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Salva vs. Makalintal

Case Ponente Decision Date

G.R. No. 132603 BUENA, J Sep 18, 2000

A class suit is filed against the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Batangas and the
COMELEC, seeking the annulment of an ordice and resolution declaring the merger of
two barangays, with the Supreme Court ruling in favor of the petitioners and affirming
the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court to enjoin the COMELEC from implementing
the merger.

EN BANC

G.R. No. 132603. September 18, 2000.

ELPIDIO M. SALVA, VILMA B. DE LEON, CLEMENTE M. MATIRA, REGION P. DE LEON,

MARILOU C. DE LEON, JAIME RELEVO, JOEY S. VERGARA, CARMENCITA A. SALVA,
DIONISIO B. DE LEON, JORGE S. VERGARA, GORGONIO B. DE LEON, AND OTHERS TOO
NUMEROUS TO ENUMERATE AS A CLASS SUIT, petitioners, vs. HON. ROBERTO L.
MAKALINTAL, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, Br. XI, Balayan, Batangas; HON.
SANGGUNIANG PANLALAWIGAN OF BATANGAS, BATANGAS CITY; HON.
SANGGUNIANG PANGBAYAN, CALACA, BATANGAS; and HON. COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS, respondents.

Pedro N. Belmi for petitioners.

Solicitor General for respondents.

Dir. Jose P. Ballbuena for COMELEC.

SYNOPSIS
 The Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Batangas enacted Ordinance No. 05 which
declared the abolition of Barangay San Rafael and its merger with Barangay Dacanlao,
municipality of Calaca, Batangas and accordingly instructed the COMELEC to conduct the
required plebiscite as provided under Sections 9 and 10 of Republic Act No. 7160, otherwise
known as the Local Government Code of 1991. The ordinance was vetoed by the Governor
of Batangas for being ultra vires, particularly as it was not shown that the essential
requirements under Section 9, in relation to Section 7, of Republic Act No. 7160 were
obtained. However, Resolution No. 345 was enacted which affirmed the effectivity of
Ordinance No. 05, thereby overriding the veto exercised by the Governor of Batangas.
Pursuant to the said ordinance and resolution, the COMELEC promulgated Resolution No.
2987, series of 1998, providing for the rules and regulations governing the conduct of the
required plebiscite scheduled on February 28, 1998, to decide the issue of the abolition of
Barangay San Rafael and its merger with barangay Dacanlao, Calaca, Batangas. Hence,
petitioners, as officials and residents of Barangay San Rafael, Calaca, Batangas, filed a class
suit before the Regional Trial Court of Balayan, Batangas, against the respondents for
annulment of Ordinance No. 05, Resolution No. 345, series of 1997, and COMELEC
Resolution No. 2987, series of 1998, with prayer for preliminary injunction/temporary
restraining order. Thereafter, the RTC, in its decision, denied the issuance of a temporary
restraining order and/or preliminary injunction for lack of jurisdiction. According to the
trial court, the temporary restraining order/injunction sought by petitioners is directed to
COMELEC Resolution No. 2987. Hence, it must be brought before the Supreme Court.
Hence, this appeal. AaHTIE

Petitioners asserted that when the COMELEC exercises its quasi-judicial functions
under Section 52 of the Omnibus Election Code (Batas Pambansa Blg. 881), its acts are
subject to the exclusive review by this Court but when the COMELEC performs a purely
ministerial duty, such act is subject to scrutiny by the Regional Trial Court. Corollary
thereto, petitioners submitted that the conduct of a plebiscite, pursuant to Ordinance No.
05 and Resolution No. 345, is not adjudicatory or quasi-judicial in nature but simply
ministerial or administrative in nature and only in obedience to the aforesaid Ordinance
and Resolution.

The appeal was meritorious.

COMELEC Resolution No. 2987 was not issued pursuant to the COMELEC's quasi-
judicial functions but merely as an incident of its inherent administrative functions over
the conduct of plebiscites, thus, the said resolution may not be deemed as a "final order"
reviewable by certiorari by the Supreme Court. Any question pertaining to the validity of
said resolution may be well taken in an ordinary civil action before the trial courts.
 SYLLABUS

1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; COMELEC; ONLY FINAL ORDERS, RULINGS AND

DECISIONS ISSUED IN THE EXERCISE OF ITS QUASI-JUDICIAL POWERS ARE
REVIEWABLE BY CERTIORARI BY THE SUPREME COURT; POWERS OF THE COMELEC.
Section 7, Article IX-A of the 1987 Constitution provides in part that: "SEC. 7. . . . . Unless
otherwise provided by this Constitution or by law, any decision, order, or ruling of each
Commission may be brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari by the aggrieved party
within thirty days from receipt of a copy thereof." In Garces vs. Court of Appeals (259 SCRA
99 1996) and Filipinas Engineering and Machine Shop vs. Ferrer (135 SCRA 25 1985), we
found occasion to interpret the foregoing provision in this wise: " . . . . What is contemplated
by the term 'final orders, rulings and decisions' of the COMELEC reviewable by certiorari
by the Supreme Court as provided by law are those rendered in actions or proceedings
before the COMELEC and taken cognizance of by the said body in the exercise of its
adjudicatory or quasi-judicial powers." In Filipinas, we have likewise affirmed that the
powers vested by the Constitution and the law on the Commission on Elections may either
be classified as those pertaining to its adjudicatory or quasi-judicial functions, or those
which are inherently administrative and sometimes ministerial in character.

2. ID.; ID.; ID.; RESOLUTION THEREOF WHICH PROVIDES FOR RULES AND
REGULATIONS GOVERNING CONDUCT OF PLEBISCITE, NOT DEEMED AS A "FINAL
ORDER" REVIEWABLE BY CERTIORARI BY THE SUPREME COURT. We agree with the
Solicitor General that " . . . . the issuance of COMELEC Resolution No. 2987 is thus a
ministerial duty of the COMELEC that is enjoined by law and is part and parcel of its
administrative functions. It involves no exercise of discretionary authority on the part of
respondent COMELEC; let alone an exercise of its adjudicatory or quasi-judicial power to
hear and resolve controversies defining the rights and duties of party-litigants, relative to
the conduct of elections of public officers and the enforcement of the election laws."
(Citation omitted.) Briefly, COMELEC Resolution No. 2987 which provides for the rules and
regulations governing the conduct of the required plebiscite, was not issued pursuant to
the COMELEC's quasi-judicial functions but merely as an incident of its inherent
administrative functions over the conduct of plebiscites, thus, the said resolution may not
be deemed as a "final order" reviewable by certiorari by this Court. Any question pertaining
to the validity of said resolution may be well taken in an ordinary civil action before the
trial courts.

3. ID.; ID.; ID.; CASES OF ZALDIVAR (23 SCRA 533 (1968), LUISON (101 PHIL. 1218
(1957), MACUD (23 SCRA 224 (1968), NOT APPLICABLE IN CASE AT BAR. Even the cases
cited by the public respondent in support of its contention that the power to review or
reverse COMELEC Resolution No. 2987 solely belongs to this Court are simply not in point.
Zaldivar vs. Estenzo speaks of the power of the COMELEC to enforce and administer all
laws relative to the conduct of elections to the exclusion of the judiciary. In the present
case, petitioners are not contesting the exclusive authority of the COMELEC to enforce and
administer election laws. Luison vs. Garcia refers to this Court's power to review
"administrative decisions," particularly referring to a COMELEC resolution declaring a
certain certificate of candidacy null and void, based on Article X, Section 2 of the 1935
Constitution. In Macud vs. COMELEC, we reiterated that when a board of canvassers rejects
an election return on the ground that it is spurious or has been tampered with, the
aggrieved party may elevate the matter to the COMELEC for appropriate relief, and if the
COMELEC sustains the action of the board, the aggrieved party may appeal to this Court. In
both Luison and Macud, the assailed COMELEC resolutions fall within the purview of "final
orders, rulings and decisions" of the COMELEC reviewable by certiorari by this Court.
DCASEc

DECISION

BUENA, J p:

This is an appeal by certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking the
reversal of the Order dated February 25, 1998, 1 of the Regional Trial Court of Balayan,
Batangas, Branch XI, 2 in Civil Case No. 3442, denying the issuance of a temporary
restraining order and/or preliminary injunction to enjoin the Commission on Elections
(COMELEC) from holding the plebiscite scheduled on February 28, 1998, on the ground of
lack of jurisdiction.

The facts are undisputed.

On February 23, 1998, petitioners, as officials and residents of barangay San Rafael,
Calaca, Batangas, filed a class suit against the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Batangas,
Sangguniang Pambayan of Calaca, Batangas, and the Commission on Elections (COMELEC),
docketed as Civil Case No. 3442, before the Regional Trial Court of Balayan, Batangas,
Branch XI, for annulment of Ordinance No. 05 and Resolution No. 345, series of 1997, both
enacted by the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Batangas, and COMELEC Resolution No. 2987,
series of 1998, with prayer for preliminary injunction/temporary restraining order.
Ordinance No. 05 3 declared the abolition of barangay San Rafael and its merger with
barangay Dacanlao, municipality of Calaca, Batangas and accordingly instructed the
COMELEC to conduct the required plebiscite as provided under Sections 9 and 10 of
Republic Act No. 7160, otherwise known as the Local Government Code of 1991. 4 On the
other hand, Resolution No. 345 5 affirmed the effectivity of Ordinance No. 05, thereby
overriding the veto 6 exercised by the governor of Batangas. 7 Ordinance No. 05 was vetoed
by the governor of Batangas for being ultra vires, particularly, as it was not shown that the
essential requirements under Section 9, in relation to Section 7, of Republic Act No. 7160,
referring to the attestations or certifications of the Department of Finance (DOF), National
Statistics Office (NSO) and the Land Management Bureau of the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources (DENR), were obtained. Pursuant to the foregoing
ordinance and resolution, on February 10, 1998, the COMELEC promulgated Resolution No.
2987, providing for the rules and regulations governing the conduct of the required
plebiscite scheduled on February 28, 1998, to decide the issue of the abolition of barangay
San Rafael and its merger with barangay Dacanlao, Calaca, Batangas. 8 Simultaneous with
the filing of the action before the trial court, petitioners also filed an ex parte motion for the
issuance of a temporary restraining order to enjoin respondents from enforcing Ordinance
No. 05, Resolution No. 345, and COMELEC Resolution No. 2987.

In an Order dated February 25, 1998, the trial court denied the ex parte motion for
the issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or preliminary injunction for lack of
jurisdiction. According to the trial court, the temporary restraining order/injunction sought
by petitioners is directed only to COMELEC Resolution No. 2987. The trial court ruled that
any petition or action questioning an act, resolution or decision of the COMELEC must be
brought before the Supreme Court. 9

On February 27, 1998, petitioners filed the instant petition with prayer for a
temporary restraining order, without filing a motion for reconsideration of the trial court's
Order dated February 25, 1998, claiming the urgency or immediate necessity to enjoin the
conduct of the plebiscite scheduled on February 28, 1998. 10

In a Resolution dated March 10, 1998, the Court directed the parties to maintain the
status quo prevailing at the time of the filing of the petition. 11

On August 28, 1998, the Solicitor General filed a Manifestation and Motion in lieu of
Comment, declaring that he concurs with petitioners' cause and recommending that the
instant petition be given due course. 12 Consequently, the Court further resolved on
September 29, 1998 to require the COMELEC and the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of
Batangas to submit their own Comment on the petition.

In a Resolution dated June 15, 1999, the Court resolved to give due course to the
petition and require the parties to submit their respective memoranda. 13

In their Memorandum filed on October 26, 1999, petitioners submitted the following
issue for the resolution of this Court: IEaHSD
"WHETHER OR NOT THE RESPONDENT COURT HAS JURISDICTION TO ENJOIN THE
COMELEC FROM IMPLEMENTING ITS RESOLUTION NO. 2987, SERIES OF 1998, WHICH
PROVIDED FOR THE RULES AND REGULATIONS FOR THE CONDUCT OF THE
PLEBISCITE SCHEDULED ON FEBRUARY 28, 1998 TO DECIDE ON THE ABOLITION OF
BARANGAY SAN RAFAEL AND ITS MERGER WITH BARANGAY DACANLAO, CALACA,
BATANGAS, PENDING THE DETERMINATION OF CIVIL CASE NO. 3442 FOR THE
ANNULMENT OF ORDINANCE NO. 05, RESOLUTION NO. 345 AND COMELEC
RESOLUTION NO. 2987." 14

First, petitioners contend that the assailed Order dated February 25, 1998, of the
Regional Trial Court of Balayan, Batangas, Branch XI, encourages multiplicity of suits and
splitting a single cause of action," contrary to Section 3, Rule 2, of the Rules of Court. 15
Petitioners maintain that since COMELEC Resolution No. 2987 was only issued pursuant to
Ordinance No. 05 and Resolution No. 345 of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Batangas, the
propriety of the issuance of COMELEC Resolution No. 2987 is dependent upon the validity
of the Ordinance No. 05 and Resolution No. 345. 16 And considering that the jurisdiction of
the trial court to hear and determine the validity of Ordinance No. 05 and Resolution No.
345 is not disputed, the assailed Order dated February 25, 1998, directing petitioners to seek
the preliminary injunction and/or temporary restraining order before this Court, advances
multiplicity of suits and splitting a single cause of action.

Second, petitioners assert that when the COMELEC exercises its quasi judicial
functions under Section 52 of the Omnibus Election Code (Batas Pambansa Blg. 881), its
acts are subject to the exclusive review by this Court; but when the COMELEC performs a
purely ministerial duty, such act is subject to scrutiny by the Regional Trial Court, 17 citing
Filipinas Engineering and Machine Shop vs. Ferrer (135 SCRA 25 1985), thus:

"It cannot be gainsaid that the powers vested by the Constitution and the law on the
Commission on Elections may either be classified as those pertaining to its adjudicatory or
quasi-judicial functions, or those which are inherently administrative and sometimes
ministerial in character." 18 HIEASa

Corollary thereto, petitioners submit that "the conduct of a plebiscite, pursuant to

Ordinance No. 05 and Resolution No. 345, is not adjudicatory or quasi judicial in nature but
simply ministerial or administrative in nature and only in obedience to the aforesaid
Ordinance and Resolution," citing Garces vs. Court of Appeals, 259 SCRA 99 (1996), thus:

". . . To rule otherwise would surely burden the Court with trivial administrative
questions that are best ventilated before the RTC Regional Trial Court, a court which the
law vests with the power to exercise original jurisdiction over 'all cases not within the
exclusive jurisdiction of any court, tribunal, person or body exercising judicial or quasi
judicial functions'." 19

Lastly, petitioners allege that while the plebiscite sought to be enjoined has already
been conducted on February 28, 1998, the instant petition is far from being moot and
academic, claiming that the actual holding of the said plebiscite could not validate an
otherwise invalid ordinance and resolution; 20 that there are still substantial matters to be
resolved; 21 assuming arguendo that this petition has become moot and academic, ". . .
courts will decide a question otherwise moot and academic if it is 'capable of repetition, yet
evading review"'; 22 and finally, petitioners maintain that this Court has resolved to require
the parties to maintain the status quo prevailing at the time of the filing of the petition, that
is, a day before the plebiscite was scheduled to be conducted. 23

Concurring with petitioners' arguments, the Solicitor General, in his Memorandum

filed on September 7, 1999, asserts that ". . . It is already settled in this jurisdiction that what
is contemplated by the terms 'any decision, order or ruling' of the COMELEC reviewable by
certiorari to this Honorable Court, as provided under Section 7, Article IX-A of the 1987
Constitution, are those that relate to the COMELEC's exercise of its adjudicatory or quasi-
judicial powers involving elective regional, provincial and city officials." (Citations omitted.)
24 The Solicitor General further argues that the issuance of COMELEC Resolution No. 2987
is a ministerial duty of the COMELEC in the exercise of its administrative functions, hence,
it is submitted that the aforecited constitutional provision is inapplicable.

Public respondent Commission on Elections (COMELEC), on the other hand,

submits that the power to review or reverse COMELEC Resolution No. 2987 solely belongs
to this Court, citing the earlier cases of Zaldivar vs. Estenzo (23 SCRA 533, 540-541 1968);
Luison vs. Garcia (L-10916, May 20, 1957); Macud vs. COMELEC (23 SCRA 224 1968); and
Aratuc vs. COMELEC (88 SCRA 251, 272 1979); 25 thus:

". . . For even without the express constitutional prescription that only this Court may
review the decisions, orders and rulings of the Commission on Elections, it is easy to
understand why no interference whatsoever with the performance of the Commission on
Elections of its functions should be allowed unless emanating from this Court. The
observation of Acting Chief Justice J.B.L. Reyes in Albano v. Arranz while not precisely in
point, indicates the proper approach. Thus: 'It is easy to realize the chaos that would ensue
if the Court of First Instance of each and every province were to arrogate unto itself the
power to disregard, suspend, or contradict any order of the Commission on Elections; that
constitutional body would be speedily reduced to impotence." 26
 The COMELEC further argues that ". . . if a Regional Trial Court does not have
jurisdiction to issue writs against statutory agencies of government like the ones cited
above [referring to the former Court of Industrial Relations, Philippine Patent Office, Public
Service Commission, Social Security Commission, National Electrification Administration
and Presidential Commission on Good Government], a fortiori it can not have any such
jurisdiction over the Commission on Elections, a constitutional independent body
expressly clothed by the 1987 Constitution with, among others, quasi-judicial functions and
tasked with one of the most paramount aspects of a democratic government. . . ." 27 Finally,
the COMELEC contends that the temporary restraining order sought by petitioners has
been rendered moot and academic by the actual holding of the plebiscite sought to be
enjoined. 28

The appeal is meritorious.

Section 7, Article IX-A of the 1987 Constitution provides in part that:

"SECTION 7. . . . Unless otherwise provided by this Constitution or by law, any

decision, order, or ruling of each Commission may be brought to the Supreme Court on
certiorari by the aggrieved party within this days from receipt of a copy thereof."

In Garces vs. Court of Appeals (259 SCRA 99 1996) and Filipinas Engineering and
Machine Shop vs. Ferrer (135 SCRA 25 1985), we found occasion to interpret the foregoing
provision in this wise:

". . . What is contemplated by the term 'final orders, rulings and decisions' of the
COMELEC reviewable by certiorari by the Supreme Court as provided by law are those
rendered in actions or proceedings before the COMELEC and taken cognizance of by the
said body in the exercise of its adjudicatory or quasi-judicial powers." 29

In Filipinas, we have likewise affirmed that powers vested by the Constitution and
the law on the Commission on Elections may either be classified as those pertaining to its
adjudicatory or quasi-judicial functions, or those which are inherently administrative and
sometimes ministerial in character. 30

As aptly explained by the Solicitor General, in the instant case, after the COMELEC
ascertained the issuance of the ordinance and resolution declaring the abolition of
barangay San Rafael, it issued COMELEC Resolution No. 2987 calling for a plebiscite to be
held in the affected barangays, pursuant to the provisions of Section 10 of Republic Act No.
7160. We agree with the Solicitor General that ". . . the issuance of COMELEC Resolution No.
2987 is thus a ministerial duty of the COMELEC that is enjoined by law and is part and
parcel of its administrative functions. It involves no exercise of discretionary authority on
the part of respondent COMELEC; let alone an exercise of its adjudicatory or quasi-judicial
power to hear and resolve controversies defining the rights and duties of party-litigants,
relative to the conduct of elections of public officers and the enforcement of the election
laws." (Citation omitted.) 31 Briefly, COMELEC Resolution No. 2987 which provides for the
rules and regulations governing the conduct of the required plebiscite, was not issued
pursuant to the COMELEC's quasi-judicial functions but merely as an incident of its
inherent administrative functions over the conduct of plebiscites, thus, the said resolution
may not be deemed as a "final order" reviewable by certiorari by this Court. Any question
pertaining to the validity of said resolution may be well taken in an ordinary civil action
before the trial courts. DHETIS

Even the cases cited by the public respondent in support of its contention that the
power to review or reverse COMELEC Resolution No. 2987 solely belongs to this Court are
simply not in point. Zaldivar vs. Estenzo 32 speaks of the power of the COMELEC to enforce
and administer all laws relative to the conduct of elections to the exclusion of the judiciary.
In the present case, petitioners are not contesting the exclusive authority of the COMELEC
to enforce and administer election laws. Luison vs. Garcia 33 refers to this Court's power to
review "administrative decisions," particularly referring to a COMELEC resolution
declaring a certain certificate of candidacy null and void, based on Article X, Section 2 of
the 1935 Constitution. In Macud vs. COMELEC, 34 we reiterated that when a board of
canvassers rejects an election return on the ground that it is spurious or has been
tampered with, the aggrieved party may elevate the matter to the COMELEC for appropriate
relief, and if the COMELEC sustains the action of the board, the aggrieved party may appeal
to this Court. In both Luison and Macud, the assailed COMELEC resolutions fall within the
purview of "final orders, rulings and decisions" of the COMELEC reviewable by certiorari
by this Court.

In view of the foregoing, public respondent's other contentions deserve scant

consideration.

WHEREFORE, the petition for review is hereby GRANTED, and the assailed Order
dated February 25, 1998, of the Regional Trial Court of Balayan, Batangas, Branch XI is
hereby SET ASIDE and ANNULLED. The Regional Trial Court of Balayan, Batangas, Branch
XI is ordered to proceed with dispatch in resolving Civil Case No. 3442. The execution of
the result of the plebiscite held on February 28, 1998 shall be deferred depending on the
outcome of Civil Case No. 3442. DaEATc

SO ORDERED.
 Davide, Jr., C.J., Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza, Panganiban,
Quisumbing, Purisima, Gonzaga-Reyes and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.

Pardo, J., took no part, he was the COMELEC Chairman at the time.

Ynares-Santiago, J., is on leave.