April 2, 2019 G.R. No.

210500

KILUSANG MAYO UNO, represented by its Secretary General ROGELIO SOLUTA; REP.
FERNANDO HICAP for himself and as representative of the ANAKPAWIS PARTY-LIST;
CENTER FOR TRADE UNION AND HUMAN RIGHTS, represented by its Executive
Director DAISY ARAGO; JOSELITO USTAREZ and SALVADOR CARRANZA, for themselves
and in representation of the NATIONAL FEDERATION OF LABOR UNIONS-KMU; NENITA
GONZAGA, PRESCILA A. MANI QUIZ, RED EN ALCANTARA,, Petitioners
vs.
Hon. BENIGNO SIMEON C. AQUINO III, Hon. PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., SOCIAL
SECURITY COMMISSION, SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM, AND EMILIO S. DE QUIROS, JR.,
Respondents

DECISION

LEONEN, J.:

This Court is called to determine the validity of the Social Security System premium
hike, which took effect in January 2014. The case also involves the application of
doctrines on judicial review, valid delegation of powers, and the exercise of police
power.

This resolves a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition,1 praying that a temporary
restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction be issued to annul the Social
Security System premium hike embodied in the following issuances: (1) Resolution No.
262-s. 2013 dated April 19, 2013; 2 (2) Resolution No. 711-s. 2013 dated September 20,
2013;3 and (3) Circular No. 2013-0104 dated October 2, 2013 (collectively, the assailed
issuances). Kilusang Mayo Uno, together with representatives from recognized labor
centers, labor federations, party-list groups, and Social Security System members
(collectively, Kilusang Mayo Uno, et al.), filed the case against government officials and
agencies involved in issuing the assailed issuances.
On April 19, 2013, the Social Security Commission issued Resolution No. 262-s.
2013,5 which provided an increase in: (1) the Social Security System members'
contribution rate from 10.4% to 11%; and (2) the maximum monthly salary credit from
₱15,000.00 to ₱16,000.00. The increase was made subject to the approval of the
President of the Philippines.6

In a September 6, 2013 Memorandum, the President approved the increase. 7

On September 20, 2013, the Social Security Commission issued Resolution No. 711-s.
2013,8 which approved, among others, the increase in contribution rate and maximum
monthly salary credit.

On October 2, 2013, the Social Security System, through President and Chief Executive
Officer Emilio S. De Quiros, Jr., issued Circular No. 2013-010, 9 which provided the
revised schedule of contributions that would be in effect in January 2014. Per the
circular, the employer and the employee shall equally shoulder the 0.6% increase in
contributions. Thus, the employer would pay a contribution rate of 7.37% (from
7.07%); the employee, 3.63% (from 3.33%).

On January 10, 2014, Kilusang Mayo Uno, et al. filed this Petition for Certiorari and
Prohibition,10 questioning the validity of the assailed issuances.

Maintaining that a majority of them are Social Security System members directly
affected by the premium hike, petitioners assert having the requisite locus standi to file
the Petition.11 Citing David v. Macapagal-Arroyo,12 they further argue that the other
petitioners' legal personality arises from the transcendental importance of the Petition's
issues.13

Petitioners claim that the assailed issuances were issued per an unlawful delegation of
power to respondent Social Security Commission based on Republic Act No. 8282, or
the Social Security Act. In particular, Section 18 14 allegedly offers vague and unclear
standards, and are incomplete in its terms and conditions. This provision, they claim,
has allowed respondent Social Security Commission to fix contribution rates from time
to time, subject to the President's approval. Petitioners claim that the delegation of the
power had no adequate legal guidelines to map out the boundaries of the delegate's
authority.15

In addition, petitioners claim that the increase in contribution rate violates Section 4(b)
(2) of the Social Security Act,16 which states that the "increases in benefits shall not
require any increase in the rate of contribution[.]" They argue that this proviso prohibits
the increase in contributions if there was no corresponding increase in benefits. 17

Petitioners then argue that the increase in contributions is an invalid exercise of police
power for not being reasonably necessary for the attainment of the purpose sought, as
well as for being unduly oppressive on the labor sector. 18 According to them, the Social
Security System can extend actuarial life and decrease its unfunded liability without
increasing the premiums they pay.19

Petitioners further insist that the revised ratio of contributions between employers and
employees, per the assailed issuances, is grossly unjust to the working class and is
beyond respondents' powers. They claim that for the purposes of justice and
consistency, respondents should have maintained the 70%-30% ratio in the premium
increase. Changing it, they add, is grossly unfair and detrimental to employees. 20

Petitioners further emphasize that the State is required to protect the rights of workers
and promote their welfare under the Constitution.21

Lastly, petitioners pray that a temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary
injunction be issued to stop the implementation of the increase in contributions. They
aver that stopping it is necessary to protect their substantive rights and interests. They
point out that their earnings for food and other basic needs would be reduced and
allocated instead to defraying the amount needed for contributions. 22

The issues for this Court's resolution are:

First, whether or not this Court can exercise its power of judicial review;

Second, whether or not there is an actual case or controversy;

Third, whether or not the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies applies;

Fourth, whether or not petitioners have legal standing to file the Petition; and

Finally, whether or not the assailed issuances were issued in violation of laws and with
grave abuse of discretion.

In connection with the fifth issue, this Court further resolves:

First, whether or not the assailed issuances are void for having been issued under
vague and unclear standards contained in the Social Security Act;

Second, whether or not the increase in Social Security System contributions is

reasonably necessary for the attainment of the purpose sought and is unduly
oppressive upon the labor sector; and

Finally, whether or not the revised ratio of contributions between employers and
employees is grossly unjust to the working class and beyond respondent Social Security
Commission's power to enact.

This Court denies the Petition for lack of merit.

Procedural infirmities attend the filing of this Petition. To begin with, former President
Benigno Simeon C. Aquino III, as President of the Philippines, is improperly impleaded
here.

The president is the head of the executive branch, 23 a co-equal of the judiciary under
the Constitution. His or her prerogative is entitled to respect from other branches of
government.24 Inter-branch courtesy25 is but a consequence of the doctrine of
separation of powers.26

As such, the president cannot be charged with any suit, civil or criminal in nature,
during his or her incumbency in office. This is in line with the doctrine of the president's
immunity from suit.27

In David,28 this Court explained why it is improper to implead the incumbent President
of the Philippines. The doctrine has both policy and practical considerations:

Settled is the doctrine that the President, during his tenure of office or actual
incumbency, may not be sued in any civil or criminal case, and there is no need to
provide for it in the Constitution or law. It will degrade the dignity of the high office of
the President, the Head of State, if he can be dragged into court litigations while
serving as such. Furthermore, it is important that he be freed from any form of
harassment, hindrance or distraction to enable him to fully attend to the performance of
his official duties and functions. Unlike the legislative and judicial branch, only one
constitutes the executive branch and anything which impairs his usefulness in the
discharge of the many great and important duties imposed upon him by the
Constitution necessarily impairs the operation of the Government. However, this does
not mean that the President is not accountable to anyone. Like any other official, he
remains accountable to the people but he may be removed from office only in the mode
provided by law and that is by impeachment. 29 (Emphasis in the original, citations
omitted)

As to the propriety of seeking redress from this Court, it is best to be guided by the
power of judicial review as provided in Article VIII, Section 1 of the 1987 Constitution:

ARTICLE VIII

Judicial Department
SECTION 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower
courts as may be established by law.

Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies
involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine
whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government.
(Emphasis supplied)

This Court has discussed in several cases how the 1987 Constitution has expanded the
scope of judicial power from its traditional understanding. As such, courts are not only
expected to "settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable
and enforceable[,]"30 but are also empowered to determine if any government branch
or instrumentality has acted beyond the scope of its powers, such that there is grave
abuse of discretion.31

This development of the courts' judicial power arose from the use and abuse of the
political question doctrine during the martial law era under former President Ferdinand
Marcos. In Association of Medical Clinics for Overseas Workers, Inc. v. GCC Approved
Medical Centers Association, Inc.,32 this Court held:

In Francisco v. The House of Representatives, we recognized that this expanded

jurisdiction was meant "to ensure the potency of the power of judicial review to curb
grave abuse of discretion by 'any branch or instrumentalities of government.'" Thus, the
second paragraph of Article VIII, Section 1 engraves, for the first time in its history, into
black letter law the "expanded certiorari jurisdiction" of this Court, whose nature and
purpose had been provided in the sponsorship speech of its proponent, former Chief
Justice Constitutional Commissioner Roberto Concepcion[:]

....

The first section starts with a sentence copied from former Constitutions. It says:
The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as
may be established by law.

I suppose nobody can question it.

The next provision is new in our constitutional law. I will read it first and explain.

Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies
involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine
whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the government.

Fellow Members of this Commission, this is actually a product of our experience during
martial law. As a matter of fact, it has some antecedents in the past, but the role of the
judiciary during the deposed regime was marred considerably by the circumstance that
in a number of cases against the government, which then had no legal defense at all,
the solicitor general set up the defense of political question and got away with it. As a
consequence, certain principles concerning particularly the writ of habeas corpus, that
is, the authority of courts to order the release of political detainees, and other matters
related to the operation and effect of martial law failed because the government set up
the defense of political question. And the Supreme Court

said: "Well, since it is political, we have no authority to pass upon it." The Committee
on the Judiciary feels that this was not a proper solution of the questions involved. It
did not merely request an encroachment upon the rights of the people, but it, in effect,
encouraged further violations thereof during the martial law regime.

....

Briefly stated, courts of justice determine the limits of power of the agencies and offices
of the government as well as those of its officers. In other words, the judiciary is the
final arbiter on the question whether or not a branch of government or any of its
officials has acted without jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction, or so capriciously as
to constitute an abuse of discretion amounting to excess of jurisdiction or lack of
jurisdiction. This is not only a judicial power but a duty to pass judgment on matters of
this nature.

This is the background of paragraph 2 of Section 1, which means that the courts cannot
hereafter evade the duty to settle matters of this nature, by claiming that such matters
constitute a political question.33 (Emphasis in the original, citations omitted)

Rule 65, Sections 1 and 2 of the Rules of Court provides remedies to address grave
abuse of discretion by any government branch or instrumentality, particularly through
petitions for certiorari and prohibition:

SECTION 1. Petition for Certiorari. — When any tribunal, board or officer exercising
judicial or quasi-judicial functions has acted without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction,
or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and there
is no appeal, or any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law,
a person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the proper court, alleging the
facts with certainty and praying that judgment be rendered annulling or modifying the
proceedings of such tribunal, board or officer, and granting such incidental reliefs as
law and justice may require.

The petition shall be accompanied by a certified true copy of the judgment, order or
resolution subject thereof, copies of all pleadings and documents relevant and pertinent
thereto, and a sworn certification of non-forum shopping as provided in the paragraph
of Section 3, Rule 46.

SECTION 2. Petition for Prohibition. — When the proceedings of any tribunal,

corporation, board, officer or person, whether exercising judicial, quasi-judicial or
ministerial functions, are without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and there is no appeal or
any other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, a person
aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the proper court, alleging the facts with
certainty and praying that judgment be rendered commanding the respondent to desist
from further proceedings in the action or matter specified therein, or otherwise granting
such incidental reliefs as law and justice may require.

The petition shall likewise be accompanied by a certified true copy of the judgment,
order or resolution subject thereof, copies of all pleadings and documents relevant and
pertinent thereto, and a sworn certification of non-forum shopping as provided in the
third paragraph of Section 3, Rule 46.

While these provisions pertain to a tribunal's, board's, or an officer's exercise of

discretion in judicial, quasi-judicial, or ministerial functions, Rule 65 still applies to
invoke the expanded scope of judicial power. In Araullo v. Aquino III,34 this Court
differentiated certiorari from prohibition, and clarified that Rule 65 is the remedy to "set
right, undo[,] and restrain any act of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction by any branch or instrumentality of the Government, even if the
latter does not exercise judicial, quasi-judicial[J or ministerial functions." 35

This Court further explained:

The present Rules of Court uses two special civil actions for determining and correcting
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. These are the
special civil actions for certiorari and prohibition, and both are governed by Rule 65. . . .

The ordinary nature and function of the writ of certiorari in our present system are aptly
explained in Delos Santos v. Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company:

....

The sole office of the writ of certiorari is the correction of errors of jurisdiction, which
includes the commission of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction.
In this regard, mere abuse of discretion is not enough to warrant the issuance of the
writ. The abuse of discretion must be grave, which means either that the judicial or
quasi-judicial power was exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of
passion or personal hostility, or that the respondent judge, tribunal or board evaded a
positive duty, or virtually refused to perform the duty enjoined or to act in
contemplation of law, such as when such judge, tribunal or board exercising judicial or
quasi-judicial powers acted in a capricious or whimsical manner as to be equivalent to
lack of jurisdiction.

Although similar to prohibition in that it will lie for want or excess of

jurisdiction, certiorari is to be distinguished from prohibition by the fact that it is a
corrective remedy used for the re-examination of some action of an inferior tribunal,
and is directed to the cause or proceeding in the lower court and not to the court itself,
while prohibition is a preventative remedy issuing to restrain future action, and is
directed to the court itself. The Court expounded on the nature and function of the writ
of prohibition in Holy Spirit Homeowners Association, Inc. v. Defensor:

A petition for prohibition is also not the proper remedy to assail an IRR issued in the
exercise of a quasi-legislative function. Prohibition is an extraordinary writ directed
against any tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person, whether exercising judicial,
quasi-judicial or ministerial functions, ordering said entity or person to desist from
further proceedings when said proceedings are without or in excess of said entity's or
person's jurisdiction, or are accompanied with grave abuse of discretion, and there is no
appeal or any other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.
Prohibition lies against judicial or ministerial functions, but not against legislative or
quasi-legislative functions. Generally, the purpose of a writ of prohibition is to keep a
lower court within the limits of its jurisdiction in order to maintain the administration of
justice in orderly channels. Prohibition is the proper remedy to afford relief against
usurpation of jurisdiction or power by an inferior court, or when, in the exercise of
jurisdiction in handling matters clearly within its cognizance the inferior court
transgresses the bounds prescribed to it by the law, or where there is no adequate
remedy available in the ordinary course of law by which such relief can be obtained.
Where the principal relief sought is to invalidate an IRR, petitioners' remedy is an
ordinary action for its nullification, an action which properly falls under the jurisdiction
of the Regional Trial Court. In any case, petitioners' allegation that "respondents are
performing or threatening to perform functions without or in excess of their jurisdiction"
may appropriately be enjoined by the trial court through a writ of injunction or a
temporary restraining order.

With respect to the Court, however, the remedies of certiorari and prohibition are
necessarily broader in scope and reach, and the writ of certiorari or prohibition may be
issued to correct errors of jurisdiction committed not only by a tribunal, corporation,
board or officer exercising judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial functions but also to set
right, undo and restrain any act of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction by any branch or instrumentality of the Government, even if the
latter does not exercise judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial functions. This application is
expressly authorized by the text of the second paragraph of Section 1, . . . .

Thus, petitions for certiorari and prohibition are appropriate remedies to raise
constitutional issues and to review and/or prohibit or nullify the acts of legislative and
executive officials.36 (Emphasis in the original, citations omitted)

Here, petitioners filed a Petition for both certiorari and prohibition to determine whether
respondents Social Security System and Social Security Commission committed grave
abuse of discretion in releasing the assailed issuances. According to them, these
issuances violated the provisions of the Constitution on the protection of workers,
promotion of social justice, and respect for human rights. 37 They further claim that the
assailed issuances are void for having been issued based on vague and unclear
standards. They also argue that the increase in contributions is an invalid exercise of
police power as it is not reasonably necessary and, thus, unduly oppressive to the labor
sector. Lastly, they insist that the revised ratio in contributions is grossly unjust to the
working class.38

Petitioners must, thus, comply with the requisites for the exercise of the power of
judicial review: (1) there must be an actual case or justiciable controversy before this
Court; (2) the question before this Court must be ripe for adjudication; (3) the person
challenging the act must be a proper party; and (4) the issue of constitutionality must
be raised at the earliest opportunity and must be the very litis mota of the case.39

I (A)

Most important in this list of requisites is the existence of an actual case or

controversy.40 In every exercise of judicial power, whether in the traditional or
expanded sense, this is an absolute necessity.

There is an actual case or controversy if there is a "conflict of legal right, an opposite

legal claims susceptible of judicial resolution." 41 A petitioner bringing a case before this
Court must establish that there is a legally demandable and enforceable right under the
Constitution. There must be a real and substantial controversy, with definite and
concrete issues involving the legal relations of the parties, and admitting of specific
relief that courts can grant.42

This requirement goes into the nature of the judiciary as a co-equal branch of
government. It is bound by the doctrine of separation of powers, and will not rule on
any matter or cause the invalidation of any act, law, or regulation, if there is no actual
or sufficiently imminent breach of or injury to a right. The courts interpret laws, but the
ambiguities may only be clarified in the existence of an actual situation.

In Lozano v. Nograles,43 the petitions assailing House Resolution No. 1109 were
dismissed due to the absence of an actual case or controversy. This Court held that the
"determination of the nature, scope[,] and extent of the powers of government is the
exclusive province of the judiciary, such that any mediation on the part of the latter for
the allocation of constitutional boundaries would amount, not to its supremacy, but to
its mere fulfillment of its 'solemn and sacred obligation' under the Constitution." 44The
judiciary's awesome power of review is limited in application. 45

Jurisprudence lays down guidelines in determining an actual case or controversy.

In Information Technology Foundation of the Philippines v. Commission on
Elections,46 this Court required that "the pleadings must show an active antagonistic
assertion of a legal right, on the one hand, and a denial thereof on the other; that is, it
must concern a real and not a merely theoretical question or issue." 47 Further, there
must be "an actual and substantial controversy admitting of specific relief through a
decree conclusive in nature, as distinguished from an opinion advising what the law
would be upon a hypothetical state of facts."48

Courts, thus, cannot decide on theoretical circumstances. They are neither advisory
bodies, nor are they tasked with taking measures to prevent imagined possibilities of
abuse.

Hence, in Southern Hemisphere Engagement Network, Inc. v. Anti-Terrorism

Council,49 this Court ruled:

Without any justiciable controversy, the petitions have become pleas for declaratory
relief, over which the Court has no original jurisdiction. Then again, declaratory actions
characterized by "double contingency," where both the activity the petitioners intend to
undertake and the anticipated reaction to it of a public official are merely theorized, lie
beyond judicial review for lack of ripeness.

The possibility of abuse in the implementation of RA 9372 does not avail to take the
present petitions out of the realm of the surreal and merely imagined, . . . Allegations
of abuse must be anchored on real events before courts may step in to settle actual
controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and
enforceable.50 (Emphasis supplied, citations omitted)
In Republic v. Roque,51 this Court further qualified the meaning of a justiciable
controversy. In dismissing the Petition for declaratory relief before the Regional Trial
Court, which assailed several provisions of the Human Security Act, we explained that
justiciable controversy or ripening seeds refer to:

. . . an existing case or controversy that is appropriate or ripe for judicial determination,

not one that is conjectural or merely anticipatory. Corollary thereto, by "ripening seeds"
it is meant, not that sufficient accrued facts may be dispensed with, but that a dispute
may be tried at its inception before it has accumulated the asperity, distemper,
animosity, passion, and violence of a full blown battle that looms ahead. The concept
describes a state of facts indicating imminent and inevitable litigation provided that the
issue is not settled and stabilized by tranquilizing declaration. 52 (Emphasis supplied,
citations omitted)

The existence of an actual case or controversy depends on the allegations pleaded. 53

Here, petitioners allege that the premium hike, through the assailed issuances, violates
their rights as workers whose welfare is mandated to be protected under the
Constitution.54 They further allege that the issuances are grossly unjust to the working
class and were issued beyond the scope of constitutional powers. 55

Thus, petitioners' allegations present violations of rights provided for under the
Constitution on the protection of workers, and promotion of social justice. 56 They
likewise assert that respondents Social Security Commission and Social Security System
acted beyond the scope of their powers.

This Court, however, notes that petitioners failed to prove how the assailed issuances
violated workers' constitutional rights such that it would warrant a judicial review.
Petitioners cannot merely cite and rely on the Constitution without specifying how these
rights translate to being legally entitled to a fixed amount and proportion of Social
Security System contributions.
Moreover, an actual case or controversy requires that the right must be enforceable and
legally demandable. A complaining party's right is, thus, affected by the rest of the
requirements for the exercise of judicial power: (1) the issue's ripeness and
prematurity; (2) the moot and academic principle; and (3) the party's standing. 57

I (B)

A case is ripe for adjudication when the challenged governmental act is a completed
action such that there is a direct, concrete, and adverse effect on the petitioner. 58 It is,
thus, required that something had been performed by the government branch or
instrumentality before the court may step in, and the petitioner must allege the
existence of an immediate or threatened injury to itself as a result of the challenged
action.59

In connection with acts of administrative agencies, ripeness is ensured under the

doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies. Courts may only take cognizance of a
case or controversy if the petitioner has exhausted all remedies available to it under the
law. The doctrine ensures that the administrative agency exercised its power to its full
extent, including its authority to correct or reconsider its actions. It would, thus, be
premature for courts to take cognizance of the case prior to the exhaustion of
remedies, not to mention it would violate the principle of separation of powers. Thus, in
Rule 65 petitions, it is required that no other plain, speedy, or adequate remedy is
available to the party. In Association of Medical Clinics for Overseas Workers, Inc.:

The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies applies to a petition for certiorari,

regardless of the act of the administrative agency concerned, i.e., whether the act
concerns a quasi-judicial, or quasi-legislative function, or is purely regulatory.

Consider in this regard that once an administrative agency has been empowered by
Congress to undertake a sovereign function, the agency should be allowed to perform
its function to the full extent that the law grants. This full extent covers the authority of
superior officers in the administrative agencies to correct the actions of subordinates, or
for collegial bodies to reconsider their own decisions on a motion for reconsideration.
Premature judicial intervention would interfere with this administrative mandate, leaving
administrative action incomplete; if allowed, such premature judicial action through a
writ of certiorari, would be a usurpation that violates the separation of powers principle
that underlies our Constitution.

In every case, remedies within the agency's administrative process must be exhausted
before external remedies can be applied. Thus, even if a governmental entity may have
committed a grave abuse of discretion, litigants should, as a rule, first ask
reconsideration from the body itself, or a review thereof before the agency concerned.
This step ensures that by the time the grave abuse of discretion issue reaches the
court, the administrative agency concerned would have fully exercised its jurisdiction
and the court can focus its attention on the questions of law presented before it.

Additionally, the failure to exhaust administrative remedies affects the ripeness to

adjudicate the constitutionality of a governmental act, which in turn affects the
existence of the need for an actual case or controversy for the courts to exercise their
power of judicial review. The need for ripeness — an aspect of the timing of a case or
controversy — does not change regardless of whether the issue of constitutionality
reaches the Court through the traditional means, or through the Court's expanded
jurisdiction. In fact, separately from ripeness, one other concept pertaining to judicial
review is intrinsically connected to it: the concept of a case being moot and academic.

Both these concepts relate to the timing of the presentation of a controversy before the
Court — ripeness relates to its prematurity, while mootness relates to a belated or
unnecessary judgment on the issues. The Court cannot preempt the actions of the
parties, and neither should it (as a rule) render judgment after the issue has already
been resolved by or through external developments.
The importance of timing in the exercise of judicial review highlights and reinforces the
need for an actual case or controversy — an act that may violate a party's right.
Without any completed action or a concrete threat of injury to the petitioning party, the
act is not yet ripe for adjudication. It is merely a hypothetical problem. The challenged
act must have been accomplished or performed by either branch or instrumentality of
government before a court may come into the picture, and the petitioner must allege
the existence of an immediate or threatened injury to itself as a result of the challenged
action.

In these lights, a constitutional challenge, whether presented through the traditional

route or through the Court's expanded jurisdiction, requires compliance with the
ripeness requirement. In the case of administrative acts, ripeness manifests itself
through compliance with the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative
remedies.60 (Emphasis in the original, citations omitted)

Here, it is clear that petitioners failed to exhaust their administrative remedies.

Petitioners allege that they "have no appeal nor any plain, speedy[,] and adequate
remedy under the ordinary course of law except through the instant Petition." 61

However, Sections 4 and 5 of the Social Security Act are clear that the Social Security
Commission has jurisdiction over any dispute arising from the law regarding coverage,
benefits, contributions, and penalties. The law further provides that the aggrieved party
must first exhaust all administrative remedies available before seeking review from the
courts:

SECTION 4. Powers and Duties of the Commission and SSS. — (a) The Commission. —
For the attainment of its main objectives as set forth in Section 2 hereof, the
Commission shall have the following powers and duties:
(1) To adopt, amend and rescind, subject to the approval of the President of the
Philippines, such rules and regulations as may be necessary to carry out the provisions
and purposes of this Act;

....

SECTION 5. Settlement of Disputes. — (a) Any dispute arising under this Act with
respect to coverage, benefits, contributions and penalties thereon or any other matter
related thereto, shall be cognizable by the Commission, and any case filed with respect
thereto shall be heard by the Commission, or any of its members, or by hearing officers
duly authorized by the Commission and decided within the mandatory period of twenty
(20) days after the submission of the evidence. The filing, determination and settlement
of disputes shall be governed by the rules and regulations promulgated by the
Commission.

(b) Appeal to Courts. — Any decision of the Commission, in the absence of an appeal
therefrom as herein provided, shall become final and executory fifteen (15) days after
the date of notification, and judicial review thereof shall be permitted only after any
party claiming to be aggrieved thereby has exhausted his remedies before the
Commission. The Commission shall be deemed to be a party to any judicial action
involving any such decision and may be represented by an attorney employed by the
Commission, or when requested by the Commission, by the Solicitor General or any
public prosecutor. (Emphasis supplied)

In Luzon Stevedoring Corporation v. Social Security Commission, 62 this Court upheld the
jurisdiction and competence of the Social Security Commission with regard to the grant
of authority under the unambiguous provisions of the Republic Act No. 8282. 63 This
Court stated:

Section 5 of the Social Security Act . . . on its face, would show that any dispute arising
therein "with respect to coverage entitlement to benefits, collection and settlement of
premium contributions and penalties thereon, or any other matter related thereto, shall
be cognizable by the Commission . . . ." On its face, support for the competence of
respondent Commission to decide . . . would thus seem to be evident. 64 (Emphasis
supplied, citations omitted)

In Enorme v. Social Security System,65 this Court categorically sustained the Social
Security Commission's exclusive power and jurisdiction to take cognizance of all
disputes covered under the Social Security Act. 66 Consequently, plaintiffs must first
exhaust all administrative remedies before judicial recourse is allowed. 67

In Social Security Commission v. Court of Appeals, 68 this Court upheld the rules of
procedure of the Social Security Commission with regard to the rule on exhaustion of
administrative remedies before a resort to the courts may be permitted:

It now becomes apparent that the permissive nature of a motion for reconsideration
with the SSC must be read in conjunction with the requirements for judicial review, or
the conditions sine qua non before a party can institute certain civil actions. A combined
reading of Section 5 of Rule VI, quoted earlier, and Section 1 of Rule VII of the SSC's
1997 Revised Rules of Procedure reveals that the petitioners are correct in asserting
that a motion for reconsideration is mandatory in the sense that it is a precondition to
the institution of an appeal or a petition for review before the Court of Appeals. Stated
differently, while Rago certainly had the option to file a motion for reconsideration
before the SSC, it was nevertheless mandatory that he do so if he wanted to
subsequently avail of judicial remedies.

....

The policy of judicial bodies to give quasi-judicial agencies, such as the SSC, an
opportunity to correct its mistakes by way of motions for reconsideration or other
statutory remedies before accepting appeals therefrom finds extensive doctrinal support
in the well-entrenched principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies.
The reason for the principle rests upon the presumption that the administrative body, if
given the chance to correct its mistake or error, may amend its decision on a given
matter and decide it properly. The principle insures orderly procedure and withholds
judicial interference until the administrative process would have been allowed to duly
run its course. This is but practical since availing of administrative remedies entails
lesser expenses and provides for a speedier disposition of controversies. Even comity
dictates that unless the available administrative remedies have been resorted to and
appropriate authorities given an opportunity to act and correct the errors committed in
the administrative forum, judicial recourse must be held to be inappropriate,
impermissible, premature, and even unnecessary.69 (Emphasis supplied, citations
omitted)

Furthermore, jurisdiction is determined by laws enacted by Congress. The doctrine of

exhaustion of administrative remedies ensures that this legislative power is respected
by courts. Courts cannot ignore Congress' determination that the Social Security
Commission is the entity with jurisdiction over any dispute arising from the Social
Security Act with respect to coverage, benefits, contributions, and penalties.

Here, nothing in the records shows that petitioners filed a case before the Social
Security Commission or asked for a reconsideration of the assailed issuances. Moreover,
petitioners did not even try to show that their Petition falls under one (1) of the
exceptions to the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies:

However, we are not unmindful of the doctrine that the principle of exhaustion of
administrative remedies is not an ironclad rule. It may be disregarded (1) when there is
a violation of due process, (2) when the issue involved is purely a legal question, (3)
when the administrative action is patently illegal amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction, (4) when there is estoppel on the part of the administrative agency
concerned, (5) when there is irreparable injury, (6) when the respondent is a
department secretary whose acts as an alter ego of the President bears the implied and
assumed approval of the latter, (7) when to require exhaustion of administrative
remedies would be unreasonable, (8) when it would amount to a nullification of a claim,
(9) when the subject matter is a private land in land case proceedings, (10) when the
rule does not provide a plain, speedy and adequate remedy, (11) when there are
circumstances indicating the urgency of judicial intervention, (12) when no
administrative review is provided by law, (13) where the rule of qualified political
agency applies, and (14) when the issue of non-exhaustion of administrative remedies
has been rendered moot.70 (Emphasis in the original, citations omitted)

The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is settled in jurisprudence. 71 As

early as 1967, this Court has recognized the requirement that parties must exhaust all
administrative remedies available before the Social Security Commission. 72 The Social
Security Commission, then, must be given a chance to render a decision on the issue,
or to correct any alleged mistake or error, before the courts can exercise their power of
judicial review. This Court ruled:

In the case at bar, plaintiff has not exhausted its remedies before the Commission. The
Commission has not even been given a chance to render a decision on the issue raised
by plaintiff herein, because the latter has not appealed to the Commission from the
action taken by the System in insisting upon the enforcement of Circular No.
34.73 (Emphasis in the original)

Thus, petitioners have prematurely invoked this Court's power of judicial review in
violation of the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies.

Notably, petitioners failed to abide by the principle of primary administrative

jurisdiction. This principle states that:

. . . courts cannot or will not determine a controversy involving a question which is

within the jurisdiction

of the administrative tribunal prior to the resolution of that question by the

administrative tribunal, where the question demands the exercise of sound
administrative discretion requiring the special knowledge, experience and services of
the administrative tribunal to determine technical and intricate matters of fact. 74

In Republic v. Gallo:75

[U]nder the doctrine of primary administrative jurisdiction, if an administrative tribunal

has jurisdiction over a controversy, courts should not resolve the issue even if it may be
within its proper jurisdiction. This is especially true when the question involves its sound
discretion requiring special knowledge, experience, and services to determine technical
and intricate matters of fact.

In Republic v. Lacap:

Corollary to the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is the doctrine of

primary jurisdiction; that is, courts cannot or will not determine a controversy involving
a question which is within the jurisdiction of the administrative tribunal prior to the
resolution of that question by the administrative tribunal, where the question demands
the exercise of sound administrative discretion requiring the special knowledge,
experience and services of the administrative tribunal to determine technical and
intricate matters of fact. . . .

Thus, the doctrine of primary administrative jurisdiction refers to the competence of a

court to take cognizance of a case at first instance. Unlike the doctrine of exhaustion of
administrative remedies, it cannot be waived. 76 (Emphasis in the original, citations
omitted)

Here, respondent Social Security Commission qualifies as an administrative tribunal,

given sound administrative discretion requiring the special knowledge, experience, and
services of the administrative tribunal to determine technical and intricate matters of
fact. This is evident from the qualifications of its members and its powers and duties
under Sections 3 and 4 of the Social Security Act:
SECTION 3. Social Security System. — (a) . . . The SSS shall be directed and controlled
by a Social Security Commission, hereinafter referred to as 'Commission', composed of
the Secretary of Labor and Employment or his duly designated undersecretary, the SSS
president and seven (7) appointive members, three (3) of whom shall represent the
workers' group, at least one (1) of whom shall be a woman; three (3), the employers'
group, at least one (1) of whom shall be a woman; and one (1), the general public
whose representative shall have adequate knowledge and experience regarding social
security, to be appointed by the President of the Philippines. The six (6) members
representing workers and employers shall be chosen from among the nominees of
workers' and employers' organizations, respectively. . . .

(b) The general conduct of the operations and management functions of the SSS shall
be vested in the SSS President who shall serve as the chief executive officer
immediately responsible for carrying out the program of the SSS and the policies of the
Commission. The SSS President shall be a person who has had previous experience in
technical and administrative fields related to the purposes of this Act. . . .

(c) The Commission, upon the recommendation of the SSS President, shall appoint
an actuary and such other personnel as may be deemed necessary; fix their reasonable
compensation, allowances and other benefits; prescribe their duties and establish such
methods and procedures as may be necessary to insure the efficient, honest and
economical administration of the provisions and purposes of this Act: . . . Provided,
further, That the personnel of the SSS shall be selected only from civil service eligibles
and be subject to civil service rules and regulations:. . .

SECTION 4. Powers and Duties of the Commission and SSS. — (a) The Commission. —
For the attainment of its main objectives as set forth in Section 2 hereof, the
Commission shall have the following powers and duties:
(1) To adopt, amend and rescind, subject to the approval of the President of the
Philippines, such rules and regulations as may be necessary to carry out the provisions
and purposes of this Act;

(2) To establish a provident fund for the members which will consist of voluntary
contributions of employers and/or employees, self-employed and voluntary members
and their earnings, for the payment of benefits to such members or their beneficiaries,
subject to such rules and regulations as it may promulgate and approved by the
President of the Philippines;

(3) To maintain a Provident Fund which consists of contributions made by both the SSS
and its officials and employees and their earnings, for the payment of benefits to such
officials and employees or their heirs under such terms and conditions as it may
prescribe;

(4) To approve restructuring proposals for the payment of due but unremitted
contributions and unpaid loan amortizations under such terms and conditions as it may
prescribe;

(5) To authorize cooperatives registered with the cooperative development authority or

associations registered with the appropriate government agency to act as collecting
agents of the SSS with respect to their members: Provided, That the SSS shall accredit
the cooperative or association: Provided, further, That the persons authorized to collect
are bonded;

(6) To compromise or release, in whole or in part any interest, penalty or any civil
liability to SSS in connection with the investments authorized under Section 26 hereof,
under such terms and conditions as it may prescribe and approved by the President of
the Philippines; and
(7) To approve, confirm, pass upon or review any and all actions of the SSS in the
proper and necessary exercise of its powers and duties hereinafter enumerated.
(Emphasis supplied)

Thus, under the doctrine of primary administrative jurisdiction, petitioners should have
first filed their case before respondent Social Security Commission.

I (C)

As for mootness, as earlier mentioned, moot cases prevent the actual case or
controversy from becoming justiciable. Courts cannot render judgment after the issue
has already been resolved by or through external developments. This entails that they
can no longer grant or deny the relief prayed for by the complaining party. 77

This is consistent with this Court's deference to the powers of the other branches of
government. This Court must be wary that it is ruling on existing facts before it
invalidates any act or rule.78

Nonetheless, this Court has enumerated circumstances when it may still rule on moot
issues. In David:

Courts will decide cases, otherwise moot and academic, if: first, there is a grave
violation of the Constitution; second, the exceptional character of the situation and the
paramount public interest is involved; third, when constitutional issue raised requires
formulation of controlling principles to guide the bench, the bar, and the public;
and fourth, the case is capable of repetition yet evading review. 79 (Emphasis in the
original, citations omitted)

The third exception is corollary to this Court's power under Article VIII, Section 5(5) of
the 1987 Constitution.80 This Court has the power to promulgate rules and procedures
for the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights, pleading, practice, and
procedure in all courts. It applies where there is a clear need to clarify principles and
processes for the protection of rights.

As for the rest of the exceptions, however, all three (3) circumstances must be present
before this Court may rule on a moot issue. There must be an issue raising a grave
violation of the Constitution, involving an exceptional situation of paramount public
interest that is capable of repetition yet evading review.

Here, since respondent Social Security Commission is set to issue new resolutions for
the Social Security System members' contributions, the issue on the assailed issuances'
validity may be rendered moot. Nonetheless, all the discussed exceptions are present:
(1) petitioners raise violations of constitutional rights; (2) the situation is of paramount
public interest; (3) there is a need to guide the bench, the bar, and the public on the
power of respondent Social Security Commission to increase the contributions; and (4)
the matter is capable of repetition yet evading review, as it involves a question of law
that can recur. Thus, this Court may rule on this case.

I (D)

Petitioners argue that they have the legal standing to file the Petition since: (1) a
majority of them are Social Security System members and are directly affected by the
increase in contributions;81 and (2) other petitioners argue that the standing
requirement must be relaxed since the issues they raise are of transcendental
importance.82

On the contrary, not all petitioners have shown the requisite legal standing to bring the
case before this Court.

Legal standing is the personal and substantial interest of a party in a case "such that
the party has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of the governmental act
that is being challenged, alleging more than a generalized grievance." 83
Petitioners Joselito Ustarez, Salvador T. Carranza, Nenita Gonzaga, Prescila A. Maniquiz,
Reden R. Alcantara, and Anakpawis Party-List Representative Fernando Hicap, for
himself, are Social Security System members who stand to suffer direct and material
injury from the assailed issuances' enforcement. They are, thus, clothed with legal
personality to assail the imposed increase in contribution rates and maximum monthly
salary credit.

On the other hand, petitioners Kilusang Mayo Uno, Anakpawis Party-List, Center for
Trade Union and Human Rights, and National Federation of Labor Unions-Kilusang Mayo
Uno all failed to show how they will suffer direct and material injury from the
enforcement of the assailed issuances.

However, jurisprudence is replete with instances when a liberal approach to

determining legal standing was adopted. This has allowed "ordinary citizens, members
of Congress, and civic organizations to prosecute actions involving the constitutionality
or validity of laws, regulations[,] and rulings."84

This Court has provided instructive guides to determine whether a matter is of

transcendental importance: "(1) the character of the funds or other assets involved in
the case; (2) the presence of a clear case of disregard of a constitutional or statutory
prohibition by the public respondent agency or instrumentality of the government; and
(3) the lack of any other party with a more direct and specific interest in the questions
being raised."85

Here, the assailed issuances set the new contribution rate and its date of effectivity.
The increase in contributions has been in effect since January 2014. As such, the issue
of the validity of increase in contributions is of transcendental importance. The required
legal standing for petitioners must be relaxed.

It is worth noting that this issue affects millions of Filipinos working here and abroad. A
substantial portion of members' salaries goes to the Social Security System fund. To
delay the resolution of such an important issue would be a great disservice to this
Court's duty enshrined in the Constitution.

For all these reasons, and despite the technical infirmities in this Petition, this Court
reviews the assailed issuances.

II

Petitioners' attack on the increase in contribution rate and maximum monthly salary
credit is two (2)-tiered: (1) they assail the validity of the exercise of respondents Social
Security System and Social Security Commission's power under the law; and (2) they
assail the validity of the delegation of power to respondent Social Security Commission.

Petitioners argue that the assailed issuances are void for being issued under vague and
unclear standards under the Social Security Act. They admit that Section 18 allows the
Social Security Commission to fix the contribution rate subject to several conditions.
However, petitioners claim that the term "actuarial calculations" is too vague and
general, and the relationship between the rate of benefits and actuarial calculations is
not clearly defined. Thus, they conclude that the delegation of power to fix the
contribution rate is incomplete in all its terms and conditions.

Petitioners' argument lacks merit.

Petitioners are putting in issue not only the validity of the exercise of the delegated
power, but also the validity of the delegation itself. They are, thus, collaterally attacking
the validity of the Social Security Act's provisions.

Collateral attacks on a presumably valid law are not allowed. Unless a law, rule, or act
is annulled in a direct proceeding, it is presumed valid. 86
Furthermore, the "delegation of legislative power to various specialized administrative
agencies is allowed in the face of increasing complexity of modern life." 87 In Equi-Asia
Placement, Inc. v. Department of Foreign Affairs:88

Given the volume and variety of interactions involving the members of today's society,
it is doubtful if the legislature can promulgate laws dealing with the minutiae aspects of
everyday life. Hence, the need to delegate to administrative bodies, as the principal
agencies tasked to execute laws with respect to their specialized fields, the authority to
promulgate rules and regulations to implement a given statute and effectuate its
policies.89

For a valid exercise of delegation, this Court enumerated the following requisites:

All that is required for the valid exercise of this power of subordinate legislation is that
the regulation must be germane to the objects and purposes of the law; and that the
regulation be not in contradiction to, but in conformity with, the standards prescribed
by the law. Under the first test or the so-called completeness test, the law must be
complete in all its terms and conditions when it leaves the legislature such that when it
reaches the delegate, the only thing he will have to do is to enforce it. The second test
or the sufficient standard test, mandates that there should be adequate guidelines or
limitations in the law to determine the boundaries of the delegate's authority and
prevent the delegation from running riot.90

Simply put, what are needed for a valid delegation are: (1) the completeness of the
statute making the delegation; and (2) the presence of a sufficient standard. 91

To determine completeness, all of the terms and provisions of the law must leave
nothing to the delegate except to implement it. "What only can be delegated is not the
discretion to determine what the law shall be but the discretion to determine how the
law shall be enforced."92
More relevant here, however, is the presence of a sufficient standard under the law.
Enforcement of a delegated power may only be effected in conformity with a sufficient
standard, which is used "to map out the boundaries of the delegate's authority and thus
'prevent the delegation from running riot.'" 93 The law must contain the limitations or
guidelines to determine the scope of authority of the delegate.

Not only is the Social Security Act complete in its terms; it also contains a sufficient
standard for the Social Security Commission to fix the monthly contribution rate and the
minimum and maximum monthly salary credits.

Section 18 states:

SECTION 18. Employee's Contribution. — (a) Beginning as of the last day of the
calendar month when an employee's compulsory coverage takes effect and every
month thereafter during his employment, the employer shall deduct and withhold from
such employee's monthly salary, wage, compensation or earnings, the employee's
contribution in an amount corresponding to his salary, wage, compensation or earnings
during the month in accordance with the following schedule:

SALARY RANGE OF MONTHLY MONTHLY CONTRIBUTION

BRACKET COMPENSATION SALARY
EMPLOYER EMPLOYEE TOTAL
CREDIT

I 1,000.00- 1000 50.70 33.30 84.00

1,249.99

II 1,250.00- 1500 76.00 50.00 126.00

1,749.99

III 1,750.00- 2000 101.30 66.70 168.00

2,249.99

IV 2,25.00- 2500 126.70 83.30 210.00

 2,749.99

V 2,750.00- 3000 152.00 100.00 252.00

3,249.99

VI 3,250.00- 3500 177.30 116.70 294.00

3,749.99

VII 3,750.00- 4000 202.70 133.30 336.00

4,249.99

VIII 4,250.00- 4500 228.00 150.00 378.00

4,749.99

IX 4,750.00- 5000 253.30 166.70 420.00

5,249.99

X 5,250.00- 5500 278.70 183.70 462.40

5,749.99

XI 5,750.00- 6000 304.00 200.00 504.00

6,249.99

XII 6,250.00- 6500 329.30 216.70 546.00

6,749.99

XIII 6,750.00- 7000 354.70 233.30 588.00

7,249.99

XIV 7,250.00- 7500 380.00 250.00 630.00

7,749.99

XV 7,750.00- 8000 405.30 266.70 672.00

8,249.99

XVI 8,250.00- 8500 430.70 283.30 714.00

8,749.99
XVII 8,750.00-OVER 9000 456.00 300.00 756.00

The foregoing schedule of contribution shall also apply to self-employed and voluntary
members.

The maximum monthly salary credit shall be Nine thousand pesos (P9,000.00) effective
January Nineteen hundred and ninety six (1996): Provided, That it shall be increased by
One thousand pesos (P1,000.00) every year thereafter until it shall have reached
Twelve thousand pesos (P12,000.00) by Nineteen hundred and ninety nine
(1999): Provided, further, That the minimum and maximum monthly salary credits as
well as the rate of contributions may be fixed from time to time by the Commission
through rules and regulations taking into consideration actuarial calculations and rate of
benefits, subject to the approval of the President of the Philippines. (Emphasis supplied)

In relation to Section 18, Section 4(a) prescribes the powers and duties of the Social
Security Commission. It provides:

SECTION 4. Powers and Duties of the Commission and SSS. — (a) The Commission. —
For the attainment of its main objectives as set forth in Section 2 hereof, the
Commission shall have the following powers and duties:

(1) To adopt, amend and rescind, subject to the approval of the President of the
Philippines, such rules and regulations as may be necessary to carry out the provisions
and purposes of this Act;

....

(7) To approve, confirm, pass upon or review any and all actions of the SSS in the
proper and necessary exercise of its powers and duties hereinafter enumerated.

It is evident from these provisions that the legislature has vested the necessary powers
in the Social Security Commission to fix the minimum and maximum amounts of
monthly salary credits and the contribution rate. The agency does not have to do
anything except implement the provisions based on the standards and limitations
provided by law.

In fixing the contribution rate and the minimum and maximum amounts of monthly
salary credits, the legislature specified the factors that should be considered: "actuarial
calculations and rate of benefits" 94 as an additional limit to the Social Security
Commission's rate fixing power under Section 18, the legislature required the approval
of the President of the Philippines.

The Social Security Act clearly specifies the limitations and identifies when and how the
Social Security Commission will fix the contribution rate and the monthly salary credits.

Actuarial science is derived from the concepts of utilitarianism and risk aversion. Thus:

Just as economic systems are the realm of the economist, social systems are the realm
of the sociologist, and electrical systems are the realm of the electrical engineer,
financial security systems have become the realm of the actuary. The uniqueness of the
actuarial profession lies in the actuary's understanding of financial security systems in
general, and the inner workings of the many different types in particular. The role of
the actuary is that of the designer, the adaptor, the problem solver, the risk estimator,
the innovator, and the technician of the continually changing field of financial security
systems.

....

Utilitarianism as a philosophy, and risk aversion as a feature of human psychology, lead

to the evolution of financial security systems as a means of reducing the financial
consequences of unfavorable events. Actuaries are those professionals with a deep
understanding of, and training in, financial security systems; their reason for being,
their complexity, their mathematics, and the way they work. 95 (Emphasis supplied)
Actuarial science is "primarily concerned with the study of consequences of events that
involve risk and uncertainty. Actuarial practice identifies, analyzes and assists in the
management of the outcomes—including costs and benefits—associated with events
that involve risk and uncertainty."96

Actuarial science is relevant to the operation of a social security system, in that "the
actuary plays a crucial role in analysing [the system's] financial status and
recommending appropriate action to ensure its viability. More specifically, the work of
the actuary includes assessing the financial implications of establishing a new scheme,
regularly following up its financial status and estimating the effect of various
modifications that might have a bearing on the scheme during its existence." 97

The application of actuarial calculations in the operation of a social system scheme

requires the determination of benefits. 98 To question the use of "actual calculations" as
factor for fixing rates is to question the policy or wisdom of the legislature, which is a
co-equal branch of government.

As a component of the doctrine of separation of powers, courts must never go into the
question of the wisdom of the policy of the law. 99 In Magtajas v. Pryce Properties
Corporation, Inc.,100 where this Court resolved the issue of the morality of gambling,
this Court held:

The morality of gambling is not a justiciable issue. Gambling is not illegal per se. While
it is generally considered inimical to the interests of the people, there is nothing in the
Constitution categorically proscribing or penalizing gambling or, for that matter, even
mentioning it at all. It is left to Congress to deal with the activity as it sees fit. In the
exercise of its own discretion, the legislature may prohibit gambling altogether or allow
it without limitation or it may prohibit some forms of gambling and allow others for
whatever reasons it may consider sufficient. Thus, it has prohibited jueteng and monte
but permits lotteries, cockfighting and horse-racing. In making such choices, Congress
has consulted its own wisdom, which this Court has no authority to review, much less
reverse. Well has it been said that courts do no[t] sit to resolve the merits of conflicting
theories. That is the prerogative of the political departments. It is settled that questions
regarding the wisdom, morality, or practicibility of statutes are not addressed to the
judiciary but may be resolved only by the legislative and executive departments, to
which the function belongs in our scheme of government. That function is exclusive.
Whichever way these branches decide, they are answerable only to their own
conscience and the constituents who will ultimately judge their acts, and not to the
courts of justice.101 (Emphasis supplied, citation omitted)

Recently, in Garcia v. Drilon,102 this Court has upheld the long-settled principle that
courts do not go into the wisdom of the law:

It is settled that courts are not concerned with the wisdom, justice, policy, or
expediency of a statute. Hence, we dare not venture into the real motivations and
wisdom of the members of Congress . . . Congress has made its choice and it is not our
prerogative to supplant this judgment. The choice may be perceived as erroneous but
even then, the remedy against it is to seek its amendment or repeal by the legislative.
By the principle of separation of powers, it is the legislative that determines the
necessity, adequacy, wisdom and expediency of any law. We only step in when there is
a violation of the Constitution.103 (Emphasis supplied, citations omitted)

Hence, the Social Security Act has validly delegated the power to fix the contribution
rate and the minimum and maximum amounts for the monthly salary credits. It is
within the scope of the Social Security Commission's power to fix them, as clearly laid
out in the law.

III

On the question of the validity of the exercise of respondents Social Security

Commission and Social Security System's powers, this Court disagrees with petitioners'
argument that the increase in contribution rate is prohibited by Section 4(b)(2) of the
Social Security Act. The provision states:

SECTION 4. Powers and Duties of the Commission and SSS. . . .

(b) The Social Security System. — Subject to the provision of Section four (4),
paragraph seven (7) hereof, the SSS shall have the following powers and duties:

....

(2) To require the actuary to submit a valuation report on the SSS benefit program
every four (4) years, or more frequently as may be necessary, to undertake the
necessary actuarial studies and calculations concerning increases in benefits taking into
account inflation and the financial stability of the SSS, and to provide for feasible
increases in benefits every four (4) years, including the addition of new ones, under
such rules and regulations as the Commission may adopt, subject to the approval of the
President of the Philippines: Provided, That the actuarial soundness of the reserve fund
shall be guaranteed: Provided, further, That such increases in benefits shall not require
any increase in the rate of contribution[.] (Emphasis supplied)

However, an examination of the provision and the assailed issuances reveals that the
questioned increase in contribution rate was not solely for the increase in members'
benefits, but also to extend actuarial life.

Social Security Commission Resolution No. 262-s.2013 provides:

RESOLVED, That the Commission approve and confirm, as it hereby approves and
confirms, the SSS 2013 Reform Agenda, the effectivity of which shall be as approved by
the President of the Philippines, which aims to address SSS' unfunded liability, extend
SSS' fund life to a more secure level and provide improved benefits for current and
future generations of SSS members, consisting of the following:
1. Increase in the contribution rate from 10.4% to 11%; and

2. Increase in the maximum monthly salary credit (MSC) from ₱15,000 to ₱16,000.

The above is based on the recommendation of the President and CEO in his
memorandum dated 19 November 2012.104

The provisos in Section 4(b)(2) must not be read in isolation, but within the context of
the provision, as well as the policy of the law.

The two (2) provisos refer to the last part of Section 4(b)(2), or on the System's duty to
"provide for feasible increases in benefits every four (4) years, including the addition of
new ones[.]" Section 4(b)(2) states that the "actuarial soundness of the reserve fund
shall be guaranteed" in providing any increase in benefits. As established earlier,
Congress has expressly provided the Social Security System, through the Social Security
Commission, power to fix the minimum and maximum monthly salary credits and the
contribution rate.

To disregard actuarial soundness of the reserves would be to go against the policy of

the law on maintaining a sustainable social security system:

SECTION 2. Declaration of Policy. — It is the policy of the State to establish, develop,

promote and perfect a sound and viable tax-exempt social security system suitable to
the needs of the people throughout the Philippines which shall promote social justice
and provide meaningful protection to members and their beneficiaries against the
hazards of disability, sickness, maternity, old age, death, and other contingencies
resulting in loss of income or financial burden. Towards this end, the State shall
endeavor to extend social security protection to workers and their beneficiaries.
(Emphasis supplied)

Petitioners' argument is, thus, bereft of merit.

In arguing that the increase in contributions is unduly oppressive upon the labor sector,
petitioners are again asking this Court to inquire into the wisdom of the policy behind
the issuances made by the executive branch. This, as earlier said, we cannot and will
not do.105

Furthermore, this Court is not persuaded by petitioners' argument that the increase in
contributions constitutes an unlawful exercise of police power.

Police power has been defined as:

. . . state authority to enact legislation that may interfere with personal liberty or
property in order to promote the general welfare. Persons and property could thus "be
subjected to all kinds of restraints and burdens in order to secure the general comfort,
health and prosperity of the state." [It is] "the power to prescribe regulations to
promote the health, morals, peace, education, good order or safety, and general
welfare of the people."106

To be a valid exercise of police power, there must be a lawful subject and the power is
exercised through lawful means.107 The second requisite requires a reasonable relation
between the purpose and the means.108

Using the parameters above, we hold that the increases reflected in the issuances of
respondents are reasonably necessary to observe the constitutional mandate of
promoting social justice under the Social Security Act. The public interest involved here
refers to the State's goal of establishing, developing, promoting, and perfecting a sound
and viable tax-exempt social security system. To achieve this, the Social Security
System and the Social Security Commission are empowered to adjust from time to time
the contribution rate and the monthly salary credits. Given the past increases since the
inception of the law, the contribution rate increase of 0.6% applied to the
corresponding monthly salary credit does not scream of unreasonableness or injustice.
Moreover, this Court will not delve into petitioners' argument that the revised ratio of
contributions was supposedly inconsistent with previous schemes. 109 Nothing in the law
requires that the ratio of contributions must be set at a 70%-30% sharing in favor of
the employee. Supplanting the executive branch's determination of the proper ratio of
contribution would result in judicial legislation, which is beyond this Court's power.

A parameter of judicial review is determining who can read the Constitution.

Interpreting its text has never been within the exclusive province of the courts. Other
branches of government are equally able to provide their own interpretation of the
provisions of our organic law, especially on the powers conferred by the Constitution
and those delegated by Congress to administrative agencies.

However, other departments' reading or interpretation is limited only to a preliminary

determination. Only this Court can read the text of the Constitution with finality.

In People v. Vera,110 Associate Justice Jose Laurel elucidated on how laws must be
accorded presumption of constitutionality due to the premise that the Constitution binds
all three (3) branches of government. He explained:

Under a doctrine peculiarly American, it is the office and duty of the judiciary to enforce
the Constitution. This court, by clear implication from the provisions of section 2,
subsection 1, and section 10, of Article VIII of the Constitution, may declare an act of
the national legislature invalid because in conflict with the fundamental law. It will not
shirk from its sworn duty to enforce the Constitution. And, in clear cases, it will not
hesitate to give effect to the supreme law by setting aside a statute in conflict
therewith. This is of the essence of judicial duty.

This court is not unmindful of the fundamental criteria in cases of this nature that all
reasonable doubts should be resolved in favor of the constitutionality of a statute. An
act of the legislature approved by the executive, is presumed to be within constitutional
limitations. The responsibility of upholding the Constitution rests not on the courts alone
but on the legislature as well. "The question of the validity of every statute is first
determined by the legislative department of the government itself." . . . And a statute
finally comes before the courts sustained by the sanction of the executive. The
members of the Legislature and the Chief Executive have taken an oath to support the
Constitution and it must be presumed that they have been true to this oath and that in
enacting and sanctioning a particular law they did not intend to violate the
Constitution. The courts cannot but cautiously exercise its power to overturn the solemn
declarations of two of the three grand departments of the government. . . . Then, there
is that peculiar political philosophy which bids the judiciary to reflect the wisdom of the
people as expressed through an elective Legislature and an elective Chief Executive. It
follows, therefore, that the courts will not set aside a law as violative of the Constitution
except in a clear case. This is a proposition too plain to require a citation of
authorities.111 (Emphasis supplied, citations omitted)

As such, courts, in exercising judicial review, should also account for the concept of
"pragmatic adjudication."112 As another parameter of judicial review, adjudicative
pragmatism entails deciding a case with regard to the "present and the future,
unchecked by any felt duty to secure consistency in principle with what other officials
have done in the past[.]"113 The pragmatist judge is:

. . . not uninterested in past decisions, in statutes, and so forth.1âшphi1 Far from it. For
one thing, these are repositories of knowledge, even, sometimes, of wisdom, and so it
would be folly to ignore them even if they had no authoritative significance. For
another, a decision that destabilized the law by departing too abruptly from precedent
might have, on balance, bad results. There is often a trade-off between rendering
substantive justice in the case under consideration and maintaining the law's certainty
and predictability. This trade-off, which is perhaps clearest in cases in which a defense
of statute of limitations is raised, will sometimes justify sacrificing substantive justice in
the individual case to consistency with previous cases or with statutes or, in short, with
well-founded expectations necessary to the orderly management of society's business.
Another reason not to ignore the past is that often it is difficult to determine the
purpose and scope of a rule without tracing the rule to its origins.

The pragmatist judge thus regards precedent, statutes, and constitutions both as
sources of potentially valuable information about the likely best result in the present
case and as signposts that must not be obliterated or obscured gratuitously, because
people may be relying upon them.114

Going into the validity of respondents' actions, petitioners must show that the assailed
issuances were made without any reference to any law, or that respondents knowingly
issued resolutions in excess of the authority granted to them under the Social Security
Act to constitute grave abuse of discretion.

Grave abuse of discretion denotes a "capricious, arbitrary[,] and whimsical exercise of

power. The abuse of discretion must be patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of
positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, as not to act at
all in contemplation of law, or where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic
manner by reason of passion or hostility."115

Any act of a government branch, agency, or instrumentality that violates a statute or a

treaty is grave abuse of discretion. 116 However, grave abuse of discretion pertains to
acts of discretion exercised in areas outside an agency's granted authority and, thus,
abusing the power granted to it. 117 Moreover, it is the agency's exercise of its power
that is examined and adjudged, not whether its application of the law is correct. 118

Here, respondents were only complying with their duties under the Social Security Act
when they issued the assailed issuances. There is no showing that respondents went
beyond the powers under the law that amounts to lack of or in excess of their
jurisdiction. Petitioners' claims are unsubstantiated and, as such, merit no finding of
grave abuse of discretion.

IV
Petitioners have failed to show that there was an invasion of a material and substantial
right, or that they were entitled to such a right. Moreover, they failed to show that
"there is an urgent and paramount necessity for the writ to prevent serious and
irreparable damage."119 Accordingly, petitioners' prayer for the issuance of a temporary
restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction is denied.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED for lack of merit. Resolution Nos. 262-s. 2013 and
711-s. 2013 issued by the Social Security Commission, as well as Circular No. 2013-010
issued by the Social Security System, are valid. The prayer for the issuance of a
temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction is also DENIED.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 157584 April 2, 2009

CONGRESSMAN ENRIQUE T. GARCIA of the 2nd District of Bataan, Petitioner,

vs.
THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, THE SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY,
CALTEX PHILIPPINES, INC., PETRON CORPORATION, and PILIPINAS SHELL
CORPORATION Respondents.

DECISION

BRION, J.:

For the second time, petitioner Enrique T. Garcia, Jr. (petitioner Garcia) asks this Court
to examine the constitutionality of Section 19 of Republic Act No. 8479 (R.A. No. 8479),
otherwise known as the Oil Deregulation Law of 1998) through this petition for
certiorari.1 He raises once again before us the propriety of implementing full
deregulation by removing the system of price controls in the local downstream oil
industry – a matter that we have ruled upon in the past.
THE FACTS

After years of imposing significant controls over the downstream oil industry in the
Philippines, the government decided in March 1996 to pursue a policy of deregulation
by enacting Republic Act No. 8180 (R.A. No. 8180) or the "Downstream Oil Industry
Deregulation Act of 1996."

R.A. No. 8180, however, met strong opposition, and rightly so, as this Court concluded
in its November 5, 1997 decision in Tatad v. Secretary of Department of Energy. 2 We
struck down the law as invalid because the three key provisions intended to promote
free competition were shown to achieve the opposite result; contrary to its intent, R.A.
No. 8180’s provisions on tariff differential, inventory requirements, and predatory
pricing inhibited fair competition, encouraged monopolistic power, and interfered with
the free interaction of market forces. We declared:

R.A. No. 8180 needs provisions to vouchsafe free and fair competition. The need for
these vouchsafing provisions cannot be overstated. Before deregulation, PETRON,
SHELL and CALTEX had no real competitors but did not have a free run of the market
because government controls both the pricing and non-pricing aspects of the oil
industry. After deregulation, PETRON, SHELL and CALTEX remain unthreatened by real
competition yet are no longer subject to control by government with respect to their
pricing and non-pricing decisions. The aftermath of R.A. No. 8180 is a deregulated
market where competition can be corrupted and where market forces can be
manipulated by oligopolies.3

Notwithstanding the existence of a separability clause among its provisions, we struck

down R.A. No. 8180 in its entirety because its offensive provisions permeated the whole
law and were the principal tools to carry deregulation into effect.

Congress responded to our Decision in Tatad by enacting on February 10, 1998 a new
oil deregulation law, R.A. No. 8479. This time, Congress excluded the offensive
provisions found in the invalidated law. Nonetheless, petitioner Garcia again sought to
declare the new oil deregulation law unconstitutional on the ground that it violated
Article XII, Section 19 of the Constitution. 4 He specifically objected to Section 19 of R.A.
No. 8479 which, in essence, prescribed the period for removal of price control on
gasoline and other finished petroleum products and set the time for the full
deregulation of the local downstream oil industry. The assailed provision reads:

SEC. 19. Start of Full Deregulation. – Full deregulation of the Industry shall start five (5)
months following the effectivity of this Act: Provided, however, That when the public
interest so requires, the President may accelerate the start of full deregulation upon the
recommendation of the DOE and the Department of Finance (DOF) when the prices of
crude oil and petroleum products in the world market are declining and the value of the
peso in relation to the US dollar is stable, taking into account relevant trends and
prospects; Provided, further, That the foregoing provision notwithstanding, the five (5)-
month Transition Phase shall continue to apply to LPG, regular gasoline and kerosene
as socially-sensitive petroleum products and said petroleum products shall be covered
by the automatic pricing mechanism during the said period.

Upon the implementation of full deregulation as provided herein, the Transition Phase is
deemed terminated and the following laws are repealed:

a) Republic Act No. 6173, as amended;

b) Section 5 of Executive Order No. 172, as amended;

c) Letter of Instruction No. 1431, dated October 15, 1984;

d) Letter of Instruction No. 1441, dated November 20, 1984, as amended;

e) Letter of Instruction No. 1460, dated May 9, 1985;

f) Presidential Decree No. 1889; and

 g) Presidential Decree No. 1956, as amended by Executive Order No. 137:

Provided, however, That in case full deregulation is started by the President in the
exercise of the authority provided in this Section, the foregoing laws shall continue to
be in force and effect with respect to LPG, regular gasoline and kerosene for the rest of
the five (5)-month period.

Petitioner Garcia contended that implementing full deregulation and removing price
control at a time when the market is still dominated and controlled by an
oligopoly5 would be contrary to public interest, as it would only provide an opportunity
for the Big 3 to engage in price-fixing and overpricing. He averred that Section 19 of
R.A. No. 8479 is "glaringly pro-oligopoly, anti-competition, and anti-people," and thus
asked the Court to declare the provision unconstitutional.

On December 17, 1999, in Garcia v. Corona (1999 Garcia case), 6 we denied petitioner
Garcia’s plea for nullity. We declined to rule on the constitutionality of Section 19 of
R.A. No. 8479 as we found the question replete with policy considerations; in the words
of Justice Ynares-Santiago, the ponente of the 1999 Garcia case:

It bears reiterating at the outset that the deregulation of the oil industry is a policy
determination of the highest order. It is unquestionably a priority program of
Government. The Department of Energy Act of 1992 expressly mandates that the
development and updating of the existing Philippine energy program "shall include a
policy direction towards deregulation of the power and energy industry."

Be that as it may, we are not concerned with whether or not there should be
deregulation. This is outside our jurisdiction. The judgment on the issue is a settled
matter and only Congress can reverse it.

xxx xxx xxx

Reduced to its basic arguments, it can be seen that the challenge in this petition is not
against the legality of deregulation. Petitioner does not expressly challenge
deregulation. The issue, quite simply, is the timeliness or the wisdom of the date when
full deregulation should be effective.

In this regard, what constitutes reasonable time is not for judicial determination.
Reasonable time involves the appraisal of a great variety of relevant conditions,
political, social and economic. They are not within the appropriate range of evidence in
a court of justice. It would be an extravagant extension of judicial authority to assert
judicial notice as the basis for the determination. [Emphasis supplied.]

Undaunted, petitioner Garcia is again before us in the present petition for certiorari
seeking a categorical declaration from this Court of the unconstitutionality of Section 19
of R.A. No. 8479.

THE PETITION

Petitioner Garcia does not deny that the present petition for certiorari raises the same
issue of the constitutionality of Section 19 of R.A. No. 8479, which was already the
subject of the 1999 Garcia case. He disagrees, however, with the allegation that the
prior rulings of the Court in the two oil deregulation cases 7 amount to res judicata that
would effectively bar the resolution of the present petition. He reasons that res judicata
will not apply, as the earlier cases did not completely resolve the controversy and were
not decided on the merits. Moreover, he maintains that the present case involves a
matter of overarching and overriding importance to the national economy and to the
public and cannot be sacrificed for technicalities like res judicata. 8

To further support the present petition, petitioner Garcia invokes the following
additional grounds to nullify Section 19 of R.A. No. 8479:
 1. Subsequent events after the lifting of price control in 1997 have confirmed the
continued existence of the Big 3 oligopoly and its overpricing of finished
petroleum products;

2. The unabated overpricing of finished petroleum products by the Big 3

oligopoly is gravely and undeniably detrimental to the public interest;

3. No longer may the bare and blatant constitutionality of the lifting of price
control be glossed over through the expediency of legislative wisdom or
judgment call in the face of the Big 3 oligopoly’s characteristic, definitive, and
continued overpricing;

4. To avoid declaring the lifting of price control on finished petroleum products

as unconstitutional is to consign to the dead letter dustbin the solemn and
explicit constitutional command for the regulation of monopolies/oligopolies. 9

THE COURT’S RULING

We resolve to dismiss the petition.

In asking the Court to declare Section 19 of R.A. No. 8479 as unconstitutional for
contravening Section 19, Article XII of the Constitution, petitioner Garcia invokes the
exercise by this Court of its power of judicial review, which power is expressly
recognized under Section 4(2), Article VIII of the Constitution. 10 The power of judicial
review is the power of the courts to test the validity of executive and legislative acts for
their conformity with the Constitution. 11 Through such power, the judiciary enforces and
upholds the supremacy of the Constitution. 12 For a court to exercise this power, certain
requirements must first be met, namely:

(1) an actual case or controversy calling for the exercise of judicial power;
 (2) the person challenging the act must have "standing" to challenge; he must
have a personal and substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained,
or will sustain, direct injury as a result of its enforcement;

(3) the question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest possible

opportunity; and

(4) the issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the case.13

Actual Case Controversy

Susceptible of Judicial Determination

The petition fails to satisfy the very first of these requirements – the existence of an
actual case or controversy calling for the exercise of judicial power. An actual case or
controversy is one that involves a conflict of legal rights, an assertion of opposite legal
claims susceptible of judicial resolution; the case must not be moot or academic or
based on extra-legal or other similar considerations not cognizable by a court of justice.
Stated otherwise, it is not the mere existence of a conflict or controversy that will
authorize the exercise by the courts of its power of review; more importantly, the issue
involved must be susceptible of judicial determination. Excluded from these are
questions of policy or wisdom, otherwise referred to as political questions:

As Tañada v. Cuenco puts it, political questions refer "to those questions which, under
the Constitution, are to be decided by the people in their sovereign capacity, or in
regard to which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the legislative or
executive branch of government." Thus, if an issue is clearly identified by the text of the
Constitution as matters for discretionary action by a particular branch of government or
to the people themselves then it is held to be a political question. In the classic
formulation of Justice Brennan in Baker v. Carr, "[p]rominent on the surface of any case
held to involve a political question is found a textually demonstrable constitutional
commitment of the issue to a coordinate political department; or a lack of judicially
discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it; or the impossibility of deciding
without an initial policy determination of a kind clearly for non-judicial discretion; or the
impossibility of a court’s undertaking independent resolution without expressing lack of
the respect due coordinate branches of government; or an unusual need for
unquestioning adherence to a political decision already made; or the potentiality of
embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements by various departments on the one
question."14 [Emphasis supplied.]

Petitioner Garcia’s issues fit snugly into the political question mold, as he insists that by
adopting a policy of full deregulation through the removal of price controls at a time
when an oligopoly still exists, Section 19 of R.A. No. 8479 contravenes the
Constitutional directive to regulate or prohibit monopolies 15 under Article XII, Section 19
of the Constitution. This Section states:

The State shall regulate or prohibit monopolies when the public interest so requires. No
combinations in restraint of trade or unfair competition shall be allowed.

Read correctly, this constitutional provision does not declare an outright prohibition of
monopolies. It simply allows the State to act "when public interest so requires"; even
then, no outright prohibition is mandated, as the State may choose to regulate rather
than to prohibit. Two elements must concur before a monopoly may be regulated or
prohibited:

1. There in fact exists a monopoly or an oligopoly, and

2. Public interest requires its regulation or prohibition.

Whether a monopoly exists is a question of fact. On the other hand, the questions of
(1) what public interest requires and (2) what the State reaction shall be essentially
require the exercise of discretion on the part of the State.
Stripped to its core, what petitioner Garcia raises as an issue is the propriety of
immediately and fully deregulating the oil industry. Such determination essentially
dwells on the soundness or wisdom of the timing and manner of the deregulation
Congress wants to implement through R.A. No. 8497. Quite clearly, the issue is not for
us to resolve; we cannot rule on when and to what extent deregulation should take
place without passing upon the wisdom of the policy of deregulation that Congress has
decided upon. To use the words of Baker v. Carr, 16 the ruling that petitioner Garcia asks
requires "an initial policy determination of a kind clearly for non-judicial discretion"; the
branch of government that was given by the people the full discretionary authority to
formulate the policy is the legislative department.

Directly supporting our conclusion that Garcia raises a political question is his proposal
to adopt instead a system of partial deregulation – a system he presents as more
consistent with the Constitutional "dictate." He avers that free market forces (in a fully
deregulated environment) cannot prevail for as long as the market itself is dominated
by an entrenched oligopoly. In such situation, he claims that prices are not determined
by the free play of supply and demand, but instead by the entrenched and dominant
oligopoly where overpricing and price-fixing are possible. 17 Thus, before full
deregulation can be implemented, he calls for an indefinite period of partial
deregulation through imposition of price controls. 18

Petitioner Garcia’s thesis readily reveals the political, 19 hence, non-justiciable, nature of
his petition; the choice of undertaking full or partial deregulation is not for this Court to
make. By enacting the assailed provision – Section 19 – of R.A. No. 8479, Congress
already determined that the problems confronting the local downstream oil industry are
better addressed by removing all forms of prior controls and adopting a deregulated
system.1awphi1.net This intent is expressed in Section 2 of the law:

Section 2. Declaration of Policy. – It shall be the policy of the State to liberalize and
deregulate the downstream oil industry in order to ensure a truly competitive market
under a regime of fair prices, adequate and continuous supply of environmentally-clean
and high-quality petroleum products. To this end, the State shall promote and
encourage the entry of new participants in the downstream oil industry, and introduce
adequate measures to ensure the attainment of these goals.

In Tatad, we declared that the fundamental principle espoused by Section 19, Article
XII of the Constitution is competition. 20 Congress, by enacting R.A. No. 8479,
determined that this objective is better realized by liberalizing the oil market, instead of
continuing with a highly regulated system enforced by means of restrictive prior
controls. This legislative determination was a lawful exercise of Congress’ prerogative
and one that this Court must respect and uphold. Regardless of the individual opinions
of the Members of this Court, we cannot, acting as a body, question the wisdom of a
co-equal department’s acts. The courts do not involve themselves with or delve into the
policy or wisdom of a statute;21 it sits, not to review or revise legislative action, but to
enforce the legislative will.22 For the Court to resolve a clearly non-justiciable matter
would be to debase the principle of separation of powers that has been tightly woven
by the Constitution into our republican system of government.

This same line of reasoning was what we used when we dismissed the first Garcia case.
The petitioner correctly noted that this is not a matter of res judicata (as the
respondents invoked), as the application of the principle of res judicata presupposes
that there is a final judgment or decree on the merits rendered by a court of competent
jurisdiction. To be exact, we are simply declaring that then, as now, and for the same
reasons, we find that there is no justiciable controversy that would justify the grant of
the petition.

Grave Abuse of Discretion

Recourse to the political question doctrine necessarily raises the underlying doctrine of
separation of powers among the three great branches of government that our
Constitution has entrenched. But at the same time that the Constitution mandates this
Court to respect acts performed by co-equal departments done within their sphere of
competence and authority, it has also allowed us to cross the line of separation on a
very limited and specific point – to determine whether the acts of the executive and the
legislative departments are null because they were undertaken with grave abuse of
discretion. IBP v. Zamora teaches us that -

When political questions are involved, the Constitution limits the determination as to
whether there has been grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction on the part of the official whose action is being questioned.

xxx xxx xxx

[W]hile this Court has no power to substitute its judgment for that of Congress or of the
President, it may look into the question of whether such exercise has been made in
grave abuse of discretion. A showing that plenary power is granted either department
of government, may not be an obstacle to judicial inquiry, for the improvident exercise
or abuse thereof may give rise to justiciable controversy. 23
[Emphasis supplied.]

Jurisprudence has defined grave abuse of discretion to mean the capricious or

whimsical exercise of judgment that is so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion
of positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in
contemplation of law, as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic
manner by reason of passion or hostility.24

Significantly, the pleadings before us fail to disclose any act of the legislature that may
be characterized as patently capricious or whimsical. A reading of the congressional
deliberations made on R.A. No. 8479 indicates that the measure was thoroughly and
carefully considered. Indeed, petitioner Garcia was among the many who interpellated
the law’s principal author, then Congressman Dante O. Tinga, now a Member of this
Court.

We note, too, that petitioner Garcia has not adequately proven at this point that an
oligopoly does in fact exist in the form of the Big 3, and that the Big 3 have actually
engaged in oligopolistic practices. He merely cites (in his argument against the
applicability of res judicata) and relies on the facts and findings stated in the two prior
cases on oil deregulation. This calls to mind what former Chief Justice Panganiban said
in his Separate Opinion in the 1999 Garcia case:

Petitioner merely resurrects and relies heavily on the arguments, the statistics and the
proofs he submitted two years ago in the first oil deregulation case, Tatad v. Secretary
of the Department of Energy. Needless to state, those reasons were taken into
consideration in said case, and they indeed helped show the unconstitutionality of RA
8180. But exactly the same old grounds cannot continue to support petitioner’s present
allegation that the major oil companies -- Petron, Shell and Caltex -- persist to this
date in their oligopolistic practices, as a consequence of the current Oil Deregulation
Law and in violation of the Constitution. In brief, the legal cause and effect relationship
has not been amply shown. [Emphasis supplied.]

This observation is true in the present case as it was true in the 1999 Garcia case; the
petitioner has simply omitted the citation of facts, figures and statistics specifically
supporting his petition. To prove charges of continued overpricing or price-fixing, he
refers to data showing price adjustments of petroleum products for the period covering
February 8, 1997 to August 1, 1997. Insofar as R.A. No. 8479 is concerned, however,
these data are irrelevant, as they cover a period way before R.A. No. 8479 was
enacted.251avvphi1

Petitioner Garcia contends that the identity in the pricing patterns of the Big 3 confirms
the existence of an oligopoly and shows that they have colluded to engage in unlawful
cartel-like behaviour. His reasoning fails to persuade us. That the oil firms have the
same prices and change them at the same rate at the same time are not sufficient
evidence to conclude that collusion exists. An independent study on local oil prices
explains:
[W]hen products are highly substitutable with each other (or what economists call
"homogeneous products"), then firms will tend to set similar prices, especially when
there are many competing sellers. Otherwise, if one firm tried to set a price significantly
higher than the others, it would find itself losing customers to the others. 26

Even assuming that the Big 3 have indeed colluded in fixing oil prices, this development
will not necessarily justify a declaration against the validity and constitutionality of
Section 19 of R.A. No. 8479. The remedy against the perceived failure of the Oil
Deregulation Law to combat cartelization is not to declare it invalid, but to set in motion
its anti-trust safeguards under Sections 11,27 12,28 and 13.29

Lis Mota

Lis Mota – the fourth requirement to satisfy before this Court will undertake judicial
review – means that the Court will not pass upon a question of unconstitutionality,
although properly presented, if the case can be disposed of on some other ground,
such as the application of the statute or the general law. The petitioner must be able to
show that the case cannot be legally resolved unless the constitutional question raised
is determined.30 This requirement is based on the rule that every law has in its favor the
presumption of constitutionality; 31
to justify its nullification, there must be a clear and
unequivocal breach of the Constitution, and not one that is doubtful, speculative, or
argumentative.

Petitioner Garcia argues against full deregulation implemented through the lifting of
price control, as it allows oligopoly, overpricing and price-fixing. R.A. No. 8479,
however, does not condone these acts; indeed, Section 11 (a) of the law expressly
prohibits and punishes cartelization, which is defined in the same section as "any
agreement, combination or concerted action by refiners, importers and/or dealers, or
their representatives, to fix prices, restrict outputs or divide markets, either by products
or by areas, or allocate markets, either by products or by areas, in restraint of trade or
free competition, including any contractual stipulation which prescribes pricing levels
and profit margins." This definition is broad enough to include the alleged acts of
overpricing or price-fixing by the Big 3. R.A. No. 8479 has provided, aside from
prosecution for cartelization, several other anti-trust mechanisms, including the
enlarged scope of the Department of Energy’s monitoring power and the creation of a
Joint Task Force to immediately act on complaints against unreasonable rise in the price
of petroleum products.32 Petitioner Garcia’s failure is that he failed to show that he
resorted to these measures before filing the instant petition. His belief that these
oversight mechanisms are unrealistic and insufficient does not permit disregard of these
remedies.33

CONCLUSION

To summarize, we declare that the issues petitioner Garcia presented to this Court are
non-justiciable matters that preclude the Court from exercising its power of judicial
review. The immediate implementation of full deregulation of the local downstream oil
industry is a policy determination by Congress which this Court cannot overturn without
offending the Constitution and the principle of separation of powers. That the law failed
in its objectives because its adoption spawned the evils petitioner Garcia alludes to does
not warrant its nullification. In the words of Mr. Justice Leonardo A. Quisumbing in the
1999 Garcia case, "[a] calculus of fear and pessimism xxx does not justify the remedy
petitioner seeks: that we overturn a law enacted by Congress and approved by the
Chief Executive."34

WHEREFORE, we hereby DISMISS the petition. No pronouncements as to costs.

PEÑAFRANCIA SHIPPING CORPORATION AND SANTA CLARA SHIPPING

CORPORATION, PETITIONERS, VS. 168 SHIPPING LINES, INC., RESPONDENT.

DECISION
JARDELEZA, J.:
This case questions the propriety of the dismissal by the Court of Appeals (CA) of a
Rule 43 petition for review of a decision of the Maritime Industry Authority (MARINA),
for failure to appeal the same to the Secretary of the Department of Transportation and
Communications (DOTC), and subsequently, to the Office of the President (OP).

Facts

On September 28, 2007, respondent 168 Shipping Lines, Inc. (respondent) filed with
the MARINA Regional Office V (MARINA RO V), Legaspi City an application [1] for the
issuance of a Certificate of Public Convenience (CPC) to operate M/V Star Ferry I, a roll-
on-roll-off vessel, in the route Matnog, Sorsogon to Allen, Northern Samar, and vice
versa. The schedule of trips as reflected in the application has 90 departures from the
port of Matnog, Sorsogon and 86 departures from the port of Allen, Northern Samar. [2]

Peñafrancia Shipping Corporation and Santa Clara Shipping Corporation (petitioners),

existing operators who own and operate ferry boats serving the ports of Allen, Northern
Samar and Matnog, Sorsogon, intervened in the proceeding and opposed [3] the
application on the following grounds: (1) respondent failed to submit a Certificate of
Berthing as required under MARINA Memorandum Circular No. 74-B; [4] (2) the proposed
schedule of trips in the original application is physically impossible to perform by the
applicant's lone vessel, the M/V Star Ferry I;[5] and (3) there exists an overtonnage in
the route applied for by the respondent, thus warranting the intervention of MARINA.
[6]
Respondent countered that under Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9295 [7] and its
Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR): (1) an application for CPC is not adversarial
in character and thus, a motion to intervene and opposition are not allowed; and (2)
there is no requirement for the CPC applicant to secure a Certificate of Berthing from
the Philippine Ports Authority.[8]

On December 13, 2007, the MARINA RO V required respondent to file an amended CPC
application with workable sailing frequencies/schedule of trips. [9] However, instead of
complying with the directive, respondent merely submitted a pleading denominated as
RE: ADOPTION OF AMENDED SCHEDULE OF TRIPS.[10]

The MARINA RO V, in its Decision [11] dated February 1, 2008, denied due course to
respondent's application. Respondent filed its Motion for Reconsideration but this was
denied.[12]

Respondent filed a Notice of Appeal on March 26, 2008 before the Office of the MARINA
Administrator.[13]

On August 8, 2008, MARINA Administrator Vicente T. Suazo, Jr., joined by Deputy

Administrator for Operations Primo V. Rivera, all acting by authority of the Board,
reversed the Decision of the MARINA RO V and granted respondent's application for
issuance of a CPC.[14] Thus, petitioners sought reconsideration of the MARINA Decision,
but their motion was denied through a Resolution [15] signed by the MARINA Officer-in-
Charge Maria Elena H. Bautista who was then concurrent Undersecretary for Maritime
Transport of the DOTC.

Petitioners appealed to the CA via Rule 43 of the Rules of Court. However, the CA
dismissed the petition for failure of the petitioners to exhaust administrative remedies,
hence, for lack of cause of action. [16]

The CA dismissed the petition through its Resolution [17] dated March 24, 2009, holding
that:
Contrary to petitioners' stance that the Maritime Industry Authority (MARINA) is an
independent agency and that it has the final say in the outcome of its adjudication in
any contested matter, this Court finds and holds that MARINA is an entity within the
Executive Department. It will be noted that Presidential Decree No. 474 (Maritime
Industry' Decree of 1974) organized MARINA under the Office of the President. This
was modified on July 23, 1979 by Executive Order No. 546 wherein MARINA was made
an attached agency of the then Ministry of Transportation and Communications (MOTC)
for policy and program coordination. This was confirmed by the Administrative Code of
1987 x x x which explicitly provides that MARINA is an agency attached to the
Department of Transportation and Communication (DOTC).

Hence, MARINA is not independent of the executive structural organization and the
ruling of the MARINA Administrator is subject to the consecutive reviews of the DOTC
Secretary and the Office of the President as its administrative superiors in the Executive
Department pursuant to the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies which
requires an administrative decision to first be appealed to the administrative superiors
up to the highest level before it may be elevated to a court of justice for review. Thus,
if a remedy within the administrative machinery can still be had by giving the
administrative body concerned the opportunity to decide on,the matter that comes
within its jurisdiction, then such remedy should be priorly exhausted before the court's
judicial power is invoked.

Petitioners' failure to resort to the DOTC Secretary and then the Office of the President,
in case of an adverse decision, and the filing of the herein petition before this Court is a
premature invocation of the Court's intervention which renders the instant petition
without cause of action, hence, dismissible.[18] (Underscoring supplied; citations
omitted.)
Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration but this was denied. [19] Hence, this
petition.

Petitioners, relying on the IRR of R.A. No. 9295, argue that: (1) a petition for review
under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court is the immediate and direct remedy from the
adverse rulings of the MARINA;[20] (2) the proper forum for review of the decision
rendered by a quasi-judicial agency is the CA; [21] (3) the decision and resolution subject
of the Rule 43 petition were acts of the MARINA Board, and not merely by the
Administrator;[22] (4) assuming an appeal to the DOTC Secretary and the Office of the
President is necessary, this case is an exception because . an appeal would be a
superfluity;[23] (5) the doctrine of qualified political agency applies because the DOTC
Secretary, who is the chairman of the MARINA Board, is the alter ego of the President;
[24]
and (6) it would be impractical to file an appeal with the OP because an individual
from the OP is also a member of the MARINA Board. [25]

In its Comment,[26] respondent counters that: (1) the IRR provision on appeal is void
and cannot supplant Section 19, Chapter IV, Book VII of the Administrative Code of
1987 which provides that an appeal from a final decision of the agency may be taken to
the Department Head unless otherwise provided by law; [27] (2) the IRR is inapplicable
since it did not provide for the mode of appeal of the decisions of the MARINA Board,
rather, it provided for appeals from an order, ruling, decision or resolution of the
MARINA Administrator;[28] (3) the DOTC is an attached agency under the control of the
executive department and the decisions or rulings rendered by the MARINA Board in
the exercise of its quasi-judicial functions are subject to the review of the DOTC
Secretary and the OP;[29] (4) the MARINA was never taken out of the framework of the
executive department;[30] (5) even assuming that the decisions by the MARINA are not
reviewable by the DOTC, the Constitution and the Administrative Code of 1987 provide
that the President shall have control of all the executive departments, bureaus and
offices;[31] and (6) the case is not an exception to the doctrine of exhaustion of
administrative remedies.[32]

Respondent moved to dismiss the petition on the ground that petitioners committed a
willful act of forum shopping.[33] Petitioners filed a Petition[34] (moratorium petition)
dated March 22, 2010 before the MARINA, praying the latter to issue a moratorium in
the grant of CPCs for carriage of passengers and cargoes covering the routes Matnog,
Sorsogon - Allen, Northern Samar or Matnog; Sorsogon - Dapdap, Allen, Northern
Samar or Matnog; Sorsogon — San Isidro, Northern Samar and vice-versa. They
contend that the moratorium petition is an attempt by the petitioners to achieve what
they sought to achieve in the present case, i.e., to prevent respondent or other entities
from operating in the subject routes.[35]

Petitioners, in their Comment (To Respondent's Manifestation/Submission with Leave of

Court dated June 1, 2010),[36] maintain that there is no forum shopping since the two
cases have different causes of action. In the present case, if the judgment is favorable
to petitioners, the effect will be retroactive, i.e., voidance of the CPC already issued by
the MARINA to respondent. Meanwhile, if the moratorium petition is granted, the effect
of the moratorium will be prospective, i.e., the freezing of new applications for CPC or
additional bottoms in the subject route.

Issues

(1) Whether petitioners committed forum shopping when they filed the moratorium
petition; and

(2) Whether the decision of the MARINA Board in the exercise of its quasi-judicial
function should be appealed first to the DOTC Secretary, and subsequently to the
OP, before appeal to the CA.

Our Ruling

We deny the petition.

I. No forum shopping.

There is, no forum shopping. There is forum shopping "when a party repetitively avails
of several judicial remedies in different courts, simultaneously or successively, all
substantially founded on the same transactions and the same essential facts and
circumstances, and all raising substantially the same issues either pending in or already
resolved adversely by some other court." [37] The test to determine'the existence of
forum shopping is whether the elements of litis pendentia are present, or whether a
final judgment in one case amounts to res judicata in the other. Thus, there is forum
shopping when the following elements are present, namely: (a) identity of parties, or at
least such parties representing the same interests in both actions; (b) identity of rights
asserted and reliefs prayed for, the relief being founded on the same facts; and (c) the
identity of the two preceding particulars, such that any judgment rendered in the other
action will, regardless of which party is successful, amounts to res judicata in the action
under consideration.[38]

The moratorium petition prays for a relief different from that sought in the main case,
from which the present petition arose. In the moratorium petition, the petitioners did
not pray for the cancellation, or revocation of the CPC issued to the respondent. What
petitioners prayed for was a "moratorium or stoppage in the grant of Certificates of
Public Convenience for carriage of passengers and cargoes involving the routes
MATNOG, SORSOGON - ALLEN, NORTHERN SAMAR or MATNOG, SORSOGON -
DAPDAP, ALLEN, NORTHERN; SAMAR, or MATNOG, SORSOGON - SAN ISIDRO,
NORTHERN SAMAR AND VICE VERSA."[39] Thus, any decision of the MARINA on the
moratorium petition will not affect the CPC already issued in favor of the respondent
and appealed before the CA, the subject matter of the present case.

II. The CA properly dismissed the appeal.

Petitioners justify their direct resort to the CA by invoking the IRR of R.A. No. 9295,
[40]
which provides for a procedure for appeal of decisions involving CPCs, [41] to wit:
RULE XV
APPEALS

Sec. 1. Appeal on Decisions Involving the CPC — Any order, ruling, decision or
resolution of the CO/MRO Director/OIC relating to the application for issuance of
Entity/Company CPC shall become final and executory fifteen (15) days unless a Motion
for Reconsideration is filed within the same period with the CO/MRO Director/OIC
concerned after the receipt of a copy thereof by the party affected. The decision of the
CO/MRO Director/OIC shall be final and executory unless within the same period an
appeal to the MARINA Administrator has been perfected.

The order, ruling decision or resolution of the MARINA Administrator shall be final .and
executory within fifteen (15) days unless an administrative appeal is filed with the
MARINA Board or petition for judicial review is filed with the Court of Appeals or
Supreme Court in accordance with the provisions of the Revised Rules of Court.
(Underscoring supplied.)
Petitioners claim that this provision of the IRR shows that "the appropriate remedy
against the adverse ruling of;the MARINA Board is a petition for review to the
Honorable Court of Appeals under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court." [42] However, as
correctly pointed out by the respondent, paragraph 2, Section 1, Rule XV of the IRR
applies only to an appeal of the order, ruling, decision or resolution of the MARINA
Administrator. There is no procedure for appeal of the decisions of the MARINA Board.
Hence, the IRR cannot be the basis for petitioners' appeal. Moreover, no procedure for
appeal before the courts is provided by R.A. No. 9295. Rules and regulations issued to
implement a law cannot go beyond its terms and provisions. [43]

Rule 43 governs all appeals from awards, judgments, final orders or resolutions of or
authorized by any quasi-judicial1 agency in the exercise of quasi-judicial functions.
Resort to the CA is authorized by Section 9 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 [44] which
provides that the CA shall have jurisdiction over the decisions or final orders of quasi-
judicial agencies. The MARINA is a quasi-judicial agency, and though it is not among
the enumerated agencies in Rule 43, the list is not meant to be exclusive. [45]

However, while Rule 43 provides for the appeal procedure from quasi-judicial agencies
to the CA, the aggrieved party must still exhaust administrative remedies prior to
recourse to the CA. Thus, Executive Order No. 292 otherwise known as the
Administrative Code of 1987 provides for the framework of administrative appeal prior
to judicial review:
BOOK VII - ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE

CHAPTER 4 - ADMINISTRATIVE APPEAL IN CONTESTED CASES

Sec. 19. Appeal.—Unless otherwise provided by law or executive order, an appeal from
a final decision of the agency may be taken to the Department head.

Sec. 20. Perfection of Administrative Appeals.—

(1) Administrative appeals under this Chapter shall be perfected within fifteen (15)
days after receipt of a copy of the decision complained of by the party adversely
affected, by filing with the agency which adjudicated the case a notice of appeal,
serving copies thereof upon trie prevailing party and the appellate agency, and
paying the required fees.
(2) If a motion for reconsideration is denied, the movant shall have the right to perfect
his appeal during the remainder of the period for appeal, reckoned from receipt of
the resolution of denial. If the decision is reversed on reconsideration, the
aggrieved party shall have fifteen (15) days from receipt of the resolution of
reversal within which to perfect his appeal.
(3) The agency shall, upon perfection of the appeal, transmit the records of the case to
the appellate agency.

Sec. 21. Effect of Appeal.—The appeal shall stay the decision appealed from unless
otherwise provided by law, or the appellate agency directs execution pending appeal, as
it may deem just, considering the nature and circumstances of the case.

Sec. 22. Action on Appeal.—The appellate agency shall review the records of the
proceedings and may, on its own initiative or upon motion, receive additional evidence.
Sec. 23. Finality of Decision of Appellate Agency.—In any contested case, the decision
of the appellate agency shall become final and executory fifteen (15) days after the
receipt by the parties of a copy thereof.

xxx

Sec. 25. Judicial Review.—

(1) Agency decisions shall be subject to judicial review in accordance with this chapter
and applicable laws.
(2) Any party aggrieved or adversely affected by an agency decision may seek judicial
review.
(3) The action for judicial review may be brought against the agency, or its officers,
and all indispensable and necessary parties as defined in the Rules of Court.
(4) Appeal from an agency decision shall be perfected by filing with the agency within
fifteen (15) days from receipt of a copy thereof a notice of appeal, and with the
reviewing court a petition for review of the order. Copies of the petition shall be
served upon the agency and all parties of record. The petition shall contain a
concise statement of the issues involved and the grounds relied upon for the
review, and shall be accompanied with a true copy of the order appealed from,
together with copies of such material portions of the records as are referred to
therein and other supporting papers. The petition shall be under oath and shall
show, by stating the specific material dates, that it was filed within the period fixed
in this chapter.
(5) The petition for review shall be perfected within fifteen (15) days from receipt of
the final administrative decision. One (1) motion for reconsideration may be
allowed. If the motion is denied, the movant shall perfect his appeal during the
remaining period for appeal reckoned from receipt of the resolution of denial. If the
decision is reversed on reconsideration, the appellant shall have fifteen (15) days
 from receipt of the resolution to perfect his appeal.
(6) The review proceeding shall be filed in the court specified by statute or, in the
absence thereof, in any court of competent jurisdiction in accordance with the
provisions on venue of the Rules of Court.
(7) Review shall be made on the basis of the record taken as a whole. The findings of
fact of the agency when supported by substantial evidence shall be final except
when specifically provided otherwise by law.
The above procedure notwithstanding, decisions of the various agencies of government
have been appealed to the OP, consistent with the President's power of control over all
the executive departments, bureaus, and offices. [46] We defined the presidential power
of control over the executive branch of government as "the power of [the President] to
alter or modify or nullify or set aside what a subordinate officer had done in the
performance of his duties and to substitute the judgment of the former with that of the
latter."[47]

The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies empowers the OP to review any

determination or disposition of a department head. The doctrine allows, indeed
requires, an administrative decision to first be appealed to the administrative superiors
up to the highest level before it may be elevated to a court of justice for review. [48]

The underlying principle of the rule on exhaustion of administrative remedies rests on

the presumption that the administrative agency, if afforded a complete chance to pass
upon the matter, will decide the same correctly. There are both legal and practical
reasons for the principle. The administrative process is intended to provide less
expensive and more speedy solutions to disputes. Where the enabling statute indicates
a procedure for administrative review and provides a system of administrative appeal or
reconsideration, the courts—for reasons of law, comity, and convenience—will not
entertain a case unless the available administrative remedies have been resorted to and
the appropriate authorities have been given an opportunity to act and correct the errors
committed in the administrative forum. [49]
While the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is flexible and may be
disregarded in certain instances,[50] we find, however, that the case does not fall under
any of the recognized exceptional circumstances. Petitioners claim that appeal to the
DOTC Secretary, who is already the chairman of the MARINA Board, is a needless
superfluity, the latter being the alter ego of the President. Moreover, petitioners state
that filing an appeal with the Office of the President would be impractical because a
member of the MARINA Board also came from the Office of the President. Both
arguments fail to convince.

A quick look into the nature and functions of the MARINA is necessary to understand its
nature, powers, and relationship to the executive department, and in turn determine
the applicability of the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies.

The MARINA was created under Presidential Decree No. 474 [51] as an agency under the
Office of the President.[52] Under Executive Order No. 546,[53] the MARINA was
designated as an attached agency of the Ministry of Transportation and
Communications.[54] Under Executive Order No. 1011,[55] the MARINA was granted the
quasi-judicial functions formerly exercised by the Board of Transportation pertaining to
water transportation.[56] The Administrative Code of 1987 reiterated that the MARINA is
an attached agency of the DOTC:
BOOK IV - THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH
TITLE XV - TRANSPORTATION AND COMMUNICATIONS
CHAPTER 6 - ATTACHED AGENCIES

Sec. 23. Attached Agencies and Corporations.—The following agencies and corporations
are attached to the Department: The Philippine National Railways, the Maritime
Industry Authority, the Philippine National Lines, the Philippine Aerospace Development
Corporation, the Metro Manila Transit Corporation, the Office of Transport Cooperatives,
the Philippine Ports Authority, the Philippine Merchant Marine Academy, the Toll
Regulatory Board, the Light Rail Transit Authority, the Transport Training Center, the
Civil Aeronautics Board, the National Telecommunications Commission and the Manila
International Airport Authority.
R.A. No. 9295, which was enacted on May 3, 2004, provides the jurisdiction, power and
duties of the MARINA including the power to:
Section 10. Jurisdiction; Powers; and Duties of MARINA.—

xxx

(2) Issue certificates of public convenience or any extensions or amendments thereto,

authorizing the operation of all kinds, classes and types of vessels in domestic
shipping: Provided, That no such certificate shall be valid for a period of more than
twenty-five (25) years;

xxx
The status of the MARINA as an attached agency of the DOTC is crucial to the
determination of whether the DOTC has the power to review the decisions of the
MARINA Board. Under Section 38, Chapter VII, Book IV of the Administrative Code of
1987,[57] there are three kinds of administrative relationship: (1) supervision and
control; (2) administrative supervision; and (3) attachment.

Among the three, the relationship of supervision and control between a department and
a subordinate agency is the most stringent since the department has the power to
review the decisions of the subordinate agency. This power is not available in
administrative supervision as Section 38 expressly states that the department shall have
no power to review the decisions of regulatory agencies in the exercise of their
regulatory or quasi-judicial functions. As to the relationship of attachment, while the law
is silent on the presence or absence of such power to review by the department,
Section 38(3) would indicate that the Legislature did not intend that the decisions of an
attached agency be subject to review by the department prior to appealing before the
proper court. Section 38(3) indicates the most lenient kind of administrative relationship
since the lateral relationship is limited to policy and program coordination. Thus, in Beja
v. Court of Appeals,[58] we distinguished an attached agency from one which is under
departmental supervision and control or administrative supervision:
An attached agency has a larger measure of independence from the Department to
which it is attached than one which is under departmental supervision and control or
administrative supervision. This is borne out by the "lateral relationship" between the
Department and the attached agency. The attachment is merely for "policy and
program coordination." With respect to administrative matters, the independence of an
attached agency from Departmental control and supervision is further reinforced by the
fact that even an agency under a Department's administrative supervision is free from
Departmental interference with respect to appointments and other personnel actions "in
accordance with the decentralization of personnel functions" under the Administrative
Code of 1987. Moreover, the Administrative Code explicitly provides that Chapter 8 of
Book IV on supervision and control shall not apply to chartered institutions attached to
a Department.[59] (Emphasis supplied; citations omitted.)
Section 39, Chapter VIII, Book IV of the Administrative Code of 1987 expressly states
that the chapter on supervision and control shall not apply to chartered institutions or
government-owned or controlled corporations attached to the department. Section 39
provides:
Sec. 39. Secretary's Authority.—

(1) The Secretary shall have supervision and control over the bureaus, offices, and
agencies under him, subject to the following guidelines:

xxx

(2) This Chapter shall not apply to chartered institutions or government-owned or

controlled corporations attached to the department.
Reading Section 39 together with Section 38, the decision of an attached agency such
as the MARINA in the exercise of its quasi-judicial function is not subject to review by
the department. Section 39 makes it clear that the supervision and control exercised by
the department over agencies under it with respect to matters including the exercise of
discretion (performance of quasi-judicial function) do not apply to attached agencies.
Thus, in this respect, petitioners are correct in saying that the decisions of the MARINA
are not subject to the review of the DOTC Secretary.

This is not to say, however, that decisions of the MARINA are not proper subjects of
appeal to the OP.

In Phillips Seafood (Philippines) Corporation v. Board of Investments, [60] we recognized

that under Administrative Order No. 18, [61] a decision or order issued by a department
or agency need not be appealed to the OP when there is a special law that provides for
a different mode of appeal. [62] R.A. No. 9295 does not provide for an appeal procedure;
thus, the assailed decision and resolution from the MARINA should have been appealed
with the OP.

More importantly, contrary to the petitioners' claim, the doctrine of qualified political
agency does not apply in this case.

Under the doctrine of qualified political agency, heads of the various executive
departments are the alter egos of the President, and, thus, the actions taken by such
heads in the performance of their official duties are deemed the acts of the President
unless the President himself should disapprove such acts. This is a recognition of the
fact that in our presidential form of government, all executive organizations, are
adjuncts of a single Chief Executive; that the heads of the Executive Departments are
assistants and agents of the Chief Executive; and that the multiple executive functions
of the President as the Chief Executive are performed through the Executive
Departments. The doctrine has been adopted here out of practical necessity,
considering that the President cannot be expected to personally perform the
multifarious functions of the executive office.[63]

But the doctrine of qualified political agency does not apply to the actions of heads of
executive departments in the performance of their duties as ex officio members of the
various agencies or entities under the executive department. [64]

Ex officio, is defined in Civil Liberties Union v. Executive Secretary[65] as:

x x x The term ex-officio means "from office; by virtue of office." It refers to an
"authority derived from official character merely, not expressly conferred upon the
individual character, but rather annexed to the official position." Ex-officio likewise
denotes an "act done in an official character, or as a consequence of office, and without
any other appointment or authority than that conferred by the office." An ex-
officio member of a board is one who is a member by virtue of his title to a certain
office, and without further wan-ant or appointment. x x x [66]
In Manalang-Demigillo v. Trade and Investment Development Corporation of the
Philippines[67] (TIDCORP), we: held that the doctrine of qualified political agency cannot
be extended to the acts of the Board of Directors of the TIDCORP, though some of its
members are cabinet members. We clarified that even if the Secretary of Finance, the
Secretary of Trade and Industry, the Governor of the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas, the
Director-General of the National Economic and Development Authority, and the
Chairman of the Philippine Overseas Construction Board are members of the cabinet,
they sat on the TIDCORP Board by virtue of Presidential Decree No. 1080, as amended
by R.A. No. 8494 and by reason of their office or function, or in their ex officio capacity,
and not because of their direct appointment to the Board by the President. Thus, they
were acting as members of the Board, and not as alter egos of the President. We said:
But the doctrine of qualified political agency could not be extended to the acts of the
Board of Directors of TIDCORP despite some of its members being themselves the
appointees of the President to the Cabinet. Under Section 10 of Presidential Decree No.
1080, as further amended by Section 6 of Republic Act No. 8494, the five ex
officio members were the Secretary of Finance, the Secretary of Trade and Industry,
the Governor of the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas, the Director-General of the National
Economic and Development Authority, and the Chairman of the Philippine Overseas
Construction Board, while the four other members of the Board were the three from the
private sector (at least one of whom should come from the export community), who
were elected by the ex officio members of the Board for a term of not more than two
consecutive years, and the President of TIDCORP who was concurrently the Vice-
Chairman of the Board. Such Cabinet members sat on the Board of Directors of
TIDCORP ex officio, or by reason of their office or function, not because of their direct
appointment to the Board by the President. Evidently, it was the law, not the President,
that sat them in the Board.

Under the circumstances, when the members of the Board of Directors effected the
assailed 2002 reorganization, they were acting as the responsible members of the
Board of Directors of TIDCORP constituted pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 1080, as
amended by Republic Act No. 8494, not as the alter egos of the President. We cannot
stretch the application of a doctrine that already delegates an enormous amount of
power. Also, it is settled that the delegation of power is not to be lightly inferred. [68]
In this case, the DOTC Secretary and the Executive Secretary are ex officio members of
the MARINA Board by yirtue of Section 7 of Presidential Decree No. 474, as amended,
which provides:
Sec. 7. Composition and Organization.—The Board shall be composed of eight members
as follows: The Secretary of Trade, the Secretary of Public Works, Transportation and
Communications, the Secretary of National Defense, the Executive Secretary, the
Chairman of the Board of Investments, the Chairman of the Development Bank of the
Philippines, the Chairman of the Board of Transportation and the Maritime
Administrator. The Chairman of the Board shall be appointed by the President of the
Philippines from among its members.[69] x x x (Emphasis supplied.)
Following our ruling in Manalang-Demegillo, the actions of the DOTC Secretary and the
Executive Secretary, as ex officio members of the MARINA Board: were made not in
their capacity as alter egos of the President. As such, an appeal to the OP is still
warranted. If petitioners are still dissatisfied with the decision of the OP, then it would
be the proper time to file a petition for review under Rule 43 with the CA.

To summarize, the DOTC Secretary does not have supervision and control over the
MARINA, which is an attached agency to the DOTC. Consequently, it cannot review the
decisions of the MARINA Board. However, decisions of the MARINA Board are proper
subjects of appeal to the OP, having been made by its members in their ex
officio capacity, and not as his alter egos. Failing to avail of such appeal, petitioners'
petition for review with the CA was properly dismissed.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Court of Appeals Resolutions dated March 24,
2009 and July. 23, 2009 are hereby AFFIRMED.

G.R. No. 188492. August 28, 2018.

GUAGUA NATIONAL COLLEGES, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, GNC FACULTY AND
LABOR UNION and GNC NON-TEACHING MAINTENANCE LABOR UNION, respondents.

DECISION

BERSAMIN, J p:

This case focuses on the correct period for appealing the decision or award of the
Voluntary Arbitrator or Panel of Arbitrators. The issue arises because the decision or
award of the Voluntary Arbitrator or Panel of Arbitrators is appealable to the Court of
Appeals (CA) by petition for review under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court, which provides
a period of 15 days from notice of the decision or award within which to file the petition
for review. On the other hand, Article 262-A (now Article 276) of the Labor Code sets 10
days as the period within which the appeal is to be made.
The Case

Petitioner Guagua National Colleges (GNC) hereby assails by petition for certiorari the
resolution promulgated on December 15, 2008, whereby the Court of Appeals (CA)
denied its Motion to Dismiss filed vis- -vis the respondents' petition for certiorari in the
following manner:

This Court resolves:

1. x x x

2. To Deny:

a) respondent's Motion to Dismiss dated 22 July 2008. While it is true that Coca-Cola
Bottlers Philippines, Inc., Sales Force Union-PTGWO-Balais vs. Coca-Cola Bottlers
Philippines, Inc. held in part:

"x x x Under Section 6, Rule VII of the same guidelines implementing Article 262-A of
the Labor Code, this Decision, as a matter of course, would become final and executory
after ten (10) calendar days from receipt of copies of the decision by the parties x x x
unless, in the meantime, a motion for reconsideration or a petition for review to the
Court of Appeals under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court is filed within the same 10-day
period. x x x;"

We, more importantly recognize the pronouncement of the Supreme Court in Manila
Midtown vs. Borromeo which reads in part:

"Upon receipt of a copy of the Voluntary Arbitrator's Decision, petitioner should have
filed with the Court of Appeals, within the 15-day reglementary period, a petition for
review x x x"
Coca-Cola Bottlers is not in direct conflict with Manila Midtown as there is no categorical
ruling in the former that the petition for review under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court
assailing the decision of the Voluntary Arbitrator should be filed within ten (10) days
from receipt thereof and not the customary reglementary period of fifteen (15) days.
Likewise, Leyte IV Electric Cooperative, Inc. vs. LEYECO IV Employees Unio-ALU,
reiterating the landmark Case of Luzon Development Bank vs. Association of Luzon
Development Bank Employees, declared that the proper remedy from the award of a
voluntary arbitrator is a petition for review to the CA, following Revised Administrative
Circular No. 1-95, which in turn provides for a reglementary period of fifteen (15) days
within which to appeal.

Keeping in mind Article 4 of the Labor Code which mandates that all doubts in the
implementation and interpretation of its provisions, including its implementing rules and
regulations, should be resolved in favor of labor and considering that technicalities are
not supposed to stand in the way of equitably and completely resolving the rights and
obligations of labor and capital, We rule that the Petition for Review was seasonably
filed. Moreso that We have already granted petitioners' Urgent Motion for Extension.

3. x x x

SO ORDERED.

Antecedents

Under Section 5 (2) of Republic Act No. 6728 (Government Assistance to Students and
Teachers in Private Education Act), 70% of the increase in tuition fees shall go to the
payment of salaries, wages, allowances and other benefits of the teaching and non-
teaching personnel. Pursuant to this provision, the petitioner imposed a 7% increase of
its tuition fees for school year 2006-2007.

Shortly thereafter, and in order to save the depleting funds of the petitioner's
Retirement Plan, its Board of Trustees approved the funding of the retirement program
out of the 70% net incremental proceeds arising from the tuition fee increases.
Respondents GNC-Faculty Labor Union and GNC Non-Teaching Maintenance Labor Union
challenged the petitioner's unilateral decision by claiming that the increase violated
Section 5 (2) of R.A. No. 6728.

The parties referred the matter to voluntary arbitration after failing to settle the
controversy by themselves.

Decision of the Voluntary Arbitrator

After hearing the parties, Voluntary Arbitrator Froilan M. Bacungan rendered his
decision dated June 16, 2008 in favor of GNC, holding that retirement benefits fell
within the category of "other benefits" that could be charged against the 70% net
incremental proceeds pursuant to Section 5 (2) of R.A. No. 6728.

After receiving a copy of the decision on June 16, 2008, the respondents filed an Urgent
Motion for Extension praying that the CA grant them an extension of 15 days from July
1, 2008, or until July 16, 2008, within which to file their petition for review.

Ruling of the CA

On July 2, 2008, the CA issued a resolution granting the Urgent Motion for Extension.
The respondents filed the petition for review on July 16, 2008.

Subsequently, the petitioner filed its Motion to Dismiss, asserting that the decision of
the Voluntary Arbitrator had already become final and executory pursuant to Article 276
of the Labor Code and in accordance with the ruling in Coca-Cola Bottlers Philippines,
Inc. Sales Force Union-PTGWO-Balais v. Coca-Cola Bottlers Philippines, Inc.

The CA acted on the Motion to Dismiss on December 15, 2008 through the now assailed
resolution denying the Motion to Dismiss.

The petitioner sought reconsideration, but the CA denied the motion for reconsideration
on January 30, 2009.
Hence, the petitioner instituted its petition for certiorari.

Issue

The petitioner submits the lone issue that

THE COURT OF APPEALS, WITH ALL DUE RESPECT, IS ACTING WITHOUT OR IN

EXCESS OF ITS JURISDICTION IN CA-G.R. SP NO. 104109 CONSIDERING THAT THE
DECISION OF THE VOLUNTARY ARBITRATOR IN AC-025-RB3-04-01-03-2007,
FOLLOWING RULE 276 OF THE LABOR CODE AND THE DECISION OF THE HONORABLE
COURT IN COCA-COLA BOTTLERS PHILIPPINES, INC. SALES FORCE UNION-PTGWO-
BALAIS v. COCA-COLA BOTTLERS PHILIPPINES, INC. X X X, HAD ALREADY BECOME
FINAL AND EXECUTORY, HENCE UNCHALLENGEABLE SINCE THE "URGENT MOTION
FOR EXTENSION" DATED 30 JUNE 2008 AND 16 JULY 2008 RESPECTIVELY, OR TEN
(10) DAYS AFTER THE UNIONS AND THEIR COUNSEL OF RECORD WERE PERSONALLY
SERVED THE VOLUNTARY ARBITRATOR'S DECISION ON 16 JUNE 2008.

The petitioner argues that the CA went beyond its jurisdiction when it denied the
Motion to Dismiss despite the finality of the decision of the Voluntary Arbitrator
pursuant to Article 276 of the Labor Code; that following the pronouncement in Coca-
Cola Bottlers Philippines, Inc. Sales Force Union-PTGWO-Balais v. Coca-Cola Bottlers
Philippines, Inc., the CA was no longer authorized to exercise its appellate jurisdiction;
that the CA's reliance on the rulings in Manila Midtown Hotel v. Borromeo and Leyte IV
Electric Cooperative, Inc. v. Leyeco IV Employees Union-ALU was misplaced because
said rulings did not define the reglementary period to appeal the decision or award of
the Voluntary Arbitrator; and that the CA misapplied the rule on equity in the absence
of strong or compelling reasons to suspend the rules of procedure.

The petitioner emphasizes the need to harmonize Rule 43 of the Rules of Court with
Article 276 of the Labor Code in view of their conflicting provisions on the period for the
appeal from the decision of the Voluntary Arbitrator. It maintains that unless Congress
amends Article 276 of the Labor Code, the reglementary period within which to appeal
the decision or award of the Voluntary Arbitrator is 10 days following the ruling in Coca-
Cola Bottlers Philippines, Inc. Sales Force Union-PTGWO-Balais v. Coca-Cola Bottlers
Philippines, Inc., instead of 15 days under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court.

In contrast, the respondents insist that they have a meritorious case because the
controversy involves the interpretation of Section 5 (2) of R.A. No. 6728 on the
disposition of the tuition fee increase; that the CA did not abuse its discretion given the
rule on the liberal application of rules of procedure to achieve substantial justice, and
the policy on the liberal construction of laws in favor of labor; that a long line of
jurisprudence set the remedy of appeal under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court as
applicable in challenging the decisions or awards of the Voluntary Arbitrator.

Did the CA gravely abuse its discretion in denying the petitioner's Motion to Dismiss
despite the finality of the decision of the Voluntary Arbitrator pursuant to Article 276 of
the Labor Code?

Ruling of the Court

We dismiss the petition for certiorari.

The petition for review shall be filed within 15 days

pursuant to Section 4, Rules 43 of the Rules of Court;

the 10-day period under Article 276 of the Labor Code

refers to the filing of a motion for reconsideration

vis- -vis the Voluntary Arbitrator's decision or award

In resolving whether or not the CA committed grave abuse of discretion, the Court has
first to determine which between the two periods found in Article 276 of the Labor Code
and Section 4 of Rule 43 of the Rules of Court governs the appeal from the decision or
award by the Voluntary Arbitrator or Panel of Arbitrators.

The petitioner posits that the appeal from the decision or award of the Voluntary
Arbitrator should be filed within 10 days in view of Article 276 of the Labor Code which
reads in full:

Article 276. Procedures. The Voluntary Arbitrator or panel of Voluntary Arbitrators shall
have the power to hold hearings, receive evidences and take whatever action is
necessary to resolve the issue or issues subject of the dispute, including efforts to effect
a voluntary settlement between parties.

All parties to the dispute shall be entitled to attend the arbitration proceedings. The
attendance of any third party or the exclusion of any witness from the proceedings shall
be determined by the Voluntary Arbitrator or panel of Voluntary Arbitrators. Hearings
may be adjourned for cause or upon agreement by the parties.

Unless the parties agree otherwise, it shall be mandatory for the Voluntary Arbitrator or
panel of Voluntary Arbitrators to render an award or decision within twenty (20)
calendar days from the date of submission of the dispute to voluntary arbitration.

The award or decision of the Voluntary Arbitrator or panel of Voluntary Arbitrators shall
contain the facts and the law on which it is based. It shall be final and executory after
ten (10) calendar days from receipt of the copy of the award or decision by the parties.

Upon motion of any interested party, the Voluntary Arbitrator or panel of Voluntary
Arbitrators or the Labor Arbiter in the region where the movant resides, in case of the
absence or incapacity of the Voluntary Arbitrator or panel of Voluntary Arbitrators, for
any reason, may issue a writ of execution requiring either the sheriff of the Commission
or regular courts or any public official whom the parties may designate in the
submission agreement to execute the final decision, order or award. (Bold underscoring
supplied for emphasis)

Article 276 is an amendment introduced by R.A. No. 6715. Prior to the effectivity of the
amendment on March 21, 1989, Article 262 (the predecessor provision) stated that
voluntary arbitration decisions or awards would be final, unappealable and executory.
Despite such immediately executory nature of the decisions and awards of the
Voluntary Arbitrators, however, the Court pronounced in Oceanic Bic Division (FFW) v.
Romero that the decisions or awards of the Voluntary Arbitrators involving
interpretations of law were within the scope of the Court's power of review. The Court
explained:

x x x We agree with the petitioner that the decisions of voluntary arbitrators must be
given the highest respect and as a general rule must be accorded a certain measure of
finality. This is especially true where the arbitrator chosen by the parties enjoys the first
rate credentials of Professor Flerida Ruth Pineda Romero, Director of the U.P. Law
Center and an academician of unquestioned expertise in the field of Labor Law. It is not
correct, however, that this respect precludes the exercise of judicial review over their
decisions. Article 262 of the Labor Code making voluntary arbitration awards final,
inappealable, and executory except where the money claims exceed P100,000.00 or
40% of paid-up capital of the employer or where there is abuse of discretion or gross
incompetence refers to appeals to the National Labor Relations Commission and not to
judicial review.

Inspite of statutory provisions making "final" the decisions of certain administrative

agencies, we have taken cognizance of petitions questioning these decisions where
want of jurisdiction, grave abuse of discretion, violation of due process, denial of
substantial justice, or erroneous interpretation of the law were brought to our attention.
There is no provision for appeal in the statute creating the Sandiganbayan but this has
not precluded us from examining decisions of this special court brought to us in proper
petitions. Thus, we have ruled:
"Yanglay raised a jurisdictional question which was not brought up by respondent public
officials. He contends that this Court has no jurisdiction to review the decisions of the
NLRC and the Secretary of Labor 'under the principle of separation of powers' and that
judicial review is not provided for in Presidential Decree No. 21.

"That contention is a flagrant error, it is generally understood that as to administrative

agencies exercising quasi-judicial or legislative power there is an underlying power in
the courts to scrutinize the acts of such agencies on questions of law and jurisdiction
even though no right of review is given by statute' (73 C.J.S. 506, note 56).

"The purpose of judicial review is to keep the administrative agency within its
jurisdiction and protect substantial rights of parties affected by its decisions' (73 C.J.S.
507, Sec. 165). It is part of the system of checks and balances which restricts the
separation of powers and forestalls arbitrary and unjust adjudications.

"Judicial review is proper in case of lack of jurisdiction, grave abuse of discretion, error
of law, fraud or collusion (Timbancaya vs. Vicente, 62 O.G. 9424; Macatangay vs.
Secretary of Public Works and Communications, 63 O.G. 11236; Ortua vs. Singson
Encarnacion, 59 Phil. 440).

"'The courts may declare an action or resolution of an administrative authority to be

illegal (1) because it violates or fails to comply with some mandatory provision of the
law or (2) because it is corrupt, arbitrary or capricious' (Borromeo vs. City of Manila and
Rodriguez Lanuza, 62 Phil. 512, 516; Villegas vs. Auditor General, L-21352, November
29, 1966, 18 SCRA 877, 891). [San Miguel Corporation v. Secretary of Labor, 64 SCRA
60].

...

"It is now settled rule that under the present Labor Code, (Presidential Decree No. 442,
as amended 1974 if lack of power or arbitrary or improvident exercise of authority be
shown, thus giving rise to a jurisdictional question, this Court may, in appropriate
certiorari proceedings, pass upon the validity of the decisions reached by officials or
administrative agencies in labor controversies. So it was assumed in Maglasang v. Ople,
(L-38813, April 29, 1975, 63 SCRA 508). It was explicitly announced in San Miguel
Corporation v. Secretary of Labor, (L-39195, May 16, 1975, 64 SCRA 56) the opinion
being penned by Justice Aquino. Accordingly, cases of that character continue to find a
place in our docket. (Cf. United Employees Union of Gelmart Industries v. Noriel, L-
40810, Oct. 3, 1975, 67 SCRA 267) The present suit is of that category. [Kapisanan ng
mga Manggagawa sa La Suerte-Foitaf vs. Noriel, 77 SCRA 415-416].

A voluntary arbitrator by the nature of her functions acts in a quasi-judicial capacity.

There is no reason why her decisions involving interpretation of law should be beyond
this Court's review. Administrative officials are presumed to act in accordance with law
and yet we do not hesitate to pass upon their work where a question of law is involved
or where a showing of abuse of authority or discretion in their official acts is properly
raised in petitions for certiorari.

Accordingly, the decisions and awards of Voluntary Arbitrators, albeit immediately final
and executory, remained subject to judicial review in appropriate cases through
petitions for certiorari.

Such was the state of things until the promulgation in 1995 of the ruling in Luzon
Development Bank v. Association of Luzon Development Bank Employees. Therein, the
Court noted the silence of R.A. No. 6715 on the availability of appeal from the decisions
or awards of the Voluntary Arbitrators. In declaring the Voluntary Arbitrators or Panels
of Voluntary Arbitrators as quasi-judicial instrumentalities, Luzon Development Bank v.
Association of Luzon Development Bank Employees pronounced the decisions or awards
of the Voluntary Arbitrators to be appealable to the CA, viz.:

It will thus be noted that the jurisdiction conferred by law on a voluntary arbitrator or a
panel of such arbitrators is quite limited compared to the original jurisdiction of the
labor arbiter and the appellate jurisdiction of the National Labor Relations Commission
(NLRC) for that matter. The state of our present law relating to voluntary arbitration
provides that "(t)he award or decision of the Voluntary Arbitrator x x x shall be final and
executory after ten (10) calendar days from receipt of the copy of the award or decision
by the parties," while the "(d)ecision, awards, or orders of the Labor Arbiter are final
and executory unless appealed to the Commission by any or both parties within ten
(10) calendar days from receipt of such decisions, awards, or orders." Hence, while
there is an express mode of appeal from the decision of a labor arbiter, Republic Act No.
6715 is silent with respect to an appeal from the decision of a voluntary arbitrator.

Yet, past practice shows that a decision or award of a voluntary arbitrator is, more often
than not, elevated to the Supreme Court itself on a petition for certiorari, in effect
equating the voluntary arbitrator with the NLRC or the Court of Appeals. In the view of
the Court, this is illogical and imposes an unnecessary burden upon it.

In Volkschel Labor Union, et al. v. NLRC, et al., on the settled premise that the
judgments of courts and awards of quasi-judicial agencies must become final at some
definite time, this Court ruled that the awards of voluntary arbitrators determine the
rights of parties; hence, their decisions have the same legal effect as judgments of a
court. In Oceanic Bic Division (FFW), et al. v. Romero, et al., this Court ruled that "a
voluntary arbitrator by the nature of her functions acts in a quasi-judicial capacity."
Under these rulings, it follows that the voluntary arbitrator, whether acting solely or in a
panel, enjoys in law the status of a quasi-judicial agency but independent of, and apart
from, the NLRC since his decisions are not appealable to the latter.

Section 9 of B.P. Blg. 129, as amended by Republic Act No. 7902, provides that the
Court of Appeals shall exercise:

"x x x (3) Exclusive appellate jurisdiction over all final judgments, decisions, resolutions,
orders or awards of Regional Trial Courts and quasi-judicial agencies, instrumentalities,
boards or commissions, including the Securities and Exchange Commission, the
Employees' Compensation Commission and the Civil Service Commission, except those
falling within the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in accordance with the
Constitution, the Labor Code of the Philippines under Presidential Decree No. 442, as
amended, the provisions of this Act, and of subparagraph (1) of the third paragraph and
subparagraph (4) of the fourth paragraph of Section 17 of the Judiciary Act of 1948...."

Assuming arguendo that the voluntary arbitrator or the panel of voluntary arbitrators
may not strictly be considered as a quasi-judicial agency, board or commission, still both
he and the panel are comprehended within the concept of a "quasi-judicial
instrumentality." It may even be stated that it was to meet the very situation presented
by the quasi-judicial functions of the voluntary arbitrators here, as well as the
subsequent arbitrator/arbitral tribunal operating under the Construction Industry
Arbitration Commission, that the broader term "instrumentalities" was purposely
included in the above-quoted provision.

An "instrumentality" is anything used as a means or agency. Thus, the terms

governmental "agency" or "instrumentality" are synonymous in the sense that either of
them is a means by which a government acts, or by which a certain government act or
function is performed. The word "instrumentality," with respect to a state, contemplates
an authority to which the state delegates governmental power for the performance of a
state function. An individual person, like an administrator or executor, is a judicial
instrumentality in the settling of an estate, in the same manner that a sub-agent
appointed by a bankruptcy court is an instrumentality of the court, and a trustee in
bankruptcy of a defunct corporation is an instrumentality of the state.

The voluntary arbitrator no less performs a state function pursuant to a governmental

power delegated to him under the provisions therefor in the Labor Code and he falls,
therefore, within the contemplation of the term "instrumentality" in the aforequoted
Sec. 9 of B.P. 129. The fact that his functions and powers are provided for in the Labor
Code does not place him within the exceptions to said Sec. 9 since he is a quasi-judicial
instrumentality as contemplated therein. It will be noted that, although the Employees'
Compensation Commission is also provided for in the Labor Code, Circular No. 1-91,
which is the forerunner of the present Revised Administrative Circular No. 1-95, laid
down the procedure for the appealability of its decisions to the Court of Appeals under
the foregoing rationalization, and this was later adopted by Republic Act No. 7902 in
amending Sec. 9 of B.P. 129.

A fortiori, the decision or award of the voluntary arbitrator or panel of arbitrators should
likewise be appealable to the Court of Appeals, in line with the procedure outlined in
Revised Administrative Circular No. 1-95, just like those of the quasi-judicial agencies,
boards and commissions enumerated therein.

This would be in furtherance of, and consistent with, the original purpose of Circular No.
1-91 to provide a uniform procedure for the appellate review of adjudications of all
quasi-judicial entities not expressly excepted from the coverage of Sec. 9 of B.P. 129 by
either the Constitution or another statute. Nor will it run counter to the legislative
intendment that decisions of the NLRC be reviewable directly by the Supreme Court
since, precisely, the cases within the adjudicative competence of the voluntary arbitrator
are excluded from the jurisdiction of the NLRC or the labor arbiter.

In other words, the remedy of appeal by petition for review under Rule 43 of the Rules
of Court became available to the parties aggrieved by the decisions or awards of the
Voluntary Arbitrators or Panels of Arbitrators.

In the 2004 ruling in Sevilla Trading Company v. Semana, the Court ruled that the
decision of the Voluntary Arbitrator became final and executory after the expiration of
the 15-day reglementary period within which to file the petition for review under Rule
43. Manila Midtown Hotel v. Borromeo also ruled so. The 15-day period was likewise
adverted to in the ruling in Nippon Paint Employees Union-Olalia v. Court of Appeals,
promulgated in November 2004.

In 2005, the Court promulgated the decision in Coca-Cola Bottlers Philippines, Inc.,
Sales Force Union-PTGWO-Balais v. Coca-Cola Bottlers Philippines, Inc., wherein it made
reference for the first time to the 10-day period for the filing of the petition for review
vis- -vis decisions or awards of the Voluntary Arbitrator provided in Article 262-A (now
Article 276). Within the same year, Philex Gold Philippines, Inc. v. Philex Bulawan
Supervisors Union applied the period of 10 days in declaring the appeal to have been
timely filed.

Thereafter, the Court has variantly applied either the 15-day or the 10-day period as the
time within which to appeal the decisions or awards of the Voluntary Arbitrators or
Panels of Arbitrators. Thus, in the 2007 ruling in Leyte IV Electric Cooperative, Inc. v.
Leyeco IV Employees Union-ALU, the Court recognized the 15-day reglementary period
under Rule 43. This was reiterated in AMA Computer College-Santiago City, Inc. v.
Nacino (2008), Mora v. Avesco Marketing Corporation (2008), Samahan ng mga
Manggagawa sa Hyatt-NUWHRAIN-APL v. Bacungan (2009), Saint Luis University, Inc. v.
Cobarrubias (2010), Samahan ng mga Manggagawa sa Hyatt (SAMASAH-NUWHRAIN) v.
Magsalin (2011) and Royal Plant Workers Union v. Coca Cola Bottlers Philippines, Inc.-
Cebu Plant (2013).

But in Philippine Electric Corporation (PHILEC) v. Court of Appeals (2014), Baronda v.

Court of Appeals (2015), and NYK-FIL Ship Management, Inc. v. Dabu (2017), the
Court, citing Article 276 of the Labor Code, applied the 10-day period. Notably, the
Court opined in Philippine Electric Corporation (PHILEC) v. Court of Appeals that despite
the period provided in Rule 43, the 10-day period should apply in determining the
timeliness of appealing the decision or award of the Voluntary Arbitrator or Panel of
Arbitrators, to wit:

Despite Rule 43 providing for a 15-day period to appeal, we rule that the Voluntary
Arbitrator's decision must be appealed before the Court of Appeals within 10 calendar
days from receipt of the decision as provided in the Labor Code.

Appeal is a "statutory privilege," which may be exercised "only in the manner and in
accordance with the provisions of the law." "Perfection of an appeal within the
reglementary period is not only mandatory but also jurisdictional so that failure to do so
rendered the decision final and executory, and deprives the appellate court of
jurisdiction to alter the final judgment much less to entertain the appeal."
We ruled that Article 262-A of the Labor Code allows the appeal of decisions rendered
by Voluntary Arbitrators. Statute provides that the Voluntary Arbitrator's decision "shall
be final and executory after ten (10) calendar days from receipt of the copy of the
award or decision by the parties." Being provided in the statute, this 10-day period
must be complied with; otherwise, no appellate court will have jurisdiction over the
appeal. This absurd situation occurs when the decision is appealed on the 11th to 15th
day from receipt as allowed under the Rules, but which decision, under the law, has
already become final and executory.

Furthermore, under Article VIII, Section 5 (5) of the Constitution, this court "shall not
diminish, increase, or modify substantive rights" in promulgating rules of procedure in
courts. The 10-day period to appeal under the Labor Code being a substantive right,
this period cannot be diminished, increased, or modified through the Rules of Court.

In Shioji v. Harvey, this Court held that the "rules of court, promulgated by authority of
law, have the force and effect of law, if not in conflict with positive law." Rules of Court
are "subordinate to the statute." In case of conflict between the law and the Rules of
Court, "the statute will prevail."

The rule, therefore, is that a Voluntary Arbitrator's award or decision shall be appealed
before the Court of Appeals within 10 days from receipt of the award or decision.
Should the aggrieved party choose to file a motion for reconsideration with the
Voluntary Arbitrator, the motion must be filed within the same 10-day period since a
motion for reconsideration is filed "within the period for taking an appeal."

The ratiocination in Philippine Electric Corporation (PHILEC) v. Court of Appeals

backstopped the ruling in NYK-FIL Ship Management, Inc. v. Dabu.

Given the variable rulings of the Court, what should now be the period to be followed in
appealing the decisions or awards of the Voluntary Arbitrators or Panel of Arbitrators?
In the 2010 ruling in Teng v. Pahagac, the Court clarified that the 10-day period set in
Article 276 of the Labor Code gave the aggrieved parties the opportunity to file their
motion for reconsideration, which was more in keeping with the principle of exhaustion
of administrative remedies, holding thusly:

In the exercise of its power to promulgate implementing rules and regulations, an

implementing agency, such as the Department of Labor, is restricted from going beyond
the terms of the law it seeks to implement; it should neither modify nor improve the
law. The agency formulating the rules and guidelines cannot exceed the statutory
authority granted to it by the legislature.

By allowing a 10-day period, the obvious intent of Congress in amending Article 263 to
Article 262-A is to provide an opportunity for the party adversely affected by the VA's
decision to seek recourse via a motion for reconsideration or a petition for review under
Rule 43 of the Rules of Court filed with the CA. Indeed, a motion for reconsideration is
the more appropriate remedy in line with the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative
remedies. For this reason, an appeal from administrative agencies to the CA via Rule 43
of the Rules of Court requires exhaustion of available remedies as a condition precedent
to a petition under that Rule.

The requirement that administrative remedies be exhausted is based on the doctrine

that in providing for a remedy before an administrative agency, every opportunity must
be given to the agency to resolve the matter and to exhaust all opportunities for a
resolution under the given remedy before bringing an action in, or resorting to, the
courts of justice. Where Congress has not clearly required exhaustion, sound judicial
discretion governs, guided by congressional intent.

By disallowing reconsideration of the VA's decision, Section 7, Rule XIX of DO 40-03 and
Section 7 of the 2005 Procedural Guidelines went directly against the legislative intent
behind Article 262-A of the Labor Code. These rules deny the VA the chance to correct
himself and compel the courts of justice to prematurely intervene with the action of an
administrative agency entrusted with the adjudication of controversies coming under its
special knowledge, training and specific field of expertise. In this era of clogged court
dockets, the need for specialized administrative agencies with the special knowledge,
experience and capability to hear and determine promptly disputes on technical matters
or intricate questions of facts, subject to judicial review, is indispensable. In Industrial
Enterprises, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, we ruled that relief must first be obtained in an
administrative proceeding before a remedy will be supplied by the courts even though
the matter is within the proper jurisdiction of a court. (Emphasis supplied)

Hence, the 10-day period stated in Article 276 should be understood as the period
within which the party adversely affected by the ruling of the Voluntary Arbitrators or
Panel of Arbitrators may file a motion for reconsideration. Only after the resolution of
the motion for reconsideration may the aggrieved party appeal to the CA by filing the
petition for review under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court within 15 days from notice
pursuant to Section 4 of Rule 43.

The Court notes that despite the clarification made in Teng v. Pahagac, the Department
of Labor and Employment (DOLE) and the National Conciliation and Mediation Board
(NCMB) have not revised or amended the Revised Procedural Guidelines in the Conduct
of Voluntary Arbitration Proceedings insofar as its Section 7 of Rule VII is concerned.
This inaction has obviously sown confusion, particularly in regard to the filing of the
motion for reconsideration as a condition precedent to the filing of the petition for
review in the CA. Consequently, we need to direct the DOLE and the NCMB to cause the
revision or amendment of Section 7 of Rule VII of the Revised Procedural Guidelines in
the Conduct of Voluntary Arbitration Proceedings in order to allow the filing of motions
for reconsideration in line with Article 276 of the Labor Code.
II

Certiorari does not lie in assailing

the CA's denial of a motion to dismiss

Generally, the denial of a motion to dismiss cannot be assailed by petition for certiorari.
As we indicated in Bi an Rural Bank v. Carlos:

The denial of a motion to dismiss generally cannot be questioned in a special civil action
for certiorari, as this remedy is designed to correct only errors of jurisdiction and not
errors of judgment. Neither can a denial of a motion to dismiss be the subject of an
appeal which is available only after a judgment or order on the merits has been
rendered. Only when the denial of the motion to dismiss is tainted with grave abuse of
discretion can the grant of the extraordinary remedy of certiorari be justified.

Although it admits being aware of this rule, the petitioner insists on the propriety of its
petition for certiorari based on its belief that the CA had gravely abused its discretion in
assuming jurisdiction over the respondents' petition. It argues that the decision
rendered by Voluntary Arbitrator Bacungan had already become final pursuant to Article
276 of the Labor Code, and, accordingly, the CA could no longer exercise its appellate
jurisdiction.

The petitioner is mistaken.

Grave abuse of discretion means either that the judicial or quasi-judicial power was
exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility,
or that the respondent judge, tribunal or board evaded a positive duty, or virtually
refused to perform the duty enjoined or to act in contemplation of law, such as when
such judge, tribunal or board exercising judicial or quasi-judicial powers acted in a
capricious or whimsical manner as to be equivalent to lack of jurisdiction.
Here, the CA did not act arbitrarily in denying the petitioner's Motion to Dismiss. It
correctly noted that Coca-Cola Bottlers Philippines, Inc., Sales Force Union-PTGWO-
Balais v. Coca-Cola Bottlers Philippines, Inc. did not make a definitive ruling on the
correct reglementary period for the filing of the petition for review. Given the varying
applications of the periods defined in Article 276 and Section 4 of Rule 43, the CA could
not be objectively held to be guilty of grave abuse of discretion in applying the
equitable rule on construction in favor of labor. To be underscored is that the underlying
aim for the requirement of strict adherence to procedural rules, particularly on appeals,
should always be the prevention of needless delays that could enable the unscrupulous
employers to wear out the efforts and meager resources of their workers to the point
that the latter would be constrained to settle for less than what were due to them.

ACCORDINGLY, the Court DISMISSES the unmeritorious petition for certiorari; AFFIRMS
the decision promulgated on December 15, 2008 by the Court of Appeals; and DIRECTS
the Department of Labor and Employment and the National Conciliation and Mediation
Board to revise or amend the Revised Procedural Guidelines in the Conduct of Voluntary
Arbitration Proceedings to amend the Revised Procedural Guidelines in the Conduct of
Voluntary Arbitration Proceedings to reflect the foregoing ruling herein.

No pronouncement on costs of suit.

G.R. No. 230355. March 18, 2021.

SONIA O. MAHINAY, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and ALMA J. GENOTIVA,

respondents.

DECISION

CARANDANG, J p:
This is a Petition for Certiorari assailing the Resolutions dated April 13, 2016 and
November 25, 2016 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 130857 dismissing
the petition for review filed by Sonia O. Mahinay (petitioner) for failure to attach several
documents in her petition in violation of Section 6 (c), Rule 43 of the Revised Rules of
Court.

Antecedents

In a Letter-Complaint dated April 14, 2010, private respondent Alma J. Genotiva (private
respondent) filed a complaint before the Civil Service Commission Regional Office No.
VIII (CSCRO VIII) against several employees of the Professional Regulation Commission
(PRC) Tacloban Office, including petitioner, for conflict of interest, grave abuse of
authority, dishonesty and violation of graft and corrupt practices and the Anti-Red Tape
Act.

Private respondent alleged that several employees of PRC Tacloban Office, who were
also officers and members of the PRC Employees Multi-Purpose Cooperative (PREMPC),
particularly Jenevieve Villasin (Professional Regulation Assistant), Maria Evelyn D.
Larraga (Professional Regulation Assistant), petitioner (Professional Regulation Officer
II), Elizabeth S. Baronda (Administrative Assistant), Mahalina Duroy (contractual),
Trinidad Rebato (contractual), and Allan W. Booc (contractual) committed acts
constituting abuse of office by taking PRC property and selling the same for their
personal gain.

According to her complaint, PREMPC, a cooperative formed by some of the employees

of the PRC, operates inside the premises of PRC Tacloban Office. It provides
photocopying services and sells mailing envelopes, mail stamps and documentary
stamps to PRC clients. On several instances, the above-mentioned employees left their
posts during office hours, took PRC forms (renewal, application for examination and
oath forms), documentary stamps, and window envelopes with mailing stamps from
PRC office and sent them to PREMPC to be sold to the latter's customers.

On July 29, 2010, CSCRO VIII issued a Formal Charge against petitioner finding a prima
facie case for the administrative offense of Grave Misconduct, which reads:

Ms. Sonia Mahinay left her post sometime on July 28-31, 2008, during office hours to
take PRC forms (renewal, application for examination forms, oath forms, window
envelopes with mailing stamps and documentary stamps) from PRC office, sent these
forms to PREMPC, and sold to PREMPC customers.

The practice of selling PRC forms and leaving office posts during office hours was also
done by Sonia Mahinay who sent PRC forms to PREMPC to be sold on Jan. 28-30, 2009.

CSCRO VIII, likewise, issued a formal charge against Maria Evelyn D. Larraga (Larraga)
for the same offense while absolving the other five PRC employees. The charge against
Larraga reads: CAIHTE

Sometime in 2008, Ms. Ma. Evelyn Larraga, PRA, took the collected window envelopes
of PRC clients twice, first is 50 pcs., second is 25 pcs., sold them to PREMPC customers
but never did she return any of the mailing envelopes. This is the reason why some of
the PRC 8 clients were not notified of the availability of their licenses and ratings
obtained during examination because the number of envelopes does not tally with the
number of clients to be notified.

The practice of selling PRC forms and leaving office posts during office hours was also
done by Ma. Evelyn Larraga who sent PRC forms to PREMPC to be sold on Jan. 28-30,
2009.

Ruling of the Civil Service Commission

In a Decision dated February 6, 2012, CSCRO VIII found petitioner guilty of the
administrative offense of Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service and
meted the penalty of six months and one day suspension.

The CSCRO VIII gave more credence to the positive and categorical declarations of
private respondent over the denials made by petitioner. Her proximity to the operation
of PREMPC supports the contention of private respondent that they took PRC supplies
and gave it to PREMPC to be sold to its clients. However, the allegation of leaving their
posts during office hours was unsubstantiated. Thus, CSCRO VIII concluded that their
acts of taking office supplies taint the integrity, trust and discipline imbibed in their
public office, thereby committing conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service.

The CSCRO VIII issued a separate Decision dated February 6, 2012 docketed as
Decision No. 12-0022 similarly finding Larraga guilty of the administrative offense of
Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service, the ruling thereof reads:

WHEREFORE, Maria Evelyn D. Larraga is hereby found guilty of the administrative

offense of Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service, and is meted the
penalty of six (6) months and one (1) day suspension. (Emphasis in the original)

Petitioner and Larraga jointly filed a Motion for Reconsideration. In a Resolution dated
April 20, 2012, the CSRO VIII downgraded the offense to Simple Misconduct and
decreased the penalty to three months and one day suspension.

Aggrieved, petitioner and Larraga jointly filed an appeal before the CSC.

In a Decision dated January 28, 2013, the CSC found petitioner liable for the offense of
Grave Misconduct and Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of Service and imposed
the penalty of dismissal from service. It ruled that the elements of clear intent to violate
the law and flagrant disregard of established rules are present in the case. The act of
taking the PRC forms and supplies without authority shows her clear intent to violate
the law. The element of flagrant disregard of established rules is present when her
taking was with intent to gain which was clearly manifested in her act of sending the
supplies to PREMPC for the purpose of selling the same to its customers.

Citing the case of Geronca v. Magalona, CSC ruled that the grave misconduct need not
be related in the performance of her duty, it being sufficient that there was unlawful use
of one's station or character. CSC found that petitioner unlawfully used her position as
Professional Regulation Officer II when she took the PRC forms. Were it not for her
position, she will not have access to these PRC supplies.

In a separate Decision dated January 28, 2013, CSC likewise found Larraga guilty of
Grave Misconduct and imposed upon her the penalty of dismissal from service.

Undeterred, petitioner and Larraga filed a Joint Motion for Reconsideration. In a

Resolution dated June 25, 2013, CSC denied petitioners Motion. Similarly, in separate
Resolution dated June 25, 2013, CSC likewise denied Larraga's Motion for
Reconsideration.

On July 18, 2013, petitioner filed a petition for review before the CA.

The CA issued a Resolution dated March 25, 2014 requiring petitioner to submit a copy
of her petition for review to the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG). On May 8, 2014,
petitioner manifested her compliance to the said Resolution. On July 21, 2014, the OSG
submitted its Comment to the petition for review of petitioner. The CA required the
parties to submit their respective memoranda.

In a Resolution dated November 14, 2014, the CA noted petitioner's Memorandum with
Manifestation and the OSG's Manifestation (In Lieu of Memorandum) and deemed the
case submitted for decision.
In a Resolution dated November 25, 2014 the CA directed petitioner to submit
documents/pleadings that were not included in her petition for review. Thus, on
February 20, 2015, petitioner filed a Partial Compliance and Motion for Extension of
Time submitting the documents/pleadings required and asking for an extension of time
to submit Exhibits "6" and "9."

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

In a Resolution dated April 13, 2016, the CA dismissed the petition for review without
ruling on its merits. CA ruled that petitioner failed to comply with its Resolution dated
November 21, 2014 which required petitioner to submit the lacking Exhibits "6" and "9"
in her petition, within the period required by law. Thus, pursuant to Section 7, Rule 43
of the Revised Rules of Court, the failure to comply with the requirements provided
under Section 6 is a ground for dismissal of the petition for review. DETACa

Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration and Extension of Time but the CA denied
the same in a Resolution dated November 25, 2016.

Hence, this petition for certiorari.

On November 8, 2017, petitioner filed a Manifestation before this Court declaring that
there is an accompanying case involving the same complainant, evidence and issues
which arose out of the same formal charge but involves a different respondent. Larraga,
who was the other respondent in the formal charge issued by the CSCRO VIII, filed a
petition for review before the CA docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 130856 and raffled to the
Special Second Division of the CA Manila. In a Decision dated September 6, 2017, the
CA set aside the Resolution of the CSC and dismissed the formal charge against Larraga
finding that the CSC erred in holding Larraga administratively liable for Grave
Misconduct and Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service.
In a Resolution dated December 14, 2017, this Court noted petitioner's Manifestation
and required the respondents to comment on the petition. In another Resolution dated
March 27, 2019, this Court resolved to await respondents' comment on the petition. In a
Resolution dated January 27, 2020, private respondent was required to show cause why
she should not be held in contempt for her failure to file a comment within the period
fixed which had long expired and to comply with the Resolution dated December 14,
2017. In a Letter dated July 8, 2020, private respondent apologized for her failure to file
a comment and recommended that the petition for certiorari be dismissed. Due to the
failure of respondent to file the required pleading, this Court has decided to dispense
with the respondent's comment.

Issues

Petitioner raises the following issues:

(1) whether the CA committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction in dismissing the petition for review on procedural grounds; and

(2) whether petitioner is liable of committing Grave Misconduct.

Petitioner's Arguments

The CA committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction

when it dismissed the petition for review merely on procedural grounds. By requesting
the OSG to comment and submitting the petition for decision, CA should have decided
the case on the merits and not dismiss it because of a procedural lapse. The absence of
Exhibits "6" and "9" was not even raised by the OSG in its comment and it is not vital to
the proper disposition of the case. Further, petitioner had prudently requested from CSC
the said documents however, the same can no longer be located by the latter. Petitioner
pleads for the liberal application of procedural rules and asks that her petition for review
be decided on the merits.
Ruling of the Court

The petition is meritorious.

Prefatorily, it must be pointed out that petitioner availed of the wrong remedy when she
filed this petition for certiorari under Rule 65 to challenge the resolutions of the CA. The
Resolutions dated April 13, 2016 and November 25, 2016 are final orders or judgments
that is well within the ambit of a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45. It is a
settled rule that an independent action for certiorari may be availed of only when there
is no appeal or any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. In
this case, the petitioner had the remedy of appeal by certiorari under Rule 45 of the
Revised Rules of Court.

Nevertheless, there are a few significant exceptions when the extraordinary remedy of
certiorari may be resorted to despite the availability of an appeal, namely: (a) when
public welfare and the advancement of public policy dictates; (b) when the broader
interests of justice so require; (c) when the writs issued are null; and (d) when the
questioned order amounts to an oppressive exercise of judicial authority. We find
attendant in the case at bar the second exception which outweigh rules of procedure
thereby providing a justification for the suspension of their application.

Petitioner assails the resolutions of the CA which dismissed her petition for review on
the ground that she failed to attach Exhibits "6" and "9" in her petition. Exhibit "6" is
the Duties and Responsibilities of petitioner as a Professional Regulation Officer II while
exhibit "9" is the affidavit of PRC Regional 8 Director German Palabyab. Petitioner avers
that the CA should have decided her case on the merits instead of dismissing it merely
because of a procedural lapse. She argues that she has been found guilty by the CSC of
Grave Misconduct and Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service and has
been imposed the penalty of dismissal from service, despite the fact that there was no
substantial evidence to support the charges against her.

We rule that the CA erred in dismissing the petition for review merely on procedural
grounds. Time and again, this Court has held that cases shall be determined on the
merits, after full opportunity to all parties for ventilation of their causes and defenses,
rather than on technicality or some procedural imperfections. The dismissal of cases
purely on technical grounds is frowned upon and the rules of procedure ought not to be
applied in a very rigid, technical sense, for they are adopted to help secure, not
override, substantial justice, and thereby defeat their very ends.

Petitioner's evidence and arguments in support of her claim of innocence have cast
doubt on the veracity of the CSC's factual conclusions in the case at hand. Petitioner
raised substantive issues that should have been threshed out by the CA. While we
recognize the effort of the CA to strictly uphold the procedural rules, it must be
remembered that a rigid application of the rules must not frustrate and defeat
substantial justice. We cannot simply brush aside her protestations of lack of
administrative culpability for the sake of sticking to technicalities when the merits of her
case cry out for proper judicial determination. aDSIHc

The CSC's decisions were anchored principally on the sole testimony of private
respondent that petitioner took PRC forms (renewal, application and oath forms) from
her and sent them to PREMPC to be sold. There was no evidence presented to show
that petitioner actually delivered the forms to PREMPC. Likewise, there was no evidence
to support the allegation that the forms were sold by petitioner or PREMPC. Thus, We
hold that such fact cannot be regarded as substantial evidence in proving that petitioner
is guilty of Grave Misconduct and Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service.

Substantial evidence is that amount of relevant evidence a reasonable mind might

accept as adequate to support a conclusion. While substantial evidence suffices to hold
one administratively liable, it does not authorize any conclusion to be made just as long
as there is any evidence to support it; it does not excuse administrative agencies from
taking into account countervailing evidence which fairly detracts from the evidence
supporting a finding. In this case, the CSC has relied solely on the evidence presented
by private respondent without taking into account the countervailing evidence
established by petitioner.
Petitioner submitted the affidavits of Norma Tupaz (Tupaz), Bebie Jane M. Aringino
(Aringino) and Lecelda G. Milan (Milan), among others. Tupaz was then the
Administrative Officer V of PRC Tacloban Office who was in-charge of the custody of the
supplies and materials of their office, including PRC forms and envelopes. She testified
that the PRC forms are not for sale and are given free to the PRC clients and that
petitioner did not sell these forms and/or window envelopes. Meanwhile, Aringino and
Milan were employees of PREMPC who were in-charge of the financial statements and
accounting of the sales of the cooperative. They testified that all the sales of PREMPC
were recorded in its books and the number of supplies tally with the number of sales
they had for the period questioned. They presented the Daily and Monthly Sales Report,
Audited Financial Statements and Certificate of Good Standing of PREMPC. These pieces
of evidence belie the allegation of private respondent that petitioner took PRC forms to
be sold by PREMPC.

Misconduct refers to intentional wrongdoing or deliberate violation of a rule of law or

standard of behavior, especially by a government official. To constitute an administrative
offense, misconduct should relate to, or be connected with, the performance of the
official functions and duties of a public officer. Grave misconduct is distinguished from
simple misconduct in that the elements of corruption, clear intent to violate the law or
flagrant disregard of established rule must be manifest in grave misconduct.

CSC found that the elements of clear intent to violate the law and flagrant disregard of
established rule are present in the case. According to the CSC, the act of taking the PRC
forms without authority shows petitioner's clear intent to violate the law while her
taking with intent to gain as manifested in her act of sending the forms to PREMPC to
be sold by the latter exhibits her flagrant disregard of established rule. However, We
hold that these elements find no support in the evidence on record.
Clear intent to violate the law and flagrant disregard of established rule presupposes
that there is an order or regulation defied by the public official. Intent, being a mental
state, is often ascertained from the acts or conduct of the person. Meanwhile, flagrant
disregard of established rule is demonstrated by the employee's propensity to ignore
the rules as clearly manifested by his or her actions.

In this case, private respondent failed to establish that petitioner violated any law or
rule, let alone she intended to commit such a violation. Likewise, petitioner did not
ignore any rule or regulation set out by their office. The act of taking the PRC forms is
not prohibited by any law or rule. As a matter of fact, these PRC forms are given free of
charge to the clients of PRC for purposes of application and renewal. It is inconceivable
how petitioner could sell these forms to PRC clients, knowing these clients are
professionals, given the long-standing practice that PRC forms are not for sale. If
indeed PREMPC or petitioner sold these PRC forms, the customers would have
immediately reported such malpractice, which is absent in this case.

Further, petitioner cannot be held administratively liable for Conduct Prejudicial to the
Best Interest of the Service. Jurisprudence has demonstrated that to be found liable for
this administrative offense, the act need not be related to or connected with the public
officer's official functions, as long as the questioned conduct tarnishes the image and
integrity of his or her public office. As mentioned above, private respondent has failed
to show that petitioner or PREMPC sold the PRC forms to customers or clients of the
latter. All that she was able to prove was petitioner took PRC forms from her, but there
was no evidence adduced that petitioner delivered the same to PREMPC and the latter
sold it to its customers. Taking of PRC forms does not in any way tarnish the image and
integrity of PRC. As a matter of fact, such act is necessary for petitioner to perform her
tasks as a Professional Regulation Officer II which includes processing of applications
and renewal forms of teachers and other various boards. Petitioner has to give these
forms to those clients who wish to apply for examination or renew their professional
license or identification cards.

Lastly, this Court takes note of special circumstances relative to the case at bar. On
November 8, 2017, petitioner manifested before this Court that there is an
accompanying case involving the same complainant, evidence, issues and which arose
out of the same formal charge but involves a different respondent decided by the CA. In
a Decision dated September 6, 2017, the CA in CA-G.R. SP No. 130856 entitled Maria
Evelyn D. Larraga v. Alma J. Genotiva, absolved Larraga of the administrative charges of
Grave Misconduct and Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service for lack of
substantial evidence to prove that she took 75 pieces of window envelopes from the
PRC office for the purpose of reselling the envelopes to the clients of PREMPC. Both
petitioner and Larraga were complained by private respondent for allegedly taking PRC
supplies and sending them to PREMPC to be sold by the latter. Such determination in
favor of Larraga who was in the same position as petitioner and who was charged of
the same offense, independent it may be from this administrative action against
petitioner, serves as added reason to warrant the reversal of the CSC's findings. ETHIDa

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Resolutions

dated April 13, 2016 and November 25, 2016 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.
130857, as well as the Decision dated January 28, 2013 and the Resolution dated June
25, 2013 of the Civil Service Commission are hereby SET ASIDE. Petitioner Sonia O.
Mahinay is ABSOLVED from any administrative liability.

G.R. No. 252914. November 9, 2020.

VIRGILIO S. SUELO, JR., petitioner, vs. MST MARINE SERVICES (PHILS.), INC., THOME
SHIP MANAGEMENT PTE. LTD., and ERNANDO A. RODIO, respondents.

DECISION

PERLAS-BERNABE, J p:

Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari filed by petitioner Virgilio S. Suelo,
Jr. (petitioner) assailing the Resolutions dated September 3, 2019 and March 6, 2020 of
the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 161699, which dismissed his petition for
review under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court (Rules) due to several procedural infirmities.
HTcADC

The Facts

On May 10, 2016, petitioner was hired by respondent MST Marine Services (Phils.), Inc.
(respondent) as Second Engineer for a six (6)-month contract on board the vessel
"Janesia Asphalt V," with a basic monthly package of $1,551.00 as salary, $1,155.00 as
overtime pay, and $466.00 vacation leave pay, among others. On May 28, 2016, he
boarded the vessel and commenced his duties as Second Engineer.

On October 29, 2016, he was brought to Singapore General Hospital due to severe
headache, slurring of speech, neck pain, and a recent history of loss of consciousness.
Upon evaluation, he was diagnosed with uncontrolled hypertension. His X-ray results
revealed degenerative change at C5-6 and C6-7 levels. Subsequently, he was given
medications, declared unfit for all marine duties, and signed off in Singapore on medical
grounds. He arrived in the Philippines on November 4, 2016 and immediately flew to his
hometown in Iloilo.
On November 7, 2016, he reported to respondent's branch office in Iloilo. He alleged
that respondent did not allow him to report to its Manila office and refused to refer him
to a company-designated physician. Instead, respondent allegedly asked him to seek
medical treatment subject to reimbursement. However, he averred that when he
submitted his request for reimbursement, respondent denied the same. Accordingly, he
filed a complaint for permanent and total disability benefits, damages, and attorney's
fees before the National Conciliation and Mediation Board (NCMB).

For their part, respondent argued that it was petitioner who refused to undergo
treatment with the company-designated physician, thereby forfeiting his right to claim
disability benefits and sick wages. Moreover, petitioner was not entitled to sickness
allowance, damages, and attorney's fees in the absence of bad faith from respondent's
end.

The VA Ruling

In a Decision dated February 18, 2019, the Panel of Voluntary Arbitrators (VA) denied
petitioner's claim, rejecting his allegation that respondent asked him to seek medical
treatment subject to reimbursement. The VA found that the medical abstract he
submitted, which was dated two (2) years from the time of his disembarkation from the
vessel, revealed that he sought medical treatment almost a year after such
disembarkation, or around August 2017. Moreover, the VA ruled that petitioner cannot
claim medical reimbursement since he failed to submit any evidence of his medical
expenses. On the other hand, it found that respondent was able to prove through
substantial evidence that it was petitioner who actually refused to be referred to a
company-designated physician because he believed that his condition was already
cured.
Aggrieved, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, which was denied in a
Resolution dated June 28, 2019. Petitioner, through counsel, received the copy of the
order of the denial of the MR on July 12, 2019. On July 22, 2019, petitioner moved for a
twenty (20)-day extension within which to file a petition for review before the CA, or
until August 11, 2019. On August 9, 2019, petitioner filed a petition for review under
Rule 43 of the Rules (Rule 43 Petition) before the CA. CAIHTE

The CA Ruling

In a Resolution dated September 3, 2019, the CA dismissed the Rule 43 Petition

outright citing the following procedural infirmities: (a) it was filed two (2) days late, and
(b) the affidavit of service was inaccurate, since it stated that the service of the copy of
the petition upon the adverse parties was done personally, when in fact it was served
through registered mail. With respect to the first ground, the CA explained that since
petitioner received the VA's June 28, 2019 Decision denying his motion for
reconsideration on July 12, 2019, he only had until August 7, 2019, reckoned from July
22, 2019 (or ten 10 days from July 12, 2019), within which to file the Rule 43 Petition
before the CA. However, he belatedly filed the same on August 9, 2019 in violation of
Section 4, Rule 43 of the Rules of Court. Anent the second ground, the CA ruled that
the inaccuracy in the affidavit of service was in violation of Section 13, Rule 13 of the
same Rules.

Dissatisfied, petitioner moved for reconsideration. He admitted that he had only fifteen
(15) days from July 12, 2019, or until July 27, 2019, within which to file the Rule 43
Petition before the CA. However, believing that he had only ten (10) days to do so, he
opted to file a motion for extension of the period to file the Rule 43 Petition, thus asking
for an additional twenty (20) days or until August 11, 2019, to file the same. He
likewise admitted that he inadvertently stated in his explanation that the copy of the
petition was served to the adverse party through personal service.
In a Resolution dated March 6, 2020, the CA denied petitioner's motion for
reconsideration, holding that the right to appeal is not a natural right as it is merely a
statutory privilege to be exercised only in accordance with the law. Although the law
admits exceptions, as the Rules may be relaxed to save litigants from injustice
commensurate with his failure to comply with the prescribed rules, the CA found said
exception to be wanting in this case. Consequently, the VA's Decision became final and
executory, and thus, immutable and unalterable.

Hence, the present petition.

The Issue Before the Court

The issue for the Court's resolution is whether or not the CA erred in dismissing the
Rule 43 Petition on procedural grounds.

The Court's Ruling

The appeal is meritorious.

In the recent case of Chin v. Maersk-Filipinas Crewing, Inc., (Chin) citing Guagua
National Colleges v. CA, (Guagua National Colleges) the Court categorically declared
that the correct period to appeal the decision or award of the Voluntary Arbitrators or
Panel of Arbitrators to the CA via a Rule 43 petition for review is the fifteen (15)-day
period set forth in Section 4 thereof reckoned from the notice or receipt of the VA's
resolution on the motion for reconsideration, and that the ten (10)-day period provided
in Article 276 of the Labor Code refers to the period within which an aggrieved party
may file said motion for reconsideration, viz.:
Hence, the 10-day period stated in Article 276 should be understood as the period
within which the party adversely affected by the ruling of the Voluntary Arbitrators or
Panel of Arbitrators may file a motion for reconsideration. Only after the resolution of
the motion for reconsideration may the aggrieved party appeal to the CA by filing the
petition for review under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court within 15 days from notice
pursuant to Section 4 of Rule 43. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied) aScITE

Moreover, under Section 4, Rule 43 of the Rules of Court, upon proper motion and the
payment of the full amount of the docket fees before the expiration of the reglementary
period, the CA may grant an additional period of fifteen (15) days only within which to
file the petition for review, and no further extension shall be granted except for the
most compelling reason and in no case shall it exceed fifteen (15) days.

In this case, records reveal that petitioner received a copy of the VA's Decision denying
his motion for reconsideration on July 12, 2019. Thus, he had fifteen (15) days
therefrom or until July 27, 2019 within which to file the petition, or to move for a 15-
day extension of time to file the same. Assuming that an extension is granted, he had
until August 11, 2019, reckoned from the expiration of the reglementary period on July
27, 2019, within which to file his petition.

Indeed, petitioner filed a motion for extension of time to file his Rule 43 Petition within
the allowable period or on July 22, 2019. Although the Rules allow only for a 15-day
extension or until August 11, 2019, he was able to file his petition on August 9, 2019,
also clearly within the allowable extended period. Hence, in both instances, petitioner
filed his pleadings on time. Moreover, petitioner's error in the affidavit of service stating
that he served copies of the Rule 43 Petition to the adverse parties through personal
service instead of registered mail appears to have been an honest mistake. In any case,
the inaccuracy in the statement of the manner of service appears inconsequential
considering that, after all, he was able to serve copies of the petition to the adverse
parties.

In sum, the Court finds that the CA erred in dismissing outright the Rule 43 Petition
based solely on procedural grounds; therefore, a remand of the case for a resolution on
the merits is warranted. Finally, following the Court's recent disposition in Chin, the
reminder to the Department of Labor and Employment and the NCMB to revise or
amend the Revised Procedural Guidelines in the Conduct of Voluntary Arbitration
Proceedings to reflect the ruling in the Guagua National Colleges case is hereby
reiterated.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Resolutions dated September 3, 2019 and
March 6, 2020 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 161699 are hereby REVERSED
and SET ASIDE. Accordingly, the present case is REMANDED to the Court of Appeals for
resolution on the merits. DETACa

G.R. No. 172027. July 29, 2010.

GONZALO S. GO, JR., petitioner,vs.COURT OF APPEALS and OFFICE OF THE

PRESIDENT, respondents.

DECISION
VELASCO, JR., J p:

Assailed in this Petition for Certiorari 1 under Rule 65 are the Resolutions dated August
17, 2005 2 and January 31, 2006 3 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No.
90665.

The facts are undisputed.

Petitioner Gonzalo S. Go, Jr. (Go) was appointed in 1980 as Hearing Officer III of the
Board of Transportation (BOT), then the government's land transportation franchising
and regulating agency, with a salary rate of PhP16,860 per annum. 4 On June 19, 1987,
Executive Order No. (EO) 202 5 was issued creating, within the Department of
Transportation and Communications (DOTC), the Land Transportation Franchising and
Regulatory Board (LTFRB) to replace the BOT. The issuance placed the LTFRB under the
administrative control and supervision of the DOTC Secretary. 6

On February 1, 1990, the DOTC Secretary extended Go a promotional appointment as

Chief Hearing Officer (Chief, Legal Division), with a salary rate of PhP151,800 per
annum. 7 The Civil Service Commission (CSC) later approved this permanent
appointment. 8 In her Certification 9 dated October 27, 2005, LTFRB Administrative
Division Chief Cynthia G. Angulo stated that the promotion was to the position of
Attorney VI, Salary Grade (SG)-26, obviously following budgetary circulars allocating
SG-26 to division chief positions.

The instant controversy started when the Department of Budget and Management
(DBM), by letter 10 of March 13, 1991, informed the then DOTC Secretary of the
erroneous classification in the Position Allocation List (PAL) of the DBM of two positions
in his department, one in the LTFRB and, the other, in the Civil Aeronautics Board
(CAB). The error, according to the DBM, stemmed from the fact that division chief
positions in quasi-judicial or regulatory agencies, whose decisions are immediately
appealable to the department secretary instead of to the court, are entitled only to
Attorney V, SG-25 allocation. Pertinently, the DBM letter reads: aCTHDA

Under existing allocation criteria division Chief positions in ...department level agencies
performing quasi-judicial/regulatory functions where decisions are appealable to higher
courts shall be allocated to Attorney VI, SG-26. Division chief positions in
quasi-judicial/regulatory agencies lower than departments such as the Civil Aeronautics
Board (CAB) and the Land Transportation Franchising and Regulatory Board (LTFRB)
where decisions are appealable to the Secretary of the DOTC and then the Office of the
President shall, however be allocated to Attorney V, SG-25. 11 (Emphasis supplied.)

After an exchange of communications between the DBM and the DOTC, the
corresponding changes in position classification with all its wage implications were
implemented, effective as of April 8, 1991. 12

Unable to accept this new development where his position was allocated the rank of
Attorney V, SG-25, Go wrote the DBM to question the "summary demotion or
downgrading of his salary grade" from SG-26 to SG-25. In his protest-letter, 13 Go
excepted from the main reason proferred by the DBM that the decisions or rulings of
the LTFRB are only appealable to the DOTC Secretary under Sec. 6 of EO 202 and not
to the CA. As Go argued, the aforecited proviso cannot prevail over Sec. 9 (3) of Batas
Pambansa Blg. (BP) 129, or the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, under which
appeals from decisions of quasi-judicial bodies are to be made to the CA.
Ruling of the DBM Secretary & Office of the President

On September 14, 1998, the DBM Secretary denied Go's protest, holding that decisions,
orders or resolutions of the LTFRB are appealable to the DOTC Secretary. 14 The DBM
reminded Go that based on the department's standards and criteria formulated
pursuant to Presidential Decree No. (PD) 985 and Republic Act No. (RA) 6758, 15 the
division chief of bureau-level agencies, like the LTFRB, is allocable to Attorney V, SG-25.

In time, Go sought reconsideration, with the following additional argument: LTFRB is

similarly situated as another bureau-level agency under DOTC, the CAB, which is listed
under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court as among the quasi-judicial agencies whose
decisions or resolutions are directly appealable to the CA.

Following the denial of his motion for reconsideration, Go appealed to the Office of the
President (OP).

On January 7, 2005, in OP Case No. 99-8880, the OP, agreeing with the ruling of the
DBM and the premises holding it together, rendered a Decision dismissing Go's appeal.

The OP would subsequently deny Gonzalo's motion for reconsideration.

Undaunted, Go interposed before the CA a petition for review under Rule 43, his
recourse docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 90665.

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

By Resolution dated August 17, 2005, the appellate court dismissed the petition on the
following procedural grounds: (a) Go resorted to the wrong mode of appeal, Rule 43
being available only to assail the decision of a quasi-judicial agency issued in the
exercise of its quasi-judicial functions, as DBM is not a quasi-judicial body; (b) his
petition violated Sec. 6 (a) of Rule 43; and (c) his counsel violated Bar Matter Nos. 287
and 1132. SaTAED

Through the equally assailed January 31, 2006 Resolution, the CA rejected Go's motion
for reconsideration.

Hence, the instant petition for certiorari.

The Issues

DID RESPONDENT CA COMMIT GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION . . . WHEN IT

DISMISSED OUTRIGHT THE PETITION ON THE GROUND OF ALLEGED WRONG MODE
OF APPEAL THROUGH RULE 43 OF THE RULES OF COURT

BY CLAIMING THAT WHEN RESPONDENT OP, WHOSE DECISION IN THE EXERCISE OF

ITS QUASI-JUDICIAL POWERS IS APPEALABLE TO THE CA UNDER RULE 43, AFFIRMED
THE DECISION OF THE DBM, IT WAS NOT IN THE EXERCISE OF ITS QUASI-JUDICIAL
POWERS BUT IN THE EXERCISE OF ADMINISTRATIVE SUPERVISION AND CONTROL
OVER THE DBM AND THEREFORE APPEAL UNDER RULE 43 CANNOT BE AVAILED OF
FOR UNWARRANTEDLY READING WHAT IS NOT IN THE LAW AND NOT BORNE OUT BY
THE FACTS OF THE CASE?
II

DID RESPONDENT CA COMMIT GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION ...WHEN IT DISMISSED

OUTRIGHT THE PETITION ON THE GROUND OF FAILURE TO IMPLEAD A PRIVATE
RESPONDENT

BY CLAIMING THAT "NO PRIVATE RESPONDENT IS IMPLEADED IN THE PETITION

WHILE IMPLEADING THE DBM AND THE OP, IN VIOLATION OF SECTION 6 (A) RULE 43
OF THE RULES OF COURT, WHEN SAID PROVISION COULD NOT BE CONSTRUED AS TO
HAVE REQUIRED IMPLEADING A PRIVATE RESPONDENT IN THE PETITION, IF THERE
WAS NONE AT ALL?

III

DID THE CA COMMIT GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION ...WHEN IT DISMISSED

OUTRIGHT THE PETITION ON THE GROUND OF FAILURE OF PETITIONER'S COUNSEL
TO INDICATE CURRENT IBP AND PTR RECEIPT NOS. AND DATES OF ISSUE

BY CLAIMING THAT "PETITIONER'S COUNSEL HAS NOT INDICATED HIS CURRENT IBP
AND PTR RECEIPT NUMBERS AND DATES OF ISSUE" EVEN AS IN THE MOTION FOR
RECONSIDERATION, PETITIONER GO EXPLAINED THAT IT WAS AN HONEST
INADVERTENCE AND HE EVEN ATTACHED THERETO COPIES OF COPIES THEMSELVES
OF THE CURRENT IBP AND PTR RECEIPTS? EScHDA

IV

DID RESPONDENT CA COMMIT GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK

OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION WHEN IT DISMISSED OUTRIGHT THE PETITION ON
TECHNICAL AND FLIMSY GROUNDS
THUS SHIRKING FROM ITS BOUNDEN TASK TO ADDRESS A VERY PRESSINIG LEGAL
ISSUE OF WHETHER EO 202 SEC. 6, A MERE EXECUTIVE ORDER, DIRECTING APPEAL
TO THE DOTC SECRETARY SHOULD PREVAIL OVER A LAW, BP BLG. 129, SEC. 9 (C)
AND RULE 43, SEC. 1 DIRECTING APPEAL TO THE COURT OF APPEALS? 16

The Court's Ruling

There is merit in the petition.

The core issues may be reduced into two, to wit: first, the propriety of the dismissal by
the CA of Go's Rule 43 petition for review on the stated procedural grounds; and
second, the validity of the reallocation of rank resulting in the downgrading of position
and diminution of salary.

Procedural Issue: Proper Mode of Appeal

As the CA held, Rule 43 is unavailing to Go, the remedy therein being proper only to
seek a review of decisions of quasi-judicial agencies in the exercise of their quasi-
judicial powers. It added that the primarily assailed action is that of the DBM, which is
not a quasi-judicial body. In turn, thus, the affirmatory OP decision was made in the
exercise of its administrative supervision and control over the DBM, not in the exercise
of its quasi-judicial powers.

The appellate court is correct in ruling that the remedy availed of by Go is improper but
not for the reason it proffered. Both Go and the appellate court overlooked the fact that
the instant case involves personnel action in the government, i.e., Go is questioning the
reallocation and demotion directed by the DBM which resulted in the diminution of his
benefits. Thus, the proper remedy available to Go is to question the DBM denial of his
protest before the Civil Service Commission (CSC) which has exclusive jurisdiction over
cases involving personnel actions, and not before the OP. This was our ruling involving
personnel actions in Mantala v. Salvador, 17 cited in Corsiga v. Defensor 18 and as
reiterated in Olanda v. Bugayong. 19 In turn, the resolution of the CSC may be elevated
to the CA under Rule 43 and, finally, before this Court. Consequently, Go availed himself
of the wrong remedy when he went directly to the CA under Rule 43 without repairing
first to the CSC.

Ordinarily, a dismissal on the ground that the action taken or petition filed is not the
proper remedy under the circumstances dispenses with the need to address the other
issues raised in the case. But this is not a hard and fast rule, more so when the
dismissal triggered by the pursuit of a wrong course of action does not go into the
merits of the case. Where such technical dismissal otherwise leads to inequitable
results, the appropriate recourse is to resolve the issue concerned on the merits or
resort to the principles of equity. This is as it should be as rules of procedure ought not
operate at all times in a strict, technical sense, adopted as they were to help secure,
not override substantial justice. 20 In clearly meritorious cases, the higher demands of
substantial justice must transcend rigid observance of procedural rules. TEcHCA

Overlooking lapses on procedure on the part of litigants in the interest of strict justice
or equity and the full adjudication of the merits of his cause or appeal are, in our
jurisdiction, matters of judicial policy. And cases materially similar to the one at bench
should invite the Court's attention to the merits if only to obviate the resulting inequity
arising from the outright denial of the recourse. Here, the dismissal of the instant
petition would be a virtual affirmance, on technicalities, of the DBM's assailed action,
however iniquitous it may be.
Bearing these postulates in mind, the Court, in the greater interest of justice, hereby
disregards the procedural lapses obtaining in this case and shall proceed to resolve Go's
petition on its substantial merits without further delay. The fact that Go's protest was
rejected more than a decade ago, and considering that only legal questions are
presented in this petition, warrants the immediate exercise by the Court of its
jurisdiction.

Core Issue: Summary Reallocation Improper

Contrary to the DBM's posture, Go maintains that the LTFRB decisions are appealable to
the CA pursuant to Sec. 9 (3) of BP 129 and Rule 43 of the Rules of Court. He argues
that the grievance mechanism set forth in Sec. 6 of EO 202 cannot prevail over the
appeal provisos of a statute and remedial law. Go thus asserts that the summary
reallocation of his position and the corresponding salary grade reassignment, i.e., from
Attorney VI, SG-26 to Attorney V, SG-25, resulting in his demotion and the downgrading
of the classification of his position, are without legal basis.

EO 202 governs appeals from LTFRB Rulings

We understand where Go was coming from since the DBM letter to the DOTC Secretary
implementing the summary reallocation of the classification of the position of LTFRB
Chief of the Legal Division gave the following to justify the reclassification: the forum,
i.e., the department secretary or the CA, where the appeal of a decision of division chief
or head of the quasi-judicial agency may be taken. The DBM, joined by the OP, held
that LTFRB decisions are appealable to the DOTC Secretary pursuant to Sec. 6 of EO
202. Therefrom, one may go to the OP before appealing to the CA.

On this count, we agree with the DBM and the OP. Sec. 6 of EO 202 clearly provides:
Sec. 6. Decision of the Board LTFRB;Appeals therefrom and/or Review thereof. The
Board, in the exercise of its powers and functions, shall sit and render its decisions en
banc. ...

The decision, order or resolution of the Board shall be appealable to the DOTC
Secretary within thirty (30) days from receipt of the decision: Provided, That the
Secretary may motu proprio review any decision or action of the Board before the same
becomes final. (Emphasis supplied.)

As may be deduced from the above provisos, the DOTC, within the period fixed therein,
may, on appeal or motu proprio, review the LTFRB's rulings. While not expressly stated
in Sec. 6 of EO 202, the DOTC Secretary's decision may, in turn, be further appealed to
the OP. The "plain meaning" or verba legis rule dictates that if the statute is clear, plain
and free from ambiguity, it must be given its literal meaning and applied without
interpretation. 21 Thus, the LTFRB rulings are not directly appealable to the CA under
Rule 43. TEacSA

Go further contends that EO 202, a mere executive issuance, cannot be made to prevail
over BP 129, Sec. 9 (3), which provides for the appeal of the decisions and rulings of
quasi-judicial agencies to the CA. Moreover, he points to the 1997 revision of the Rules
of Civil Procedure which now provides under Rule 43 the appeals before the CA of
decisions and rulings of quasi-judicial agencies.

Go is mistaken for the ensuing reasons: First, EO 202 was issued on June 19, 1987 by
then President Corazon C. Aquino pursuant to her legislative powers under the then
revolutionary government. The legislative power of President Aquino ended on July 27,
1987 when the first Congress under the 1987 Constitution convened. 22 For all intents
and purposes, therefore, EO 202 has the force and effect of any legislation passed by
Congress.

Second, EO 202, creating the LTFRB, is a special law, thus enjoying primacy over a
conflicting general, anterior law, such as BP 129. In Vinzons-Chato v. Fortune Tobacco
Corporation, 23 the Court elucidated on this issue in this wise:
A general law and a special law on the same subject are statutes in pari materia and
should, accordingly, be read together and harmonized, if possible, with a view to giving
effect to both. The rule is that where there are two acts, one of which is special and
particular and the other general which, if standing alone, would include the same
matter and thus conflict with the special act, the special law must prevail since it
evinces the legislative intent more clearly than that of a general statute and must not
be taken as intended to affect the more particular and specific provisions of the earlier
act, unless it is absolutely necessary so to construe it in order to give its words any
meaning at all. (Emphasis supplied.)

Given the foregoing premises, BP 129 must, on matters of appeals from LTFRB rulings,
yield to the provision of EO 202, the subsequent special law being regarded as an
exception to, or a qualification of, the prior general act. 24

DBM has authority to allocate classifications of

different positions in the Government service

There is no dispute that the DBM is vested the authority to enforce and implement PD
985, as amended, which mandates the establishment of a unified compensation and
position classification system for the government. Sec. 17 (a) of PD 985, as amended
by Sec. 14 (a) of RA 6758, and the original Sec. 17 (b) of PD 985 pertinently provide,
thus:

Section 17. Powers and Functions. The Budget Commission (now DBM),principally
through the OCPC (now CPCB, Compensation and Position Classification Board) shall, in
addition to those provided under other Sections of this Decree, have the following
powers and functions:
a. Administer the compensation and position classification system established herein
and revise it as necessary;

b. Define each grade in the salary or wage schedule which shall be used as a guide in
placing positions to their appropriate classes and grades; TaISDA

Moreover, Secs. 2, 7 and 9 of RA 6758 respectively provide:

Sec. 2. Statement of Policy. It is hereby declared the policy of the State to provide equal
pay for substantially equal work and to base differences in pay upon substantive
differences in duties and responsibilities, and qualification requirements of the positions.
...For this purpose, the ...(DBM) is hereby directed to establish and administer a unified
Compensation and Position Classification System,hereinafter referred to as the System,
as provided for in PD No. 985, as amended, that shall be applied for all government
entities, as mandated by the Constitution.

...

Sec. 7. Salary Schedule. The DBM is hereby directed to implement the Salary Schedule
prescribed below:

...

The DBM is hereby authorized to determine the officials who are of equivalent rank to
the foregoing Officials, where applicable,and may be assigned the same Salary Grades
based on the following guidelines:

...
Sec. 9. Salary Grade Assignments for Other Positions. For positions below the Officials
mentioned under Section 8 hereof and their equivalent, whether in the National
Government, local government units, government-owned or controlled corporations or
financial institutions, the DBM is hereby directed to prepare the Index of Occupational
Services to be guided by the Benchmark Position Schedule prescribed hereunder and
the following factors: (1) the education and experience required ...;(2) the nature and
complexity of the work to be performed; (3) the kind of supervision received; (4)
mental and/or physical strain required ...;(5) nature and extent of internal and external
relationships; (6) kind of supervision exercised; (7) decision-making responsibility ....
(Emphasis supplied.)

And while the Office of Compensation and Position Classification, now Compensation
and Position Classification Board (CPCB), is vested, under Sec. 8 25 of PD 985, the sole
authority to allocate the classification of positions, its determinations relative to the
allocations require the approval of the DBM Secretary to be binding.

This brings us to the validity of the reallocation.

Summary reallocation illegal

Go argues that the summary reallocation of the classification of his position as Chief,
LTFRB Legal Division to a lower grade substantially reduced his salary and other
benefits, veritably depriving him of property, hence, illegal.

We agree with Go on this count. The summary reallocation of his position to a lower
degree resulting in the corresponding downgrading of his salary infringed the policy of
non-diminution of pay which the Court recognized and applied in Philippine Ports
Authority v. Commission on Audit, 26 as well as in the subsequent sister cases 27
involving benefits of government employees. Running through the gamut of these cases
is the holding that the affected government employees shall continue to receive benefits
they were enjoying as incumbents upon the effectivity of RA 6758. IaEScC
Relevant to the critical issue at hand is Sec. 15 (b) of PD 985 which, as amended by
Sec. 13 (a) of RA 6758, pertinently reads:

SEC. 13. Pay Adjustments. ...

(b) Pay Reduction If an employee is moved from a higher to a lower class, he shall not
suffer a reduction in salary:Provided, That such movement is not the result of a
disciplinary action or voluntary demotion. (Emphasis supplied.)

Prior to its amendment, Sec. 15 (b) of PD 985 reads:

(b) Pay Reduction If an employee is moved from a higher to a lower class, he shall not
suffer a reduction in salary except where his current salary is higher than the maximum
step of the new class in which case he shall be paid the maximum:Provided, That such
movement is not the result of a disciplinary action. (Emphasis supplied.)

As may be noted, the legislature dropped from the original proviso on pay reduction the
clause: "except where his current salary is higher than the maximum step of the new
class in which case he shall be paid the maximum." The deletion doubtless indicates the
legislative intent of maintaining, in line with the non-diminution principle, the level or
grade of salary enjoyed by an incumbent before the reallocation to a lower grade or
classification is effected. It must be made absolutely clear at this juncture that Go
received his position classification of Attorney VI and assigned SG-26 upon his
promotional appointment as Chief, LTFRB Legal Division on February 1, 1990, or after
the effectivity of RA 6758. Following the clear mandate of the aforequoted Sec. 15 (b)
of PD 985, as amended, Go must not suffer a reduction in his salary even if there was a
reallocation of his position to a lower grade.

Lest it be overlooked, the transition provisos of RA 6758 provide additional justification

for Go's entitlement to continue receiving the compensation and emoluments previously
granted him upon his promotion as Chief, LTFRB Legal Division. Go, as an incumbent of
said position before the assailed reallocation was effected ostensibly through the
implementation of RA 6758, the statute's transition provisions should apply mutatis
mutandis to him. The pertinent provisions are Secs. 12 and 17 of RA 6758, to wit:

Section 12. Consolidation of Allowances and Compensation. All allowances, except for
representation and transportation allowances, clothing and laundry allowances; ...and
such other additional compensation not otherwise specified herein as may determined
by the DBM,shall be deemed included in the standardized salary rates herein prescribed.
Such other additional compensation, whether in cash or in kind, being received by
incumbents only as of July 1, 1989 not integrated into the standardized salary rates
shall continue to be authorized.

...

Section 17. Salaries of Incumbents. Incumbents of positions presently receiving salaries

and additional compensation/fringe benefits including those absorbed from local
government units and other emoluments, the aggregate of which exceeds the
standardized salary rate as herein prescribed, shall continue to receive such excess
compensation, which shall be referred to as transition allowance. The transition
allowance shall be reduced by the amount of salary adjustment that the incumbent shall
receive in the future. cCTIaS

Pursuant to the principle of non-diminution and consistent with the rule on the
prospective application of laws in the spirit of justice and fair play, 28 the above
provisions are, indeed, meant to protect incumbents who are receiving salaries and
allowances beyond what may be allowable under RA 6758. It may be that Go was not
the occupant of his present position as of July 1, 1989. Still the positions in the plantilla
of the LTFRB were properly subjected to the standardization under RA 6758. In fact, the
matter of excess of salary and benefits in the application of RA 6758 and PD 985 is a
non-issue. What is at issue is the reallocation of the position from Attorney VI, SG-26 to
Attorney V, SG-25. Obviously, the question of who was sitting as Chief of the Legal
Division as of July 1, 1989 is of no moment. Of particular significance is the issue of
whether the reallocation to a lower degree is proper given that Go was already enjoying
the salary and emoluments as Attorney VI, SG-26 upon his appointment on February 1,
1990 as Chief, LTFRB Legal Division.

While the DBM is statutorily vested with the authority to reclassify or allocate positions
to their appropriate classes, with the concomitant authority to formulate allocating
policies and criteria for bureau-level agencies, like the LTFRB, the investiture could not
have plausibly included unchecked discretion to implement a reallocation system
offensive to the due process guarantee.

It is recognized that one's employment is a property right within the purview of the due
process clause. So it was that in Crespo v. Provincial Board of Nueva Ecija 29 the Court
categorically held that "one's employment, profession, trade or calling is a 'property
right,' and the wrongful interference therewith is an actionable wrong. The right is
considered to be property within the protection of a constitutional guaranty of due
process of law." 30

Per our count, from his promotional appointment as Chief, LTFRB Legal Division to the
time (April 8, 1991) the summary reallocation was implemented, Go had occupied the
position and enjoyed the corresponding salary and emoluments therefor for one year,
two months and eight days. In this length of time, Go's entitlement to the benefits
appurtenant to the position has well nigh ripened into a vested right.
As the records show, Go, as Attorney VI, SG-26, was receiving an annual salary of
PhP151,800. Consequent to the enforcement of the summary reallocation of his position
to Attorney V, SG-25, this was effectively reduced, reckoned from April 8, 1991, to
PhP136,620, 31 or a salary reduction of PhP15,180 a year. These figures of course have
yet to factor in supervening pay adjustments occurring through the years.

A vested right is one whose existence, effectivity and extent do not depend upon events
foreign to the will of the holder, or to the exercise of which no obstacle exists, and
which is immediate and perfect in itself and not dependent upon a contingency. 32 The
term "vested right" expresses the concept of present fixed interest which, in right
reason and natural justice, should be protected against arbitrary State action, or an
innately just and imperative right which enlightened free society, sensitive to inherent
and irrefragable individual rights, cannot deny. 33

To be vested, a right must have become a title legal or equitable to the present or
future enjoyment of property. 34 AcICTS

To us, Go has established a clear, equitable vested right to the emoluments of his
position as Attorney VI, SG-26. He continues to occupy at least up to April 11, 2006
when he filed this petition the position of Chief, LTFRB Legal Division. His title to
Attorney VI, SG-26 is without question, having been legally appointed to the position on
February 1, 1990. And being an incumbent to that position, he has, at the very least, an
equitable right to receive the corresponding salary and emoluments attached thereto.
The summary demotion to a lower salary grade, with the corresponding decrease in
salary and emoluments after he has occupied his current rank and position, goes
against his right to continue enjoying the benefits accorded the position and which his
predecessors must have been receiving. His right thereto has ripened into a vested
right, of which he could be deprived only by due process of law, but which we believe
he was denied through the summary reallocation. With the view we take of this case,
Go was neither apprised nor given the opportunity to contest the reallocation before its
summary implementation.

Lest this Decision is taken out of context, the Court wishes to emphasize that it is not
its intention to disturb the reallocation of the position Chief, LTFRB Legal Division to
Attorney V, SG-25. Accordingly, it behooves the DBM and the LTFRB to enforce the
classification of position of Attorney V, SG-25 to those who will succeed Go in the said
position.

It bears to stress nonetheless that this pro hac vice case disposition is predicated on the
following key considerations: (1) Go was duly appointed to an office previously
classified as a division chief position with an Attorney VI, SG 26 assignment; (2) under
DBM circulars then obtaining, it would appear that division chief positions carried a SG-
26 classification without the qualification set forth in the DBM's letter of March 31,
1991. In a real sense, therefore, the present controversy is attributable to the DBM's
failure to incorporate, at the outset, the necessary clarificatory qualifications/distinctions
in its position and salary allocation rules/circulars; (3) Go's receipt for some time of the
salary and other emoluments attached to the position was cut short by the reallocation
of the position, resulting in his demotion and downgrading of salary; and (4) the
reallocation was effected by the DBM in a summary manner.

WHEREFORE,the instant petition is GRANTED.The Resolutions dated August 17, 2005

and January 31, 2006 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 90665 are hereby
REVERSED and SET ASIDE.The January 7, 2005 Decision and June 28, 2005 Order of
the Office of the President in OP Case No. 99-8880 are likewise REVERSED and SET
ASIDE.Accordingly, the summary reallocation enforced and implemented on April 8,
1991 is declared NULL and VOID.The Department of Transportation and
Communications is hereby ORDERED to reinstate Gonzalo S. Go, Jr. to the position of
Attorney VI, SG-26 as the Chief of the Legal Division of the Land Transportation
Franchising and Regulatory Board, with the corresponding release to him of the
differential of all emoluments reckoned from April 8, 1991.

G.R. No. 249168. April 26, 2021.

AILEEN CYNTHIA M. AMURAO,petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES AND

SANDIGANBAYAN SIXTH DIVISION,respondents.

DECISION

J.Y. LOPEZ, J p:

The Verified Petition for Certiorari,Prohibition, and Mandamus (with prayer for the
issuance of a temporary restraining order or writ of preliminary injunction) filed by
petitioner Aileen Cynthia M. Amurao seeks the nullification and setting aside of the
Resolution dated September 5, 2019 issued by the respondent Sandiganbayan Sixth
Division, ordering the suspension pendente lite of petitioner in Criminal Case No. SB-17-
CRM-1385.

The case stemmed from an Affidavit executed by Doris Suelo, Sheryl Lynn Lebante, and
Engilbert Alvarez, the private complainants in Criminal Case No. SB-17-CRM-1385,
wherein they alleged that petitioner and her co-accused, as tourism officers of the City
Government of Puerto Princesa, Palawan, solicited money and other gifts from private
individuals and entities for the purpose of tourism activities. The money and gifts
solicited then went to the personal and individual accounts of the petitioner and her co-
accused.

In an Information dated March 5, 2015, petitioner and several others were charged
before the Sandiganbayan with violation of Section 7 (d) of Republic Act No. (R.A.)
6713, otherwise known as the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials
and Employees.The Information states:

That on or about the period between February 2014 and April 2014 or sometime prior
or subsequent thereto, in Puerto Princesa City, Palawan, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused public officers, Aileen
Cynthia M. Amurao, being the City Tourism Officer and Head of the City Tourism
Department, Joyce C. Enriquez, Tourism Operations Assistant, Michie H. Meneses,
Tourism Operations Officer I, and Michael Angelo M. Meneses and Lucero Aquino,
Jr.,contractual Tourism Operations Assistant, all of the City Tourism Department, City
Government of Puerto Princesa City, Palawan, while in the performance of their
functions, taking advantage of their positions, committing the offense in relation to their
office, and conspiring and confederating with each other, did then and there, willfully,
unlawfully and criminally solicit or accept, directly or indirectly, any gift, gratuity, favor,
entertainment, loan, or anything of monetary value from tourism-oriented and private
entities or individuals by sending them solicitation letters for sponsorship of the City
Government of Puerto Princesa's tourism activities and related projects, supervised by
the accused.

CONTRARY TO LAW.
During the pendency of the proceedings, the Sandiganbayan issued a Resolution dated
July 23, 2019 pursuant to Section 4, Rule VIII of the 2018 Revised Internal Rules of the
Sandiganbayan. The Order directed petitioner to show cause why she should not be
suspended pendente lite in accordance with Section 13 of R.A. 3019.

In her Compliance and Manifestation, petitioner claimed that she should not be
suspended because Section 13 of R.A. 3019 only applies to those charged with violation
under the same law and the provisions under the Revised Penal Code (RPC) on bribery,
and not to violations of R.A. 6713 of which she was charged.

On September 5, 2019, the Sandiganbayan issued the assailed Resolution, the

dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE,premises considered, accused AILEEN CYNTHIA MAGGAY AMURAO is

ordered SUSPENDED pendente lite,for a period of ninety (90) days, as Head of the
Office of the City Tourism of Puerto Princesa City, or any other public position she may
now or hereafter be holding.

Accused Aileen Cynthia Maggay Amurao is ordered to CEASE AND DESIST from further
performing and/or exercising the functions, duties, and privileges of her position upon
the implementation of this Order of Preventive Suspension. The suspension of the
accused shall be automatically lifted upon the expiration of the 90-day period from the
implementation of this resolution.

The Sandiganbayan ruled that the offense charged against petitioner is covered by the
rule on preventive suspension under Section 13 of R.A. 3019. It noted that the
imposition of preventive suspension is applicable not only to those charged with
violation of R.A. 3019 and Title 7, Book II of the RPC, but also to those charged with
any offense involving fraud upon the government and any offense involving public funds
or property. Finding that the latter two instances applies to petitioner's case, the
Sandiganbayan held that fraud upon the government was committed when the money
received from solicitations was deposited in petitioner's personal bank account and
allegedly used for the latter's personal consumption; and that such amounts of money
solicited from the private individuals and entities are public funds as they were intended
for the tourism activities of the City Government of Puerto Princesa.

Petitioner did not move for the reconsideration of the assailed Resolution. Instead, she
filed the instant petition, imputing grave abuse of discretion on the part of the
Sandiganbayan.

The contentions raised by petitioner boil down to the lone issue of whether the
Sandiganbayan, Sixth Division committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction when it issued the assailed Resolution ordering her suspension
pendente lite.

Petitioner maintains that violation of Section 7 (d) of R.A. 6713 is not among those
offenses covered by the preventive suspension rule under Section 13 of R.A. 3019 as
there is yet to be a categorical pronouncement on such inclusion. She asserts that the
letters which became the basis of her indictment refer to the term "sponsorship" and
not solicitation. Petitioner likewise argues that she did not commit fraud and that deceit
was not proven in relation to the offense charged against her. She claims that evidence
for the defense in Criminal Case No. SB-17-CRM-1385 would show that the cash, gift
checks, and other form of awards went directly to the participants and winners of
contests, pageants, and other activities. Petitioner also contends that the money that
came from tourism stakeholders was not in the nature of public funds because it was
still in the possession of the one in charge or assigned to collect and keep the same for
distribution during an awards night.

In its Comment, the People of the Philippines, represented by the Office of the
Ombudsman, through the Office of the Special Prosecutor (OSP), argues that Section 7
(d) of R.A. 6713 is included among the offenses covered by Section 13 of R.A. No.
3019. It maintains that the assailed Resolution was issued on the basis of compliance
with Section 13, R.A. 3019, as amended, reiterating that the fraudulent act of petitioner
was established through evidence before the Sandiganbayan when money (and gifts)
was solicited from private individuals and deposited in petitioner's (and her co-
accused's) personal accounts. The OSP likewise echoes the ruling of the Sandiganbayan
that the sums of money subject of the criminal case, having been collected for the
purpose of tourism activities, are public funds.

The Ruling of the Court

We first discuss the procedural issue of petitioner's failure to file a motion for
reconsideration prior to resorting to the present petition for certiorari,prohibition, and
mandamus.

In her Verified Petition, petitioner submits that she did not file a motion for
reconsideration because the preventive suspension contemplated in Section 13 of R.A.
3019 is mandatory and ministerial on the part of the Sandiganbayan. She, likewise,
posits that the instant petition falls under the exceptions to the necessity of filing a
motion for reconsideration.
It has long been settled that a motion for reconsideration is a condition sine qua non for
the filing of a petition for certiorari. The objective of this mandate is to allow the lower
court, or tribunal, the opportunity to correct any actual or perceived error imputed to it.

In Siok Ping Tan v. Subic Bay Distribution, Inc., however, the Court reiterated that the
foregoing rule admits of exceptions:

x x x The rule is, however, circumscribed by well-defined exceptions, such as (a) where
the order is a patent nullity, as where the court a quo had no jurisdiction; (b) where the
questions raised in the certiorari proceeding have been duly raised and passed upon by
the lower court, or are the same as those raised and passed upon in the lower court;
(c) where there is an urgent necessity for the resolution of the question and any further
delay would prejudice the interests of the Government or of the petitioner or the
subject matter of the action is perishable; (d) where, under the circumstances, a motion
for reconsideration would be useless; (e) where petitioner was deprived of due process
and there is extreme urgency for relief; (f) where, in a criminal case, relief from an
order of arrest is urgent and the granting of such relief by the trial court is improbable;
(g) where the proceedings in the lower court are a nullity for lack of due process; (h)
where the proceedings were ex parte,or in which the petitioner had no opportunity to
object; and (i) where the issue raised is one purely of law or where public interest is
involved.

While the petitioner cites exceptions (c),(d),(e),and (i) in her petition, she plainly did so
without explaining how such circumstances apply to her case. Nevertheless, the Court
finds that the second exception is more relevant in this case as the question raised by
petitioner in her Verified Petition has been duly raised before and was already passed
upon by the Sandiganbayan.

Excusing the petitioner's procedural misstep notwithstanding, the petition fails.

There is grave abuse of discretion when there has been an evasion of a positive duty or
a virtual refusal to perform a duty prescribed by law or to act in accordance with law,
such as when a judgment was rendered not on the basis of law and evidence, but on
caprice, whim, and despotism.

Here, the Court finds that no grave abuse of discretion may be attributed to the
Sandiganbayan in the assailed Resolution, the same having been issued on cogent legal
grounds.

The suspension pendente lite ordered in the assailed Resolution finds basis in Section
13 of R.A. 3019, to wit:

Section 13. Suspension and loss of benefits. Any incumbent public officer against whom
any criminal prosecution under a valid information under this Act or under Title Seven
Book II of the Revised Penal Code or for any offense involving fraud upon government
or public funds or property whether as a simple or as complex offense and in whatever
stage of execution and mode of participation, is pending in court shall be suspended
from office.Should he be convicted by final judgement, he shall lose all retirement or
gratuity benefits under any law, but if he is acquitted, he shall be entitled to
reinstatement and to the salaries and benefits which he failed to receive during
suspension, unless in the meantime administrative proceedings have been filed against
him.

In the event that such convicted officer, who may have been separated from the service
has already received such benefits he shall be liable to restitute the same to the
government. (Emphasis and underscoring added)

Verily, and contrary to petitioner's contention, the rule on preventive suspension is not
limited to cases where there has been a violation of R.A. 3019 or Title 7, Book II of the
RPC. The same Rule applies for any offense involving fraud upon government or public
funds or property.

The relevant question now is whether the offense charged against petitioner is
considered as fraud upon the government or public funds or property.

In Bustillo v. Sandiganbayan, this Court has settled that the term "fraud," as used in
Section 13 of R.A. 3019, is understood in its generic sense, that is, referring to "an
instance or an act of trickery or deceit especially when involving misrepresentation."

The Information filed against petitioner charged her and her co-accused with violation
of Section 7 (d) of R.A. 6713 by soliciting money and gifts from private individuals and
entities for supposed tourism activities and projects of the City Government of Puerto
Princesa, Palawan while in the performance of their functions and taking advantage of
their positions as tourism officers. It is clear from the foregoing that the act of
petitioner (and her co-accused) involves fraud upon public funds as such money and
gifts solicited were collected for the purpose of funding the tourism activities of the City
Government of Puerto Princesa, Palawan.

It is noteworthy that petitioner did not assail the validity of such Information. In fact, in
her Manifestation and Compliance before the Sandiganbayan, petitioner begged
exception to the suspension pendente lite that she admitted should be imposed on her
under a "valid information."

In Bolastig v. Sandiganbayan (Third Division), the Court underscored the mandatory

nature of preventive suspension when a public officer is charged with a valid
information involving violation of R.A. 3019, Title 7, Book II of the RPC, or offenses
involving fraud upon government, public funds, or property:

x x x Sec. 13 of Republic Act No. 3019 makes it mandatory for the Sandiganbayan to
suspend any public officer against whom a valid information charging violation of that
law, Book II, Title 7 of the Revised Penal Code, or any offense involving fraud upon
government or public funds or property is filed. The court trying a case has neither
discretion nor duty to determine whether preventive suspension is required to prevent
the accused from using his office to intimidate witnesses or frustrate his prosecution or
continue committing malfeasance in office. The presumption is that unless the accused
is suspended he may frustrate his prosecution or commit further acts of malfeasance or
do both, in the same way that upon a finding that there is probable cause to believe
that a crime has been committed and that the accused is probably guilty thereof, the
law requires the judge to issue a warrant for the arrest of the accused. The law does
not require the court to determine whether the accused is likely to escape or evade the
jurisdiction of the court. (citations omitted)
Since the petitioner is charged with an offense that clearly falls under Section 13 of R.A.
3019, her suspension pendente lite is justified. The Sandiganbayan has no other option
but to order the suspension of the petitioner when it is convinced that the information
charges her with acts of fraud involving government funds.

WHEREFORE,premises considered, the instant petition is DISMISSED.The Resolution

dated September 5, 2019 issued by the Sandiganbayan, Sixth Division in Criminal Case
No. SB-17-CRM-1385 is hereby AFFIRMED.

G.R. No. L-8692 December 20, 1913

GODOFREDO B. HERRERA, as municipal president of Caloocan, petitioner,

vs.
ALBERTO BARRETTO, judge of First Instance of Rizal, and CONSTANCIO
JOAQUIN, respondents.

Office of the Solicitor-General Harvey, for petitioners.

R. Diokno and Gibbs, McDonough and Blanco, for respondents.

MORELAND, J.:

A decision having been rendered in this case dismissing the application for a writ
of certiorari, the respondents or defendants in that application now come asking for an
assessment by this court of the damages occasioned by reason of the issuance in that
proceeding of an injunction by one of the members of this court restraining the
defendant from operating his cockpit until this court should have passed finally upon
the application for the writ.
It is provided by the Code of Civil Procedure that an injunction may be granted upon
the demonstration to the court of certain facts and the presentation of an undertaking
with sufficient sureties, conditioned "that the plaintiff will pay to the party enjoined all
such damages as such party may sustain by reason of the injunction, if the court should
finally decide that the plaintiff was not entitled thereto."

Section 170 of the Code (Act No. 190) provide that: "Upon final trial the amount of
damages to be awarded to the plaintiff or to the defendant upon the obligations
provided in the last four preceding sections shall be ascertained by the court trying the
action, and judgment for the same shall be included in the final judgment and the
judgment shall be both against the plaintiff and against the sureties upon any obligation
given under the provisions of any of the last four sections."

We do not believe that this court should take cognizance of the proceeding for damages
as proposed.lawphil.net Certiorari is not an action within the sense in which that word is
used in the sections of the Code of Civil Procedure relating to
injunctions. Certiorari being limited in its issuance to cases involving jurisdictional
defects can never be a proceeding in which the merits of a cause are ventilated. If an
application for the writ be made before the action or proceeding in the inferior court is
terminated, and such application is well founded, the only result will be, in case where
the court has exceeded its jurisdiction, the correction of the error and the continuation
of the cause in trial court in accordance with law. If the action or proceeding in the
inferior court is terminated, this court in certiorari will either affirm, annul, or modify. In
either case, it will be presumed that the party interested will take or has taken such
proceedings in the court below as will protect him in the prosecution of the proceeding
to obtain the damages sustained by reason of the injunction, if any. In certiorari this
court touches no question but one law and makes no adjudication which in any sense
affects the merits of the action or proceeding in the inferior court. In that sense,
therefore, it is an action.
Under such circumstances, this court is not warranted in taking cognizance of the
proceeding presented to it. If we may assume for the moment that the court could find
any basis for such a proceeding before it, or there could be presented any facts which
would warrant its action, we can readily see what embarrassment might arise. If this
court should determine that the party restrained by the injunction had suffered
damages and should award him a sum sufficient to compensate him, the Court of First
Instance subsequently, after a trial on the merits of the cause, might find that the party
restrained was not entitled to a judgment upon the merits and had no basis whatever
for his action. This very case is an illustration of that possible condition. Plaintiff in the
action in the court below asked for a mandamus to compel the issuance to him of a
cockpit license. In that action he obtained a mandatory injunction compelling the
issuance of one to continue during the pendency of the action. A member of this court,
upon a proceeding in certiorari, issued an injunction against the plaintiff in the court
below restraining him from exploiting his cockpit under that license until the Supreme
Court should finally pass upon the certiorari proceeding. This court, acting upon the
application, dismissed it, at the same time dissolving the injunction against the plaintiff
in the court below. If, now upon the proceeding presented for the assessment of
damages, this court should find that the plaintiff in the court below was entitled to the
sum asked, namely, P33,000, we might possibly be met in the future with a judgment
of the Court of First Instance upon the merits of the cause, declaring that the plaintiff in
that action was not entitled to a cockpit license and therefore suffered no damage by
reason of not having been permitted to use it while the injunction was in force. If that
judgment were well founded, then the plaintiff in that action could have suffered no
damage by reason of the restraining order issued by the member of this court. It is
apparent, therefore, that, before this court can determine intelligently and properly the
question of damages resulting from an injunction, it must have before it for adjudication
the merits of the cause. The merits never being before the court in a proceeding for the
issuance of a writ of certiorari, no damages can be assessed by this court in that
proceeding. This court is not, in certiorari proceedings, "the court trying the action"
which has cognizance of the "final trial."
As we have already said, certiorari is not an action within the meaning of section 170 of
the Code of Civil Procedure. While the decisions of this court frequently refer to the
proceeding as "an ordinary action," such language, although correct in the sense used,
is not intended to convey the idea that the proceeding is such in all that term implies,
especially in the sense in which the word is used in the section just referred to.

In the case of Blanco vs. Ambler (3 Phil. Rep., 358), the court said at page 360: "The
court has adopted a different practice in case of certiorari from that adopted in cases of
mandate and prohibition. The latter take the form of an ordinary action. In the former
an order to show cause is issued an upon its return, if no sufficient cause is shown, the
order provided for by section 217 is issued."1awphi1.net

In the case of Beech vs. Crossfield (12 Phil. Rep., 555), the court said: "It was
suggested at the argument that some of the defendants in this case had made no
proper answer to the order to show cause. We had directed that the defendants should
appear and state their reasons why a writ of certiorari should not be granted. Some of
them appeared and presented what they called a demurrer to the complaint and the
plaintiff says that a demurrer in such cases is improper. That is true, but the document
they presented was improperly called by them a demurrer. If they saw fit to answer the
order to show cause by saying that they admitted all the facts stated in the complaint,
but that even on such admission the plaintiff was not entitled to relief, they had a right
to do so. That is, in effect, what they did. The document which they called a demurrer
was, in effect, their answer to the order to show cause."

From these decisions it is clear that certiorari is not considered by this court an action in
all senses. While it may take somewhat the form of an action, being begun perhaps by
a complaint, or something similar thereto, followed by what may be termed an answer,
or what may be, in substance, a demurrer, it lacks many of the essential features of an
action. It never touches the merits of the cause and deals almost exclusively with
questions of law based upon the record of the case. A proceeding which, in its final
judgment, does not touch the merits of the cause can hardly be called an action in all
senses.

The motion to assess damages is denied and the parties are remanded to the Court of
First Instance for the vindication of their rights, if any they have, in that particular.

Arellano, C.J., Torres and Mapa, JJ., concur.

Carson, J., concurs in the result.

G.R. No. L-24811. March 3, 1967.

MARITIME COMPANY OF THE PHILIPPINES (MCP); MARINE OFFICER'S ASSOCIATION

OF THE PHILIPPINES (MOAP), and GENERAL MARITIME STEVEDORES' UNION OF THE
PHILIPPINES (GMSU), petitioners, vs. THE HON. ANSBERTO P. PAREDES, in his capacity
as Associate Judge of the Court of Industrial Relations, and PHILIPPINE MARITIME
INDUSTRIAL UNION (MPMIU), respondents.

Rafael Dinglasan, Logarta & Falgui for petitioner.

F.M. de los Reyes for respondent.

Niceforo S. Agaton for respondent Union.

SYLLABUS
1. WRIT OF CERTIORARI; REQUISITES. Under Section 1 of Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court, the writ of certiorari lies if the following requisites are present: (1) that it is
directed against a tribunal board or officer exercising judicial functions; (2) that such
tribunal board or officer has acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave
abuse of discretion, and (3) that there is no appeal nor any plain, speedy and adequate
remedy in the ordinary course of law.

2. ID.; ERRORS OF JUDGMENT OR OF PROCEDURE NOT RENEWABLE BY CERTIORARI

Errors of judgment or of procedure, not relating to the court's jurisdiction or amounting
to grave abuse of discretion, are not reviewable by certiorari (Bimeda vs. Perez, et al.,
93 Phil. 636).

3. ID.; ISSUE AFFECTING WISDOM OR SOUNDNESS OF DECISION NOT REVIEWABLE

BY CERTIORARI. Where the issues or question involved, affects the wisdom or
soundness of the decision, not the jurisdiction of the court to render said decision or its
validity, the same is beyond the province of the special civil action for certiorari
(Philippine Surety and Insurance Co. vs. Jacala, et al., 108 Phil., 177). Error of judgment
can be reviewed only by appeal (Paringit vs. Masakayan, L-16578, July 31, 1961; Delos
Santos vs. Mapa, 46 Phil. 398; Castro vs. Pea, 80 Phil. 488).

4. ID.; WRIT NOT AVAILABLE IF THERE IS APPEAL OR ADEQUATE REMEDY. If there is

an appeal or other adequate remedy, like a motion for reconsideration which is still
pending in the court below, the writ shall be denied. The rule is that before a petition
for certiorari can be brought against an order of a lower court, all remedies available in
that court must first be exhausted. The rule also provides that actions for certiorari may
only be brought in case there is no adequate remedy available to the petitioner in the
could below and against which the petition for certiorari is filed (Plaza, et al. vs.
Mencias, L-18253, October 31, 1962).

5. REMEDIAL LAW; PROCEDURE DEFINED; WHAT COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS

MAY DO. Procedure is the means whereby the court reaches out to restore rights and
remedy wrongs, and includes every step which may be taken from the beginning to the
end of a case (72 C.J.S. 473). The court may, subject to the requirement of due
process, give all such directions and orders as it may deem necessary or expedient in
the determination of the dispute before it. It may refrain from hearing the dispute or
part thereof, or dismiss any matter or part of any matter where further proceedings are
not necessary or desirable. It may also defer the hearing of any motion or hear one
motion in preference to others, when in its judgment such is necessary to settle an
industrial dispute which disrupts industrial peace and economic order of the country.
This discretion granted by law is not to be interfered with unless it is gravely abused.

6. ID.; MEANING OF GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION. Grave abuse of discretion implies

such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of
jurisdiction (Abad Santos vs. Province of Tarlac, 38 Off. Gaz., 830), or in other words,
where the power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion or
personal hostility, and it must be so patent and gross as to amount be an evasion of
positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act at all in
contemplation of law (Alafriz vs. Nable, et al., 72 Phil. 278).

DECISION

ZALDIVAR, J p:
Because of certain labor disputes between the crew members of the M/V "Doa Aurora"
and M/V "Doa Alicia", belonging to the Philippine Maritime Industrial Union, hereinafter
referred to as PMIU, on the one hand; and the Maritime Company of the Philippines,
hereinafter referred to as MCP, operator of the two vessels, on the other hand, on
March 16, 1965, the PMIU served notice to strike to the MCP. The next day, March 17,
1965, the crew members of the "Doa Aurora", which was then docked at Kobe, Japan,
struck. At that time the other vessel, the "Doa Alicia", was docked at Cebu City, but the
crew of this vessel did not actually go on strike as did the crew of the "Doa Aurora." On
March 25, 1965, the PMIU filed charges of unfair practice against the MCP before the
Court of Industrial Relations, hereinafter referred to as CIR. Supplemental charges of
unfair labor practice were subsequently filed on April 19, 1965 by the PMIU against the
MCP.

On May 24, 1965, the President of the Philippines, pursuant to the provisions of Section
10 of Republic Act 875, certified the above-mentioned labor dispute to the CIR,
particularly the strike of the members of the crew of the "Doa Aurora." This certified
case was docketed in the CIR as Case No. 60-IPA and was assigned to Judge Ansberto
P. Paredes, one of the respondents in the instant case now before this Court.

Also on May 24, 1965, an agreement was entered into between the MCP and the PMIU
denominated as "Memorandum Agreement for the Return to Manila of the Doa Aurora."
This agreement, which was attested to by Secretary of Labor Jose B. Lingad and
approved by the CIR on May 31, 1965, provides as follows:

"I. The strike of the 'Doa Aurora' crew only shall be certified to the CIR by the
President.
"II. 'Doa Aurora' vessel shall be sailed back to Manila by its striking crew.

"III. The return to work order issued by the CIR in the certified case of the 'Doa Aurora'
crew shall decide the terms and conditions thereof; provided that

"The strikers shall continue to serve in the 'Doa Aurora', without prejudice to whatever
may be ordered by the Court in its return to work order in the certification case. No
dismissal or lay off shall be made by management during the pendency of the aforesaid
certified case.

"The disputed cost of living allowance of P40.00 per month and the claim for overtime
payment from the transfer of the 'Doa Aurora' vessel to the Maritime Company until the
signing of this Agreement, shall be deposited upon the arrival of the 'Doa Aurora' in
Manila with the Dept. of Labor, subject to the decision of the CIR on the question of
whether or not the strikers are entitled thereto.

"IV. The salaries of the crew of the 'Doa Aurora' from March 17, to the date of this
Agreement shall be delivered to the R.P. Consul- General or the Secretary of Labor Jose
Lingad in Japan, but this shall be without prejudice to the decision of the CIR in the
certified case of the 'Doa Aurora' on the question of whether or not said crew are
entitled to said payment.

"V. This agreement shall be without prejudice to the raising by any interested party of
any proper question in the certified case of the 'Doa Aurora', like the illegality of the
strike and the unfair labor practices and any right of other unions affected by the
certified case under their existing contracts."

On June 10, 1965, the PMIU, in its behalf, and in representation of the crew of the "Doa
Aurora", filed a verified petition in CIR Case No. 60-IPA, which was captioned "CREW
MEMBERS, DOA AURORA, PHILIPPINE MARITIME INDUSTRIAL UNION (PMIU),
Petitioners, versus MARITIME COMPANY OF THE PHILIPPINES (MCP), Respondent",
alleging, among other things, that the PMIU filed a notice to strike for the crews of both
the "Doa Aurora" and "Doa Alicia" on March 16, 1965; that on March 17, 1965, the crew
members of the "Doa Aurora" struck; and that charges of unfair labor practice against
the MCP were filed by the PMIU on March 25, 1965 and were supplemented on April 18,
1965. The petitioner prayed, among others, that the strike of the members of the crew
of the "Doa Aurora" be declared legal. The MCP filed its answer alleging that the strike
staged and conducted by the members of the PMIU on board the "Doa Aurora" while it
was in Kobe, Japan, was illegal, malicious, tortious and unlawful. On June 21, 1965, the
Marine Officers' Association of the Philippines, hereinafter referred to as MOAP, and the
General Maritime Stevedores' Union of the Philippines, hereafter referred to as GMSU,
as intervenors, filed their respective answer to the verified petition of the PMIU, likewise
alleging that the strike staged by the members of the PMIU was illegal.

The CIR Case No. 60-IPA was set for hearing on June 10 and 11, 1965, and was
assigned to a Commissioner of the Court who tried to conciliate the differences among
the parties. In the meantime, by reason of supervening incidents, the PMIU filed three
motions, as follows:

(1) Motion, dated June 17, 1965, entitled "Advice and Motion", wherein PMIU
manifested to the court that the "Doa Aurora" had already arrived in Manila, was
unloading her cargo and was ready to resume her sailing schedule; that replacement of
some members of the crew was necessary; that because the prerogative of making the
necessary replacement was vested in the PMIU, it was advising the court of the
proposed replacements. The PMIU prayed that during the pendency of the case it be
authorized to effect the proposed replacements and changes of the crew members.

(2) Motion, dated June 17, 1965 entitled "Motion to Require Respondent to Pay
Members of Petitioner Union Unpaid Salaries and Other Monies Due Without Delay",
wherein PMIU alleged that the MCP violated the "Memorandum Agreement" by not
paying the 50% of the salaries of the crew of the "Doa Aurora" from March 17 to May
24, 1965; that the crew was not paid the salary corresponding to March 16, 1965
although they worked on that day; that 50% of the salaries due to the crews' families
corresponding to the period from May 26 to May 31, 1965 had not been paid; that the
50% due to the families of "Doa Aurora" and "Doa Alicia" crews for the periods
February 16 to February 28 and March 1 to March 15, 1965 had not been paid; that the
MCP was not willing to pay the salaries due to the crew of the "Doa Aurora" from June
1, 1965 to June 15; and prayed the Court to order the MCP to pay said monies.

As the two above-cited motions dated June 17, 1965 involved issues of fact, the
incidents were set for hearing before the Commissioner on June 22, 1965, but the
hearing was later suspended.

(3) Motion dated June 22, 1965, wherein PMIU alleged that at about 9:30 p.m. on June
21, 1965, a group of around 35 men, some armed with pistols, boarded the "Doa
Aurora" as a "cleaning gang"; that the PMIU crew members, coming from home visits to
their families, were not allowed to board the vessel, and that the vessel left for Cebu at
about 2:00 p.m. on June 22, 1965, leaving behind in Manila a considerable number of
the PMIU crew, and that the sailing of the "Doa Aurora" enlisting a new set of crew was
a violation of the Memorandum Agreement. The motion prayed that the CIR orders the
MCP and intervening MOAP and GMSU to bring back the "Doa Aurora" to Manila and to
disembark the "cleaning gang"; that the MCP, MOAP and GMSU be restrained from
doing any act designed to take the vessel without the petitioning PMIU crew, or any act
forcing petitioning PMIU crew to disembark against their will, or preventing them from
having access to the vessel during the pendency of the case; and that the officials of
the MCP, GMSU, and MOAP be cited for contempt of the court's order dated May 31,
1965, approving the Memorandum Agreement.

It is to be noted that before the filing of the motion of June 22, 1965, respondent Judge
issued an order, dated June 22, 1965, enjoining the parties, under pain of contempt, to
maintain the status quo, that is, "the crew members of the M/V Doa Aurora before the
strike, should not be disembarked without previous Court approval." Respondent Judge
heard the motions filed by the PMIU while the MCP, MOAP and GMSU urged the
respondent Judge to proceed with the hearing of the issue of the legality or illegality of
the strike. While respondent Judge was hearing the motion for injunction dated June
22, 1965, the PMIU filed additional motions, as follows:

(4) Motion, dated June 29, 1965, entitled "Motion for 'Judgment on the Pleadings' Re
Motion to Require Respondents to Pay Monies Due to Petitioners", which motion was
denied.

(5) Motion, dated July 3, 1965, entitled "Motion to Order Respondent to Return Doa
Aurora to Manila Pending Injunction Incident" in order that the crew members might
withdraw their personal belongings left on board.
(6) Motion, dated July 3, 1965, entitled "Motion to Cite for Contempt of Court" the
officials of the MCP, GMSU and MOAP for various violations of the orders dated May 31,
1965 and June 22, 1965.

(7) Pleading, dated July 6, 1965, entitled "Urgent Supplemental Manifestation Re Goings
on Aboard Doa Aurora at Cebu" wherein PMIU manifested to the CIR that some regular
crew members of the "Doa Aurora" were ordered by the Captain to disembark at Cebu;
that other crew members were under severe pressure, threat and constant fear of
harassment, and were being asked to disaffiliate from the PMIU. PMIU thereby
reiterated its prayer for an order enjoining the MCP and the intervening unions from
disembarking crew members against their will, and prayed further that the MCP, MOAP
and GMSU be cited for contempt.

(8) Motion, dated July 8, 1965, entitled "Supplemental Motion Requiring Respondent to
Desist from Acts of Discrimination, Acts of Vexation, Prejudice Against Petitioners,"
alleging that the MCP, MOAP and GMSU were doing acts designed to compel the PMIU
crew members to disembark from the "Doa Aurora" and to destroy the union in the two
Doa vessels (Aurora and Alicia) as an exclusive independent appropriate bargaining
unit.

While the foregoing motions were being heard by the CIR, the MCP, MOAP and GMSU
filed on July 9, 1965 an urgent motion entitled "Urgent Motion to Suspend Hearings on
All Motions Filed by Petitioners Subsequent to its 'Petition' Filed on June 10, 1965, and
for this Honorable Court to Proceed with the Hearing of the Legality or Illegality of the
Strike Conducted and Staged by Members of Petitioner Squarely Presented by the
Pleadings of All the Parties in the Case." The PMIU filed its opposition to said motion,
and the movants their reply. Respondent Judge, in his order dated July 19, 1965,
denied, for reasons stated therein, the urgent motion, and resolved to continue or
proceed to hear and resolve the motions dated June 22, 1965 and June 17, 1965; the
pleading "Advice and Motion", dated June 17, 1965; the motions of June 29, 1965 and
July 3, 1965 "and such other motions that are pending before the Court where right to
return to work is not in issue."

Upon receipt of said order of July 19, 1965, the MCP, MOAP, and GMSU filed a motion,
dated July 23, 1965, praying the CIR that the hearing on the motions of the PMIU be
held in abeyance because they would file a motion for reconsideration of said order. The
motion was denied and the respondent Judge proceeded with the hearings of the
motions as scheduled, pursuant to a prior admonition that he would proceed with the
hearing unless restrained by a higher court. The MCP, MOAP and GMSU then jointly
filed, on July 23, 1965, a verified motion for reconsideration of the order dated July 19,
1965 addressed to the CIR en banc.

Without awaiting the resolution of the CIR en banc of their motion for reconsideration
of the order of respondent Judge Ansberto P. Paredes dated July 19, 1965, the MCP,
MOAP and GMSU filed before this Court on July 31, 1965 a petition for certiorari,
prohibit ion and mandamus with preliminary injunction, naming as respondents the
Hon. Judge Ansberto P. Paredes of the CIR and the PMIU, and praying: (1) that the
order of respondent Judge of July 19, 1965 in CIR Case No. 60-IPA be declared illegal,
null and void; (2) that the respondent Judge, or any other Judge of the CIR to whom
the CIR Case No. 60-IPA and its incidents may be assigned, be ordered to immediately
proceed to hear the issue of legality or illegality of the strike squarely presented by the
pleadings of the parties in said case and to suspend further hearings on all remaining
motions filed by the respondent PMIU etc.; and (3) that upon the filing of a bond to be
fixed by this Court an order issue enjoining respondent Judge Ansberto P. Paredes, or
any Judge of the CIR to whom Case No. 60-IPA and its incidents may be assigned, from
enforcing his order of July 19, 1965 and from proceeding further with the hearing of the
remaining motions of respondent PMIU pending before the Court presided by said
respondent Judge as well as other motions that respondent PMIU may later file which
are not relevant to the issue of the legality or illegality of the strike.

This Court, upon the petitioners' filing of a bond of P10,000.00, issued the preliminary
injunction prayed for.

The issues raised by the parties in the present case boil down to the following:

1. Is the instant petition premature?

2. Did the respondent Judge commit a grave abuse of discretion, or had acted without
or in excess of jurisdiction, in denying petitioners' motion to give priority to the hearing
and resolution of the issue regarding the legality or illegality of the strike in CIR Case
No. 60-IPA over the motions presented by the respondents in said case?

1. Respondents contend that the present petition is premature because there is as yet
no decision which may be reviewed by this Court. It is the stand of respondents that
what can be appeared to this Court is not the decision of any judge of the CIR but the
decision of the Court en banc as ruled in Broce, et al. vs. Democratic Labor Association,
et al., G.R. No. L-12367, October 28, 1959.

Respondents further aver that the impression created by the petitioners in their petition
is that at the time of the filing of their petition before this Court there was no quorum
among the Judges of the CIR and that there would be a long delay if the resolution of
the Court en banc had to be awaited, when the truth is that at the time of the filing of
the petition, there was already a quorum. The respondents point to the certification
made by the Acting Clerk of Court of the CIR to the effect that "as of July 26, 1964, the
court en banc has a quorum." (p. 96, Record)

Petitioners, on the other hand, maintain that their petition is not an appeal by certiorari
but an original special action for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus under the
provisions of Section 1, 2 and 3 of Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, hence, the case of
Broce, et al. vs. Democratic Labor Association, et al., supra, relied upon by respondents,
is inapplicable.

We find merit in the contention of respondents. Under Section 1 of Rule 65 of the Rules
of Court the writ of certiorari lies if the following requisites are present: (1) that it is
directed against a tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial functions; (2) that such
tribunal, board or officer has acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave
abuse of discretion, and (3) that there is no appeal nor any plain, speedy and adequate
remedy in the ordinary course of law.

We find that these three requisites are not present in the instant case. The presence of
the first requisite cannot be gainsaid the CIR being a tribunal exercising judicial
functions. As to the second requisite, it is not disputed that the CIR has jurisdiction over
the labor dispute in question, the same having been certified by the President as
affecting an industry indispensable to the national interest (Section 10, Republic Act
875). Even assuming, for the sake of argument, that the respondent Judge committed
an error in denying the motion to give preference to the hearing and resolution of the
issue of the legality of the strike, said error is not an error of jurisdiction which may be
reviewed in certiorari proceedings (Henderson vs. Tan, L-3223, October 10, 1950). Said
error would be at most one of judgment or of procedure. But errors of judgment or of
procedure, not relating to the court's jurisdiction or amounting to grave abuse of
discretion, are not reviewable by certiorari (Bimeda vs. Perez, et al., L-5588, August 26,
1953). This Court has also held that where the issue or question involved affects the
wisdom or soundness of the decision, not the jurisdiction of the court to render said
decision or its validity, the same is beyond the province of the special civil action for
certiorari (Philippine Surety and Insurance Co. vs. Jacala, et al., L-12766, May 25,
1960). Error of judgment can be reviewed only by appeal (Paringit vs. Masakayan, L-
16578, July 31, 1961; De los Santos vs. Mapa, 46 Phil. 398; Castro vs. Pea, 80 Phil.,
488). As to whether the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion, the question
will be discussed later.

The third requisite, i.e. the absence of appeal or any speedy and adequate remedy in
the ordinary course of law, cannot be said to be present in the instant case. Petitioners
claim in their petition that they filed before the CIR on July 23, 1965 a motion for
reconsideration of the questioned order of July 19, 1965. The present petition was filed
before this Court on July 31, 1965, although it is dated July 28, 1965. It is during the
pendency of their motion for reconsideration before the CIR, therefore, that the instant
petition was filed. It is an admitted fact that the motion for reconsideration was not
resolved before the instant petition was filed. It has been held by this Court in Mayol vs.
Blanco, 61 Phil., 547, that if there is an appeal or other adequate remedy, like a motion
for reconsideration which is still pending in the court below, the writ shall be denied. In
Plaza, et al. vs. Mencias, G.R. No. L-18253, October 31, 1962, this Court had occasion
to state that:

"One of the grounds raised by the respondents against the present petition for certiorari
is that it has been prematurely filed. We find this objection to be well taken. The rule is
that before a petition for certiorari can be brought against an order of a lower court, all
remedies available in that court must first be exhausted. In the case at bar the
petitioners filed a petition without waiting for a resolution of the court on the motion for
reconsideration, which could have been favorable to the petitioners. The rule also
provides that actions for certiorari may only be brought in case there is no adequate
remedy available to the petitioner in the court below and against which the petition for
certiorari is filed. In the case at bar the adequate remedy was the motion for
reconsideration and the resolution thereon, which was expected to be a more speedy
remedy than the present petition for certiorari."

Petitioners' claim that there is no speedy remedy because there was lack of quorum of
the judges of the CIR to rule on the motion for reconsideration cannot be given credit in
the face of the allegation of respondent Judge, in his answer, that there was such a
quorum and the certification of the Acting Clerk of Court of the CIR that there was such
a quorum as of July 26, 1964.

2. Regarding the second issue, We find that respondent Judge did not commit a grave
abuse of discretion, or had acted without or in excess of jurisdiction, when he denied
petitioners' motion to give priority to the hearing and resolution of the issue regarding
the legality or illegality of the strike.

In proceeding to hear or investigate any matter before it, the CIR is conferred discretion
in procedural matters (Section 7, Com. Act 103, as amended). Procedure is the means
whereby the court reaches out to restore rights and remedy wrongs, and includes every
step which may be taken from the beginning to the end of a case (72 C.J.S., p. 473).
The court may, subject to the requirement of due process, give all such directions and
orders as it may deem necessary or expedient in the determination of the dispute
before it. It may refrain from hearing the dispute or part thereof, or dismiss any matter
or part of any matter, where further proceedings are not necessary or desirable.
Certainly, it may also defer the hearing of any motion or hear one motion in preference
to others, when in its judgment such is necessary to settle an industrial dispute which
disrupts industrial peace and economic order of the country. This discretion granted by
law is not to be interfered with unless it is gravely abused.

It cannot be said in the instant case that the respondent Judge committed a grave
abuse of discretion when he issued the questioned order of July 19, 1965. Grave abuse
of discretion, which is also a requirement in order that the instant petition for certiorari
may prosper, "implies such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as is
equivalent to lack of jurisdiction (Abad Santos vs. Province of Tarlac, 38 Off. Gaz., 830),
or in other words, where the power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by
reason of passion or personal hostility, and it must be so patent and gross as to amount
to an evasion of positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to
act at all in contemplation of law" (Alafriz vs. Nable, et al., 72 Phil., 278).

The respondent Judge's order is not claimed to have been motivated by passion and
personal hostility. It is not despotic or arbitrary. It was prompted by justifiable grounds.
A perusal of the questioned order is sufficient to show its basis. In a paragraph of the
order the respondent Judge says:

"However there are some issues brought out of the hearings thus far held which should
be first resolved before the Court is ready for the reception of evidence and resolution
of the strike illegality issue . . ."
And those issues were (1) the disagreement as to the import or interpretation of the
Memorandum Agreement, whether it was only for the return of the "Doa Aurora" or a
return to work agreement ending the strike; (2) the payment of the "salaries to the
crew of the Doa Aurora from March 17 to the date of this Agreement . . ." and
enforcement of the items agreed upon in the Agreement like the deposit upon arrival of
the disputed cost of living allowance of P40.00 per month, and the claim for overtime
pay from the transfer of the "Doa Aurora" to the Maritime Company until the signing of
the Agreement. And the order continued:

"It is clear then that from all these facts, the strike illegality issue should first be
relegated to the background and the enforcement of the items agreed upon by the
parties in that Agreement should first be decided one way or the other, especially where
the items would appear to be clear and non-compliance therewith would manifestly
work undue hardship to labor."

The reason given by the Court gains added weight when it is considered that the
condition provided in the agreement of the raising of the issue of legality or illegality of
the strike did not affect the effectivity of the other terms and conditions laid down in
said Memorandum Agreement. This same reason explodes the contention of the
petitioners herein that all the issues raised in the motions of respondents depend upon
the issue of the legality or illegality of the strike.

The respondent PMIU did not file those motions for delay but for the protection of the
immediate rights affecting the status of the employees and their wages matters that are
vital to their livelihood and to the livelihood of their dependents.
Neither can it be said that the respondent Judge is guilty of positive evasion of duty in
not giving preference to the issue of the legality of the strike. The case of Philippine
Can Co. vs. CIR, et al., G.R. No. L-3021, July 31, 1950, relied upon by petitioners is not
applicable to the case at bar, as can be seen in the facts and ruling in said case.

The facts in that case are: On March 14, 1949, a number of laborers belonging to the
Liberal Labor Union and working in the can factory of Philippine Can Company, staged a
strike and established a picket line around the company's compound. According to the
company, the strikers and picketers used threat and intimidation to prevent the other
laborers from continuing to work. The same morning the company posted notices at the
gate of the company compound notifying the strikers that those who would not return
to work at one o'clock in the afternoon would be dismissed; in fact those who did not
return to work were declared dismissed and dropped from the payroll. Five days later,
i.e. on March 19, 1949, the Liberal Labor Union filed a petition with the CIR alleging
that from February 26, 1949, the Philippine Can Company had reduced the wages of
seven laborers and that after the corresponding negotiations had failed the strike was
declared and prayed the CIR to order, after due hearing, the Philippine Can Company to
restore the former rate of wages and to refund all deductions made in their salaries. In
its answer, the company denied the reduction of the wages, and alleged that the strike
was illegal and unjustified; that in spite of the notice to the strikers to report to duty,
they did not, so they were discharged; and that the company had been steadily losing
in its business and that in view of the great financial losses, the laying-off of laborers
not necessary in the operation of the can factory had become imperative to save the
company from bankruptcy. The company prayed that the petition of the labor union be
denied, and that the court order the lay-off of the laborers not necessary in the
operation of the factory by confirming the discharge from the service of the strikers who
did not return to work. On the second day of the hearing, counsel for the labor union
asked that the strikers be ordered back to work. The attorney for the can company
vigorously objected to this request, saying that the illegality of the strike had been
raised squarely in issue before the court and consequently, it would be highly unfair to
compel the can company to readmit the strikers without first deciding whether or not
said strike was legal and whether or not the dismissal of the strikers was proper. The
same day, April 8, 1949, Judge Jose S. Bautista of the CIR issued an order directing the
laborers of the labor union to immediately return to work and the can company to
admit them under the same conditions which prevailed before the conflict arose. A
motion for reconsideration filed by the can company was denied by a resolution of three
judges of the CIR. The Philippine Can Company filed a petition for certiorari. The
Supreme Court held:

"We hold that where an employer claims that the strike of some of its laborers was
illegal and so it has dismissed said laborers for refusing to return to work, and raises
such illegality squarely in issue in a case pending before the Court of Industrial
Relations, and further asserts that because of the loss in its business, it does not
presently need the services of said strikers nor of substitutes to take their places in the
employer's factory, the Court of Industrial Relations instead of ordering the strikers back
to work, should first determine whether or not the strike was legal and whether or not
the strikers had been properly and lawfully discharged, and for this purpose the lower
court should give priority to the hearing and determination of the case, so as to avoid
committing any possible injustice to the employer. This, especially in a case where like
the present, as we understand it, only a portion of the workers had gone on strike
thereby not unduly interrupting, much less, paralyzing the work and production of the
Company, which production by the way, does not, because of its nature, involve public
interest." (Italics supplied)

We find that between the Philippine Can Company case and the case at bar there is
only one significant similarity, and it is that the question of the legality or illegality of the
strike had been raised squarely in issue before the Court. There are, however, many
significant and material differences, namely: (1) the instant case involves public
interest; the Philippine Can case did not; (2) the strikers here have not been formally
dismissed, or at least it was not so alleged in the pleadings; the strikers in the Philippine
Can case were dismissed by the employer; (3) there is a Memorandum Agreement in
this case for the strikers to continue solving in the "Doa Aurora", and the strikers
pursuant to the agreement did return to work; in the Philippine Can case there was no
such agreement; (4) in the instant case, the PMC does not allege that it was losing and
could not afford to readmit dismissed employees, or that it did not need any more the
services of the crew for the "Doa Aurora"; in the Philippine Can case the company
complained of tremendous losses and did not need the services of the dismissed
employees back. The incurring by the can company of business losses was the injury
that the Supreme Court sought to remedy when it decided that the issue of the legality
of the strike be heard first; and (5) the most significant difference lies in the fact that in
the Philippine Can case, the CIR ordered the strikers to return to work before deciding
the legality of the strike; in the case at bar, the strikers had already returned to work by
virtue of the Memorandum Agreement executed by the parties and confirmed by the
Court. Assuming that the crew members had been disembarked, the hearing of the
motions of respondent would not lead to a return to work order before the legality of
the strike is settled because the questioned order expressly stated that the court will
proceed to hear "such other motions where the right to return to work is not in issue."
We, therefore, hold that the doctrine laid down by this Court in the Philippine Can case
is not controlling in the present case.

In view of the foregoing, the instant petition should be, as it is hereby, dismissed, and
the writ of preliminary injunction issued in the present case on August 5, 1965 is
dissolved, with costs to the petitioners. It is so ordered.

G.R. No. 211833. April 7, 2015.

FERDINAND R. VILLANUEVA, Presiding Judge, MCTC, Compostela-New Bataan,
Compostela Valley Province, petitioner, vs. JUDICIAL AND BAR COUNCIL, respondent.

DECISION

REYES, J p:

Presiding Judge Ferdinand R. Villanueva (petitioner) directly came to this Court via a
Petition for Prohibition, Mandamus,and Certiorari,and Declaratory Relief under Rules 65
and 63 of the Rules of Court, respectively, with prayer for the issuance of a temporary
restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction, to assail the policy of the Judicial
and Bar Council (JBC), requiring five years of service as judges of first-level courts
before they can qualify as applicant to second-level courts, on the ground that it is
unconstitutional, and was issued with grave abuse of discretion.

The Facts

The petitioner was appointed on September 18, 2012 as the Presiding Judge of the
Municipal Circuit Trial Court, Compostela-New Bataan, Poblacion, Compostela Valley
Province, Region XI, which is a first-level court. On September 27, 2013, he applied for
the vacant position of Presiding Judge in the following Regional Trial Courts
(RTCs):Branch 31, Tagum City; Branch 13, Davao City; and Branch 6, Prosperidad,
Agusan Del Sur.
In a letter dated December 18, 2013, JBC's Office of Recruitment, Selection and
Nomination, informed the petitioner that he was not included in the list of candidates
for the said stations. On the same date, the petitioner sent a letter, through electronic
mail, seeking reconsideration of his non-inclusion in the list of considered applicants and
protesting the inclusion of applicants who did not pass the prejudicature examination.

The petitioner was informed by the JBC Executive Officer, through a letter dated
February 3, 2014, that his protest and reconsideration was duly noted by the JBC en
banc.However, its decision not to include his name in the list of applicants was upheld
due to the JBC's long-standing policy of opening the chance for promotion to second-
level courts to, among others, incumbent judges who have served in their current
position for at least five years, and since the petitioner has been a judge only for more
than a year, he was excluded from the list. This caused the petitioner to take recourse
to this Court.

In his petition, he argued that: (1) the Constitution already prescribed the qualifications
of an RTC judge, and the JBC could add no more; (2) the JBC's five-year requirement
violates the equal protection and due process clauses of the Constitution; and (3) the
JBC's five-year requirement violates the constitutional provision on Social Justice and
Human Rights for Equal Opportunity of Employment. The petitioner also asserted that
the requirement of the Prejudicature Program mandated by Section 10 of Republic Act
(R.A.) No. 8557 should not be merely directory and should be fully implemented. He
further alleged that he has all the qualifications for the position prescribed by the
Constitution and by Congress, since he has already complied with the requirement of 10
years of practice of law.
In compliance with the Court's Resolution dated April 22, 2014, the JBC and the Office
of the Solicitor General (OSG) separately submitted their Comments. Summing up the
arguments of the JBC and the OSG, they essentially stated that the petition is
procedurally infirm and that the assailed policy does not violate the equal protection
and due process clauses. They posited that: (1) the writ of certiorari and prohibition
cannot issue to prevent the JBC from performing its principal function under the
Constitution to recommend appointees to the Judiciary because the JBC is not a tribunal
exercising judicial or quasi-judicial function; (2) the remedy of mandamus and
declaratory relief will not lie because the petitioner has no clear legal right that needs to
be protected; (3) the equal protection clause is not violated because the classification of
lower court judges who have served at least five years and those who have served less
than five years is valid as it is performance and experience based; and (4) there is no
violation of due process as the policy is merely internal in nature.

The Issue

The crux of this petition is whether or not the policy of JBC requiring five years of
service as judges of first-level courts before they can qualify as applicant to second-
level courts is constitutional.

Ruling of the Court

Procedural Issues:

Before resolving the substantive issues, the Court considers it necessary to first
determine whether or not the action for certiorari,prohibition and mandamus,and
declaratory relief commenced by the petitioner was proper.
One.The remedies of certiorari and prohibition are tenable. "The present Rules of Court
uses two special civil actions for determining and correcting grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. These are the special civil actions for
certiorari and prohibition, and both are governed by Rule 65." As discussed in the case
of Maria Carolina P. Araullo, etc., et al. v. Benigno Simeon C. Aquino III, etc., et al., this
Court explained that:

With respect to the Court, however, the remedies of certiorari and prohibition are
necessarily broader in scope and reach, and the writ of certiorari or prohibition may be
issued to correct errors of jurisdiction committed not only by a tribunal, corporation,
board or officer exercising judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial functions but also to set
right, undo and restrain any act of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction by any branch or instrumentality of the Government, even if the
latter does not exercise judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial functions. This application is
expressly authorized by the text of the second paragraph of Section 1, supra.

Thus, petitions for certiorari and prohibition are appropriate remedies to raise
constitutional issues and to review and/or prohibit or nullify the acts of legislative and
executive officials. (Citation omitted)

In this case, it is clear that the JBC does not fall within the scope of a tribunal, board, or
officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions. In the process of selecting and
screening applicants, the JBC neither acted in any judicial or quasi-judicial capacity nor
assumed unto itself any performance of judicial or quasi-judicial prerogative. However,
since the formulation of guidelines and criteria, including the policy that the petitioner
now assails, is necessary and incidental to the exercise of the JBC's constitutional
mandate, a determination must be made on whether the JBC has acted with grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in issuing and enforcing
the said policy.

Besides, the Court can appropriately take cognizance of this case by virtue of the
Court's power of supervision over the JBC. Jurisprudence provides that the power of
supervision is the power of oversight, or the authority to see that subordinate officers
perform their duties. It ensures that the laws and the rules governing the conduct of a
government entity are observed and complied with. Supervising officials see to it that
rules are followed, but they themselves do not lay down such rules, nor do they have
the discretion to modify or replace them. If the rules are not observed, they may order
the work done or redone, but only to conform to such rules. They may not prescribe
their own manner of execution of the act. They have no discretion on this matter except
to see to it that the rules are followed.

Following this definition, the supervisory authority of the Court over the JBC is to see to
it that the JBC complies with its own rules and procedures. Thus, when the policies of
the JBC are being attacked, then the Court, through its supervisory authority over the
JBC, has the duty to inquire about the matter and ensure that the JBC complies with its
own rules.

Two.The remedy of mandamus cannot be availed of by the petitioner in assailing JBC's

policy. The petitioner insisted that mandamus is proper because his right was violated
when he was not included in the list of candidates for the RTC courts he applied for. He
said that his non-inclusion in the list of candidates for these stations has caused him
direct injury.
It is essential to the issuance of a writ of mandamus that the applicant should have a
clear legal right to the thing demanded and it must be the imperative duty of the
respondent to perform the act required. The petitioner bears the burden to show that
there is such a clear legal right to the performance of the act, and a corresponding
compelling duty on the part of the respondent to perform the act. The remedy of
mandamus,as an extraordinary writ, lies only to compel an officer to perform a
ministerial duty, not a discretionary one. Clearly, the use of discretion and the
performance of a ministerial act are mutually exclusive.

The writ of mandamus does not issue to control or review the exercise of discretion or
to compel a course of conduct, which, it quickly seems to us, was what the petitioner
would have the JBC do in his favor. The function of the JBC to select and recommend
nominees for vacant judicial positions is discretionary, not ministerial. Moreso, the
petitioner cannot claim any legal right to be included in the list of nominees for judicial
vacancies. Possession of the constitutional and statutory qualifications for appointment
to the judiciary may not be used to legally demand that one's name be included in the
list of candidates for a judicial vacancy. One's inclusion in the list of the candidates
depends on the discretion of the JBC, thus:

The fact that an individual possesses the constitutional and statutory qualifications for
appointment to the Judiciary does not create an entitlement or expectation that his or
her name be included in the list of candidates for a judicial vacancy. By submitting an
application or accepting a recommendation, one submits to the authority of the JBC to
subject the former to the search, screening, and selection process, and to use its
discretion in deciding whether or not one should be included in the list. Indeed,
assuming that if one has the legal right to be included in the list of candidates simply
because he or she possesses the constitutional and statutory qualifications, then the
application process would then be reduced to a mere mechanical function of the JBC;
and the search, screening, and selection process would not only be unnecessary, but
also improper. However, this is clearly not the constitutional intent. One's inclusion in
the list of candidates is subject to the discretion of the JBC over the selection of
nominees for a particular judicial post.Such candidate's inclusion is not, therefore, a
legally demandable right, but simply a privilege the conferment of which is subject to
the JBC's sound discretion.

Moreover, petitioner is essentially seeking a promotional appointment, that is, a

promotion from a first-level court to a second level court. There is no law, however, that
grants him the right to a promotion to second-level courts. (Emphasis in the original)

Clearly, to be included as an applicant to second-level judge is not properly compellable

by mandamus inasmuch as it involves the exercise of sound discretion by the JBC.

Three.The petition for declaratory relief is improper. "An action for declaratory relief
should be filed by a person interested under a deed, a will, a contract or other written
instrument, and whose rights are affected by a statute, an executive order, a regulation
or an ordinance. The relief sought under this remedy includes the interpretation and
determination of the validity of the written instrument and the judicial declaration of the
parties' rights or duties thereunder." "The purpose of the action is to secure an
authoritative statement of the rights and obligations of the parties under a statute,
deed, contract, etc.,for their guidance in its enforcement or compliance and not to settle
issues arising from its alleged breach."

In this case, the petition for declaratory relief did not involve an unsound policy. Rather,
the petition specifically sought a judicial declaration that the petitioner has the right to
be included in the list of applicants although he failed to meet JBC's five-year
requirement policy. Again, the Court reiterates that no person possesses a legal right
under the Constitution to be included in the list of nominees for vacant judicial
positions. The opportunity of appointment to judicial office is a mere privilege, and not
a judicially enforceable right that may be properly claimed by any person. The inclusion
in the list of candidates, which is one of the incidents of such appointment, is not a
right either. Thus, the petitioner cannot claim any right that could have been affected by
the assailed policy.

Furthermore, the instant petition must necessarily fail because this Court does not have
original jurisdiction over a petition for declaratory relief even if only questions of law are
involved. The special civil action of declaratory relief falls under the exclusive jurisdiction
of the appropriate RTC pursuant to Section 19 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as amended
by R.A. No. 7691.

Therefore, by virtue of the Court's supervisory duty over the JBC and in the exercise of
its expanded judicial power, the Court assumes jurisdiction over the present petition.
But in any event, even if the Court will set aside procedural infirmities, the instant
petition should still be dismissed.

Substantive Issues

As an offspring of the 1987 Constitution, the JBC is mandated to recommend

appointees to the judiciary and only those nominated by the JBC in a list officially
transmitted to the President may be appointed by the latter as justice or judge in the
judiciary. Thus, the JBC is burdened with a great responsibility that is imbued with
public interest as it determines the men and women who will sit on the judicial bench.
While the 1987 Constitution has provided the qualifications of members of the judiciary,
this does not preclude the JBC from having its own set of rules and procedures and
providing policies to effectively ensure its mandate.

The functions of searching, screening, and selecting are necessary and incidental to the
JBC's principal function of choosing and recommending nominees for vacancies in the
judiciary for appointment by the President. However, the Constitution did not lay down
in precise terms the process that the JBC shall follow in determining applicants'
qualifications. In carrying out its main function, the JBC has the authority to set the
standards/criteria in choosing its nominees for every vacancy in the judiciary, subject
only to the minimum qualifications required by the Constitution and law for every
position. The search for these long held qualities necessarily requires a degree of
flexibility in order to determine who is most fit among the applicants. Thus, the JBC has
sufficient but not unbridled license to act in performing its duties.

JBC's ultimate goal is to recommend nominees and not simply to fill up judicial
vacancies in order to promote an effective and efficient administration of justice. Given
this pragmatic situation, the JBC had to establish a set of uniform criteria in order to
ascertain whether an applicant meets the minimum constitutional qualifications and
possesses the qualities expected of him and his office. Thus, the adoption of the five-
year requirement policy applied by JBC to the petitioner's case is necessary and
incidental to the function conferred by the Constitution to the JBC.

Equal Protection

There is no question that JBC employs standards to have a rational basis to screen
applicants who cannot be all accommodated and appointed to a vacancy in the
judiciary, to determine who is best qualified among the applicants, and not to
discriminate against any particular individual or class.

The equal protection clause of the Constitution does not require the universal
application of the laws to all persons or things without distinction; what it requires is
simply equality among equals as determined according to a valid classification. Hence,
the Court has affirmed that if a law neither burdens a fundamental right nor targets a
suspect class, the classification stands as long as it bears a rational relationship to some
legitimate government end.

"The equal protection clause, therefore, does not preclude classification of individuals
who may be accorded different treatment under the law as long as the classification is
reasonable and not arbitrary." "The mere fact that the legislative classification may
result in actual inequality is not violative of the right to equal protection, for every
classification of persons or things for regulation by law produces inequality in some
degree, but the law is not thereby rendered invalid."

That is the situation here. In issuing the assailed policy, the JBC merely exercised its
discretion in accordance with the constitutional requirement and its rules that a member
of the Judiciary must be of proven competence, integrity, probity and independence.
"To ensure the fulfillment of these standards in every member of the Judiciary, the JBC
has been tasked to screen aspiring judges and justices, among others, making certain
that the nominees submitted to the President are all qualified and suitably best for
appointment. In this way, the appointing process itself is shielded from the possibility of
extending judicial appointment to the undeserving and mediocre and, more importantly,
to the ineligible or disqualified."
Consideration of experience by JBC as one factor in choosing recommended appointees
does not constitute a violation of the equal protection clause. The JBC does not
discriminate when it employs number of years of service to screen and differentiate
applicants from the competition. The number of years of service provides a relevant
basis to determine proven competence which may be measured by experience, among
other factors. The difference in treatment between lower court judges who have served
at least five years and those who have served less than five years, on the other hand,
was rationalized by JBC as follows:

Formulating policies which streamline the selection process falls squarely under the
purview of the JBC. No other constitutional body is bestowed with the mandate and
competency to set criteria for applicants that refer to the more general categories of
probity, integrity and independence.

The assailed criterion or consideration for promotion to a second-level court, which is

five years experience as judge of a first-level court, is a direct adherence to the qualities
prescribed by the Constitution. Placing a premium on many years of judicial experience,
the JBC is merely applying one of the stringent constitutional standards requiring that a
member of the judiciary be of "proven competence." In determining competence, the
JBC considers, among other qualifications, experience and performance.

Based on the JBC's collective judgment, those who have been judges of first-level
courts for five (5) years are better qualified for promotion to second-level courts. It
deems length of experience as a judge as indicative of conversance with the law and
court procedure. Five years is considered as a sufficient span of time for one to acquire
professional skills for the next level court, declog the dockets, put in place improved
procedures and an efficient case management system, adjust to the work environment,
and gain extensive experience in the judicial process.

A five-year stint in the Judiciary can also provide evidence of the integrity, probity,and
independence of judges seeking promotion. To merit JBC's nomination for their
promotion, they must have had a "record of, and reputation for, honesty, integrity,
incorruptibility, irreproachable conduct, and fidelity to sound moral and ethical
standards." Likewise, their decisions must be reflective of the soundness of their
judgment, courage, rectitude, cold neutrality and strength of character.

Hence, for the purpose of determining whether judges are worthy of promotion to the
next level court, it would be premature or difficult to assess their merit if they have had
less than one year of service on the bench. (Citations omitted and emphasis in the
original)

At any rate, five years of service as a lower court judge is not the only factor that
determines the selection of candidates for RTC judge to be appointed by the President.
Persons with this qualification are neither automatically selected nor do they
automatically become nominees. The applicants are chosen based on an array of
factors and are evaluated based on their individual merits. Thus, it cannot be said that
the questioned policy was arbitrary, capricious, or made without any basis.

Clearly, the classification created by the challenged policy satisfies the rational basis
test. The foregoing shows that substantial distinctions do exist between lower court
judges with five year experience and those with less than five years of experience, like
the petitioner, and the classification enshrined in the assailed policy is reasonable and
relevant to its legitimate purpose. The Court, thus, rules that the questioned policy does
not infringe on the equal protection clause as it is based on reasonable classification
intended to gauge the proven competence of the applicants. Therefore, the said policy
is valid and constitutional.

Due Process

The petitioner averred that the assailed policy violates procedural due process for lack
of publication and non-submission to the University of the Philippines Law Center Office
of the National Administrative Register (ONAR).The petitioner said that the assailed
policy will affect all applying judges, thus, the said policy should have been published.

Contrary to the petitioner's contention, the assailed JBC policy need not be filed in the
ONAR because the publication requirement in the ONAR is confined to issuances of
administrative agencies under the Executive branch of the government. Since the JBC is
a body under the supervision of the Supreme Court, it is not covered by the publication
requirements of the Administrative Code.

Nevertheless, the assailed JBC policy requiring five years of service as judges of first-
level courts before they can qualify as applicants to second-level courts should have
been published. As a general rule, publication is indispensable in order that all statutes,
including administrative rules that are intended to enforce or implement existing laws,
attain binding force and effect. There are, however, several exceptions to the
requirement of publication, such as interpretative regulations and those merely internal
in nature, which regulate only the personnel of the administrative agency and not the
public. Neither is publication required of the so-called letters of instructions issued by
administrative superiors concerning the rules or guidelines to be followed by their
subordinates in the performance of their duties.
Here, the assailed JBC policy does not fall within the administrative rules and
regulations exempted from the publication requirement. The assailed policy involves a
qualification standard by which the JBC shall determine proven competence of an
applicant. It is not an internal regulation, because if it were, it would regulate and affect
only the members of the JBC and their staff. Notably, the selection process involves a
call to lawyers who meet the qualifications in the Constitution and are willing to serve in
the Judiciary to apply to these vacant positions. Thus, it is but a natural consequence
thereof that potential applicants be informed of the requirements to the judicial
positions, so that they would be able to prepare for and comply with them.

The Court also noted the fact that in JBC-009, otherwise known as the Rules of the
Judicial and Bar Council, the JBC had put its criteria in writing and listed the guidelines
in determining competence, independence, integrity and probity. Section 1, Paragraph 1
of Rule 9 expressly provides that applicants for the Court of Appeals and the
Sandiganbayan, should, as a general rule, have at least five years of experience as an
RTC judge, thus:

RULE 9 SPECIAL GUIDELINES FOR NOMINATION TO A VACANCY IN THE COURT OF

APPEALS AND SANDIGANBAYAN

Section 1. Additional criteria for nomination to the Court of Appeals and the
Sandiganbayan. In addition to the foregoing guidelines the Council should consider the
following in evaluating the merits of applicants for a vacancy in the Court of Appeals
and Sandiganbayan:
1. As a general rule, he must have at least five years of experience as a judge of
Regional Trial Court,except when he has in his favor outstanding credentials, as
evidenced by, inter alia,impressive scholastic or educational record and performance in
the Bar examinations, excellent reputation for honesty, integrity, probity and
independence of mind; at least very satisfactory performance rating for three (3) years
preceding the filing of his application for nomination; and excellent potentials for
appellate judgeship.

... (Emphasis ours)

The express declaration of these guidelines in JBC-009, which have been duly published
on the website of the JBC and in a newspaper of general circulation suggests that the
JBC is aware that these are not mere internal rules, but are rules implementing the
Constitution that should be published. Thus, if the JBC were so-minded to add special
guidelines for determining competence of applicants for RTC judges, then it could and
should have amended its rules and published the same. This, the JBC did not do as
JBC-009 and its amendatory rule do not have special guidelines for applicants to the
RTC.

Moreover, jurisprudence has held that rules implementing a statute should be published.
Thus, by analogy, publication is also required for the five-year requirement because it
seeks to implement a constitutional provision requiring proven competence from
members of the judiciary.

Nonetheless, the JBC's failure to publish the assailed policy has not prejudiced the
petitioner's private interest. At the risk of being repetitive, the petitioner has no legal
right to be included in the list of nominees for judicial vacancies since the possession of
the constitutional and statutory qualifications for appointment to the Judiciary may not
be used to legally demand that one's name be included in the list of candidates for a
judicial vacancy. One's inclusion in the shortlist is strictly within the discretion of the
JBC.

As to the issue that the JBC failed or refused to implement the completion of the
prejudicature program as a requirement for appointment or promotion in the judiciary
under R.A. No. 8557, this ground of the petition, being unsubstantiated, was
unfounded. Clearly, it cannot be said that JBC unlawfully neglects the performance of a
duty enjoined by law.

Finally, the petitioner argued but failed to establish that the assailed policy violates the
constitutional provision under social justice and human rights for equal opportunity of
employment. The OSG explained:

The questioned policy does not violate equality of employment opportunities. The
constitutional provision does not call for appointment to the Judiciary of all who might,
for any number of reasons, wish to apply. As with all professions, it is regulated by the
State. The office of a judge is no ordinary office. It is imbued with public interest and is
central in the administration of justice ....Applicants who meet the constitutional and
legal qualifications must vie and withstand the competition and rigorous screening and
selection process. They must submit themselves to the selection criteria, processes and
discretion of respondent JBC, which has the constitutional mandate of screening and
selecting candidates whose names will be in the list to be submitted to the President.
So long as a fair opportunity is available for all applicants who are evaluated on the
basis of their individual merits and abilities, the questioned policy cannot be struck
down as unconstitutional. (Citations omitted)
From the foregoing, it is apparent that the petitioner has not established a clear legal
right to justify the issuance of a preliminary injunction. The petitioner has merely filed
an application with the JBC for the position of RTC judge, and he has no clear legal
right to be nominated for that office nor to be selected and included in the list to be
submitted to the President which is subject to the discretion of the JBC. The JBC has
the power to determine who shall be recommended to the judicial post. To be included
in the list of applicants is a privilege as one can only be chosen under existing criteria
imposed by the JBC itself. As such, prospective applicants, including the petitioner,
cannot claim any demandable right to take part in it if they fail to meet these criteria.
Hence, in the absence of a clear legal right, the issuance of an injunctive writ is not
justified.

As the constitutional body granted with the power of searching for, screening, and
selecting applicants relative to recommending appointees to the Judiciary, the JBC has
the authority to determine how best to perform such constitutional mandate. Pursuant
to this authority, the JBC issues various policies setting forth the guidelines to be
observed in the evaluation of applicants, and formulates rules and guidelines in order to
ensure that the rules are updated to respond to existing circumstances. Its discretion is
freed from legislative, executive or judicial intervention to ensure that the JBC is
shielded from any outside pressure and improper influence. Limiting qualified applicants
in this case to those judges with five years of experience was an exercise of discretion
by the JBC. The potential applicants, however, should have been informed of the
requirements to the judicial positions, so that they could properly prepare for and
comply with them. Hence, unless there are good and compelling reasons to do so, the
Court will refrain from interfering with the exercise of JBC's powers, and will respect the
initiative and independence inherent in the latter.
WHEREFORE,premises considered, the petition is DISMISSED.The Court, however,
DIRECTS that the Judicial and Bar Council comply with the publication requirement of
(1) the assailed policy requiring five years of experience as judges of first-level courts
before they can qualify as applicant to the Regional Trial Court, and (2) other special
guidelines that the Judicial and Bar Council is or will be implementing.

G.R. No. 183409. June 18, 2010.

CHAMBER OF REAL ESTATE AND BUILDERS ASSOCIATIONS, INC. (CREBA),

petitioner,vs.THE SECRETARY OF AGRARIAN REFORM, respondent.

DECISION

PEREZ, J p:

This case is a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition (with application for temporary
restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction) under Rule 65 of the 1997
Revised Rules of Civil Procedure, filed by herein petitioner Chamber of Real Estate and
Builders Associations, Inc. (CREBA) seeking to nullify and prohibit the enforcement of
Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) Administrative Order (AO) No. 01-02, as
amended by DAR AO No. 05-07, 1 and DAR Memorandum No. 88, 2 for having been
issued by the Secretary of Agrarian Reform with grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction as some provisions of the aforesaid administrative
issuances are illegal and unconstitutional.
Petitioner CREBA, a private non-stock, non-profit corporation duly organized and
existing under the laws of the Republic of the Philippines, is the umbrella organization
of some 3,500 private corporations, partnerships, single proprietorships and individuals
directly or indirectly involved in land and housing development, building and
infrastructure construction, materials production and supply, and services in the various
related fields of engineering, architecture, community planning and development
financing. The Secretary of Agrarian Reform is named respondent as he is the duly
appointive head of the DAR whose administrative issuances are the subject of this
petition.

The Antecedent Facts

The Secretary of Agrarian Reform issued, on 29 October 1997, DAR AO No. 07-97, 3
entitled "Omnibus Rules and Procedures Governing Conversion of Agricultural Lands to
Non-Agricultural Uses," which consolidated all existing implementing guidelines related
to land use conversion. The aforesaid rules embraced all private agricultural lands
regardless of tenurial arrangement and commodity produced, and all untitled
agricultural lands and agricultural lands reclassified by Local Government Units (LGUs)
into non-agricultural uses after 15 June 1988.

Subsequently, on 30 March 1999, the Secretary of Agrarian Reform issued DAR AO No.
01-99, 4 entitled "Revised Rules and Regulations on the Conversion of Agricultural
Lands to Non-agricultural Uses," amending and updating the previous rules on land use
conversion. Its coverage includes the following agricultural lands, to wit: (1) those to be
converted to residential, commercial, industrial, institutional and other non-agricultural
purposes; (2) those to be devoted to another type of agricultural activity such as
livestock, poultry, and fishpond the effect of which is to exempt the land from the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP) coverage; (3) those to be converted
to non-agricultural use other than that previously authorized; and (4) those reclassified
to residential, commercial, industrial, or other non-agricultural uses on or after the
effectivity of Republic Act No. 6657 5 on 15 June 1988 pursuant to Section 20 6 of
Republic Act No. 7160 7 and other pertinent laws and regulations, and are to be
converted to such uses. 2005jurcd

On 28 February 2002, the Secretary of Agrarian Reform issued another Administrative

Order, i.e., DAR AO No. 01-02, entitled "2002 Comprehensive Rules on Land Use
Conversion," which further amended DAR AO No. 07-97 and DAR AO No. 01-99, and
repealed all issuances inconsistent therewith. The aforesaid DAR AO No. 01-02 covers
all applications for conversion from agricultural to non-agricultural uses or to another
agricultural use.

Thereafter, on 2 August 2007, the Secretary of Agrarian Reform amended certain

provisions 8 of DAR AO No. 01-02 by formulating DAR AO No. 05-07, particularly
addressing land conversion in time of exigencies and calamities.

To address the unabated conversion of prime agricultural lands for real estate
development, the Secretary of Agrarian Reform further issued Memorandum No. 88 on
15 April 2008, which temporarily suspended the processing and approval of all land use
conversion applications.

By reason thereof, petitioner claims that there is an actual slow down of housing
projects, which, in turn, aggravated the housing shortage, unemployment and illegal
squatting problems to the substantial prejudice not only of the petitioner and its
members but more so of the whole nation.

Hence, this petition.

The Issues

In its Memorandum, petitioner posits the following issues:

I.

WHETHER THE DAR SECRETARY HAS JURISDICTION OVER LANDS THAT HAVE BEEN
RECLASSIFIED AS RESIDENTIAL, COMMERCIAL, INDUSTRIAL, OR FOR OTHER NON-
AGRICULTURAL USES.

II.

WHETHER THE DAR SECRETARY ACTED IN EXCESS OF HIS JURISDICTION AND

GRAVELY ABUSED HIS DISCRETION BY ISSUING AND ENFORCING [DAR AO NO. 01-02,
AS AMENDED] WHICH SEEK TO REGULATE RECLASSIFIED LANDS.

III.
WHETHER [DAR AO NO. 01-02, AS AMENDED] VIOLATES THE LOCAL AUTONOMY OF
LOCAL GOVERNMENT UNITS. aDcETC

IV.

WHETHER [DAR AO NO. 01-02, AS AMENDED] VIOLATES THE DUE PROCESS AND
EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSES OF THE CONSTITUTION.

V.

WHETHER MEMORANDUM NO. 88 IS A VALID EXERCISE OF POLICE POWER. 9

The subject of the submission that the DAR Secretary gravely abused his discretion is
AO No. 01-02, as amended, which states:

Section 3. Applicability of Rules. These guidelines shall apply to all applications for
conversion, from agricultural to non-agricultural uses or to another agricultural use,
such as:

...

3.4 Conversion of agricultural lands or areas that have been reclassified by the LGU or
by way of a Presidential Proclamation, to residential, commercial, industrial, or other
non-agricultural uses on or after the effectivity of RA 6657 on 15 June
1988,....Emphasis supplied.

Petitioner holds that under Republic Act No. 6657 and Republic Act No. 8435, 10 the
term agricultural lands refers to "lands devoted to or suitable for the cultivation of the
soil, planting of crops, growing of fruit trees, raising of livestock, poultry or fish,
including the harvesting of such farm products, and other farm activities and practices
performed by a farmer in conjunction with such farming operations done by a person
whether natural or juridical, and not classified by the law as mineral, forest, residential,
commercial or industrial land." When the Secretary of Agrarian Reform, however, issued
DAR AO No. 01-02, as amended, he included in the definition of agricultural lands
"lands not reclassified as residential, commercial, industrial or other non-agricultural
uses before 15 June 1988." In effect, lands reclassified from agricultural to residential,
commercial, industrial, or other non-agricultural uses after 15 June 1988 are considered
to be agricultural lands for purposes of conversion, redistribution, or otherwise. In so
doing, petitioner avows that the Secretary of Agrarian Reform acted without jurisdiction
as he has no authority to expand or enlarge the legal signification of the term
agricultural lands through DAR AO No. 01-02. Being a mere administrative issuance, it
must conform to the statute it seeks to implement, i.e., Republic Act No. 6657, or to the
Constitution, otherwise, its validity or constitutionality may be questioned. TcSICH

In the same breath, petitioner contends that DAR AO No. 01-02, as amended, was
made in violation of Section 65 11 of Republic Act No. 6657 because it covers all
applications for conversion from agricultural to non-agricultural uses or to other
agricultural uses, such as the conversion of agricultural lands or areas that have been
reclassified by the LGUs or by way of Presidential Proclamations, to residential,
commercial, industrial or other non-agricultural uses on or after 15 June 1988.
According to petitioner, there is nothing in Section 65 of Republic Act No. 6657 or in any
other provision of law that confers to the DAR the jurisdiction or authority to require
that non-awarded lands or reclassified lands be submitted to its conversion authority.
Thus, in issuing and enforcing DAR AO No. 01-02, as amended, the Secretary of
Agrarian Reform acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction.

Petitioner further asseverates that Section 2.19, 12 Article I of DAR AO No. 01-02, as
amended, making reclassification of agricultural lands subject to the requirements and
procedure for land use conversion, violates Section 20 of Republic Act No. 7160,
because it was not provided therein that reclassification by LGUs shall be subject to
conversion procedures or requirements, or that the DAR's approval or clearance must
be secured to effect reclassification. The said Section 2.19 of DAR AO No. 01-02, as
amended, also contravenes the constitutional mandate on local autonomy under Section
25, 13 Article II and Section 2, 14 Article X of the 1987 Philippine Constitution.

Petitioner similarly avers that the promulgation and enforcement of DAR AO No. 01-02,
as amended, constitute deprivation of liberty and property without due process of law.
There is deprivation of liberty and property without due process of law because under
DAR AO No. 01-02, as amended, lands that are not within DAR's jurisdiction are
unjustly, arbitrarily and oppressively prohibited or restricted from legitimate use on pain
of administrative and criminal penalties. More so, there is discrimination and violation of
the equal protection clause of the Constitution because the aforesaid administrative
order is patently biased in favor of the peasantry at the expense of all other sectors of
society.
As its final argument, petitioner avows that DAR Memorandum No. 88 is not a valid
exercise of police power for it is the prerogative of the legislature and that it is
unconstitutional because it suspended the land use conversion without any basis.

The Court's Ruling

This petition must be dismissed.

Primarily, although this Court, the Court of Appeals and the Regional Trial Courts have
concurrent jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari,prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto,
habeas corpus and injunction, such concurrence does not give the petitioner
unrestricted freedom of choice of court forum. 15 In Heirs of Bertuldo Hinog v. Melicor,
16 citing People v. Cuaresma, 17 this Court made the following pronouncements:
CcHDaA

This Court's original jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari is not exclusive.It is shared by
this Court with Regional Trial Courts and with the Court of Appeals. This concurrence of
jurisdiction is not, however, to be taken as according to parties seeking any of the writs
an absolute, unrestrained freedom of choice of the court to which application therefor
will be directed. There is after all a hierarchy of courts.That hierarchy is determinative
of the venue of appeals, and also serves as a general determinant of the appropriate
forum for petitions for the extraordinary writs. A becoming regard for that judicial
hierarchy most certainly indicates that petitions for the issuance of extraordinary writs
against first level ("inferior") courts should be filed with the Regional Trial Court, and
those against the latter, with the Court of Appeals. A direct invocation of the Supreme
Court's original jurisdiction to issue these writs should be allowed only when there are
special and important reasons therefor, clearly and specifically set out in the
petition.This is an established policy. It is a policy necessary to prevent inordinate
demands upon the Court's time and attention which are better devoted to those matters
within its exclusive jurisdiction, and to prevent further over-crowding of the Court's
docket. 18 (Emphasis supplied.)

The rationale for this rule is two-fold: (a) it would be an imposition upon the precious
time of this Court; and (b) it would cause an inevitable and resultant delay, intended or
otherwise, in the adjudication of cases, which in some instances had to be remanded or
referred to the lower court as the proper forum under the rules of procedure, or as
better equipped to resolve the issues because this Court is not a trier of facts. 19
ATcaEH

This Court thus reaffirms the judicial policy that it will not entertain direct resort to it
unless the redress desired cannot be obtained in the appropriate courts, and
exceptional and compelling circumstances, such as cases of national interest and of
serious implications, justify the availment of the extraordinary remedy of writ of
certiorari, calling for the exercise of its primary jurisdiction. 20

Exceptional and compelling circumstances were held present in the following cases: (a)
Chavez v. Romulo, 21 on citizens' right to bear arms; (b) Government of the United
States of America v. Hon. Purganan, 22 on bail in extradition proceedings; (c)
Commission on Elections v. Judge Quijano-Padilla, 23 on government contract involving
modernization and computerization of voters' registration list; (d) Buklod ng Kawaning
EIIB v. Hon. Sec. Zamora, 24 on status and existence of a public office; and (e) Hon.
Fortich v. Hon. Corona, 25 on the so-called "Win-Win Resolution" of the Office of the
President which modified the approval of the conversion to agro-industrial area. 26
In the case at bench, petitioner failed to specifically and sufficiently set forth special and
important reasons to justify direct recourse to this Court and why this Court should give
due course to this petition in the first instance, hereby failing to fulfill the conditions set
forth in Heirs of Bertuldo Hinog v. Melicor. 27 The present petition should have been
initially filed in the Court of Appeals in strict observance of the doctrine on the hierarchy
of courts. Failure to do so is sufficient cause for the dismissal of this petition.

Moreover, although the instant petition is styled as a Petition for Certiorari, in essence, it
seeks the declaration by this Court of the unconstitutionality or illegality of the
questioned DAR AO No. 01-02, as amended, and Memorandum No. 88. It, thus,
partakes of the nature of a Petition for Declaratory Relief over which this Court has only
appellate, not original, jurisdiction. 28 Section 5, Article VIII of the 1987 Philippine
Constitution provides:

Sec. 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:

(1) Exercise original jurisdiction over cases affecting ambassadors, other public
ministers and consuls, and over petitions for certiorari,prohibition, mandamus, quo
warranto, and habeas corpus.

(2) Review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on appeal or certiorari as the law or the
Rules of Court may provide, final judgments and orders of lower courts in:

(a) All cases in which the constitutionality or validity of any treaty, international or
executive agreement, law, presidential decree, proclamation, order, instruction,
ordinance, or regulation is in question.(Emphasis supplied.) TIAEac
With that, this Petition must necessarily fail because this Court does not have original
jurisdiction over a Petition for Declaratory Relief even if only questions of law are
involved.

Even if the petitioner has properly observed the doctrine of judicial hierarchy, this
Petition is still dismissible.

The special civil action for certiorari is intended for the correction of errors of
jurisdiction only or grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
Its principal office is only to keep the inferior court within the parameters of its
jurisdiction or to prevent it from committing such a grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction. 29

The essential requisites for a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 are: (1) the writ is
directed against a tribunal, a board, or an officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial
functions; (2) such tribunal, board, or officer has acted without or in excess of
jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction; and (3) there is no appeal or any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in
the ordinary course of law. 30

Excess of jurisdiction as distinguished from absence of jurisdiction means that an act,

though within the general power of a tribunal, board or officer, is not authorized and
invalid with respect to the particular proceeding, because the conditions which alone
authorize the exercise of the general power in respect of it are wanting. 31 Without
jurisdiction means lack or want of legal power, right or authority to hear and determine
a cause or causes, considered either in general or with reference to a particular matter.
It means lack of power to exercise authority. 32 Grave abuse of discretion implies such
capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction or,
in other words, where the power is exercised in an arbitrary manner by reason of
passion, prejudice, or personal hostility, and it must be so patent or gross as to amount
to an evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to
act at all in contemplation of law. 33

In the case before this Court, the petitioner fails to meet the above-mentioned
requisites for the proper invocation of a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65. The
Secretary of Agrarian Reform in issuing the assailed DAR AO No. 01-02, as amended, as
well as Memorandum No. 88 did so in accordance with his mandate to implement the
land use conversion provisions of Republic Act No. 6657. In the process, he neither
acted in any judicial or quasi-judicial capacity nor assumed unto himself any
performance of judicial or quasi-judicial prerogative. A Petition for Certiorari is a special
civil action that may be invoked only against a tribunal, board, or officer exercising
judicial functions. Section 1, Rule 65 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure is
explicit on this matter, viz.:

SECTION 1. Petition for certiorari. When any tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial
or quasi-judicial functions has acted without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and there is no
appeal, nor any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, a
person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the proper court, alleging the
facts with certainty and praying that judgment must be rendered annulling or modifying
the proceedings of such tribunal, board or officer.
A tribunal, board, or officer is said to be exercising judicial function where it has the
power to determine what the law is and what the legal rights of the parties are, and
then undertakes to determine these questions and adjudicate upon the rights of the
parties. Quasi-judicial function,on the other hand, is "a term which applies to the
actions, discretion, etc., of public administrative officers or bodies . . . required to
investigate facts or ascertain the existence of facts, hold hearings, and draw conclusions
from them as a basis for their official action and to exercise discretion of a judicial
nature." 34 EcHAaS

Before a tribunal, board, or officer may exercise judicial or quasi-judicial acts, it is

necessary that there be a law that gives rise to some specific rights of persons or
property under which adverse claims to such rights are made, and the controversy
ensuing therefrom is brought before a tribunal, board, or officer clothed with power and
authority to determine the law and adjudicate the respective rights of the contending
parties. 35

The Secretary of Agrarian Reform does not fall within the ambit of a tribunal, board, or
officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions. The issuance and enforcement by
the Secretary of Agrarian Reform of the questioned DAR AO No. 01-02, as amended,
and Memorandum No. 88 were done in the exercise of his quasi-legislative and
administrative functions and not of judicial or quasi-judicial functions. In issuing the
aforesaid administrative issuances, the Secretary of Agrarian Reform never made any
adjudication of rights of the parties. As such, it can never be said that the Secretary of
Agrarian Reform had acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction in issuing and enforcing DAR AO No. 01-02, as amended, and
Memorandum No. 88 for he never exercised any judicial or quasi-judicial functions but
merely his quasi-legislative and administrative functions.
Furthermore, as this Court has previously discussed, the instant petition in essence
seeks the declaration by this Court of the unconstitutionality or illegality of the
questioned DAR AO No. 01-02, as amended, and Memorandum No. 88. Thus, the
adequate and proper remedy for the petitioner therefor is to file a Petition for
Declaratory Relief, which this Court has only appellate and not original jurisdiction. It is
beyond the province of certiorari to declare the aforesaid administrative issuances
unconstitutional and illegal because certiorari is confined only to the determination of
the existence of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
Petitioner cannot simply allege grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction and then invoke certiorari to declare the aforesaid administrative issuances
unconstitutional and illegal. Emphasis must be given to the fact that the writ of
certiorari dealt with in Rule 65 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure is a
prerogative writ, never demandable as a matter of right, "never issued except in the
exercise of judicial discretion." 36

At any rate, even if the Court will set aside procedural infirmities, the instant petition
should still be dismissed.

Executive Order No. 129-A 37 vested upon the DAR the responsibility of implementing
the CARP. Pursuant to the said mandate and to ensure the successful implementation of
the CARP, Section 5 (c) of the said executive order authorized the DAR to establish and
promulgate operational policies, rules and regulations and priorities for agrarian reform
implementation.Section 4 (k) thereof authorized the DAR to approve or disapprove the
conversion, restructuring or readjustment of agricultural lands into non-agricultural
uses.Similarly, Section 5 (1) of the same executive order has given the DAR the
exclusive authority to approve or disapprove conversion of agricultural lands for
residential, commercial, industrial, and other land uses as may be provided for by
law.Section 7 of the aforesaid executive order clearly provides that "the authority and
responsibility for the exercise of the mandate of the DAR and the discharge of its
powers and functions shall be vested in the Secretary of Agrarian Reform ...." HTAEIS

Under DAR AO No. 01-02, as amended, "lands not reclassified as residential,

commercial, industrial or other non-agricultural uses before 15 June 1988" have been
included in the definition of agricultural lands. In so doing, the Secretary of Agrarian
Reform merely acted within the scope of his authority stated in the aforesaid sections of
Executive Order No. 129-A, which is to promulgate rules and regulations for agrarian
reform implementation and that includes the authority to define agricultural lands for
purposes of land use conversion. Further, the definition of agricultural lands under DAR
AO No. 01-02, as amended, merely refers to the category of agricultural lands that may
be the subject for conversion to non-agricultural uses and is not in any way confined to
agricultural lands in the context of land redistribution as provided for under Republic Act
No. 6657.

More so, Department of Justice Opinion No. 44, Series of 1990, which Opinion has been
recognized in many cases decided by this Court, clarified that after the effectivity of
Republic Act No. 6657 on 15 June 1988 the DAR has been given the authority to
approve land conversion. 38 Concomitant to such authority, therefore, is the authority
to include in the definition of agricultural lands "lands not reclassified as residential,
commercial, industrial or other non-agricultural uses before 15 June 1988" for purposes
of land use conversion.

In the same vein, the authority of the Secretary of Agrarian Reform to include "lands
not reclassified as residential, commercial, industrial or other non-agricultural uses
before 15 June 1988" in the definition of agricultural lands finds basis in jurisprudence.
In Ros v. Department of Agrarian Reform, 39 this Court has enunciated that after the
passage of Republic Act No. 6657, agricultural lands, though reclassified, have to go
through the process of conversion,jurisdiction over which is vested in the DAR.
However, agricultural lands, which are already reclassified before the effectivity of
Republic Act No. 6657 which is 15 June 1988, are exempted from conversion. 40 It
bears stressing that the said date of effectivity of Republic Act No. 6657 served as the
cut-off period for automatic reclassifications or rezoning of agricultural lands that no
longer require any DAR conversion clearance or authority. 41 It necessarily follows that
any reclassification made thereafter can be the subject of DAR's conversion authority.
Having recognized the DAR's conversion authority over lands reclassified after 15 June
1988, it can no longer be argued that the Secretary of Agrarian Reform was wrongfully
given the authority and power to include "lands not reclassified as residential,
commercial, industrial or other non-agricultural uses before 15 June 1988" in the
definition of agricultural lands. Such inclusion does not unduly expand or enlarge the
definition of agricultural lands; instead, it made clear what are the lands that can be the
subject of DAR's conversion authority, thus, serving the very purpose of the land use
conversion provisions of Republic Act No. 6657.

The argument of the petitioner that DAR AO No. 01-02, as amended, was made in
violation of Section 65 of Republic Act No. 6657, as it covers even those non-awarded
lands and reclassified lands by the LGUs or by way of Presidential Proclamations on or
after 15 June 1988 is specious. As explained in Department of Justice Opinion No. 44,
series of 1990, it is true that the DAR's express power over land use conversion
provided for under Section 65 of Republic Act No. 6657 is limited to cases in which
agricultural lands already awarded have, after five years, ceased to be economically
feasible and sound for agricultural purposes, or the locality has become urbanized and
the land will have a greater economic value for residential, commercial or industrial
purposes. To suggest, however, that these are the only instances that the DAR can
require conversion clearances would open a loophole in Republic Act No. 6657 which
every landowner may use to evade compliance with the agrarian reform program. It
should logically follow, therefore, from the said department's express duty and function
to execute and enforce the said statute that any reclassification of a private land as a
residential, commercial or industrial property, on or after the effectivity of Republic Act
No. 6657 on 15 June 1988 should first be cleared by the DAR. 42

This Court held in Alarcon v. Court of Appeals 43 that reclassification of lands does not
suffice. Conversion and reclassification differ from each other. Conversion is the act of
changing the current use of a piece of agricultural land into some other use as
approved by the DAR while reclassification is the act of specifying how agricultural lands
shall be utilized for non-agricultural uses such as residential, industrial, and commercial,
as embodied in the land use plan, subject to the requirements and procedures for land
use conversion. In view thereof, a mere reclassification of an agricultural land does not
automatically allow a landowner to change its use. He has to undergo the process of
conversion before he is permitted to use the agricultural land for other purposes. 44
cADEHI

It is clear from the aforesaid distinction between reclassification and conversion that
agricultural lands though reclassified to residential, commercial, industrial or other non-
agricultural uses must still undergo the process of conversion before they can be used
for the purpose to which they are intended.

Nevertheless, emphasis must be given to the fact that DAR's conversion authority can
only be exercised after the effectivity of Republic Act No. 6657 on 15 June 1988. 45 The
said date served as the cut-off period for automatic reclassification or rezoning of
agricultural lands that no longer require any DAR conversion clearance or authority. 46
Thereafter, reclassification of agricultural lands is already subject to DAR's conversion
authority. Reclassification alone will not suffice to use the agricultural lands for other
purposes. Conversion is needed to change the current use of reclassified agricultural
lands.

It is of no moment whether the reclassification of agricultural lands to residential,

commercial, industrial or other non-agricultural uses was done by the LGUs or by way
of Presidential Proclamations because either way they must still undergo conversion
process. It bears stressing that the act of reclassifying agricultural lands to non-
agricultural uses simply specifies how agricultural lands shall be utilized for non-
agricultural uses and does not automatically convert agricultural lands to non-
agricultural uses or for other purposes. As explained in DAR Memorandum Circular No.
7, Series of 1994, cited in the 2009 case of Roxas & Company, Inc. v. DAMBA-NFSW and
the Department of Agrarian Reform, 47 reclassification of lands denotes their allocation
into some specific use and providing for the manner of their utilization and disposition
or the act of specifying how agricultural lands shall be utilized for non-agricultural uses
such as residential, industrial, or commercial, as embodied in the land use plan. For
reclassified agricultural lands, therefore, to be used for the purpose to which they are
intended there is still a need to change the current use thereof through the process of
conversion. The authority to do so is vested in the DAR, which is mandated to preserve
and maintain agricultural lands with increased productivity. Thus, notwithstanding the
reclassification of agricultural lands to non-agricultural uses, they must still undergo
conversion before they can be used for other purposes.

Even reclassification of agricultural lands by way of Presidential Proclamations to non-

agricultural uses, such as school sites, needs conversion clearance from the DAR. We
reiterate that reclassification is different from conversion. Reclassification alone will not
suffice and does not automatically allow the landowner to change its use. It must still
undergo conversion process before the landowner can use such agricultural lands for
such purpose. 48 Reclassification of agricultural lands is one thing, conversion is
another. Agricultural lands that are reclassified to non-agricultural uses do not ipso facto
allow the landowner thereof to use the same for such purpose. Stated differently,
despite having reclassified into school sites, the landowner of such reclassified
agricultural lands must apply for conversion before the DAR in order to use the same for
the said purpose.

Any reclassification, therefore, of agricultural lands to residential, commercial, industrial

or other non-agricultural uses either by the LGUs or by way of Presidential
Proclamations enacted on or after 15 June 1988 must undergo the process of
conversion, despite having undergone reclassification, before agricultural lands may be
used for other purposes.

It is different, however, when through Presidential Proclamations public agricultural

lands have been reserved in whole or in part for public use or purpose, i.e., public
school, etc.,because in such a case, conversion is no longer necessary. As held in
Republic v. Estonilo, 49 only a positive act of the President is needed to segregate or
reserve a piece of land of the public domain for a public purpose. As such, reservation
of public agricultural lands for public use or purpose in effect converted the same to
such use without undergoing any conversion process and that they must be actually,
directly and exclusively used for such public purpose for which they have been
reserved, otherwise, they will be segregated from the reservations and transferred to
the DAR for distribution to qualified beneficiaries under the CARP. 50 More so, public
agricultural lands already reserved for public use or purpose no longer form part of the
alienable and disposable lands of the public domain suitable for agriculture. 51 Hence,
they are outside the coverage of the CARP and it logically follows that they are also
beyond the conversion authority of the DAR. ESIcaC
Clearly from the foregoing, the Secretary of Agrarian Reform did not act without
jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction in (1) including lands not reclassified as residential,
commercial, industrial or other non-agricultural uses before 15 June 1988 in the
definition of agricultural lands under DAR AO No. 01-02, as amended, and; (2) issuing
and enforcing DAR AO No. 01-02, as amended, subjecting to DAR's jurisdiction for
conversion lands which had already been reclassified as residential, commercial,
industrial or for other non-agricultural uses on or after 15 June 1988.

Similarly, DAR AO No. 01-02, as amended, providing that the reclassification of

agricultural lands by LGUs shall be subject to the requirements of land use conversion
procedure or that DAR's approval or clearance must be secured to effect reclassification,
did not violate the autonomy of the LGUs.

Section 20 of Republic Act No. 7160 states that:

SECTION 20. Reclassification of Lands. (a) A city or municipality may, through an

ordinance passed by the sanggunian after conducting public hearings for the purpose,
authorize the reclassification of agricultural lands and provide for the manner of their
utilization or disposition in the following cases: (1) when the land ceases to be
economically feasible and sound for agricultural purposes as determined by the
Department of Agriculture or (2) where the land shall have substantially greater
economic value for residential, commercial, or industrial purposes, as determined by the
sanggunian concerned: Provided, That such reclassification shall be limited to the
following percentage of the total agricultural land area at the time of the passage of the
ordinance:
...

(3) For fourth to sixth class municipalities, five percent (5%): Provided, further, That
agricultural lands distributed to agrarian reform beneficiaries pursuant to Republic Act
Numbered Sixty-six hundred fifty-seven (R.A. No. 6657), otherwise known as "The
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law," shall not be affected by the said reclassification
and the conversion of such lands into other purposes shall be governed by Section 65 of
said Act.

...

(e) Nothing in this Section shall be construed as repealing, amending, or modifying in

any manner the provisions of R.A. No. 6657.

The aforequoted provisions of law show that the power of the LGUs to reclassify
agricultural lands is not absolute. The authority of the DAR to approve conversion of
agricultural lands covered by Republic Act No. 6657 to non-agricultural uses has been
validly recognized by said Section 20 of Republic Act No. 7160 by explicitly providing
therein that, "nothing in this section shall be construed as repealing or modifying in any
manner the provisions of Republic Act No. 6657."

DAR AO No. 01-02, as amended, does not also violate the due process clause, as well
as the equal protection clause of the Constitution. In providing administrative and
criminal penalties in the said administrative order, the Secretary of Agrarian Reform
simply implements the provisions of Sections 73 and 74 of Republic Act No. 6657, thus:
aETADI
Sec. 73. Prohibited Acts and Omissions. The following are prohibited:

...

(c) The conversion by any landowner of his agricultural land into any non-agricultural
use with intent to avoid the application of this Act to his landholdings and to disposes
his tenant farmers of the land tilled by them;

...

(f) The sale, transfer or conveyance by a beneficiary of the right to use or any other
usufructuary right over the land he acquired by virtue of being a beneficiary, in order to
circumvent the provisions of this Act.

...

Sec. 74. Penalties. Any person who knowingly or willfully violates the provisions of this
Act shall be punished by imprisonment of not less than one (1) month to not more than
three (3) years or a fine of not less than one thousand pesos (P1,000.00) and not more
than fifteen thousand pesos (P15,000.00),or both, at the discretion of the court.

If the offender is a corporation or association, the officer responsible therefor shall be

criminally liable.
And Section 11 of Republic Act No. 8435, which specifically provides:

Sec. 11. Penalty for Agricultural Inactivity and Premature Conversion. ....

Any person found guilty of premature or illegal conversion shall be penalized with
imprisonment of two (2) to six (6) years, or a fine equivalent to one hundred percent
(100%) of the government's investment cost, or both, at the discretion of the court,
and an accessory penalty of forfeiture of the land and any improvement thereon.

In addition, the DAR may impose the following penalties, after determining, in an
administrative proceedings, that violation of this law has been committed:

a. Consolation or withdrawal of the authorization for land use conversion; and

b. Blacklisting, or automatic disapproval of pending and subsequent conversion

applications that they may file with the DAR.

Contrary to petitioner's assertions, the administrative and criminal penalties provided for
under DAR AO No. 01-02, as amended, are imposed upon the illegal or premature
conversion of lands within DAR's jurisdiction, i.e., "lands not reclassified as residential,
commercial, industrial or for other non-agricultural uses before 15 June 1998." HDTCSI
The petitioner's argument that DAR Memorandum No. 88 is unconstitutional, as it
suspends the land use conversion without any basis, stands on hollow ground.

It bears emphasis that said Memorandum No. 88 was issued upon the instruction of the
President in order to address the unabated conversion of prime agricultural lands for
real estate development because of the worsening rice shortage in the country at that
time. Such measure was made in order to ensure that there are enough agricultural
lands in which rice cultivation and production may be carried into. The issuance of said
Memorandum No. 88 was made pursuant to the general welfare of the public, thus, it
cannot be argued that it was made without any basis.

WHEREFORE,premises considered, the instant Petition for Certiorari is DISMISSED.Costs

against petitioner.