787 FOTB GPS Interference 2023

BOEING COMMERCIAL AIRPLANES
FLIGHT OPERATIONS TECHNICAL BULLETIN
NUMBER: 787-27
DATE: November 10, 2023
This bulletin provides information which may prove useful in airline operations or airline training. The
information provided in this bulletin is not critical to flight safety. The information may not apply to all
customers; specific effectivity can be determined by contacting The Boeing Company. This information
will remain in effect depending on production changes, customer-originated modifications, and Service
Bulletin incorporation. Information in this bulletin is supplied by The Boeing Company and may not be
approved or endorsed by the FAA at the time of writing. Appropriate formal documentation will be revised,
as necessary, to reflect the information contained in this bulletin. For further information, contact Boeing
Commercial Airplanes through the Service Requests application on the MyBoeingFleet home page.
SUBJECT: Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS) Radio Frequency Interference (RFI)
ATA NO: Multiple
APPLIES TO: 787
REASON: To provide flight crew awareness of RFI in the GNSS, which includes Global
Positioning System (GPS) jamming and spoofing. Provide this bulletin to flight
crews.
Introduction
Reports of GNSS RFI (in particular GPS jamming/spoofing) are increasing. These occurrences are
currently concentrated in specific regions; however, they can occur worldwide. Interference with GPS
signals can have an effect on multiple systems on the 787. The purpose of this bulletin is to identify and
provide guidance to operators and flight crews for mitigating these effects.
GPS uses signals from satellites to determine an accurate position. GPS data is used in many functions
on the 787, including:
• Inertial Reference System
• Flight Management Function (FMF/FMC)
• GPWS Look-Ahead
• ADS-B
• Time/clock
• Some HUD functions
• Autopilot Flight Director System (AFDS)
Note: Primary flight control systems and functions are not affected by GPS RFI.
Occurrences of RFI can result in missing or erroneous information. This RFI comes from many sources,
including portable devices, GPS jammers, and GPS repeaters.
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Categories of RFI
Intentional Interference
Intentional interference includes jamming and smart jamming (or spoofing). Occurrences can be due to:
• Geopolitical conflict
• Protection of sensitive areas or personnel such as military, government sites, or VIP movements
• Personal privacy devices
Jamming causes a loss of measurement and therefore a degradation of the position/velocity/time (PVT)
solution.
Spoofing (or smart jamming) is a fake signal that causes the receiver to output misleading data, such as
an incorrect position or time.
Unintentional Interference
Unintentional interference can result from unregulated radio transmitters that infringe on radio frequency
spectra protected for aviation. It can also be caused by rare atmospheric electromagnetic phenomena
and potentially malfunctioning radio frequency transmitters.
787 Hybrid GPS-Inertial System
The 787 has a hybrid GPS-inertial system. The affected systems may or may not recover after leaving
areas of RFI.
• In jamming events, the hybrid GPS-inertial system remains valid and available when GPS
receiver data becomes invalid due to loss of signal or signal interference. The FMC remains in
GPS update mode and shows the hybrid GPS accuracy and integrity as the ANP on the NDs.
When no GPS measurements are available due to interference, the hybrid position output
accuracy and integrity slowly degrades and the ANP grows (up to 20). In this way, the hybrid
GPS-inertial system can “coast” through periods when GPS data is unavailable while the
navigation accuracy and integrity continue to meet required navigational performance (RNP)
requirements.
• In spoofing events, erroneous GPS position data is sent to the hybrid GPS-inertial system. The
hybrid GPS-inertial system considers the erroneous GPS signal to be valid.
RFI Flight Deck Effects (FDEs) and Recommended Crew Mitigations

There are several potential FDEs possible with RFI. The following list contains examples and is not an
exhaustive list. Some effects have aural or visual alerts, others do not.
Inertial Reference System
• Spoofing may cause erroneous GPS position data to the hybrid IRS/GPS solution. The FDEs are
described in the affected systems list below.
• GPS data to the IRS cannot be deselected by pilot action.
FMF
• Jamming causes a slow, gradual increase in ANP that has minimal impact on navigation
capability.
• Spoofing can cause:
o Inaccurate GPS position input to the FMF in the air or on the ground.
o An FMF-generated flight path to be affected, such as LNAV, VNAV, and ADS-C.
• FMF may not automatically switch to radio navigation during spoofing.
• ANP information should be accurate. Degraded ANP may restrict operation in certain airspace.
• NAV UNABLE RNP advisory message can show if ANP exceeds RNP. This alert must be
considered valid.
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• Fuel prediction in the FMF can be affected.
• GPS data can be deselected. Refer to the Mitigations for Consideration section of this bulletin.
• FMF position update can change from GPS to the next most accurate updating source (see
Appendix 1 and FCOM>Systems Description>Flight Management, Navigation.
GPWS Look-Ahead Terrain
• Jamming causes a loss of GPS position data. When the GPS signal is no longer available, the
GPWS uses IRS data as a backup. When the IRS horizontal position uncertainty exceeds limits,
the terrain is removed from the ND and TERR POS message shows.
• Spoofing can cause erroneous GPS position data to the GPWS Look-Ahead Terrain function that
can resolve or persist for the remainder of the flight.
• Terrain warnings can occur at any altitude.
• The TERR POS advisory message can show.
• The GND PROX SYS advisory message can show and TERR FAIL can show on the ND.
• Terrain display on ND and VSD can be inaccurate.
• For a GPWS Look-Ahead Terrain warning at a cruise altitude that is clearly above the highest
known actual terrain in the area, pilot discretion can be used in determining the alert, including
persistent alerts, to be false.
• Further guidance on GPWS Look-Ahead Terrain warning validity is available in
QRH>Maneuvers>Non-Normal Maneuvers>Ground Proximity Warning System (GPWS)
Response. Pilot discretion can also be used in the case of persistent terrain alert.
• The GPWS immediate alerts are still operational.
• GPWS can be disabled. Refer to FCOM>Systems Description>Warning Systems.
• Selecting GPS updating to OFF on the POS REF page does not inhibit GPS data for GPWS
Look-Ahead Terrain.
ADS-B
• Jamming causes a loss of ADS-B capability. Coordination with ATC is necessary.
• Spoofing can cause erroneous position data to ADS-B. ADS-B IN traffic can disappear from the
ND, or be displayed in an erroneous position with or without the ADS-B advisory message.
• If an ADS-B advisory message shows, it must be considered valid.
• ADS-B can be temporarily turned off (by turning the transponder off) in coordination with ATC.
However, doing this also turns off TCAS alerts.
• All TCAS alerts must be considered valid.
• In-Trail Procedures (ITP) function is not reliable if ADS data is erroneous.
Note: Selecting GPS updating to OFF on the POS REF page does not inhibit GPS for ADS-B.
Time/Clock
• Jamming does not affect time/clock functions.
• Spoofing can cause inaccurate time and date information.
• ETA in the FMF can be affected.
• Periodic time checking and cross-checking procedures can be developed by the operator.
• Aeronautical Telecommunications Network (ATN) communication functions are impacted by
date/time inaccuracy. Log-on and reporting functions may not be available.
HUD Guidance
• In jamming events, prolonged GPS signal loss can cause lateral displacement of the FPV of up to
two degrees.
• Spoofing can affect some displayed HUD functions, identified by lateral misalignment of HUD
FPV and runway depiction.
• The HUD can be temporarily stowed to avoid distraction.
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AFDS
• Erroneous or loss of GPS data may impact autopilot and flight director Localizer/Final Approach
Course capture guidance resulting in excessive overshoot or engagement of the Localizer mode
but no capture of the runway centerline (ILS, GLS, or IAN).
• Loss of or erroneous GPS data with approach armed or engaged tuned to GLS may cause the
following:
o Autopilot disconnect
o LOC and/or G/S mode fail
o Removal of flight director bars in either or both axes
o Autoland status annunciation downgrade to LAND 2 or NO AUTOLAND
General Mitigations for Consideration

Loss of GPS information is usually temporary. GPS data, communication, and surveillance functions can
recover as soon as the airplane leaves the area affected by RFI. However, some spoofing events can
impact the user system for the remainder of the flight.
When responding to alerts, signs, and symptoms of GPS RFI, it is important to advise ATC as soon as
practical of any degraded navigation capability, advising them of systems that have not recovered due to
spoofing.
• If systems such as LNAV path or VNAV path experience degraded performance or unsatisfactory
performance due to interference, reduce the level of automation (e.g., HDG/TRK, FLCH, VS).
Once clear of the interference area and the position of the GPS and FMC is verified, the level of
automation can be increased.
• If GPS spoofing is suspected, revert to another update mode such as DME/DME updating and/or
reference ground-based navigation aids such as VOR and NDB. These functions are described in
FCOM>Supplementary Procedures>Flight Management, Navigation.
• Cross-check terrain altitude using enroute charts if terrain depiction on ND and VSD appears
unreasonable for the geographic location.
• Familiarize crew with the availability of arrival and approach procedures using conventional
navigation aids.
GPS updating in the FMF can be temporarily disabled as per the FCOM>Supplementary Procedures>
Flight Management, Navigation as a preventative measure before entering areas of known GPS RFI and
in the event of unexpected GPS RFI. This practice is at the discretion of the operator after a risk
assessment with the following considerations:
• The operator must provide the flight crew instructions on when to disable GPS updating as a
preventative measure against GPS RFI and when to turn GPS updating back on upon exiting
areas of known interference.
• GPS updating should be turned back on, after the position accuracy is verified. This can be
accomplished by referring to the POS REF pages as described in the FCOM>Systems
Description>Flight Management, Navigation. Boeing does not recommend preventative disabling
of GPS updating for the entire flight.
Operator Responsibilities
Operational Risk Assessment
Intentional operations into areas of known GPS RFI should be carefully risk assessed by the operator.
The conditions and effects on airplane systems vary depending on the type, sophistication, and
geographical area of the interference.
Risk assessments should not dismiss avoidance of areas of known interference as an option when
developing risk mitigations.
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Contingency procedures can be developed by the operator using this guidance. Ensure flight crews are
familiar with conventional navigation capabilities and operation. This information is contained in the
FCOM>Systems Description>Flight Management, Navigation. However, when doing so:
• Caution should be exercised when developing procedural steps if they involve disabling or
downgrading of navigation systems and GPWS Look Ahead Terrain. Unintended consequences
can occur in integrated systems. Boeing can review and comment on operator developed
procedures for technical accuracy and consequences, but will not provide a “No Technical
Objection” for these procedures.
• Consideration must be given to the negative effect of desensitizing flight crew to valid alerts due
to frequency of occurrence.
• Flight crew workload must be considered in operator-developed procedural mitigations, especially
in critical phases of flight.
• Flight crews should only disable GPS updating when instructed to do so as part of an established
operator-created risk mitigation or if unexpected FDEs occur in-flight.
Reporting RFI Anomalies

Data from RFI events is being collected and analyzed. Communications from Boeing will be updated as
needed. Pilots are encouraged to submit detailed reports of disruptions or interference events as soon as
practical through an internal company reporting system. Operators can submit reports and data to Boeing
to assist in targeted situational improvement.
Reference
See Appendix 1 of this bulletin for an in-depth technical description of the 787 GPS and types of
interference.
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APPENDIX 1
1. GPS Jamming (Basic)
2. GPS Smart Jamming or Spoofing
3. Navigation GPS Signal Available (Normal Operation)
4. GPS System Overview – Expanded Information
5. Flight Deck Indications – Expanded Information
6. EICAS Messages and Non-Normal Checklists (NNC)
7. Ground Proximity Warning System (GPWS) Look-Ahead Terrain – Expanded Information
8. ADS-B During GPS Signal Interference – Expanded Information
9. Electronic Flight Bag
10. Additional Information
11. Planned Changes
The information in this bulletin applies to airplanes with the LASEREF VI (PNs HG2100BC02 and
HG2111BC02) Earth Reference System (ERS). The LASEREF V (PNs HG2100AC02 and HG2111AC02)
system has a different, lower performance hybrid GPS-inertial implementation that is also affected by
GPS interference and is installed on only early production 787-8 airplanes.
This appendix provides engineering data to help operators further understand the FDEs during GPS
signal interference and to assess risks and mitigations to a level that is satisfactory to operators and their
regulatory authorities.
1. GPS Jamming (Basic)
GPS interference typically causes a loss of measurement data from one or more satellites and a
degradation or loss of the receiver’s PVT solution and normally does not result in an output of misleading
data from the GPS receiver.
The ERS independently computes a hybrid GPS-inertial PVT solution using the raw satellite
measurement data from the GPS receivers blended with inertial measurement data. The ERS hybrid
GPS-inertial function has multiple layers of integrity monitoring that detects and excludes corrupted GPS
satellite measurement data from the GPS receivers to maintain a high integrity hybrid GPS-inertial
solution. The hybrid GPS-inertial solution remains highly accurate by coasting on calibrated inertial data
with high integrity for extended periods of time, even with complete loss or exclusion of GPS
measurement data.
The FMC normally uses the hybrid GPS-inertial position and velocity data as its primary source for
navigation. If GPS measurement data is lost, the FMC remains in the GPS update mode, the hybrid GPS-
inertial accuracy and integrity slowly deteriorates, and the FMC ANP grows as shown by the ANP on the
NDs and the navigation performance scales (NPS) on the PFDs. The longer GPS measurement data is
lost, the more the hybrid GPS-inertial accuracy degrades. When GPS data is lost, the FMC uses another
navigation source, such as inertial navigation or conventional navigation aids (e.g., DME-DME, VOR-
DME), for updating the FMC position.
The GPWS look-ahead terrain function, and the ADS/ATS systems use autonomous GPS data from the
GPS receivers, and GPS interference can affect these systems.
The flight deck indications and detail of affected systems are covered later in this document.
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2. GPS Smart Jamming or Spoofing
When interfering signals have a structure similar to the desired GPS signals, the effects can be more
severe. This is called smart jamming or spoofing. This is a fake signal pretending to be real. Smart
jamming can cause the receiver to output misleading data. Smart jamming is more difficult to produce
than basic interference; however, the means to produce such signals are becoming more accessible and
affordable due to advances in electronics capabilities such as software defined radios (SDR). Smart
jamming can cause position errors of varying magnitude. Large errors can be detected and mitigated by a
crosscheck of the GPS position compared to the position from an independent navigation aid. Smaller
errors can be difficult to detect.
During smart jamming, the flight deck indications of the impacted system can vary depending on the
sophistication of smart jamming.
3. Navigation GPS Signal Available (Normal Operation)
The FMC navigation update mode source shows on the navigation display (ND). Hybrid GPS-inertial is
the normal source of FMC navigation update mode and shows as GPS. See Figure 1.
Figure 1 – Hybrid GPS-Inertial as the FMC Navigation Update Mode
When hybrid GPS-inertial is unavailable or GPS NAV is selected to OFF, the FMC selects the most
accurate updating source [smallest actual navigational performance (ANP)], either radio or inertial.
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The current FMC position source and associated ANP show on POS REF page 2/x and the navigation
display (ND) per Table 1 below:
Primary FMC Position Failed, Invalid or POS REF page FMC Position
Update Source Inactive 2/4 Update Status on ND
GPS-IRU GPS-IRU GPS
GPS-IRU GPS GPS-IRU** GPS**
GPS-AHRU IRU GPS-AHRU GPS
GPS LOC, IRS (IRU, AHRU) GPS GPS
DME/DME, IRS LOC, GPS RADIO DME-DME
VOR/DME, IRS LOC, GPS, DME/DME RADIO VOR-DME
IRU LOC, VOR, DME, GPS INERTIAL INERTIAL
LOC-DME/DME, IRU* GPS LOC-RADIO LOC-DME-DME
LOC- VOR/DME, IRU* GPS LOC-RADIO LOC-VOR-DME
LOC-IRU* GPS, VOR, DME LOC LOC
Both GPS and IRS GPS, IRS (IRU, AHRU) blank map not available
invalid or failed
* The FMC changes to LOC updating when:

• The tuned localizer is associated with the destination runway.
• The airplane is less than 6000 feet above localizer navaid elevation.
• The airplane is less than 20 NM from the localizer navaid for a front course approach or
less than 12 NM for a back course approach.
• The airplane is within 1.25° of the localizer centerline.
• The difference between airplane track and the localizer course is less than a 45° intercept
angle.
** When the hybrid GPS-inertial data is valid and available, and GPS NAV is not selected to
OFF, the ERS hybrid GPS-inertial function coasts on a calibrated solution and GPS shows as
the update mode until the ANP increases such that another source is more accurate.
Table 1 – FMC Position Update Source
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ND MENU POS Key
When the POS key on the ND map menu is selected, the symbols for the GPS, IRU, and radio positions,
relative to the FMC position, show. See Figure 2.
Figure 2 – GPS and IRU Positions on ND

Control Display Unit (CDU) POS REF Page
POS REF Page 2/x shows FMC, IRU, hybrid GPS-inertial, and radio positions, and allows updating of the
FMC-computed position to match either the IRU, hybrid GPS-inertial, or radio position. Figure 3 shows
both hybrid GPS-inertial and radio positions available.
Figure 3 – FMC, IRU, hybrid GPS-Inertial, and radio Positions CDU POS REF page
LSK 1L shows the FMC position and, in the header line, the source being used to update the FMC
position (as described in Table 1).
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LSK 4L shows the radio position. When in range of a navigational radio, this line shows the radio’s
position even when radio updating is inhibited. If radio updating is inhibited, the FMC does not use it as
an update source until radio updating is enabled.
LSK 5R shows the identifier(s) of the navigation stations(s) currently being used to compute the radio
position.
NAVAID INHIBIT
See FCOM>Supplementary Procedures>Flight Management, Navigation>Navaid Inhibit for steps to
inhibit navigation sources. To allow each source to be used for navigation, it must be selected to ON.
Figure 4 below shows that all the update sources are selected ON. The FMC selects the navigation
source that provides the smallest lateral ANP.
Figure 4 – CDU NAV OPTIONS page
4. GPS System Overview – Expanded Information

The 787 has two independent high-integrity GPS receivers. The GPS receivers are part of the two
integrated navigation receivers (INRs). The system has two independent GPS antennas.
The GPS receivers on Boeing airplanes have receiver autonomous integrity monitoring (RAIM) algorithms
to detect and mitigate erroneous GPS signals. These algorithms offer some protection against errors from
interference. For example, RAIM detects smart jamming where the receiver tracks both real and fake
satellite signals that cause inconsistent measurement data. The RAIM horizontal integrity limit (HIL) must
be valid before the GPS output is used for most other functions.
The 787 ERS has two inertial reference units (IRU) and two attitude heading reference units (AHRU).
The INRs send GPS raw measurement data (pseudo ranges and satellite position), position, time, and
RAIM integrity data to the ERS. See Figure 5.
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Figure 5 – ERS Architecture
The left INR is also connected to the TCPs and provides GPS position data for the alternate navigation
radio function.
The ERS is the primary sensor system that provides airplane attitude, heading, angular rates, linear
accelerations, present position, velocity, and track data. The ERS sensor data is used to support flight
controls, primary flight displays, and FMC navigation functions. The hardware and software of the IRU
and the AHRU are identical, except the AHRU has lower-performance gyroscopes and provides a smaller
set of output parameters.
The FMC uses data from the IRUs and AHRUs for the navigation and guidance systems. The flight
control system also gets data from the IRUs and AHRUs. Redundant, independent pure inertial reference
parameters and hybrid GPS-inertial reference parameters are equalized and voted by the flight control
system to generate high-integrity ERS data. This high-integrity, high-availability data is used by the flight
control system and provided to other critical functions. Redundancy and high-integrity provide resilience
against GPS interference.
The FMC uses hybrid GPS-inertial solution as the primary preferred source of navigation. Autonomous
GPS solution can be used when hybrid GPS-inertial data is not valid. The FMC checks autonomous GPS
and hybrid GPS-inertial data for validity and stability before using it for the navigation solution. These
checks can detect some position discontinuities caused by smart jamming.
ADS-B OUT, ADS-B IN, GPWS look-ahead terrain, and electronic flight bag (EFB) are applications that
use autonomous GPS data.
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Figure 6 shows the path of the GPS data and its use by the airplane systems.
Figure 6 – Block diagram of GPS data flow/use
5. Flight Deck Indications – Expanded Information

This section covers the flight deck indications for the impacted systems during GPS signal interference
events.
Navigation when GPS Update is Not Available or during GPS Signal Interference
Hybrid GPS-inertial remains valid and available when GPS receiver data becomes invalid due to loss of
signal or signal interference. The FMC remains in the GPS update mode and shows the hybrid GPS
accuracy and integrity as the ANP on the NDs. When no GPS measurements are available due to
interference, the hybrid position output accuracy and integrity slowly degrades, that is, the ANP grows. In
this way the hybrid GPS-inertial system can "coast" through periods when GPS data is unavailable while
the navigation accuracy and integrity continues to meet required navigational performance (RNP)
requirements. Hybrid GPS-inertial coasting times vary depending upon the selected RNP level (see FMC
document D613Z033-1, "787 RNP Navigation Capabilities, Generation 1", section 6.1.2 for ERS RNP
availability and coasting performance data).
When the hybrid GPS-inertial accuracy further degrades due to lack of GPS data for a long time, the FMC
selects another navigation source, such as inertial navigation or conventional navigation aids like DME-
DME or VOR- DME for updating the FMC position.
Selecting GPS updating to OFF on the POS REF page disables updating of the FMC with GPS data
including both the hybrid GPS-inertial navigation data and the autonomous GPS data received directly
from the INR. The FMC selects another navigation source, such as inertial navigation or conventional
navigation aids like DME-DME or VOR-DME for updating the FMC position. Some operators have an
FMF default to DME/DME Updating OFF. Unless GPS updating must be selected OFF for procedures
such as operation in areas that are not WGS-84 surveyed, FMC navigation and HUD PFV display during
GPS interference events perform best when GPS updating remains ON.
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Note: Selecting GPS updating to OFF on the POS REF page does not inhibit GPS autonomous data for
GPWS look-ahead terrain or ADS-B.
The FMC switches to RADIO updating if available and enabled, when the RADIO provides better position
accuracy/integrity. The FMC switches to INERTIAL when RADIO update is not available or not enabled,
and the hybrid GPS-inertial HIL becomes greater than 4.0 NM which is equivalent to an ANP of 2.0. The
FMC position update status shows the update source. See Figure 7.
Figure 7 – Loss of GPS Signal
During an ILS approach, when GPS NAV update is selected OFF or when both hybrid GPS-inertial and
autonomous GPS data are not available, the FMC uses the localizer deviation to correct its position if all
of the conditions for LOC update are satisfied as described in Table 1. This can cause the ND map to
shift.
The ANP continues to increase in value which is shown on the ND. See Figure 8 below.
Figure 8 – Loss of GPS Signal
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Navigation Performance Scales (NPS) on the PFD show the ANP reaching the limit of the RNP value.
See Figure 9 below.
Figure 9 – NPS Scale, ANP reaching RNP value
When ANP exceeds RNP, the NAV UNABLE RNP message shows as shown in Figure 10.
Figure 10 – NAV UNABLE RNP EICAS Message
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CDU POS REF Page
During oceanic operations if both hybrid GPS-inertial and autonomous GPS data are not available and
the airplane is out of range of any radio navaid, both the autonomous GPS and RADIO position fields are
blank. See Figure 11.
Figure 11 – Oceanic Out of Radio Range
When both hybrid GPS-inertial and autonomous GPS data are not available but the airplane is in range of
radio navaids, only the GPS position field is blank. If radio updating is inhibited, the FMC uses the IRS as
the only navigation source as shown in LSK 1L in Figure 12 below.
Figure 12 – Domestic within Radio Range
When radio updating is enabled, the FMC uses the radio navaids as the navigation source as shown in
LSK 1L in Figure 13 below.
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Figure 13 – FMC Radio Position Update
LSK 5R shows the identifier(s) of the navigation stations(s) being used to compute the radio position.
GLS approaches
When GPS signal loss occurs during a GLS approach the following are the flight deck indications with
autopilot off:
Before LOC, Armed After LOC/GS, Above 200 ft After LOC/GS, Below 200 ft
Dist to runway removed Dist to runway removed Dist to runway removed
IDENT, course, RWY IDENT, course, RWY number IDENT, course, RWY
number stay shown stay shown number stay shown
Deviation guidance removed
Deviation guidance removed Pitch/roll mode fail after Pitch/Roll mode fail after
10 seconds 4 seconds
When GPS signal loss occurs during a GLS approach the following are the flight deck indications with
autopilot engaged:
Before LOC, Armed After LOC/GS, Above 200 ft After LOC/GS, Below 200 ft
Dist to runway removed Dist to runway removed Dist to runway removed
IDENT, course, RWY IDENT, course, RWY number IDENT, course, RWY number stay
number stay shown stay shown shown
Deviation guidance Pitch/roll mode fail after AP control laws are robust continue
removed 10 seconds to autoland with indications
Head-Up Display (HUD)

The HUD uses GPS-aided FMC track to position the flight path vector (FPV) symbol laterally (to compute
drift angle). See Figure 12. The NAV track signal normally uses the hybrid GPS-inertial true track
parameter.
Loss of GPS signal for a long time, selecting GPS updating to OFF, or an undetected GPS error can
cause a lateral position error of the FPV symbol of up to 2 degrees. See Figures 13 and 14. The HUD
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logic limits the effect of NAV track to a 2-degree difference from the voted inertial track value from the
flight control system.
The vertical FPV position and the flight director guidance are not affected by GPS signal issues and
provide proper indications.
Figure 12 – Lateral positioning of the FPV using hybrid GPS-inertial updating
Figure 13 – Example of 1.8-degree error
Figure 14 – Typical lateral displacement without hybrid GPS-inertial updating
During GPS signal interference, report the event to ATC as soon as practical. Navigation procedures that
require GPS such as RNP-AR and GLS approaches can be unusable.
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6. EICAS Messages and Non-Normal Checklists (NNC)
GPS Receiver Failure
Failure of a GPS receiver, a GPS antenna, or loss of the RF path between the antenna and the receiver
causes the advisory message NAV SINGLE GPS. If both GPS systems fail, the advisory message GPS
shows.
Loss of the valid GPS signal due to interference or jamming does not result in any EICAS messages
because there is no system failure and the hybrid GPS-inertial filter in the IRU/AHRU continues to
function by coasting on a calibrated solution with very low drift rates. When the ANP exceeds the RNP,
the NAV UNABLE RNP caution message shows.
The steps in the NAV UNABLE RNP non-normal checklist (NNC) are based on a detected failure of the
equipment. The checklist is not intended to cover the loss of the GPS signal or a signal interference.
Other NNCs
Backup systems such as GPS altitude (GPS ALT) and TCP Alternate Navigation may not function during
GPS jamming or smart jamming because data can be missing or incorrect. It is not possible to develop
NNCs for all situations. In all situations, the flight crew must assess the situation and use good judgment
to determine the safest course of action.
7. Ground Proximity Warning System (GPWS) Look-Ahead Terrain – Expanded
Information
The autonomous GPS data is the primary source of position data for the GPWS. When the GPS signal is
no longer available, the GPWS uses IRS data as a backup. While the IRS horizontal position uncertainty
stays within limits, terrain shows on the ND and the look-ahead terrain alerting functions. When the IRS
horizontal position uncertainty exceeds limits, the terrain is removed from the ND, and TERR POS
message shows. The ground proximity alerts that occur are valid.
Ground Proximity Warning System (GPWS) Look-Ahead Terrain during GPS signal interference
The GPWS look-ahead terrain function can detect step changes in GPS position and altitude data. In this
case, the GPWS step detection algorithm invalidates GPS position inputs and uses IRS data. If the IRS
horizontal position uncertainty exceeds accuracy limits, the terrain is removed from the ND, and TERR
POS message shows. Indication returns to normal when the GPS inputs are stable for 60 seconds.
The GPWS cannot detect a small and gradual change in the GPS position or altitude. In this case,
depending on the landscape in the terrain database for the GPS position, alerts associated with look-
ahead terrain function can occur when threat thresholds are met. There have been several in-service
cases where false GPWS look-ahead terrain alerts occurred during GPS smart jamming.
Ground Proximity Terrain Override (TERR OVRD)
When TERR OVRD is selected, it inhibits the GPWS look-ahead terrain and obstacle display. The GPWS
TERR OVRD message shows and the amber VSD TERR OVRD flag shows on the vertical situation
display.
GPWS immediate alerts are based on radio altitude, barometric altitude, ADRS, glideslope deviation, and
airplane configuration. These alerts continue to function and if an alert occurs, it is valid. GPWS alerts
occur for the following conditions:
• Altitude loss after takeoff or go-around
• Excessive and severe descent rate
• Excessive terrain closing rate
• Unsafe terrain clearance when not in the landing configuration
• Excessive deviation below ILS glideslope
Page 18 of 19
• Excessive deviation below IAN glide path
These functions also remain valid:
• Reactive windshear
• Altitude call outs
• Bank angle callouts (option)
GPWS alerts that do occur are valid. Accomplish the maneuver associated with the alert as described in
the FCOM
8. ADS-B During GPS Signal Interference – Expanded Information
The automatic dependent surveillance (ADS) function uses autonomous GPS data. GPS interference can
affect these functions:
ADS-B OUT
• During GPS interference or when the GPS signal is lost, the ADS-B Out does not function.
• With ADS-B Out, the ADS-B OUT message shows. Selecting the opposite transponder causes the
message to show again since the signal is not available.
• Loss of ADS-B position reports by ATC. ATC can contact the pilot and request the pilot to switch to the
other transponder side; however, this does not restore ADS-B function. Transponder mode C remains
operational.
• ADS-B OUT reporting of incorrect airplane position during a GPS smart jamming event is possible. In
this case, ATC can observe a position difference between ADS-B OUT position and airplane position
on primary and secondary radar.
ADS-B IN
Normally ADS-B IN data shows on ND. The loss of GPS signal causes the following:
• ADS-B IN traffic is removed from the ND. TCAS traffic shows.
• Traffic list and ITP pages on MFD are removed.
• For a smart jamming event, long range ADS-B IN targets that are outside of the TCAS validation range
(40 NM around ownship) can be displayed in incorrect locations or be missing from ND depending on
the severity of smart jamming. Normal TCAS functions are not affected for the traffic inside the TCAS
validation range.
ADS-C
• ADS-C uses FMC position.
9. Electronic Flight Bag
Some EFB applications use autonomous GPS data and GPS interference can affect these applications.
10. Additional Information
A full listing of FAA-issued flight prohibition and advisory NOTAMs and flight prohibition SFARs for areas
in which the FAA does not provide air navigation services is posted on the FAA website:
http://www.faa.gov/air_traffic/publications/us_restrictions
11. Planned Changes
Boeing has committed to researching engineering and software changes to increase robustness of
systems that use GPS.
Page 19 of 19

787 FOTB GPS Interference 2023

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BOEING COMMERCIAL AIRPLANES

FLIGHT OPERATIONS TECHNICAL BULLETIN

DATE: November 10, 2023

ATA NO: Multiple

APPLIES TO: 787

RFI Flight Deck Effects (FDEs) and Recommended Crew Mitigations

General Mitigations for Consideration

Reporting RFI Anomalies

Figure 1 – Hybrid GPS-Inertial as the FMC Navigation Update Mode

GPS-IRU GPS-IRU GPS

GPS-IRU GPS GPS-IRU** GPS**

GPS-AHRU IRU GPS-AHRU GPS

GPS LOC, IRS (IRU, AHRU) GPS GPS

DME/DME, IRS LOC, GPS RADIO DME-DME

VOR/DME, IRS LOC, GPS, DME/DME RADIO VOR-DME

IRU LOC, VOR, DME, GPS INERTIAL INERTIAL

LOC-DME/DME, IRU* GPS LOC-RADIO LOC-DME-DME

LOC- VOR/DME, IRU* GPS LOC-RADIO LOC-VOR-DME

LOC-IRU* GPS, VOR, DME LOC LOC

* The FMC changes to LOC updating when:

Table 1 – FMC Position Update Source

Figure 2 – GPS and IRU Positions on ND

Figure 4 – CDU NAV OPTIONS page

4. GPS System Overview – Expanded Information

Figure 6 – Block diagram of GPS data flow/use

5. Flight Deck Indications – Expanded Information

Figure 7 – Loss of GPS Signal

Figure 8 – Loss of GPS Signal

Figure 9 – NPS Scale, ANP reaching RNP value

Figure 10 – NAV UNABLE RNP EICAS Message

Figure 11 – Oceanic Out of Radio Range

Figure 12 – Domestic within Radio Range

Head-Up Display (HUD)

Figure 12 – Lateral positioning of the FPV using hybrid GPS-inertial updating

Figure 13 – Example of 1.8-degree error

Figure 14 – Typical lateral displacement without hybrid GPS-inertial updating

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GPS-IRU GPS GPS-IRU GPS