2020

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3.2. ARTICLE 310

Article 310 lays down that the defence personnel31 and civil servants32 of the Union, and the
members of All-India Service, hold office during the „pleasure of the President‟. Similarly, a
Civil Servant of a State holds office during the „pleasure of the Governor‟.33
In India this is the generally rule that operates „except as expressly provided by the
Constitution”. This implies that Doctrine of Pleasure in India is not absolute and is subject to
Constitutional limitations. This indicates that if there is a provision in the Constitution giving
a Civil Servant a tenure of office, then that office would be excluded from the Doctrine of
Pleasure as provided in Article 310. 34 By virtue of this, the following offices are expressly
excluded by the Constitution from Rule of Pleasure:
(i) The Supreme Court Judges35;
(ii)Auditor-General36;
(iii)High Court Judges37;
(iv)A member of the Public Service Commission38and
(v) The Chief Election Commissioner39.
The Supreme Court in the case of Union of India v. Tulsiram Patel40 has clarified that the
pleasure doctrine is based on public policy, public interest and public good insofar as
inefficient, dishonest or corrupt persons, or those who have become a security risk should
not continue service. It can be observed that in both Britain and India the Doctrine of
Pleasure is based on Public Policy. However, in India the Pleasure Doctrine under Article
310 is conditioned by Constitutional restrictions under Article 31141 and is not absolute or
unfettered unlike United The position in India differs from that of the United Kingdom,
because in United Kingdom, the Parliament may supersede the doctrine of pleasure in any
case, but the same cannot be done in India as in India the Doctrine of Pleasure is sanctioned
by the Constitution.

31 The term „defence personnel‟ means a member of a defence service or a person holding any post connected
with defence.
32 The term „civil servant‟ includes members of a Civil service of the Centre or a state, or of an all-India
33 Art. 310 Constitution of India, 1950
34 M P Jain, Indian Constitutional Law (7th edn, Lexis Nexis 2016) 1480
35 Art. 124, Constitution of India 1950
36 Art. 148, Constitution of India 1950
37 Art. 217, Art. 218, Constitution of India 1950
38 Art. 317, Constitution of India 1950
39 Art. 324, Constitution of India 1950

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40 AIR 1985 SC 1416
41 State of Uttar Pradesh v. Chandra Mohan Nigam, AIR 1977, SC 2411

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3.3. RESTRICTIONS ON DOCTRINE OF PLEASURE

The Doctrine of Pleasure embodied in Article 310, though not subject to legislative power is
not, however, unlimited. One important limitation is laid down in Article 311(1) which
provides that no Civil servant is to be dismissed or removed by an authority subordinate to
the authority by which he was appointed and the second limitation of rule of reasonable
opportunity is laid down in Article 311(2). These restrictions are Constitutional Safeguards
provided to the Civil Servant.
3.3.1. NO REMOVAL BY SUBORDINATE AUTHORITY
The First restriction on the Doctrine of Pleasure as Laid down in Article 311 doesn‟t mean
that the officer has to be removed by the authority he was appointed but it only implies that
removal shall not be by an officer subordinate to the appointing authority and such a
dismissal or removal would be invalid.42 By virtue of this Article the Government can confer
powers on an officer other than the appointing authority to dismiss a Government Servant
provided the officer ordering such dismissal is not subordinate in rank to the appointing
authority.43
However, this requirement does not place a restriction on the Doctrine of Pleasure to be
exercised by the President or the Governor, for he may always dismiss a Civil Servant
whether appointed by him or someone else who is subordinate to him. This continues as a
restriction on subordinate appointing authorities, wherein the power of dismissal is to be
exercised by the authorities of the same rank as the appointing authorities. 44 It is essential to
understand that 311(1) is a safeguard to the Civil Servants and does not fetter the Doctrine of
Pleasure.
The purpose underlying Article 311(1) is to ensure that a certain amount of security is
provided to Civil Servants. This Article bars removal or dismissal by subordinate authorities
in whose judgments the Civil-Servants may not have much faith.45
3.3.2. REASONABLE OPPORTUNITY TO DEFEND
Clause (2) of Article 311 shall not be „dismissed‟, „removed‟ or „reduced‟ in rank except after
an enquiry in which he has been informed of the charges against him and given a reasonable
opportunity of being heard in respect those charges. There is a vast jurisprudence as to what
these terms „dismissed‟, „removed‟ or „reduced‟ connote but that is not within the scope of
the paper. Prior to the Constitution (42 nd Amendment) Act, 1976, a second opportunity was
also required to be given if it was proposed to impose on him the punishment of dismissal,
removal
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42 Krishna Kumar v. Divisional Assistant, E.E. Central Railways, AIR 1979 SC 1912
43 Mahesh v. State of Uttar Pradesh, AIR 1955 SC 70; State of Uttar Pradesh v. Ram Naresh Lal, AIR 1970 SC 1263
44 M P Jain, Indian Constitutional Law (7th edn, Lexis Nexis 2016) 1485
45 Purshottam Lal Dhingra v. Union of India, AIR 1958 SC 36

22
or reduction in rank. It was illegal to impose this punishment without giving a second
reasonable opportunity.46
It is essential that in a case governed by Article 311, a reasonable opportunity has to be given
to the Civil Servant to defend himself at the stage of enquiry against the charges imposed on
him. This safeguard is in accordance with the Principles of Natural Justice which provide that
no man should be punished without hearing him i.e. Audi Alterem Partem. The question as to
what does the expression “reasonable opportunity” take within itself has arisen before the
Apex Court several times and the generally accepted view is that there can be no general
rules laid down to establish what a reasonable opportunity would connote.47 The only general
statement which has been made is as follows:
“Before an officer is punished by way of dismissal, removal or reduction,
i. An enquiry should have been held in accordance with the Principles of
Natural Justice; and
ii. The enquiry should have been conducted fairly and properly”48

It can be observed that this safeguard has been interpreted in the light of Principles of Natural
Justice by the Courts. It can be said that the Doctrine of Pleasure does not operate as an
antithesis to the Principles of Natural Justice but complies with the same. It is also pertinent
to note that the restrictions in Section 240 of the 1935 Act were reflected in Article 311.
While the power under Article 310 is clearly limited or circumscribed by the Provisions of
Article 311 The Pleasure of the President is however not limited but has to be exercised in
accordance with the requirements laid down in Article 311.49

IV. FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS, PRINCIPLES OF NATURAL JUSTICE

AND THE DOCTRINE OF PLEASURE

The questions as to whether Article 310(1) of the Constitution is controlled by the

Fundamental Rights have been one of the most important questions that has arisen for
consideration before the Courts time and again. Although several High Courts were not
unanimous on this point but the difference seems to be settled. It is a settled position that the
Doctrine of Pleasure embodied

46 M P Jain, Indian Constitutional Law (7th edn, Lexis Nexis 2016) 1501; Mahendra Pal Singh, „V.N. Shukla‟s
Constitution of India (12th Edn, Eastern Book Company 2013) 943
47 Mahendra Pal Singh, „V.N. Shukla‟s Constitution of India (12th Edn, Eastern Book Company 2013) 943
48 U.P. Govt. v. Sabir Hussain, (1975) 4 SCC 703

23
49 Moti Ram Deka v. General Manager, North East Frontier Railway, AIR 1964 SC 600

24
in Article 310 cannot be exercised in a discriminatory manner and is controlled by
Fundamental Rights especially Articles 14, 16 and 19.50

4.1. RIGHT TO EQUALITY

The Constitution of India guarantees the right to Equality through Article 14 to 18. The Court
in Indira Sawhney v. Union of India51 has held that “Equality is one of the magnificent
corner- stones of Indian Democracy.” A constitution bench has declared that equality is a
basic feature of the Constitution and the content of Article 14 has been expanded to non-
arbitrariness, compliance with rules of Natural Justice eschewing irrationality, etc.52 It is an
established position of Law that a person‟s right to equality cannot be violated. Article 14 can
be invoked when a person‟s services are terminated in a discriminatory manner. Article
15(1) would come into picture when a person‟s services are terminated on grounds of
religious bigotry.53 Article 16(1) imposes equable treatment and bars arbitrary discrimination
under Article 310.54
4.1.1. ARTICLE 14
The Doctrine of Pleasure being subject to other provisions of the Constitution cannot be
exercised in contravention of the Right to Equality enshrined under Article 14 of the
Constitution. If any termination Is affected in a discriminatory manner, it violates the
Constitutional Mandate, and therefore, cannot withstand legal scrutiny.55 Where there are
similar sets of disciplinary rules adoption of the more drastic ones amounts to a
discriminatory action. The Court in the case of State of Orissa v. Dhirendranth 56 has held
that if different sets of enquiry procedures are adopted in such cases, without any rationale, an
order selecting a prejudicial procedure would result in violation of the equality clause.
Further, in the case of Kumari Shrilekha Vidyarthi v. State of Uttar Pradesh 57 the Court
held that, an arbitrary action of the State being a negation of the Rule of Law, cannot survive
the test of Reasonableness.

50 M P Jain, Indian Constitutional Law (7th edn, Lexis Nexis 2016) 1484
51 AIR 1993 SCC 477
52 M. Nagraj v. Union of India, AIR 2007 SC 71; M.G. Badapannavar v. State of Karnataka, AIR 2001 SC 260
53 Moinuddin v. State of Uttar Pradesh, AIR (1960) Allahabad 484
54 General Manager, Southern Railways v. Rangchari (1961) 2 S.C.J. 424
55 Union of India v. P.K. More, AIR 1962 SC 630

25
56AIR 1961 SC 1715
57 AIR 1991, SC 73

26
4.1.2. ARTICLE 16
Article 16(1) enshrines equality of opportunity in matters relating to appointment or
employment under the State. In the light of Article 16(1) the Court has held that exercise of
tenure of pleasure in contravention of the Constitutional Mandate amounts to arbitrary
discrimination in respect of employees and irrelevant or extraneous considerations amount to
hostile discrimination.58

4.2. RIGHT TO FREEDOM: ARTICLE 19

Article 19 of the Constitution provides for fundamental freedoms which are not absolute in
nature but subject to certain restrictions. The Court in the case of Kameshwar Prasad v.
State of Bihar59 has held that exercise of the doctrine of pleasure in contravention to Article
19 amounts to an unreasonable restriction. The Court in State of Punjab v. Jogindra
Singh60 has emphasised that a person entering upon his service does not surrender or waive
his fundamental rights and the exercise of Doctrine of Pleasure has to be subject to
Fundamental Rights.

4.3. PRINCIPLES OF NATURAL JUSTICE

As discussed in the previous chapter Article 311(2) lays down that a Civil Servant cannot be
dismissed, removed or reduced in rank except after an inquiry in which he has been informed
of the charges against him and given a reasonable opportunity of being heard in regard of
those charges. Article 311(2) gives Constitutional mandate to the Principles of Natural
Justice.61
The Court in the case of Shukbans Singh v. State of Punjab 62 has held that the concept of
„reasonable opportunity to show cause‟ is synonymous with the natural justice. And the
Supreme Court went on to say that Article 311(2) gives a Constitutional mandate to Principles
of Natural Justice. The proviso to Article 311 also provides for cases where the opportunity to
be heard can be excluded.63
Natural Justice however cannot have a fixed connotation and depends on the facts and
circumstances of each case. The Court has held that the essential point is that the person
concerned should have a reasonable opportunity of presenting himself before the
administrative authority and that the authority should act fairly, impartially and reasonably.64

58 Janakiraman v. State of Madhya Pradesh, AIR 1959 AP 185

59 AIR 1962 SC 1172
27
60 AIR 1963 SC 913
61 M P Jain, Indian Constitutional Law (7th edn, Lexis Nexis 2016) 1494
62 AIR 1968 SC 1089
63 See, Proviso to Art. 311(2) Constitution of India 1950
64 Kumaon Mandal Vikas Nigam Ltd. v. Girija Shankar Pant, AIR 2001 SC 24

28
 The Supreme Court has interpreted the Doctrine of Pleasure in such a way so as to not
override the Fundamental Rights and the Principles of Natural Justice. Though the position
prevails that the Doctrine of Pleasure can be exercised but, if the same is done in
contravention of the Fundamental Rights and Principles of Natural Justice it would be
considered void. Violation of Principles of Natural Justice and infringement of Fundamental
Rights enables the Courts to set aside the disciplinary proceedings on ground of bias and
procedural defects.

Way Ahead

 The National Commission to Review the Working of the Constitution appointed

by the Atal Bihari Vajpayee government in 2000 recommended significant changes in
the selection of Governors.
o The Commission suggested that the Governor of a State should be
appointed by the President, after consultation with the Chief Minister of
that State.
o Normally the five year term should be adhered to and removal or transfer
of the Governor should be by following a similar procedure as for
appointment i.e., after consultation with the Chief Minister of the
concerned State.
 The Sarkaria Commission:
o That was set up in 1983 to look into Centre-state relations, and proposed
that the Vice President of India and Speaker of Lok Sabha should be
consulted by the Prime Minister in the selection of Governors.
 The Justice Madan Mohan Punchhi Committee
o That was constituted in 2007 and proposed in its report that a committee
comprising the Prime Minister, Home Minister, Vice President, Speaker,
and the concerned Chief Minister should choose the Governor.
o It recommended deleting the Doctrine of Pleasure from the Constitution,
but backed the right of the Governor to sanction the prosecution of
ministers against the advice of the state government.
o It also argued for a provision for impeachment of the Governor by the state
legislature.

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 CONCLUSION
In the Indian Context the Doctrine of Pleasure was not adopted in its entirety from the United
Kingdom Common Law it is limited by certain provisions of the Constitution. In the United
Kingdom this is an absolute power and is not circumscribed by any restrictions. However, it
can be limited by the Parliament due to Parliamentary Sovereignty in the English Law. The
Constitution of India more or less adopted the same pattern laid down in the Government of
India Act 1935 which lays down certain safeguards to prevent arbitrary exercise of power
against them. The bureaucracy plays a prominent role in helping the political executive in the
governance of the country and to ensure that bureaucracy doesn‟t become autocracy the
doctrine of pleasure in India has certain limitations. The same is ensured through Article 311
of the Constitution which lays down certain limitations and the Courts have circumscribed the
exercise of Doctrine of Pleasure and have time and again emphasised that Doctrine of Pleasure
cannot be exercised in contravention to the Fundamental Rights enshrined in Part III of the
Constitution and the Principles of Natural Justice.

30
 REFERENCES

I. PRIMARY SOURCES

A. Constitutions
1. The Constitution of India, 1950
B. Case Laws

1. Chelliah Kodeeswaran v. Attorney-General of Ceylon, (1970) AC 1111

2. Dunn. v. R, (1896) 1 QB 116
3. Firrty v. Odlum, (1790) 3 TR 68

31
4. General Manager, Southern Railways v. Rangchari (1961) 2 S.C.J. 424
5. Gould v. Stuart, (1896) AC 57
6. Indira Sawhney v. Union of India, AIR 1993 SCC 477
7. Kameshwar Prasad v. State of Bihar, AIR 1962 SC 1172
8. Krishna Kumar v. Divisional Assiatant, E.E. Central Railways, AIR 1979 SC 1912
9. Kumaon Mandal vikas Nigam Ltd. v. Girija Shankar Pant, AIR 2001 SC 24
10. Kumari Shrilekha Vidyarthi v. State of Uttar Pradesh, AIR 1991 SC 73
11. M. Nagraj v. Union of India, AIR 2007 SC 71
12. M.G. Badapannavar v. State of Karnataka, AIR 2001 SC 260
13. Mahesh v. State of Uttar Pradesh, AIR 1955 SC 70
14. Moinuddin v. State of Uttar Pradesh, AIR (1960) Allahabad 484
15. Moti Ram Deka v. General Manager, North East Frontier Railway, AIR 1964 SC 600
16. Purshottam Lal Dhingra v. Union of India, AIR 1958 SC 36
17. R Venkata Rao v. Secretary of State, A.I.R. (1937), P.C., 31
18. R.T. Rangachari v. Secretary of State for India, A.I.R (1973), P.C., 27
19. Reilly v. The King, (1934) AC 176
20. Satish Chandra Das v. Secretary of State, A.I.R 1927, Cal 311
21. Satyavir Singh v. Union of India, AIR 1986 SC 555
22. Shenton v. Smith, (1895) AC 229
23. Shukbans Singh v. State of Punjab, AIR 1968 SC 1089
24. State of Orissa v. Dhirendrant, AIR 1961 SC 1715
25. State of Punjab v. Jogindra Singh, AIR 1963 SC 913
26. State of Uttar Pradesh v. Chandra Mohan Nigam, AIR 1977, SC 2411
27. State of Uttar Pradesh v. Ram Naresh Lal, AIR 1970 SC 1263
28. Terreil v. Secy. of State, (1953) 2 QB 482
29. The High Commissioner of India and another v. I.M. Lall, A.I.R. (1948), P.C., 121
30. U.P. Govt. v. Sabir Hussain, (1975) 4 SCC 703
31. Union of India v. K.S. Subramaniam, AIR 1989 SC 662
32. Union of India v. P.K. More, AIR 1962 SC 630
33. Union of India v. Tulsiram Patel, AIR 1985 SC 1416
C. Books
1. M P Jain, Indian Constitutional Law (7th edn, Lexis Nexis 2016)

32
2. Mahendra Pal Singh, „V.N. Shukla‟s Constitution of India (12th Edn, Eastern Book
Company 2013)
3. Sujit Choudhry, Madhav Khosla and Pratap Bhanu, The Oxford Handbook of the
Indian Constitution (1st edn, Oxford University Publications 2016)

II. SECONDARY SOURCES

A. Essays, Articles and Journals

1. Babita Devi, „Constitutional Safeguards to Civil Servants: An Analysis‟ (2019) 11 DLR

2. D.S. Chopra, „Doctrine of Pleasure -its scope, implications and limitations‟ [1975]
Indian Journal of Public Administration
3. Madhushri Sharma, „Doctrine of Pleasure‟ (2018) 2 IJTSRD
4. O.P. Motiwal, „Development of Legal Rights of Civil Servants in India‟ (1975) 17
Journal of the Indian Law Institute
5. Om Prakash Motiwal, „Doctrine of pleasure and the Services in Indian Constitution‟
[1963] Indian Journal of Public Administration 64
6. Siddharth Thapliyal, Poonam Rawat, „Doctrine of Pleasure in Major Common Law
Countries: Interpretation and Correlation‟ (2019) 8 IJRTE
7. Swadha Rath, „The Doctrine of Pleasure‟ [2017] Indian Constitutional Law Review

B. Websites
1. www.constitutionofIndia.net
2. www.Indiankanoon.org
3. www.jstor.org
4. www.manupatra.com
5. www.scconline.com

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