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The role of nuclear weapons in Russia's strategic

deterrence: implications for European security and
nuclear arms control
Wachs, Lydia

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Wachs, L. (2022). The role of nuclear weapons in Russia's strategic deterrence: implications for European security and
nuclear arms control. (SWP Comment, 68/2022). Berlin: Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik -SWP- Deutsches Institut für
Internationale Politik und Sicherheit. https://doi.org/10.18449/2022C68

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NO. 68 NOVEMBER 2022 Introduction

The Role of Nuclear Weapons in Russia’s

Strategic Deterrence
Implications for European security and nuclear arms control
Lydia Wachs

In the West, Russia’s nuclear deterrence strategy is often described as one of “escalate
to deescalate”. The thinking goes that Moscow is prepared to use nuclear weapons
at an early stage in a conflict in order to “deescalate” and terminate the confrontation
quickly in its favour. However, Russia’s official military doctrine, nuclear exercises
of the Russian military, and debates among political and military elites have so far
pointed in a different direction. With the concept of “strategic deterrence”, Russia
has developed a holistic deterrence strategy in which nuclear weapons remain an
important element. Yet, to gain more flexibility below the nuclear threshold in order
to manage escalation, the strategy also conceptualises a broad range of non-military
and conventional means. Given Russia’s dwindling arsenal of conventional precision
weapons due to its war against Ukraine as well as the strategic adaptation of the North
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), Russia’s strategy is likely to change: In the
coming years, Russia’s reliance on its non-strategic nuclear weapons will probably
increase. These developments could both undermine crisis stability in Europe and
further impede the prospects for nuclear arms control in the future.

Over the past decades, Russia has carried are deployed on land-based intercontinen-
out a comprehensive modernisation of its tal ballistic missiles (ICBMs), submarine-
nuclear forces. As part of this, it has not launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), and at
only replaced legacy delivery systems, but heavy bomber bases. At present, the New
also developed entirely new capabilities. START Treaty with the United States still
The size of the strategic arsenal of the Soviet limits Russia’s strategic nuclear arsenal.
Union and Russia has historically not been However, the treaty expires in 2026. Since
determined by specific targeting require- Russia currently has around 1,000 additional
ments. One of the main objectives has in- warheads in storage, it would then have the
stead been to achieve numerical parity with possibility to substantially increase the num-
the United States. Today, Russia has an ber of its deployed strategic nuclear weapons.
active nuclear arsenal of about 4,500 nuclear Russia’s modernisation campaign is also
warheads. About 1,600 of these warheads driven by concerns about the credibility of
 its own second-strike capability, especially remains unclear what Moscow would con-
in view of the US missile defence pro- sider a threat to the state’s existence. This
gramme. Although the latter poses no real uncertainty about Russia’s exact nuclear
threat to Moscow’s second-strike capability, threshold cannot be resolved. Perhaps not
the Russian leadership has repeatedly even the Kremlin has precisely defined the
underlined its concerns and has framed the point at which it would employ nuclear
development of several new strategic and weapons. An analysis of Russian strategic
partly asymmetric capabilities as responses documents and debates among the political
to advances in US missile defence. These and military elites can nonetheless shed
Russian capabilities include the already light on how Moscow conceptualises deter-
deployed Avangard hypersonic glide vehicle, rence.
the new Sarmat ICBM, which is supposed to
be deployed in the next months, the Poseidon
nuclear-powered, long-range underwater Moscow’s nuclear threshold
drone, and the Burevestnik nuclear-powered
cruise missile with global range. The latter In its military doctrine, Moscow has for
two systems are still being developed and decades not ruled out using nuclear weap-
tested. ons first. This notwithstanding, Russia’s
deterrence strategy has changed over time
with implications for its nuclear threshold.
Russia’s non-strategic Russia’s changed threat perception is likely
nuclear weapons one factor that has influenced this as well
as the interplay of conventional and nu-
In addition to its strategic arsenal, Russia clear capabilities.
possesses about 2,000 non-strategic nuclear In the first years after the collapse of the
weapons, meaning weapons with generally Soviet Union, Russia’s perceived conven-
lower yields and shorter ranges. These are tional inferiority compared to the modern
not subject to any arms control or transpar- precision strike capabilities of the United
ency measures. States led Moscow to rely more on its non-
The fact that Russia still possesses and strategic nuclear weapons. Increased nu-
modernises such a sizeable number of non- clear signalling but also Russia’s declaratory
strategic nuclear weapons has triggered policy underlined this. According to the
debates in the West about Moscow’s nu- Russian military doctrine from 2000, Rus-
clear threshold. These have intensified with sia would also consider the use of nuclear
Russia’s attack on Ukraine and its nuclear weapons in response to a conventional
threats. In particular, Western officials and aggression “critical to the national security
analysts have voiced the concern that Rus- of Russia” (emphasis added). Russia thereby
sia could employ nuclear weapons early appeared to signal a willingness to employ
in a conflict in a limited way because its nuclear weapons even as a response to an
leaders believe that this will allow Russia aggression that did not threaten the exist-
to end the conflict quickly on its terms – ence of the state. This lowered nuclear
an approach that has been described in threshold was however also controversial
the West as “escalate to de-escalate”. The in Moscow, as discussions among political-
Kremlin has always rejected this portrayal military elites indicate. After all, threaten-
of its deterrence strategy. Instead, it offi- ing a nuclear response in the face of non-
cially states that Russia would use nuclear nuclear threats seemed non-credible also in
weapons only in the event of an attack with the eyes of these elites.
nuclear weapons or other weapons of mass The role of nuclear weapons in Moscow’s
destruction, or if the existence of the Rus- deterrence strategy appeared to gradually
sian state were threatened by a large-scale change with the modernisation of its con-
conventional aggression. However, it ventional forces and the development of

SWP Comment 68
November 2022

2
Figure

modern conventional or dual-capable land-, means. Above all, however, the concept is
sea-, and air-based capabilities in the 2010s. based on the credible threat to use military
These include the dual-capable short-range force, which includes a broad range of
Iskander missile system as well as several weapons – from conventional to strategic
intermediate-range missiles, such as the nuclear weapons. This is supposed to con-
dual-capable sea-based cruise missile Kalibr tribute towards deterring and containing
and the air-based conventional or nuclear adversaries in peacetime as well as manag-
cruise missile Kh-101/Kh-102. ing escalation in wartime.
These new conventional and dual-capable It follows that the Russian understanding
systems did not replace the role of nuclear of deterrence is much broader than the tra-
weapons in Russia’s strategy of escalation ditional Western one: From Moscow’s point
management and nuclear weapons remain of view, it is based not only on the threat of
an important component in Russia’s deter- force or intimidation, but also on the will-
rence system. Yet, Moscow’s over-reliance ingness to use limited force (“silovoe sderzhi-
on nuclear weapons appears to have been vanie”). Furthermore, according to the offi-
significantly reduced in the past decade. cial definition, its deterrence tools may be
Writings in Russian military journals sug- used to influence not only political deci-
gest that the availability of non-nuclear sion-makers but also the general public of
capabilities is primarily intended to create an adversarial state.
more flexibility below the nuclear thresh- Nuclear weapons are included within
old and in the early phases of a conflict. Its this conceptualisation. The Russian stra-
most recent military doctrines also indicate tegic debate on the utility of nuclear weap-
that Moscow is raising the bar for nuclear ons starts from a conceptualisation of dif-
weapons use: Today it officially declares ferent conflict archetypes. At one end of
that it would consider using nuclear weap- the spectrum are local wars, such as the one
ons as a response to a conventional aggres- in Ukraine; at the other end are large-scale
sion that threatens the state’s existence. wars between major powers or coalitions.
In between are regional wars, understood
as more limited military confrontations
Strategic deterrence with an alliance of states, such as NATO.
An analysis of publications in Russian
With the concept of “strategic deterrence” military journals from the past few years
(“strategicheskoe sderzhivanie”), Russia is today suggests that the role of nuclear weapons
pursuing a holistic deterrence strategy that in local wars is limited to mere threats of
integrates both non-military and military nuclear employment. Such threats are sup-

SWP Comment 68
November 2022

3
 posed to deter other states from interven- lation management has so far been that
ing, thereby keeping a limited war from Russia would use the signalling effect of its
becoming a regional one. In confrontations non-strategic nuclear weapons only to pro-
of this nature, the focus lies on the use of tect its own national security and territory –
(strategic) conventional capabilities. In turn, not to pursue revisionist goals in its own
it is within regional wars that Russian strat- neighbourhood. Russia’s actions in Ukraine
egists conceptualise a transition from the now call this interpretation into question.
use of strategic conventional weapons to
non-strategic nuclear weapons. It is only
for the largest conflict type that Russian Russia’s problems with
debates theorise the possibility of a massive conventional precision weapons
use of non-strategic and strategic nuclear
weapons (see figure). In the future, the role of nuclear weapons
Accordingly, the nuclear element has in Russia’s strategic deterrence is likely to
three main functions: deterrence through change. Two factors in particular could lead
the threat of escalation, actual limited use to a greater reliance on the nuclear com-
in order to manage escalation, and massive ponent: Russia’s dwindling arsenal of non-
retaliation or warfare in the event of esca- nuclear strategic weapons and NATO’s
lation. political and military adaptation.
There is furthermore a much closer link Since the beginning of the war in Ukraine,
between non-nuclear and nuclear capabili- Russia has used a vast number of ballistic
ties than in the West. This is also evident in and cruise missiles. According to Western
organisational terms: For example, Russian intelligence, however, Russian missiles
forces are not structured into strategic or appear to have a high fail rate as well as
non-strategic nuclear forces. Rather, Russia problems with precision. In addition, Rus-
differentiates functionally between general sia’s arsenal of modern non-nuclear preci-
purpose forces (“sily obshchego naznacheniya”), sion weapons is slowly running low, which
which are supposed to achieve effects directly is why the military leadership is increasingly
in the theatre of military operations, and having to resort to older, less precise systems
strategic deterrence forces (“strategicheskiye and reaching out to partners such as Iran for
sily sderzhivaniya”), which range from stra- assistance. To reconstitute Russia’s depleted
tegic conventional weapons to strategic nu- stocks, missile manufacturers have tried to
clear weapons. Owing to this much greater accelerate production but are struggling to
integration of conventional and nuclear significantly increase volumes.
capabilities, some Western experts argue Russia’s dependence on semiconductors
that when compared to the approach of and electronic components from the West
NATO states, Russia’s nuclear threshold is exacerbates this situation. Systems such as
much more blurred. Russia’s Iskander-M, Kalibr, and Kh-101 mis-
Russia’s conventional operation in siles require specialised microelectronic
Ukraine to some extent demonstrates this components that are produced primarily in
strategy. Moscow seems to be trying to keep North America, Europe, and East Asia. Yet,
the war limited to Ukraine and to deter due to Western sanctions and export con-
NATO from intervening through veiled trols, the Russian military appears to be
nuclear threats. Nuclear signalling serves struggling to replenish its arsenal. Moscow’s
escalation management purposes. This efforts to build its own semiconductor in-
approach is not entirely new. Russia used dustry have so far met with little success.
nuclear rhetoric during its annexation of In the short and medium term, imports
Crimea in 2014 and in Georgia in 2008 – from China are also not an option due to
but not to the same extent as in 2022. the extraterritorial effect of US sanctions.
In the West, however, the predominant Therefore, Russia either has to produce less-
interpretation of Moscow’s strategy of esca- efficient systems or it has to try to circum-

SWP Comment 68
November 2022

4
vent sanctions, for example by using front other factor spurring an elevated role of
companies. especially non-strategic nuclear weapons
Against this background, the question in Russia’s deterrence strategy and driving
arises as to whether the vacuum left by nuclear posture adjustments in the regions
Russia’s strategic conventional capabilities bordering NATO.
in its deterrence strategy could to a certain Russia permanently deployed Iskander-M
extent be filled by non-strategic nuclear systems to Kaliningrad in 2018, although
weapons. As a consequence, Moscow would it remains unclear whether it also stores
– at least temporarily – rely more on non- nuclear warheads there. Over the past years,
strategic nuclear weapons in its strategy Moscow has carried out renovations of
of escalation management, resembling its some storage sites in the exclave. If it has
approach in the early 2000s. not already done so, Russia could now
move nuclear weapons to the region. Mos-
cow also deployed Mig-31I fighter jets with
Could Moscow adapt its Kinzhal dual-capable missiles to Kaliningrad
nuclear posture? in August 2022 to strengthen its strategic
deterrence. The Kinzhal medium-range air-
In addition to the described conventional launched ballistic missile is one of Russia’s
weaknesses, the current changes in the advanced weapons systems. Although it
European security order could further is often labelled as a hypersonic missile,
contribute to the growing role of nuclear its design is likely derived from Russia’s
weapons in Moscow’s deterrence strategy. Iskander-M systems. Its distinguishing fea-
Russia’s war in Ukraine has triggered a ture is not so much its high speed, which
substantial transformation in the security resembles the speed of other ballistic mis-
architecture in Europe. The accession of siles, but its manoeuvrability, limiting the
Finland and Sweden to NATO will make it ability of the defending party to target
easier for the Alliance to defend and stra- the incoming missile.
tegically utilise the Baltic region, while Another way in which Russia could
hampering Russia’s ability to conduct mili- respond to the changing European security
tary operations in the Baltic Sea. Thus, order is by transferring nuclear weapons or
future Russian military planning will have nuclear-capable systems to Belarus. Alexan-
to take into account a much longer coast- der Lukashenko and Vladimir Putin ad-
line and land border with the Alliance. dressed this issue in late June, announcing
NATO’s steps to adapt its deterrence and that in the coming months Belarusian Su-25
defence posture are likely to further worsen aircraft would be modified in Russia so
the strategic situation from Moscow’s point that they could carry nuclear weapons and
of view. Russia already has considerable personnel would be trained accordingly.
military resources in Kaliningrad, in the In addition, Putin announced the transfer
St Petersburg region, and on the Kola Pen- of Iskander-M systems to Belarus. However,
insula. This notwithstanding, the Kremlin’s what the two men did not touch upon was
threat perception will most likely increase the transfer of nuclear warheads to Belarus.
in light of NATO’s strategic adaptation, Even though the ban on hosting nuclear
potentially triggering Russian force adjust- weapons on Belarusian territory was re-
ments. Defence Minister Sergei Shoigu has moved through changes in the Belarusian
already stated that the above-mentioned constitution in February 2022, such a trans-
developments will affect Russia’s defence fer would be relatively difficult. Former
strategy. What form this might take Soviet storage sites in Belarus would first
remains unclear, however. At the moment, need to be reactivated. Moreover, the Bela-
Russia does not seem to have sufficient rusian Su-25 aircraft could most likely carry
conventional forces to increase its regional only gravity bombs, and its survivability
presence in the Baltics. This could be an- against defensive measures would be rela-

SWP Comment 68
November 2022

5
 tively poor. Recently, the Su-24 aircraft was In the long term, this could push Mos-
also raised as another option in Belarusian cow towards developing a serious interest
media reports. This aircraft would be nuclear- in non-strategic arms control, much like
capable, but it was removed from service by in the 1970s and 1980s. In the short to
Belarus 10 years ago and would therefore medium term, however, it could exacerbate
first need to be reactivated. Moscow’s threat perception and thus influ-
For the time being, several political but ence escalation dynamics.
also technical questions therefore still This leads to the second point: A greater
appear unresolved. What is also possible is role of nuclear weapons in Russia’s esca-
that the public deliberations between Putin lation management could have an impact
and Lukashenko were first and foremost on the stability and dynamic of potential
aimed at sending a political signal rather crises between NATO and Russia. Research
than providing the basis for an actual trans- on nuclear crises highlights two factors in
fer of robust systems to Belarus. particular that can influence crisis stability.
These are, firstly, the incentive to use nuclear
weapons first and, secondly, the degree to
Crisis stability could decline... which crises can be controlled, for example
through communication channels. What
An elevated role for nuclear weapons in matters is less the actual situation than the
Russia’s deterrence strategy and a strength- perceptions of the actors involved.
ened nuclear posture in areas bordering Thus, in a worsening crisis situation, for
NATO could weaken European security and example in the Baltic Sea region, the United
stability in different ways. States might be concerned about a low Rus-
First, strengthened deployments of sian nuclear threshold and therefore con-
nuclear weapons in western Russia could sider the use of conventional precision weap-
trigger new arms dynamics in Europe. The ons. Russia, in turn, is likely to fear such
immediate military impact of deploying a step, which could make a Russian use of
non-strategic nuclear weapons in Kalinin- nuclear weapons more likely. Overall, the
grad and Belarus would likely be limited. escalation potential of crises would thus
Russia can already hold any target in increase.
Europe at risk with its various missiles. Since both sides will factor these poten-
Nevertheless, a strengthening of Russian tial escalation dynamics into their military
nuclear forces in the Baltic region and pos- planning and established crisis communica-
sibly in Belarus could generate political tion channels do exist, nuclear escalation
pressure within NATO to respond to these should remain unlikely. Nonetheless, look-
moves. So far, the military Alliance has ing into the future, the perceptions of asym-
rejected the deployment of new land-based metric force distribution are more likely
nuclear missiles in Europe. Yet, the United than ever before to shape both crises and
States is currently developing various the strategic behaviour of both sides.
conventional stand-off missiles. Decisions
about their deployment are still pending.
Should Russia expand its nuclear deploy- ...and the prospects for arms
ments close to NATO, Central and Eastern control could further dwindle
European states in particular could demand
not only a strengthening of defensive capa- Third, a potentially growing role of nuclear
bilities such as missile and air defence. weapons for Russia’s security will pose
They could also pressure NATO to increase an additional obstacle to arms control. The
offensive capabilities by deploying Ameri- New START Treaty, which limits the num-
can conventional cruise missiles and hyper- ber of strategic delivery systems and nuclear
sonic weapons, which are currently in the warheads, expires in 2026. At present, it is
final stages of development. highly unlikely that the United States and

SWP Comment 68
November 2022

6
Russia will conclude a follow-on treaty. This In this context, it is first of all important
is not only due to bilateral tensions but also that Germany remains clear-eyed and ac-
due to China’s nuclear build-up and the knowledges the current challenges: Russia
domestic political situation in the United will have no interest in arms control, let
States. It remains to be seen whether, despite alone the disarmament of non-strategic
these obstacles, a politically binding upper nuclear weapons in the coming years. On
limit on strategic nuclear weapons or trans- the contrary, Moscow’s reliance on nuclear
parency measures, for example limited data weapons for deterrence and escalation man-
exchanges, can be negotiated. agement will likely grow. The “disarmament
With regard to non-strategic nuclear offensive” called for in the German coali-
weapons, the situation is even more com- tion agreement, which also demands arms © Stiftung Wissenschaft
plicated. Already before the war, arms con- control measures covering nuclear weapons und Politik, 2022
trol of non-strategic systems faced serious with shorter ranges, is unlikely to have any All rights reserved
challenges. The 1987 Intermediate-Range chance of success in this legislative period.
This Comment reflects
Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF), which banned In addition, Berlin should strengthen its
the author’s views.
land-based intermediate-range missiles, fell position with regard to the arms dynamics
apart in 2019 when the Trump administra- taking place in Europe. In view of Washing- The online version of
tion decided to withdraw from the treaty. ton’s development of new conventional this publication contains
Russia’s development of a cruise missile medium-range missile systems and the re- functioning links to other
SWP texts and other relevant
banned under the treaty had triggered this activation of the 56th Artillery Command
sources.
decision. Moscow had however always in Germany, Berlin might face difficult
denied violating INF provisions and, in decisions concerning the deployment of SWP Comments are subject
turn, accused the United States of breaching conventional medium-range missiles in the to internal peer review, fact-
the treaty. Since then, various arms control coming years. Negotiations with Moscow, checking and copy-editing.
and transparency initiatives regarding INF however, can only succeed from a position For further information on
our quality control pro-
systems have not come to fruition. of strength, which is based in particular on
cedures, please visit the SWP
If Russia’s reliance on non-strategic a united Alliance. Thus, the German gov- website: https://www.swp-
nuclear weapons once again increases, Mos- ernment should seek to prevent decisions berlin.org/en/about-swp/
cow’s appetite for limitations on short- and on possible US missile deployments in quality-management-for-
medium-range missiles will likely erode Europe from becoming a test for NATO. swp-publications/
even further. The United States is also un- Finally, German government officials
SWP
likely to have any interest in restrictions should thwart Russia’s nuclear intimidation Stiftung Wissenschaft und
in view of both its own missile programmes strategy, which is among other things Politik
and China’s growing arsenal of medium- aimed at weakening social cohesion within German Institute for
range missiles. Thus, there will be no sig- Western societies. Moscow’s nuclear sig- International and
nificant increase in nuclear security and nalling will likely continue in the coming Security Affairs

stability in Europe in the coming years, years and potentially disconcert the Ger-
Ludwigkirchplatz 3–4
neither on the strategic nor on the non- man population. Effective communication 10719 Berlin
strategic level. and explanations of the situation and con- Telephone +49 30 880 07-0
text can help counteract the effect of intimi- Fax +49 30 880 07-100
dation. Here, media representatives can www.swp-berlin.org
[email protected]
Recommendations play an important role as well.
ISSN (Print) 1861-1761
Germany’s forthcoming National Security ISSN (Online) 2747-5107
Strategy provides an opportunity for the DOI: 10.18449/2022C68
government to analyse the new threat land-
scape in Europe and to adapt its position. (English version of
SWP-Aktuell 59/2022)

Lydia Wachs is Research Associate in the International Security Research Division at SWP. This Comment appears within
the framework of the project STAND (Strategic Threat Analysis and Nuclear (Dis-)Order).

SWP Comment 68
November 2022