BASIC PRINCIPLES OF CIVIL LAW

it is well settled that ouster of jurisdiction of civil courts should not be

inferred easily. It must be clearly provided for and established.

it is well settled that minor discrepancies cannot demolish the veracity

of the prosecution case.
It is well settled that a liability cannot be created retrospectively.
it is well settled that compassionate employment is given solely on
humanitarian grounds with the sole object to provide immediate relief to
the employee's family to tide over the sudden financial crisis and cannot
be claimed as a matter of right.

It is well settled that special leave under Article 136 of the Constitution
of India is a discretionary remedy, and hence a special leave petition can
be 202 for a variety of reasons and not necessarily on merits. We cannot
say what was in the mind of the Court while dismissing the special leave
petition without giving any reasons. Hence, when a special leave petition
is dismissed without giving any reasons, there is no merger of the
judgment of the High Court with the order of this Court. Hence, the
judgment of the High Court can be reviewed since it continues to exist,
though the scope of the review petition is limited to errors apparent on
the face of the record. If, on the other hand, a special leave petition is
dismissed with reasons, however meagre (it can be even of just one
sentence), there is a merger of the judgment of the High Court in the
order of the Supreme Court. (See the decisions of this Court in the cases
of Kunhay Ammed & Others v. State of Kerala & Another (2000) 6 SCC
359; S. Shanmugavel Nadar v. State of Tamil Nadu & Another JT 2002
(7) SCC 568; State of Manipur v. Thingujam Brojen Meetei AIR 1996 SC
2124; and U.P. State Road Transport Corporation v. Omaditya Verma
and others AIR 2005 SC 2250).

10. A judgment which continues to exist can obviously be reviewed,

though of course the scope of the review is limited to errors apparent on
the face of the record but it cannot be said that the review petition is not
maintainable at all.

it is well settled that a writ of quo warranto applies in a case when a

person usurps an office and the allegation is that he has no title to it or a
legal authority to hold it. According to the learned counsel for a writ of
quo warranto to be issued there must be a clear infringement of the law.
It is well settled that High Court while exercising the power of judicial
review from the order of the disciplinary authority do not act as a Court
of appeal and appraise evidence. It interferes with the finding of enquiry
officer only when the finding is found to be perverse.

It is well settled that a High Court in Writ Petition cannot interfere with
the finding of fact, regarding bonafide need.

It is well settled that if certain provisions of law construed in one way

would make them consistent with the Constitution, and another
interpretation would render them unconstitutional, the Court would lean
in favour of the former construction.
It is well settled that admission to a course can be given only to those
candidates who are eligible as per the regulations of the Examining Body
and the State Government. Therefore, unless the students fulfilled the
eligibility requirements stipulated by the Board which is the affiliating
and examining authority, their admissions will be invalid and they
cannot be permitted to take the examination.
It is well settled that a company cannot maintain a petition under
Article 32 of the Constitution for enforcement of Fundamental Rights
guaranteed under Article 19 of the Constitution. “A company, being not a
citizen, has no Fundamental Rights under Article 19 of the Constitution.
it is well settled that the principles of natural justice mandate that the
authority who hears, must also decide.
It is well settled that when the statutes create an offence and an
ingredient of the offence is a deliberate attempt to evade duty either by
fraud or misrepresentation, the statute requires 'mens rea' as a
necessary constituent of such an offence.
It is well settled that if a person has submitted to the jurisdiction of the
Authority, he cannot challenge the proceedings, on the ground of lack of
jurisdiction of said authority in further appellate proceedings.
It is well settled that deduction for development cost has to be made
only where the value of a small residential/commercial/industrial plot of
land in a developed layout is made the basis for arriving at the market
value of a nearly large tract of undeveloped agricultural land.
It is well settled that genuine and bona fide sale transactions in respect
of the land under acquisition or in its absence the bona fide sale
transactions proximate to the point of acquisition of the lands situated in
the neighbourhood of the acquired lands possessing similar value or
utility taken place between a willing vendee and the willing vendor which
could be expected to reflect the true value, as agreed between reasonable
prudent persons acting in the normal market conditions are the real
basis to determine the market value.”

It is well settled that the construction of provision by the Court before

such provision is amended or substituted is an exercise of interpretation
of the law as existed and does not and should not be treated as covering
the situation after express enactment amending the provisions of Law so
construed earlier.”

So far as election law is concerned by now it is well settled that it

would be unsafe to accept the oral evidence on its face value without
seeking for assurance from other circumstances or unimpeachable
document. It is very difficult to prove a charge of corrupt practice merely
on the basis of oral evidence because in election cases, it is very easy to
get the help of interested witnesses. In Abdul Hussain Mir vs. Shamsul
Huda and another (1975) 4 SCC 533, the Three Judge Bench of this
Court held that oral evidence, ordinarily is inadequate especially if it is of
indifferent quality or easily procurable. According to this Court, the oral
evidence has to be analyzed by applying common sense test.
It is well settled that anyone who feels aggrieved by non-promotion or
non-selection should approach the Court/Tribunal as early as possible.
If a person having a justifiable grievance allows the matter to become
stale and approaches the Court/Tribunal belatedly, grant of any relief on
the basis of such belated application would lead to serious administrative
complications to the employer and difficulties to the other employees as
it will upset the settled position regarding seniority and promotions
which has been granted to others over the yeaRs. Further, where a claim
is raised beyond a decade or two from the date of cause of action, the
employer will be at a great disadvantage to effectively contest or counter
the claim, as the officers who dealt with the matter and/or the relevant
records relating to the matter may no longer be available. Therefore, even
if no period of limitation is prescribed, any belated challenge would be
liable to be dismissed on the ground of delay and laches.

it is well settled that in a suitable case the Court could lift the
corporate veil where the companies share the relationship of a holding
company and a subsidiary company and also pay regard to the economic
realities behind the legal facade.
Till the final decree as stated above is passed in a partition suit, it is
well settled that the suit is said to be pending, till the final decree is
signed by the Judge after engrossing the same on the stamps.
. It is well settled that the High Court or the Central Administrative
Tribunal will not interfere with the findings of fact recorded at the
domestic enquiry, however, if the case is a case of no evidence or the
finding is highly perverse or improbable then it is the duty of the High
Court and the Central Administrative Tribunal to go into the merits of
the case......”

It is a question of challenging the public policy and it is well settled

that public authorities must be given a very long rope, full freedom and
full liberty in framing policies, though the discretion of the authorities
cannot be absolute and unqualified, unfettered or uncanalised. The same
can be the subject matter of judicial scrutiny only in exceptional
circumstances where it can be shown to be arbitrary, unreasonable or
violative of the statutory provisions.
It is well settled that in civil revision the jurisdiction of the High Court
is limited, and it can only go into the questions of jurisdiction, but there
is no error of jurisdiction in the present case.

It is well settled that the intention of the parties should be ascertained

on a construction of a document; and where there is any patent
ambiguity in any recital, aid may be taken from evidence of surrounding
circumstances and the conduct of the parties.
It is well settled that the Court cannot ordinarily interfere with policy
decisions.

It is well settled that market value has to be determined with reference

to comparable lands and with reference to comparable sales, if available.
It is well settled that the High Court in second appeal cannot interfere
with the findings of fact of the first appellate court.

It is well settled that a person in the possession of clinching evidence

on an issue in dispute cannot hope to succeed by withholding that
evidence.
It is well settled that the court must put itself as far as possible in the
position of a person making a will in order to collect the testator's
intention from his expressions; because upon that consideration must
very much depend the effect to be given to the testator's intention, when
ascertained. The will must be read and construed as a whole to gather
the intention of the testator and the endeavor of the court must be to
give effect to each and every disposition. In ordinary circumstances,
ordinary words must bear their ordinary construction and every
disposition of the testator contained in will should be given effect to as
far as possible consistent with the testator's desire.

It is well settled that by an interim order the final relief should not be
granted, vide U.P. Junior Doctors Action Committee v. Dr. B. Sheetal
Nandwani, AIR 1992 SC 671 (para 8), State of U.P. v. Ram Sukhi Devi,
JT 2004(8) SC 264 (para6), etc.

It is well settled that the words of a statute should be first understood

in their natural, ordinary or popular sense and phrases and sentences
should be construed according to their grammatical meaning, unless
that leads to some absurdity or unless there is something in the context,
or in the object of the statute to suggest the contrary. If the language
used has a natural meaning, normally the Court cannot depart from that
meaning, unless reading the statute as a whole, the context directs the
Court not to do so. In the construction of the statutes their words are
normally interpreted in their ordinary grammatical sense. Of course, the
context in which they occur and the object of the statute has to be kept
in mind while adopting ordinary grammatical sense of the word. It is
often said that the golden rule is that the words of a statute must prima
facie be given their ordinary meaning. Parliament should prima facie be
credited with meaning what is said in an Act of Parliament or
Constitution. The drafting of statutes, so important to a people who hope
to live under the rule of law, will never be satisfactory unless the Courts
seek, whenever possible, to apply the golden rule of construction, that is
to read the statutory language grammatically and terminologically in the
ordinary and primary sense, which it bears in its context without
omission or addition. Of course, Parliament should also be credited with
good sense that when such an approach produces injustice, absurdity,
contradiction or stultification of statutory objective the language may be
modified sufficiently to avoid such disadvantage.
2011 AIR(SCW) 404

It is well settled that an execution court cannot go behind the decree.

If, therefore, the claim for interest on solatium had been made and the
same has been negatived either expressly or by necessary implication by
the judgment or decree of the Reference Court or of the appellate court,
the execution court will have necessarily to reject the claim for interest
on solatium based on Sunder on the ground that the execution court
cannot go behind the decree. But if the award of the Reference Court or
that of the appellate court does not specifically refer to the question of
interest on solatium or in cases where claim had not been made and
rejected either expressly or impliedly by the Reference Court or the
appellate court, and merely interest on compensation is awarded, then it
would be open to the execution court to apply the ratio of Sunder and
say that the compensation awarded includes solatium and in such an
event interest on the amount could be directed to be deposited in
execution. Otherwise, not.

It is well settled that writ jurisdiction is discretionary jurisdiction, and

the discretion should not ordinarily be exercised if there is an alternative
remedy available to the appellant.

It is well settled that the modern method of interpretation is purposive

vide Directorate of Enforcement v. Deepak Mahajan & Anr., (1994) 3 SCC
440, Hindustan Lever Ltd. v. Ashok Vishnu Kate & Ors., (1995) 6 JT 625
(vide page 631) and Workmen of American Express International Banking
Corporation v. Management of American Express International Banking
Corporation, (1985) 4 SCC 71.

In our opinion, though the judgment of the learned Single Judge is a

final judgment, it is in another sense an interlocutory order as it is well
settled that an appeal is a continuation of the original proceedings.
Since the original order of the learned Additional District Judge was an
interlocutory order, hence the appeal against that order and the
judgment of learned Single Judge in that sense was also interlocutory.

27. It is well settled that this Court does not ordinarily interfere under
Article 136 of the Constitution with interlocutory orders.

It is well settled that general terms following particular expressions

take their colour and meaning as that of the preceding expressions,
applying the principle of ejusdem generis rule, therefore, in construing
the words “or any other process”, the import of the specific expressions
will have to be kept in mind.

It is well settled that in case of such a conflict the earlier disposition of

absolute title should prevail and the later directions of disposition should
be disregarded as unsuccessful attempts to restrict the title already
given. (See Sahebzada Mohd. Kamgar Shah v. Jagdish Chandra Deo
Dhabal Deo (1960) 3 SCR 604. It is clear, however, that an attempt
should always be made to read the two parts of the documents
harmoniously, if possible. It is only when this is not possible, e.g., where
an absolute title is given is in clear and unambiguous terms and the later
provisions trench on the same, that the later provisions have to be held
to be void.”

It is well settled that the judgments of this Court are binding on all the
authorities under Article 142 of the Constitution and it is not open to
any authority to ignore a binding judgment of this Court on the ground
that the full facts had not been placed before this Court and/or the
judgment of this Court in the earlier proceedings had only collaterally or
incidentally decided the issues ......”

“It is well settled that in respect of agricultural land or undeveloped

land which has potential value for housing or commercial purposes,
normally 1/3rd amount of compensation has to be deducted out of the
amount of compensation payable on the acquired land subject to certain
variations 8 depending on its nature, location, extent of expenditure
involved for development and the area required for roads and other civic
amenities to develop the land so as to make the plots for residential or
commercial purposes.”

it is well settled that the sale deeds pertaining to the portion of lands
which are subject to acquisition would be the most relevant piece of
evidence for assessing the market value of the acquired lands.”

“36. Furthermore, a judgment or award determining the amount of

compensation is not conclusive. The same would merely be a piece of
evidence. There cannot be any fixed criteria for determining the increase
in the value of land at a fixed rate. ..................”
It is settled law that the objects and reasons of the Act are to be taken
into consideration in interpreting the provisions of the statute. It is
incumbent on the court to strive and interpret the statute as to protect
and advance the object and purpose of the enactment. Any narrow or
technical interpretation of the provisions would defeat the legislative
policy. The Court must, therefore, keep the legislative policy in mind
while applying the provisions of the Act to the facts of the case. It is a
cardinal principle of construction of statute or the statutory rule that
efforts should be made in construing the different provisions, so that
each provision may have effective meaning and implementation and in
the event of any conflict a harmonious construction should be given. It is
also settled law that literal meaning of the statute must be adhered to
when there is no absurdity in ascertaining the legislative intendment and
for that purpose the broad features of the Act can be looked into. The
main function of the Court is to merely interpret the section and in doing
so it cannot re-write or re-design the section. Keeping all these principles
in mind, let us consider the relevant provisions.

it is settled law that the fact finding task undertaken by the High
Court, which is evident from the impugned judgment, is not warranted in
a writ petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.

It is settled law that this Court grants a decree of divorce only in those
situations in which the Court is convinced beyond any doubt that there
is absolutely no chance of the marriage surviving and it is broken beyond
repair. Even if the chances are infinitesimal for the marriage to survive, it
is not for this Court to use its power under Article 142 to dissolve the
marriage as having broken down irretrievably. We may make it clear that
we have not finally expressed any opinion on this issue.

It is well settled that a writ petition is a remedy in public law which

may be filed by any person but the main respondent should be either
Government, Governmental agencies or a State or instrumentalities of a
State within the meaning of Article 12. Private individuals cannot be
equated with State or instrumentalities of the State. All the respondents
in a writ petition cannot be private parties. But private parties acting in
collusion with State can be respondents in a writ petition. Under the
phraseology of Article 226, High Court can issue writ to any person, but
the person against whom writ will be issued must have some statutory or
public duty to perform.

It is well settled that while an employee can be reverted to a lower post

or service, he cannot be reverted to a post lower than the post in which
he entered service (See: Nyadar Singh v. Union of India, AIR 1988 SC
1979). Further it is also well settled that reversion to a lower post or
service does not permit reversion to a post outside the cadre that is from
regular post to a daily wage post. We are therefore of the view that the
punishment inflicted on the delinquent employee not being one of the
punishments enumerated in Regulation 36, is not permissible in law.
South Bengal

It is well settled that a Statute can be invalidated or held

unconstitutional on limited grounds viz., on the ground of the
incompetence of the Legislature which enacts it and on the ground that it
breaches or violates any of the fundamental rights or other
Constitutional Rights and on no other grounds. (See State of A.P. v.
McDowell and Co., [(1996) 3 SCC 709], Kuldip Nayar v. Union of India
and Ors., [(2006) 7 SCC 1].
Goa Glass

it is well settled that no provision or word in a statute is to be read in

isolation. In fact, the statute has to be read as a whole and in its entirety.
In Reserve Bank of India v. Peerless General Finance & Investment Co.
Ltd., [(1987) 1 SCC 424], this Court while elaborating the said principle
held as under:

“33. Interpretation must depend on the text and the context. They are
the bases of interpretation. One may well say if the text is the texture,
context is what gives the colour. Neither can be ignored. Both are
important. That interpretation is best which makes the textual
interpretation match the contextual. A statute is best interpreted when
we know why it was enacted. With this knowledge, the statute must be
read, first as a whole and then section by section, clause by clause,
phrase by phrase and word by word. If a statute is looked at, in the
context of its enactment, with the glasses of the statute-maker, provided
by such context, its scheme, the sections, clauses, phrases and words
may take colour and appear different than when the statute is looked at
without the glasses provided by the context. With these glasses we must
look at the Act as a whole and discover what each section, each clause,
each phrase and each word is meant and designed to say as to fit into
the scheme of the entire Act. No part of a statute and no word of a
statute can be construed in isolation. Statutes have to be construed so
that every word has a place and everything is in its place.”
Zameer Ahmed

This was strongly refuted by the counsel appearing for the respondents
stating that it is well settled that under Order 23 Rule 3 of the Code of
Civil Procedure, 1908, a compromise may be signed by the counsel or the
Power of Attorney holder. Counsel for the respondents referred to and
relied upon the judgment of this Court in Byram Pestonji Gariwala v.
Union Bank of India & Ors., (1992) 1 SCC 31 where it was held thus:

“39. To insist upon the party himself personally signing the agreement or
compromise would often cause undue delay, loss and inconvenience,
especially in the case of non- resident persons. It has always been
universally understood that a party can always act by his duly
authorised representative. If a power-of-attorney holder can enter into an
agreement or compromise on behalf of his principal, so can counsel,
possessed of the requisite authorisation by vakalatnama, act on behalf of
his client. Not to recognise such capacity is not only to cause much
inconvenience and loss to the parties personally, but also to delay the
progress of proceedings in court. If the legislature had intended to make
such a fundamental change, even at the risk of delay, inconvenience and
needless expenditure, it would have expressly so stated.”
Shanti Budhiya

It is well settled that while giving reports after Ballistic examination,

the bullets, cartridge case and the cartridges recovered and weapon of
offence recovered are carefully examined and test firing is done at the
FSL by the said weapon of offence and then only a specific opinion is
given.
Manu Sharma

It is well settled that an order of Court must be construed having

regard to the text and context in which the same was passed. For the
said purpose, the judgment of this Court is required to be read in its
entirety. A judgment, it is well settled, cannot be read as a statute.
Construction of a judgment should be made in the light of the factual
matrix involved therein. What is more important is to see the issues
involved therein and the context wherein the observations were made.
Observation made in a judgment, it is trite, should be read in isolation
and out of context.
Goan Real Estate

It is equally well settled that Article 32 of the Constitution guarantees the

right to a Constitutional remedy and relates only to the enforcement of
the right conferred by Part III of the Constitution and unless a question
of enforcement of a fundamental right arises, Article 32 does not apply.
It is well settled that no petition under Article 32 is maintainable,
unless it is shown that the petitioner has some fundamental right. In
Northern Corporation v. Union of India, (1990) 4 SCC 239, this Court
has made a pertinent observation that when a person complains and
claims that there is a violation of law, it does not automatically involves
breach of fundamental right, for the enforcement of which alone, Article
32 is attracted.
Ramdas Athawale
Mr. Jethmalani placed reliance on Delhi Transport Corporation v. D.T.C.
Mazdoor Congress & Others 1991 (Supp) 1 SCC 600 wherein vide paras
166, 167 and 168, this Court observed thus:

“166. It is well settled that even if there is no specific provision in a

statute or rules made thereunder for showing cause against action
proposed to be taken against an individual, which affects the right of that
individual the duty to give reasonable opportunity to be heard will be
implied from the nature of the function to be performed by the authority
which has the power to take punitive or damaging action.
Md. Shahabuddin

It is well settled that if an authority has a power under the law merely
because while exercising that power the source of power is not
specifically referred to or a reference is made to a wrong provision of law,
that by itself does not vitiate the exercise of power so long as the power
does exist and can be traced to a source available in law.”

48. It is a well-established law that when an authority passes an order

which is within its competence, it cannot fail merely because it purports
to be made under a wrong provision if it can be shown to be within its
power under any other provision or rule, and the validity of such
impugned order must be judged on a consideration of its substance and
not its form. The principle is that we must ascribe the act of a public
servant to an actual existing authority under which it would have validity
rather than to one under which it would be void. In such cases, this
Court will always rely upon Section 114 Ill. (e) of the Evidence Act to
draw a statutory presumption that the official acts are regularly
performed and if satisfied that the action in question is traceable to a
statutory power, the courts will uphold such State action. [Reference in
this regard may be made to the decisions of this Court in P. Balakotaiah
v. Union of India, AIR 1958 SC 232; Lekhraj Sathramdas Lalvani v. N.M.
Shah, Deputy Custodian-cum-Managing Officer, (1966) 1 SCR 120;
Peerless General Finance and Investment Co. Ltd. v. Reserve Bank of
India, (1992) 2 SCC 343; B.S.E. Brokers' Forum, Bombay v. Securities
and Exchange Board of India, (2001) 3 SCC 482]
Md. Shahabuddin

It is well settled that Article 136 of the Constitution does not confer a
right to appeal on any party; it confers a discretionary power on the
Supreme Court to interfere in suitable cases. Article 136 cannot be read
as conferring a right on anyone to prefer an appeal to this Court; it only
confers a right on a party to file an application seeking leave to appeal
and a discretion on the Court to grant or not to grant such leave in its
wisdom. When no law confers a statutory right to appeal on a party,
Article 136 cannot be called in aid to spell out such a right. The Supreme
Court would not under Article 136 constitute itself into a tribunal or
court just settling disputes and reduce itself to a mere court of error. The
power under Article 136 is an extraordinary power to be exercised in rare
and exceptional cases and on well-known principles.”
Mathai

It is well settled that if exception has been added to remedy the

mischief or defect, it should be so construed that remedies the mischief
and not in a manner which frustrates the very purpose. Purposive
construction has often been employed to avoid a lacuna and to suppress
the mischief and advance the remedy. It is again a settled rule that if the
language used is capable of bearing more than one construction and if
construction is employed that results in absurdity or anomaly, such
construction has to be rejected and preference should be given to such a
construction that brings it into harmony with its purpose and avoids
absurdity or anomaly as it may always be presumed that while
employing a particular language in the provision absurdity or anomaly
was never intended.
M. Nizamuddin

It is well settled that if a person who has even a slight interest in the
estate of the testator is entitled to file caveat and contest the grant of
probate of the will of the testator. (emphasis supplied)
Jagjit Singh/Pamela

It is well settled that a right to sue for unliquidated damages for breach
of contract or for tort, not being a right connected with the ownership of
any property, nor being a right to sue for a debt or actionable claim, is a
mere right to sue and is incapable of being transferred.
Economic Transport

It is well settled that an increase in market value by about 10% to 12%

per year can be provided, in regard to lands situated near urban areas
having potential for non-agricultural development. (See: Sardar Jogendra
Singh v. State of UP, 2008 (17) SCC 133). Haridwar Devlopm
In Munshi Ram & Others v. Delhi Administration (1968) 2 SCR 455, this
court observed that “it is well settled that even if the accused does not
plead self defence, it is open to consider such a plea if the same arises
from the material on record. The burden of establishing that plea is on
the accused and that burden can be discharged by showing
preponderance of probabilities in favour of that plea on the basis of
materials available on record.
Darshan Singh/Punjab

In DCM Ltd. v. Union of India (1996) 5 SCC 468, this Court reiterated
that “It is well settled that the doctrine of promissory estoppel
represents a principle evolved by equity to avoid injustice and, though
commonly named promissory estoppel, it is neither in the realm of
contract nor in the realm of estoppel. The basis of this doctrine is the
inter-position of equity which has always proved to its form, stepped in to
mitigate the rigour of strict law. It is equally true that the doctrine of
promissory estoppel is not limited in its application only to defence but it
can also find a cause of action. This doctrine is applicable against the
Government in the exercise of its governmental public or executive
functions and the doctrine of executive necessity or freedom of future
executive action, cannot be invoked to defeat the applicability of this
doctrine. It is further well established that the doctrine of promissory
estoppel must yield when the equity so requires. If it can be shown by
the Government or public authority that having regard to the facts as
they have transpired, it would be unequitable to hold the Government or
public authority to the promise or representation made by it, the court
would not raise an equity in favour of the person to whom the promise or
representation is made and enforce the promise or representation against
the Government or public authority. The doctrine of promissory estoppel
would be displaced in such a case because on the facts, equity would not
require that the Government or public authority should be held bound by
the promise or representation made by it.”
DCM Ltd./UOI

It is well settled that where the right to sue is personal to the deceased,
the same does not survive for the benefit of his legal representatives.
Dwarika Prasad/Nirmala

It is well settled that in a suit for partition of the joint properties every
defendant is also in the capacity of the plaintiff and would be entitled to
decree in his favour, if it is established that he has the share in the
properties. Therefore, the suit for partition of the joint properties, filed by
the late father of respondent No. 1, could not have been dismissed as
withdrawn without notice to another brother, who was also entitled to
share in the properties.
Dwarika Prasad/Nirmala

It is well settled that in the event, the Will is found to be genuine and
probate is granted, only the appellant would be entitled to get an order of
eviction of the tenants/respondents from the suit premises excluding the
claim of the natural heirs and legal representatives of the deceased
plaintiff. The Code of Civil Procedure enjoins various provisions only for
the purpose of avoiding multiplicity of proceedings and for adjudicating
of related disputes in the same proceedings, the parties cannot be driven
to different Courts or to institute different proceedings touching on
different facets of the same major issue. Such a course of action will
result in conflicting judgments and instead of resolving the disputes,
they would end up in creation of confusion and conflict. It is now well
settled that determination of the question as to who is the legal
representatives of the deceased plaintiff or defendant under Order XXII
Rule 5 of the Code of Civil Procedure is only for the purposes of bringing
legal representatives on record for the conducting of those legal
proceedings only and does not operate as res judicata and the inter se
dispute between the rival legal representatives has to be independently
tried and decided in probate proceedings.
Sureshkumar Bansal/Krishna

It is well settled that the arbitrator is the master of facts. When the
arbitrator on the basis of record and materials which are placed before
him by the railways came to such specific findings and which have not
been stigmatized as perverse by the High Court, the High Court in
reaching its conclusions cannot ignore those findings.
Madnani Construction/UOI

it is well settled that illegality should not be allowed to be perpetuated

and failure by this Court to interfere with the same would amount to
allowing the illegality to be perpetuated.

It is well settled that the first information report need not contain every
minute detail about the occurrence. It is not a substantive piece of
evidence. It is not necessary that the name of every individual present at
the scene of occurrence is required to be stated in the first information
report.
Moti Lal/UP
It is well settled that in order to obtain an order of injunction, the party
who seeks for grant of such injunction has to prove that he has made out
a prima facie case to go for trial, the balance of convenience is also in his
favour and he will suffer irreparable loss and injury if injunction is not
granted. But it is equally well settled that when a party fails to prove
prima facie case to go for trial, question of considering the balance of
convenience or irreparable loss and injury to the party concerned would
not be material at all, that is to say, if that party fails to prove prima facie
case to go for trial, it is not open to the Court to grant injunction in his
favour even if, he has made out a case of balance of convenience being in
his favour and would suffer irreparable loss and injury if no injunction
order is granted.
Kashi Math Sansthan/Shrimad Sudhindra

It is well settled that admission previously made can be allowed to be

explained in order to show that it was erroneous. The maker of the
admission can very well show that the facts admitted are not correct.
Geo Group Communications

. In B.S. Bajwa v. State of Punjab & Ors., AIR 1999 SC 1510, this Court
while deciding the similar issue re-iterated the same view, observing as
under:-

“It is well settled that in service matters, the question of seniority

should not be re-opened in such situations after the lapse of reasonable
period because that results in disturbing the settled position which is not
justifiable. There was inordinate delay in the present case for making
such a grievance. This along was sufficient to decline interference under
Article 226 and to reject the writ petition”. (Emphasis added)
Shiba Shankar

It is well settled that the burden of proving sub- letting is on the

landlord but if the landlord proves that the sub-tenant is in exclusive
possession of the suit premises, then the onus is shifted to the tenant to
prove that it was not a case of sub-letting.”
Celina

It is well settled that in a suit for specific performance of a contract for

sale, it has to be proved that the plaintiff who is seeking for a decree for
specific performance of the contract for sale must always be ready and
willing to complete the terms of the agreement for sale and that he has
not abandoned the contract and his intention is to keep the contract
subsisting till it is executed.

It is well settled that the expression 'cause of action' means that

bundle of facts which gives rise to a right or liability.

In Haridas Aildas Thadani & Others v. Godraj Rustom Kermani, (1984) 1

SCC 668 this Court said that “It is well settled that the court should be
extremely liberal in granting prayer for amendment of pleading unless
serious injustice or irreparable loss is caused to the other side. It is also
clear that a revisional court ought not to lightly interfere with a
discretion exercised in allowing amendment in absence of cogent reasons
or compelling circumstances.

It is well settled that a statutory provision cannot control a

constitutional provision. An appeal is a creature of the statute and the
conditions mentioned in Section 13(6) of the Act will apply to the
statutory appeal and not to the constitutional remedy. That is because a
constitutional provision is on a higher pedestal as compared to a
statutory provision. A statute cannot control the constitutional
provisions
Ram Babu Agarwal

It is no doubt true that Rules under Article 309 can be made so as to

operate with retrospective effect. But it is well settled that rights and
benefits which have already been earned or acquired under the existing
rules cannot be taken away by amending the rules with retrospective
effect. [See : N.C. Singhal v. Director General, Armed Forces Medical
Services - 1972 (4) SCC 765; K.C. Arora v. State of Haryana - 1984 (3)
SCC 281; and T.R. Kapoor v. State of Haryana - 1986 Supp. SCC 584].
Therefore, it has to be held that while the amendment, even if it is to be
considered as otherwise valid, cannot affect the rights and benefits which
had accrued to the employees under the unamended rules. The right to
NPA @ 25% of the pay, having accrued to the respondents under the
unamended Rules, it follows that respondents-employees will be entitled
to Non-Practising Allowance @ 25% of their pay upto 20.5.2003.
It is well settled that if a literal interpretation leads to absurd
consequences, it should be avoided, and a purposive interpretation be
given.
Rishabh Chand Bhandari

It is well settled that the intention of the parties to an instrument must

be gathered from the terms thereof in the light of surrounding
circumstances. In Union of India v. Millenium Mumbai Broadcast (P)
Ltd., 2006 (10) SCC 510, this Court said that a document must be
construed having regard to the terms and conditions as well as nature
thereof.
Commercial Auto Sales

It is well settled that it is not in every case that deduction towards

development charges has to be made when a big chunk of land is
acquired for housing colonies etc. Where the acquired land falls in the
midst of an already developed land with amenities of roads, electricity
etc. deduction on this account may not be warranted. At the same time,
where all civic and other amenities are to be provided to make it suitable
for building purposes or under the local building regulations setting
apart of some portion of the lands for providing common facilities is
mandatory, an appropriate deduction may be justified.
Charan Das

In Bhavnagar University v. Palitana Sugar Mills Pvt. Ltd - (2003) 2 SCC

111 (vide paragraph 59), this Court observed:
“It is well settled that a little difference in facts or additional facts may
make a lot of difference in the precedential value of a decision.”

17. As held in Bharat Petroleum Corporation Ltd. & another v. N.R.

Vairamani & another, (AIR 2004 SC 4778), a decision cannot be relied on
without disclosing the factual situation. In the same judgment this Court
also observed:-

“Courts should not place reliance on decisions without discussing as to

how the factual situation fits in with the fact situation of the decision on
which reliance is placed. Observations of Courts are neither to be read as
Euclid's theorems nor as provisions of the statute and that too taken out
of the context. These observations must be read in the context in which
they appear to have been stated.” (emphasis supplied)
Bihar School examination

As a legal proposition, it is well settled that a question of title may arise

even in a suit for injunction relating to possession. In this connection
reference may be made to the decisions of this Court in the following
cases:

1. Sajjadanashin Sayed Md. B.E. Edr(D) by Lrs. v. Musa Dadabhai

Ummer and Ors. - (2000) 3 SCC 350.

2. Annaimuthu Thevar (dead) by Lrs. v. Alagammal and others - (2005) 6

SCC 202.
3. Swamy Atmananda and others v. Sri Ramakrishna Tapovanam and
others - (2005) 10 SCC 51.

4. Williams v. Lourdusamy and another -(2008) 5 SCC 647

Gangai Venayagar Temple/Meenakashi

It has been held by this Court in Vithal Yeshwant Jathar v.

Shikandarkhan Makhtumkhan Sardesai - 1963 (2) SCR 285 at page 290:

“...It is well settled that if the final decision in any matter at issue
between the parties is based by a Court on its decisions on more than
one point - each of which by itself would be sufficient for the ultimate
decision - the decision on each of these points operates as res judicate
between the parties”.

The High Court while following Sarbati Devi case (supra) held that it is
well settled that mere nomination made in favour of a particular person
does not have the effect of conferring on the nominee any beneficial
interest in property after the death of the person concerned. The
nomination indicates the hand which is authorized to receive the amount
or manage the property. The property or the amount, as the case may be,
can be claimed by the heirs of the deceased, in accordance with the law
of succession, governing them.
Shipra Sengupta

It is well settled that when a Statute is couched in negative language it

is ordinarily regarded as peremptory and mandatory in nature. [See
Principles of Statutory Interpretation by Justice G.P. Singh 11th Edition,
2008 pages 390 to 392].
Vijay Narayan Thatte

It is well settled that Statutory Rules framed under Article 309 of the
Constitution can be amended only by a Rule or Notification duly made
under Article 309 and not otherwise. Whatever be the efficacy of the
Executive Orders or Circulars or Instructions, Statutory Rules cannot be
altered or amended by such Executive Orders or Circulars or
Instructions nor can they replace the Statutory Rules. The Rules made
under Article 309 of the Constitution cannot be tinkered by the
administrative Instructions or Circulars.
Ajay kumar Das/Orissa

It is well settled that the doctrine of equal pay for equal work can be
invoked only when the employees are similarly situated. Similarity in the
designation or nature or quantum of work is not determinative of
equality in the matter of pay scales. The Court has to consider the
factors like the source and mode of recruitment/appointment,
qualifications, the nature of work, the value thereof, responsibilities,
reliability, experience, confidentiality, functional need, etc. In other
words, the equality clause can be invoked in the matter of pay scales
only when there is wholesale identity between the holders of two posts.

15. In Government of West Bengal v. Tarun Kumar Roy, 2004 (1) SCC
347, a three-Judge Bench of this Court held as under:
"14. Article 14 read with Article 39(d) of the Constitution of India
envisages the doctrine of equal pay for equal work. The said doctrine,
however, does not contemplate that only because the nature of the work
is same, irrespective of an educational qualification or irrespective of
their source of recruitment or other relevant considerations the said
doctrine would be automatically applied. The holders of a higher
educational qualification can be treated as a separate class. Such
classification, it is trite, is reasonable. Employees performing the similar
job but having different educational qualification can, thus, be treated
differently.”
MP/Ramesh Chandra Bajpai
In Kanan & Ors. v. State of Kerala [AIR 1979 SC 1127], this Court held :

“It is well settled that the expression “cause of action” means that
bundle of facts which the petitioner must prove, if traversed, to entitle
him to a judgment in his favour by the Court. Therefore, in determining
the objection of lack of territorial jurisdiction the court must take all the
facts pleaded in support of the cause of action into consideration albeit
without embarking upon an enquiry as to the correctness or otherwise of
the said facts. In other words the question whether a High Court has
territorial jurisdiction to entertain a writ petition must be answered on
the basis of the averments made in the petition, the truth or otherwise
whereof being immaterial. To put it differently, the question of territorial
jurisdiction must be decided on the facts pleaded in the petition.” (Para
6)
Rajiv Modi/Sanjay Jain
It is well settled that in the same enactment if two distinct definitions
are given defining a word/expression, they must be understood
accordingly in terms of the definition. It must be remembered that a
person does not acquire or suffer disability by choice. An employee, who
acquires disability during his service, is sought to be protected under
Section 47 of the Act specifically. Such employee, acquiring disability, if
not protected, would not only suffer himself, but possibly all those who
depend on him would also suffer.
UOI/Devendra Kumar

It is well settled that whether the word “may” shall be used as “shall”,
would depend upon the intention of the Legislature. It is not to be taken
that once the word “may” is used by the Legislature in Section 27 of the
Act, would not mean that the intention of the Legislature was only to
show that the provisions under Section 27 of the Act was directory but
not mandatory.
Sarla Goel/Kishan Chand

It is well settled that provisions of statutory rules cannot be overridden

or violated by administrative instruction and that administrative
instruction which is inconsistent with and violative of the Rules, is illegal
and void.
Radha mohan Malakar

it is well settled that mere delay is not sufficient to refuse to allow

amendment of pleadings or filing of additional counter statement. At the
same time, delay is no ground for dismissal of an application under
Order 8 Rule 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure where no prejudice was
caused to the party opposing such amendment or acceptance of
additional counter statement which could easily be compensated by cost.
Olympic Industries

in M.V.S. Manikayala Rao Vs. M. Narasimhaswami & Ors. [AIR 1966 SC

470], wherein this Court stated as follows:

“Now, it is well settled that the purchaser of a co-parcener's undivided

interest in the joint family property is not entitled to possession of what
he had purchased. His only right is to sue for partition of the property
and ask for allotment to him of that which, on partition, might be found
to fall to the share of the co-parcener whose share he had purchased.”
Ramdas/sitabai

The first Appellate Court relied upon the decision in P. Lakshmi Reddy v.
L Lakshmi Reddy AIR 1957 SC 314 at para 4, wherein this Court referred
to the decision in Corea v. Appuhamy 1912 AC 230 (C). In the said case
the principle of law has been clearly enunciated. The relevant portion of
the said judgment reads as under:

“It is well settled that in order to establish adverse possession of one

co-heir as against another it is not enough to show that one of them is in
sole possession or enjoyment of the profits of the properties. Ouster of
the non-possessing co- heir by the co-heir in possession who claims his
possession to be adverse, should be made out. The possession of one co-
heir is considered, in law, as possession of all the co-heirs. The co-heir in
possession cannot render his possession adverse to the other co-heir not
in possession merely by any secret hostile animus on his own part in
derogation of the other co-heirs title. It is a well settled rule of law that as
between co-heirs there must be evidence of open assertion of hostile title,
coupled with exclusive possession and enjoyment by one of them to the
knowledge of the other so as to constitute ouster.”

8. This principle has been consistently applied by the Indian courts.

Bonder/Hem singh

It is well settled that essential legislative function cannot be delegated.

Global Energy

It is well settled that a suit for partition stands disposed of only with
the passing of the final decree. It is equally settled that in a partition
suit, the court has the jurisdiction to amend the shares suitably, even if
the preliminary decree has been passed, if some member of the family to
whom an allotment was made in the preliminary decree dies thereafter.
The share of the deceased would devolve upon other parties to a suit or
even a third party, depending upon the nature of the succession or
transfer, as the case may be. The validity of such succession, whether
testate or intestate, or transfer, can certainly be considered at the stage
of final decree proceedings. An inference to this effect can suitably be
drawn from the decision of this Court in the case of Phoolchand v Gopal
Lal (AIR 1967 SC 1470). In that decision, it was observed as follows:

“There is nothing in the Code of Civil Procedure which prohibits the

passing of more than one preliminary decree if the circumstances justify
the same and that it may be necessary to do so particularly in partition
suits when after the preliminary decree some parties die and shares of
other parties are thereby augmented... it would in our opinion be
convenient to the court and advantageous to the parties, specially in
partition suits, to have disputed rights finally settled and specifications
of shares in the preliminary decree varied before a final decree is
prepared. If this is done there is a clear determination of the rights of the
parties to the suit on the question in dispute and we see no difficulty on
holding that in such cases there is a decree deciding these disputed
rights, if so, there is no reason why a second preliminary decree
correcting the shares in a partition suit cannot be passed by the court.”
Maddineni

It is well settled that a suit for partition stands disposed of only with
the passing of the final decree. It is equally settled that in a partition
suit, the court has the jurisdiction to amend the shares suitably, even if
the preliminary decree has been passed, if some member of the family to
whom an allotment was made in the preliminary decree dies thereafter.
The share of the deceased would devolve upon other parties to a suit or
even a third party, depending upon the nature of the succession or
transfer, as the case may be. The validity of such succession, whether
testate or intestate, or transfer, can certainly be considered at the stage
of final decree proceedings. An inference to this effect can suitably be
drawn from the decision of this Court in the case of Phoolchand v Gopal
Lal (AIR 1967 SC 1470). In that decision, it was observed as follows:

“There is nothing in the Code of Civil Procedure which prohibits the

passing of more than one preliminary decree if the circumstances justify
the same and that it may be necessary to do so particularly in partition
suits when after the preliminary decree some parties die and shares of
other parties are thereby augmented... it would in our opinion be
convenient to the court and advantageous to the parties, specially in
partition suits, to have disputed rights finally settled and specifications
of shares in the preliminary decree varied before a final decree is
prepared. If this is done there is a clear determination of the rights of the
parties to the suit on the question in dispute and we see no difficulty on
holding that in such cases there is a decree deciding these disputed
rights, if so, there is no reason why a second preliminary decree
correcting the shares in a partition suit cannot be passed by the court.”
Maddineni

It is well settled that to save a statutory provision from the vice of

unconstitutionality sometimes a restricted or extended interpretation of
the statute has to be given. This is because it is a well-settled principle of
interpretation that the Court should make every effort to save a statute
from becoming unconstitutional. If on giving one interpretation the
statute becomes unconstitutional and on another interpretation it will be
constitutional, then the Court should prefer the latter on the ground that
the Legislature is presumed not to have intended to have exceeded its
jurisdiction.
M. Rathinaswami/TN

It is well settled that the object of the introduction of Sub- section (3) in
Section 397 was to prevent a second revision so as to avoid frivolous
litigation, but, at the same time, the doors to the High Court to a litigant
who had lost before the Sessions Judge was not completely closed and in
special cases the bar under Section 397(3) could be lifted. In other
words, the power of the High Court to entertain a petition under Section
482, was not subject to the prohibition under Sub-section (3) of Section
397 of the Code, and was capable of being invoked in appropriate cases.
Mr. Sanyal's contention that there was a complete bar under Section
397(3) of the Code debarring the High Court from entertaining an
application under Section 482 thereof does not, therefore, commend itself
to us.
Shakuntala devi

The basic principle of Article 136 is that if a litigant feels that injustice
has been done by a Court or any other body charged with administration
of justice, there is one superior court he may always approach and
which, in its discretion, may give him special leave to appeal so that
justice may be done: (1996) 1 SCJ 786, 803.

(11) It is not possible to define with any precision, the limitations on the
exercise of the discretionary jurisdiction vested in the Supreme Court by
the constitutional provision made in Article 136. The limitations
whatever they be, are implicit in the nature and character of the power
itself. It being an exceptional and over-riding power, naturally, it has to
be exercised sparingly and with caution and in special and extraordinary
situations.

(12) It is well settled that though special leave is granted, the

discretionary power which is vested in the Court at the stage of the
special leave petition continues to remain with the Court even at the
stage when the appeal comes up for hearing and when both sides are
heard on merits in the appeal: (1999) 2 SCC 321.
Anurag Kumar

It is well settled that Exemption Notification have to be read in the

strict sense.
Hotel Leela

It is well settled that suggestion not put up on any point to the

Defendant regarding the matter in dispute. The claim of the Defendant
regarding the denial of the relationship as licensor and licensee is
deemed to be admitted.”
Bhagwan sarup

In State of Maharashtra v. B.E. Billimoria [(2003) 7 SCC 336], this Court

observed:

"32. It is well settled that the provisions of the statute are to be read in
the text and context in which they have been enacted. It is well settled
that in construction of a statute an effort should be made to give effect to
all the provisions contained therein. It is equally well settled that a
statute should be interpreted equitably so as to avoid hardship”

It is well settled that the presumption in regard to existence of joint

family gets weaker and weaker from descendant to descendant and such
weak presumption can be rebutted by adduction of slight evidence of
separate possession of the properties in which even the burden would
shift to the plaintiff to prove that the family was a joint family.
2009 (2) SCC 177
It is well settled that a judgment of a Court is not to be read
mechanically as a Euclid's theorem nor as if it was a statute.
Deepak bajaj

it is well settled that a Director is not a mere employee or servant of the

Company. In Lee v. Lee's Air Framing Ltd., 1961 AC 12, it was held that
a Director is a controller of the company's affairs and is not a mere
servant of the Company. Such Director may have to work also as an
employee in a different capacity. Gower and Davies' Principles of Modern
Company Law, (17th Edn. pp. 370-76) also deals with duties of Director
viz-a-viz as an employee of the Company and makes it clear that a
Director per se cannot be said to be an employee or servant of the
Company.

29. In Ram Pershad v. Commissioner of Income Tax, New Delhi (1972) 2

SCC 696, this Court held that a Managing Director may have a dual
capacity. He may be both, a Director as well as an Employee.
Comed

It is well settled that the concept of legitimate expectation has no role

to play where the State action is as a public policy or in the public
interest unless the action taken amounts to an abuse of power. The court
must not usurp the discretion of the public authority which is
empowered to take the decisions under law and the court is expected to
apply an objective standard which leaves to the deciding authority the
full range of choice which the legislature is presumed to have intended.
Even in a case where the decision is left entirely to the discretion of the
deciding authority without any such legal bounds and if the decision is
taken fairly and objectively, the court will not interfere on the ground of
procedural fairness to a person whose interest based on legitimate
expectation might be affected. Therefore, a legitimate expectation can at
the most be one of the grounds which may give rise to judicial review but
the granting of relief is very much limited. [Vide Hindustan Development
Corporation (supra)]
Sethi Auto

Furthermore, by now it is well settled that save in certain exceptional

situations, the principle of audi alteram partem mandates that no one
shall be condemned unheard. It is a part of rules of natural justice and
the soul of natural justice is 'fair play in action', which demands that
before any prejudicial or adverse order is passed or action is taken
against a person, he must be given an opportunity to be heard
Babloo Pasi

It is well settled that if a person who has even a slight interest in the
estate of the testator is entitled to file caveat and contest the grant of
probate of the will of the testator.
G. Gopal

This can be compared with exercise of extraordinary jurisdiction by a

writ Court under Article 32 or 226 of the Constitution. It is well settled
that this Court can exercise power by issuing writs, directions or orders
to every authority within the territory of India (as also those functioning
outside the country provided such authorities are under the control of
Government of India). But the jurisdiction of a High Court has territorial
limitations. It can exercise the power "throughout the territories in
relation to which it exercises the jurisdiction", that is to say, the writs
issued by a High Court cannot run beyond the territory subject to its
jurisdiction and the person or authority to whom the High Court is
empowered to issue such writs must be within those territories which
clearly implies that they must be amenable to its jurisdiction in
accordance with law.
Durgesh Sharma

The principle was reiterated by this Court in Ram Sarup Gupta (dead) by
Lrs. v. Bishun Narain Inter College [AIR 1987 SC 1242]:

"It is well settled that in the absence of pleading, evidence, if any,

produced by the parties cannot be considered. It is also equally settled
that no party should be permitted to travel beyond its pleading and that
all necessary and material facts should be pleaded by the party in
support of the case set up by it. The object and purpose of pleading is to
enable the adversary party to know the case it has to meet. In order to
have a fair trial it is imperative that the party should state the essential
material facts so that other party may not be taken by surprise. The
pleadings however should receive a liberal construction, no pedantic
approach should be adopted to defeat justice on hair splitting
technicalities. Sometimes, pleadings are expressed in words which may
not expressly make out a case in accordance with strict interpretation of
law, in such a case it is the duty of the court to ascertain the substance
if the pleadings to determine the question. It is not desirable to place
undue emphasis on form, instead the substance of the pleadings should
be considered. Whenever the question about lack of pleading is raised
the enquiry should not be so much about the form of pleadings, instead
the court must find out whether in substance the parties knew the case
and the issues upon which they went to trial. Once it is found that in
spite of deficiency in the pleadings, parties knew the case and they
proceeded to trial on those issue by producing evidence, in that event it
would not be open to a party to raise the question of absence of
pleadings in appeal. ¡ [emphasis supplied]
Bachhaj

It is well settled that under Order 6 Rule 17 of the Code of Civil

Procedure, wide powers and unfettered discretion have been conferred on
the Court to allow amendment of the pleadings to a party in such a
manner and on such terms as it appears to the Court just and proper.
Even if, such an application for amendment of the plaint was filed
belatedly, such belated amendment cannot be refused if it is found that
for deciding the real controversy between the parties, it can be allowed on
payment of costs. Therefore, in our view, mere delay and latches in
making the application for amendment cannot be a ground to refuse
amendment. It is also well settled that even if the amendment prayed for
is belated, while considering such belated amendment, the Court must
bear in favour of doing full and complete justice in the case where the
party against whom the amendment is to be allowed, can be
compensated by cost or otherwise. [See B.K.N. Pillai v. P. Pillai and
another [AIR 2000 SC 614 at Page 616]. Accordingly, we do not find any
reason to hold that only because there was some delay in filing the
application for amendment of the plaint, such prayer for amendment
cannot be allowed.
Surendra Kumar Sharma
2009 (16) SCC 187

Before:- Aftab Alam :J , Tarun Chatterjee :J

Mariamma Roy
Versus
Indian Bank & Ors.

It is well settled that even if an alternative remedy was available to an

aggrieved party against a particular order, but if it was open to such
party to move a writ application and the court has the power to entertain
the same if it finds that while passing the order there has been a
violation of the principle of natural justice.

It is well settled that while interpreting a provision of a statute, the

same has to be interpreted taking into consideration the other provisions
of the same statute.
Ajit singh/Jit ram

"It is well settled that the power to review is not an inherent power. It
must be conferred by law either specifically or by necessary implication.
No provision in the Act was brought to our notice from which it could be
gathered that the Government had power to review its own order. If the
Government had no power to review its own order, it is obvious that its
delegate could not have reviewed its order". (emphasis supplied)
2008 (6) Supreme 637
2008 (14) SCC 632 : 2008 (6) Supreme 714

Before:- H.S.Bedi :J , Tarun Chatterjee :J

South Konkan Distilleries & Anr.

Versus
Prabhakar Gajanan Naik & Ors.

It is well settled that the court must be extremely liberal in granting

the prayer for amendment, if the court is of the view that if such
amendment is not allowed, a party, who has prayed for such an
amendment, shall suffer irreparable loss and injury. It is also equally
well settled that there is no absolute rule that in every case where a relief
is barred because of limitation, amendment should not be allowed. It is
always open to the court to allow an amendment if it is of the view that
allowing of an amendment shall really sub-serve the ultimate cause of
justice and avoid further litigation. In L.J. Leach & Co. Ltd. & Anr. v.
M/s. Jardine Skinner & Co. [AIR 1957 SC 357], this Court at paragraph
16 of the said decision observed as follows:-

"It is no doubt true that courts would, as a rule, decline to allow

amendments, if a fresh suit on the amended claim would be barred by
limitation on the date of the application. But that is a factor to be taken
into account in exercise of the discretion as to whether amendment
should be ordered, and does not affect the power of the court to order it,
if that is required in the interest of justice."
2008 (8) SCC 765 : 2008 (6) Supreme 383

Before:- J.M.Panchal :J , K.G.Balakrishnan :J , R.V.Raveendran :J

N.D.M.C.& Ors.
Versus
Tanvi Trading & Credit Pvt.Ltd.& Ors.

It is well settled that the law for approval of the building plan would be
the date on which the approval is granted and not the date on which the
plans are submitted. This is so in view of paragraph 24 of the decision of
this Court in Usman Gani J. Khatri of Bombay v. Cantonment Board and
others etc. etc. (1992) 3 SCC 455.

2008 (10) SCC 153 : 2008 (6) Supreme 122

Before:- P.Sathasivam :J , Tarun Chatterjee :J

Kumar Gonsusab & Ors.

Versus
Sri Mohammed Miyan Urf Baban & Ors.
It is well settled that it would be open to the pre-emptee, to defeat the
law of pre-emption by any legitimate means, which is not fraud on the
part of either the vendor or the vendee and a person is entitled to steer
clear of the law of pre-emption by all lawful means.

2008 (9) SCC 622 : 2008 (6) Supreme 1

Before:- Aftab Alam :J , Arijit Pasayat :J , P.Sathasivam :J

Commissioner of Income Tax-I, Ahmedabad

Versus
Gold Coin Health Food Pvt.Ltd.

15. In Principles of Statutory Interpretation, 11th Edn. 2008, Justice

G.P. Singh has stated the position regarding retrospective operation of
statutes as follows:

"The presumption against retrospective operation is not applicable to

declaratory statutes. As stated in Craies and approved by the Supreme
Court: For modern purposes a declaratory Act may be defined as an Act
to remove doubts existing as to the common law, or the meaning or effect
of any statute. Such Acts are usually held to be retrospective. The usual
reason for passing a declaratory Act is to set aside what Parliament
deems to have been a judicial error, whether in the statement of the
common law or in the interpretation of statutes. Usually, if not
invariably, such an Act contains a preamble, and also the word `declared'
as well as the word 'enacted'. But the use of the words `it is declared' is
not conclusive that the Act is declaratory for these words may, at times,
be used to introduce new rules of law and the Act in the latter case will
only be amending the law and will not necessarily be retrospective. In
determining, therefore, the nature of the Act, regard must be had to the
substance rather than to the Corm. If a new Act is 'to explain' an earlier
Act, it would be without object unless construed retrospective. An
explanatory Act is generally passed to supply an obvious omission or to
clear up doubts as to the meaning of the previous Act. It is well settled
that if a statute is curative or merely declaratory of the previous law
retrospective operation is generally intended. The language `shall be
deemed always to have meant' or 'shall be deemed never to have
included'' is declaratory, and is in plain terms retrospective. In the
absence of clear words indicating that the amending Act is declaratory, it
would not be so construed when the amended provision was clear and
unambiguous. An amending Act may be purely clarificatory to clear a
meaning of a provision of the principal Act which was already implicit. A
clarificatory amendment of this nature will have retrospective effect and,
therefore, if the principal Act was existing law when the constitution
came into force, the amending Act also will be part of the existing law."
16. In Zile Singh v. State of Haryana and Ors. (2004 (8) SCC 1), it was
observed as follows:

"13. It is a cardinal principle of construction that every statute is prima

facie prospective unless it is expressly or by necessary implication made
to have a retrospective operation. But the rule in general is applicable
where the object of the statute is to affect vested rights or to impose new
burdens or to impair existing obligations. Unless there are words in the
statute sufficient to show the intention of the legislature to affect existing
rights, it is deemed to be prospective only - "nova constitutio futuris
formam imponere debet non praeteritis" - a new law ought to regulate
what is to follow, not the past. (See Principles of Statutory Interpretation
by Justice G.P. Singh, 9th Edn., 2004 at p. 438.) It is not necessary that
an express provision be made to make a statute retrospective and the
presumption against retrospectivity may be rebutted by necessary
implication especially in a case where the new law is made to cure an
acknowledged evil for the benefit of the community as a whole (ibid., p.
440).

14. The presumption against retrospective operation is not applicable to

declaratory statutes.... In determining, therefore, the nature of the Act,
regard must be had to the substance rather than to the form. If a new
Act is "to explain" an earlier Act, it would be without object unless
construed retrospectively. An explanatory Act is generally passed to
supply an obvious omission or to clear up doubts as to the meaning of
the previous Act. It is well settled that if a statute is curative or merely
declaratory of the previous law retrospective operation is generally
intended.... An amending Act may be purely declaratory to clear a
meaning of a provision of the principal Act which was already implicit. A
clarificatory amendment of this nature will have retrospective effect
(ibid., pp. 468-69).

2008 (10) SCC 796

Before:- B.N.Agrawal :J , G.S.Singhvi :J

Rajaram Prasad Gupta and Another
Versus
Ramchandra Prasad And Others

It is well settled that in cases where the subject of suit is residential

premises and the judgment-debtor is residing in it, prayer for stay is
ordinarily granted.

2008 (9) SCC 413

Before:- C.K.Thakker :J , D.K.Jain :J

Nil Ratan Kundu & Anr.

Versus
Abhijit Kundu

In Tarun Ranjan Majumdar & Anr. v. Siddhartha Datta, AIR 1991 Cal.
76, the High Court considered Sections 7, 12 and 25 of 1890 Act. It held
that when the Court is of the opinion that some order is required to be
passed with regard to custody of a ward, it can be passed considering the
welfare of the ward. It was further observed that even if a child is in the
custody of one who has no legal right thereto and its welfare is
reasonably looked after in a manner in which it should, the legal
guardian cannot claim an order of return or recovery of custody merely
on the strength of his legal right or financial soundness.
51. In Bimla Devi v. Subhas Chandra Yadav 'Nirala', AIR 1992 Pat. 76,
the Court held that paramount consideration should be welfare of minor
and normal rule (the father is natural guardian and is, therefore, entitled
to the custody of the child) may not be followed if he is alleged to have
committed murder of his wife. In such case, appointment of grand-
mother as guardian of minor girl cannot be said to be contrary to law.

52. Construing the expression `welfare' in Section 13 of 1956 Act

liberally, the Court observed;

"It is well settled that the word `welfare' used in this section must be
taken in its widest sense. The moral and ethical welfare of the child must
also weigh with the Court as well as its physical well being". (emphasis
supplied)

53. In Goverdhan Lal & Ors. v. Gajendra Kumar, AIR 2002 Raj. 148, the
High Court observed that it is true that father is a natural guardian of a
minor child and therefore has a preferential right to claim custody of his
son, but in the matters concerning the custody of minor child, the
paramount consideration is the welfare of the minor and not the legal
right of a particular party. Section 6 of 1956 Act cannot supersede the
dominant consideration as to what is conducive to the welfare of the
minor child. It was also observed that keeping in mind the welfare of the
child as the sole, consideration, it would be proper to find out wishes of
the child as to with whom he or she wants to live.

54. Again, in M.K. Hari Govindan v. A.R. Rajaram, AIR 2003 Mad. 315,
the Court held that custody cases cannot be decided on documents, oral
evidence or precedents without reference to 'human touch'. The human
touch is the primary one for the welfare of the minor since the other
materials may be created either by the parties themselves or on the
advice of counsel to suit their convenience.

2009 (0) AIR(SC) 840 : 2008 (9) JT 115 : 2008 (11) Scale 52

Before:- A.K.Mathur :J , Tarun Chatterjee :J

T.Kaliamurthi & Anr.

Versus
Five Gori Thaikal Wakf & Ors.
It is well settled that no statute shall be construed to have a
retrospective operation until its language is such that would require such
conclusion. The exception to this rule is enactments dealing with
procedure. This would mean that the law of limitation, being a
procedural law, is retrospective in operation in the sense that it will also
apply to proceedings pending at the time of the enactment as also to
proceedings commenced thereafter, notwithstanding that the cause of
action may have arisen before the new provisions came into force.
However, it must be noted that there is an important exception to this
rule also. Where the right of suit is barred under the law of limitation in
force before the new provision came into operation and a vested right has
accrued to another, the new provision cannot revive the barred right or
take away the accrued vested right. At this juncture, we may again note
Section 6 of the General Clauses Act, as reproduced herein earlier.
Section 6 of the General Clauses Act clearly provides that unless a
different intention appears, the repeal shall not revive anything not in
force or existing at the time at which the repeal takes effect, or affects the
previous operation of any enactment so repealed or anything duly done
or suffered thereunder, or affect any right, privilege, obligation or liability
acquired, accrued, or incurred under any enactment so repealed.

2008 (12) SCC 698

Before:- Arijit Pasayat :J , P.Sathasivam :J

North West Karnataka Road Transport Corpn.

Versus
H.H.Pujar

In State of Haryana and Anr. v. Rattan Singh (1977 (2) SCC 491), it was,
inter alia, held as follows:

"4. It is well settled that in a domestic enquiry the strict and

sophisticated rules of evidence under the Indian Evidence Act may not
apply. All materials which are logically probative for a prudent mind are
permissible. There is no allergy to hearsay evidence provided it has
reasonable nexus and credibility. It is true that departmental authorities
and Administrative Tribunals must be careful in evaluating such
material and should not glibly swallow what is strictly speaking not
relevant under the Indian Evidence Act.
2008 (16) SCC 328

Before:- Arijit Pasayat :J , P.Sathasivam :J

Asraf Ali
Versus
State of Assam

16. Thus it is well settled that the provision is mainly intended to

benefit the accused and as its corollary to benefit the court in reaching
the final conclusion.

17. At the same time it should be borne in mind that the provision is not
intended to nail him to any position, but to comply with the most
salutary principle of natural justice enshrined in the maxim audi alteram
partem. The word "may" in clause (a) of sub-section(1) in Section 313 of
the Code indicates, without any doubt, that even if the court does not
put any question under that clause the accused cannot raise any
grievance for it. But if the court fails to put the needed question under
clause (b) of the sub-section it would result in a handicap to the accused
and he can legitimately claim that no evidence, without affording him the
opportunity to explain, can be used against him. It is now well settled
that a circumstance about which the accused was not asked to explain
cannot be used against him.
18. In certain cases when there is perfunctory examination under
Section 313 of the Code, the matter is remanded to the trial Court, with a
direction to re-try from the stage at which the prosecution was closed.

2008 (9) SCC 368

Before:- C.K.Thakker :J , Lokeshwar Singh Panta :J

Rajinder Singh
Versus
State of Jammu & Kashmir & Ors.

It is well settled that Revenue Records confer no title on the party. It

has been recently held by this Court in Suraj Bhan & Ors. v. Financial
Commissioner & Ors., (2007) 6 SCC 186, that such entries are relevant
only for "fiscal purpose" and substantive rights of title and of ownership
of contesting claimants can be decided only by a competent civil Court in
appropriate proceedings.

In Suraj Bhan and Others v. Financial Commissioner and Others [(2007)

6 SCC 186], this Court held:

"...It is well settled that an entry in revenue records does not confer
title on a person whose name appears in record-of-rights. It is settled law
that entries in the revenue records or jamabandi have only "fiscal
purpose" i.e. payment of land revenue, and no ownership is conferred on
the basis of such entries. So far as title to the property is concerned, it
can only be decided by a competent civil court (vide Jattu Ram v. Hakam
Singh)..."

2008 (12) SCC 481 : 2008 (5) Supreme 287

Before:- C.K.Thakker :J , D.K.Jain :J

K.D.Sharma
Versus
Steel Authority of India Ltd.& Ors.

16. Reference was also made to a recent decision of this Court in A.V.
Papayya Sastry & Ors. v. Govt. of A.P. & Ors., (2007) 4 SCC 221.
Considering English and Indian cases, one of us (C.K. Thakker, J.)
stated:

"It is thus settled proposition of law that a judgment, decree or order

obtained by playing fraud on the Court, Tribunal or Authority is a nullity
and non est in the eye of law. Such a judgment, decree or order-by the
first Court or by the final Court-- has to be treated as nullity by every
Court, superior or inferior. It can be challenged in any Court, at any
time, in appeal, revision, writ or even in collateral proceedings".
2008 (14) SCC 58

Before:- C.K.Thakker :J , D.K.Jain :J

Ramesh Chandra Sankla Etc.

Versus
Vikram Cement Etc.

It is well settled that generally, all issues arising in a suit or proceeding

should be tried together and a judgment should be pronounced on those
issues.

65. Before more than hundred years, the Privy Council in Tarakant v.
Puddomoney, (1866) 10 MIA 476, favoured this approach.

66. Speaking for the Judicial Committee, Lord Turner stated:

"The Courts below, in appealable cases, by forbearing from deciding on

all the issues joined, not infrequently oblige this Committee to
recommend that a cause be remanded which might otherwise be finally
decided on appeal. This is certainly a serious evil to the parties litigant,
as it may involve the expense of a second appeal as well as that of
another hearing below. It is much to be desired, therefore, that in
appealable cases the Courts below should, as far as may be practicable,
pronounce their opinions on all the important points". (emphasis
supplied)
67. The above principle has been consistently followed. This Court
dealing with the provisions of Order XIV Rule 2 (prior to the amendment
Act of 1976), in Major S.S. Khanna v. Brigadiar F.J. Dillion, (1964) 4 SCR
409, stated;

"Under Order 14 Rule 2, Code of Civil Procedure, where issues both of

law and of fact arise in the same suit, and the Court is of opinion that
the case or any part thereof may be disposed of on the issues of law only,
it shall try those issues first, and for that purpose may, if it thinks fit,
postpone the settlement of the issues of fact until after the issues of law
have been determined. The jurisdiction to try issues of law apart from the
issues of fact may be exercised only where in the opinion of the Court the
whole suit may be disposed of on the issues of law alone, but the Code
confers no jurisdiction upon the Court to try a suit on mixed issues of
law and fact as preliminary issues. Normally all the issues in a suit
should be tried by the Court; not to do so, especially when the decision
on issues even of law depend upon the decision of issues of fact, would
result in a lop-sided trial of the suit". (emphasis supplied)

68. The Law Commission also considered the question and did not favour
the tendency of deciding some issues as preliminary issues. Dealing with
Rule 2 of Order XIV (before the amendment), the Commission stated;

"This rule has led to one difficulty. Where a case can be disposed of on a
preliminary point (issue) of law, often the courts do not inquire into the
merits, with the result that when, on an appeal against the finding on
the preliminary issue the decision of the Court on that issue is reversed,
the case has to be remanded to the Court of first instance for trial on the
other issues. This causes delay. It is considered that this delay should be
eliminated, by providing that a court must give judgment on all issues,
excepting, of course, where the Court finds that it has no jurisdiction or
where the suit is barred by any law for the time being in force".
(emphasis supplied)

2008 (8) SCC 564 : 2008 (4) Supreme 360

Before:- A.K.Mathur :J , Tarun Chatterjee :J

K.B.Saha & Sons Pvt.Ltd.

Versus
Development Consultant Ltd.

20. In the case of Rana Vidya Bhushan Singh Vs. Ratiram [1969 (1) UJ
86 (SC)], the following has been laid down:

"A document required by law to be registered, if unregistered, is

inadmissible as evidence of a transaction affecting immovable property,
but it may be admitted as evidence of collateral facts, or for any collateral
purpose, that is for any purpose other than that of creating, declaring,
assigning, limiting or extinguishing a right to immovable property. As
stated by Mulla in his Indian Registration Act, 7th En., at p. 189:

"The High Courts of Calcutta, Bombay, Allahabad, Madras, Patna,

Lahore, Assam, Nagpur, Pepsu, Rajasthan, Orissa, Rangoon and Jammu
& Kashmir; the former Chief Court of Oudh; the Judicial Commissioner's
Court of Peshawar, Ajmer and Himachal Pradesh and the Supreme Court
have held that a document which requires registration under Section 17
and which is not admissible for want of registration to prove a gift or
mortgage or sale or lease is nevertheless admissible to prove the
character of the possession of the person who holds under it."

21. From the principles laid down in the various decisions of this Court
and the High Courts, as referred to hereinabove, it is evident that:-

1. A document required to be registered is not admissible into evidence

under Section 49 of the Registration Act.

2. Such unregistered document can however be used as an evidence of

collateral purpose as provided in the Proviso to Section 49 of the
Registration Act.

3. A collateral transaction must be independent of, or divisible from, the

transaction to effect which the law required registration.

4. A collateral transaction must be a transaction not itself required to be

effected by a registered document, that is, a transaction creating, etc.
any right, title or interest in immoveable property of the value of one
hundred rupees and upwards.

5. If a document is inadmissible in evidence for want of registration, none

of its terms can be admitted in evidence and that to use a document for
the purpose of proving an important clause would not be using it as a
collateral purpose.

2008 (9) Scale 182

Before:- H.K.Sema :J , Markandey Katju :J

Union of India
Versus
Prabhakaran Vijaya Kumar & Ors.

It is well settled that if the words used in a beneficial or welfare statute

are capable of two constructions, the one which is more in consonance
with the object of the Act and for the benefit of the person for whom the
Act was made should be preferred. In other words, beneficial or welfare
statutes should be given a liberal and not literal or strict interpretation
vide Alembic Chemical Works Co. Ltd. v. The Workmen AIR 1961 SC
647(para 7), Jeewanlal Ltd. v. Appellate Authority AIR 1984 SC 1842
(para 11), Lalappa Lingappa and others v. Laxmi Vishnu Textile Mills
Ltd. AIR 1981 SC 852 (para 13), S. M. Nilajkar v. Telecom Distt. Manager
(2003) 4 SCC 27(para 12) etc.

13. In Hindustan Lever Ltd. v. Ashok Vishnu Kate and others 1995(6)
SCC 326 (vide para 42) this Court observed:
"In this connection, we may usefully turn to the decision of this Court in
Workmen vs. American Express International Banking Corporation
wherein Chinnappa Reddy, J. in para 4 of the Report has made the
following observations:

The principles of statutory construction are well settled. Words occurring

in statutes of liberal import such as social welfare legislation and human
rights' legislation are not to be put in Procrustean beds or shrunk to
Lilliputian dimensions. In construing these legislations the imposture of
literal construction must be avoided and the prodigality of its
misapplication must be recognized and reduced. Judges ought to be
more concerned with the 'colour', the 'content' and the 'context' of such
statutes (we have borrowed the words from Lord Wilberforce's opinion in
Prenn v. Simmonds). In the same opinion Lord Wilberforce pointed out
that law is not to be left behind in some island of literal interpretation
but is to enquire beyond the language, unisolated from the matrix of
facts in which they are set; the law is not to be interpreted purely on
internal linguistic considerations.

2008 (8) Supreme 453

Before:- C.K.Thakker :J , D.K.Jain :J

State of Uttar Pradesh & Anr.

Versus
U.P.Rajya Khanij Vikas Nigam S.S.& Ors.
It is settled law that there can be no estoppel against a statute.
46. It is well settled that a Court of Law can direct the Government or
an instrumentality of State by mandamus to act in consonance with law
and not in violation of statutory provisions.

2008 (12) SCC 181 : 2008 (5) Supreme 45

Before:- Aftab Alam :J , P.P.Naolekar :J

Mahant Dooj Das (Dead) through LR.

Versus
Udasin Panchayati Bara Akhara & Anr.

16. In Abdul Waheed Khan v. Bhawani and Others, AIR 1966 SC 1718, it
was held that it is settled principle that it is for the party who seeks to
oust the jurisdiction of a civil court to establish his contention and it is
also equally well settled that a statute ousting the jurisdiction of a civil
court must be strictly constructed.

In Sri Vedagiri Lakshmi Narasimha Swami Temple v. Induru

Pattabhirami Reddi, AIR 1967 SC 781, this Court held that under
Section 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the courts shall have
jurisdiction to try all suits of civil nature excepting suits of which there is
a bar expressly or impliedly provided. It is well settled principle that a
party seeking to oust jurisdiction of an ordinary civil court shall establish
the right to do so.

In Smt. Bismillah v. Janeshwar Prasad and Others, (1990) 1 SCC 207,

this Court has reiterated the principle laid down and said that it is
settled law that exclusion of the jurisdiction of the civil court is not to be
readily inferred, but that such exclusion must either be explicitly
expressed or clearly implied. The provisions of law which seek to oust the
jurisdiction of civil court need to be strictly construed.

In Sahebgouda (Dead) by LRs. and Others v. Ogeppa and Others, (2003)

6 SCC 151, this Court has held that it is well settled that a provision of
law ousting the jurisdiction of a civil court must be strictly construed
and onus lies on the party seeking to oust the jurisdiction to establish
his right to do so.

In Dwarka Prasad Agarwal (D) by LRs. v. Ramesh Chander Agarwal and

Others, (2003) 6 SCC 220, a 3-Judge Bench has held that Section 9 of
the Code of Civil Procedure confers jurisdiction upon the civil courts to
determine all disputes of civil nature unless the same is barred under a
statute either expressly or by necessary implication. Bar of jurisdiction of
a civil court is not to be readily inferred. A provision seeking to bar
jurisdiction of a civil court requires strict interpretation. The court, it is
well settled, would normally lean in favour of construction, which would
uphold retention of jurisdiction of the civil court. The burden of proof in
this behalf shall be on the party who asserts that the civil court's
jurisdiction is ousted.
2008 (7) SCC 46

Before:- S.B.Sinha :J , V.S.Sirpurkar :J

Hardeo Rai
Versus
Sakuntala Devi and others

In M.V.S. Manikayala Rao v. M. Naraisimhaswami and others, AIR 1966

SC 470 this Court stated the law thus:-

"It is well settled that the purchaser of a coparcener's undivided

interest in joint family property is not entitled to possession of what he
has purchased."

2008 (3) Supreme 217

Before:- S.B.Sinha :J , V.S.Sirpurkar :J

Usha Breco Mazdoor Sangh

Versus
Management of M/s.Usha Breco Ltd.& Anr.
In Ajit Kumar Nag v. General Manager (PJ), Indian Oil Corpn. Ltd.,
Haldia and Others [(2005) 7 SCC 764], a Three-Judge Bench of this
Court opined:

" It is well settled that the burden of proving mala fide is on the person
making the allegations and the burden is "very heavy". (vide E.P.
Royappa v. State of T.N.) There is every presumption in favour of the
administration that the power has been exercised bona fide and in good
faith. It is to be remembered that the allegations of mala fide are often
more easily made than made out and the very seriousness of such
allegations demands proof of a high degree of credibility."

2008 (12) SCC 577

Before:- A.K.Mathur :J , Altamas Kabir :J

Kamlesh Babu & Ors.

Versus
Lajpat Rai Sharma & Ors.

"3. Bar of limitation. - (1) Subject to the provisions contained in Sections

4 to 24 (inclusive), every suit instituted, appeal preferred, and application
made after the prescribed period shall be dismissed although limitation
had not been set up as a defence."
16. Even in the decision of this Court in Darshan Singh's case (supra)
the said provision does not appear to have been brought to the notice of
the Hon'ble Judges who decided the matter.

17. It is well settled that Section 3(1) of the Limitation Act casts a duty
upon the court to dismiss a suit or an appeal or an application, if made
after the prescribed period, although, limitation is not set up as a
defence.

2008 (14) SCC 151

Before:- B.N.Agrawal :J , D.K.Jain :J , P.P.Naolekar :J

Sahara India (Firm), Lucknow

Versus
Commissioner of Income Tax,Central-I & Anr.

It is well settled that the principle audi alteram partem can be excluded
only when a statute contemplates a post decisional hearing amounting to
a full review of the original order on merit

2008 (14) SCC 283

Before:- Ashok Bhan :J , Dalveer Bhandari :J

Pradip J.Mehta
Versus
Commissioner of Income Tax, Ahmedabad

. It is well settled that when two interpretations are possible, then

invariably, the Court would adopt the interpretation which is in favour of
the tax payer and against the Revenue. Reference may be made to the
decision in Sneh Enterprises v. Commissioner of Customs, New Delhi
[(2006) 7 SCC 714], of this Court wherein, inter alia, it was observed as
under:

"While dealing with a taxing provision, the principle of "Strict

Interpretation" should be applied. The Court shall not interpret the
statutory provision in such a manner which would create an additional
fiscal burden on a person. It would never be done by invoking the
provisions of another Act, which are not attracted. It is also trite that
while two interpretations are possible, the Court ordinarily would
interpret the provisions in favour of a tax-payer and against the
Revenue."

2008 (5) SCC 124

Before:- Arijit Pasayat :J , P.Sathasivam :J

M.R.Satwaji Rao (D) by L.Rs.

Versus
B.Shama Rao (Dead) by L.Rs.& Ors.

In Jayasingh Dnyanu Mhoprekar and Another v. Krishna Babaji Patil

and Another, (1985) 4 SCC 162, again considering similar claim with
reference to Section 83 of the Transfer of Property Act and Section 90 of
the Indian Trusts Act, this Court held:

"6. The only question which arises for decision in this case is whether by
reason of the grant made in favour of the defendants the right to redeem
the mortgage can be treated as having become extinguished. It is well
settled that the right of redemption under a mortgage deed can come to
an end only in a manner known to law. Such extinguishment of right can
take place by a contract between the parties, by a merger or by a
statutory provision which debars the mortgagor from redeeming the
mortgage. A mortgagee who has entered into possession of the mortgaged
property under a mortgage will have to give up possession of the property
when the suit for redemption is filed unless he is able to show that the
right of redemption has come to an end or that the suit is liable to be
dismissed on some other valid ground. This flows from the legal principle
which is applicable to all mortgages, namely "Once a mortgage, always a
mortgage".....

2008 (8) SCC 42

Before:- Arijit Pasayat :J , S.H.Kapadia :J

Novva ADS
Versus
Secretary, Deptt.of Municipal Administration and Water Supply and
Anr.

It is well settled that a delegated legislation would have to be read in

the context of the primary statute under which it is made and, in case of
any conflict, it is primary legislation that will prevail.

2008 (2) Supreme 752

Before:- Lokeshwar Singh Panta :J , P.P.Naolekar :J

Bal Krishna & Anr.

Versus
Bhagwan Das (Dead)by Lrs.& Ors.

In Syed Dastagir v. T.R. Gopalakrishna Setty, AIR 1999 SC 3029, this

Court has held in para 9 as under:

> In construing a plea in any pleading, Courts must keep in mind that
a plea is not an expression of art and science but an expression through
words to place fact and law of one's case for a relief. Such an expression
may be pointed, precise, some times vague but still could be gathered
what he wants to convey through only by reading the whole pleading,
depends on the person drafting a plea. In India most of the pleas are
drafted by counsels hence aforesaid difference of pleas which inevitably
differ from one to other. Thus, to gather true spirit behind a plea it
should be read as a whole. This does not distract one from performing
his obligations as required under a statute. ¡

In Motilal Jain v. Ramdasi Devi (Smt.) and Others, (2000) 6 SCC 420,
this Court has held that an averment as to readiness and willingness in
plaint is sufficient if the plaint, read as a whole, clearly indicates that the
plaintiff was always and is still ready and willing to fulfil his part of the
obligations. Such averment is not a mathematical formula capable of
being expressed only in certain specific words or terms. Further, in
Umabai and Another v. Nilkanth Dhondiba Chavan (Dead) by LRs. and
Anr., (2005) 6 SCC 243, this Court in para 30 has said as under:

>It is well settled that the conduct of the parties, with a view to arrive
at a finding as to whether the plaintiff-respondents were all along and
still are ready and willing to perform their part of contract as is
mandatorily required under Section 16(c) of the Specific Relief Act must
be determined having regard to the entire attending circumstances. A
bare averment in the plaint or a statement made in the examination-in-
chief would not suffice. The conduct of the plaintiff-respondents must be
judged having regard to the entirety of the pleadings as also the
evidences brought on records.

2008 (2) Supreme 548

Before:- B.Sudershan Reddy :J , S.H.Kapadia :J

Bhikhubhai Vithlabhai Patel & Ors.

Versus
State of Gujarat & Anr.

It is well settled that when a statutory authority is required to do a

thing in a particular manner, the same must be done in that manner or
not at all. The State and other authorities while acting under the said Act
are only creature of statute. They must act within the four corners
thereof.

2008 (2) Supreme 413

Before:- S.B.Sinha :J , V.S.Sirpurkar :J

Vimlaben Ajitbhai Patel

Versus
Vatslabeen Ashokbhai Patel and others

It is well settled that apparent state of affairs of state shall be taken a

real state of affairs. It is not for an owner of the property to establish that
it is his self-acquired property and the onus would be on the one, who
pleads contra.

2008 (2) Supreme 629

Before:- Ashok Bhan :J , J.M.Panchal :J

Synco Industries Ltd.
Versus
Assessing Officer, Income Tax, Mumbai & Anr.

It is well settled that where the predominant majority of the High

Courts have taken certain view on the interpretation of certain
provisions, the Supreme Court would lean in favour of the predominant
view.

2008 (4) SCC 755

Before:- H.K.Sema :J , Markandey Katju :J

Gujarat Urja Vikash Nigam Ltd.

Versus
Essar Power Ltd.

It is well settled that sometimes `and' can mean `or' and sometimes `or'
can mean `and' (vide G.P. Singh's `Principle of Statutory Interpretation'
9th Edition, 2004 page 404.)
It is well settled that the special law overrides the general law. Hence,
in our opinion, Section 11 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996
has no application to the question who can adjudicate/arbitrate disputes
between licensees and generating companies, and only Section 86(1)(f)
shall apply in such a situation.
2008 (2) SCC 41

Before:- C.K.Thakker :J , P.Sathasivam :J

U.P.State Sugar Corporation Ltd.& Ors.

Versus
Kamal Swaroop Tondon

Now it is well settled that retiral benefits are earned by an employee for
long and meritorious services rendered by him/her. They are not paid to
the employee gratuitously or merely as a matter of boon. It is paid to
him/her for his/her dedicated and devoted work.

2007 (8) Supreme 437

Before:- A.K.Mathur :J , Markandey Katju :J

Union of India
Versus
S.R.Dhingra and Ors.

It is well-settled that a mistake does not confer any right to any party,
and can be corrected.
2008 (2) SCC 728

Before:- P.Sathasivam :J , Tarun Chatterjee :J

Nopany Investments (P) Ltd.

Versus
Santokh Singh (HUF)

It is well settled that in the case of reversal, the first appellate court
ought to give some reason for reversing the findings of the trial court
whereas in the case of affirmation, the first appellate court accepts the
reasons and findings of the trial court.
In Santosh Hazari's case [supra], this court observed:-

"The task of an appellate court affirming the findings of the trial court is
an easier one. The appellate court agreeing with the view of the trial
court need not restate the effect of the evidence or reiterate the reasons
given by the trial court; expression of general agreement with the reasons
given by the court, decision of which is under appeal, would ordinarily
suffice." (Emphasis supplied).

Again, in Madhukar & Ors. Vs. Sangram & Ors. [supra], this court had to
set aside the judgment of the High Court because the first appellate
court was singularly silent as to any discussion, either of the
documentary or the oral evidence. In addition, this court in that decision
was of the view that the findings of the first appellate court were so
cryptic that none of the relevant aspects were noticed. In this
background, this court at paragraph 8 observed as follows:-

"Our careful perusal of the judgment in the first appeal shows that it
hopelessly falls short of considerations which are expected from the court
of first appeal. We, accordingly set aside the impugned judgment and
decree of the High Court and remand the first appeal to the High Court
for its fresh disposal in accordance with law."

2007 (13) Scale 808

Before:- A.K.Mathur :J , Markandey Katju :J

U.P.State Agro Industrial Corporation Ltd.

Versus
Kisan Upbhokta Parishad & Ors.

it is well settled that ordinarily the meaning of the word or expression

in common parlance or in common use should be accepted, unless the
statute or order in which it is used has defined it with a specific
meaning.

2008 (1) SCC 560

Before:- J.M.Panchal :J , S.B.Sinha :J

Sheikh Abdul Rashid & Ors.
Versus
State of Jammu & Kashmir & Ors.

In State of Bihar and Others v. Akhouri Sachindra Nath and Others

[1991 Supp (1) SCC 334], this Court held:

" .. It is well settled that no person can be promoted with retrospective

effect from a date when he was not born in the cadre so as to adversely
affect others. It is well settled by several decisions of this Court that
amongst members of the same grade seniority is reckoned from the date
of their initial entry into the service ."

2007 (13) Scale 602

Before:- P.Sathasivam :J , Tarun Chatterjee :J

K.N.Ananthraja Gupta
Versus
D.V.Usha Vijaykumar

It is well settled that a co-owner is entitled to evict a tenant on the

ground of bona fide requirement.
2008 (1) SCC 362

Before:- A.K.Mathur :J , Markandey Katju :J

B.Ramakichenin @ Balagandhi
Versus
Union of India & Ors.
15. It is well settled that the method of short-listing can be validly
adopted by the Selection Body vide Madhya Pradesh Public Service
Commission v. Navnit Kumar Potdar and another, 1994(6) SCC 293 (vide
paras 6, 8, 9 and 13), Government of Andhra Pradesh v. P. Dilip Kumar
and another, 1993(2) SCC 310, etc.

16. Even if there is no rule providing for short-listing nor any mention of
it in the advertisement calling for applications for the post, the Selection
Body can resort to a short-listing procedure if there are a large number
of eligible candidates who apply and it is not possible for the authority to
interview all of them. For example, if for one or two posts there are more
than 1000 applications received from eligible candidates, it may not be
possible to interview all of them. In this situation, the procedure of short-
listing can be resorted to by the Selection Body, even though there is no
mention of short-listing in the rules or in the advertisement.

2007 (8) Supreme 112

Before:- B.Sudershan Reddy :J , P.P.Naolekar :J

Paramjit Singh @ Mithu Singh
Versus
State of Punjab Through Secretary (Home)

it is well settled that even a defect, if any, found in investigation,

however, serious has no direct bearing on the competence or the
procedure relating to the cognizance or the trial. A defect or procedural
irregularity, if any, in investigation itself cannot vitiate and nullify the
trial based on such erroneous investigation.

2007 (7) Supreme 595

Before:- Arijit Pasayat :J , P.Sathasivam :J

State of Uttranchal & Anr.

Versus
Prantiya Sinchai Avam Bandh Yogana Shramik Mahaparishad

it is well settled that only because a person had been working for more
than 240 days, he does not derive any legal right to be regularized in
service. This view has been reiterated in Gangadhar Pillai v. Siemens Ltd.
(2007 (1) SCC 533). The same question has been examined in
considerable detail with reference to employee working in a Government
Company in Indian Drugs and Pharmaceuticals Ltd. v. Workman, Indian
Drugs & Pharmaceuticals Ltd. (2007 (1) SCC 408) and paragraphs 34
and 35 of the judgment are being reproduced below:-

>34. Thus, it is well settled that there is no right vested in any daily
wager to seek regularization. Regularization can only be done in
accordance with the rules and not de hors the rules. In the case of E.
Ramakrishnan and Ors. v. State of Kerala and Ors. (1996) 10 5CC 565)
this Court held that there can be no regularization de hors the rules. The
same view was taken in Dr. Kishore v. State of Maharashtra (1997) 3
SCC 209) and Union of India and Ors. v. Bishambar Dutt (1996) 11 SCC
341). The direction issued by the Services Tribunal for regularizing the
services of persons who had not been appointed, on regular basis in
accordance with the rules was set aside although the petitioner had been
working regularly for a long time.

2007 (11) SCC 747

Before:- A.K.Mathur :J , Markandey Katju :J

G.K.Mohan and Ors.

Versus
Union of India & Ors.

It is well settled that categorization can be done on the basis of

educational qualifications and there will be no violation of Article 14 if
this is done.
2007 (12) Scale 374

Before:- H.S.Bedi :J , S.B.Sinha :J

Niyamat Ali Molla

Versus
Sonargon Housing Co-operative Society Ltd.& Ors.

20. In Samarendra Nath Sinha & Anr. v. Krishna Kumar Nag [(1967) 2
SCR 18, this Court held:

>Now it is well settled that there is an inherent power in the court

which passed the judgment to correct a clerical mistake or an error
arising from an accidental slip or omission and to vary its judgment so as
to give effect to its meaning and intention. 'Every court,' said Bowen L.J.
in Mellor v. Swira [30 Ch. 239] 'has inherent power over its own records
so long as those records are within its power and that it can set right any
mistake in them. An order even when passed and entered may be
amended by the court so as to carry out its intention and express the
meaning of the court when the order was made.- In Jankirama Iyer v.
Nilakanta Iyer [AIR 1962 SC 633] the decree as drawn up in the High
Court had used the words 'mesne profits' instead of 'net profits'. In fact
the use of the words 'mesne profits' came to be made probably because
while narranting the facts, those words were inadvertently used in the
judgment.
2007 (8) SCC 329

Before:- P.K.Balasubramanyan :J , Tarun Chatterjee :J

Saroja
Versus
Chinnusamy (Dead) by L.Rs and Anr.

It is well settled that an ex parte decree is binding as a decree passed

after contest on the person against whom such an ex parte decree has
been passed. It is equally well settled that an ex parte decree would be so
treated unless the party challenging the ex parte decree satisfies the
court that such an ex parte decree has been obtained by fraud.

2007 (7) SCC 120

Before:- S.H.Kapadia :J

Aurohili Global Commodities Ltd.

Versus
M.S.T.C.Ltd.
it is well settled that parties have to stand by the terms of the contract.

2007 (6) SCC 167

Before:- Markandey Katju :J , Tarun Chatterjee :J

Andhra Bank
Versus
ABN Amro Bank N.V.and Ors.

It is well settled that delay is no ground for refusal of prayer for

amendment.

2007 (4) Supreme 572

Before:- Lokeshwar Singh Panta :J , R.V.Raveendran :J

B.Arvind Kumar
Versus
Government of India & Ors.

It is well settled that when an auction purchaser derives title on

confirmation of sale in his favour, and a sale certificate is issued
evidencing such sale and title, no further deed of transfer from the court
is contemplated or required.
2007 (4) Supreme 359

Before:- Markandey Katju :J , S.B.Sinha :J

State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors.

Versus
Jeet S.Bisht & Anr.

It is well settled that a mere direction of the Supreme Court without

laying down any principle of law is not a precedent. It is only where the
Supreme Court lays down a principle of law that it will amount to a
precedent.

22. In Municipal Committee, Amritsar vs. Hazara Singh, AIR 1975 SC

1087, the Supreme Court observed that only a statement of law in a
decision is binding. In State of Punjab vs. Baldev Singh, 1999 (6) SCC
172, this Court observed that everything in a decision is not a precedent.
In Delhi Administration vs. Manoharlal, AIR 2002 SC 3088, the Supreme
Court observed that a mere direction without laying down any principle
of law is not a precedent. In Divisional Controller, KSRTC vs. Mahadeva
Shetty 2003 (7) SCC 197, this Court observed as follows:

"...The decision ordinarily is a decision on the case before the Court,

while the principle underlying the decision would be binding as a
precedent in a case which comes up for decision subsequently. The scope
and authority of a precedent should never be expanded unnecessarily
beyond the needs of a given situation. The only thing binding as an
authority upon a subsequent Judge is the principle, upon which the case
was decided .."

2007 (5) SCC 614

Before:- B.P.Singh :J , H.S.Bedi :J

Hardesh Ores Pvt.Ltd.

Versus
Hede and Company

It is well settled that whether a plaint discloses a cause of action is

essentially a question of fact, but whether it does or does not must be
found out from reading the plaint itself. For the said purpose the
averments made in the plaint in their entirety must be held to be correct.
The test is whether the averments made in the plaint if taken to be
correct in their entirety a decree would be passed. The averments made
in the plaint as a whole have to be seen to find out whether clause (d) of
Rule 11 of Order VII is applicable. It is not permissible to cull out a
sentence or a passage and to read it out of the context in isolation.
Although it is the substance and not merely the form that has to be
looked into, the pleading has to be construed as it stands without
addition or subtraction of words or change of its apparent grammatical
sense. As observed earlier, the language of clause (d) is quite clear but if
any authority is required, one may usefully refer to the judgments of this
court in Liverpool & London S.P. & I Association Ltd. Vs. M.V. Sea
Success I and another : (2004) 9 SCC 512 and Popat and Kotecha
Property Vs. State Bank of India Staff Association : (2005) 7 SCC 510.

2007 (5) Supreme 557

Before:- C.K.Thakker :J , Tarun Chatterjee :J

State of Bihar & Ors.

Versus
Bihar State +2 Lecturers Associations & Ors.

The Constitution Bench of this Court stated:-

" It is well settled that though Article 14 forbids class legislation, it

does not forbid reasonable classification for the purposes of legislation.
When any impugned rule or statutory provision is assailed on the ground
that it contravenes Article 14, its validity can be sustained if two tests
are satisfied. The first test is that the classification on which it is founded
must be based on an intelligible differentia which distinguishes persons
or things grouped together from others left out of the group, and the
second test is that the differentia in question must have a reasonable
relation to the object sought to be achieved by the rule or statutory
provision in question. In other words, there must be some rational nexus
between the basis of classification and the object intended to be achieved
by the statute or the rule."

2007 (5) SCC 634

Before:- C.K.Thakker :J , P.K.Balasubramanyan :J

Suman Sood @ Kamal Jeet Kaur

Versus
State of Rajasthan

it is well settled that an inference as to conspiracy can be drawn from

the surrounding circumstances inasmuch as normally, no direct
evidence of conspiracy is available.

2007 (3) Supreme 1019

Before:- Markandey Katju :J , S.B.Sinha :J

Sujoy Sen @ Sujoy Kr.Sen

Versus
State of West Bengal

it is well settled that in a case of circumstantial evidence the

prosecution has to establish the chain of circumstances which inevitably
connect the accused to the crime. Even if a single link breaks, the whole
prosecution case collapses.

2007 (6) SCC 100

Before:- Markandey Katju :J , S.B.Sinha :J

Binapani Paul
Versus
Pratima Ghosh & Ors.

It is well settled that intention of the parties is the essence of the

benami transaction and the money must have been provided by the party
invoking the doctrine of benami.

2007 (4) Supreme 165

Before:- Markandey Katju :J , S.B.Sinha :J

Bharat Petroleum Corpn.Ltd.

Versus
Maddula Ratnavalli & Ors.

it is well settled that when there is a conflict between law and equity, it
is the law which has to prevail, in accordance with the Latin maxim 'dura
lex sed lex', which means 'the law is hard, but it is the law'. Equity can
only supplement the law, but it cannot supplant or override it. ¡

20. A statute, however, must be construed justly. An unjust law is no law

at all (Lex injusta non est lex).

2007 (4) Supreme 154

Before:- B.Sudershan Reddy :J , S.H.Kapadia :J

Asharam & Anr.

Versus
State of Madhya Pradesh

It is well settled that an FIR is not a substantive piece of evidence. It

cannot contradict the testimony of the eye witnesses even though it may
contradict its maker. (see Dharma Rama Bhagare v. The State of
Maharashtra reported in 1973 (3) SCR 92 at page 100).

2007 (5) SCC 519

Before:- Altamas Kabir :J , C.K.Thakker :J

Bihar Public Service Commission & Ors.

Versus
Kamini & Ors.
it is well settled that in the field of education, a Court of Law cannot
act as an expert. Normally, therefore, whether or not a
student/candidate possesses requisite qualifications should better be left
to educational institutions [vide University of Mysore v. Govinda Rao,
(1964) 4 SCR 576 : AIR 1965 SC 591]. This is particularly so when it is
supported by an Expert Committee.

2007 (5) Scale 34

Before:- P.K.Balasubramanyan :J , S.B.Sinha :J

Subhash Mahadevasa Habib

Versus
Nemasa Ambasa Dharmadas (D) by Lrs.& Ors.

In Seth Hiralal Patni Vs. Sri Kali Nath (supra), it was held that:

"It is well settled that the objection as to local jurisdiction of a court

does not stand on the same footing as an objection to the competence of
a court to try a case. Competence of a court to try a case goes to the very
root of the jurisdiction, and where it is lacking, it is a case of inherent
lack of jurisdiction. On the other hand, an objection as to the local
jurisdiction of a court can be waived and this principle has been given a
statutory recognition by enactments like S. 21 of the Code of Civil
Procedure."
In Bahrein Petroleum Co. Ltd. Vs. P.J. Pappu & Anr. (supra), it was held
Section 21 is a statutory recognition of the principle that the defect as to
the place of suing under Sections 15 to 20 of the Code may be waived
and that even independently of Section 21, a defendant may waive the
objection and may be subsequently precluded from taking it.

2007 (2) Supreme 936

Before:- A.R.Lakshmanan :J , Altamas Kabir :J

All Bengal Excise Licensees Association

Versus
Reghbendra Singh & Ors.

42. In Mulraj v. Murti Raghonathji Maharaj, this Court has dealt with
effect of a stay order passed by a court and has laid down:
In effect therefore a stay order is more or less in the same position as an
order of injunction with one difference. An order of injunction is generally
issued to a party and it is forbidden from doing certain acts. It is well
settled that in such a case the party must have knowledge of the
injunction order before it could be penalised for before disobeying it.
Further it is equally well-settled that the injunction order not being
addressed to the court, if the court proceeds in contravention of the
injunction order, the proceedings are not a nullity. In the case of a stay
order, as it is addressed to the court and prohibits it from proceeding
further, as soon as the court has knowledge of the order it is bound to
obey it and if it does not, it acts illegally, and all proceedings taken after
the knowledge of the order would be a nullity. That in our opinion is the
only difference between an order of injunction to a party and an order of
stay to a court.

2007 (1) Supreme 704

Before:- Markandey Katju :J , S.B.Sinha :J

Nagar Nigam, Meerut

Versus
Al Faheem Meat Exports Pvt.Ltd & Ors.

It is well settled that ordinarily the State or its instrumentalities should

not give contracts by private negotiation but by open public
auction/tender after wide publicity. In this case the contract has not only
been given by way of private negotiation, but the negotiation has been
carried out by the High Court itself, which is impermissible.
The law is well-settled that contracts by the State, its corporations,
instrumentalities and agencies must be normally granted through public
auction/public tender by inviting tenders from eligible persons and the
notification of the public-auction or inviting tenders should be advertised
in well known dailies having wide circulation in the locality with all
relevant details such as date, time and place of auction, subject-matter
of auction, technical specifications, estimated cost, earnest money
Deposit, etc. The award of Government contracts through public-
auction/public tender is to ensure transparency in the public
procurement, to maximise economy and efficiency in Government
procurement, to promote healthy competition among the tenderers, to
provide for fair and equitable treatment of all tenderers, and to eliminate
irregularities, interference and corrupt practices by the authorities
concerned. This is required by Article 14 of the Constitution. However, in
rare and exceptional cases, for instance during natural calamities and
emergencies declared by the Government; where the procurement is
possible from a single source only; where the supplier or contractor has
exclusive rights in respect of the goods or services and no reasonable
alternative or substitute exists; where the auction was held on several
dates but there were no bidders or the bids offered were too low, etc., this
normal rule may be departed from and such contracts may be awarded
through 'private negotiations'. (See Ram and Shyam Company vs. State
of Haryana and Others, AIR 1985 SC 1147).

2007 (2) SCC 230

Before:- Markandey Katju :J , S.B.Sinha :J

Raghunath Rai Bareja and another

Versus
Punjab National Bank and others
it is well settled that when there is a conflict between law and equity, it
is the law which has to prevail, in accordance with the Latin maxim
`dura lex sed lex', which means `the law is hard, but it is the law'. Equity
can only supplement the law, but it cannot supplant or override it.
Thus, in Madamanchi Ramappa & Anr. vs. Muthaluru Bojjappa AIR
1963 SC 1633 (vide para 12) this Court observed :
" . what is administered in Courts is justice according to law, and
considerations of fair play and equity however important they may be,
must yield to clear and express provisions of the law." .
In Council for Indian School Certificate Examination vs. Isha Mittal &
Anr. 2000(7) SCC 521 (vide para 4) this Court observed :
" . Considerations of equity cannot prevail and do not permit a High
Court to pass an order contrary to the law."
Similarly in P.M. Latha & Anr. vs. State of Kerala & Ors. 2003(3) SCC
541 (vide para 13) this Court observed :
"Equity and law are twin brothers and law should be applied and
interpreted equitably, but equity cannot override written or settled
law." ..
In Laxminarayan R. Bhattad & Ors. vs. State of Maharashtra & Anr.
2003(5) SCC 413 (vide para 73) this Court observed :
"It is now well settled that when there is a conflict between law and
equity the former shall prevail." ..
Similarly in (vide para 35) this Court observed :

"In a case where the statutory provision is plain and unambiguous, the
court shall not interpret the same in a different manner, only because of
harsh consequences arising therefrom." ..
Similarly in E. Palanisamy vs. Palanisamy (Dead) by Lrs. & Ors. 2003(1)
SCC 123 (vide para 5) this Court observed :
" .. Equitable considerations have no place where the statute contained
express provisions." ..
In India House vs. Kishan N. Lalwani 2003(9) SCC 393 (vide para 7) this
Court held that :

" ..The period of limitation statutorily prescribed has to be strictly

adhered to and cannot be relaxed or departed from by equitable
considerations."....

2007 (1) SCC 486

Before:- Arijit Pasayat :J , Lokeshwar Singh Panta :J

Srikant
Versus
District Magistrate, Bijapur & Ors.

It is well settled that a decision pronounced by a Court of competent

jurisdiction is binding between the parties unless it is modified or
reversed by adopting a procedure prescribed by law. It is in the interest
of public at large that finality should attach to the binding decisions
pronounced by a court of competent jurisdiction and it is also in the
public interest that individuals should not be vexed twice over with the
same kind of litigation.
In Union of India & others v. Chowgule & Co. Ltd. & others 2003(2) SCC
641, this Court held that even under the new policy, the appellant who
had an accrued right under the old policy was entitled to the benefits
under the new policy.
It is well settled that rights which have accrued under the old law
continue to exist unless there is an express or implied inconsistent
provision in the new law

It is well settled that legislation can be declared invalid or

unconstitutional only on two grounds namely, (i) lack of legislative
competence and (ii) violation of any fundamental rights or any provision
of the Constitution (See Smt. Indira Nehru Gandhi v. Raj Narain, [1975
Supp SCC 1] ).

2006 (6) Supreme 490

Before:- C.K.Thakker :J , Markandey Katju :J

Manalal Prabhudayal
Versus
Oriental Insurance Co.Ltd.
It is well settled that award of interest is in the discretion of court.
Normally, when interest is granted, appellate, revisional or writ court
would not interfere with exercise of discretion unless the discretion has
been exercised arbitrarily or capriciously. It is equally well settled that
like grant of interest, rate of interest is also in the discretion of the court
and in the absence of any agreement between the parties, usually, the
court would not interfere with rate of interest unless it is convinced that
the direction of the lower court was ex facie bad in law.

2006 (6) Supreme 292

Before:- Ashok Bhan :J , Markandey Katju :J

Vijayalashmi Rice Mill & Ors

Versus
Commercial Tax Officers, Palakol & Ors

It is well settled that the basic difference between a tax and a fee is that
a tax is a compulsory exaction of money by the State or a public
authority for public purposes, and is not a payment for some specific
services rendered. On the other hand, a fee is generally defined to be a
charge for a special service rendered by some governmental agency. In
other words there has to be quid pro quo in a fee vide Kewal Krishan Puri
vs. State of Punjab (AIR 1980 SC 1008).
2006 (6) Supreme 11

Before:- Arijit Pasayat :J , Lokeshwar Singh Panta :J

Reiz Electrocontrols Pvt.Ltd.

Versus
Commissioner of Central Excise, Delhi-I

It is well settled that registration of trade mark/brand name once

granted relates back to the date of application.

It is well settled that declaration of law can be made prospective i.e.

operative from the date of the judgment. This Court in several decisions
has laid down the law and declared it to be operative only prospectively.
The Constitution Bench of this Court in the matter of Somaiya Organics
(India) Ltd. & Anr. vs. State of U.P. & Anr. reported in (2001) 5 SCC 519
has discussed at length the principles of Prospective over-ruling

In Richpal Singh and Ors. v. Dalip (1987 (4) SCC 410), it was held as
under:

"12. It is well settled that ouster of jurisdiction of civil courts should

not be inferred easily. It must be clearly provided for and established."
2006 (4) Supreme 540

Before:- B.P.Singh :J , R.V.Raveendran :J

D.Vinod Shivappa
Versus
Nanda Belliappa

It is well settled that in interpreting a statute the court must adopt that
construction which suppresses the mischief and advances the remedy.
This is a rule laid down in Heydon's case (76 ER 637) also known as the
rule of purposive construction or mischief rule.

2006 (3) Supreme 386

Before:- P.K.Balasubramanyan :J , S.B.Sinha :J

Gursewak Singh
Versus
Avtar Singh and others

It is well settled that an order of re-counting of votes can be passed

when the following conditions are fulfilled:
(i) a prima facie case;

(ii) pleading of material facts stating irregularities in counting of votes;

(iii) a roving and fishing inquiry shall not be made while directing re-
counting of votes; and

(iv) an objection to the said effect has been taken recourse to."

16. The said dicta has been reiterated in M. Chinnasamy v. K.C.

Palanisamy and Others [(2004) 6 SCC 341], Hoshila Tiwari v. State of
Bihar and Others [(2005) 12 SCC 342] and Tanaji Ramchandra Nimhan
v. Swati Vinayak Nimhan & Ors. [2006 (2) SCALE 81]. The reason why
we referred to the said decisions is that at every level, in case of a
challenge to an election, pleadings of the parties have been held to play a
significant role.

2006 (8) Supreme 830

Before:- Altamas Kabir :J , B.P.Singh :J

Hansa Industries Pvt.Ltd.and Ors.

Versus
Kidarsons Industries Pvt.Ltd.
13. This Court held that courts have leaned in favour of upholding a
family arrangement instead of disturbing the same on technical or trivial
grounds. Where the courts find that the family arrangement suffers from
a legal lacuna or a formal defect the rule of estoppel is pressed into
service and is applied to shut out plea of the person who being a party to
family arrangement seeks to unsettle a settled dispute and claims to
revoke the family arrangement under which he has himself enjoyed some
material benefits. The principles were concretized and succinctly reduced
to the following propositions :-

"(1) The family settlement must be a bona fide one so as to resolve family
disputes and rival claims by a fair and equitable division or allotment of
properties between the various members of the family;

(2) The said settlement must be voluntary and should not be induced by
fraud, coercion or undue influence;

(3) The family arrangement may be even oral in which case no

registration is necessary;

(4) It is well settled that registration would be necessary only if the

terms of the family arrangement are reduced into writing. Here also, a
distinction should be made between a document containing the terms
and recitals of a family arrangement made under the document and a
mere memorandum prepared after the family arrangement had already
been made either for the purpose of the record or for information of the
Court for making necessary mutation. In such a case the memorandum
itself does not create or extinguish any rights in immoveable properties
and therefore does not fall within the mischief of Section 17(2) (sic)
(Section 17(1)(b)?) of the Registration Act and is, therefore, not
compulsorily registrable;

(5) The members who may be parties to the family arrangement must
have some antecedent title, claim or interest even a possible claim in the
property which is acknowledged by the parties to the settlement. Even if
one of the parties to the settlement has no title but under the
arrangement the other party relinquishes all its claims or titles in favour
of such a person and acknowledges him to be the sole owner, then the
antecedent title must be assumed and the family arrangement will be
upheld, and the Courts will find no difficulty in giving assent to the
same;

(6) Even if bona fide disputes, present or possible, which may not involve
legal claims are settled by a bona fide family arrangement which is fair
and equitable the family arrangement is final and binding on the parties
to the settlement."

14. The aforesaid judgment of this Court refers to many other decisions
to which we need not advert in this case but some of those decisions do
take the view that a compromise or family arrangement is based on the
assumption that there is an antecedent title of some sort in the parties
and the agreement acknowledges and defines what that title is, each
party relinquishing all claims to property other than that falling to his
share and recognising the right of the others, as they had previously
asserted it, to the portions allotted to them respectively. That explains
why no conveyance is required in these cases to pass the title from the
one in whom it resides to the person receiving it under the family
arrangement. It is assumed that the title claimed by the person receiving
the property under the arrangement had always resided in him or her so
far as the property falling to his or her share is concerned and therefore
no conveyance is necessary.

2006 (12) SCC 28

Before:- Markandey Katju :J , S.B.Sinha :J

Union of India & Anr.

Versus
Kunisetty Satyanarayana

It is well settled that a writ lies when some right of any party is
infringed. A mere show-cause notice or charge-sheet does not infringe
the right of any one. It is only when a final order imposing some
punishment or otherwise adversely affecting a party is passed, that the
said party can be said to have any grievance.

2006 (7) Supreme 151

Before:- Arijit Pasayat :J , Lokeshwar Singh Panta :J

State of Gujarat & Ors.

Versus
Dilipbhai Shaligram Patil

It is well settled that an order granting pending disposal of the writ

petition/suit or other proceedings, comes to an end with the disposal of
the substantive proceedings and that it is the duty of the Court in such a
case to put the parties in the same position, they would have been but
for the interim orders of the Court. Any other view would result in the act
or order of the court prejudicing the party for no fault of his and would
also mean rewarding writ petitioner in spite of his failure. Any such
unjust consequence cannot be countenanced by the courts. [(See
Kanoria Chemicals and Industries Ltd. v. U.P. State Electricity Board and
Ors. 1997 (5) SCC 772)].
The position was also highlighted in Shree Chamundi Mopeds Ltd. v.
Church of South India Trust Association CSI Cinod Secretariat, Madras
(1992 (3) SCC 1). It was inter alia noted as follows:-
"While considering the effect of an interim order staying the operation of
the order under-challenge, a distinction has to be made between
quashing of an order and stay of operation of an order. Quashing of an
order results in the restoration of the position as it stood on the date of
the passing of the order which has been quashed. The stay of operation
of an order does not, however, lead to such a result. It only means that
the order which has been stayed would not be operative from the date of
the passing of the stay order and it does not mean that the said order
has been wiped out from existence."

2006 (7) Supreme 359

Before:- Ashok Bhan :J , Markandey Katju :J

Baraka Overseas Traders

Versus
Director General of Foreign Trade & Anr.

It is well settled that rights which have accrued under the old law
continue to exist unless there is an express or implied inconsistent
provision in the new law vide 'Principles of Statutory Interpretation' by
Justice G.P. Singh, 9th Edition (2004) p. 586.

2006 (6) Supreme 777

Before:- A.R.Lakshmanan :J , Lokeshwar Singh Panta :J

Jindal Vijayanagar Steel (JSW Steel Ltd.)

Versus
Jindal Praxair Oxygen Company Ltd.

It is well settled that an action can be instituted only in a Court where

the immovable property is situated. Thus clause 12 of the Letters Patent
never arose for consideration.

2006 (7) Supreme 44

Before:- C.K.Thakker :J , K.G.Balakrishnan :J , P.K.Balasubramanyan :J
, S.H.Kapadia :J , Y.K.Sabharwal :J

Kuldip Nayar
Versus
Union of India & Ors.

It is well settled that legislation can be declared invalid or

unconstitutional only on two grounds namely, (i) lack of legislative
competence and (ii) violation of any fundamental rights or any provision
of the Constitution (See Smt. Indira Nehru Gandhi v. Raj Narain, [1975
Supp SCC 1] ).

It is well settled that a challenge to Legislation cannot be decided on

the basis of there being another view which may be more reasonable or
acceptable. A matter within the legislative competence of the legislature
has to be left to the discretion and wisdom of the latter so long as it does
not infringe any Constitutional provision or violate the Fundamental
rights.

2005 (7) Supreme 492

Before:- A.R.Lakshmanan :J , S.H.Kapadia :J , S.N.Variava :J

Sudhir G.Angur
Versus
M.Sanjeev

In our view, Mr. G.L. Sanghi is also right in submitting that it is a law on
the date of trial of the suit which is to be applied. In support of this
submission, Mr. Sanghi relied upon the Judgment in the case of Shiv
Bhagwan v. Onkarmal, A.I.R. 1952 Bombay 365, wherein it has been
held that no party has a vested right to a particular proceeding or to a
particular Forum. It has been held that it is well settled that all
procedural laws are retrospective unless the Legislature expressly states
to the contrary. It has been held that the procedural laws in force must
be applied at the date when the suit or proceeding comes on for trial or
disposal. It has been held that a Court is bound to take notice of the
change in the law and is bound to administer the law as it was when the
suit came up for hearing. It has been held that if a Court has jurisdiction
to try the suit, when it comes on for disposal, it then cannot refuse to
assume jurisdiction by reason of the fact that it had no jurisdiction to
entertain it at the date when it was instituted. We are in complete
agreement with these observations. As stated above, the Mysore Act now
stands repelled. It could not be denied that now the Court has
jurisdiction to entertain this suit.

. In Y.B. Patil (supra) it was held:

"4... It is well settled that principles of res judicata can be invoked not
only in separate subsequent proceedings, they also get attracted in
subsequent stage of the same proceedings. Once an order made in the
course of a proceeding becomes final, it would be binding at the
subsequent state of that proceeding..."

2005 (3) Supreme 574

Before:- N.Santosh Hegde :J , P.K.Balasubramanyan :J , Tarun

Chatterjee :J

Kasturi
Versus
Iyyamperumal

It is well settled that in a suit for specific performance of a contract for

sale the lis between the appellant and the respondent Nos. 2 and 3 shall
only be gone into and it is also not open to the Court to decide whether
the respondent Nos. 1 and 4 to 11 have acquired any title and possession
of the contracted property as that would not be germane for decision in
the suit for specific performance of the contract for sale, that is to say in
a suit for specific performance of the contract for sale the controversy to
be added raised by the appellant against respondent Nos. 2 and 3 can
only be adjudicated upon, and in such a lis the Court cannot decide the
question of title and possession of the respondent Nos. 1 and 4 to 11
relating to the contracted property.
2005 (3) Supreme 267

Before:- A.R.Lakshmanan :J , Ashok Bhan :J

Amarendra Komalam
Versus
Usha Sinha

It is well settled that once a issue of fact has been judicially determined
finally between the parties by a Court of competent jurisdiction and the
same issue comes directly in question in subsequent proceedings
between the same parties then the persons cannot be allowed to raise the
same question which already stands determined earlier by the competent
Court.

It is well settled that possible logical extensions from the ratio of a

judgment surely are not part of the ratio itself and it is hazardous to
apply precedents in that manner."

2005 (2) Supreme 437

Before:- N.Santosh Hegde :J , S.B.Sinha :J

Rekha Mukherjee
Versus
Ashish Kumar Das

. In Sushil Kumar Sen (supra), Mathew J. considered the effect of

allowing an application for review of a decree holding that the same
would amount to vacating the decree passed, stating : AIR 1975 SC 1185

"2. It is well settled that the effect of allowing an application for review
of a decree is to vacate the decree passed. The decree that is
subsequently passed on review, whether it modifies, reverses or confirms
the decree originally passed, is a new decree superseding the original one
(see Nibaran Chandra Sikdar v. Abdul Hakim (AIR 1928 Cal 418),
Kanhaiya Lal v. Baldeo Prasad (ILR (1906) 28 All 240), Brijbasi Lal v.
Salig Ram (ILR (1912) 34 All 282) and Pyari Mohan Kundu v. Kalu Khan
(ILR (1917) 44 Cal 1011 : 41 IC 497). AIR 1917 Cal 29

2005 (1) Supreme 393

Before:- B.P.Singh :J , H.K.Sema :J , N.Santosh Hegde :J , S.B.Sinha :J ,

S.N.Variava :J

Nathi Devi
Versus
Radha Devi Gupta

It is well settled that the real intention of the legislation must be

gathered from the language used. It may be true that use of the
expression "shall or may" is not decisive for arriving at a finding as to
whether statute is directory or mandatory. But the intention of the
legislature must be found out from the scheme of the Act. It is also
equally well settled that when negative words are used the courts will
presume that the intention of the legislature was that the provisions
should be mandatory in character."

17. Even if there exists some ambiguity in the language or the same is
capable of two interpretations, it is trite the interpretation which serves
the object and purport of the Act must be given effect to. In such a case
the doctrine of purposive construction should be adopted. (See : Swedish
Match AB and another v. Securities & Exchange Board, India and
another : 2004 (7) Scale 158.)

2005 (1) Supreme 37

Before:- A.R.Lakshmanan :J , S.N.Variava :J

India Agencies (Regd.) , Bangalore

Versus
Additional Commissioner of Commer.Taxes, Bangalore

It is well settled that `the effect of an excepting or qualifying proviso,

according to the ordinary rules of construction, is to except out of the
preceding portion of the enactment, or to qualify something enacted
therein, which but for the proviso would be within it. There is an
understandable reason for the stringency of the provisions.
2005 (1) Supreme 469

Before:- G.P.Mathur :J , R.C.Lahoti :J

Atma Ram Properties (P) Limited

Versus
Federal Motors Private Limited

It is well settled that mere preferring of an appeal does not operate as

stay on the decree or order appealed against nor on the proceedings in
the court below. A prayer for the grant of stay of proceedings or on the
execution of decree or order appealed against has to be specifically made
to the appellate Court and the appellate Court has discretion to grant an
order of stay or to refuse the same. The only guiding factor, indicated in
the Rule 5 aforesaid, is the existence of sufficient cause in favour of the
appellant on the availability of which the appellate Court would be
inclined to pass an order of stay. Experience shows that the principal
consideration which prevails with the appellate Court is that in spite of
the appeal having been entertained for hearing by the appellate Court,
the appellant may not be deprived of the fruits of his success in the event
of the appeal being allowed. This consideration is pitted and weighed
against the other paramount consideration: why should a party having
succeeded from the Court below be deprived of the fruits of the decree or
order in his hands merely because the defeated party has chosen to
invoke the jurisdiction of a superior forum. Still the question which the
Court dealing with a prayer for the grant of stay asks to itself is: Why the
status quo prevailing on the date of the decree and/ or the date of
making of the application for stay be not allowed to continue by granting
stay, and not the question why the stay should be granted.

2004 (8) Supreme 4

Before:- Arijit Pasayat :J , C.K.Thakker :J

V.Raja Kumari
Versus
P.Subbarama Naidu

It is well settled that a notice refused to be accepted by the addressee

can be presumed to have been served on him (vide Harcharan Singh v.
Shivrani (1981(2) SCC 535) and Jagdish Singh v. Natthu Singh (1992(1)
SCC 647).

2004 (7) Supreme 636

Before:- B.P.Singh :J , H.K.Sema :J , N.Santosh Hegde :J , S.B.Sinha :J ,

S.N.Variava :J

P.S.Sathappan (Dead) By Lrs.

Versus
Andhra Bank Limited
. Now it is well settled that any statutory provision barring an appeal or
revision cannot cut across the constitutional power of a High Court. Even
the power flowing from the paramount charter under which the High
Court functions would not get excluded unless the statutory enactment
concerned expressly excludes appeals under letters patent. No such bar
is discernible from Section 6(3) of the Act. It could not be seriously
contended by learned counsel for the respondents that if clause 15 of the
Letters Patent is invoked then the order would be appealable.
Consequently, in our view, on the clear language of clause 15 of the
Letters Patent which is applicable to Bombay High Court, the said appeal
was maintainable as the order under appeal was passed by learned
Single Judge of the nigh Court exercising original jurisdiction of the
court. Only on that short ground the appeal is required to be allowed."

The question whether a Letters Patent Appeal was maintainable against

the Judgment/Order of a single Judge passed in a First Appeal under
Section 140 of the Motor Vehicles Act was considered by this Court in
the case of Chandra Kanta Sinha v. Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. reported
in (2001) 6 SCC 158. In this case, it was held that such an Appeal was
maintainable. It is held that the decision of this Court in the case of New
Kenilworth Hotel (P) Ltd. (supra) was inapplicable.

27. Thereafter in the case of Sharda Devi v. State of Bihar reported in

(2002) 3 SCC 705 the question again arose whether a Letters Patent
Appeal was maintainable in view of Section 54 of the Land Acquisition
Act. A three Judges Bench of this Court held that a Letters Patent was a
Charter under which the High Courts were established and that by virtue
of that Charter the High Court got certain powers. It was held that when
a Letters Patent grants to the High Court a power of Appeal, against a
Judgment of a single Judge, the right to entertain such an Appeal does
not get excluded unless the statutory enactment excludes an Appeal
under the Letters Patent. It was held that as Section 54 of the Land
Acquisition Act did not bar a Letters Patent Appeal such an Appeal was
maintainable. At this stage it must be clarified that during arguments,
relying on the sentence "The powers given to a High Court under the
Letters patent are akin to the constitutional powers of a High Court" in
para 9 of this Judgment it had been suggested that a Letters Patent had
the same status as the Constitution of India. In our view these
observations merely lay down that the powers given to a High Court are
the powers with which that High Court is constituted. These
observations do not put Letters Patent on par with the Constitution of
India.

2004 (7) Supreme 196

Before:- A.K.Mathur :J , B.N.Agrawal :J

Anjlus Dungdung
Versus
State of Jharkhand

it is well settled that suspicion howsoever strong it may be cannot take

the place of proof. In any view of the matter, on the basis of these
circumstances, it is not possible to draw an irresistible conclusion which
is incompatible with innocence of the appellant so as to complete the
chain. It is well settled that in a case of circumstantial evidence, the
chain of circumstances must be complete and in case there is any
missing link therein, the same cannot form the basis of conviction. For
the foregoing reasons, we are of the opinion that prosecution has failed to
prove its case beyond reasonable doubt against all the accused persons,
much less than appellant.

2004 (6) Supreme 194

Before:- C.K.Thakker :J , G.P.Mathur :J , R.C.Lahoti :J

Balvant N.Viswamitra
Versus
Yadav Sadshiv Mule (D) Through Lrs.

it is well settled that a court having jurisdiction over the subject-matter

of the suit and over parties thereto, though bound to decide right may
decide wrong; and that even though it decided wrong it would not be
doing something which it had no jurisdiction to do .... If the party
aggrieved does not take appropriate steps to have that error corrected,
the erroneous decree will hold good and will not open to challenge on the
basis of being a nullity. (emphasis supplied)
18. Again, in Bhawarlal v. Universal Heavy Mechanical Lifting Enterprise
(1999) 1 SCC 558, this Court held that "even if the decree was passed
beyond the period of limitation, it would be an error of law, or at the
highest, a wrong decision which can be corrected in appellate
proceedings and not by the executing court which was bound by such
decree."

2004 (4) Supreme 662

Before:- P.V.Reddi :J , Ruma Pal :J

Indian Mineral & Chemicals Co..

Versus
Deutsche Bank

it is well settled that the proper way to plead to the jurisdiction of the
Court is to take the plea in the written statement and as a substantive
part of the defence. Except in the clearest cases that should be the
course". (p. 147)

2004 (4) Supreme 446

Before:- S.B.Sinha :J , Y.K.Sabharwal :J

Engineering Kamgar Union

Versus
Electro Steels Castings Ltd., and another
it is well settled that in absence of Presidential assent, the
Parliamentary Act would prevail and where the assent has been received,
the State Act would, (See also M.P.A.I.T. Permit Owners Assocn. and
another v. State of Madhya Pradesh (2003 (10) Scale 380)).

2004 (10) SCC 745

Before:- A.R.Lakshmanan :J , G.P.Mathur :J , S.Rajendra Babu :J

Kiran Tandon
Versus
Allahabad Development Authority and another

It is well settled that the Court has power under sub-rule (2) Order I,
Rule 10, CPC to transfer a defendant to the category of plaintiffs and
where the plaintiff agrees, such transposition should be readily made.
This power could be exercised by the High Court in appeal, if necessary,
suo motu to do complete justice between the parties. This principle was
laid by the Privy Council in Bhupendra Narayan Sinha v. Rajeshwar
Prasad, AIR 1931 PC 162 and has been consistently followed by all the
Courts.

It is well settled that a decision is an authority for what it actually

decides. What is of the essence in a decision is its ratio and not every
observation found therein nor what logically follows from the various
observations made therein. (See Krishena Kumar v. Union of India, AIR
1990 SC 1782; Municipal Corporation of Delhi v. Gurnam Kaur, AIR
1989 SC 38 and M/s. Orient Paper and Industries Ltd. and another v.
State of Orissa, AIR 1991 SC 672). Shri Vijay Cotton and Oil Mills (supra)
is therefore not an authority for the proposition that where possession is
taken before issuance of Notification under S. 4(1), interest on the
compensation amount could be awarded in accordance with S. 34 of the
Act with effect from the date of taking of possession.

2004 (2) Supreme 336

Before:- Arijit Pasayat :J , Y.K.Sabharwal :J

Jagdish Ram
Versus
State of Rajasthan & Anr.

It is well settled that notwithstanding the opinion of the police, a

Magistrate is empowered to take cognizance if the material on record
makes out a case for the said purpose. The investigation is the exclusive
domain of the police. The taking of cognizance of the offence is an area
exclusively within the domain of a Magistrate. At this stage, the
Magistrate has to be satisfied whether there is sufficient ground for
proceeding and not whether there is sufficient ground for conviction.
Whether the evidence is adequate for supporting the conviction, can be
determined only at the trial and not at the stage of inquiry. At the stage
of issuing the process to the accused, the Magistrate is not required to
record reasons. (Dy. Chief Controller of Imports and Exports v. Rashanlal
Agarwal and others (2003) 4 SCC 139).

32. This Court referred to the decision in Satish Kumar vs. Surinder
Kumar (AIR 1970 SC 833) and held:
"The true legal position in regard to the effect of an award is not in
dispute. It is well settled that as a general rule, all claims which are the
subject-matter of a reference to arbitration merge in the award which is
pronounced in the proceedings before the arbitrator and that after an
award has been pronounced, the rights and liabilities of the parties in
respect of the said claims can be determined only on the basis of the said
award. After an award is pronounced, no action can be started on the
original claim which had been the subject-matter of the reference.. This
conclusion, according to the learned judge, is based upon the elementary
principles that, as between the parties and their privies, an award is
entitled to that respect which is due to judgment of a court of last resort.
Therefore, if the award which has been pronounced-between the parties
has in fact, or can in law, be deemed to have dealt with the present
dispute, the second reference would be incompetent. This position also
has not been and cannot be seriously disputed."

2003 (5) Supreme 196

Before:- B.N.Agrawal :J , B.N.Srikrishna :J

Pawan Kumar
Versus
State of Haryana

it is well settled that illegality should not be allowed to be perpetuated

and failure by this Court to interfere with the same would amount to
allowing the illegality to be perpetuated.

It is well settled that the cardinal principle of interpretation of statute

is that courts or tribunals must be held to possess power to execute their
own order.

60. It is also well settled that a statutory Tribunal which has been
conferred with the power to adjudicate a dispute and pass necessary
order has also the power to implement its order. Further, the Act which
is a self-contained Code, even if it has not been specifically spelt out,
must be deemed to have conferred upon the Tribunal all powers in order
to make its order effective.

61. In Savitri vs. Gobind Singh Rawat (AIR 1986 SC 984) , it has been
held as follows : -
"Every court must be deemed to possess by necessary intendment all
such powers as are necessary to make its orders effective. This principle
is embodied in the maxim 'ubi aliquid conceditnur, ed id since quo res
ipsa isse non potest" (where anything is conceded, there is conceded also
anything without which the thing itself cannot exist) (Vide Earl Jowitt's
Dictionary of English law, 1959 Edn. P.1797) . Whenever anything is
required to be done by law and it is found impossible to do that thing
unless something not authorised in express terms be also done then
something else will be supplied by necessary intendment. Such a
construction though it may not always he admissible in the present case
however would advance the object of the legislation under consideration.
A contrary view as likely to result in grave hardship to the applicant, who
may have no means to subsist until the final order is passed. There is no
room for the apprehension that the recognition of such implied power
would lead to the passing of interim orders in a large number of cases
where the liability to pay maintenance may not exist. It is quite possible
that such contingency may arise in a few cases but the prejudice caused
thereby to the person against whom it is made is minimal as it can be set
right quickly after hearing both the parties..."

62. In Arabind Das vs. State of Assam and others (AIR 1981 Gauhati 18
(F.B.) , it has been held as follows : -
"We are of firm opinion that where a statute gives a power, such power
implies that all legitimate steps may be taken to exercise that power even
though these steps may not be clearly spelt in the statute. Where the
rule making authority gives power to certain authority to do anything of
public character, such authority should get the power to take
intermediate steps in in order to give effect to the exercise of the power in
its final step, otherwise the ultimate power would become illusory,
ridiculous and inoperative which could not be the intention of the rule
making authority.
2003 (1) Supreme 537

Before:- Arijit Pasayat :J , B.N.Agrawal :J , M.B.Shah :J

Ram Narain Poply

Versus
Central Bureau of Investigation

It is well settled that an approver is not worthy of credit and his

evidence must be corroborated in all material particulars through
independent evidence. The conviction cannot be based on sole evidence
of an approver. It is submitted that in the instant case there is no
corroboration of the so-called conspiracy through any independent
evidence; in fact the evidence of approver himself does not disclose any
conspiracy as alleged in the charge.

2002 (4) Supreme 53

Before:- K.G.Balakrishnan :J , R.P.Sethi :J

Assistant Director of Inspection Investigation: Chamundi Granites

Private Limited
Versus
A.B.Shanthi: Deputy Commissioner of Income Tax, Bangalore
It is well settled that a state does not have to tax everything in order to
tax something It is allowed to pick and choose districts, objects, persons,
methods and even rates for taxation if it does so reasonably "

2002 (4) Supreme 631

Before:- B.N.Agrawal :J , M.B.Shah :J

Government of Orissa
Versus
Ashok Transport Agency

it is well settled that in a partition suit every defendant is plaintiff,

provided he has cause of action for seeking partition. In my view, prayer
for leave can be made not only by the person upon whom interest has
devolved, but also by the plaintiff or any other party or person interested.

(34) IN the case of Kiran Singh and others v. Chaman Paswan and
Others [AIR 1954 SC 340], question was raised, when decree passed by a
Court is nullity and whether execution of such a decree can be resisted
at the execution stage which would obviously mean by taking an
objection under section 47 of the Code. Venkatarama Aiyar, J. speaking
for himself and on behalf of B.K. Mukherjea, Vivian Bose, Ghulam
Hasan, JJ., observed at page 352 thus:
"IT is a fundamental principle well-established that a decree passed by a
Court without jurisdiction is a nullity, and that its invalidity could be set
up whenever and wherever it is sought to be enforced or relied upon,
even at the stage of execution and even in collateral proceedings."

(35) IN the case of Ittyavira Mathai v. Varkey Varkey and Another [AIR
1964 SC 907], the question which fell for consideration before this Court
was, if a court, having jurisdiction over the parties to the suit and
subject matter thereof passes a decree in a suit which was barred by
time, such a decree would come within the realm of nullity and the Court
answered the question in the negative holding that such a decree cannot
be treated to be nullity but at the highest be treated to be an illegal
decree. While laying down the law, the Court stated at page 910 thus:-
"IF the suit was barred by time and yet, the court decreed it, the court
would be committing an illegality and therefore the aggrieved party would
be entitled to have the decree set aside by preferring an appeal against it.
But it is well settled that a court having jurisdiction over the subject
matter of the suit and over the parties thereto, though bound to decide
right may decide wrong; and that even though it decided wrong it would
not be doing something which it had no jurisdiction to do. It had the
jurisdiction over the subject matter and it had the jurisdiction over the
party and, therefore, merely because it made an error in deciding a vital
issue in the suit, it cannot be said that it has acted beyond its
jurisdiction. As has often been said, courts have jurisdiction to decide
right or to decide wrong and even though they decide wrong, the decrees
rendered by them cannot be treated as nullities."
(36) AGAIN, in the case of Vasudev Dhanjibhai Modi v. Rajabhai Abdul
Rehman and Others [AIR 1970 SC 1475], the Court was considering
scope of objection under section 47 of the Code in relation to the
executability of a decree and it was laid down that only such a decree
can be subject matter of objection which is nullity and not a decree
which is erroneous either in law or on facts. J.C. Shah, J., speaking for
himself and on behalf of K.S. Hegde and A.N. Grover, JJ., laid down the
law at pages 1476-77 which runs thus:-
"A Court executing a decree cannot go behind the decree between the
parties or their representatives; it must take the decree according to its
tenor, and cannot entertain any objection that the decree was incorrect
in law or on facts. Until it is set aside by an appropriate proceeding in
appeal or revision, a decree even if it be erroneous is still binding
between the parties. When a decree which is a nullity, for instance,
where it is passed without bringing the legal representatives on the
record of a person, who was dead at the date of the decree, or against a
ruling prince without a certificate, is sought to be executed and an
objection in that behalf may be raised in a proceeding for execution.
Again, when the decree is made by a Court which has no inherent
jurisdiction to make it, objection as to its validity may be raised in an
execution proceeding if the objection appears on the face of the record:
where the objection as to the jurisdiction of the Court to pass the decree
does not appear on the face of the record and requires examination of the
questions raised and decided at the trial or which could have been but
have not been raised, the executing court will have no jurisdiction to
entertain an objection as to the validity of the decree even on the ground
of absence of jurisdiction."

(37) IN the case of Everest Coal Company (P) Ltd. v. State of Bihar and
Others. [(1978) 1 SCC 12], this Court held that leave for suing the
receiver can be granted even after filing of the suit and held that the
infirmity of not obtaining the leave does not bear upon the jurisdiction of
the trial court or the cause of action but it is peripheral. It also held that
if a suit prosecuted without such leave culminates in a decree, the same
is liable to be set aside. These observations do not mean that the decree
is nullity. On the other hand, the observation of the court at page 15 that
"any litigative disturbance of the court's possession without its
permission amounts to contempt of its authority; and the wages of
contempt of court in this jurisdiction may well be voidability of the whole
proceeding" would lend support to the view and such decree is voidable
but not void.

(38) IN the case of Haji Sk.Subhan v. Madhorao, [AIR 1962 SC 1230], the
question which fell for consideration of this Court was as to whether an
executing court can refuse to execute a decree on the ground that the
same has become inexecutable on account of the change in law in
Madhya Pradesh by promulgation of M.P. Abolition of Proprietary Rights
(Estates, Mahals, Alienated Lands) Act, 1950 and a decree was passed in
ignorance of the same. While answering the question in the affirmative,
the Court observed at page 1287 thus:-
"THE contention that the executing court cannot question the decree and
has to execute it as it stands, is correct, but this principle has no
operation in the facts of the present case. The objection of the appellant
is not with respect to the invalidity of the decree or with respect to the
decree being wrong. His objection is based on the effect of the provisions
of the Act which has deprived the respondent of his proprietary rights,
including the right to recover possession over the land in suit and under
whose provisions the respondent has obtained the right to remain in
possession of it. In these circumstances, we are of the opinion that the
executing court can refuse to execute the decree holding that it has
become inexecutable on account of the change in law and its effect."

It is well settled that courts perform all judicial functions of the State
except those that are excluded by law from their jurisdiction. Section 9 of
Code of Civil Procedure, for example, provides that the courts shall have
jurisdiction to try all suits of a civil nature excepting suits of which their
cognizance is either expressly or impliedly barred.

It is well settled that industrial tribunal or a labour court may interfere

with a quantum of punishment awarded by the employer in exercise of
its power under Section 11A of the U.P. Industrial Disputes Act but,
ordinarily, the discretion exercised by the employer should not be
interfered with.
U. P. State Road Corporation

it is well settled that the permissible occupation cannot be regarded as

adverse possessory right.
Biswanath Agarwalla

In our view, the High Court as well as the Family Court was not justified
in rejecting the application for medical examination of the wife-
respondent. It is difficult to conceive that the Family Court cannot be
conferred with jurisdiction to pass an order for medical examination in
an appropriate case because when such report is received, that would
facilitate the court in giving a positive conclusion on the mental condition
of the wife-respondent. It is true that the Hindu Marriage Act or any
other law governing the field does not contain any express provision
empowering the court to issue direction upon a party in a matrimonial
proceeding to compel him to submit herself/himself to a medical
examination. But, in our view, it does not preclude the court from
passing such an order. The court is always empowered to satisfy itself as
to whether a party before it suffers from mental illness or not either for
the purpose of taking evidence on the ground for which the matrimonial
proceeding was started. It is well settled that the primary duty of the
court is to see that the truth comes out. Therefore, although the medical
examination for a party is not provided in the Act, even then, the court
has complete inherent power in an appropriate case under Section 151 of
the Code of Civil Procedure to pass all orders for doing complete justice
to the parties to the suit. In Sharda vs. Dharmpal [(2003) 4 SCC 493], a
three-Judge Bench decision of this Court has taken into consideration
the power of the court to allow such application for medical examination
of a party in a matrimonial proceeding and observed as under:-

“In certain cases medical examination by the experts in the field may not
only be found to be leading to the truth of the matter but may also lead
to removal of misunderstanding between the parties. It may being the
parties to terms.”
Lalit Kishore/Lalit Sharma

2007 (1) Supreme 197

Before:- A.K.Mathur :J , G.P.Mathur :J

Associated Indem Mechanical Pvt.Ltd.

Versus
West Bengal Small Scale Industrial Development Corporation Ltd.&
Ors.

It is well settled that the word "include" is generally used in

interpretation clauses in order to enlarge the meaning of the words or
phrases occurring in the body of the statute; and when it is so used
those words or phrases must be construed as comprehending, not only
such things, as they signify according to their natural import, but also
those things which the interpretation clause declares that they shall
include. (See Dadaji v. Sukhdeobabu AIR 1980 SC 150; Reserve Bank of
India v. Pearless General Finance and Investment Co. Ltd. AIR 1987 SC
1023 and Mahalakshmi Oil Mills v. State of Andhra Pradesh AIR 1989
SC 335). The inclusive definition of "district judge" in Article 236(a) of the
Constitution has been very widely construed to include hierarchy of
specialized Civil Courts viz. Labour Courts and Industrial Courts which
are not expressly included in the definition. (See State of Maharashtra v.
Labour Law Practitioners' Association AIR 1998 SC 1233). Therefore,
there is no warrant or justification for restricting the applicability of the
Act to residential buildings alone merely on the ground that in the
opening part of the definition of the word "premises", the words "building
or hut" have been used.

2002 (3) Supreme 369

Before:- Arijit Pasayat :J , B.N.Agrawal :J , M.B.Shah :J

Krishna Mochi
Versus
State of Bihar

2002 (2) Supreme 143

Before:- B.N.Agrawal :J , M.B.Shah :J

Ram Nath Sao @ Ram Nath Sahu

Versus
Gobardhan Sao

ABATEMENT
Suit for partition Limitation Act, 1963 -- Section 5 -- Condonation of
delay -- Some of the defendants expired -- No steps for substitution of
their legal representatives were taken within time prescribed -- Suit
abated accordingly -- Application for condonation of delay was rejected
holding that no sufficient cause shown either for condonation and setting
aside abatement -- Not proper, the expression "sufficient cause" should
receive a liberal construction when no negligence or inaction is imputable
to defaulting party.
Held: It is axiomatic that condonation of delay is a matter of discretion of
the Court. Section 5 of the Limitation Act does not say that such
discretion can be exercised only if the delay is within a certain limit.
Length of delay is no matter, acceptability of the explanation is the only
criterion. Sometimes delay of the shortest range may be uncondonable
due to a want of acceptable explanation whereas in certain other cases,
delay of a very long range can be condoned as the explanation thereof is
satisfactory. Once the Court accepts the explanation as sufficient, it is
the result of positive exercise of discretion and normally the superior
Court should not disturb such finding, much less in revisional
jurisdiction, unless the exercise of discretion was on wholly untenable
grounds or arbitrary or preserve. But it is a different matter when the
first Court refuses to condone the delay. In such cases, the superior
Court would be free to consider the cause shown for the delay afresh and
it is open to such superior Court to come to its own finding even
untrammeled by the conclusion of the lower Court. Thus it becomes
plain that the expression "sufficient cause" within the meaning of Section
5 of the Act or Order 22 Rule 9 of the code or any other similar provision
should receive a liberal construction so as to advance substantial justice
when no negligence or inaction or want of bona fide is imputable to a
party. In a particular case whether explanation furnished would
constitute "sufficient cause" or not will be dependant upon facts of each
case. There cannot be a straitjacket formula for accepting or rejecting
explanation furnished for the delay caused in taking steps. But one thing
is clear that the Courts could not proceed with the tendency of finding
fault with the cause shown and reject the petition by a slipshod order in
over jubilation of disposal drive. Acceptance of explanation furnished
should be the rule and refusal an exception more so when no negligence
or inaction or want of bona fide can be imputed to the defaulting party.
On the other hand, while considering the matter the Courts should not
loose sight of the fact that by not taking steps within the time prescribed
a valuable right has accrued to the other party which should not be
lightly defeated by condoning delay in a routine like matter. However, by
taking a pedantic and hyper technical view of the matter the explanation
furnished should not be rejected when stakes are high and/or arguable
points of facts and law are involved in the case, causing enormous loss
and irreparable injury to the party against whom the lis terminates either
by default or inaction and defeating valuable right of such a party to
have the decision on merit.

2002 (2) Supreme 59

Before:- B.P.Singh :J , S.S.M.Quadri :J

Gurbax Singh
Versus
Kartar Singh

it is well settled that a document on subsequent registration will

take effect from the time when it was executed and not from the
time of its registration. Where two documents are executed on the
same day, the time of their execution would determine the priority
irrespective of the time of their registration. The one which is
executed earlier in time will prevail over the other executed
subsequently.

2002 (1) Supreme 83

Before:- Brijesh Kumar :J , R.C.Lahoti :J

Madhukar D.Shende
Versus
Tarabaiaba Shedage

IT is well settled that one who propounds a will must establish the
competence of the testator to make the will at the time when it was
executed. The onus is discharged by the propounder adducing prima
facie evidence proving the competence of the testator and execution of
the will in the manner contemplated by law. The contestant opposing the
will may bring material on record meeting such prima facie case in which
event the onus would shift back on the propounder to satisfy the court
affirmatively that the testator did know well the contents of the will and
in sound disposing capacity executed the same. The factors, such as the
will being a natural one or being registered or executed in such
circumstances and ambience, as would leave no room for suspicion,
assume significance. If there is nothing unnatural about the transaction
and the evidence adduced satisfies the requirement of proving a will, the
court would not return a finding of "not proved" merely on account of
certain assumed suspicion or supposition. Who are the persons
propounding and supporting a will as against the person disputing the
will and the pleadings of the parties would be relevant and of
significance.

2002 (1) Supreme 36

Before:- S.N.Phukan :J , V.N.Khare :J

Darshan Singh
Versus
Gujjar Singh

It is well settled that if a co- sharer is in possession of the entire

property, his possession cannot be deemed to be adverse for other co-
sharers unless there has been an ouster of other co-sharers.

Immovable property One co-sharer was in the possession of entire

immovable property -- Whether possession of one co-sharer would be
deemed to be adverse to other co-sharers -- No -- Exclusive
possession of co-sharer cannot be deemed to be adverse possession
to other co-sharers unless there has been ouster of other co-sharers.
Held: In our view, the correct legal position is that possession of a
property belonging to several co-sharers by one co-sharer shall be
deemed that he possess the property on behalf of the other co-
sharers unless there has been a clear ouster by denying the title of
other co-sharers and mutation in the revenue record in the name of
one co-sharer would not amount to ouster unless there is a clear
declaration that title of the other co-sharers was denied.

2001 (8) Supreme 618

Before:- Brijesh Kumar :J , R.C.Lahoti :J

Fakir Mohd.
Versus
Sita Ram

It is well settled that 'and' is capable of being read as 'or', if the context
demands it to be so read. The rule of homogenous construction also
dictates the said 'and' in clause (c) being read as 'or' failing which there
will be an apparent conflict between clauses (a) and (b) of sub-section (3)
read with sub-section (4) and clause (c) of sub-section (3) of Section 19A.

(7) THE word 'or' is normally disjunctive and the word 'and' is normally
conjunctive. But at times they are read as vice-versa to give effect to the
manifest intent of the legislature as disclosed from the context. It is
permissible to read 'or' as 'and' and vice-versa if some other part of the
same statute, or the legislative intent clearly spelled out, require that to
be done. (See Statutory Interpretation by Justice G.P. Singh, 8th Edition,
2001, p. 370).

2001 (8) Supreme 358

Before:- Brijesh Kumar :J , R.C.Lahoti :J

Kamaleshwar Kishore Singh

Versus
Paras Nath Singh

IT is well settled that the court fee has to be paid on the plaint as
framed and not on the plaint as it ought to have been framed unless by
astuteness employed in drafting the plaint the plaintiff has attempted at
evading payment of court fee or unless there be a provision of law
requiring the plaintiff to value the suit and pay the court fee in a manner
other than the one adopted by the plaintiff. The court shall begin with an
assumption, for the purpose of determining the court fees payable on
plaint, that the averments made therein by the plaintiff are correct. Yet,
an arbitrary valuation of the suit property having no basis at all for such
valuation and made so as to evade payment of court fees and fixed for
the purpose of conferring jurisdiction on some court which it does not
have, or depriving the court of jurisdiction which it would otherwise
have, can also be interfered with by the court. It is the substance or the
relief sought for and not the form which will be determinative of the
valuation and payment of court fee. The defence taken in the written
statement may not be relevant for the purpose of deciding the payment of
court fee by the plaintiff. If the plaintiff is ultimately found to have
omitted to seek an essential relief which he ought to have prayed for, and
without which the relief sought for in the plaint as framed and filed
cannot be allowed to him, the plaintiff shall have to suffer the dismissal
of the suit.

2001 (5) Supreme 492

Before:- N.Santosh Hegde :J , S.P.Bharucha :J , Shivaraj V.Patil :J ,
V.N.Khare :J , Y.K.Sabharwal :J

Shyam Sunder
Versus
Ram Kumar
Practice and Procedure -- Change in the Rights of Parties, where the
Substantive Law changed After Decision of Suit, but during
pendency of Appeal -- Amendment is not retrospective -- previous
Section had been precise, plain and simple, which do not require
any clarifications by an Amendment -- the Amending Act is not a
Declaratory Act -- the Appeal to be decided with the Law, as it had
been when the Suit was filed -- Punjab Pre-emption Act, 1913,
Section 15 (As amended by Haryana Amendment Act, 1995).

Punjab Pre-emption Act, 1913, Section 15 (As amended by Haryana

Amendment Act, 1995) -- Rights of parties, where the Amendment
took away the right, when the Appeal had been pending -- In a pre-
emption case, where an Appeal is filed against the decree of the
Trial Court -- Appellate Court is to decide only the question,
whether the decision of Trial Court is correct -- to ensure that,
Rights of Pre-emptor will not be displaced, the Appellate Court not
to consider any subsequent event taking place during pendency of
Appeal -- the reason is, it is the legal position which held field over a
century.

Practice and Procedure -- whether Appeal is continuation of Suit and

the Appellate Court is re-hearing the Suit -- Only in certain context
and not always -- the plaintiff in a Pre-emption suit -- Plaintiff’s
right is incoherent up to decision in Suit -- once Suit is Won and
decree passed in is favour, Plaintiff gets a vested right -- Appellate
Court do not have such wide power to disturb the said vested right --
it’s power is confined to decide the question, whether the decision
of the Trial Court is correct or not -- Punjab Pre-emption Act, 1913,
Section 15 (As amended by Haryana Amendment Act, 1995).

Interpretation of Statutes -- Prospective and Retrospective

Operation -- Presumption -- where a Statute is amended, but the
amendment is silent about whether it is retrospective -- where the
amended Statute affects substantive Rights of Parties -- it is
presumed that, Statute is of Prospective Operation.

Words and Phrases -- Declaratory Statutes -- ordinarily when a

Statute declares a previous law, it requires to be given retrospective
effect -- it functions to supply an omission or to supply an
explanation to previous Statute -- when a declaratory Statute is
passed, it comes into effect from the date, when the previous law
was passed -- Legislature’s power to enact Law includes the power to
Declare existing law, and when such a Declarative Act is passed, it
has been held to be Retrospective -- Mere absence of use of word
`declaration’ in an Act explaining what was the law before may not
appear to be a declaratory Act, but if Court finds an Act as
Declaratory or Explanatory, it has to be construed as Retrospective
-- Conversely where a Statute uses the word `Declaratory’ the words
so used may not be sufficient to hold that the Statute is declaratory
Act as words may be used in order to being into effect New Law.
Interpretation of Statutes -- Rule of Benevolent Construction --
Court is to Interpret Statute in Advancing the ends of Justice --
Limitations on the powers of Court, when the Rule of Benevolent
Construction is not applied:- (1) when the Court will have to re-
legislate a provision of Statute -- (2) when the words used in the
Statute is capable of only one meaning -- (3) when there is no
ambiguity in the Statute.

Interpretation of Statutes -- Definition of Relations between the

weaker and stronger -- Role of the Rule of benevolent construction --
Ordinarily, the Rule of benevolent construction has been applied
while construing welfare legislations or provisions relating to
relationship between weaker and stronger contracting parties.

In the case of Moti Ram v. Suraj Bhan & Ors. [1960 (2) SCR 896] it was
held thus:

"IT is clear that the amendment made is not in relation to any procedure
and cannot be characterized as procedural. It is in regard to a matter of
substantive law since it affects the substantive right of the landlord. It
may be conceded that the Act is intended to provide relief to the tenants
and in that sense is a beneficial measure and as such its provision would
be liberally constructed: but this principle would not be material or even
relevant in deciding the question as to whether the new provision is
retrospective or not. It is well settled that where an amendment affects
vested rights, the amendment would operate prospectively unless it is
expressly made retrospective or its retrospective operation follows as a
matter of necessary implication. The amending Act obviously does not
make the relevant provision retrospective in terms and we see no reason
to accept the suggestion that the retrospective operation of the relevant
provision can be spelt out as a matter of necessary implication."

2001 (1) Supreme 311

Before:- K.T.Thomas :J , R.P.Sethi :J

Dalmia Cement (Bharat) Limited

Versus
Galaxy Traders and Agencies Limited

It is well settled that a notice refused to be accepted by the addressee,

can be presumed to have been served on him (vide Harcharan Singh v.
Shivrani [1981 (2) SCC 535] and Jagdish Singh v. Natthu Singh [JT 1991
(5) SC 400 =1992 (1) SCC 647]. Here the notice is returned as unclaimed
and not as refused. Will thereby any significant difference between the
two so far as the presumption of service is concerned? In this connection
a reference to Section 27 of the General Clauses Act will be useful. The
Section reads thus:

27. Meaning of service by post- Where any Central Act or Regulation

made after the commencement of this Act authorises or requires any
document to be served by post, whether the expression 'serve' or either of
the expression 'give' or 'send' or any other expression is used, then,
unless a different intention appears, the service shall be deemed to be
effected by properly addressing, pre-paying and posting by registered
post, a letter containing the document, and unless the contrary is proved
to have been effected at the time at which the letter would be delivered in
the ordinary course of post."

(7) SECTION 27 of the General Clauses Act deals with the presumption of
service of a letter sent by post. The despatcher of a notice has, therefore,
a right to insist upon and claim the benefit of such a presumption. But.
as the presumption is rebuttable one, he has two options before him.
One is to concede to the stand of the sendee that as a matter of fact he
did not receive the notice, and the other is to contest the sendee's stand
and take the risk for proving that he in fact received the notice. It is open
to the dispatcher to adopt either of the options. If he opts the former, he
can afford to take appropriate steps for the effective service of notice
upon the addressee. Such a course appears to have been adopted by the
appellant-Company in this case and the complaint filed, admittedly,
within limitation from the date of the notice of service considered to have
been served upon the respondents.

2001 (1) Supreme 41

Before:- A.S.Anand :J , R.C.Lahoti :J , Shivaraj V.Patil :J

Vijay Laxmi Sadho

Versus
Jagdish
It is well settled that if a Bench of coordinate jurisdiction disagrees
with another Bench of coordinate jurisdiction whether on the basis of
"different arguments" or otherwise, on a question of law, it is appropriate
that the matter be referred to a larger Bench for resolution of the issue
rather than to leave two conflicting judgments to operate creating
confusion. It is not proper to sacrifice certainty of law. Judicial decorum,
no less than legal propriety forms the basis of judicial procedure and it
must be respected at all costs.

THIS decision was relied upon in Life Insurance Corporation of India v.

Smt. G.M. Channabasamma7, in which the following observations were
made:

".....IT is well settled that a contract of insurance is contract uberruna

fides and there must be complete good faith on the part of the assured.
The assured is thus under a solemn obligation to make full disclosure of
material facts which may be relevant for the insurer to take into account
while deciding whether the posal should be accepted or not. While
making a disclosure of the relevant facts, the duty of the insured to state
them correctly cannot be diluted. Section 45 of the Act has made special
provisions for a life insurance policy if it is called in question by the
insurer after the expiry of two years from the date on which it was
effected. Having regard to the facts of the present case, learned counsel
for the parties have rightly stated that this distinction is not material in
the present appeal. If the allegations of fact made on behalf of the
appellant Company are found to be correct, all the three conditions
mentioned in the section and discussed in mithoolal Nayak v. Life
Insurance Corporation of India must be held to have been satisfied. We
must, therefore, proceed to examine the evidence led by the parties in the
case."

2000 (8) Supreme 553

Before:- S.N.Phukan :J , V.N.Khare :J

Vannattankandy Ibrayi
Versus
Kunhabdulla Hajee

It is well settled that the destruction of a house does not by itself

determine the tenancy of the land on which it stands."

(6) THIS statement of law does not explain whether the destruction of a
house will destroy the tenancy of the house itself but only indicates its
effect on the tenancy of the land. In Woodfalls' Law of Landlord and
Tenant, 28th edition, Vol. I para 1-2056, page 928 - the proposition
stated as thus :

"A demise must have a subject-matter, either corporeal or incorporeal. If

the subject matter is destroyed entirely, it is submitted that the lease
comes automatically to an end, for there is no longer any demise. The
mere destruction of a building on land is not total destruction of the
subject matter of a lease of the land and building. So demise continues. "

2000 (5) Supreme 467

Before:- K.G.Balakrishnan :J , M.Jagannadha Rao :J

Government of A.P.
Versus
G.V.K.Girls High School

It is well settled that the legislature cannot overrule a judgment by

passing a law to that effect unless it removes the basis of the legal rights
upon which the judgment is based, with retrospective effect and provided
there is no violation of any constitutional provision in such withdrawal of
rights retrospectively.

2000 (9) SCC 752

Before:- K.T.Thomas :J , R.P.Sethi :J

State of Andhra Pradesh

Versus
Kommaraju Gopala Krishna Murthy
It is well settled that when the amount is found to have been passed to
the public servant the burden is on the public servant to establish that it
is not by way of illegal gratification.

2000 (3) Supreme 601

Before:- R.P.Sethi :J , S.Saghir Ahmad :J

Lily Thomas
Versus
Union of India

It is well settled that children borne out of bigamous marriage are

legitimate children, and mere conversion cannot absolve them from
their liability. In this regard making law or amendment to law for
making uniform law applicable to all people is not possible.
BIGAMY -- Second Marriage -- Contracting second marriage by Hindu
after converting to Islam -- Inspite of conversion to Islam, he. will be
liable for the offence of Bigamy within the provisions of Section 17
of Hindu Marriage Act and also under Section 494 of Penal Code of
India -- Evidently mere by conversion, first marriage will not get
dissolved. If a Hindu wife files a complaint for the offence under
Section 494 on the ground that during the subsistence of the
marriage, her husband had married a second wife under some other
religion after converting to that religion, the offence of bigamy
pleaded by her would have to be investigated and tried in
accordance with the provisions of the Hindu Marriage Act. It is
under this Act that it has to be seen whether the husband, who has
married a second wife, has committed the offence of bigamy or not.
Since under the Hindu Marriage Act, a bigamous marriage is
prohibited and has been constituted as an offence under Section 17
of the Act, any marriage sole-mnized by the husband during the
subsistence of the marriage. In spite of his conversion to another
religion, would be an offence triable under Section 17 of the Hindu
Marriage Act read with Section 494, IPC.

2000 (2) Supreme 145

Before:- A.P.Misra :J , M.Jagannadha Rao :J

Haldiram Bhujiawala
Versus
Anand Kumar Deepak Kumar

PARTNERSHIP ACT, 1932 -- Suit by unregistered firm -- Section 69

-- Suit for permanent injunction by the firm on the basis of
statutory rights under Trades Marks Act and on Common Principles
of tort is not barred under Section 69 -- Therefore, application for
rejection of plaint under Order 7, Rule 11 was rightly rejected --
However, where a suit is barred, fresh suit can be filed by the firm
after getting registration. It has been held that bar under Section 69
regarding statutory rights or common rights is not applicable. The
right to evict a tenant upon expiry of the lease was not a right under
the Transfer of Property Act. The fact that the plaint in that case
referred to a lease and to its expiry, made no difference. Hence, the
said suit was held not barred. In that case the reference to the lease
in that plaint was obviously treated as a historical fact. That case is
therefore, directly in point. Following the said judgment, it must be
held in the present case too that a suit is not barred by Section
69(2) if a statutory right or a common law right is being enforced. A
suit for perpetual injunction to restrain the defendants not to pass
off the defendants' goods as those of the plaintiffs by using the
plaintiffs' trade mark and for damages is an action at common law
and is not barred by Section 69(2). The decision, in Virendra Dresses
v. Varinder Garments, AIR 1982 Delhi 482, and the decision of the
Division Bench of Delhi High Court in Bestochem Formulations v.
Dinesh Ayurvedic Agencies, RFA (OS) 17 of 1999 dated 12.7.1999
(Del) (DB) based on tort and not on contract.

1999 (3) Supreme 171

Before:- A.P.Misra :J , S.B.Majmudar :J

Ferro Alloys Corporation Limited

Versus
Union of India
IT is no doubt true that principle of constructive res judicata can be
invoked even inter se Respondents, but it is well settled that before any
plea by contesting Respondents could be said to be barred by
constructive res judicata in future proceedings inter se such contesting
Respondents, it must be shown that such a plea was required to be
raised by the contesting Respondents to meet the claim of the appellant
in such proceedings. If such a plea is not required to be raised by the
contesting Respondents with a view to successfully meet the case of the
appellant, then such a plea inter se contesting Respondents would
remain in the domain of an independent proceedings giving an entirely
different cause of action inter se the contesting Respondents with which
the appellants would not be concerned. Such pleas based on
independent causes of action inter se Respondents cannot be said to be
barred by constructive res judicata in the earlier proceedings where the
Us is between the appellants on the one hand and all the contesting
Respondents on the other

1999 (3) Supreme 364

Before:- A.P.Misra :J , M.Jagannadha Rao :J

Sardul Singh
Versus
Pritam Singh
It is well settled that notwithstanding the absence of pleadings before a
court or authority, still if an issue is framed and the parties were
conscious of it and went to trial on that issue and adduced evidence and
had an opportunity to produce evidence or cross-examine witnesses in
relation to the said issue, no objection as to want of a specific pleading
can be permitted to be raised lateR

1999 (2) Supreme 333

Before:- M.B.Shah :J , N.Santosh Hegde :J , S.P.Bharucha :J

T.A.V.Trust Alleppey
Versus
Commissioner of Income Tax, Kerala

Commissioner of Income-Tax, Gujarat vs. Motilal Hirabhai Spg. and Wvg.

Co. Ltd. [113 ITR 173], where it was stated:

"IT is well settled that if evidence is allowed to be let in without any

objection, it would not be open to the party aggrieved to raise any
objection, as to its admissibility at a subsequent stage. Not only that but
once a document is properly admitted, the contents of those documents
are also admitted in evidence, though those contents may not be treated
as conclusive evidence."
1999 (2) Supreme 123

Before:- A.S.Anand :J , M.Srinivasan :J , U.C.Banerjee :J

Githa Hariharan: Drvandana Shiva

Versus
Reserve Bank of India: Jayanta Bandhopadhyaya

Constitution of India, 1950 -- Natural Guardianship -- Article 14 --

Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act, 1956 -- Even during the life
time of father, mother can be a natural guardian of the minor --
Section 19(b) of Guardians and Wards Act would be interpreted in
the similar analogy -- The decision, however, would operate
prospectively only.

While both the partners are duty bound te-take care of the person
and property of their minor child and act in the best interest of his
welfare, we hold that in all situations where the father is not in
actual charge of the affairs of the minor either because of his
indifference or because of an agreement between him and the
mother of the minor (oral or written) and the minor is in the
exclusive care and custody of the mother or the father for any other
reason is unable to take care of the minor because of his physical
and/or mental incapacity, the mother, can act as natural guardian
of the minor and all her actions would be valid even during the life
time of the father, who would be deemed to be 'absent' for the
purpose of Section 6(a) of HMG Act and Section 19(b) of GW Act.
It is well settled that if on one construction a given statute will
become unconstitutional, whereas on another construction, which
may be open, the statute remains within the constitutional limits,
the Court will prefer the latter on the ground that the Legislature is
presumed to have acted in accordance with the Constitution and
Courts generally lean in favour of the constitutionality of the
statutory provisions.

1999 (2) Supreme 82

Before:- D.P.Wadhwa :J , M.Srinivasan :J

Mathew M.Thomas
Versus
Commissioner of Income Tax

IT is well settled that the word "proceedings" shall include the

proceedings at the appellate stage. It is sufficient to refer to the judgment
of this court in Garikapati Veeraya v. N. Subbiah Choudhry wherein the
court said at p. 553:

"(I) That the legal pursuit of a remedy, suit, appeal and second appeal are
really but steps in a series of proceedings all connected by an intrinsic
unity and are to be regarded as one legal proceeding." Hence we are
unable to persuade ourselves to agree with the view expressed by the full
bench of the High court in the judgment under appeal that the Circular
would apply only to proceedings pending before the competent authority.

1999 (1) Supreme 278

Before:- D.P.Wadhwa :J , M.Jagannadha Rao :J

Indian Airports Employees Union

Versus
Ranjan Chatterjee

IT is well settled that disobedience of orders of the court, in order to

amount to "civil contempt" under Section 2(b) of the Contempt of courts
Act, 1971 must be "wilful" and proof of mere disobedience is not
sufficient (S.S. Roy v. State of orissa). Where there is no deliberate
flouting of the orders of the court but a mere misinterpretation of the
executive instructions, it would not be a case of civil contempt (Ashok
Kumar Singh v. State of Bihar).

12. That apart, it is now well settled that the right of pre-emption is a
weak right and is not looked upon with favour by courts and therefore
the courts cannot go out of their way to help the pre-emptor. (See:
Radhakishan Laxminarayan Toshniwal v. Shridhar Ramchandra Alshi &
Ors. [AIR 1960 SC 1368].
9. Again in T.N. Alloy Foundry Co. Ltd. Vs. T.N. Electricity Board and
Ors. [(2004) 3 SCC 392 this Court observed as follows:

"The law as regards permitting amendment to the plaint, is well settled in

L.J. Leach and Co. Ltd. v. Jardine Skinner and Co., it was held that the
Court would as a rule decline to allow amendments, if a fresh suit on the
amended claim would be barred by limitation on the date of the
application. But this is a factor to be taken into account in exercise of
the discretion as to whether amendment should be ordered, and does not
affect the power of the court to order it.

"THE general rule of law, as to commissions, undoubtedly is, that the

whole service or duty must be performed, before the right to any
commissions attaches, either ordinary or extraordinary; for an agent
must complete the thing required of him, before he is entitled to charge
for it. In the case of brokers employed to sell real estate, it is well
settled that they are entitled to their commission when they have found
a purchaser, even though the negotiations are conducted and concluded
by the principal himself; and also where there is a failure to complete the
sale in consequence of a defect in title and no fault on the part of the
brokers." 1950 (0) AIR(SC) 15
It is well settled that in exercising their powers whether general or
special, the directors, must always bear in mind that they hold a
fiduciary position and must exercise their powers for the benefit of the
company and for that alone and that the court can intervene to prevent
the abuse of a power whenever such abuse is held proved, but it is
equally settled that where directors have a discretion and are bona fide
acting in the exercise of it, it is not the habit of the court to interfere with
them. When the company is in no need of further capital, directors are
not entitled to use their power of issuing shares merely for the purpose of
maintaining themselves and their friends in management over the affairs
of the company, or merely for the purpose of defeating the wishes of the
existing majority of shareholders. 1950 (0) AIR(SC) 172 Nannalal Zaver

It is well settled that the Constitution must be interpreted in a broad

and liberal manner giving effect to all its parts, and the presumption
should be that no conflict or repugnancy was intended by its framers. In
interpreting the words of a Constitution, the same principles
undoubtedly apply which are applicable in construing a statute, but as
was observed by Lord Wright in James v. Commonwealth of Australia
( 1 ),
"THE ultimate result must be determined upon the actual
words used not in vacuo but as occurring in a single complex
instrument in which one part may throw light on the other.` `The
Constitution,` his Lordship went on saying, `has been described as
the federal compact and the construction must hold a balance
between all its parts.`" A. k. Gopalan
 It is well settled that a writ of certiorari can be issued only
against inferior courts or persons or authorities who are required
by law to act judicially or quasi-judicially, in those cases where
they act in excess of their legal authority. Such a writ is not
available to remove or correct executive or administrative acts.
Province of Bombay 1950 (0) AIR(SC) 222

it is well settled that the owner of a property does not cease to be

its owner merely because it is placed in the hands of a receiver. 1953 (0)
AIR(SC) 425

IT is well settled that if a Statute giving a special remedy is

repealed without a saving clause in favour of pending suits all suits must
stop where the repeal finds them. If final relief has not been granted
before the repeal went into effect, it cannot be after. If a case is appealed,
& pending the appeal the law is changed, the appellate Ct. must dispose
of the case under the law in force when its decision was rendered. The
effect of the repeal is to obliterate the Statute repealed as completely as if
it had never been passed, & it must be considered as a law which never
existed, except for the purposes of those actions or suits which were
commenced, prosecuted & concluded while it was an existing law.
Pending judicial proceedings based upon a Statute cannot proceed after
its repeal. This rule holds true until the proceedings have reached a final
judgment in the Ct. of last resort, for that Ct., when it comes to
announce its decision, conforms it to the law then existing, & may,
therefore, reverse a judgment which was correct when pronounced in the
subordinate tribunal from whence the appeal was taken, if it appears
that pending the appeal a Statute which was necessary to support the
judgment of the lower Ct. has been withdrawn by an absolute
repeal."Keshavan Madhav Menon 1951 (0) AIR(SC) 128

IT is well settled that if a Ct. acts without jurisdiction, its decision

can be challenged in the same way as it would have been challenged if it
had acted with jurisdiction, i.e., an appeal would lie to the Ct. to which it
would lie if its order was with jurisdiction.
Janardhan Reddy1951 (0) AIR(SC) 217

It is well settled that the validity of an Act is not affected if it

incidentally trenches on matters outside the authorised field, & therefore
it is necessary to inquire in each case what is the pith and Sub-stance of
the Act impugned. If the Act, when so viewed, substantially falls within
the powers expressly conferred upon the Legislature which enacted it,
then it cannot be held to be invalid, merely because it incidentally
encroaches on matters which have been assigned to another legislature.
This was emphasised very Clearly m 'Gallagher v. Lynn', 1937 AC 863 at
p. 870, in these words :
"IT is well established that you are to look at the 'true nature & character
of the legislation': 'Russell v. The Queen', 1882 7 A. C. 829' 'the pith &
Sub-stance of the legislation'. If, on the view of the statute as a whole,
you find that the Sub-stance of the legislation is within the express
powers, then it is not invalidated if incidentally it affects matters which
are outside the authorised field".
Bombay/Balsara

it is well settled that in an enabling Act words of a permissive

nature cannot be given a compulsory meaning
 S. Krishanan

It is well settled that a public body invested with statutory powers

such as those conferred upon the corporation must take care not to
exceed or abuse its powers. It must keep within the limits of the
authority committed to it. It must act in good faith. And it must act
reasonably.
Bihar/Kameshwar Singh

It is well settled that a legislature which has to deal with diverse

problems arising out of an infinite variety of human relations must, of
necessity, have the power of making special laws to attain particular
objects ; and for that purpose it must have large powers of selection or
classification of persons and ,*things upon which such laws are to
operate. Mere differentiation or inequality of treatment does not per so
amount to discrimination within the inhibition of the equal protection
clause. To attract the operation of the clause it is necessary to show that
the selection or differentiation is unreasonable or arbitrary; that it does
not rest on any rational basis having regard to the object which the
legislature has in view. 1953 (0) AIR(SC) 91

1953 (0) AIR(SC) 201

Before:- M.C.Mahajan :J , S.R.Dass :J

T.Saraswathi Ammal
Versus
Jagadambal

It is well settled that custom cannot be extended by analogy. It must be

estabished inductively, not deductively and it cannot be established by a
priori methods. Theory and custom are antitheses, custom cannot be a
matter of mere theory but must always be a matter of fact and one
custom cannot be deduced from another. A community living in one
particular district may have evolved a particular custom but from that it
does not follow that the community living in another district is
necessarily following the same-custom.

1953 (0) AIR(SC) 235

Before:- M.C.Mahajan :J , S.R.Dass :J

Trojan and Company

Versus
Rm.N.N.Nagappa Chettiar

It is well settled that the decision of a case cannot be based on grounds

outside the pleadings of the parties and it is the case pleaded that has to
be found. Without an amendment of the plaint the court was not entitled
to grant the relief not asked for and no prayer was ever made to amend
the plaint so as to incorporate in it an alternative case.

1953 (0) AIR(SC) 385

Before:- B.Jagannath Das :J , M.C.Mahajan :J , Vivian Bose :J

R.Mathalone
Versus
Bombay Life Assurance Company Limited

It is well settled that a trustee is not entitled to claim indemnity till he

suffers an injury for which he has to be indemnified.

1953 DGLS(Soft.) 136

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Equivalent Citations:

Before:- B.P.Sinha :J , K.N.Wanchoo :J , K.Subba Rao :J ,

N.H.Bhagwati :J , S.R.Dass :J

Sri Ram Ram Narain Medhi

Versus
State of Bombay

It is well settled that these heads of legislation should not be construed

in a narrow and pedantic sense but should be given a large and liberal
interpretation. As was observed by the Judicial Committee of the Privy
Council in British Coal Corporation v. The King, 1935 A C 500 at p. 518 :
(AIR 1935 P C 158 at p. 162) :
"Indeed, in interpreting a constituent or organic statute such as the Act,
that construction most beneficial to the widest possible amplitude of its
powers must be adopted."

1954 (0) AIR(SC) 715

Before:- B.K.Mukherjee :J , N.H.Bhagwati :J , Vivian Bose :J

Mangleshwari Prasad
Versus
State of Bihar

it is well settled that circumstantial evidence should not only be

consistent with the guilt of the accused but should be inconsistent with
his innocence.

1954 (0) AIR(SC) 621

Before:- B.Jagannath Das :J , N.H.Bhagwati :J , T.L.Venkatarama

Ayyar :J

Bhagat Ram
Versus
State of Punjab
it is well settled that the cumulative effect of the circumstances must
be such as to negative the innocence of the accused and to bring the
offences home to him beyond any reasonable doubt. This Court has
affirmed the proposition in 'Hanumant v. State of Madhya Pradesh', AIR
1952 SC 343 (A), in the following terms at pp. 345-346. "It is well to
remember that in cases where the evidence is of a circumstantial nature,
the circumstances from which the conclusion of guilt is to be drawn
should in the first instance be fully established, and all the facts so
established should be consistent only with the hypothesis of the guilt of
the accused. Again, the circumstances. should be of a conclusive nature
and tendency and they should be such as to exclude every hypothesis
but the one proposed to be proved. In other words, there must be a chain
of evidence so far complete as not to leave any reasonable ground for a
conclusion consistent with the innocence of the accused and it must be
such as to show that within all human probability the act must have
been done by the accused".

1954 (0) AIR(SC) 352

Before:- Ghulam Hasan :J , M.C.Mahajan :J , Vivian Bose :J

Shankar Sitaram Sontakke

Versus
Balkrishna Sitaram Sontakke
It is well settled that a consent decree is as binding upon the parties
thereto as a decree passed by invitum. The compromise having been
found not to be vitiated by fraud, misrepresentation, misunderstanding
or mistake, the decree passed thereon has the binding force of res
judicata.

1954 (0) AIR(SC) 424

Before:- B.K.Mukherjee :J , M.C.Mahajan :J , N.H.Bhagwati :J ,

T.L.Venkatarama Ayyar :J , Vivian Bose :J

Dhirendra Kumar
Versus
Superintendent and Remembrancer of Legal Affairs To The
Government of West Bengal

NOW it is well settled that though article 14 is designed to prevent any

person or class of persons from being singled out as a special subject for
discriminatory legislation, it is not implied that every law must have
universal application to all persons who are not by nature, attainment or
circumstance, in the same position, and that by process of classification
the State has power of determining who should be regarded as a class for
purposes of legislation and in relation to a law enacted on a particular
subject; but the classification, however, must be based on some real and
substantial distinction bearing a just and reasonable relation to the
objects sought to be attained and cannot be made arbitrarily and without
any substantial basis.

1954 (0) AIR(SC) 440

Before:- B.K.Mukherjee :J , M.C.Mahajan :J , N.H.Bhagwati :J ,

T.L.Venkatarama Ayyar :J , Vivian Bose :J

T.C.Basappa
Versus
T.Nagappa
it is well settled that the court cannot by a wrong decision of the fact
give it jurisdiction which it would not otherwise possess (2).

1954 (0) AIR(SC) 545

Before:- M.C.Mahajan :J , N.H.Bhagwati :J , S.R.Dass :J ,

T.L.Venkatarama Ayyar :J , Vivian Bose :J

Suraj Mali Mohta and Company

Versus
A.V.Visvanatha Sastri

It is well settled that in its application to legal. Proceedings article 14

assures to everyone the same rules of evidence and modes of procedure;
in other words, the same rule must exist for all in similar circumstances.
It is also well settled that this principle does not mean that every law
must have universal application for all persons who are not by nature,
attainment or circumstance, in the same position.

1955 (0) AIR(SC) 481

Before:- Jagannadha Das :J , S.B.Sinha :J , Vivian Bose :J

Sahu Madho Das and others

Versus
Mukand Ram and another

It is well settled that a compromise or, family arrangement is based on

the assumption that there is an antecedent title of some sort in the
parties and the agreement acknowledges and defines what that title is
each party relinquishing all claims to property other than that falling to
his share and recognising the right of the others, as they had previously
asserted it, to the portions allotted to them respectively. That explains
why no conveyance is required in these cases to pass the title from the
one in whom it resides to the person receiving it under the family
arrangement. It is assumed that the title claimed by the person receiving
the property under the arrangement had always resided in him or her so
far as the property falling to his or her share is concerned and therefore
no conveyance is necessary.
1955 (0) AIR(SC) 661

Before:- B.Jagannath Das :J , B.P.Sinha :J , N.H.Bhagwati :J ,

S.R.Dass :J , Syed Jafar Imam :J , T.L.Venkatarama Ayyar :J , Vivian
Bose :J

Bengal Immunity Company Limited

Versus
State of Bihar

IT is well settled that marginal notes to the S. of an Act of Parliament

cannot be referred to for the purpose of construing the Act.

1955 (0) AIR(SC) 778

Before:- B.Jagannath Das :J , B.P.Sinha :J , Vivian Bose :J

Bed Raj
Versus
State of Uttar Pradesh

A question of a sentence is a matter of discretion and it is well settled

that when discretion has been properly exercised along accepted judicial
lines, an appellate court should not interfere to the detriment of an
accused person except for very strong reasons which must be disclosed
on the face of the judgment; see for example the observations in Dalip
Singh v. State of Punjab(1) and Nar Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh (2). In
a matter of enhancement there should not be interference when the
sentence passed imposes substantial punishment. Interference is only
called for when it is manifestly inadequate.

1956 (0) AIR(SC) 181

Before:- B.Jagannath Das :J , B.P.Sinha :J , Vivian Bose :J

Baladin
Versus
State of Uttar Pradesh

It is well settled that mere presence in an assembly does not make

such a person a member of an unlawful assembly unless it is shown that
he had done something or omitted to do something which would make
him a member of an unlawful assembly, or unless the case falls under
section 142, Indian Penal Code.

1956 (0) AIR(SC) 87

Before:- B.P.Sinha :J , P.N.Bhagwati :J , T.L.Venkatarama Ayyar :J

Merla Ramanna
Versus
Nallaparaju
It is well settled that when a sale in execution of a decree is impugned
on the ground that it is not warranted by the terms thereof, that question
could be agitated, when it arises between parties to the decree, only by
an application under section 47, Civil Procedure Code and not in a
separate suit.

1956 (0) AIR(SC) 202

Before:- B.Jagannath Das :J , B.P.Sinha :J , P.N.Bhagwati :J ,

S.R.Dass :J , Vivian Bose :J

Union of India: Ganesh Jute Mills Limited

Versus
Commercial Tax officer, West Bengal: Commercial Tax officer

IT is well settled that the provisions of a statute have to be construed

with reference to the state of affairs as they existed at the time the
statute was passed

1956 (0) AIR(SC) 374

Before:- P.N.Bhagwati :J , S.R.Dass :J , T.L.Venkatarama Ayyar :J

Firm Bhagat Ram Mohanlal

Versus
Commissioner of Excess Profits Tax Nagpur
It is well settled that when the karta of a joint Hindu family enters into
a partnership with strangers, the members of the family do not ipso facto
become partners in that firm. They have no right to take part in its
management or to sue for its dissolution. The creditors of the firm would
no doubt be entitled to proceed against the joint family assets including
the shares of the nonpartner co-parceners for realisation of their debts.
But that is because under the Hindu law, the karta has the right when
properly carrying on business to pledge the credit of the joint family to
the extent of its assets, and not because the junior members become
partners in the business. In short, the liability of the latter arises by
reason of their status as copartners and not by reason of any contract of
partnership by them.

1957 (0) AIR(SC) 49

Before:- S.R.Dass :J , Syed Jafar Imam :J , T.L.Venkatarama Ayyar :J

Sree Meenakshi Mills Limited

Versus
Commissioner of Income Tax, Madras

it is well settled that under section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure
the High court has no jurisdiction to reverse the findings of fact arrived
at by the lower appellate court however erroneous, unless they are
vitiated by some error of law.

1958 (0) AIR(SC) 578

Before:- B.P.Sinha :J , J.L.Kapur :J , N.H.Bhagwati :J ,
P.B.Gajendragadkar :J , P.N.Bhagwati :J , Syed Jafar Imam :J

Express Newspaper Private Limited: Press Trust of India, Indian

National Press, Shri Kanayalal Nanabhai Desai, Hindustan Times
Limitedloksatta Karyalaya, Sandesh Limited, Jansatta Karyalaya:
Express Newspaper Private Limited
Versus
Union of India

IT is well settled that writs of certiorari and prohibition will lie only in
respect of judicial or quasi-judicial acts :
"THE orders of certiorari and prohibition will lie to bodies and
persons other than courts stricto sensu. Any body of persons having
legal authority to determine questions affecting rights of subjects and
having the duty act judicially, is subject to the controlling jurisdiction of
the High court of justice, exercised by means of these orders."

1958 (0) AIR(SC) 770

Before:- A.K.Sarkar :J , J.L.Kapur :J , N.H.Bhagwati :J

Ganga Dhar
Versus
Shankar Lal
it is well settled that the mortgagee's right to enforce the mortgage and
the mortgagor's right to redeem are co-extensive.

1958 (0) AIR(SC) 845

Before:- K.Subba Rao :J , N.H.Bhagwati :J , S.K.Das :J , S.R.Dass :J ,

Vivian Bose :J

Sewpujanrai Indrasanarai Limited

Versus
Collector of Customs

It is well settled that where proceedings in an inferior court or tribunal

are partly within and partly without its jurisdiction, prohibition will lie
against doing what is in excess of jurisdiction. (see Halsbury's Laws of
England, 3rd Edn. Vol. 11, para. 216, p. 116). In the recent decision in
Dalmia's case, Shri Ram Krishna Dalmia V. Shri Justice S. R. Tendolkar
and others(1), this court held a part of a notification made under s. 3 of
the Commission of Enquiry Act (LX of 1952) to be bad, and holding that
it was severable from the rest of the notification, deleted it and held that
rest of the notification to be good.

It is well settled that an appellate court is entitled to take into

consideration any change in the law (vide the case of Lachmeshwar
Prasad Shukul v. Keshwar Lal Chaudhuri(1)

1963 (0) AIR(SC) 354

Before:- B.P.Sinha :J , K.Subba Rao :J , Raghubar Dayal :J

Sakharam Alias Bapusaheb Narayan Sanas

Versus
Manikchand Motichand Shah

It is well settled that where there is a right recognised by law, there is a

remedy,; and, therefore, in' the absence of any special provisions
indicating the particular forum for enforcing a particular right, the
general law of the land will naturally take its course.

1962 (0) AIR(SC) 53

Before:- A.K.Sarkar :J , B.P.Sinha :J , J.R.Mudholkar :J , N.Rajagopala

Ayyangar :J , S.R.Dass :J

Instalment Supply Private

Versus
Union of India

It is well settled that in matters of taxation, doctrine of res judicata

does not apply because each year assessment is final only for that
year and does not govern the later years.
1962 (0) AIR(SC) 123

Before:- J.C.Shah :J , K.Subba Rao :J , M.Hidayatullah :J ,

P.B.Gajendragadkar :J , Raghubar Dayal :J

Balaji
Versus
Income Tax Officer, Special Investigation Circle, Akola

IT is well settled that the Entries in the Lists are not powers but are
only fields of legislation, and that widest import and significance must be
given to the, language used by Parliament in the various Entries.

1962 (0) AIR(SC) 195

Before:- A.K.Sarkar :J , B.P.Sinha :J , J.R.Mudholkar :J , N.Rajagopala

Ayyangar :J , S.R.Dass :J

Dhaneshwar Narain Saxena

Versus
Delhi Administration
It is well settled that if a public servant dishonestly or fraudulently
misappropriates property entrusted to him, he cannot be said to have
been doing so in the discharge of his official duty (vide the case of Hori
Ram Singh v. The Crown (1).
1962 (0) AIR(SC) 1314

Before:- B.P.Sinha :J , J.C.Shah :J , J.L.Kapur :J , J.R.Mudholkar :J ,

M.Hidayatullah :J

Chuni Lal V.Mehta, Sons Limited, Advocate General For The State of
Maharashtra Intervener
Versus
Century Spinning and Manufacturing Company Limited

it is well settled that the construction of a document of title or of a

document which is the foundation of the rights of parties necessarily
raises a question of law

1963 (0) AIR(SC) 1128

Before:- A.K.Sarkar :J , J.L.Kapur :J , M.Hidayatullah :J , Raghubar

Dayal :J , S.R.Dass :J

Mysore State Electricity Board (In All Aapeals)

Versus
Bangalore Woollen, Cotton and Silk Mills Limited

It is well settled that in order to decide whether a decision in an earlier

litigation operates as res judicata, the court must look at the nature of
the litigation, what were the issues raised therein and what was actually
decided in it.

1964 (0) AIR(SC) 907

Before:- J.R.Mudholkar :J , K.Subba Rao :J , Raghubar Dayal :J , Syed

Jafar Imam :J

Ittyavira Mathai
Versus
Varkey Varkey
CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE, 1908-- Section 2(2) -- Decree -- Nullity --
Decree passed in suit barred by time -- The decree is illegal and not
in nullity. If the suit was barred by time and yet, the court decreed
it, the court would be committing an illegality and therefore the
aggrieved party would be entitled to have the decree set aside by
preferring an appeal against it.
it is well settled that a court having jurisdiction over the subject matter
of the suit and over the parties thereto, though bound to decide right
may decide wrong; and that even though it decided wrong it would not be
doing something which it had no jurisdiction to do. It had the
jurisdiction over the subject-matter and it had the jurisdiction over the
party and, therefore, merely because it made an error in deciding a vital
issue in the suit, it cannot be said that it has acted beyond its
jurisdiction.

1963 DGLS(Soft.) 50
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Equivalent Citations:

Before:- A.K.Sarkar :J , M.Hidayatullah :J , N.Rajagopala Ayyangar :J ,

S.K.Das :J

Lakshmi Achi
Versus
T.V.V.Kailasa Thevar

It is well settled that where an appeal has been preferred against a

preliminary decree the time for applying for final decree runs from the
date of the appellate decree; see. Jowad Hussain v. Gendan Singh (1). In
that decision the Privy Council quoted with approval the following
observations of Benerjee, J. made in Gajadhar Singh v. Kishan Jiwan Lal
(2).

"IT seems to me that this rulethe rule regulating application for final
decree in mortgage actionscontemplates the passing of only one final
decree in a suit for sale upon a mortgage. The essential condition to the
making of a final decree is the existence of a preliminary decree which
has become conclusive between the parties. When an appeal has been
preferred, it is the decree of the appellate Court which is the final decree
in the cause."
1964 (0) AIR(SC) 136

Before:- J.R.Mudholkar :J , K.Subba Rao :J , Raghubar Dayal :J

A.Raghavamma
Versus
A.Chenchamma

It is well settled that a person who seeks to displace the natural

succession to property by alleging an adoption must discharge the
burden that lies upon him by proof of the factum of adoption and its
validity.

1964 (0) AIR(SC) 743

Before:- J.C.Shah :J , K.C.Das Gupta :J , K.N.Wanchoo :J , N.Rajagopala

Ayyangar :J , P.B.Gajendragadkar :J

Central Bank of India Limited

Versus
P.S.Rajagopalan

it is well settled that it is open to the Executing court to interpret the

decree for the purpose of execution. It is, of course, true that the
executing court cannot go behind the decree, nor can it add to or
subtract from the provision of the decree. These limitations apply also to
the Labour court; but like the executing court, the Labour court would
also be competent to interpret the award or settlement on which a
workman bases his claim under s. 33C (2).

1964 (0) AIR(SC) 719

Before:- K.C.Das Gupta :J , K.N.Wanchoo :J , P.B.Gajendragadkar :J

Khardah and Company Limited

Versus
Workmen
IT is well settled that if the enquiry is held to be unfair, the employer
can lead evidence before the tribunal and justify his action, but in such a
case) the question as to whether the dismissal of The employee is
justified or not would be open before the tribunal and the tribunal will
consider the merits ,if the dispute and come to its own conclusion
without having any regard for the view taken by the management in
dismissing the employee. If the enquiry is good and the conduct of the
management is not mala fide or vindictive, then, of course, the tribunal
would not try to examine the merits of the findings as though it was
sitting in appeal over the conclusions of the enquiry officer.

1964 (0) AIR(SC) 269

Before:- J.R.Mudholkar :J , K.Subba Rao :J , Raghubar Dayal :J

Nagraj
Versus
State of Mysore

It is well settled that the jurisdiction of the court to proceed with the
complaint emanates from the allegations made in the complaint and not
from what is alleged by the accused or what is finally established in the
case as a result of the evidence recorded.

1964 (0) AIR(SC) 1854

Before:- J.R.Mudholkar :J , K.N.Wanchoo :J , K.Subba Rao :J ,

N.Rajagopala Ayyangar :J , P.B.Gajendragadkar :J

Champaklal Chimanlal Shah

Versus
Union of India
It is well settled that temporary servants are also entitled to the
protection of Art. 311(2) in the same manner as permanent government
servants, if the government takes action against them by meting out one
of the three punishments i.e. dismissal, removal or reduction in rank:
(see Parshotam Lal Dhingra v. Union of India(`). But this protection is
only available where discharge, removal or reduction in rank is sought to
be inflicted by way of punishment and not otherwise. It is also not
disputed that the mere use of expressions like `terminate` or `discharge`
is not conclusive and in spite of the use of such innocuous expressions,
the court has to apply the two tests mentioned in Parshotam Lal
Dhingra's case(1), namely-(1) whether the servant had a right to the post
or the rank or (2) whether he has been visited with evil consequences;
and if either of the tests is satisfied, it must be held that the servant had
been punished. Further even though misconduct, negligence, inefficiency
or other disqualification may be the motive or the inducing factor which
influences the government to take action under the terms of the contract
of employment or the specific service rule, nevertheless, if a right exists
under the contract or the rules, to terminate the service the motive
operating on the mind of the government is wholly irrelevant. It is on
these principles which have been laid down in Parshotam Lal Dhingra's
case() that we have to decide whether the appellant was entitled to the
protection of Art. 311(2) in this case.

1964 (0) AIR(SC) 457

Before:- J.C.Shah :J , K.N.Wanchoo :J , K.Subba Rao :J ,

P.B.Gajendragadkar :J , Raghubar Dayal :J

State of Maharashtra
Versus
Mishrilal Tarachand Lodha
it is well settled that the plaintiff has to value his appeal against the
dismissal of his suit on the amount of the claim he had made in the
plaint and has not to include the interest due on the amount claimed up
to the date of instituting the appeal, that the defendant has not to
include that amount of future interest subsequent to the date of the
decree till the institution of the appeal in the valuation of the appeal for
the purposes of court-fee and that no court-fee is to be paid on the
amount of costs decreed in the suit when the party aggrieved appeals
against the decree.

1964 (0) AIR(SC) 1256

Before:- J.C.Shah :J , K.C.Das Gupta :J , K.N.Wanchoo :J , N.Rajagopala

Ayyangar :J , P.B.Gajendragadkar :J

Memon Abdul Karim Haji Tayab, Central Cutlery Stores, Veraval

Versus
Deputy Custodian General, New Delhi

It is well settled that procedural amendments to a law apply, in the

absence of anything to the contrary, retrospectively in the sense that
they apply to all actions after the date they come into force even though
the actions may have begun earlier or the claim on which the action may
be based may be of an anterior date.

1998 (7) SCC 608 : 1998 (7) Supreme 248

Before:- A.S.Anand :J , D.P.Wadhwa :J

Mohammedkasam Haji Gulambhai

Versus
Bakerali Fatehali
IT is well settled that parting with possession meant giving possession
to persons other than those to whom possession had been given by the
lease and the parting with possession must have been by the tenant;
user by other person is not parting with possession so long as the tenant
retains the legal possession himself, or in other words, there must be
vesting of possession by the tenant in another person by divesting
himself not only of physical possession but also of the right to
possession. So long as the tenant retains the right to possession there is
no parting with possession in terms of clause (b) of Section 14(1 of the
Act. Even though the father had retired from the business and the sons
had been looking after the business, in the facts of this case, it cannot be
said that the father had divested himself of the legal right to be in
possession. If the father has a right to displace the possession of the
occupants, i.e., his sons, it cannot be said that the tenant had parted
with possession."

The court also relied on its earlier decision in Krishnawati v. Hans Raj. In
that case, two persons lived in a house as husband and wife. One of
them had rented the premises and allowed the other to carry on business
in a part of it. Again, the question was if it amounted to sub-letting. This
court held that if two persons live together in a house as husband and
wife and one of them who was the tenant of the house allows the other to
carry on business in a part of it, it will, in the absence of any other
evidence, be a rash inference to draw that the tenant has let out that
part of the premises. The court said that it was a settled law that onus to
prove sub-letting was on the landlord. If the landlord prima facie shows
that the occupant who was in the exclusive possession of the premises
let out for valuable consideration, it would then be for the tenant to rebut
the evidence. The court said that the landlord in that case produced no
evidence to show sub-letting in spite of the denial by the tenant in the
written statement of any sub-letting.

Before:- M.Jagannadha Rao :J , S.B.Majmudar :J

Ganesh Shet
Versus
C.S.G.K.Setty

It is well settled that the circumstances referred to in sub-clauses (2 to

(4 in regard to exercise of discretion for granting a decree for specific
performance are not exhaustive. The relief for specific performance is
discretionary and is not given merely because it is legal but it is governed
by sound judicial principles. (See Mademsetty Satyanarayana v. G. Yelloji
Rao and Sardar Singh v. Krishna Devi.)

(13) IT is again well settled that in a suit for specific performance,

the a evidence and proof of the agreement must be absolutely clear and
certain.

(14) IN Pomeroy on Specific Performance of Contracts (3rd Edn.),

(para 159 it is stated clearly that a

"GREATER amount or degree of certainty is required in the terms of

an agreement, which is to be specifically executed in equity, than is
necessary in a contract which is to be the basis of an action at law for
damages. An action at law is founded upon the mere non-performance by
the defendant, and this negative conclusion can often be established
without determining all the terms of the agreement with exactness. The
suit in equity is wholly an affirmative proceeding. The mere fact of non-
performance is not enough; its object is to procure a performance by the
defendant, and this demands a clear, definite, and precise understanding
of all the terms; they must be exactly ascertained before their
performance can be enforced. This quality of certainty can best be
illustrated by examples selected from the decided cases ...".

(15) THE question is whether, when parties have led evidence in

regard to a contract not pleaded in the evidence, relief can be granted on
the basis of the evidence and whether the plaintiff can be allowed to give
a go-by to the specific plea in the plaint. Is there any difference between
suits for specific performance and other suits?

(16) IT appears to us that while normally it is permissible to grant

relief on the basis of what emerges from the evidence - even if not
pleaded, provided there is no prejudice to the opposite party, such a
principle is not applied in suits relating to specific performance. In
Gonesh Ram v. Ganpat Rai the Calcutta High court has considered the
same question. There the agreement pleaded was not proved but the
plaintiff wanted to prove an antecedent agreement based on
correspondence. It was held that the plaintiff, in a suit for specific
performance, could not be permitted to abandon the case made out in
the plaint and to invite the court to examine whether a completed
agreement may or may not be spelt out of the antecedent
correspondence. In that connection, Sir Asutosh Mookerjee observed:

"THE court would not in a case of this description permit the plaintiffs
to depart from the case made in the plaint as the Court discourages, as a
rule, variance between pleading and proof. The test applied in such cases
is whether if the variance were permitted in favour of the plaintiffs,
defendants would be taken by surprise and be prejudiced thereby. ...
This rule is applied with special strictness in cases of specific
performance of contracts. In Hawkins v. Maltby one contract was alleged
and another was proved, with the result that the bill was dismissed. No
doubt where there has been a part performance, the court may struggle
with apparently conflicting evidence rather than dismiss the suit. This
appears to have been the view adopted by Lord Cottenham in Mundy v.
Jolliffe. In the case before us there is no question of part performance."

1998 (5) SCC 1 : 1998 (4) Supreme 537

Before:- D.P.Wadhwa :J , S.P.Kurdukar :J , Sujata V.Manohar :J

Harshad Shantilal Mehta

Versus
Custodian

IT is well settled that the Insolvency court can, both at the time of
hearing the petition for adjudication of a person as an insolvent and
subsequently at the stage of the proof of debts, reopen the transaction on
the basis of which the creditor had secured the judgment of a court
against the debtor. This is based on the principle that it is for the
Insolvency court to determine at the time of the hearing of the petition for
insolvency whether the alleged debtor does owe the debts mentioned by
the creditor in the petition, and whether, if he owes them, what is the
extent of those debts. A debtor is not to be adjudged an insolvent unless
he owes the debts equal to or more than a certain amount, and has also
committed an act of insolvency. It is the duty of the Insolvency court,
therefore, to determine itself the alleged debts owed by the debtor
irrespective of whether those debts are based on a contract or under a
decree of court. At the stage of the proof of the debts, the debts to be
proved by the creditor are scrutinised by the Official Receiver or by the
court in order to determine the amount of all the debts which the
insolvent owes as his total assets will be utilised for the payment of his
total debts and if any debt is wrongly included in his total debts that will
adversely affect the interests of the creditors other than the judgment
creditor in respect of that particular debt as they were not parties to the
suit in which the judgment debt was decreed. That decree is not binding
on them and it is right that they be in a position to question the
correctness of the judgment debt."

1998 (4) Supreme 490

Before:- G.B.Pattanaik :J , S.Saghir Ahmad :J

Benny T.D.
Versus
Registrar of Co-operative Societies

It is well settled that when recruitment is made to the posts

governed by statutory rules under provision to Article 309, said
rules must be strictly adhered to. The view of the High Court,
therefore, not proper and set aside.
Appointment in excess of the posts advertised -- Though the
appointments in excess of the posts advertised is not bad but the
conclusion that the appointments in excess of the staff strength
approved by the Registrar was not justified because there was no
material on the record to that effect. The plea that in the public
interest the selection should be annulled even though the report
had not been submitted to the employer not accepted as it would be
in gross violation of natural justice.
1998 (4) Supreme 440

Before:- M.Jagannadha Rao :J , S.B.Majmudar :J

Jagan Nath
Versus
Jagdish Rai

It is well settled that the initial burden to show that the subsequent
purchaser of suit property covered by earlier suit agreement was a bona
fide purchaser for value without notice of the suit agreement squarely
rests on the shoulders of such subsequent transferee. In the case of
Bhup Narain Singh v. Gokul Chand Mahton the Privy council relying
upon earlier Section 27 of the Specific Relief Act of 1877 which is in pari
materia with Section 19(l)(b) of the present Act, made the following
pertinent observations at 6 p. 70 of the Report in this connection:
"SECTION 27 lays down a general rule that the original contract may
be specifically enforced against a subsequent transferee, but allows an
exception to that general rule, not to the transferor, but to the transferee,
and therefore it is for the transferee to establish the circumstances which
will allow him to retain the benefit of a transfer which prirna facie, he
had no right to get:"

However, it has to be kept in view that once evidence is led by both the
sides the question of initial onus of proof pales into insignificance and
the court will have to decide the question in controversy in the light of
the evidence on record. Even this aspect of the matter is well settled by a
decision of the Privy council in the case of Mohd. Aslam Khan v. Feroze
Shah wherein it was observed with reference to the very same question
arising under Section 27(6 of the earlier Specific Relief Act of 1877 that:
"IT is not necessary to enter upon a discussion of the question of
onus where the whole of the evidence in the case is before the court and
it has no difficulty in arriving at a conclusion in respect thereof, Where a
transferee has knowledge of such facts which would put him on inquiry
which if prosecuted would have disclosed a previous agreement, such
transferee is not a transferee without notice of the original contract
within the meaning of the exception in Section 27(b)."

IT is well settled that in the absence of any express or implied

agreement to the contrary, in a monthly tenancy, the rent is payable at
the end of each month of tenancy.
It is well settled that a probationer's service can be terminated during
the period of probation if he is found unsuitable. No enquiry is necessary
for such termination of the services of a probationer. In the case of
Samsher Singh v. State of Punjab a bench of this court consisting of
seven Judges, inter alia, held that the services of a probationer can be
terminated when the authorities are satisfied regarding his inadequacy
for the job, or unsuitability for temperamental or other reasons not
involving moral turpitude, or when his conduct may result in dismissal
or removal but without a formal enquiry. An enquiry is necessary only
when the termination is by way of a punishment, and to determine this
the substance of the order and not the form is decisive. The same
position has been reaffirmed in Anoop Jaiswal v. Govt. of India where the
decision in Samsher Singh v. State of Punjab has been quoted
extensively. Before a probationer is confirmed, the authority concerned is
under an obligation to consider whether the work of the probationer is
satisfactory or whether he is suitable for the post. If it comes to the
conclusion that the probationer is not suitable he is liable to be
discharged. He cannot, in this situation, claim the benefit of Article
311(2.

In Babu Ram Gupta v. Sadhir Bhasin this court said:

"IT is well settled that while it is the duty of the court to punish a
person who tries to obstruct the course of justice or brings into disrepute
the institution of judiciary this power has to be exercised not casually or
lightly but with great care and circumspection and only in such cases
where it is necessary to punish the contemner in order-to uphold the
majesty of law and dignity of the courts."

1998 (3) Supreme 258

Before:- A.S.Anand :J , V.N.Khare :J

Sayyed Ali
Versus
A.P.Wakf Board, Hyderabad

It is well settled that if a decision of a court or a tribunal is without

jurisdiction, such a decision or finding cannot operate as res judicata in
any subsequent proceedings. The plea of res judicata presupposes that
there is in existence a decree or judgment which is legal but when the
judgment is non est in law, no plea of res judicata can be founded on
such ajudgment. It would be appropriate here to quote the following
passage from Res judicata - Spencer Bower and Turner, 2nd Edn., p. 92-

"COMPETENT jurisdiction is an essential condition of every valid res

judicata, which means that, in order that a judicial decision relied upon,
whether as a bar, or as the foundation of an action, may conclusively
bind the parties, or (in the case of in rem decisions) the world, it must
appear that the judicial tribunal pronouncing the decision had
jurisdiction over the cause or matter, and over the parties, sufficient to
warrant it in so doing."
(8) IN Mathura Prasad Bajoo Jaiswal v. Dossibai N.B. Jeejeebhoy
this court observed as follows:

"A question of jurisdiction of the court, or of procedure, or a pure

question of law unrelated to the right of the parties to a previous suit, is
not res judicata in the subsequent suit. * * * Similarly, by an erroneous
decision if the court assumes jurisdiction which it does not possess
under the statute, the question cannot operate as res judicata between
the same parties, whether the cause of action in the subsequent
litigation is the same or otherwise."

(9) IN Richpal Singh v. Dalip this court held thus:

"A salutary and simple test to apply in determining whether the

previous decision operates as res judicata or on principles analogous
thereto is to find out whether the first court, here the Revenue court
could go into the question whether the respondent was a tenant in
possession or mortgagee in possession. It is clear in view of language
mentioned before that it could not. If that be so, there was no res
judicata. The subsequent civil suit was not barred by res judicata."

(10) IN Pandurang Mahadeo Kavade v. Annaji Balwant Bokil it was

held that in order to operate res judicata it must be established that the
previous decision was given by a court which had jurisdiction to try the
present suit, and the plea of res judicata would not be available if the
previous decision was by a court having no jurisdiction. Learned counsel
for the appellant referred to a decision of this court in the case of
Mohanlal Goenka v. Benoy Kishna Mukherjee in support of his
argument. In this case it was held that a the principle of res judicata will
also apply to execution proceedings. But this case has no bearing on the
controversy which is before us, and, therefore, learned counsel cannot
derive any assistance from this decision. Thus, it is well settled that
doctrine of res judicata does not apply to a decision of a court or tribunal
which lacked jurisdiction.

1998 (1) Supreme 90

Before:- M.Jagannadha Rao :J , S.C.Sen :J

I.T.C.Limited
Versus
Debts Recovery Appellate Tribunal

it is well settled that in regard to payment under Bank Guarantees or

irrevocable Letters of Credit, the contract between the sellers (appellant)
and the Bank was independent of the contract between the buyers and
sellers in respect of the goods and that the Bank had no authority to
refuse payment on the ground of any alleged breach of contract by the
sellers in their contract with the buyers. The only exceptions which have
been recognised by the courts were cases of fraud or irretrievable injury.
In the case of those exceptions, the buyer could seek an injunction
against the Bank before the Bank paid money to the sellers. No such
injunction was sought by the buyers. Further, the exceptions relating to
forgery or fraud and misrepresentation recognised by the courts relate to
forgery or fraudulent presentation of the documents tendered to the
Bank. The case on hand did not come within the said exceptions and,
therefore, there was no cause of action against the appellant. Learned
counsel also contended, that merely because the word fraud or
misrepresentation were used in the plaint, the Bank could not claim that
the said allegations have to be accepted as true for purposes of Order 7
Rule 11 Civil Procedure Code.

-it is well settled that any IPR can be changed if there is an overriding
public interest involved. It has been stated on affidavit by the State of
orissa that after a package of incentives was given to the industries, the
government was faced with severe resource crunch. On a review of its
financial position, it was felt that for the sake of the economy of the
State, it was necessary to limit the scope of exemption granted to various
industries. Accordingly, further notifications were issued under Section 6
of the orissa Sales Tax Act from time to time. Because of this new
perception of the economic scenario, the scope of the earlier notifications
was restricted by subsequent notifications issued under Section 6. This
also led to issuance of the second IPR dated 31/7/1980.

1998 (1) SCC 756 : 1997 (10) Supreme 529

Before:- M.M.Punchhi :J , M.Srinivasan :J

General Court Martial

Versus
Col.Aniltej Singh Dhaliwal
It is well settled that an admission can be explained by the makers
thereof. In Nagubai Ammal v. B. Shama Rao the court held that an
admission is not conclusive as to the truth of the matter stated therein
and it is only a piece of evidence, the weight to be attached to which
must depend upon the circumstances under which it is made. The court
said that it may be shown to be erroneous or untrue so long as the
person to whom it was made has not acted upon it at the time when it
might become conclusive by way of estoppel. The same principle has
been reiterated in K.S. Srinivasan v. Union of India, Basant Singh v.
Janki Singh and Prem Ex-Servicemen Cooperative Tenant Farming
Society Ltd. v. State of Haryana.

1997 (10) Supreme 309

Before:- G.B.Pattanaik :J , G.T.Nanavati :J

Banwari Ram: Bans Narain Singh

Versus
State of Uttar Pradesh

It is well settled that there is no difference so far as power of the

Appellate Court is concerned to deal with an appeal from a
conviction and that from an appeal against the order of acquittal.
The procedure for dealing with two kinds of appeals was identical
and the power of the Appellate Court in disposing of the appeals
were in essence the same. If, however, on the evidence, two use are
possible, one supporting the acquittal has to be adopted.
1997 (10) Supreme 554

Before:- K.Venkataswami :J , S.B.Majmudar :J

Vanita M.Khanolkar
Versus
Pragna M.Pai

it is well settled that any statutory provision barring an appeal or

revision cannot cut across the constitutional power of a High court. Even
the power flowing from the paramount charter under which the High
court functions would not get excluded unless the statutory enactment
concerned expressly excludes appeals under letters patent. No such bar
is discernible from Section 6(3 of the Act. It could not be seriously
contended by learned counsel for the respondents that if clause 15 of the
Letters Patent is invoked then the order would be appealable.
Consequently, in our view, on the clear language of clause 15 of the
Letters Patent which is applicable to Bombay High court, the said appeal
was maintainable as the order under appeal was passed by learned
Single Judge of the High court exercising original jurisdiction of the
court. Only on that short ground the appeal is required to be allowed.

1997 (9) Supreme 69

Before:- M.Jagannadha Rao :J , S.B.Majmudar :J

Union of India
Versus
United India Insurance Company Limited

It is well settled that when the issue framed by the trial court is wide
and parties understood the scope thereof and adduced such evidence as
they wanted to, then there can be no prejudice and a contention
regarding absence of a detailed pleading cannot be countenanced

1997 (7) Supreme 427

Before:- G.B.Pattanaik :J , K.Ramaswamy :J , S.Saghir Ahmad :J

S.S.Bola
Versus
B.D.Sardana

IT is well settled that Parliament and State Legislatures have plenary

powers of legislation on the subjects within their field. They can legislate
on the said subjects prospectively as well as retrospectively. If the
intention of the legislature is clearly expressed that it purports to
introduce the legislation or to amend an existing legislation
retrospectively, then subject to the legislative competence and the
exercise being not in violation of any of the provisions of the
Constitution, such power cannot be questioned."
The court also further held that the exercise of rendering ineffective the
judgments or orders of competent courts by changing the very basis by
legislation is a well-known device of validating legislation and such
validating legislation which removes the cause of the invalidity cannot be
considered to be an encroachment on judicial power.

1997 (6) Supreme 29

Before:- G.B.Pattanaik :J , K.Ramaswamy :J , S.Saghir Ahmad :J

R.S.Rekhchand Mohota Spinning and Weaving Mills Limited

Versus
State of Maharashtra

It is well settled that the various entries in the three lists of the Indian
Constitution are not powers but fields of legislation. The power to
legislate is given by Article 246 and other articles of the Constitution. The
three lists of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution are legislative
heads of fields of legislation. These demarcate the area over which the
appropriate legislatures can operate. It is well settled that widest
amplitude should be given to the language of the entries in three Lists
but some of these entries in different lists or 3 1990 1 SCC 109 in the
same list may override and sometimes may appear to be in direct conflict
with each other, then and then only comes the duty of the court to find
the true intent and purpose and to examine the particular legislation in
question. Each general word should be held to extend to all ancillary or
subsidiary matters which can fairly and reasonably be comprehended in
it. In interpreting an entry it would not be reasonable to import any
limitation by comparing or contrasting that entry with any other in the
same list. It has to be interpreted as the Constitution must be
interpreted as an organic document in the light of the experience
gathered. In the constitutional scheme of division of powers under the
legislative lists, there are separate entries pertaining to taxation and
other laws. The aforesaid principles are fairly well settled by various
decisions of this court and other courts. Some of these decisions have
been referred to in the decision of this court in India Cement Ltd. v. State
of T.N."

1997 (5) Supreme 62

Before:- D.P.Wadhwa :J , K.Ramaswamy :J

Mahendra Raghunathdas Gupta

Versus
Vishvanath Bhikaji Mogul

It is well settled that a transferee of the landlord's rights steps into the
shoes of the landlord with all the rights and liabilities of the transferor
landlord in respect of the subsisting tenancy. The section does not
require that the transfer of the right of the landlord can take effect only if
the tenant attorns to him. Attornment by the tenant is not necessary to
confer validity of the transfer of the landlord's rights. Since attomment by
the tenant is not required a notice under Section 106 in terms of the old
terms of lease by the transferor landlord would be proper and so also the
suit for ejectment.
It was held by this court in the case of Yogender Pal Singh v. Union of
India

"... It is well settled that when a competent authority makes a new

law which is totally inconsistent with the earlier law and the two cannot
stand together any longer it must be construed that the earlier law has
been repealed by necessary implication by the later law...."

1997 (3) Supreme 1

Before:- A.M.Ahmadi :J , K.Venkataswami :J

B.V.Radha Krishna
Versus
Sponge Iron India Limited

It is well settled that if a question of law is referred to arbitrator and

the arbitrator comes to a conclusion, it is not open to challenge the
award on the ground that an alternative view of law is possible. In this
connection, reference may be made to the decisions of this court in Alopi
Parshad and Sons Ltd. v. Union of lndiu and Kapoor Nilokheri
Cooperative Dairy Farm Society . In Indian Oil Corpn. Ltd. v. Indian
Carbon Ltd , this court has held that the court does not sit in appeal over
the award and review the reasons. The court can set aside the award
only if it is apparent from the award that there is no evidence to support
the conclusions or if the award is based upon any legal proposition
which is erroneous."
(12) IN Hindustan Construction Co. Ltd. v. governor of orissa this
court observed on the scope of interference by the court as follows:

"… It is well known that the court while considering the question
whether the award should be set aside, does not examine that question
as an appellate court. While exercising the said power, the court cannot
reappreciate all the materials on the record for the purpose of recording a
finding whether in the facts and circumstances of a particular case the
000000 award in question could have been made. Such award can be set
aside on any of the grounds specified in Section 30 of the Act."

it is well settled that time is not of the essence of the contract unless
the parties specifically make it so. Section 11 of the Sale of Goods Act
gives statutory recognition to this principle. This aspect of the matter
was also overlooked in Britannia Biscuits Co. case '.

1997 (3) Supreme 365

Before:- K.Ramaswamy :J , S.Saghir Ahmad :J

Tamil Nadu Electricity Board

Versus
Bridge Tunnel Constructions
 IT is well settled that in the matter of challenge to the award there are
two distinct and different grounds, viz., that there is an error apparent
on the face of the record and that the arbitrator has exceeded his
jurisdiction. In the latter case, the court can look into the arbitration
agreement but under the former it cannot do so unless the agreement
was incorporated or cited in the award or evidence was made part of the
agreement. In the case of jurisdictional error, there is no embargo on the
power of the court to admit the contract into evidence and to consider
whether or not the umpire had exceeded the jurisdiction because the
nature of the dispute is something which has to be determined, outside
the award, whatever might be said about it in the award or by the
arbitrator. In the case of non-speaking award, it isnot open to the court
to go into the merits. Only in a speaking award the court can look into
the reasoning in the award and correct wrong proposition of law or error
of law. It is not open to the court to probe the mental process of the
arbitrator and speculate, when no reasons have been given by the
arbitrator, as to what impelled the arbitrator to arrive at his conclusion.
but in the later case the court, with reference to the terms of THE
CONTRACT/arbitration agreement, would consider whether or not
THEARBITRATOR/umpire has exceeded his jurisdiction in awarding or
refusing toaward the sum of money awarded or omitted a consolidated
lump sum.

(37) IN fact, in G.S. Atul & Co. case , having noticed that the
arbitrator had exceeded his jurisdiction to grant the amount dehors the
terms of the contract and being a non-speaking award, the court was
unable to speculate as to what extent the award was within the terms of
the contract or claims made and to what extent the amount awarded was
in respect of a non arbitrable dispute. Accordingly, the order of the civil
court was set aside reversing the judgment of the division bench of the
Calcutta High court.

It is well settled that even orders which may not be strictly legal
become final and are binding between the parties if they are not
challenged before the superior courts.

1996 (8) Supreme 121

Before:- A.M.Ahmadi :J , S.C.Sen :J , S.P.Bharucha :J

C.T.Limited
Versus
Commercial Tax officer

THE learned counsel cited from the judgment of this court in the case of
Bhopal Sugar Industries Ltd. v. SALES TAX OFFICER the following:

"IT is well settled that while interpreting the terms of the agreement,
the Court has to look to the substance rather than the form of it. The
mere fact that the word 'agent' or 'agency' is used or the words 'buyer'
and 'seller' are used to describe the status of the parties concerned is not
sufficient to lead to the irresistible inference that the parties did in fact
intend that the said status would be conferred. Thus the mere formal
description of a person as an agent or a buyer is not conclusive, unless
the context shows that the parties clearly intended to treat a buyer as a
buyer and not as an agent. Learned counsel for the appellant relied on
several circumstances to show that on a proper construction of the
agreement it could not, but be, held to be a contract of sale. Learned
counsel strongly relied on a decision of this court in Sri Tirumala
Venkateswara Timber and Bamboo Firm v. CTO, where this Court held
the transaction to be a sale in almost similar circumstances. Speaking
for the Court, Ramaswami, J., observed as follows: 'As a matter of law
there is a distinction between a contract of sale and a contract of agency
by which the agent is authorised to sell or buy on behalf of the principal.
The essence of a contract of sale is the transfer of title to the goods for a
price paid or promised to be paid. The transferee in such a case is liable
to the transferor as a debtor for the price to be paid and not as agent for
the proceeds of the sale. The essence of agency to sell is the delivery of
the goods to a person who is to sell them, not as his own property but as
the property of the principal who continues to be the owner of the goods
and will therefore be liable to account for the sale proceeds.' It is clear
from the observations made by this Court that the true relationship of
the parties in such a case has to be gathered from the nature of the
contract, its terms and conditions, and the terminology used by the
parties is not decisive of the said relationship."

It is well settled that unless the a property in question for which the
relief has been sought for is identifiable, no decree can be granted in
respect of the same.

It is well settled that every provision in the Act needs to be construed

harmoniously with a view to promote the object and spirit of the Act but
while doing so, no violence would be done to the plain language used in
the section.

It is well settled that when legislature enacts a law even in respect of

the personal law of a group of persons following a particular religion,
then such statutory provisions shall prevail and override any personal
law, usage or custom prevailing before coming into force of such Act.

It is well settled that the approver's evidence must pass the double test
of reliability and corroboration in material particulars. It is said that the
approver is a most unworthy friend and he having bargained for his
immunity must prove his worthiness for credibility in court. Firstly, we
will have to scrutinize the evidence of Gurjant Singh (Public Witness 3,
approver carefully to find out as to whether his evidence can be accepted
as trustworthy. Secondly, once that hurdle is crossed the story given by
an approver so far as the accused on trial is concerned, must implicate
him in such a manner as to give rise to a conclusion of guilt beyond
reasonable doubt. Ordinarily, combined effect of S. 133 and 114 of the
Evidence Act, 1872 is that conviction can be based on uncorroborated
testimony of an approver but as a rule of prudence it is unsafe to place
reliance on the uncorroborated testimony of an approver. Section 114
Illustration (b) incorporates a rule of caution to which the courts should
have regard. See Suresh Chandra Bahri v. State of Bihar.
1996 (4) Supreme 42

Before:- A.S.Anand :J , Faizan Uddin :J

Kirtikant D.Vadodaria
Versus
State of Gujarat

It is well settled that a son has to maintain his mother irrespective of

the fact whether he inherits any property or not from his father, as on
the basis of the relationship alone he owes a duty and an obligation, legal
and moral, to maintain his mother who has given birth to him. Further,
according to Section 20 of the Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act,
1956, a Hindu is under a legal obligation to maintain his wife, minor
sons, unmarried daughters and aged or infirm parents. The obligation to
maintain them is personal, legal and absolute in character and arises
from the very existence of the relationship between the parties. But the
question before us is whether a stepmother can claim maintenance from
the stepson under Section 125 of the Code. In other words, whether
Section 125 of the Code includes within its fold the stepmother also as
one of the persons to claim maintenance from her stepson.

1996 (1) Supreme 264

Before:- A.M.Ahmadi :J , S.C.Sen :J

State of Maharashtra
Versus
National Construction Company, Bombay
CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE,1908 -- Order 2, Rule 2 -- Bar under
Order 2, Rule 2 in filing 2nd petition, only when causes are same --
Where first suit was filed to enforce Bank guarantee, 2nd suit to
claim damages for breach of contract relating to which Bank
guarantee was given, will not be barred being based on different
cause of action.

The legal position would be that a Bank guarantee is ordinarily a

contract, distinct and independent of underlying contract. The
Supreme Court has held in AIR 1970 SC 1059 that where the cause
of action on the basis of which previous suit was filed does not form
the foundation of the subsequent suit and in a earlier suit the
plaintiff could not have claimed the relief which he sought in the
subsequent suit, the suit of the plaintiff filed subsequently, will not
be barred under Order, 2 Rule 2. Applying this ruling to the facts of
the case, it was clear that in the first suit, the appellant could only
claim the relief for 14, 12, 836 was the maximum amount and they
could claim relief of I, 13, 27, 298. 16 which they did in the 2nd
suit. Therefore, the 2nd suit was not barred.

it is well settled that Section 53-A confers no active title on the

transferee in possession; it only imposes a statutory bar on the
transferor.

IN Ram Gopal Reddy v. Additional Custodian Evacuee Property , a

Constitution bench of this court had held that the benefit of Section 53-A
cannot be taken aid of by the plaintiff to establish his right as owner of
the property. Therefore, Section 53-A can be used as a shield but not as
an independent claim either as a plaintiff or as a defendant. In Delhi
Motor Co. v. U.A. Basrurkar , a bench of three Judges had held that
Section 53-A is meant only to bring out a bar against the enforcement of
a right by a lessor in respect of the property of which the lessee had
already taken possession but does not give any right to the lessee to
claim possession or to claim any other right on the basis of an
unregistered lease. Section 53-A is available only as a defence to a lessee
and not as conferring a right on the basis of which the lessee can claim
rights against the lessor. In that case the appellants had put forward
certain documents as a lease which was admittedly beyond 11 months
and, therefore, it was held that the company was not entitled to avail of
the statutory right under Section 53-A. In Sardar Govindmo Mahadik v.
De.vi Sahai , this court had held that the court would look at the writing
that is offered as a contract for transfer for consideration of any
immovable property, then examine the acts said to have been done in
furtherance of the contract, and find out whether there is a real nexus
between the contract and the acts pleaded as a part performance so that
to refuse relief would be perpetuating the fraud of the party, who after
having taken advantage or benefit of the contract, backs out and pleads
non-registration as a defence, a defence analogous to Section 4 of the
Statute of Frauds. In that case it was held that the mortgagee in
possession was not entitled to claim title of ownership against suit of
mortgagor for redemption. Therefore, the doctrine of part performance in
Section 5

(8) THE contract for sale of immovable property does not create any
title except when covered under Section 54 of the Act and registered
under Section 17 of the Registration Act. Equally, it does not create an
interest in the property. It merely gives a right to enforce it specifically as
an equitable relief in a court of law. In Technicians Studio (P) Ltd. v. Lila
Ghosh , this court had held that it is well settled that Section 53-A
confers no active title on the transferee in possession; it only imposes a
statutory bar on the transferor.

IT is well settled that if a court acts without jurisdiction, its decision

can be challenged in the same way as it would have been challenged if it
had acted with jurisdiction, i.e., an appeal would lie to the court to which
it would lie if its order was with jurisdiction."
It is well settled that the plea of adverse possession is not a pure
question of law but a mixed question of fact and law. It is also well
established that the party pleading adverse possession must state with
sufficient clarity as to when his adverse possession commenced and the
nature of its possession. In this case, the defendant's plea is that the
adverse possession of the predecessor-in-interest, i.e., the first
defendant, commenced in 1954. Once that plea falls to ground, as held
hereinabove, there is no alternate plea. To repeat, the defendants have
not suggested that their adverse possession commenced at any later
point of time.

IT is well settled that in order to decide whether a decision in an earlier

litigation operates as res judicata, the court must look at the nature of
the litigation, what were the issues raised therein and what was actually
decided in it. ... It is indeed true that what becomes res judicata is the
'matter' which is actually decided and not the reason which leads the
court to decide the 'matter'."
These observations are well settled and reiterate established principle
laid down by the courts for the same, sound and general purpose for
which the rule of res judicata has been accepted, acted, adhered and
applied, dictated by wisdom of giving finality even at the cost of absolute
justice. In a recent English decision Ampthill Peerage case , finality at
cost of fallibility has been graphically described at pp. 423 and 424 thus:
1995 (1) SCC 642

Before:- B.P.Jeevan Reddy :J , S.C.Sen :J

Bombay Metropolitan Region Development Authority, Bombay

Versus
Gokak Patel Volkart Limited

IT is well settled that when the statute lays down the period of
limitation for passing an order that requirement is fulfilled as soon as an
order is passed within that period. If the order is set aside on appeal and
the appellate order directs a fresh order to be passed then there is no
requirement of law that the consequential order to give effect to the
appellate order must also be passed within the statutory period of
limitation. This proposition of law is well settled.

1995 (1) SCC 235

Before:- J.S.Verma :J , K.S.Paripoornan :J , S.P.Bharucha :J

Municipal Corporation of Delhi
Versus
Ganesh Razak

it is well settled that it is open to the Executing court to interpret the

decree for the purpose of execution. It is, of course, true that the
Executing court cannot go behind the decree, nor can it add to or
subtract from the provision of the decree. These limitations apply also to
the Labour court; but like the Executing court, the Labour court would
also be competent to interpret the award or settlement on which a
workman bases his claim under Section 33-C(2. Therefore, we feel no
difficulty in holding that for the purpose of making the necessary
determination under Section 33-C(2, it would, in appropriate cases, be
open to the Labour court to interpret the award or settlement on which
the workman's right rests."
1994 (6) SCC 485

Before:- G.N.Ray :J , M.N.Venkatachaliah :J

State of Rajasthan
Versus
Puri Construction Company Limited

It is well settled that if a question of law is referred to arbitrator and

the arbitrator comes to a conclusion, it is not open to challenge the
award on the ground that an alternative view of law is possible. In this
connection, reference may be made to the decisions of this court in Alopi
Parshad & Sons Ltd. v. Union of India and Kapoor Nilokheri Cooperative
Dairy Farm Society. In Indian Oil Corpn. Ltd. v. Indian Carbon Ltd. , this
court has held that the court does not sit in appeal over the award and
review the reasons. The court can set aside the award only if it is
apparent from the award that there is no evidence to support the
conclusions or if the award is based upon any legal proposition which is
erroneous.

1994 (5) SCC 572

Before:- G.N.Ray :J , Kuldip Singh :J , N.P.Singh :J , P.B.Sawant :J ,

S.Mohan :J

Syndicate Bank: Canara Bank: State Bank of India

Versus
K.Umesh Nayak: R.Jambunathan: State Bank of India Staff Union

In the appeal filed by the management against the award of the Tribunal
in this Court, the only question that fell for determination was whether
the award of the Tribunal granting the striking workmen wages for the
period from 11th January, 1968 to 29th February, 1968 was valid. In
paragraph 4 of the judgment, this Court observed as follows (AIR 1978
SC 1489):

"4. It is well settled that in order to entitle the workmen to wages for
the period of strike, the strike should be legal as well as justified. A strike
is legal if it does not violate any provision of the statute. Again, a strike
cannot be said to be unjustified unless the reasons for it are entirely
perverse or unreasonable. Whether a particular strike was justified or
not is a question of fact which has to be judged in the light of the facts
and circumstances of each case. It is also well settled that the use of
force or violence or acts of sabotage resorted to by the workmen during a
strike disentitled them to wages for the strike-period."

1994 (5) SCC 566

Before:- A.M.Ahmadi :J , B.L.Hansaria :J

Maharashtra State Financial Corporation

Versus
Suvarna Board Mills

It is well settled that natural justice cannot be placed in a strait-

jacket; its rules are not embodied and they do vary from case to case and
from one fact situation to another. All that has to be seen is that no
adverse civil consequences are allowed to ensue before one is put on
notice that the consequence would follow if lie would not take care of the
lapse, because of which the action as made known is contemplated. No
particular form of notice is the demand of law. All will depend on facts
and circumstances of the case.

1993 (2) SCC 429

Before:- A.S.Anand :J , B.P.Jeevan Reddy :J , L.M.Sharma :J

M.V.Nair
Versus
Union of India

It is well settled that suitability and eligibility have to be considered

with reference to the last date for receiving the applications, unless, of
course, the notification calling for applications itself specifies such a
date.

1992 (2) SCC 717

Before:- A.M.Ahmadi :J , R.M.Sahai :J

Madanlal Phulchand Jain

Versus
State of Maharashtra

It is well settled that a Hindu can have interest in the ancestral

property as well as acquire his separate or self-acquired property
and if he acquires a separate property by inheritance, birth of a son
or adoption of a son will not deprive him of the power he has to
dispose of the same by gift or will -- Therefore, the Commissioner of
Income Tax in exercise of power under Section 45(2) of Maharashtra
Act held that the land inherited by the appellant from his uncle was
a separate property and hence the contention that one-fifth share of
his major son in the said property should be deducted from the
holding, rejected, since in his said separate property, the son will
have no right by birth.
A Hindu can own separate property besides having a share in
ancestral property and therefore, when the appellant inherited the
land left by his uncle that property came to him as a separate
property and he had an absolute and unfettered right to dispose of
that property in any manner.
It is well settled that excluding the property inherited from a
maternal grandfather, the only property which can be characterised
as ancestral property is the property inherited by a person from his
father, father's father or father's father's father and that means the
property inherited by a person from other relation became his
separate property and his male issue does not take any interest
therein by birth. Thus, the property inherited from collateral such
as brother's uncle etc. cannot be said to be ancestral property and
his son cannot claim a share therein as if it were ancestral property.

1993 (Supp.1) SCC 300

Before:- M.Fathima Beevi :J , M.H.Kania :J , N.M.Kasliwal :J

P.J.Thomas
Versus
Taluk Land Board
It is well settled that a statute is not to be read retrospectively except of
necessity.
1992 (2) SCC 330

Before:- J.S.Verma :J , K.Jayachandra Reddy :J

Syndicate Bank
Versus
Vijay Kumar

It is well settled that the Bank guarantee is an autonomous contract

and imposes an absolute obligation on the Bank to fulfil the terms and
the payment in the Bank guarantee becomes due on the happening of a
contingency on the occurrence of which the guarantee becomes
enforceable.

It is well settled that it is not the function of the judiciary to look

into the equation of post and determination of pay scales and
ordinarily court do not enter upon the task job evaluation but if the
aggrieved employees are unjustly treated by arbitrary state action or
inaction the court certain interfere. The courts must realise that job
evaluation is both a difficult and time consuming task which even
expert body having the assistance of the staff with requisite
expertise have found difficult to undertake sometimes on account of
relevant data and scales for evaluating performances of different
groups of employees. Merely because the Sub-registrars were
conferred gazetted status and the registration service was included
in the state service did not entitle the sub-registrars to be placed in
the higher scale if their duties and responsibilities did not justify
the same.

1994 (0) AIR(SC) 26

Before:- K.Jayachandra Reddy :J , R.C.Patnaik :J

Ramu Alias Ram Kumar

Versus
Jagannath

It is well settled that the revisional jurisdiction conferred on the High

Court should not be lightly exercised particularly when it was invoked by
a private complaint.

1992 (2) SCC 343

Before:- K.Ramaswamy :J , N.M.Kasliwal :J

Peerless General Finance and Investment Company Limited: Reserve

Bank of India: Reserve Bank of India: Reserve Bank of India
Versus
Reserve Bank of India: Timex Finance and Investment Company Limited:
Timex Finance And Investment Company Limited: Timex Finance And
Investment Company Limited

It is well settled that a public body invested with statutory powers

must take care not to exceed or abuse its power. It must keep within the
limits of the authority committed to it. It must act in good faith and it
must act reasonably. courts are not to interfere with economic policy
which is the function of experts. It is not the function of the courts to sit
in judgment over matters of economic policy and it must necessarily be
left to the expert bodies. In such matters even experts can seriously and
doubtlessly differ. courts cannot be expected to decide them without even
the aid of experts.
IT is well settled that the court is not a tribunal from the crudities and
inequities of complicated experimental economic legislation. The
discretion in evolving economic measures, rests with the policy makers
and not with the judiciary. Indian social order is beset with social and
economic inequalities and of status, and in our socialist secular
democratic Republic, inequality is an anathema to social and economic
justice. The Constitution of India charges the State to reduce inequalities
and ensure decent standard of life and economic equality. The Act
assigns the power to the RBI to regulate monetary system and the
experimentation of the economic legislation, can best be left to the
executive unless it is found to be unrealistic or manifestly arbitrary. Even
if a law is found wanting on trial, it is better that its defects should be
demonstrated and removed than that the law should be aborted by
judicial fiat. Such an assertion of judicial power deflects responsibilities
from those on whom a democratic society ultimately rests. The court has
to see whether the scheme, measure or regulation adopted is relevant or
appropriate to the power exercised by the authority. Prejudice to the
interest of depositors is a relevant factor. Mismanagement or inability to
pay the accrued liabilities are evils sought to be remedied. The directions
are designed to preserve the right of the depositors and the ability of
RNBC to pay back the contracted liability. It is also intended to prevent
mismanagement of the deposits collected from vulnerable social
segments who have no knowledge of banking operations or credit system
and repose unfounded blind faith on the company with fond hope of its
ability to pay back the contracted amount. Thus the directions maintain
the thrift for saving and streamline and strengthen the monetary
operations of RNBCs.

1992 (1) SCC 710

Before:- B.P.Jeevan Reddy :J , N.M.Kasliwal :J

Omprakash
Versus
Jaiprakash

It is well settled that an appeal is a continuation of suit and in the

present case the appeal was pending before this Court. There is no
manner of dispute that the present suit had been filed by the plaintiff-
respondent claiming that he was the real owner of the property and the
names of the defendants-appellants were mentioned in the sale deeds as
benami. In our view, Section 4 of the Benami Act is a total prohibition
against any suit based on benami transaction and the plaintiff-
respondent is not entitled to get any decree in such suit or in appeal.

1992 (1) SCC 160

Before:- B.P.Jeevan Reddy :J , P.B.Sawant :J

V.B.Rangaraj
Versus
V.B.Gopalakrishnan
it is well settled that unless the Articles otherwise provide the
shareholder has a free right to transfer to whom he will. It is not
necessary to seek in the Articles for a power to transfer, for the Act (the
English Act of 1980) itself gives such a power. It is only necessary to look
to the Articles to ascertain the restrictions, if any, upon it. Thus a
member has a right to transfer his share/ shares to another person
unless this right is clearly taken away by the Articles.

1993 (Supp.1) SCC 233

Before:- M.Fathima Beevi :J , N.D.Ojha :J , S.Ranganathan :J

Revathinnalbalagopala Varma: Indirabayi

Versus
His Highness Shri Padmanabha Dasa Bala Rama Varma (Since
Deceased)

it is well settled that the fact that an estate is impartible does not make
it the separate and exclusive property of the holder: where the property is
ancestral and the holder has succeeded to it, it will be part of the joint
estate of the undivided family.

1992 (1) SCC 659

Before:- Kuldip Singh :J , Ranganath Misra :J

Radhasoami Satsang, Saomibagh, Agra

Versus
Commissioner of Income Tax
CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE,1908 -- Section 11 -- Principles of res
judicata do not apply to Income Tax proceedings -- Each Assessment
year being a unit, what is decided in one year may not apply in the
following year, out where a fundamental aspect permitting through
the different assessment years has been found a fact one way or the
others and parties have allowed that position to be sustained by not
challenging the order, it would not be at all appropriate to allow the
position to be changed in the subsequent year.

It is well settled that no formal document is necessary to create a trust.

1992 (1) SCC 105

Before:- M.Fathima Beevi :J , M.H.Kania :J , N.M.Kasliwal :J

Uma Kant: University of Rajasthan, Jaipur

Versus
Bhikalal Jain
It is well settled that in matters relating to educational institutions, if
two interpretations are possible, the Courts would ordinarily be reluctant
to accept that interpretation which would upset and reverse the long
course of action and decision taken by such educational authorities and
would accept the interpretation made by such educational authorities.

1992 (1) SCC 31

Before:- R.M.Sahai :J , T.K.Thommen :J

By Ram Pestonji Gariwala
Versus
Union Bank of India

It is well settled that a consent decree is as binding upon the parties

thereto as a decree passed by invitum. The compromise having been
found not to be vitiated by fraud, misrepresentation, misunderstanding
or mistake, the decree passed thereon has the binding force of 'res
judicata'. " (Page 355)

42. S. R. Das, C.J. in Sailendra Narayan Bhanja Deo v. State of Orissa,

AIR 1956 SC 346, states:

".....a judgment by consent or default is as effective an estoppel between

the parties as a judgment whereby the Court exercises its mind on a
contested case (Page 351).

43. A judgment by consent is intended to stop litigation between the

parties just as much as a judgment resulting from a decision of the
Court at the end of a long drawn out fight. A compromise decree creates
an estoppel by judgment. As stated by Spencer Bower & Turner in Res
judicata, Second Edition, page 37:

"Any judgment or order which in other respects answers to the

description of a res judicata is nonetheless so because it was made in
pursuance of the consent and agreement of the parties Accordingly,
judgments, orders, and awards by consent have always been held no less
efficacious as estoppels than other judgments, orders, or decisions,
though doubts have been occasionally expressed whether strictly, the
foundation of the estoppel in such cases is not representation by
conduct, rather than res judicata.

1992 (Supp.2) SCC 29

Before:- K.Ramaswamy :J , N.M.Kasliwal :J

East India Hotels Limited

Versus
Syndicate Bank

It is well settled that the plaintiff cannot be allowed to go against its

own pleadings and the case as set up in the plaint.

Section 6 -- The respondent was in possession of the premises under

leave and licence agreement -- The appellant did not accept the
request for renewal of licence but the respondent bank did not
vacate the premises even after notice of the appellant -- However, in
1990 a fire broke out in the premises and hank started its business
at some other place -- Under these circumstances, whether the bank
was entitled to recover the possession under Section 6 and whether
it amounted to dispossession within the meaning of Section 6 of the
Act -- The High Court held that the plaintiff bank was no doubt a
licensee but even alter the expiry of licensed period it cannot be
dispossessed otherwise than in due course of law and therefore, was
entitled to file a suit for possession under Section 6 of the Act --
Held, that there can be no doubt that Section 6 provides for a
summary remedy to any person dispossessed without consent,
otherwise then in due course of law and such person is entitled to
recover the possession by filing a suit within six months, but the
court under Section 6 will not go into the question of title. -- The
question of finding out the intention of the parties does not arise in
the instant case inasmuch as the bank was in occupation of the
premises as a licensee and it is also admitted that though the
licence came to an end on 31.12.1986 but the company never took
law into his own hands in order to dispossess the bank rather served
a notice upon the bank to hand over the possession -- Then a fire
broke out on 12.4.1990 without any fault of any party as a result of
which the bank started its business at some other place and vacated
the suit premises when the company fixed new lock and bank was
not allowed to enter the premises -- Under these circumstances, the
bank was not entitled to file a suit under Section 6 -- However,
according to justice K. Ramaswamy, the bank was entitled to such
decree and could file a suit under Section 6 of the Act.
In the above-noted circumstances since there is conflicting
judgement given by the two judges, the case ordered to be placed
before the Chief "Justice for constituting a larger Bench.

1991 (3) SCC 130

Before:- B.C.Ray :J , J.S.Verma :J

Chandmal
Versus
Firm Ram Chandra and Vishwanath

IN the case of Majati Subbamo v. P.V.K. Krishna Rao , it has been

observed that the denial of title of the landlord by the tenant must be
made in clear and in unequivocal terms. It was further observed that it
is well settled that the court hearing a suit or appeal can take into
account events which are subsequent to the filing of the suit in order to
give appropriate relief or mould the relief appropriately.

1991 (3) SCC 410

Before:- R.M.Sahai :J , T.K.Thommen :J

Kalawatibai
Versus
Soiryabai

It is well settled that a section has to be read in its entirety as one

composite unit without bifureating it or ignoring any part of it. Viewed
from this perspective the section, undoubtedly, comprises of two parts,
one descriptive, specifying the essential requirements for applicability of
the section, other consequences arising out of it. One cannot operate
without the other. Neither can be read in isolation. Both are integral
parts of the section. Mere provision that any property possessed by a
female Hindu on the date the Act came into force shall be held by her
would have been incomplete and insufficient to achieve the objective of
removing inequality amongst male and female Hindus unless it was
provided that the otherwise limited estate of such a female would become
enlarged into full or absolute estate. Any other construction would result
in not only ignoring the expression, and not as a limited owner'which
would be against principle of interpretation but also against the
historical background of enactment of the section. Whereas if it is read in
its entirety with one part throwing light on another then the conclusion
is irresistible that a limited owner became a full owner provided she was
in possession of the property on the date of enactment of the Act.
Articles 64 and 65 -- Alienation by Hindu widow without legal
necessity '-- The reversioners can file a suit for possession after the
death of widow -- Alienee of such estate could not acquire any right
of estate of widow so as to take benefit of Section 14, nor can claim
adverse possession over the said property -- There is no provision in
the Hindu Successin Act which deprives the reversioner of their
rights except to the extent mentioned in Section 14 of the said Act.
It is clear that an alienee from a Hindu widow prior to 1956 did not
acquire limited estate or widow's estate nor she was a limited owner
who could get any benefit under Section 14 of the Act. It was not
even life estate except loosely as the eight to continue in possession
was not related with her span of life but of the transferer, i.e. the
Hindu widow. The High Court was not justified in closing in
concluding that it was a question of fact. Possession under a gift
deed which was found to be invalid as it was not permitted under
the Hindu Law was on general principle contrary to the law and as
such could be adverse. When did it come adverse to the donor and
what circumstances constitute adverse possession against the donor
is an accept which docs not arise for consideration. Therefore, it is
obvious that appellant could not acquire any right by adverse
possession against the reversioner during the life time of her
mother.

1991 (1) SCC 357

Before:- L.M.Sharma :J , M.Fathima Beevi :J

Life Insurance Corporation of India

Versus
G.M.Channabasamma

It is well settled that a contract of insurance is contract uberrima fides

and there must be complete good faith on the part of the assured. The
assured is thus under a solemn obligation to make full disclosure of
material facts which may be relevant for the insurer to take into account
while deciding, whether the proposal should be accepted or not. While
making a disclosure of the relevant facts, the duty of the insured to state
them correctly cannot be diluted.

1991 (Supp.2) SCC 18

Before:- K.Ramaswamy :J , S.Ranganathan :J

Municipal Corporation of Greater Bombay

Versus
Indian Oil Corporation Limited
17. In S..P.Jainv.KrishnaMohanGupta,(1987)1 SCC 191 : (AIR.1987 SC
222), this court held that law should take pragmatic view of the matter
and respond to ihe purpose for which it was made and also take
cognizance of the current cadabilities of technology rid life style' the
community.It is well settled that the purpose of law provides agood
guide to the interpretation of the meaning of the Act .The legislative
futility is to be ruled out so long as interpretative possibility permits.
(Emphasis supplied)

18. In S. P. Gupta, v. Union of India 1981 Suppl. SCC 87 : (AIR 1982 SC

149), interpreting S. 123 of the Indian Evidence Act, this Court held that
the Section was'enated irftts second half of the last century, but its
meaning and content cannot remain static. The interpretation of every
statutory provision must keep pace with changing concepts and. the
values and it must, to the extent to which its language permits or rather
does not prohibit,, suffer adjustments through judicial inter-pretation so
as to accord with the requirements of the fast changing society which is
undergoing rapid social and economic transformation. The language of a
statutory provision is not static vehicle of ideas and concepts and as
ideas and concepts change, as they are bound to do in any country like
ours with the establishment of a democratic structure based on
egalitarian values and aggressive developmental strategies, so must the
meaning and content of the statutory provision undergo a change. It is
elementary that law does not operate in a vacuum. It is not an antique to
be taken down, dusted, admired and put back on the shelf, but rather it
is a powerful instrument fashioned by society for the purpose of
adjusting conflicts and tensions which arise by reason of - clash between
conflicting interests. It is, therefore, intended to serve a social purpose
and it cannot be interpreted without taking into account the social,
economic and political setting in which it is intended to operate. It is here
that a Judge is called upon the perform a creative function. He has to
inject flesh and blood in the dry skeleton provided by the legislature and
by a process of dynamic interpretation, invest it with a meaning which
will harmonise the law with the prevailing concepts and values and make
it an effective instrument for delivering justice.

1991 (1) SCC 422

Before:- B.C.Ray :J , R.M.Sahai :J

Rai Chand Jain

Versus
Chandra Kanta Khosla

It is well settled that unregistered lease executed by both the parties

can be ,looked into for collateral purposes.

1991 (1) SCC 494

Before:- M.H.Kania :J , N.D.Ojha :J

Isabellajohnson
Versus
M.A.Susai
It is well settled that there cannot be no estoppel on a pure question
of law and the question of resjudicata is a pure question of law and
there is no question of estoppel -- The jurisdiction of the civil court
being barred cannot be conferred on the ground that the earlier
decision of the Rent Controller to the effect that it was the City
Civil Court and not the Rent Controller to entertain the suit for
eviction, constituted res judicata between the parties on the
question of jurisdiction and it cannot be said that in such a case
even if that decision was wrong the issue of jurisdiction was finally
decided between the parties and that decision was that it was the
civil court and not the Rent Controller which had jurisdiction.

1991 (1) SCC 489

Before:- K.Ramaswamy :J , L.M.Sharma :J

Veerattalingam
Versus
Ramesh
It is well settled that a court while construing a will should try to
ascertain the intention of the testator to be gathered primarily from the
language of the document; but while so doing the surrounding
circumstances; the position of the testator, his family relationship and
the probability that he used the words in a particular sense also must be
taken into account. They lend a valuable aid in arriving at the correct
construction of the will. Since these considerations are changing from
person to person, it is seldom profitable to compare the words of one will
with those of another or to try to discover which of the wills upon which
the decisions have been given in reported cases, the disputed will
approximates closely. Recourse to precedents, therefore, should be
confined for the purpose of general principle of construction only, which
by now, are well settled. There is still another reason as to why the
construction put on certain expressions in a will should not be applied to
a similar expression in the will under question for a will has to be
considered and construed as a whole, and not piecemeal. It follows that a
fair and reasonable construction of the same expression may vary from
will to will. For these reasons it has been again and again held that in
the matter of construction of a will, authorities or precedents are of no
help as each will has to be construed in its own terms and in the setting
in which the clauses occur (see Ramachandra Shenoy v. Mrs. Hilda Brite,
(1964) 2 SCR 722 at p. 736(AIR 1964 SC 1323 at pp. 1328-29). The risk
in not appreciating this wholesome rule is demonstrated by the case
before us.
1990 (3) SCC 396

Before:- L.M.Sharma :J , P.B.Sawant :J

M.J.Zakharia Sait
Versus
T.M.Mohammed

"IT is now well settled by several authorities of this court that an.
allegation of corrupt practice must be proved as strictly as a criminal
charge and the principle of preponderance of probabilities would not
apply to corrupt practices envisaged by the Act because if this test is not
applied a very serious prejudice would be caused to the elected candidate
who may be disqualified for a period of six years from fighting any
election, which will adversely affect the electoral process."

(30) IN W. Hay v. Aswini Kumar Samanta a division bench of the

Calcutta High court held that it is well settled that in a "libel action"
the ordinary defamatory words must be set out in the plaint. Where the
words are per se or prima facie defamatory only the words need be set
out. Wherever the defamatory sense is not apparent on the face of the
words, the defamatory meaning or as it is technically known in law the
innuendo must also be set out and stated in clear and specific terms.
Where again the offending words would be defamatory only in the
particular context in which they were used, uttered or published, it is
necessary also to set out except where as in England, the law is or has
been made expressly otherwise, the offending context (colloquium) in the
plaint, and to state or aver further that this context or the circumstances
constituting the same, were known to the persons to whom the words
were published, or, at least, that they understood the words in the
defamatory sense. In the absence of these necessary averments, the
plaint would be liable to be rejected on the ground that it does not
disclose any cause of action.

1990 (3) SCC 190

Before:- K.Jayachandra Reddy :J , M.Fathima Beevi :J , S.R.Pandian :J

Vijayeesingh
Versus
State of Uttar Pradesh
It is well settled that "this burden" which rests on the accused does not
absolve the prosecution from discharging its initial burden of
establishing the case beyond all reasonable doubts. It is also well settled
that the accused need not set up a specific plea of his offence and
adduce evidence. That being so the questions is : What is the nature of
burden that lies on the accused under S. 105 a if benefit of the general
exception of private defence is claimed and how it can be discharged? In
Woolmington v. Director of Public Prosecutions, Viscount Sankey, L.C.
observed:
"WHEN evidence of death and malice has been given (this is a
question for the jury) the prisoner is entitled to show, by evidence or by
examination of the circumstances adduced by the Crown that the act on
his part which caused death was either unintentional or provoked. If the
jury are either satisfied with his explanation or, upon a review of all the
evidence, are left in reasonable doubt whether, even if his explanation be
not accepted, the act was unintentional or provoked, the prisoner is
entitled to be acquitted."
It is further observed:
"JUST as there is evidence on behalf of the prosecution so there
may be evidence on behalf of the prisoner which may cause a doubt as to
his guilt. In either case, he is entitled to the benefit of the doubt. But
while the prosecution must prove the guilt of the prisoner, there is no
such burden laid on the prisoner to prove his innocence and it is
sufficient for him to raise a doubt as to his guilt; he is not bound to
satisfy the jury of his innocence...
THROUGHOUT the web of the English criminal law one golden
thread is always to be seen, that it is the duty of the prosecution to prove
the prisonerS guilt subject to what I have already said as to the defence
of insanity and subject also to any stationary exception. If, at the end of
and on the whole of the case, there is reasonable doubt, created by the
evidence given by either the prosecution or the prisoner, as to whether
the prisoner killed the deceased with a malicious intention, the
prosecution has not made out the case and the prisoner is entitled to an
acquittal. No matter what the charge or where the trial, the principle that
the prosecution must prove the guilt of the prisoner is part of the
common law of England and no attempt to whittle it down can be
entertained."
In Emperor v. U. Damapala, a full bench of the Rangoon High court
following the Woolmington case held that the ratio therein is not in any
way inconsistent with the law in British India, and that indeed the
principles there laid down form valuable guide to the correct
interpretation of S. 105 of the Evidence Act and the full bench laid down
that even if the evidence adduced by the accused fails to prove the
existence of circumstances bringing the case within the exception or
exceptions pleaded, the accused is entitled to be acquitted if upon a
consideration of the evidence as a whole the court is left in a state of
reasonable doubt as to whether the accused is or is not entitled to the
benefit of the exception pleaded.

1990 (2) SCC 562

Before:- K.Ramaswamy :J , P.B.Sawant :J , Ranganath Misra :J

Vijay Kumar Sharma: G.Abal Ali and K.Moideen: K.C.Naik:

Hasanabha: K.S.Hegde
Versus
State of Karnataka

IT is well settled that the validity of an Act is not affected if it

incidentally trenches on matters outside the authorised field and,
therefore, it is necessary to enquire in each case what is the pith and
substance of the Act impugned. If the Act, when so viewed, substantially
falls within the powers expressly conferred upon the legislature which
enacted it then it cannot be held to be invalid merely because it
incidentally encroaches on matters which have been assigned to another
legislature."
In Atiabari Tea Co. Ltd. v. State of Assam , Gajendragadkar, J. (as he
then was) speaking per majority, has explained the purpose of the rule of
pith and substance thus :
"THE test of pith and substance is generally and more
appropriately applied when a dispute arises as to the legislative
competence of the legislature, and it has to be resolved by reference to
the entries to which the impugned legislation is relatable. When there is
a conflict between two entries in the legislative lists, and legislation by
reference to one entry would be competent but not by reference to the
other, the doctrine of pith and substance is invoked for the purpose of
determining the true nature and character of the legislation in question."

1990 (1) SCC 593

Before:- A.M.Ahmadi :J , K.Jagannatha Shetty :J , Sabyasachi Mukharjee

:J
Suresh Chand
Versus
Gulam Chisti

"The legislature found that rent control law had a chilling effect on new
building construction, and so, to encourage more building operations,
amended the statute to release, from the shackles of legislative
restriction, 'new constructions' for a period of ten years. So much so, a
landlord who had let out his new building could recover possession
without impediment if he instituted such proceeding within ten years of
completion."

this Court held as under (at p. 2034 of AIR):

"It is well settled that no man should suffer because of the fault of the
court or delay in the procedure. Broom has stated the maxim "actus
curiae neminem gravabit" - an act of court shall prejudice no man.
Therefore, having regard to the time normally consumed for adjudication,
the ten years' exemption or holiday from the application of the Rent Act
would become illusory, if the suit has to be filed within that time and be
disposed of finally. It is common knowledge that unless a suit is
instituted soon after the date of letting it would never be disposed of
within ten years and even then within that time it may not be disposed
of. That will make the ten years holiday from the Rent Act illusory and
provide no incentive to the landlords to build new houses to solve
problem of shortages of houses. The purpose of legislation would thus be
defeated. Purposive interpretation in a social amelioration legislation is
an imperative irrespective of anything else."
1990 (1) SCC 400

Before:- Kuldip Singh :J , S.Ranganathan :J , V.Ramaswami :J

Frick India Limited

Versus
Union of India

It is well settled that the headings prefixed to sections or entries cannot

control the plain words of the provision; they cannot also be referred to
for the purpose of construing the provision when the words used in the
provision are clear and unambiguous; nor can they be used for cutting
down the plain meaning of the words in the provision. Only, in the case
of ambiguity or doubt the heading or sub-heading may be referred to as
an aid in construing the provision but even in such a case it could not be
used for cutting down the wide application of the clear words used in the
provision. Sub-item (3) so construed is wide in its application and all
parts of refrigerating and air-conditioning appliances and machines
whether they are covered or not covered under sub-items (1) and (2)
would be clearly covered under that sub-item. Therefore, whether the
manufacturer supplies the refrigerating or air-conditioning appliances as
a complete unit or not is not relevant for the levy of duty on the parts
specified in subitem (3) of Item 29A.

1990 (1) SCC 357

Before:- L.M.Sharma :J , V.Ramaswami :J

Trideshwar Dayal
Versus
Mahbshwardayal

This Court in Janardhan Reddy v. State of Hyderabad, 1951 SCR 344 :

(AIR 1951 SC 217), after referring to a number of decisions, observed
that it is well settled that if a Court acts without jurisdiction, its
decision can be challenged in the same way as it would have been
challenged if it had acted with jurisdiction, i.e., an appeal would lie to the
Court to which it would lie if its order was with jurisdiction. We,
therefore, agree with the appellants that the Chief Controlling Revenue
Authority had full power to interfere with the Collector's order, provided
it was found to be erroneous. Their difficulty, however, is that we do not
find any defect in the Collector directing to take steps for the realisation
of the stamp duty.

1990 (1) SCC 345

Before:- K.N.Singh :J , N.M.Kasliwal :J

Mohd.Zainulabudeen (Since Deceased) By Lrs

Versus
Sayed Ahmed Mohideen

It is well settled that where one co-heir pleads adverse possession

against another co-heir then it is not enough to show that one out of
them is in sole possession and enjoyment of the profits of the properties,
The possession of one co-heir is considered in law., as possession of all
the co-heirs. The co-heir in possession cannot render his possession
adverse to the other co-heir not in possession merely by any secret
hostile animus on his own part in derogation of the other co-heir's title.
Thus it is a settled rule of law as between co-heirs that must be evidence
of open assertion of hostile title, coupled with exclusive possession and
enjoyment by one of them to the knowledge of the other so as to construe
ouster. Thus in order to make out a case of ouster against Fathima Bee
or the plaintiffs, it was necessary for the defendants to plead that they
had asserted hostile title coupled with exclusive possession and
enjoyment to the knowledge of Fathima Bee. The written statement filed
by the defendants in the present case is totally lacking in the above
particulars and thus apart from the want of evidence, there is no proper
pleading of ouster in the present case. Thus it is clear that neither in the
written statement nor in reply to the notice of the plaintiffs any stand
was taken that the right of Fatima Bee or plaintiffs was specifically
denied on any particular occasion so as to put them on notice that from
that date the possession of the defendants would be adverse to the
interest or rights of the plaintiffs or Fathima Bee. We are supported in
the above view by a decision of this court in P. Lakshmi v. L. Lakshmi
Reddy, 1957 SCR 195 (AIR 1957 SC 314).

1989 (Supp.2) SCC 744

Before:- E.S.Venkataramiah :J , K.N.Singh :J , N.M.Kasliwal :J

Raojibhai Jivabhai Patel

Versus
State of Gujarat

It is well settled that a classification to be valid has to satisfy two

conditions:

(1 that there is an intelligible differentia between those who are

included in the class which is affected by any law or rule and those who
are placed outside the said rule; and

(2 that there is a reasonable nexus between the classification and tne

object to be achieved by the rule or law in question.

1989 (Supp.2) SCC 706

Before:- M.M.Dutt :J , S.R.Pandian :J , V.Ramaswami :J

Padala Veerareddy
Versus
State of A.P.

19. This Court in Palvinder Kaur v. State of Punjab, 1953 SCR 94: (AIR
1952 SC 354) has pointed out that in cases depending on circumstantial
evidence Courts should safeguard themselves against the danger of
basing their conclusion on suspicions howsoever strong.

20. In Chandrakant Ganpat Sovitkar v. State of Maharashtra, (1975) 3

SCC 16: (AIR 1984 SC 1290 at p. 1299) it has been observed:
"It is well settled that no one can be convicted on the basis of mere
suspicion, though strong it may be. It also cannot be disputed that when
we take into account the conduct of an accused, his conduct must be
looked at in its entirety."

21. In Sharad Birdhichand Sarda v. State of Maharashtra, (1984) 4 SCC

116: (AIR 1984 SC 1622), this Court has reiterated the above dictum and
pointed out that the suspicion, however, great it may be, cannot take the
place of legal proof and that "fouler the crime higher the proof."

1990 (1) SCC 109

Before:- B.C.Ray :J , E.S.Venkataramiah :J , G.L.Oza :J , K.N.Singh :J ,

Ranganath Misra :J , S.Natarajan :J , Sabyasachi Mukharjee :J

Synthetics and Chemicals Limited

Versus
State of Uttar Pradesh

It is well settled that the various entries in the three lists of the Indian
Constitution are not powers but fields of legislation. The power to
legislate is given by Article 246 and other Articles of the Constitution.
The three lists of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution are legislative
heads or fields of legislation. These demarcate the area over which the
appropriate legislatures can operate. It is well settled that widest
amplitude should be given to the language of the entries in three Lists
but some of these entries in different lists or in the same list may
override and sometimes may appear to be in direct conflict with each
other, then and then only comes the duty of the court to find the true
intent and purpose and to examine the particular legislation in question.
Each general word should be held to extend to all ancillary or subsidiary
matters which can fairly and reasonably be comprehended in it. In
interpreting an entry it would not be reasonable to import any limitation
by comparing or contrasting that entry with any other in the same list. It
has to be interpreted as the Constitution must be interpreted as an
organic document in the light of the experience gathered. In the
constitutional scheme of division of powers under the legislative lists,
there are separate entries pertaining to taxation and other laws. The
aforesaid principles are fairly well settled by various decisions of this
court and other courts. Some of these decisions have been referred to in
the decision of this court in CivilNo. 62 (N)/70 India Cement Ltd. v. State
of Tamil Nadu.

1990 (2) SCC 71

Before:- S.Ranganathan :J , Sabyasachi Mukharjee :J

Goodyear India Limited: Goodyear India Limited: Gedore India

Private Limited: State of Haryana: State of Haryana: Kelvinator of
India Limited: Food Corporation of India: Food Corporation of India,
Karnal: State of Haryana: Wipro Products Limited: Hindusta
Versus
State of Haryana: Gedore Tools Private Limited: Goodyear India
Limited: State of Maharashtra
It is well settled that a precedent is an authority only for what it
actually decides and not for what may remotely or even logically follow
from it. See Quinn v. Leathern and State of Orissa v. Sudhansu Sekhar
Misra.

1989 (4) SCC 595

Before:- B.C.Ray :J , Sabyasachi Mukharjee :J

K.V.George
Versus
Secretary To Government, Water and Power Department,
Trivandrum

18. In Satish Kumar v. Surinder Kumar, AIR 1970 SC 833, it has been
observed that (at p. 838) :-

"The true legal position in regard to the effect of an award is not in

dispute. It is well settled that as a general rule, all claims which are the
subject-matter of a reference to arbitration merge in the award which is
pronounced in the proceedings before the arbitrator and that after an
award has been pronunced, the rights and liabilities of the parties in
respect of the said claims can be determined only on the basis of the said
award. After an award is pronounced, no action can be started on the
original claim which had been the subject-matter of the reference ..This
conclusion, according to the learned Judge, is based upon the
elementary principle that, as between the parties and their privies, an
award is entitled to that respect which is due to judgment of a court of
last resort. Therefore, if the award which has been pronounced between
the parties has in fact, or can in law, be deemed to have dealt with the
present dispute, the second reference would be incompetent. This
position also has not been and cannot be seriously disputed."

1989 (4) SCC 603

Before:- A.M.Ahmadi :J , K.Jagannatha Shetty :J

Southern Roadways Limited, Madurai, Represented By Its Secretary

Versus
S.M.Krishnan

As to the nature of agent's-possession in respect of principal's property,

this Court in a recent judgment rendered in Smt. Chandrakantaben v.
Vadilal Bapalal Modi (1989) 2 SCC 630 said at p. 643 : (AIR 1989 SC
1269 at p. 1277) :

"It is well settled that the possession of the agent is the possession of
the principal and in view of the fiduciary relationship defendant 1 cannot
be permitted to claim his own possession. This aspect was well
emphasised in David Lyell v. John Lawson Kennedy (1889) 14 App Cas
437 where the agent who was collecting the rent from the tenants on
behalf of the owner and depositing it in a separate earmarked account
continued to do so even after the death of the owner. After more than 12
years of the owner's death his heir's assignee brought the action against
the agent for possession and the agent defendant pleaded adverse
possession and limitation. The plaintiff succeeded in the first Court. But
the action was dismissed by the Court of Appeal. The House of Lords
reversed the decision of the Court of Appeal and remarked: "For whom,
and on whose behalf, were those rents received after Ann Duncan's
death? Not by the respondent for himself, or on his own behalf, any more
than during her lifetime". Emphasising the fiduciary character of the
agent his possession was likened to that of trustee, a solicitor or an agent
receiving the rent under a power of attorney. Another English case of
Williams v. Pott (1871) LR 12 Eq 149, arising out of the circumstances
similar to the present case was more interesting. The agent in that case
was the real owner of the estate but he collected the rents for a
considerably long period as the agent of his principal who was his
mother. After the agent's death his heir claimed the estate. The mother
(the principal) had also by then died after purporting by her will to devise
the disputed lands to the defendants upon certain trusts. The claim of
the plaintiff was dismissed on the plea of adverse possession. Lord
Romilly, M. R. in his judgment observed that since the possession of the
agent was the possession of the principal, the agent could not have made
an entry as long as he was in the position of the agent for his mother,
and that he could not get into possession without first resigning his
position as her agent which he could have done by saying: "The property
is mine; I claim the rents, and I shall apply the rents for my own
purposes." The agent had thus lost his title by reason of his own
possession as agent of the principal."

1989 (4) SCC 732

Before:- Kuldip Singh :J , M.H.Kania :J

Majati Subbarao
Versus
P.V.K.Krishna Rao

it is well settled that the Court hearing a suit or appeal can take into
account events which are subsequent to the filing of the suit in order to
give appropriate relief or mould the relief appropriately.

1989 (4) SCC 313

Before:- M.H.Kania :J , T.K.Thommen :J

Abdul Khader Rowther

Versus
P.K.Sara Bai

As observed by this Court in Pt. Prem Rai v. The D.L.F. Housing and
Construction (Private) (Ltd.), Civil Appeal No. 37/66, decided on 4-4-
1968 (reported in AIR 1968 SC 1355), that it is well settled that in a
suit for specific performance the plaintiff should allege that he is ready
and willing to perform his part of the contract and in the absence of such
an allegation the suit is not maintainable.

1989 (3) SCC 574

Before:- J.S.Verma :J , L.M.Sharma :J

B.V.Dsouza
Versus
Antonio Fausto Fernandes

It is well settled that the main purpose of enacting the Rent statutes is
to protect the tenant from the exploitation of the landlord, who being in
the dominating position is capable of dictating his terms at the inception
of the tenancy; and, the Rent Acts must receive that interpretation which
may advance the object and suppress the mischief. By adopting a
different approach the Rent laws are likely to be defeated altogether.

1989 (1) SCC 420

Before:- M.N.Venkatachaliah :J , Ranganath Misra :J

Dineshchandra Jamnadas Gandhi

Versus
State of Gujarat

It is well settled that wherever possible, without unreasonable

stretching or straining the language of such a statute, should be
construed in a manner which would suppress the mischief, advance the
remedy, promote its object, prevent its subtle evasion and foil its art full
circumvention..."

1988 (4) SCC 419

Before:- A.P.Sen :J , L.M.Sharma :J

Baliram Waman Hiray
Versus
Justice B.Lentin

it is well settled that a Commission of Inquiry has not the attributes of

a court inasmuch there is no Us before it and it has no powers of
adjudication of rights.

In Tarachand v. State of Rajasthan, AIR 1980 SC 2133 the grievance of

the detenu detained under the COFEPOSA Act was that he had sent
representations to the detaining authority viz. the State Government and
the Central Government on 23-2-1980 but there was a delay of 1 month
and 5 days in his representation reaching the State Government and
even then the State Government had failed to consider his representation
and pass orders. While striking down the detention order the Court
observed that "it is well settled that in case of preventive detention of a
citizen, Article 22(5) of the Constitution enjoins that the obligation of the
appropriate Government or of the detaining authority (State Government
in that case), to afford the earliest opportunity to make a representation
and to consider the representation speedily.
1988 (3) SCC 57

Before:- S.Natarajan :J , Sabyasachi Mukharjee :J

Jagan Nath
Versus
Chander Bhan

It is well settled that parting with possession meant giving possession

to persons other than those to whom possession had been given by the
lease and the parting with possession must have been by the tenant,
user by other person is not parting with possession so long as the tenant
retains the legal possession himself, or in other words there must be
vesting of possession by the tenant in another person by divesting
himself not only of physical possession but also of the right to
possession. So long as the tenant retains the right to possession there is
no parting with possession in terms of Cl. (b) of S. 14(1) of the Act. Even
though the father had retired from the business and the sons had been
looking after the business in the facts of this case, it cannot be said that
the father had divested himself of the legal right to be in possession. If
the father has a right to displace the possession of the occupants, i.e.,
his sons, it cannot be said that the tenant had parted with possession.
This court in Smt. Krishnawati v. Hans Raj, (1974) 1 SCC 289 : (AIR
1974 SC 280) had occasion to discuss the same aspect of the matter.
There two persons lived in a house as husband and wife and one of them
who rented the premises allowed the other to carry on business in a part
of it. The question was whether it amounted to sub-letting and attracted
the provisions of subsection (4) of S. 14 of the Delhi Rent Control Act.
This Court held that if two persons live together in a house as husband
and wife and one of them who owns the house allows the other to carry
on business in a part of it, it will be in the absence of any other evidence
a rash inference to draw that the owner has let out that part of the
premises. In this case if the father was carrying on the business with his
sons and the family was a joint Hindu family, it is difficult to presume
that the father had parted with possession legally to attract the mischief
of S. 14(1)(b) of the Act.

1988 (3) SCC 570

Before:- M.H.Kania :J , R.S.Pathak :J

Assistant Commissioner of Commercial Taxes (Assistance) Dharwar

Versus
Dharmendra Trading Company

It is well settled that if the Government wants to resile from a promise

or an assurance given by it on the ground that undue advantage was
being taken or misuse was being made of the concessions granted the
court may permit the Government to do so but before allowing the
Government to resile from the promise or go back on the assurance the
Court would have to be satisfied that allegations by the Government
about misuse being made or undue advantage being taken of the
concessions given by it were reasonably well established.

1988 (2) SCC 587

Before:- G.L.Oza :J , Sabyasachi Mukharjee :J

Anil Kumar Neotia

Versus
Union of India
Deeming provision is intended to enlarge the meaning of a particular
word or to include matters which otherwise may or may not fall within
the main provisions. It is well settled that the word 'includes' is an
inclusive definition and expands the meaning. See Corporation of the
City of Nagpur v. Its Employees, (1960) 2 SCR 942: (AIR 1960 SC 675)
and Vasudev Ranichandra v. Pranlal Jayanand, (1975) 1 SCR 534: (AIR
1974 SC 1728). The words 'all other rights and interests; are words of
widest amplitude. Section 4 also uses the words "ownership, possession,
power or control of the Company in relation to the said undertakings".
The words 'pertaining to' are not restrictive as mentioned hereinbefore."

1988 (2) SCC 360

Before:- S.Ranganathan :J , Sabyasachi Mukharjee :J

International Airport Authority of India

Versus
K.D.Bali

It is well settled that there must be purity in the administration of

justice as well as in administration of Quasi justice as are involved
in the adjudicatory process before the Arbitrators. But it is not
every suspicion felt by a party which must lead to the conclusion
that the authority hearing the authority, hearing the proceeding is
biased. The apprehension must be judged from a healthy, reasonable
and average point of view and, not on mere apprehension of any
whimsical person.
1988 (2) SCC 77

Before:- B.C.Ray :J , K.Jagannatha Shetty :J

Sunil Kumar
Versus
Ram Parkash

It is well settled that in a Joint Hindu Mitakshara Family, a son

acquires by birth an interest equal to that of the father in ancestral
property. The father by reason of his paternal relation and his position as
the head of the family is its Manager and he is entitled to alienate joint
family property so as to bind the interests of both adult and minor
coparceners in the property, provided that the alienation is made for
legal necessity or for the benefit of the estate or for meeting an
antecedent debt. The power of the Manager of a joint Hindu family to
alienate a joint Hindu family property is analogous to that of a Manager
for an infant heir as observed by the Judicial Committee in
Hunoomanpersaud Panday v. Mussumat Babooee Munraj Koonweree
(1856) 6 Moo Ind App 393.
SPECIFIC RELIEF ACT, 1963
Section 38(4) and 41 -- Suit for permanent injunction for restraining
father from alienating the property by coparcener -- held suit was not
maintainable.
A suit for permanent injunction by a coparcener against the father, a
Karta for restraining him from alienating the house property belonging to
the Joint Hindu Family for legal necessity would not be% maintainable
because the coparcener had got the remedy of challenging the sale and
getting it satisfied in a suit subsequent to the completion of sale. The
rights of the coparcener are not independent of the control of Karta. If
there is no such need or the benefit the purchaser takes the risk and the
right had interest or coparcener will remain unimpaired in the alienated
property.
1987 (Supp.1) SCC 553

Before:- E.S.Venkataramiah :J , K.N.Singh :J

B.K.Mohapatra
Versus
State of Orissa

It is well settled that the doctrine of an "Act of State" cannot be

pleaded by the State as a defence against its own citizen. An act of
state is an act done in relation to a foreigner by the sovereign power
of a country or its agent either previously authorised or
subsequently ratified. Such and act cannot be questioned or made
the subject of legal proceedings in any court of law.
1988 (1) SCC 86

Before:- K.Jagannatha Shetty :J , Sabyasachi Mukharjee :J

Delhi Cloth and General Mills Company Limited

Versus
Union of India
It is well settled that the principle of estoppel cannot be applied unless
the person pleading estoppel can show that he has been prejudiced by
the conduct of the party on whose assurance he has acted."

1987 (4) SCC 382

Before:- G.L.Oza :J , Sabyasachi Mukharjee :J

Nano Kishore Marwah

Versus
Samundri Devi

it is well settled that if the right to file a suit accrues on the date of
filing of the suit then the rights will have to be determined on the basis of
the law applicable on the date of the suit and, not subsequently.
1987 (4) SCC 410

Before:- G.L.Oza :J , Sabyasachi Mukharjee :J

Richpal Singh
Versus
Dalip

It is well settled that outter of jurisdiction of civil courts should not

be inferred easily. It must be clearly provided for and established
the limit of the jurisdiction of Revenue Court under section 77 (3) of
Punjab Act is apparent from the fact that the suits by the landlord
to eject a tenant do not encompass suits to decide whether a person
is a tenant or not or whether the plaintiff is a landlord or not. As the
revenue Court could not go into the question involved, the
subsequent civil suit was not barred by res-judicata.

1987 (4) SCC 345

Before:- E.S.Venkataramiah :J , K.N.Singh :J

Yashbir Singh
Versus
Union of India

It is well settled that anyone who may feel aggrieved with an

administrative order or decision affecting his right should act with due
diligence and promptitude and not sleep over the matter. Raking of old
matters after a long time is likely to result in administrative
complications and difficulties and it would create insecurity and
instability in the service which would affect its efficiency. The petitioners
are therefore not entitled to challenge the validity of the Railway Board's
Circular dated July 2, 1970 after 11 years and their challenge is bound
to fail on this ground alone.

1987 (0) AIR(SC) 1550

Before:- A.P.Sen :J , B.C.Ray :J

E.S.Reddi
Versus
Chief Secretary, Goverment of A.P.

It is well settled that a court of law cannot compel a statutory authority

to exercise its statutory discretion in a particular manner. The legislative
will in conferring discretion in an essentially administrative function
cannot be interfered with by courts."

1987 (2) SCC 344

Before:- G.L.Oza :J , V.Khalid :J

Kewal Ram
Versus
Ram Lubhai

It is well settled that when a decree of the trial Court is either

confirmed, modified or reversed by the appellate decree, except when the
decree is passed without notice to the parties, the trial Court decree gets
merged in the appellate decree. But when the decree is passed without
notice to a party, that decree will not, in law, be a decree to which he is a
party. Equally so in the case of an appellate decree.

1986 (4) SCC 537

Before:- R.S.Pathak :J , Sabyasachi Mukharjee :J

Institute of Chartered Accountants of India

Versus
L.K.Ratna

It is well settled that every. member of a tribunal that is called upon to

try issues in judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings must be able to act
judicially; and it is of the essence of judicial decisions and judicial
administration that judges should be able to act impartially, objectively
and without any bias. In such cases the test is not whether in fact a bias
has affected the judgment; the test always is and must be whether a
litigant could reasonably, apprehend that a bias attributable to a
member of the tribunal might have operated against him in the final
decision of the, tribunal. It is in this sense that it is often said that
justice must not only be done but must also appear to be done."
1986 (4) SCC 326

Before:- A.P.Sen :J , B.C.Ray :J

A.K.Roy
Versus
State of Punjab

It is well settled that rules framed pursuant to a power conferred by a

statute cannot proceed or go against the specific provisions of the
statute. It must therefore follow as a logical consequence that R. 3 of the
Prevention of Food Adulteration (Punjab) Rules, 1958 must be read
subject to the provisions contained in S. 20(1) of the Prevention of Food
Adulteration Act, 1954 and cannot be construed to authorise sub-
delegation of powers by the Food. (Health) Authority, Punjab to the Food
Inspector, Faridkot. If so construed, as it must, it would mean that the
Food (Health) Authority was the person authorised by the State
Government to initiate prosecutions. It was also permissible for the Food
(Health) Authority being the person. authorised under S. 20(1) of the Act
to give his written consent for the institution of such prosecutions by the
Food Inspector, Faridkot as laid down by this Court in State of Bombay
v. Parshottam Kanaiyalal (1961) 1 SCR 458: (AIR 1961 SC 1) and
Corporation of Calcutta V. Md. Omer Ali, (1976) 4 SCC 527 : (AIR 1977
SC 912).

2008 (10) SCC 714

Before:- B.N.Agrawal :J , G.S.Singhvi :J

N.Balakrishnan And Another

Versus
Kailasa Naicker (Dead) By Lr.

It is well settled that, in a second appeal filed under Section 100 of the
Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, if the High Court is of the opinion that a
substantial question of law arises, then such question of law is required
to be framed and decided. In this case, the High Court upset the
judgment of the lower appellate court without framing any substantial
question of law. Therefore, on this ground alone the impugned order is
liable to be set aside.

55. In Kamla Devi v. State of Himachal Pradesh, AIR 1987 HP 34, the
Court observed;
"The Court while deciding child custody cases in its inherent and general
jurisdiction is not bound by the mere legal right of the parent or
guardian. Though the provisions of the special statutes which govern the
rights of the parents or guardians may be taken into consideration, there
is nothing which can stand in the way of the Court exercising its parens
patriae jurisdiction arising in such cases giving due weight to the
circumstances such as a child's ordinary comfort, contentment,
intellectual, moral and physical development, his health, education and
general maintenance and the favourable surroundings. These cases have
to be decided ultimately on the Court's view of the best interests of the
child whose welfare requires that he be in custody of one parent or the
other".

Principles governing custody of minor children

56. In our judgment, the law relating to custody of a child is fairly well-
settled and it is this. In deciding a difficult and complex question as to
custody of minor, a Court of law should keep in mind relevant statutes
and the rights flowing therefrom. But such cases cannot be decided
solely by interpreting legal provisions. It is a humane problem and is
required to be solved, with human touch. A Court while dealing with
custody cases, is neither bound by statutes nor by strict rules of
evidence or procedure nor by precedents. In selecting proper guardian of
a minor, the paramount consideration should be the welfare and well-
being of the child. In selecting a guardian, the Court is exercising parens
patriae jurisdiction and is expected, any bound, to give due weight to a
child's ordinary comfort, contentment, health, education, intellectual
development and favourable surroundings. But over and above physical
comforts, moral and ethical values cannot be ignored. They are equally,
or we may say, even more important, essential and indispensable
considerations. If the minor is old enough to form an intelligent
preference or judgment, the Court must consider such preference as
well, though the final decision should rest with the Court as to what is
conducive to the welfare of the minor.

Related witness
2008 (16) SCC 73

Before:- P.Sathasivam :J , R.V.Raveendran :J

State of Uttar Pradesh

Versus
Kishanpal & Ors.

(9) From the above it is clear that "related" is not equivalent to

"interested". The witness may be called "interested" only when he or she
has derived some benefit from the result of a litigation in the decree in a
civil case, or in seeing an accused person punished. A witness, who is a
natural one and is the only possible eyewitness in the circumstances of a
case cannot be said to be `interested'.

(10) The plea of defence that it would not be safe to accept the evidence
of the eye witnesses who are the close relatives of the deceased, has not
been accepted by this Court. There is no such universal rule as to
warrant rejection of the evidence of a witness merely because he/she was
related to or interested in the parties to either side. In such cases, if the
presence of such a witness at the time of occurrence is proved or
considered to be natural and the evidence tendered by such witness is
found in the light of the surrounding circumstances and probabilities of
the case to be true, it can provide a good and sound basis for conviction
of the accused. Where it is shown that there is enmity and the witnesses
are near relatives too, the Court has a duty to scrutinize their evidence
with great care, caution and circumspection and be very careful too in
weighing such evidence. The testimony of related witnesses, if after deep
scrutiny, found to be credible cannot be discarded. It is now well settled
that the evidence of witness cannot be discarded merely on the ground
that he is a related witness, if otherwise the same is found credible. The
witness could be a relative but that does not mean his statement should
be rejected. In such a case, it is the duty of the Court to be more careful
in the matter of scrutiny of evidence of the interested witness, and if, on
such scrutiny it is found that the evidence on record of such interested
witness is worth credence, the same would not be discarded merely on
the ground that the witness is an interested witness. Caution is to be
applied by the court while scrutinizing the evidence of the interested
witness. It is well settled that it is the quality of the evidence and not
the quantity of the evidence which is required to be judged by the court
to place credence on the statement. The ground that the witness being a
close relative and consequently being a partisan witness, should not be
relied upon, has no substance. Relationship is not a factor to affect
credibility of a witness. It is more often than not that a relation would not
conceal actual culprit and make allegations against an innocent person.
Foundation has to be laid if plea of false implication is made. In such
cases, the Court has to adopt a careful approach and analyse the
evidence to find out whether it is cogent and credible. Vide State of A.P.
v. Veddula Veera Reddy & Ors. (1998) 4 SCC 145, Ram Anup Singh &
Ors. v. State of Bihar (2002) 6 SCC 686, Harijana Narayana & Ors. v.
State of A.P. (2003) 11 SCC 681, Anil Sharma & Ors. v. State of
Jharkhand (2004) 5 SCC 679, Seeman @ Veeranam v. State, By
Inspector of Police (2005) 11 SCC 142, Salim Sahab v. State of M.P.
(2007) 1 SCC 699, Kapildeo Mandal and Ors. v. State of Bihar, AIR 2008
SC 533, D. Sailu v. State of A.P., AIR 2008 SC 505.

(11) In Kulesh Mondal v. State of West Bengal, (2007) 8 SCC 578, this
Court considered the reliability of interested/related witnesses and has
reiterated the earlier rulings and it is worthwhile to refer the same which
reads as under:

"11. "10. We may also observe that the ground that the [witnesses being
close relatives and consequently being partisan witnesses,] should not be
relied upon, has no substance. This theory was repelled by this Court as
early as in Dalip Singh v. State of Punjab, AIR 1953 SC 364 in which
surprise was expressed over the impression which prevailed in the minds
of the members of the Bar that relatives were not independent witnesses.
Speaking through Vivian Bose, J. it was observed: (AIR p. 366, para 25)
`25. We are unable to agree with the learned Judges of the High Court
that the testimony of the two eyewitnesses requires corroboration. If the
foundation for such an observation is based on the fact that the
witnesses are women and that the fate of seven men hangs on their
testimony, we know of no such rule. If it is grounded on the reason that
they are closely related to the deceased we are unable to concur. This is a
fallacy common to many criminal cases and one which another Bench of
this Court endeavoured to dispel in Rameshwar v. State of Rajasthan
(AIR 1952 SC 54 at p. 59). We find, however, that it unfortunately still
persists, if not in the judgments of the Courts, at any rate in the
arguments of counsel.'

11. Again in Masalti v. State of U.P. (AIR 1965 SC 202) this Court
observed: (AIR pp. 209-10, para 14)

`14. But it would, we think, be unreasonable to contend that evidence

given by witnesses should be discarded only on the ground that it is
evidence of partisan or interested witnesses. ... The mechanical rejection
of such evidence on the sole ground that it is partisan would invariably
lead to failure of justice. No hard-and-fast rule can be laid down as to
how much evidence should be appreciated. Judicial approach has to be
cautious in dealing with such evidence; but the plea that such evidence
should be rejected because it is partisan cannot be accepted as correct.'

12. To the same effect is the decision in State of Punjab v. Jagir Singh,
(1974) 3 SCC 277, Lehna v. State of Haryana, (2002) 3 SCC 76 .... As
observed by this Court in State of Rajasthan v. Kalki (1981) 2 SCC 752,
normal discrepancies in evidence are those which are due to normal
errors of observation, normal errors of memory due to lapse of time, due
to mental disposition such as shock and horror at the time of occurrence
and those are always there however honest and truthful a witness may
be. Material discrepancies are those which are not normal, and not
expected of a normal person. Courts have to label the category to which a
discrepancy may be categorised. While normal discrepancies do not
corrode the credibility of a party's case, material discrepancies do so.
These aspects were highlighted recently in Krishna Mochi v. State of
Bihar, (2002) 6 SCC 81".

2008 (9) SCC 284 : 2008 (6) Supreme 56

Before:- Altamas Kabir :J , Markandey Katju :J

Rajbir Singh Dalal (Dr.)

Versus
Chaudhari Devi Lal University, Sirsa & Anr.

42. In Ambica Quarry Works v. State of Gujarat & others (1987) 1 SCC
213 (vide para 18) this Court observed:-

"The ratio of any decision must be understood in the background of the

facts of that case. It has been said long time ago that a case is only an
authority for what it actually decides, and not what logically follows from
it."

43. In Bhavnagar University v. Palitana Sugar Mills Pvt. Ltd. (2003) 2 SC

111 (vide para 59), this Court observed:-

"It is well settled that a little difference in facts or additional facts may
make a lot of difference in the precedential value of a decision."
(Emphasis supplied)
44. As held in Bharat Petroleum Corporation Ltd. & Another v. N.R.
Vairamani & Another (air 2004 sc 4778), a decision cannot be relied on
without disclosing the factual situation. In the same Judgment this
Court also observed:

"Court should not place reliance on decisions without discussing as to

how the factual situation fits in with the fact situation of the decision on
which reliance is placed. Observations of Courts are neither to be read as
Euclid`s theorems nor as provisions of the statute and that too taken out
of the context. These observations must be read in the context in which
they appear to have been stated. Judgments of Courts are not to be
construed as statutes. To interpret words, phrases and provisions of a
statute, it may become necessary for judges to embark into lengthy
discussions but the discussion is meant to explain and not to define.
Judges interpret statutes, they do not interpret judgments. They
interpret words of statutes; their words are not to be interpreted as
statutes.