Noscutur A Sociis
Noscutur A Sociis
Noscutur A Sociis
INTRODUCTION
The legal principle “noscitur a sociis” is based on the idea that the meaning of any part of a
law, including words and phrases, should be interpreted based on the context in which it is
used. This rule helps to assign a precise meaning and effect to each element within the
context of its application. In every sentence, each word serves a purpose and carries both a
denotation (its literal meaning) and a connotation (its implied meaning). The distinction
between these two aspects of a word’s meaning depends on how it is used in the sentence and
its influence on the overall meaning. “Noscitur a sociis,” which means “it is known by its
association,” is a rule used to clarify the meaning of ambiguous words by considering the
words they are associated with in context.
MEANING
The phrase “noscitur a sociis” is a Latin legal principle in which noscere means ‘to
know’ and sociis means ‘association’. Therefore, it means ‘to know from its association’. 1 It
is a rule of interpretation wherein the meaning of an unclear or ambiguous word is
determined by consideration of the words associated with it in the statute. 2 In simpler terms,
the principle of “noscitur a sociis” can be explained like this: To assess a person's character,
one might examine the character of their associates. It is often believed that if an individual's
companions have a negative reputation, then that individual may also be supposed negatively,
and the opposite is true for positive associations. The principle known as "noscitur a sociis"
suggests that the meaning of a word can be inferred from the words surrounding it. This
method of understanding a word's meaning through its context and association with nearby
words is what defines the principle of "noscitur a sociis."
EXPLANATION
It has been clearly explained by Gajendragadkar J., in the following words: "This rule
according to Maxwell, when two or more words which are susceptible of analogous(similar)
meaning are coupled together, they are understandable to be used in their cognate sense, they
take as it were their colour from each other, that is, the more general is restricted to a less
general or particular having a certain meaning. Associated words take their colour or meaning
from one another if the context, of statute so suggested."3
SCOPE
It is a rule broader than Ejusdem generis; rather the latter rule is only an application of
the previous. The scope of this rule of interpretation is limited and can be used only in
following circumstances:
This doctrine is merely a rule of construction and it cannot prevail in cases where it is
clear that the wider words have been expressively used in order to make the room of
the definite word harmoniously wider.
It is only where the intention of the Legislature in associating wider words with
narrow word is doubtful, or not clear, then the present rule of construction can be
usefully applied.
This principle may be employed when the broader meaning of the terms is uncertain.
However, if the legislative intent behind using expansive language is obvious and
unambiguous, this interpretative approach is not applicable.
State of Bombay v. Hospital Mazdoor Sabha4, the Supreme Court said: the basic scope and
applicability of noscitur a sociis rule is that associated wards take their meaning from one
another under doctrine of noscitur a sociis, the philosophy of which is that the meaning of
doubtful word may be ascertained by reference to the meaning of words associated with it.
APPLICABILITY
The accurate interpretation of a legal provision should be derived from the legislature’s
explicitly stated intent. When the language of a law is clear and unambiguous, it is only
necessary to interpret the words according to their traditional meaning, as they most
accurately reflect the intention of the legislature.5
1.In M.K. Ranganathan v. Government of Madras 6, interpretation of Section 232 of the old
Indian Companies Act, 1913 was involved. The provision said that “where any company is
being wound up by or subject to the supervision of the court, any attachment, distress or
execution put into force without leave of the court against the estate or effects or any sale
held without leave of the court of any of the properties of the company after the
commencement of the winding up shall be void”. The Supreme Court interpreted the words
'any attachment, destress, or execution put into force' associated with these and held that the
process must be carried out with the court’s involvement and not in any other way, such as a
secured creditor selling the assets outside of the court’s winding-up process.
2.State of Bombay v. Hospital Mazdoor Sabha7: Miss Vatsala Narayan and Mrs. Ruth Isaac,
who worked as ward servants at JJ Hospitals in Bombay, were given termination notices. The
hospital cited retrenchment (removal of employees, typically due to economic reasons like
company restructuring, mergers, or cost-cutting measures) in the civil supplies department as
the reason, and the need to make room for others in their positions.
In response, Mrs. Isaac and Ms. Narayan, the defendants in this matter, challenged their
termination by filing a writ of mandamus in the Bombay High Court. They argued that the
notice was improper, rendering their termination invalid. They filed a writ of mandamus in
the Bombay High Court, claiming the termination notice was improper.
The Bombay High Court, led by Justice Tendolkar, ruled that the hospital was not an
‘industry’ under Section 2(j) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, thus upholding the
termination as valid.
They filed an appeal in the supreme court and the issues were
Here's the reframed version of the sentences with exact details and terms:
Applicability to Hospitals: Does the Industrial Disputes Act extend its provisions to
the operations of hospitals?
Definition of Industry: Is a hospital encompassed within the 'industry' definition as
per the Industrial Disputes Act?
Validity of Retrenchment: Is the retrenchment notice given to two employees
considered invalid due to the failure to adhere to Section 25F of the Industrial
Disputes Act?
The Supreme Court declared that Section 25F(b) of the Industrial Dispute Act, 1947 is clear
and unambiguous. It mandates that employees with over a year of continuous service must
not be dismissed without due retrenchment compensation, equating to 14 days' average pay
for each completed year of service, as stipulated in Section 25. The Act's definition of
'Industry' intentionally includes a broad spectrum in its initial clause, with a subsequent
clause providing an inclusive definition. Given this intentional breadth, the term 'Industry'
must be interpreted widely, thus including hospitals.
The Court recognized that the ‘noscitur a sociis’ principle was not relevant in this particular
case due to the clear intent of the legislature. However, it remains a valuable interpretive tool
for cases with ambiguous legislative intent, especially when broad terms are contrasted with
more specific ones. The Supreme Court determined that applying ‘noscitur a sociis’ to narrow
the meaning of words is inappropriate when the legislature has intentionally used unrestricted
language without ambiguity. Despite its rejection in this instance, the Court examined the
rule’s applicability, noting that ‘noscitur a sociis’ is a basic interpretive rule, not to be
employed when legislative intent is obvious and unambiguous. The rule is relevant in
situations where legislative intent is not clear, particularly when broad terms are associated
with narrower terms.
3.Mangoo Singh v. Election Tribunal8: The Supreme Court addressed the case of an appellant
who, at the time of submitting his election nomination, had unpaid municipal taxes exceeding
the annual demand. Although he settled all outstanding taxes before the polling date and won
the election, his victory was subsequently nullified. He argued to the Supreme Court that the
critical date should be the polling date, not the nomination date, and also claimed that he had
not received a formal demand notice. The Court rejected his argument, affirming that the
nomination date was definitely the crucial date. The Court clarified that the term 'demand'
must be understood in the context of its usage, meaning it refers to municipal taxes or similar
obligations. The typical interpretation of 'demand' as a request is not applicable here; instead,
it should be read as the total amount of overdue payments or liabilities.
4.State of Assam v. Ranga Mohammad 9: The respondent submitted a legal petition seeking
the issuance of a quo warranto, which challenges the authority of the appellant to execute the
transfer and appointment of a District Judge. The interpretations of Articles 233(1) and 235 of
the Constitution were involved. Article 233(1) says: 'Appointment of persons to be, and the
posting and promotion of, District Judges in any State shall be made by the Governor of the
State in consultation with the High Court exercising jurisdiction in relation to such State'.
Article 235 says: 'The control over district courts and courts subordinate thereto including the
posting and promotion of, and the grant of leave to, persons belonging to the judicial service
of a State and holding any post inferior to the post of District Judge shall be vested in the
High Cour.' The Supreme Court, while interpreting the word posting in Article 233(1) said
that it may mean (1) stationing someone at a place, or (2) assigning someone to a post,
position or job. The second interpretation is the correct one in this context because it aligns
with the true purpose intended by the legislature. The legislature has employed the term
"posting" in conjunction with "appointment" and "promotion," indicating that "posting" refers
to a type of assignment that constitutes an appointment or a promotion. Out of the above-
cited two meanings of the words, the second meaning resembles with the nature of the other
two words and, therefore, the principle of noscitur a sociis is applicable. Posting cannot mean
a transfer in relation to the idea of appointment and promotion. If the legislature intended for
'posting' to be understood as 'transfer', they would have simply used the term 'transfer' instead
of 'posting'. So interpreted, therefore, the Governor is concerned with the posting,
appointment, and promotion of a District Judge under Article 233 while under Article 235 the
transfer of District Judges was under the control of the High Court.
5. In Alamgir v. State of Bihar10, the construction of Section 498, Indian Penal Code was
involved. This section says: 'Whoever takes or entices away any woman who is and whom he
knows or has reason to believe to be the wife of any other man, from that man, or from any
person having the care of her on behalf of that man, with intent that she may have illicit
intercourse with any such person, or conceals or detains with that intent any such woman,
shall be punished'. The facts in this case were, A married woman left her husband on her own
and started living with another man openly. This man was accused under a law that makes it
illegal to lead or lure a wife away from her husband. He argued that he didn't convince her to
leave, nor did he hide her or prevent her from leaving, so the charges against him should be
dropped. The main question for the court was whether, since the woman left her husband
willingly and lived with him openly, the man's actions could be considered as 'detaining' her
according to the law. The Supreme Court held that however the word detains normally
implies confinement against will; this meaning cannot be credited to the word here because
the expression must to be understood in the light of different words in its organization. The
word detains is to be interpreted with reference to the expression takes, entices,
and conceals used in Section 498. And therefore, it would mean detention without the consent
of the husband. Section 498 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 safeguards a husband's rights
when he is denied his wife's companionship without his consent. Under this section, the
wife's consent is considered irrelevant.
6.State of Karnataka v. Union of India 11: The question of interpreting the word ‘powers’ as
appearing in Article 194(30) of the constitution was involved. This word has been used in the
company of words ‘privileges’ and ‘immunities’ of a House of a legislature. The Supreme
Court observed that word must take its meaning from the associated words, and thus
interpreted it must mean such powers of a house as are necessary for the conduct of its
business and not legislative powers.
7.In the case of Commissioner of Income Tax vs. Bharti Cellular12, the court found the term
‘technical services’ in Section 194J of the Income Tax Act to be vague. It was determined that
‘technical’ should be interpreted in the context of the adjacent terms ‘managerial’ and
‘consultancy’, which both imply the need for human involvement. Therefore, by the principle
of noscitur a sociis, ‘technical’ must also be understood to include a human element.
Consequently, services like interconnection and port access, which do not require human
interaction, were not considered ‘technical services’ under Section 194J of the Income Tax
Act.
8. In the case of Pardeep Aggarbatti vs. State of Punjab 13, the Supreme Court addressed
whether Dhoop and Aggarbatti fell under the category of 'perfumery' as per Entry 16 of
Schedule A of the Punjab General Sales Tax Act, 1948. The entry initially included
'cosmetics, perfumery, and toilet goods', but did not cover toothpaste, tooth powder, kumkum,
and soaps. This entry was later divided into Entries 16 and 16A. The Supreme Court, using
the noscitur a sociis principle, concluded that 'perfumery' does not apply to Dhoop and
Aggarbatti. The Court reasoned that 'perfumery', as mentioned in Entry No. 16, is influenced
by the associated terms 'cosmetics' and 'toilet goods', and therefore, should only refer to
perfumery items used on the body, similar to cosmetics and toilet goods.
9.In Scales v. Pickering14, A water corporation was granted the authority ‘to dig the ground
and surfaces of roads, main roads, pedestrian paths, commons, streets, byways, side street,
passages, and public areas’, with the requirement that they were not to intrude upon any
privately-owned territories without obtaining the proprietor's permission. The corporation
argued that this authorization permitted them to excavate the terrain of a privately-owned
meadow that included a public walkway. However, the argument did not succeed. The
judiciary interpreted the term "pedestrian paths" in the context of its associated terms,
presuming it to signify those paved pathways in crowded urban areas that are too narrowed
for the passage of horses and vehicles.
10. In Vania Silk Mills Pvt. Ltd. vs. Commissioner of IT 15, the Supreme Court used the
noscitur a sociis rule to construe "transfer" in Section 2(47) of the Income Tax Act, 1961. The
Court concluded that "extinguishment of any rights therein" refers specifically to rights
extinguished by a transfer, such as sale or exchange, and not to the termination of rights
unrelated to a transfer. Furthermore, the Supreme Court clarified the term "consumables" in
Section 5B of the Andhra Pradesh Goods and Services Act, 1957. The term was interpreted
alongside "raw materials," "component part," "sub-assembly part," and "intermediate part."
The Court determined that "consumables" must be items used to produce the final product.
As a result, natural gas, which the assessee used, did not fall under "consumables" and was
ineligible for the concessional tax rate provided by Section 5B.
The rule of 'noscitur a sociis', which means that words are understood by the other words
around them, can't be used unless certain conditions are met.
General terms are used after specific terms and are influenced by them; or the general
term is directly linked to the preceding specific terms.
The general term can be interpreted similarly to the specific terms it accompanies,
allowing them to be understood in a related sense.
The legislative intent is to interpret associated terms in light of each other within the
specific context of their use.
This approach aligns with the legal principle of 'noscitur a sociis', which suggests that
words derive their meaning from the company they keep.
In Coastal Chemicals Ltd. v. Commercial Tax Office16r, there was interpretation of several
expressions’ contrary to each other in concept and use like raw material, mechanical tools,
electronic machinery, household goods, furniture and other things of useful purpose and
which were accountable to Sales Tax Act, 1957. Where the words are not in association, or
when words are not identical or cognate to each other so that they can be read as the
connected words, which take their colour from each other, the rule of noscitur a sociis will
not apply.
ADVANTAGES
Legislative drafters are not expected to predict every possible scenario. The law is
designed to be flexible enough to accommodate unforeseen circumstances.
Words that are unclear or ambiguous can often be clarified by examining them in the
context of related words. This approach helps to address and resolve potential gaps in
legal statutes.
DISADVANTAGES
The application of this principle can be seen as disagreeing with the separation of
powers, as it may unconsciously grant the judiciary a role in creating laws.
Additionally, the outcome of legal cases becomes less predictable.
It introduces a level of judicial discretion that may occasionally be applied
inconsistently.
Furthermore, it has the potential to lead to decisions that were not predicted by the
legislative or parliamentary bodies.
CONCLUSION
This article provides an insight into the “noscitur a sociis” doctrine, which aids in clarifying
vague terms within legal statutes. The Supreme Court has validated its use through various
rulings. However, there are exceptions to its application, such as when legislative intent is
explicit, terms are self-defined within the statute, or no ambiguity exists. This doctrine does
not serve to unduly narrow or limit word meanings. It is broader in scope than the “ejusdem
generis” rule, which is limited to interpreting words of the same class within loosely framed
statutes.
1
Prof. T. Bhattacharya, The Interpretation of Statutes 61 (6th Ed. Central Law Agency, 2006).
2
Noscitur a Sociis, Merriam Webster, https://www.merriam-webster.com/legal/noscitur%20a%20sociis (Last visited March
19,2024).
3
Maxwell, Interpretation of statutes, 11 Edn., P.32.
4
AIR 1960 SC 610: (1960) 2 SCR 866.
5
Corporation of city of Nagpur v. Employees, AIR 1960 SC 675: (1960) I LLJ 523 SC.
6
AIR 1955 SC 604.
7
AIR 1960 SC 610: (1960) 2 SCR 866.
8
AIR 1957 SC 871.
9
AIR 1967 SC 903: (1968) I LLJ 282 SC: (1967) 1 SCR 454.
10
AIR 1959 SC 436.
11
AIR 1978 SC 68.
12
Commissioner of Income Tax vs. Bharti Cellular (October 31, 2008).
13
AIR 1998 SC 171.
14
AIR 1969 SC 63
15
1991 AIR 2104
16
1999 AIR SCW 3933