Economic Dimension
Economic Dimension
Economic Dimension
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themselves. Sometimes however conflict may result from attempts to increase economic
efficiency. Economic factors make some societies susceptible to conflict, and one of the
main factors is poverty, leading not only to civil but also international conflict. Although
wealth reduces the chances of conflict, the rise in global economic prosperity throughout
the 20th Century has corresponded with an increase rather than a fall in the number of
civil wars. his is likely due to the rise in other conflict-inducing factors, such as
population levels, and the fact that global growth has been unbalanced.
Economic power-sharing is not unique to conflict settings. Many countries have forms of
economic power-sharing, in particular where they have devolved power to sub-state units.
So called fiscal federalism' involves sharing of economic management and decision
making between central state institutions and those of sub-state units. Countries with
significant natural resources also often have special mechanisms for allocating these
resources, which can prioritize the territories in which the resources are found, or target
particular areas of socioeconomic need.'
Throughout history, people have debated the virtues and vices of foreign trade. For many,
trade represents a path toward peace and prosperity among nations.' For others, trade is
for interstate relations, it also varies in degree and character across pairs of states.'
In International Relations, there have been four major propositions about the trade
conflict relationship:- (1) the liberal argument consider trade as promoting peace: (2) For
neo-Marxists, when they have symmetrical ties it promotes peace, while their
asymmetrical trade leads to conflict; (3) the suggestion that trade increases conflict; and
(4) the belief that trade is irrelevant to conflict.
Gasiorowski, Mark, 1986a. "Economic Interdepen-dence and International Conflict: Some Cross
National Evidence', International Studies Quarterly, vol. 30, no. 1I, March, pp. 23-28.
2Rosecrance, Richard, 1986. The Rise of the Trading State: Commerce and Conquest in the Modern
World, New York: Basic Books.
3 Polachek, Solomon W. , 1992. 'Conflict and Trade: An Economics Approach to Political International
Inter- actions', pp. 89-120 in Walter Isard & Chale H. Anderton. eds, Economics of Arms Reduction
and the Peace Process. Amsterdam: North-Holland.
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than increasing the prosperity of trading partners, trade often results in the
impoverishment of less powerful nations. A broad list of counter-claims has been
advanced by dependency theorists in response to liberal claims of trade's universal
benefits. These include the argument that: the gains from trade are enjoyed exclusively by
developed states; trading relations between developed and developing nations retard the
development process of the latter; trade destroys traditional political, economic, and
social institutions; trade exacerbates inequalities in the wealth of nations; and trade
relegates powerless states to aposition of dependence."
Moreover, dependent states may face negative political consequences when they become
subject to the manipulation or coercion of the more powerful (i.e., less dependent) state in
the trading relationship. The power that arises from asymmetrical dependence may be
used to gain concessions in either the political or economic domain". Particularly, when
structural linkages exist, dependent states are less able to alter their trade patterns and
may become subject to manipulation. Thus, such states will be unable to enjoy the
benefits of trade without being vulnerable to coercion. When extensive economic
dependence threatens national autonomy and poses problems for domestic foreign policy
makers, tensions may arise among trade partners. The negative consequences of
dependence are assumed to be more pronounced in asymmetrical relationships; however,
trade.
Polachek, Solomon W. & Judy McDonald, 1992. 'Strategic Trade and the Incentive for Cooperation',
pp. 273-284 in Manas Chatterji & Linda Forcey, eds, Disarmament, Economic Conversion and Peace
Management. New York: Praeger.
Keohane, Robert & Joseph Nye, 1977. Power and Interdependence: World Politics in Transition. Bos
ton. MA: Little Brown.
Hirschman, Albert O., [1945] 1980. National Power and the Structure of Foreign Trade. Reprint. Berke
ley & Los Angeles, CA: University of California Press.
Gowa, Joanne, 1994. Allies, Adversaries, and Inter- national Trade. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University
Press.
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to military options for acquiring resources and market. The history of colonialism and
imperialism illustrates how military force may be used in conjunction with trading
strategies to establish and maintain inequitable economic relationships. Thus, the
expansion of trade may not promote peace, but may involve increased interstate conflict,
as powerful states vie with one another for control over finite resources and markets, and
use force to subjugate developing states to a position of dependence. Although
interesting, these studies are focused at the system level of analysis and are less relevant
to the study.
The trade is another level of conflict in the economic dimension. There is strong evidence
that countries that trade with each other are less likely to fight each other, though it has
been debated as sometimes mutual dependence established between two trading
partners(dyads) is sufficient to raise the costs of conflict. thereby diminishing levels of
dyadic dispute. Conflict is also assumed to affect the terms of trade. Specifically, greater
levels of conflict make trade more difficult. Reasons include retaliatory tariffs, quotas,
embargoes, and other trade prohibitions. Conflict thus raises the costs of trade, thereby
making at least one of the countries worse off (in a welfare sense). The implicit price of
being hostile is the diminution of welfare associated with potential trade losses. Trade is
postulated as an instrument to reduce conflict, as trade tends to increase cooperation.
Trading countries with significant trade relations would thus engage in less conflict,
because they are most threatened by welfare losses associated with lost trade.?
4) Trade is Irrelevant to Conflict
The realist theorists have traditionally relegated economic relations to low politics,
arguing that the influence of trade is subordinate to other considerations in determining
the incidence of international conflict. Instead, traditional security concerns and military
factors dominate leaders' calculations of the utility of conflict. In addition, realists
recognize that economic instruments may be an important tool in the pursuit of the
national interest. In such instances, trade does not represent a path toward interstate
peace, but a means for securing power. Trade relations represent transitory arrangements
for pursuing the national interest; when demands change, trade ties can easily be broken.
In no way does trade preclude the use of alternative strategies to further the national
interest, including the use of force. One way to reconcile the differences in the