NATIONAL UNIVERSITY OF SCIENCES AND TECHNOLOGY

School of Electrical Engineering and Computer Sciences

PAKISTAN STUDIES (HU-107)

Title of the assignment: Justice and It’s Decline Report

SUBMITTED TO: Dr. Sobia Jamil

SUBMITTED BY: Ali Aqdas 453852

Saim Tariq 463023

M. Sadiq 480980

Ali Haider 454330

CLASS + SECTION: BESE-14B

Date of Submission: 28/12/2023

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 Justice and It’s Decline Report

Introduction:
The purpose of this report is to analyze Pakistan's legal complexities and highlight structural
inequities that continue to exist in spite of the country's well-established legal systems. Beyond
the surface-level legal frameworks, the public is impacted by significant issues. Through a careful
examination of past cases and current concerns, we aim to disentangle the intricate web of
obstacles impeding the establishment of a just judicial system. This conversation encourages
careful reflection, highlighting the necessity of a legal system in Pakistan that is consistent with
the values of fairness and impartiality for all people.
Hierarchy of Courts in Pakistan:
Pakistan has two classes of courts:
1. The Superior Courts
2. The Subordinate Courts
The Superior Courts:
The superior courts are

• Supreme Court of Pakistan

• The Federal Shariat Court
• Five High Courts
There is a High Court for each of the four provinces as well as the federal capital. The Constitution
of Pakistan entrusts the superior judiciary with the obligation to preserve, protect and defend the
constitution. The autonomous territories of Gilgit-Baltistan and Azad Kashmir have separate
judicial systems from the main Pakistani system, as a result of the Kashmir Conflict and their
disputed status.
Supreme Court of Pakistan:
The Supreme Court of Pakistan serves as the paramount guardian of the Constitution, wielding
appellate and original jurisdiction. As the final court of appeal, it adjudicates cases from lower
courts, while also possessing the authority to address matters directly and ensure constitutional
adherence. Safeguarding fundamental rights, the court engages in judicial review, scrutinizing the
legality of governmental actions and policies. Its pivotal role includes settling legal controversies,
interpreting the Constitution, and shaping legal precedents. Tasked with administrative functions,
it oversees the judiciary's operation. In essence, the Supreme Court stands as the cornerstone of
justice, ensuring the rule of law and constitutional compliance in Pakistan.

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The Five High Courts:
The Five High Courts are

1. Lahore High Court, Lahore, Punjab

2. Sindh High Court, Karachi, Sindh
3. Peshawar High Court, Peshawar, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa
4. Balochistan High Court, Quetta, Balochistan
5. Islamabad High Court, Islamabad, ICT

The High Court in Pakistan holds a pivotal role as a key judicial authority within the country. Its
primary functions include serving as an appellate court, hearing appeals from lower courts and
tribunals. Additionally, the High Court possesses original jurisdiction in specific cases of public
importance. Empowered with the authority of judicial review, it can challenge the constitutionality
of laws, executive actions, and governmental policies. The High Court plays a crucial role in
protecting fundamental rights and ensuring justice at the provincial level. It can challenge
decisions of lower courts and tribunals, acting as a vital pillar in upholding the rule of law in
Pakistan.

Federal Shariat Court:

The Federal Shariat Court in Pakistan is a specialized judicial body established to examine the
conformity of laws with Islamic principles. Constituted under the Constitution of Pakistan, it
primarily ensures the compatibility of legislation with the tenets of Islam. The court exercises
jurisdiction over matters related to the Islamic legal system, interpreting and applying Sharia law.
Its authority includes reviewing laws and administrative actions for compliance with Islamic
principles. Serving as a bridge between the legal and religious domains, the Federal Shariat Court
plays a crucial role in harmonizing the legal framework with Islamic jurisprudence in Pakistan,
contributing to the synthesis of law and religion.
Supreme Court of Pakistan:
The Supreme Court of Pakistan, established in 1956, stands as the apex judicial body in the
country. It holds significant constitutional authority, ensuring the interpretation and application of
the law. Comprising a Chief Justice and other justices, the court plays a pivotal role in safeguarding
fundamental rights and constitutional principles. It has the jurisdiction to hear cases of national
importance, including matters involving constitutional interpretation and disputes between
provinces. The Supreme Court is instrumental in upholding the rule of law, acting as a final arbiter
in legal disputes and contributing to the preservation of justice, transparency, and constitutional
order in Pakistan.

The Subordinate Courts:

The subordinate judiciary consists of civil and criminal district courts, and numerous specialized
courts covering banking, insurance, customs and excise, smuggling, drugs, terrorism, taxation, the
environment, consumer protection, and corruption. The criminal courts were created under the
Criminal Procedure Code 1898, during the British Raj, and the civil courts were established by the
West Pakistan Civil Court Ordinance 1962. There are also revenue courts that operate under the
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West Pakistan Land Revenue Act 1967. The government may also set up administrative courts and
tribunals for exercising exclusive jurisdiction in specific matters.

How Chief Justice is Selected in Pakistan?

Recommendation by the Judicial Commission:
The Judicial Commission recommends the Chief Justice nominee to the President.
Consultation with Prime Minister:
The President consults with the Prime Minister before making the Chief Justice appointment.
Presidential Appointment:
The President formally appoints the Chief Justice based on the Judicial Commission's
recommendation and consultation with the Prime Minister.

How Judges are appointed in High Courts?

Recommendation by the Chief Justice:
The Chief Justice of the High Court recommends judge nominees.
Consultation with Chief Justice of Pakistan:
The Chief Justice of Pakistan is consulted in the appointment process.
Consultation with the Governor:
The Governor of the province is consulted before the appointment.
Presidential Approval: The President formally approves the appointment based on
recommendations and consultations.

Introductions to BAR ASSOCIATION:

The Bar Association is a regulatory body which follows procedures recommended by Bar Council.
The question arises in our mid, how role of this body increases their influence in judiciary. After
restoration of former chief justice of Pakistan Ifthikar Chaudhry, the bar rights increases after
judiciary reforms. Their right to file petition against any lawyer on getting complaint or find lawyer
practice against legal practice. They also issue license to lawyers who complete their studies in
LLB.
BAR ASSOCIATION ROLE:
Unfortunately, this body used by politician for their own benefits. Bar files many petition by
getting pressure from politician in which purpose is mentioned that case is filed on public concern.
However, critic find this type of petition as proxy. For Examples: In history, Sindh Bar Association
file petition like raise allegation on judge Rana Shamim, also stand against Former General
Pervaze Musharaf that he was anti-state or betray country. These all our past examples of this body
which destroy system of judiciary. Recently, Supreme court release their decision on KPK and
Punjab election and consisder election commission decision on this matter as revocation decision.
The bar polarized into two blocks. One block considered this decision as 3,2 decision , other
consider 4,3 decision and raise allegation on bench. In this way, their influence also have great
hand on deteriorating judiciary system.

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COMMON PERSON LIFE DUE TO THIS SYSTEM:
According to a report published by the UNDP in 2012, 43% of the cases filed in the courts in
Sindh took 5 to 10 years to be resolved. Two third prisoners in jail are under trial on which guilt
is not proved yet. Their trial takes 5-6 years due to lacks in judiciary system. The reasons are:

• Absence of witness on hearing of case.

• Lack of police van due to which accused person not reach court.
• Manipulation done by lawyers to extend case and earn money from client.
• Judge absence from court due to vacation.
• Transfer of cases from one court to another court.

EFFECT:
The accused person and their family suffer from mentally and physical stress. They treat as
shamed people in society due to blame on them which is not proved yet. The accused person
personality damages, progress stop due to spending 6-7 years in jail. These all harmful and
toxic effects make them weaker in society and did not able to sustain. Therefore, more suicides
act due to this imperfect judiciary system.
STATISTIC GRAPH:

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 Statistics Graph of Pending Cases in Supreme Court, High Court:

THE JUDICIARY AND THE TWO EXECUTIVES:

How did shifts within the judiciary impact its relationship with executive institutions? Historically,
the superior judiciary was seen by democrats as the junior partner of the military, providing the
military’s political actions with legal cover. During the 1990s, Pakistan’s national politics were
shaped by relationships among three offices that came to be known as the “troika”: the prime
minister, the president, and the chief of army staff. The clashes between the elected executive
office led by the prime minister and the unelected executive leadership in the presidency and the
military regularly resulted in constitutional disputes until the 1999 coup through which General
Pervez Musharraf took over the presidency.

From the 1990s onward, for the reasons outlined earlier, the courts gradually began to chart a
more independent and interventionist direction, culminating in a confrontation between the
superior judiciary and Musharraf’s regime in 2007. An interventionist Supreme Court challenged
the regime’s core interests, including Musharraf’s power to remain president while being chief
of army staff, prompting the regime to suspend Chief Justice Iftikhar Muhammad Chaudhry and
attempt to purge the judiciary. Judges resisted, and lawyers mobilized in support of the superior
judiciary, galvanizing a national movement for democracy that led to Musharraf’s downfall. The

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court’s resistance and impact on Musharraf’s regime solidified the superior judiciary as a power
center in its own right.

After Musharraf’s exit and with the return of elected civilian rule, judges began to play a tutelary
role of their own in the political system, challenging what they saw as the excesses and corruption
of Pakistan’s other power centers. A “new troika” emerged in Pakistan’s democratic politics: the
prime minister, the chief of army staff, and the chief justice of Pakistan. Shifting alignments and
conflicts between these three officeholders shaped national politics during this decade.The
superior judiciary, especially the Supreme Court, adopted the mission of improving governance
and combating corruption by intervening in, and frequently overruling, bureaucratic transfers
and postings in order to limit the interference of elected politicians in unelected bureaucracies.
The courts also formulated policy on socioeconomic issues and went after the political leadership
of the ruling parties, the Pakistan People’s Party (PPP) and the Pakistan Muslim League Nawaz
(PML-N), in corruption cases. The Supreme Court’s focus on political corruption and expansive
interpretation of its authority led to the removal of two elected prime ministers, Yousuf
Gilani and Nawaz Sharif. While political and administrative corruption were serious issues that
needed to be dealt with, repeated judicial interventions in the domain of executive and legislative
institutions undermined elected civilian supremacy.In contrast, there were relatively fewer
confrontations between the military and judiciary after 2010. The Supreme Court not
only enabled the military’s role in internal security as part of the war on terror, but it also gave
itself a role in overseeing aspects of these operations. Courts attempted to establish certain
redlines against political interference by the military, even charging the now-deposed Musharraf
with treason for his past actions, but the courts did not push for the implementation of military-
related judgments the way they did in civilian government–related judgments.

The judiciary’s stance against the military’s political interventions and its interference in the
civilian executive and legislature were the essential pieces of its jurisprudential strategy to carve
out a role as the country’s legitimate intervening authority. It adopted the military’s self-serving,
anti-corruption rhetoric and used constitutional and popular support to legitimize itself in this
role. The courts’ tactics, combined with their softer approach toward the military, left democracy
unconsolidated and after 2017 weakened the system of elected government and facilitated the
military’s return to political primacy—to the detriment of both democracy and judicial
independence.

THE JUDICIARY AND THE SAME-PAGE REGIME:

In 2017, the military leadership, several senior judges of the Supreme Court, and the political
party Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI)—developed a consensus that different players in the political
system needed to be brought onto the same page with institutional stakeholders aligned around
a common platform. These stakeholders agreed that the root of Pakistan’s problems was a
corrupt political class personified by the leaders of the mainstream political parties (the PML-N
and the PPP). The solution was to rescue state institutions from their control and influence, by
any means necessary.

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From 2017 to 2018, the Supreme Court’s anti-corruption jurisprudence focused on the PPP and
PML-N, often hearing petitions brought against them by PTI members. This concentration led to
the disqualification of these party’s leaders from political office, including Sharif. Led by Khan,
the populist PTI benefited from these disqualifications. The party hitched its wagon to the court’s
interventions, using the court’s judgments to validate PTI claims that mainstream political parties
were corrupt. Khan’s popular appeal, the Supreme Court’s anti-corruption jurisprudence, and the
military’s efforts to engineer the election in the PTI’s favor helped ensure the party’s victory in
2018. With the elected, military, and judicial leadership aligned around key political questions,
the new political arrangement was popularly known as the same-page regime. Under the PTI,
military authority and influence across state institutions grew substantially, and democratic
backsliding took hold with increasing suppression of opposition and dissent. It seemed the new
troika in Pakistani politics was the prime minister, the chief of army staff, and the director-general
of the Inter-Services Intelligence.

The military was happy to allow the assertion of court powers as long as judges exercised those
powers against the elected executive and legislature. While some judges willingly aligned with
the military in regulating political branches, judges also came under the growing influence of an
increasingly authoritarian executive and its surveillance apparatus. As the public profile of judges
grew, they became more vulnerable to threats from executive agencies holding information
that could tarnish their reputations and careers. Through a combination of an alignment of
interests between judicial and executive elites and executive pressure on judges, a sizeable
faction of judges became unwilling to confront military power.

Members of opposition parties, including the PPP and PML-N, spent time in and out of court
hearings and prison cells on corruption charges. With many judges under executive influence,
the likelihood that a high court would uphold a detention order or reject a bail petition for an
opposition member could almost be predicted by the state of relations between the ruling
leadership and that opposition party. While the Supreme Court remained relatively restrained
toward federal executive institutions during the PTI’s rule, it routinely clashed with the PPP’s
provincial government in Sindh Province. The Eighteenth Amendment to the Constitution
enhanced provincial authority and autonomy, but federal political and bureaucratic elites that
opposed the PPP found the superior judiciary a useful tool to constrain Sindh’s government.
During the pandemic especially, the Supreme Court chastised the PPP’s government and
made observations regarding the limits of provincial autonomy. Such communication from the
court chipped away at provincial discretion in critical policy areas.

However, some judges were less willing to acquiesce to autocratization. The Islamabad and
Peshawar High Courts, led by more independently minded chief justices, became important sites
for opposition parties and dissenters to push back against the worst excesses of executive
institutions. In the Supreme Court there was growing polarization between judges who were
willing to align with the political and military leadership and those who were not. These fissures
became most apparent in the case of Justice Qazi Faez Isa. Isa’s willingness to confront military
interference in politics made him a target, and a reference was filed with the Supreme Court to
have him removed for alleged financial misconduct. During the proceedings, some judges who
sided with the executive called for judicial accountability, while others who sided with Isa called

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this reference an attack on judicial independence. Ultimately, Isa’s supporters on the
bench quashed the case against him, but polarization within the judiciary was now evident, as
were the judiciary’s and the bar’s growing fatigue with increasing autocratization and the
court’s legitimacy crisis caused by its enabling this autocratization.

By 2021, the military leadership’s relationship with Khan frayed, providing an opportunity for
opposition parties to push back against the PTI and leading to the parliament’s April 2022 vote
of no confidence in Khan. When Khan attempted to block that vote, it was apparent that the
military was not siding with the PTI, but there was concern that several judges on the bench who
were involved in judgments that helped bring the PTI to power might still rule in the PTI’s favor.
Khan’s defense for blocking Parliament’s vote rested on flimsy legal grounds, including foreign
conspiracy allegations, restrictions on judicial power to intervene in parliamentary matters, and
the necessity of allowing elections in the so-called national interest. But the tutelary court
was disinclined to accept limitations on its prerogative to intervene in parliamentary matters.
And given that the foreign conspiracy allegation remained unsubstantiated, and that there was
a widespread legal consensus that Khan’s actions amounted to an attack on the constitutional
order, ruling in Khan’s favor would have further damaged the court’s legitimacy with the legal
community. Bar leaders and several judges pushed the chief justice to take notice of Khan’s
actions. The court’s reopening at midnight on the night of the vote, on the Supreme Court Bar
Association’s advice, was intended as a show of strength by the court to enforce compliance by
a recalcitrant PTI. But it convinced PTI supporters of judicial bias.

The judiciary’s tutelary role and associated political interventions helped to both establish and
dismantle the same-page hybrid—but they also exposed the judiciary to threats to its authority
and legitimacy.

TOWARD ELECTIONS AND BEYOND:

Moving forward, the courts may continue to play a critical role in shaping the rocky road to
Pakistan’s next elections and beyond. When courts wade into the resolution of major political
questions, some stakeholders are likely to be disappointed by their decisions; judges risk
damaging their credibility and legitimacy with those constituencies. As Khan’s
supporters mobilized around the country after his ouster, Khan questioned the court’s motives,
leading PTI supporters to enact a smear campaign against judges. Large segments of the bar saw
the court’s actions as an affirmation of constitutionalism in the face of a populist assault on
constitutional norms. However, outside the legal community, Pakistan’s broader urban middle
classes have long supported Khan’s anti-corruption populism. Thus, judges will have to balance
the conflicting expectations of their core constituencies: their professional networks in the legal
community and their social networks of urban, middle-class households.

Judicial reputations and legitimacy are being tested by a range of political litigation coming to the
courts during this complicated and contested transition. Already, we have seen legal proceedings
over the chief ministership and governorship in Punjab, the fate of elected representatives who
turn on their party’s leadership, the delimitation process for electoral constituencies, and
the treatment of PTI staff, to name a few. As the PTI amplifies its claims of a foreign-instigated

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conspiracy and demands immediate elections, the PTI is inviting courts to review the judgment
on the no-confidence vote, proceed on corruption charges against PML-N leaders, challenge the
electoral commission, facilitate prompt new elections, investigate Khan’s allegations of a foreign
conspiracy, and ensure Khan can hold protests and sit-ins in the capital city unencumbered.
Meanwhile, as the new PML-N-led government seeks to consolidate power, it is looking to pursue
charges of corruption and treason against PTI leaders in the courts and wants courts
to handle PTI petitions in ways that allow for stability in the political transition.

The PTI has honed a strategy of pressuring judges through social media. As the party files court
petitions, its social media activists cast aspersions against judges for not taking up their petitions
promptly or not giving them a fair hearing. Pakistan’s unelected judges and generals are less
vulnerable to electoral pressures than they are to pressures from their social, professional, and
institutional networks. Targeting judicial reputations within pro-PTI social networks has yielded
dividends; many of the PTI’s recent petitions were heard promptly. This strategy is similar to one
bar associations use: naming and shaming judges when they act against the interests of bar
leaders. The current leadership of most high courts’ bar associations is opposed to the PTI
(although, as time passes, more bar associations are willing to give Khan’s narrative a hearing).
The growing public visibility of judges in electronic and social media has rendered them more
vulnerable to reputational pressures from these constituencies.

The pressures from Khan’s effective mobilization since his removal combined with the judiciary’s
continuing distrust of mainstream political parties, especially the PPP and PML-N, and an abiding
judicial interest in constraining political discretion and holding politicians accountable mean that
the new PML-N government cannot expect much relief from the courts. The Supreme Court,
addressing Khan’s demands, ordered that there should be no withdrawal of, or government
interference in, corruption proceedings against members of the new government. The Supreme
Court also ruled that votes from members of a party that contradict their party leader—known
as party defection—shall not be counted in a vote of no-confidence, effectively meaning that a
prime minister with a party majority can never be voted out. The judges who made this
ruling argued that it would deter elected politicians from supposedly trading votes for private
benefits, illustrating judges’ continued distrust of politicians’ motives. Parliament has been
weakened as the court has circumscribed parliamentary accountability of the political executive
and weakened the model of constituency-based parliamentary representation. Military and
judicial leadership appear keen on directing the state toward a political dispensation with a
reformed institutional structure, perhaps with a new troika that better matches their
preferences. Should the current government be replaced by a caretaker government before fresh
elections, courts will likely receive petitions regarding the caretaker government’s actions from
across the political spectrum, providing judges a further opportunity to maneuver political
dynamics in their preferred direction—but at the risk of angering political elites aggrieved by their
decisions.

The court may also hear important cases pertaining to the military, particularly regarding
Musharraf’s treason conviction and the military’s internment centers and real estate empire. The
relationship and divisions between the civilian and military leadership will continue to inform the
judiciary’s approach to these cases.

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How the judiciary deals with these challenges will also depend upon judges themselves. It is
apparent many judges disapprove of traditional political parties and sympathize with Khan’s anti-
corruption rhetoric, even as they opposed Khan’s blatantly unconstitutional actions in April. But
there are also judges who are focused on ensuring judicial independence rather than
participating in further autocratization. To predict which direction courts will take, observers can
look to which judges, and their associated normative positions, are elevated to positions of
authority. With the current Supreme Court leadership, the trend of constraining PML-N and PPP-
led political institutions is likely to continue. But the differently minded Justice Isa
is designated to be the next chief justice of Pakistan in 2023. Whoever is chief justice during
Pakistan’s next elections will play a critical role in defining the judiciary’s role during the elections.
Beyond this transition, some judges are concerned about how enmeshed courts are in politics
and policymaking, but for now, the judiciary is unlikely to walk back from this role.

Today, the government and opposition parties court the support of both the military and the
superior judiciary. Political elites criticize these institutions for overreach when the institutions
intervene against their interests and celebrate the role of these institutions when the institutions
act in their interests. Pakistan now has two tutelary institutions: the military and the superior
judiciary. Even as the military remains the more powerful one, the interests of these two
institutions, their disdain for political elites, and their relationship with each other will shape
Pakistan’s political future.

CASE STUDY ( Majeed khan hit and run case):

Overview:

On 20th June 2017, car having number plate ‘BD 4381’ hit a traffic sergeant named Haji Attaullah
working on duty on GPO chowk, Quetta. The victim was seriously injured and taken to Civil
Hospital Quetta, but he died soon after reaching hospital.

Claim of Achakzai:

Prior to his remand, however, Achakzai had confessed to his involvement in the accident and
claimed to have agreed to compensate the family members of the slain traffic policeman.
Surprisingly, the Civil Lines Police Station had still lodged a First Information Report against
'unknown individuals'.

Arrest of Achakzai:

Initially, police registered a case of accident against unidentified persons. CCTV footage of the
incident was shared widely on social media and sparked a campaign demanding the arrest of the
legislator. Baluchistan police had registered a case against the former MPA – who is from
Pashtoonkhawa Milli Awami Party – and arrested him on June 25, 2017 from his residence under
the charges of terrorism, murder and attempt to murder. Civil lines police had submitted a
challan in the Anti-Terrorist Court. The accused was remanded for 14 days.

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Bail from Anti-terrorism court:

On 29th December,2017, Baluchistan MPA Majeed Achakzai had been released from jail after an
anti-terrorism court granted him bail in a case pertaining to the killing of a traffic sergeant in
Quetta by his over-speeding vehicle.

Continuation of Case:

The case continued for three years in Model Criminal Trial Court (MCTC).

Final verdict:

Judge Dost Muhammad Mandokhail of the Model Criminal Trial Court (MCTC) acquitted former
chairman of Balochistan Public Accounts Committee Majeed Khan Achakzai in the hit-and-run
incident over three years ago in Quetta. Final verdict is as follow:

“Out of the 20 prosecution witnesses -- including the victims, eyewitnesses and real brother of
the deceased traffic warden Haji Attaullah -- no one has been assigned any role to say that the
vehicle bearing number: BD 4381, was being driven by accused Abdul Majeed, Therefore,
statements of the prosecution witnesses are far from satisfaction of this court and there are
no substantial and sufficient grounds for the conviction of the accused. It is not identified in
the CCTV footage as to who was driving the vehicle.”

The judgment further said the accused was earlier declared ‘unknown’ in the first information
report (FIR) but when the police nominated Achakzai as an accused, they did not conduct any
identification parade through the victims and eyewitnesses.

The court, therefore, acquitted Achakzai on the charges under section 302, 324, 279, 337 and
427 of PPC.

References
1. The Dawn News
2. The Express Tribune
3. WION News (video of Achakzai’s claim)
4. Pakistani.org
5. Wikipedia
6. https://carnegieendowment.org/

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