ISBN 978-0-9575049-3-6

ACTIVE SYSTEM CONTROL

By Igor Schagaev

1
 Preface

ASC what it is and why - instead of introduction

every work is having its reason and area, as well as any good idea has its own limits. When various
people did aggregate their development and expertise and decided to make a book we should ex-
pect what and what is it all about.

active system control

area
market

state of the art problems types features

aircraft system properties

safety efficiency ecology
classification
Reliability models NRT RT tbc…
exploitation

manufacturing maintenance utilisation

Probability FTA MP Active Control Training Tools Devices

Simulators Flight control system Flight recorders External systems

FIGURE 0 MAP OF ACTIVE SYSTEM CONTROL

let us have a look on a picture below - we call it Figure 0 (Zero), as it explains us ourselves what
are we doing and where we are during conversations.

2
when one deals with aviation, transport, moving substances quite a few various and very often mu-
tually exclusive approaches, requirements and paradigms are introduced and discussed. using area
of system safety as an example we introduced new approach called “active system safety” and its
generalisation called “active system control”.

when we want to make system we use critically and vitally depend on - aviation is one of them -
we need to make all best efforts to guarantee its quality through the whole life cycle - from con-
cept down to design, development, testing, exploitation, maintenance, ecology impacts and even
utilisation.

theories, concepts and methods supported by devices and tools and people involved (designers,
pilots, engineers, maintenance engineers) all serve this purpose.
facing a disease during our lives we naturally want to have treatment mildest and well advanced -
making its negative impact minimal and tackling disease effectively, and, at max, make diseases avoid-
able. word disease is used here not by accident, just check Oxford Dictionary of English:

disease |dɪˈziːz|
noun
a disorder of structure or function in a human, animal, or plant, especially one that produces specific
symptoms or that affects a specific location and is not simply a direct result of physical injury: [ mass
noun ] : heart disease.
• a particular quality or disposition regarded as adversely affecting a person or group of people: we are
suffering from the British disease of self-deprecation.

if we replace in the definition above human, animal or plant by vehicle or aircraft we can surprise
ourselves: the same theoretical methods of diagnostic and recovery ( see our GAFT generalise
algorithm of fault tolerance explanation in R3 paper ) can be used for design technical systems.

our natural desire to introduce active system level control what is going on and be able to handle a
system better is extended through various requirements and processes.

in terms of Figure 0 requirements and processes of implementation are:safety, efficiency, ecology. the
whole cycle of system design should be efficient as well in terms of: efficiency, maintenance, ex-
ploitation, manufacturing, utilisation etc.

we present a system level of safety and recent achievements in this area active system safety ap-
proach, thinking about active system control of other properties or requirements.

dealing with critical systems we simply must understand general and specific properties of various
aircrafts - to see the limit of implementation of proposed concepts through structural features. thus

3
state of the art and aircraft system properties must be introduced and classification (not ontology!)
is presented, to ease a pain of implementation and limitations.

regarding safety world has developed models, reliability models, fault tree analysis models used
Markov processes and semi-Markov processes so far to explain what is possible and analyse ab-
stractions of system behaviour.

only control theory and systems are exploited in real time of flight - leaving safety and other prop-
erties in the position of poor relatives, valuing our lives secondary and setting profit margins as pri-
marily goal… thus we have to make new systems with integrated safety and control and active
predictive behaviour modifying flight control system, existing technologically developed devices
(flight recorders) simulators, training tools, harmonising external systems in operation with on-
board devices and systems. thus this book is dealing with detailed development of mentioned and
shown on Figure 0
area. This book called “active system control”.

We use the word “active” - because our aim is to dynamically forecast the future behaviour of the
system and react accordingly.

We use word “system” - because we create a model of a system, and aggregate models of its ele-
ments to discover the system parameters of its behaviour;

We use word “control” - because we seek the causal stimulus (or stimuli) then control the system
accordingly and so contribute to controlling the situation.

So "active system control" sums it up succinctly. It describes a system control philosophy that can
be used in a wide variety of applications to improve, for example, higher availability, inherent safety,
precision and to reduce cost of maintenance.

In more technical terms our approach is to consider the system as a dynamic whole primarily char-
acterised by three matrices representing input and output variables, system states and the graph of
physical dependencies between elements that form the system.

In contrast to classic approach the first matrix of input and output variables does not assume that
the variables are independent. The matrix of system states can represent any arbitrary quantity of
states including the terminal state. The matrix of physical dependency between the elements of the
system determines the rules whereby the elements impact each other when there is a change or
deviation in any of them. A graph logic model is used to define the matrix of states and matrix of
element dependencies; each relational link between nodes is characterised by out going and incom-
ing logical operators. In this way it is possible to directly express "one-to-many", "many-to-one",
"some-to-some" etc dependencies. To provide for quantitative considerations the links have associ-

4
ated numeric weights which define the impact of actions and thus characterise interactions be-
tween elements.

The application domain used for examples in the book is aviation and the purpose of the active
system control is to improve the safety of the aircraft and its availability.

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 Table of content for Chapter 1

Table of content for Chapter 1 6

Introduction 7
Survey of Aviation Application Domain 11
Terminology 11
Classification of Aviation 12
Classification of Aircraft by Mission 13
Classification by Type of Aircraft or Method of Operation 16
Classification by Technical Specifications 18
Classification by State of Development 20
Conclusion for the Section 21
The Aircraft Market 22
Military 22
Commercial Aviation 25
General Aviation 28
Distribution of General Aviation 29
Features of General Aviation 31
Helicopters 32
Conclusion on Aircraft Market 33
Safety and Risk of Flight 35
Aviation Safety In Commercial Aviation 35
Main Risk Agents and Their Contribution 37
Risk Factors and Flight Phases 40
Risk and Safety in General Aviation 42
Accident Statistics 42
US GA accidents 42
Australian GA accidents 43
UK GA accidents 44
Flight Risk Analysis 47
First Occurrences and Sequence of Events 47
Causes and Factors of Accidents 49
Conclusion for Flight Risk Analysis 50
Where we are in the book 51

6
Introduction

The idea of making better systems, more efficient, reliable and better designed has been well-known
since human race existed. In the aerospace domain reliability and efficiency become crucial and
vitally important in both meanings of the word, life is at stake. Thus this work investigates how to
make new systems and aircraft taking into account:

- Estimation of the market volume

- Systematic classification of aviation aiming to create a “portrait” of the aircraft as a ‘safety object’
- Analysis of aviation safety and reliability statistics
- Analysis of features and requirements for new designs for aviation and aerospace
- A “rich picture” of efficiency, safety and reliability for further modelling and prototyping

Our aim is to propose, analyse and develop a new Principle for Active System Control (PASC) for
aviation. Just recording data during an aircraft’s flight or vehicle’s mission in order to allow post-
crash analysis to be carried-out is no longer adequate or feasible. PACS proposes the analysis of
available data in real time DURING the flight and reacting on them with the aim of accident PRE-
VENTION. The concept of active safety, initially called dynamic safety, was introduced in the early
90’s (Schagaev, The Concept of Dynamic Safety for Aeroplanes, 1998) and further developed in
(Overtoon & Schagaev, 1999) (Schagaev, Concept of Active System Safety, Proc.15th IFAC Symp. on
Automatic Control in Aerospace, 2001). These where the starting points for this work. Currently
these kinds of system are referred to in the aerospace industry as health monitoring systems.

In the later Chapters these ideas and new ideas including the theoretical principles of active system
control, a flight safety (risk) model, an information flow model and a control system model. Subse-
quently, analysis of the dependencies within and between the models define the features, functions
and structures of the vehicle, it’s onboard architecture including its software and hardware. A com-
parison between the existing and the proposed system structure in terms of achievable aviation
safety, health monitoring and efficiency, will be presented, namely:

- Further theoretical and conceptual development of the active system control principles
- Formation of theoretical models to analyse the limits of the ASC applicability
- Development of working prototype of active system control for aircraft
- Research and development of HW and SSW elements for the on-board part of the ASC

HW and SSW are stand for hardware and system software. In terms of the system software the
main characteristics of ASC implementation will be extremely high reliability, fault tolerant concur-
rency, recoverability of processed data, support mechanisms for real time fault detection, system
reconfiguration in case of hardware fault or degradation, high performance and hard real time
scheduling. In terms of system hardware the main characteristics of ASC will be highest possible
reliability, recoverability, fault tolerance, thermal and vibration resistance and survivability as well as
support of graceful mechanical degradation.

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This work develops further the Principle of Active System Control (PASC) for aviation, aerospace
and transport at large. As well as developing the possibility for analysing flight or mission data after
an accident, of a successfully completed mission PASC proposes a comprehensive preventive analy-
sis and management of vehicle condition in real time, during the flight by integrating existing historic
and data recorded during each mission.

The main goal of this work is implementation of PASC in the air and on the ground - making all ef-
forts ‘in concert’ before, during and and after flight to aim for unprecedented efficiency of flights
and aerospace systems.

Modern aircraft and spacecraft are not well supported by on-ground maintenance. Recent acci-
dents and delays of launches, world press about cracked wings of A380, A340 FranceAir June 2009
disaster, rather steady sad statistics on aircraft crashes worldwide (http://planecrashinfo.com) indi-
cates the need to implement PASC. PASC aims to support the monitoring and prediction of the
condition aircraft including structure, engines, avionics and pilot behaviour to avoid accidents, or re-
duce the level of possible harm. This involves continuous real time analysis of flight data as well as
data accumulated lated from an aircraft’s previous flights.
!

Object: aviation

Proposed approach: !
Active System !
Control

Analysed feature:
safety

Existing methods
and technologies

FIGURE 1 SCOPE OF THE WORK

8
The potential beneficiaries of adoption of the ASC concept and implementation are:

- USA, Europe and Asia at large, by using and transferring results to other transport segments and
implementing them in the USA, European and Asian markets
- Citizens: aircraft owners and users based on efficiency and safety
- Main regulatory bodies such as FAA, Eurocontrol, EASA, ACARE and as they will be able to in-
troduce new progressive regulations which are easier to implement and maintain
- USA, European and Asian industries, involved in aircraft and avionics manufacturing
- Insurance companies as ASC will help to create the basis for a new insurance schemes and the
market for aviation, transport and aerospace that simply does not exist at the moment.

The book is organised as follows. The aviation market as a whole is briefly analysed and trends and
challenges in aviation, both conceptual and technological, are discussed including cross segment and
segment specific. A new classification of aircraft is introduced, aiming future analysis of key features,
technologies and aspects of aircraft efficiency. New approaches and technologies (such as the free
flight approach, IT and information processing, as well as GPS and automatic Air Traffic Control) are
reviewed again to assess their suitability for use in an implementation of PASC.

Aerospace has its own specific risks and efficiency factors and one of the goals is to reduce the
former and promote the latter. Of course, there are existing regulations and definitions and wher-
ever possible the approach has been to conform with or complement them, at least ‘in spirit’, aiming
to create common ground with the various aviation administrators and regulators by implementing
ASC taking account of current developments, tools, programmes and standards. Risk profiles are
also analysed across all flight phases, taking account of the key external and internal risk factors.

A special section of ASC programme will deal with aerospace vehicles, specifically in terms of life
cycle efficiency, reliability and safety. In order to achieve improvements and “real-time-ness” of data
processing and analysis both historic and flight/mission will be used and the required format of flight
data will be analysed. Existing and potential devices for implementing ASC will be discussed, with
the aim of making flight more efficient and improving the quality of aircraft maintenance.

The main risk factors will be discussed and methods and solutions to reduce risk will be analysed.
Technological requirements and feasibility aspects are also considered in special part of this work as
the success of an effective ASC implementation depends on their further development.

9
 Review of aviation, and aerospace

Market analysis, classification, regulations, requirements

Key features of aircraft and spacecraft

Technological profile of design, maintenance and safety

Principle of Active System Control (PASC)

Theory and methods of implementation

FIGURE 2 STRUCTURE OF THE WORK

10
Survey of Aviation Application Domain

Terminology

At first we introduce some definitions and terminology required for classification of aircraft and ac-
tive safety. In further sections the classification of aircraft is presented. Features of aviation market
accordingly aircraft classifications are discussed in Section below.

Glossary essential for reading of this work is attached in Appendix. The terminology used for active
safety is briefly introduced here:

- Object of Danger (OD) which, given the right conditions, is able to cause hazards and increase
risk of a dangerous event or accident which can cause harm.
- Objects of Safety (OS) which are the subject of harm, such as people, animals, plants, property
and the environment

Each object of danger has one or a number of factors of danger or so-called hazards i.e. the physical
phenomena manifested when ОD and OS interact. For example, in a nuclear power plant a hazard
might be a nuclear explosion resulting in harm from the shock wave, blinding light flash, long term
intense radiation, or electromagnetic impulse.

In these tense times where acts of terrorism know no bounds it is not beyond possibility that such
an event might be triggered by an aircraft being aimed at a nuclear power plant.

Many practical air safety guidelines are formulated on the basis of estimates (either experimental or
modelled) of the characteristics of OD and OS on the likelihood of hazards occurring.

11
Classification of Aviation

A defining (or 'principal') attribute is that attribute of a substance which distinguishes it from any other type of
substance, and thus without which that substance could not be conceived.
Descartes, (Principles, part one, §53, I, 210-1)

There are at least three main reasons to classify aircraft or spacecraft. The first reason is the need
for a proper definition of the terms: “business”, “commercial’, “general aviation”, and of autonomous
and piloted vehicles. Classification here makes it possible to characterise these domains, define limits
and describe differences between various types of aircraft and, so clarify terminology.

Secondly, by defining meaningful features and aspects of taxonomy it becomes possible to identify
the class of required features for system elements that are relevant for active system control.

Thirdly, classification helps to unify implementation solutions for various types of aircraft and space-
craft using a two tier system with basic and specific parts. The basic part is common to all active
system control implementations whilst the specific part serves as an interface between main system
and specific types of aircraft or spacecraft.

Previously aircraft classification has generally been based on four aspects:

- particular mission, based on its purpose (sector of aviation)

- the type of aircraft or the principle of creation of lift (method of propulsion)
- technical features (and technical data)
- state of development of the aircraft (status and operational maturity)

In some documents a classification by type of propulsion has been used, however for ASC purposes
this can be considered to be one of the consumer properties (such as the type of a wing, the shape
of a wing, the type of a landing gear and so forth). Another classification might be airworthiness,
but this is just a measure of the quality, safety and readiness of the all aspects of the plane for flight,
rather than a classification.

The international and regional aviation organisations define various sets of standards and rules
based on their classification system. In the following sections the standards are related to the classi-
fications outlined above.

12
Classification of Aircraft by Mission

According to the generally accepted standards (FAR, JAR …) and the general approach of the main
players (ICAO, FAA, ECARE etc.), aircraft for a particular mission can be subdivided into two larger
groups: military and civil. There is a possibility that a particular model will be dual-purpose, i.e. useful
for both military and civil segments, for example - large cargo planes used for disaster relief.

The particular mission of an aircraft affects key properties, altering the meaning of words used in
that context (efficiency, safety, maintenance) and, thus, requires a different classification to make
sense of general and specific property-wise procedures and gains: efficiency, safety, maintenance etc.
Here a brief and incomplete survey of safety schemes is presented for military aircraft as some fea-
tures may migrate in commercial and general aviation.

Military aircraft can be defined by mission or purpose. For a military aircraft the presence of their
own and their enemies armaments are specific danger and also the factors related. Extreme condi-
tions of operation such as very high-altitude or high levels of acceleration present additional danger.
This may require special additional equipment for life support. In addition all the objects of safety
for a military aircraft also exist in civil aircraft, but to a lesser degree.

In order to achieve the required level of risk reduction in military aircraft, specified resources are
required to protect the crew (e.g. armoured cabins, ejector seats etc). Note that life insurance and
the health of members of crews of military aircraft are the same as in general practice with other
military personnel, even though their life-chances are clearly impaired.

Legally, once at war all are equal, and for military personnel the risk of perishing onboard an aircraft
(or helicopter) is equated to risk to perishing on the front line. Although hardly any data are avail-
able from the military for the sake of generalisation we assume that safety standards for crews of
military are similar to those established by internal standards of the countries in which they operate.

The astronomical prices and costs of modern military aircraft should ensure society that their de-
sign and maintenance is intended to be as safe as possible. But unfortunately high costs do not
guarantee the quality required!

Fighter, and special military aircraft are equipped with standard ‘Systems of Objective
Checking’ (SOC) and various kinds of onboard data storage devices for flight data primarily intend-
ed to ease problem solving in combat training of crews e.g. for control and analysis of fulfilment of
the mission.

Independent experts investigate accidents and other abnormal events for both military and civil avi-
ation and have access to the information stored during flight. Most of ASC principles are applicable

13
for both military and commercial aviation. However, ASC is not being targeted at the military mar-
ket for the following reasons:

- Equipment of military aircraft where PASC should be implemented are already certified and
would need adaptations to both hardware and corresponding software
- The specific problems facing various military aircraft do not allow a standard solution
- Safety supportive schemes are hard to analyse as they may contain sensitive military data
- Maintenance for military aircraft tends to be rather conservative and again difficult to assess

Within Civil Aviation in the UK and USA (FAR rules) civil aviation is subdivided between commer-
cial (CA) and a general-purpose aviation (GA). A Commercial aircraft (CA) is defined as “any air-
craft carrying more than 30 passengers or a minimum actual load of 7500 pounds (or more), trans-
porting passengers and/or freight for payment”. Such aircraft are regulated by the ICAO and used
to provide air transport services.

Although the term "general-purpose aviation" (GA) is widely used it is in fact quite poorly defined.
For example, the Federal Aviation Administration’s (FAA) definition of the term "general-purpose
aviation" embraces a very broad range of aircraft. The Association of GA Manufacturers (GAMA)
(Weener E. , 1998) uses a similar catchall definition:

‘GA constitutes all aviation, except commercial and military’.

Though this definition is similar to the FAA’s, GAMA does not define the scope of commercial avi-
ation. The association of pilots and owners of aircraft (AOPA) uses its own classification of aircraft
according to the Part of 135 Air rules, this includes short haul airlines.

Nevertheless, this exclusion is too strict, as it would exclude air-taxis from the scope of our re-
search. Operators of air-taxis are allowed to operate without registration according to Part 135
FAR. Also helicopters, not intended for hiring, can also be considered to be part of the GA market.

General-purpose aviation includes various kinds of aircraft application: administrative, business, air -
taxi, medical, life-saving, agricultural, prospecting, sporting, training, experimental. Users of GA air-
craft, in turn, can be private and corporate owners as well as state and local administrative bodies
such as the Police or Fire Service.

Classification of aircraft by mission is shown on the Figure 3. The majority of the indicated kinds of
aviation fall into more than one classification, for example some military aircraft are used to carry
passengers, or as an air-taxi.

14
 Agricultural

Geological

CIVIL
Sport

General Aviation
Medical

Administrative (Public)

Commercial Air Taxi

Passenger

Cargo

Research

Multiple

Search & Rescue

DUAL-PURPOSE
Training

Multitask

Reconnaissance

Drone

MILITARY
Patrol

Observation

Anti-submarine

Low Temp. Operation

Tanker

Fighter

Special Elec. Equipment

Direction

Attack

FIGURE 3 CLASSIFICATION OF AIRCRAFT BY PRIMARY MISSION

15
Classification by Type of Aircraft or Method of Operation

The type of an aircraft is defined by its construction and method of operation (glider, balloon,
blimp/dirigible, fixed wing or rotorcraft). Classification by type is illustrated in Figure 4, the approach
is in general agreement with existing documents, but has some distinctive features:

- The classification is based only on basic flight characteristics

without specifics of construction features (for example, a power-unit);
- The classification has a hierarchic structure with several levels of branching.

There are five levels of branching based on:

- Means of creating lift., generally divided into two categories: lighter-than-air and heavier-than-air;
- Presence of the wing, heavier-than-air aircraft can be subdivided into winged and wingless;
- Wing mobility, creating two alternate categories, with fixed wing and mobile wing;
- Wing construction, main constructional aspects are wing rigidity (soft, semirigid, rigid) and kind of
wing movement (spinning, alternating motion);
- Technique of lift implementation.

The first three levels of hierarchy present a combination of classification features, that help to an-
alyse aircraft that use vertical takeoff and landing.

The definitions of different types of aircraft operated under FAR, are provided in Appendix I. Note
again the lack of a systematic classification scheme in these FAA definitions. Other approaches to
classify aircraft by type depend on the aims of the classification. For example, the US AiForce uses
the following codes for various aircraft types

G Glider;
H Helicopter;
V Vertical takeoff plane;
Z Balloon / Zeppelin.

It is generally assumed that aircraft with a rigid immobile wing are aircraft, but there are also other
possibilities including aircraft with:
- Flexible wings(s) such as para-planes or monoplanes
- Semi-rigid wings such as kites or delta winged planes
- Rigid wing planes depending on the ekran effect, so called ekran-planes
- Rotor based planes, without motors
- Flap winged planes, a helicopter/aircraft hybrid
- Backpack wingless planes, e.g. rocket propelled
- Other micro-light based configurations

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 LIGHTER THAN AIR

Balloon
Airship / Zeppelin

Combined

HEAVIER THAN AIR

Wingless

Backpack
Rocket

Combined

Winged
Immobile Wing

Soft Wing Paraglider

Paraplane

Rigid Wing Plane

Glider
Ground-effect
Plane
Semi-rigid Kite
Wing Deltaplane

Mobile Wing

Rotorcraft Helicopter
Gyroplane
Gyrodyne

Flap-hinged

Combination

Vertical
Takeoff
Plane

FIGURE 4: CLASSIFICATION BY TYPE OF AIRCRAFT

17
Classification by Technical Specifications

Aircraft can be defined by their consumer features and technical specifications. Selection of partic-
ular properties depends on the intended use. For example, in the USA the FAA uses two main
sets of technical data for classification: the aircraft’s landing (approach) - speed and wing span.

According to FAA Advisory Circular (AC) 150/5300-13, on Airport Design, airports (and by infer-
ence the aircraft that use them) are subdivided into five classes based on the aircraft type they are
designed to accommodate.

Ordering of features and consumer properties of aircraft enable to define the following groups:
- general characteristics
- engine characteristics
- design features

The first group refers to: maximum takeoff weight of aircraft; overall dimensions (wing span); num-
ber of passengers; approach speed; cruising speed and other characteristics.

The second group relates to number and type of engines.

The third group refers to distinctive structural attributes/features of airframe design, flight control
type and configuration; landing gear type and configuration; design features of instrumentation; fuel
system configuration and electrical system configuration.

Figure 5 illustrates the classification of aircraft by technical features; alternative values of classification
attributes are shown by yellow shading. and elements of the indicated systems of the aircraft are
shown in pale blue.

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 Flight Weight (Take-off) Super-light Light Middle Large

Approach Speed (Knots) < 91 B. 91 - 121 121 - 141 141 - 166 166+

< 49 49 - 79 79 g 118 118 g 171 171 g 214 214+

Aircraft Wingspan (Ft)
(15 m) (15 - 24m) (24 g 36m) (36 - 52m) (52 - 65m) (65+ m)
Unmanned Single- Multi-
Number of Seats
seated seated
Cruising (Air) Speed Subsonic Supersonic Transonic

Power Plant Characteristics

None Single Double /

Number of Engines
Multiple
Type of Engine Piston Turbo-prop Rocket

Coaxial Reblade Straight Multi (N)

Type of Propellers
Blade blade

Design Features
Configuration No wheels 2-wheeled 3-wheeled Multi-wheeled
Landing Gear
(Bicycle) (Bicycle) (Polycycle)
Type and
Configuration Gear Type

Flight Control Rudder Type

Type and
Configuration Aileron Type

Trim Type

Flap Type

Elevator Type

Airframe Scheme Monocoque Classic Canard

Design
Fuselage Narrow Wide Single- Double-
aisled aisled
Wings Monoplane Biplane Strait Delta

Empennage

CIS Design Cockpit Instruments

Alternator

Antennas

Pilot Static System

Other Onboard Systems

Fuel System Configuration

Electrical System Configuration

FIGURE 5 CLASSIFICATION BY TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION

19
Classification by State of Development

Another important classification group for aircraft is their state of development. This group is rather
important for future aviation projects when taking into consideration the possibility of using new
engineering technologies and methods, including application of active safety principles.

During the design and testing of new aircraft it is important to consider the analysis of aircraft data,
information flows and later flight and monitoring informational support.

Here the proposed principle of active system safety and evaluation of its possible implementation
might be extremely productive, as there is an opportunity to integrate PASC during design process.
As a result new aircraft could become much safer than exiting ones.

On the other hand, complex flight data processing may exceed the duration of experiments where
measuring of technical characteristics and parameters took place. Some examples here: aerody-
namics parameters, and take-off and landing speeds. In this case the performance of the PASC
hardware and algorithms needs to be estimated so that the technology used to implement the al-
gorithms can keep pace with the real-time control requirements of actual flight.

The application of new systems of active safety during development trials and the subsequent ex-
perimental improvement of the aircraft design can result in a significant saving of time and resources
allocated to development and the introduction of new aircraft model into series production. This
was successfully proven by Concord project where flight data processing took place before, during
and after flight in special ground based centres using flight data transmission equipment.

Specially dedicated and trained personnel supported of every flight of every Concord aircraft. The
main problems in this scheme of safety management are that both on ground and on board per-
sonnel must collaborate in an extremely stable and intensive and expensive way.

But worse still the flight data at that time could only be processed in batch mode after each flight,
not in real time during flight. With modern satellite base communication systems data could be
monitored in real time by a ground based data centre. This approach is now used, for example, by
Rolls Royce to monitor the performance and condition of jet engines during flight.

20
Conclusion for the Section

The classifications presented here are not claimed in any way to be complete. The intention has
been to focus on classification principles which are useful to define a features of aircraft that should
be taken into account in the design of next generation of aircraft and their systems to promote the
separation of general and domain specific solutions.

In order to make the application of PASC application effective classification can be used to identify
and ‘localise’ specific features that depend on aircraft types and other differences defined by the
classification used. The classifications briefly presented here tend to relate at least statically, a “por -
trait of aircraft” with the “portrait” of requirements for PASC implementation schemes. These rela-
tionships will be analysed further to enable the future design efficient technological solutions.

21
The Aircraft Market

This section analyses the features and size of the existing aircraft market including military, commer-
cial and general aviation. Analysis of the size and share of each segment will indicate the likelihood
of success for implementing PASC. With this goal in mind, the aircraft market is analysed in more
detail for segments where PASC can have the biggest impact - general aviation and UAV.

Military

According to analysts, despite of some stabilisation of deliveries of military aircraft in 2002-6 (see
Figure 6 sales of military and civil aircrafts

$60,000

$50,000
Millions of US Dollars

$40,000

$30,000

$20,000
Civil
Military
$10,000
Polynomial trend of Civil
Polynomial trend of Military

$0
1990 1990 2000 2005
Year

Figure 2.4: Sales of Civil and Military Aircraft

FIGURE 6 SALES OF MILITARY AND CIVIL AIRCRAFTS

During the last 20 years the number of fighter aircraft purchased has reduced, as shown in Figure 7.

22
 Europe &
Equtorial & South Latin America CIS Canada
Africa 8% 2% 21%
3%

Near East & China South Asia

South-East Asia
South Africa 11% 14%
19%
22%

FIGURE 7 EXPORT MARKET FOR MILITARY AIRCRAFTS

Figure 7 illustrates quantitative growth of aircraft fleets at the expense of purchases by a number of
countries, mainly the Near East and Asian - Pacific region, i.e. the additional number of 4th and 5th
generation fighters.

Probably the most important reasons for this are strategic military, commercial and technological:

1. Strategic

- Cold War is over and there is no enemy on Earth with a serious airforce to intercept
where fighters will be required
- New forms of air operations (shown in Iraq and Yugoslavia) require multi-purpose aircraft

II. Commercial

- Growth of the cost of new aircraft

- Growth of service life of military aircraft at the expense of their modernisation
- Extending the practice of short term leasing of fighters

III. Technological

- Development of pilotless combat aircraft, UAV;

- New more efficient air defence systems
- Fast change of related technologies increases the risk of obsolescence for expensive vehicles

23
There are three main approaches in the fighters and basic trainers market :

- Further modernisation of existing aircraft in order to expand their multi-functionality;

- Increasing technical flight resources to extend operational lifespan, for example improvement of
aircraft, weapon systems, mission and navigational equipment, and other airborne systems related
to our work);
- replacement of physically and obsolete aircraft with more modern ones, such as:

- Fighters: American F-16 and F/A-18, French Mirage-2000, Swedish JAS-39, Russian Су-30
and MiG-29, and possibly - EF 2000, F-22, Rafale, F/A-18E/F, JSF, F-2, F-10, FC-1, LCA and
others;
- Trainer aircraft: Italian MB-339FD, Czech L-159, South Korea КТХ-2, Brazilian ЕМВ-312Н
- Super Tucano: the planned joint development by Germany, Republic Korea and the republic
of South Africa of the AT - 2000, Indian НТТ-35, Russian MiG-AT and Як-130;
- Strike helicopters: Italian C-129 Mangust, ex -German RAN - 2 Tiger, American АН-64А
Apache and AH-64D Longbow, Russian Ка-50, Ка-52 and Mi-28.

24
Commercial Aviation

Commercial aviation (CA) is the largest aviation sector with service and operation that includes
more than 200 countries. At the end of 2006 the CA network included 800+ airlines, 5,000 users,
1,350 large and 10,000 small airports, 16,000 aircraft, 150,000 air pilots and 240,000 maintenance
staff. According to long-term forecasts, the global CA capacity still has room for significant growth.

CA here will be briefly analysed with an emphasis on several aspects: long-distance and short dis-
tance aircraft, wide body and narrow fuselage aircraft, European made and US made CA. These
aspects are discussed separately as future ASC systems might be applicable for CA. In turn, ASC
results for USA, and European made aircraft might be a subject for collaboration and further work.
In turn, manufacturers and owners of US made business aircraft can be considered as future prime
customers of ASC solutions, devices and systems.

Europe. The current European fleet is 3,900 aircraft, see Figure 8. Around 67 % of the fleet are
narrow-fuselage aircraft. By 2025 the number of narrow-fuselage aircraft will be almost doubled,
their deliveries will continue to grow at a high rate. The European airlines will need almost 6,200
new jet aircraft at a total cost of $480 billion. Three quarters of them will be narrow-fuselage and
used regionally.

The other 1,562 aircraft will be wide-fuselage ones with an estimated cost about $206 billion. Air-
craft such as В747 and other so-called ‘Super Jumbos’ will support the market for long distance
routes. In total about 200 aircraft of this class will be required. The majority of aviation companies
in Europe will also require medium sized wide-fuselage aircraft. As competition in international
markets intensifies, aircraft with smaller number of seats and cheaper operating costs will allow air-
lines to introduce new routes, create new markets with reduced risk. Medium sized wide-fuselage
aircraft are needed by European airlines to decrease their operating and maintenance costs and to
create new international non-stop routes.

2002 2022
European market
Number % Number %
Regional jet aircraft 468 12 979 13
Narrow-fuselage aircraft 2,613 67 5,608 63
Wide-fuselage aircraft 585 15 1,869 21
747 and heavier aircraft 234 6 267 3
Total 3,900 100 8,900 100
Source: Boeing

Figure
FIGURE 82.5: European
EUROPEAN Aircraft
AIRCRAFT MARKET Market
FORECASTForecast

25
The overall forecast of CA development for European aviation manufacturers is consistent and pos-
itive, see Figure 9. By 2022 Airbus expects a threefold growth of passenger traffic. Assuming a
mean annual increment of passenger traffic of 5.3% in two decades it will require 16,600 new 100-
seated aircraft. Higher requirements for fuel efficient aircraft also highlight the need to replace 9,200
narrow body aircraft. From the economic viewpoint this is a good sign.

In support of the EU forecast Boeing forecasts that the largest part of deliveries will be narrow-
fuselage aircraft – 13,650 units. The share of lighter regional jet aircraft will increase by 4,300 units.
Regional airlines in the USA maintain lighter jet aircraft for new non-stop trips. Regional jet aircraft
increase geographical limits for large nodal airports, expand use of heavier jet aircraft at non peak
hours, replace them on the unstressed routes and are used instead of turbo-prop aircraft.

% of %
Class of aircraft Number
total number total cost
Regional jet aircraft 4,374 18 5
Narrow-fuselage aircraft 13,608 56 39
Wide-fuselage aircraft 5,346 22 45
747 and heavier 972 4 11
Total 24,300 100 100

FIGURE 9 MARKET DEMAND FOR NEW AIRCRAFTS

Accordingly Boeing airlines will use narrow-fuselage aircraft together with regional jet aircraft to in-
crease the frequency of internal and short international trips. Additionally, airlines will increase their
fleets of wide-fuselage aircraft (5,340 units), 45% of all such investments will go to medium wide-
fuselage aircraft. They will be used in long-distance transportation markets, for example Atlantic and
Pacific, and also on intense short-distance routes, for example, in Asia. Such aircraft as В747 and
A380 will make up only 4% of all deliveries during 2003-2022, and their  number will not exceed
900 units.

An estimation of CA market expansion is $1.9 billion, and narrow and wide-fuselage aircraft make
up about 85% of this figure. Market expansion in the next 20 years will add approximately 3,000
aircraft to the freight aircraft fleet. Almost three quarters of them will be converted from passen-
ger and mixed versions. Almost half of such requirements will fall on wide-fuselage aircraft.

Market expansion in the next 20 years will add approximately 3,000 aircraft to the freight aircraft
fleet, see Figure 10. Almost three quarters of them will be converted from passenger and mixed
versions. and almost half will be wide-fuselage aircraft.

Though new freight aircraft will not make up a large part of the global fleet by 2022, many airlines
nevertheless prefer their technical advantages of reliability and fuel efficiency. Half of these new de-

26
liveries will be for heavy freight aircraft. Note here that the importance of the active system safety
for this segment of CA is quite high as freight aircraft are not the best served and maintained in
CA. In this sector safety management schemes clearly restrict the profits of aviation companies and
aircraft owners. The cost of all newly delivered freight aircraft is evaluated at $132 billion at current
rates.

2002 2022
Class of aircraft
Number % Number %
Light (< 30 t) 578 33 1,330 38
Middle narrow-fuselage (30 g 50 t) 192 11 735 21
Middle wide-fuselage (40 g 65 t) 490 28 630 18
Heavy (> 65 t) 490 28 805 23
Total 1,750 100 3,500 100

FIGURE 10 AIRCRAFT CARGO FLEET ANALYSIS

27
General Aviation

General Aviation (or GA) is one of the most important parts of aviation globally. In fact, in the U.S.
alone, GA flight hours exceed 60% of all flight duration. As previously mentioned GA includes a
range of aircraft starting from small, propeller-driven aircraft to quite large jet aircraft that perform
non-scheduled commercial flights, corporate flights, and the top end of private aviation.

European GA sometimes is considered as a part of civil aviation except for air carrier operations.
The variety of GA usage is very wide:
- Law enforcement
- Forest fire fighting
- Air ambulance
- Logging
- Fish and wildlife spotting
- Passenger Traffic including corporate, business and leisure travel
- Highway traffic management,
- Search and rescue
- Surveying, mapping, observation, photography and logging
- Agriculture, fish and wildlife monitoring
- Smuggling of people, drugs, munitions etc
- Covert operations (more recently)
- Pilot training

The most common European GA use of GA are: aerial work operations, non-scheduled opera-
tions for remuneration or hire and sailplanes (gliders). GA accident rates have always been higher
than in CA. This is caused by marked differences and wider variety of types of flying. The following
highlights some of the important distinctions between GA and CA:

Regulation aspects

- GA pilots are involved in a wide range of operations.

- There is a wide variance in pilot qualifications and experience levels.
- Pilot certificates range from ATP to student pilot with similar variability in flight hours, whereas
all airline flights are crewed by at least one ATP.
- GA aircraft owners and pilots are individually responsible for the safety of flight. CA and
the military aviation have specially trained personnel to perform maintenance and safety.

Technological Support

- GA aircraft have fewer cockpit resources

- Airports and landing fields for GA have poorer facilities than CA: runways; approach
lighting systems, and the advanced services similar to of airline-served airports
- CA requires at least two pilots; GA operations are predominantly single pilot
- More facilities - in the U.S., GA flies to nearly 14,000 airports

28
Wider Risk

- Many operations of GA, such as aerial application, external loads, and banner towing, have
special mission-related risks.
- There are more takeoffs and landings — the highest risk phases of any flight. On a per hour ba-
sis, GA have many more takeoffs and landings than either air carriers or the military.
- GA flights are shorter, but as flight increase, the rate of take off and landing grows too.

Effect of Weather

GA aircraft are more weather dependent, they usually fly through the weather instead of
avoiding it, or may not have systems to avoid or cope with adverse conditions.

At the same time GA is relatively flexible regarding decisions about flight. In contracts, CA follows
the schedule. GA operations such as recreational flying will choose not to fly in poor weather con-
ditions.

Although GA operations are different from air carrier operations, pilots who actively manage risk
can significantly improve their respective safety records.

Distribution of General Aviation

As mentioned above, the definition of GA varies in different countries, also in various bodies. The
bodies conducting GA surveys often experience difficulties in accumulating valid data. Some coun-
tries do not have an up-to-date register of their GA aircraft; some might not even have a designat-
ed authority for maintaining such records. As a result, the figures provided will be approximations or
estimates.

An initial review of the above data confirms that biggest market for GA is USA (about 67% of the
global GA fleet). The only other significant market shares are those corresponding to Canada,
Germany, Australia, Brazil and the UK, see Figure 11. Research into GA figures for this report has
shown that although extensive data is available for the U.S., very limited data is available for Europe.

Recent FAA studies show steady growth of US GA in numbers. GA growth is the result of new
production. Reduction of aircraft numbers is caused by retirements of aircraft, and write-offs.
These two processes have opposite effects, therefore the net balance – expected average growth in
production of GA aircraft is slightly bigger than the rate of decline.

The annual grow in GA is expected to be 1.2% over the 13-year forecast period, rising from
211,244 in 2002 to 246,415 in 2015.

This growth includes the addition of a new aircraft category – the light sport aircraft - that was
added to the active fleet in 2004 and to account for 20,915 aircraft by 2015. In addition, it is as-

29
sumed that approximately 330-500 newly manufactured light sport aircrafts will annually enter the
fleet in 2006 and following years.

CIS Near East & South Africa

2% 22 %

Equitorial & South Africa

3%

Latin America
8%

China
11 % Europe & Canada
21%

South Asia South-East Asia

14 % 19 %

FIGURE 11 GA DISTRIBUTION IN THE WORLD (SOURCE: FAA, 2004)

Distribution of models and relative shares of GA aircraft by type is shown by Figure 12.

Beech 23 Cessna 170/172

Cessna 310
Cessna 206
Piper PA24
Cessna 177 Piper PA28*/PA32
Beech 55/58
Cessna 210
Piper J3/PA18
Cessna 180/182
Mooney M20
Beech 33/35/36 Cessna 150

FIGURE 12 GA DISTRIBUTION IN THE USA OVER THE LAST 30 YEARS, (SOURCE: FAA, 2004)

30
Features of General Aviation

General Aviation aircraft have the widest variety of applications due to the following factors:

- Low operational costs (mostly attributable to scalability factors with respect to Civil Aviation)
- Shorter take-off and landing distances
- Flexibility in terms of operational altitude
- Flexibility in regulations
- Easier access to GA airports, etc.

Through the years the use of general aviation aircraft has further increased to include medical
emergency and similar services. The main use of GA aircraft is for leisure/private, whilst pilot train-
ing is the second largest category.

A further important aspect with respect to GA is age of the aircraft. Although sales of new general
aviation aircraft increased after the mid-90s, most general aviation aircraft in use in 2000 in the US
were more than 25 years old. US manufacturers delivered in 2000 2,816 new aircraft. Note the
market size of GA in US - 213,500 aircraft.

Amongst all GA aircraft categories, the single-engine piston aircraft category currently has the high-
est average age of all while at the same time it accounts for the largest percentage of the GA fleet
in the US. The oldest aircraft is single-engine piston aircraft with 8+ seats, this type of aircraft has
the average age about 43 years.

The average age of the GA fleet in the US in 2000 was 27 years. A report compiled by NASA in
1999 defined some further typical features of GA aircraft drawing on data from the US. These fea-
tures are summarised in the following two figures (13 and 14) Figure 13 Typical GA aircraft (source:
NASA 1999)

Characteristics of Typical GA Aircraft Typical GA Aircraft

Number of seats 4
Number of engines 1
Type of engine Horizontally opposed, 4 or 6 cylinder piston
Landing Gear Type and Configuration Fixed Tricycle
Airframe Construction Aluminium frame, Aluminium skin, steel engine
mount
Flight Control Type and Configuration Mainly cable operated utilizing bell cranks and
push-pull rods

FIGURE 13 TYPICAL GA AIRCRAFT CHARACTERISTICS (SOURCE: NASA 1999)

31
 Electrical
Power Plant CIS* Aircraft Control Airframe
System
Engine System Cockpit Instruments Flight Control Empennage Lighting System
Fuel System Vacuum System Rudder System Fuselage Source & Dist.
Propeller System Pilot Static System Aileron System Tail
Heating/Ventilation Alternator Elevator System Wings
Antennas Trim System
Flap System
Ground Control
Landing Gear

Figure 2.11: Typical GA aircraft system breakdown

FIGURE 14 TYPICAL GA AIRCRAFT (SOURCE: NASA 1999)

Helicopters

Another segment of GA that has recently a period of stable growth is helicopters. Sales and vol-
ume of production has grown considerably, increasing from $4 billion dollars in 1996 up to $6.7
billion in 2001.

According to R. Aboulafia, Vice President of Analysis in the Teal Group, short-term prospects of this
market remain favourable. Accordingly forecasts in 2001-2010 9,503 helicopters will be produced
with a total value of this production exceeds $75,9 billion. Compare this to 1991-2000 when 7,963
helicopters were produced with value $52,7 billion.

Different segments of the helicopter market are growing at different speeds. For the ASC the mar-
ket of civil and business helicopters is the most interesting. The volume of new deliveries of civil
helicopters has reached $1.2 billion. It is expected that in the period between 2001 and 2010
about 819 civil helicopters with a value of $12.43 billion will be produced. During 1991-2000 the
volume of this market was $11.2 billion.

The cost of annual deliveries of civil helicopters is between 1/3 and 1/7 of the respective military
 sales are more
helicopter market. Demand for civil helicopters is rather stable whereas military
variable.

Fuel prices have been the main factor in slowing down the growth of the civil helicopters segment.
At the same, time the market for corporate and administrative helicopters is booming, with growth
increasing almost 4 times during the years 1995 to 2000.

Busy and impatient businessmen and business executives are creating stable growth for this seg-
ment of GA either by buying or hiring helicopters as their use is no longer considered as pro-

32
hibitively expensive. Recent years have shown the growth of joint ownership of helicopters and this
has become the key factor of increase the demand.

The manufacturers have offering the sharing schemes, such as ‘HeliFlight’. But overall the concept of
shared ownership of helicopter fleets will be limited due to flight range, however the practical area
for effective sharing does have its merits.

Corporate helicopters at the moment represent only a small share of the civil helicopters market –
which according to experts comprise only 2% of all civil helicopters. The operating companies share
of profit from helicopters is about 4%.

Nevertheless, this sector of the market will still promote sales of one or two expensive models of
corporate helicopters. The leader here is Bell/Agusta ВА609 helicopter with variable tilt rotor
blades. Not surprisingly the manufacturers have made serious investments in the development of
new models for this segment of the market. The Sikorsky S-76 has been modified to produce a
new version (S- 76C+) which is priced at about $7 million.

Sikorsky assures that S-76 is used by more CEOs in the Fortune Top 100 largest companies than all
others taken together, and since 1997 the members of the British Royal Family are also using it. If
this company becomes successful with promoting the scheme of shared ownership then the market
for the S-76 will prosper.

In parallel, the Eurocopter Consortium has expressed a strong interest in the business helicopter
market and is offering the EC 155. This is not newcomer, but an improved version of the Dauphin
helicopter.

Conclusion on Aircraft Market

A short overview of the market shows clearly that the numbers for aircraft in service worldwide
will continue to increase leading to increasing challenges on air traffic and aviation safety. The GA
segment shows a steady growth too. The trend to more intensive use of aircraft puts pressure on
safety management schemes; most of them affect the main interest of the aviation companies: i.e.,
profit. For example narrow bodied aircraft will be used for longer flights and without any possibility
to check their condition and detect potential safety treats in between flights. A typical flight ‘turn-
around’ time for a budget airline is down from about 60 minutes to only 20! As Boeing proudly
declare:

“our aircrafts only make money when they are flying”

33
This intensification of aircraft use leads to a growing concern about safety:

- The intensive use of aircraft creates problems for implementation of safety management
schemes;
- Long haul flights - which relentlessly stress the engines and airframe.
- Narrow bodied aircraft will be used for longer flights without the possibility to check their condi-
tions and potential safety vulnerabilities
- Wide bodied aircraft will be used in both ways: similar to narrow bodied ones and for shorter
flights with intensive use and frequent taking off and landing – the most risky phases of flight.
- Highly manoeuvrable GA aircraft and helicopters are also creating a concern for safety manage-
ment due to their wider risk distribution.
- The use of GA with less qualified pilots and insufficient maintenance may create even more seri-
ous safety problems

The overview further shows that General Aviation aircraft have a significantly higher share of the
overall aircraft market. It is clear that the aviation market is suffering from pressure in two conflict-
ing directions:

1. an increase in the volume of flight operations in CA and GA exposing an increasing number of

passengers to operational risk and
2. an increasing level of safety risk due to faster turnaround of CA flights and poor maintenance
facilities for GA aircraft

Safety issues are becoming more and more important whilst at the same time being ‘squeezed’ at
the operational level. This makes the use of on-board monitoring, and on-ground detection more
and more essential for control and monitoring of aircraft condition, and also makes the develop-
ment of ASC for safety a critically important priority.

34
Safety and Risk of Flight
This chapter provides an overview of existing flight risk, its profile and statistics. Various types of
flight risk are reviewed and a brief summary of the current aviation safety landscape is presented,
including GA safety.

Aviation Safety In Commercial Aviation

Statistically during last 40 years aviation safety in Commercial aviation has been improving. The
number of accidents been reduced to 1 per 5 per million departures (Fig. 15) (Weener E. ,Boeing).

30

Hull Loss Accidents

25
Worldwide Commercial Aviation g All Aircraft (Boeing)

20

15

10

FIGURE
Figure 3.1: 15 ACCIDENT
Global CA lossSTATISTICS PERper
statistics MILLION DEPARTURES
million 1960-2000
departures, 1960 to 2000

In contrast, General Aviation is far less safe than CA as will be shown by detailed data presented
here. It might be expected that new aircraft will be more reliable, and that as their share of the
whole fleet grows the safety of the aviation should be improved.

However, there are some doubts here. The trends in aviation safety management are rather similar
between sectors and unfortunately not very effective. In operation new aircraft are as reliable as
the old ones,.

The factors that influence risk and its profile are almost identical for aviation across the board and
are influenced by human factors (Operator, Flight crew, Maintenance, ATC personnel), equipment
related factors (Airport, Aircraft) and external factors such as the weather and security, see Fig-
ure16. The recent delays with the delivery of Airbus A380 have been attributed to serious safety
problems.

Various organisation and bodies share responsibility for safety in aviation. Firstly, manufacturers
should design safer aircraft, by developing and using safety-enhanced technologies and secondly

35
management of aircraft flight should include effective schemes for safety, maintenance and opera-
tions and provide the most efficient documentation, training and support.

The common function of aircraft manufacturer and aviation companies should be safety related
analysis and unconditional support of safety driven initiatives.

Aircraft
18 %

Environment Personnel
27.6 % 54.4 %

FIGURE 16 MAIN CAUSES OF AVIATION ACCIDENTS (SOURCE: WEENER E., BOEING)

In turn, operators should develop and follow a reliable operation policy, provide clear and safe pro-
cedures and publish and use training materials with aircraft details to make them available for pilots
and crew. They should also develop maintenance programmes and follow maintenance policy and
procedures, update maintenance publications, develop a safety programme and provide the re-
quired high quality training.

Finally, government bodies and ATC should develop efficient rules and regulations, develop and
modernise navigation facilities and maintain operations, inspect and modernise airport facilities and
unify and improve air traffic control services within each country and internationally. This under-
standing of aviation safety area is accepted in both the US and Europe. There is still much to be
done, as presented by E.Weener in 1998 (Weener E. , 1998):

“There are opportunities for preventing accidents in all segments of the air transport system. However, we
do not have an understanding of which segments offer the opportunities for greatest leverage.

Only by analysing accident/incident data and applying judgment about future trends can we determine
which actions will be most effective.”

36
 The first sentence of this statement implies that a general model of aircraft safety didn’t exist at that
time. The second sentence indicates that safety management will be based on after flight analysis. It
is also evident that the current practice of basing safety management schemes solely on sporadic
after flight analysis is doomed to failure, due to the current trends and commercial pressures al-
ready mentioned. So we need to analyse both of these aspects in order to improve flight safety.

Main Risk Agents and Their Contribution

A review of the published statistics, accordingly (US GAO (General Accounting Office),
GAO-01-916, “General Aviation Status of the Industry, Related Infrastructure, and Safety Issues”,
2001), between 1988-1997 the main risk makers were Loss of Control in flight, Control Flight in
Terrain (CFIT), Sabotage, Mechanical Malfunctions etc.

They include 618 fatalities were the cause was unknown (Figure 17). This shows that even when
the flight information exists it still isn't being used effected. Safety in CA and other segments of avi
ation could be improved by focusing on these risk areas.

2000
1827

1667 Worldwide Airline Fatalities

Classified by Type of Aircraft 1988 - 1997
1500

1180
Number of Fatalities

1000
820

Total fatalities g 7,966

618
506
500
372

238
203
134 127 121
91
58
4
0
Loss CFIT Sabo- Mech- Un- Mid- In- Fuel Misc. Ice/ Other Fuel Wind- Runway Loss of
of tage/ anical known air flight tank accident snow environ- starva- shear incursion ground
control hostile Malfunc- collision fire explosion mental tion control
in flight action* tion

Number of fatal
accidents
(158) 32 21 15 17 12 2 3 2 20 4 8 7 2 11 2

 Includes multiple non-onboard fatalities

 Single fatality, non-onboard accidents are excluded
Note : * Exceptions to statistical accident definition
CFIT = Controlled Flight Into Terrain
(except King Air runway incursion 1/18/90)

FIGURE 17 BOEING STATISTICS OF WORLD ACCIDENT FATALITIES (SOURCE: WEENER E., BOEING)

Many aviation accidents in the past have been attributable to the malfunction of hardware, e.g. sen-
sors, engines, aircraft body, etc.

37
This has been the result of an unexpected hardware fault. In most cases, though the root cause is
once more attributable to human factors (52% of all accidents) and more specifically the absence
of maintenance actions or the incorrect or inadequate maintenance.

Additionally to US safety analysis, recent 2003-05 European data of aircraft accidents and incidents
highlights the main categories of accidents and their reasons. A special column is introduced to
show potential for improving safety using Active System Control techniques onboard the aircraft.

Figure 18 provides an analysis and summary of some aviation accidents and incidents over a two
year period (source: German “Bundesamt für Unfalluntersuchung” - the Federal Office for accident
investigation), (http://www.bfu-web.de/berichte/index.htm).

The contents of the table indicate that if the Principle of Active System Control were applied to the
aircraft safety systems then the majority of accidents and incidents in European aviation could be
averted, and it offers an excellent opportunity and choice for further safety improvement.

38
Date Place Aircraft Damage Reason Prevention

wrong departure heading;

21-12- Socata TB-20
CZ – Brno Crash excessive demands on pilot when trying to Yes
02 Trinidad change the heading manually

17-12- D – Hahn Cessna 414A Crash after insufficient and mistakable communication
02 touching tree tops between cockpit crew and ATC
- insufficient meteorological and navigational Yes
preparations according to bad weather
conditions

03-12- D - Munich Airbus A300-600 Serious - software error Yes

02 malfunction of - insufficient maintenance works Yes
autopilot - lack in certification procedure of
EUROCAE

29-11- D – Dortmund Boeing B737-800 Tail touched - aircraft was operated with ineligible balance Yes
02 runway point position
divergences in the standards used

20-10- D Waldenburg- Christen Industries Crash aircraft overloaded Yes

02 Sailach Pitts S-2B overestimation of pilot’s capabilities N/A

16-10- D – Paderborn- Fairchild Dornier Serious incident coverage of yaw rudder torn Yes
02 Lippstadt DO 228-200 non-following to safety procedures Yes

29-09- CH – Basel Cessna C551 Ground contact - non-adherence to regulations by the crew N/A
02 before runway - bad weather conditions
- crew was not qualified to CAT III landings
- aircraft was not applicable for CAT III N/A
- no certification of airline for CAT III

01-07- D - Überlingen Boeing B757-200 / Collision during - wrong orders from ATC N/A
02 Tupolew TU 154M flight - cockpit crew followed the wrong orders of Yes
ATC instead of the advices of the TCAS

24-06- D – Stuttgart Cessna 172P / Collision on - insufficient communication between Cessna N/A
02 Boeing B717 ground and ATC concerning other traffic
- insufficient caution in both aircraft for the Yes
other traffic when taxiing to the runway
- non-adherence to standard procedures Yes

28-05- DK – Jordsans Cessna A 185 E Crash during - pilot did not pay attention to instruments Yes
02 Flak Skywagon water landing alert, that landing gear was still down

05-03- D – Dresden Aerospatiale ATR Aircraft destroys - cockpit crew mistook runway border
N/A
02 72-212 runway illumination for the runway center illumination
illumination

28-11- D – Aichach Beech Aircraft Crash - bad weather cond-s N/A

01 B95A - stall because of frosted wings Yes

08-10- I – Milano Cessna 524A / Collision on - bad weather cond-s CATIII N/A
01 McDonald MD 87 ground - airport apron correlating ICAO standards N/A
- inadvertent runway incursion by Cessna N/A
- ATC did not remark collision risk Yes

18-09- D – Obermehler H. K. Aircraft Techn. Crash - overestimation of pilots capabilities N/A

01 AG/Wega 100 - loss of aircraft control Yes

13-08- D – Stade Piper PA-28-161 Collision with - pilot didn’t notice contact wires Yes
01 a contact wire - reaction time too short Yes

05-08- DK – Narsarsuaq Dassault Falcon 20 Crash - CFIT accident Yes

01 (Greenland) - Flight crew was no aware of proximity to Yes
mountainous terrain
- Flight crew did not follow SOPs N/A
- GPWS was inoperative Yes
- Flight crew was exposed to peak fatigue Yes
- Absence of CRM N/A

FIGURE 18 POSSIBLE PREVENTION OF ACCIDENTS IF ASC WAS IMPLEMENTED

39
Risk Factors and Flight Phases

The lifecycle of flight can be split into five phases: taxi-out, climbing, in-flight, descent, taxi-in. These
phases are characterised as follows:

1. Taxi-out phase - taxiing from the respective parking position to the runway
2. Climbing phase - acceleration on the runway, taking off, ends at the flight cruise altitude
3. In-flight phase the flight at the cruise altitude, ends when aircraft starts descent
4. Descent phase includes descending and landing on the runway
5. Taxi-in phase the taxiing from the runway to the respective parking position

Fig 19 illustrates proposed classification of flight phases. Theoretically, the most risky phases of flight
are taking off and landing. Initially aircraft operates in two dimensions and on take off it operates in
three dimensions, when speed of an aircraft Va exceeds the take off threshold speed Vto : Va>Vto.

a. Taxi-out b. Climbing c. In-flight d. Descent e. Taxi-in

phase phase phase phase phase

FIGURE 19 TYPICAL FLIGHT PHASES

In turn, landing, transitioning from 3 dimensional movement to 2 dimensional, is even more danger-
ous as this phase requires much more precise speed control – the landing speed must be within
small window between recommended landing speed, for example 240 km/h for some CA: maxi-
mum allowed landing speed respectively:

Vlmin<Va<Vlmax,

The risk of each phase of flight is illustrated by statistics given below, in Figure 20.

40
 Taxi Takeoff Climb Cruise Descent Manoeuvre Approach Go Landing
or Hover Around

4.1% 19.6% 3.6% 14.9% 2.7% 14.8% 11.0% 2.0% 27.3%

Figure 3.5: Risk of each phase of flight

FIGURE 20 DISTRIBUTION OF AIRCRAFT ACCIDENTS BY FLIGHT PHASE (SOURCE NTSB, 2004)

Unfortunately, the statistics support the hypothesis that takeoff and landing are the most risky flight
phases, in spite of their relatively short duration in comparison with the other phases.

The crew, during takeoff and landing, must control the aircraft, change altitude and speed, communi-
cate with air traffic control (ATC) and/or other aircraft, and maintain separation from obstacles and
other aircraft.

Aircraft systems are also stressed during these phases due to simultaneous changes to engine pow-
er settings, the possible operation of retractable landing gear, flaps, slats, and spoilers, and changes in
cabin pressurisation.

Wind and weather conditions are also much more dangerous at low altitudes.

The landing related phases of flight have the largest percentage of total accidents: landing (27.3%),
manoeuvring (14.8%), approach (11%), descent and go-around all create danger (57.8%).

The statistics will obviously vary for different aircraft types due to different amount of time spent in
each phase and particular hazards associated with the aircraft and the type of operational use. Even
so the risk profile will be generally be similar to the data presented in the table in Figure 20.

Some risks are aircraft specific, for example with helicopters the most dangerous phase is manoeu-
vring during hover 36% and carrying external loads. In contrast, the largest percentage of accidents
involving single and multi-engine piston aircraft occurres during landing.

41
Risk and Safety in General Aviation
The risk and safety aspects of general aviation are similar to other aviation segments., although the
size of GA aircraft and their equipment and management schemes are different to CA. This section
defines specific safety features in GA.

Accident Statistics

The main risk agents in GA are the same as for the majority of aviation, though there are specific
features due to the nature and environment GA operations. The GA accident data used in this
analysis has been accumulated from US, Australia and UK sources, which includes the vast majority
of global GA applications.

US GA accidents

FAA data (United States GAO (General Accounting Office), GAO-01-916, “General Aviation Status
of the Industry, Related Infrastructure, and Safety Issues”, 2001) about accidents in GA (1996-2003)
shows no substantial improvement in safety and GA. At 1.36 accidents per 100.000 hours the rate
is certainly the “poor relative” in comparison with CA where number of accidents is estimated as
4.8 per million departures, see Figure 21. Human factors and performance dominate GA accident
statistics in US as the major cause. Of the 1,468 accidents which were human factors related in
2000 the most frequently cited cause/factor was aircraft handling and control (65.6%), followed by
planning and decision-making (41.1%) and use of aircraft equipment (12.2%). Issues related to per-
sonnel qualification were cited in almost half of the 209 accidents with underlying explanatory fac-
tors related to human performance. Examples of qualification issues that were cited in the year
2000 accident records include lack of total experience, lack of recent experience, and inadequate
training.

Year Total Fatal Fatalities Hours Accident Fatal

Accidents Accidents Flown Rate Accident Rate
(per 100,000 (per 100,000
flight hours) flight hours)

2003 1,732 351 626 25,800,000 6.71 1.36

2002 1,713 345 581 25,545,000 6.71 1.35
2001 1,726 325 562 25,431,000 6.79 1.28
2000 1,837 345 596 27,838,000 6.60 1.24
1999 1,905 340 619 29,246,000 6.51 1.16
1998 1,904 364 624 25,518,000 7.46 1.43
1997 1,845 350 631 25,591,000 7.21 1.37
1996 1,908 361 636 24,881,000 7.67 1.45
Figure 3.6: USA General Aviation Accident Statistics
FIGURE 21 US GA ACCIDENTS, FATALITIES AND RATES TILL 2003 (SOURCE: FAA GAO-01-916)

42
The annual review of US GA accident data, compiled by the NTSB, highlights the following:

- The fatal accident rate in the US for personal flying remained the highest of all general aviation
categories (for the year 2000), with 1.61 fatal accidents per 100,000 hours flown.
- In contrast, the corresponding fatal accident rate for instructional flights was 0.63 fatal accidents
per 100,000 hours. Instructional flights include an experienced pilot, the instructor, in addition to
the student
- GA accidents in the US in 2000, for which pilot total flight experience data are available, 46.6%
involved pilots with a total flight time of 1,000 hours or less. The largest percentage of accident
pilots in this group had 200 hours or less of total flight time
- Of the 1,527 accidents in 2000, 82.4% involved pilots with 1,000 hours or less of time in the ac-
cident aircraft make and model, or less
- Most accident pilots in this group (68.2%) had less than 200 hours of total flight time in the acci-
dent aircraft type
- Night-time fatal accidents were more than two and-a-half times more likely than daylight ones
- Weather-related accidents and accidents at night are more likely to involve disorientation, loss of
control, and/or collision with objects or terrain that result in higher levels of injury.

Australian GA accidents

Comprehensive statistics on GA accident and fatality rates were obtained from the Australian
Transport Safety Bureau (Fig 22 and 23) (ATSB (Australian Transport Safety Bureau) Website,
2005).

Accident rate
1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
(per 100,000 hours)

GA Charter 8.26 9.09 11.10 11.47 8.96 7.03 10.07 8.24 4.13 5.33
GA Agricultural 22.69 31.24 24.50 18.41 28.10 26.28 24.83 23.73 17.83 18.03
GA Flying Training 6.54 5.85 8.13 6.32 8.25 5.77 8.35 4.96 7.04 9.59
GA Other Aerial Work 12.07 12.12 12.23 8.75 6.13 9.23 10.80 5.32 5.74 9.85
GA Private/Business 27.24 24.01 24.34 18.77 20.31 18.56 16.60 21.18 16.43 21.4

Total 14.81 14.11 15.02 12.07 12.26 11.28 12.45 11.08 9.01 11.67

FIGURE 22 AUSTRALIAN GA ACCIDENTS 1991-2000 (SOURCE: ATSB, 2004)

Clearly GA private, business and agricultural operations give rise to the highest rate of accidents
and fatalities. The accident rate of GA in Australia is almost double that of GA in the States where-
as the fatal accident rate is nearly the same (per 100,000 flight hours). This may be due to different
use, traffic density and terrain in the two countries.

43
 Fatal Accident Rate
1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
(per 100,000 hours)

GA Charter 0.52 0.49 1.01 1.40 0.64 1.24 0.82 0.40 0.59 0.62
GA Agricultural 0.91 3.36 1.02 4.60 1.94 3.19 3.65 1.36 0.00 2.58
GA Flying Training 0.65 0.23 0.00 0.47 0.23 0.00 0.00 0.21 0.22 0.00
GA Other Aerial Work 0.34 0.38 1.05 1.30 1.29 1.37 0.32 0.63 0.31 0.73
GA Private/Business 2.78 3.89 2.91 1.96 2.71 2.01 1.57 3.72 3.70 2.17

Total 1.20 1.51 1.29 1.47 1.25 1.28 0.92 1.22 1.13 1.00

FIGURE 23 AUSTRALIAN GA FATALITIES 1991-2000 (SOURCE: ATSB, 2004)

Analysis of this statistics shows the following:

- Of all types of use for GA aircraft, GA private/business and agricultural operations give rise to
the highest rate of accidents and fatalities
- The accident rate of GA in Australia is almost double that of GA in the United States whereas
the fatal accident rate is nearly the same (per 100,000 hours of flight)

UK GA accidents

Similarly to NTSB US, UK Civil Aviation Authority (CAA) provides a substantial analysis of accident
statistics in GA. The difference here is that in the UK the CAA investigates GA accidents aiming to
classify the most dangerous types and accident causes and addresses them as a priority.

The data below covers period 1985-1994. UK CAA highlights four types of GA accidents: Control
flight in terrain (CFIT), Loss of control in Visual Meteorological Conditions (LOC VMC), Low flying/
aerobatics (LOW/AERO) and Loss of control in Instrument Meteorological Conditions (LOC IMC).
The total share of these four types of exceeds 67.5% of all GA accidents over the specified period
in the UK as shown below in Figure 24:

44
 Unknown
5% CFIT
21 %
Other
9%
Propeller
3%
Performance
3%
Mid Air LOC VMC
4% 20 %
Technical
8%
LOC IMC LOC / AERO
8% 19 %

Figure
FIGURE 3.9:
24 UK GA UK GA
ACCIDENT accident
TYPES types
1985-1994, 2000 1985-1994
(SOURCE: CAA, 1997)

Loss of control was the predominant factor as this occurred in several of the types of accident, e.g.
loss of control in Visual Meteorological Conditions, Instrument Meteorological Conditions and in
aerobatics/low flying accidents. Other causal factors of fatal accidents include:

- Illegality: in 21% of fatal general aviation accidents, the factor ‘Illegal’ was identified. In many cases
the circumstances suggested that pilots were knowingly breaking the law. Education is likely to
be more effective than further legislation or stricter enforcement.
- Poor Clarity/Availability of Information: For a flight to be legally and safely conducted, article
38(a) of the Air Navigation Order (ANO) of the UK requires the commander to take into ac-
count the latest information on the route, aerodromes, weather etc. Lack of the appropriate
information was a factor in a number of accidents. Although the availability of weather informa-
tion is much improved, Notices to Airmen (NOTAMs) are frequently criticised by GA pilots on
grounds of availability, level of clarity and presentation. A pilot needs to be able to readily find in
the NOTAMs relevant information for his flight.
- Human Factors: the majority of causal factors had a Human Factors element either in terms of
pilot or maintenance actions.

Regarding flight phases accident statistics UK 1994-1996 (UK CAA, Safety Regulation Group, “CAP
673 - Aviation Safety Review”, 1997), (UK CAA, Safety Regulation Group, “CAP 667 - Review of
General Aviation Fatal Accidents 1985-1994”, 1997) and similar CAA/NTSB data and show that
vast majority of GA accidents occurred during the landing phase ~53% while the most fatal acci-
dents (64%) were related to the initial climb and cruise phases (Fig 25).

45
 350

295
300 Reportable
Fatal
Number of Accidents

250

200

150

100
73
53
50 33 37
27
7 8 4 1 17 5 2 4 3 10 1 6 3 2
0
Parked Taxi Take - Initial Climb Cruise Descent Approach Landing Circuit Aerobat Unknown
off Climb / flight / other

Flight Phase

FIGURE 25 UK GA FATAL ACCIDENTS PER FLIGHT PHASE 1994-1996 (SOURCE: CAA, 1997)

Among other fatal general aviation accidents the most frequently cited reason is weather. GA air-
craft are much more affected by weather, e.g. when conditions reduce or block visibility. These con-
ditions are usually called: “low ceiling,” “fog,” and “cloud.” Accidents under conditions of low visibility
typically involve either loss of aircraft control and/or collision with obstacles or terrain, both of
which are likely to result in severe injuries, fatalities and aircraft damage.

46
Flight Risk Analysis
[Reason] must approach nature in order to be taught by it. It must not, however, do so in the character of a pupil
who listens to everything that the teacher chooses to say, but of an appointed judge who compels the witnesses to
answer questions, which he has himself formulated. (Bxiii) Kant Critique of Pure Reason

Accident investigators and safety researchers try to determine the causes of accidents. There is a
common understanding that the vast majority of accidents and incidents are caused by a sequence
of causal events rather than being just the result of random events. In the literature and corporate
research the most widely used technique to capture the causal links is called fault tree analysis. The
most comprehensive forum in this area is Annual International System Safety Conference (ISSSC).

The majority of aviation accidents including GA sector usually are associated with flight phases. By
following the structure of the fault tree an analyst can investigate possible sequences of events with
the objective of improving safety for similar aircraft. Knowing profile of risk occurrence makes it
possible to concentrate on accidents/sequences of events of a particular type.

Boeing studies of accidents of transporter aircraft (Weener E. , 1998), found that most accidents
result from a sequence of events rather than a single catastrophic event. Research identified as
many as 20 events in a single flight that directly influenced the flight and culminated in an accident.

NTSB uses a similar method to break down each accident into “occurrences.”(NTSB (National
Transportation Safety Board), 2000). The objective is to prevent future accidents by learning from
the past.

First Occurrences and Sequence of Events

An accident’s first occurrence and the phase of flight during that occurrence indicates how and
when an accident starts. An accident can also be viewed as a chain of all the relevant accident oc-
currences cited in the order in which they happen. Accident events might include a combination of
multiple occurrences, with many possible combinations. From available data in 1,822 GA accidents
that occurred during 2000 in the US, 407 unique combinations of accident occurrences were cited.

NTSB accident reports document the circumstances of an accident as “accident occurrences” and
the “sequence of events.” Occurrence data can be defined as what happened during the accident.
A total of 54 occurrence codes are available for NTSB reports to describe the events for any given
accident. Because aviation accidents are rarely limited to a single occurrence, each occurrence is
coded as part of a sequence, with as many as five different occurrence codes in one accident. For
accidents that involve more than one aircraft, the list of occurrences may be different for each air-
craft.

47
Occurrence data do not include specific information about why an accident may have happened.
Among the eight major categories of first occurrences, the largest percentage of accidents (26.4%)
included occurrences related to aircraft power.

Among the individual occurrences, the most common involved a loss of control either in flight
(14.4%) or on the ground (12.3%). Although occurrences involving loss of aircraft control on the
ground resulted in only 1 fatal accident in year 2000, loss-of- control occurrences in flight resulted
in a total of 110 fatal accidents - nearly one-third of all fatal accidents and more than twice that of
any other single occurrence.

Figure 26 displays the percentage of accident aircraft in each phase of flight at the time of first oc-
currence, as per the NTSB records for the year 2000 in the US. The phase of flight can be defined
as when, during the operation of the aircraft, the first occurrence took place. The upper set of
numbers in the figure represent the percentage of all accidents that occurred in each phase, and
the numbers in parentheses indicate the percentage of all accidents that were fatal.

The landing phase has the largest percentage of total accident first occurrences (27.3%) but only
2.9% of fatal accident first occurrences. The largest percentage of fatal accident first occurrences
(33.4%) occurred during the manoeuvring phase of flight, but only 14.8% of all accident first occur-
rences occurred during this phase. Accidents that occur during cruise and manoeuvring are more
likely to result in higher levels of injury and aircraft damage due to the higher speeds and altitudes
associated with these phases of flight.

Standing / Takeoff Climb Cruise Descent Maneuver Approach Go- Landing

Taxi / Other / Hover Around

4.1 % 19.6% 3.6% 14.9% 2.7% 14.8% 11.0% 2.0% 27.3%

(0.6%) (15.6%) (6.1%) (22.3%) (3.8%) (33.4%) (14.3%) (1.0%) (2.9%)

FIGURE 26. FIRST OCCURRENCE AND FLIGHT PHASE ACCIDENT STATISTICS

48
Causes and Factors of Accidents

In addition to coding accident occurrences in the US, the NTSB makes a determination of probable
cause. The objective of the probable cause statement is to define the cause and effect relationships
in the accident sequence. The probable cause could be described as a determination of why the
accident happened. In determining probable cause, the NTSB considers the facts, conditions, and
circumstances of the event.

Within each accident occurrence, any information that helps explain why that event happened is
identified as a “finding” and may be further designated as either a “cause” or “factor.” The term “fac-
tor” is used to describe situations or circumstances that contributed to the accident cause.

The details of probable cause are coded as the combination of all causes, factors, and findings asso-
ciated with the accident. Just as accidents often include a series of events, the reason why those
events led to an accident reflects a combination of multiple causes and factors.

An accident sequence might begin with an explosion in the engine compartment of a single-engine
aircraft due to, say, a fuel leak. Because of the explosion, the aircraft engine might experience a
complete mechanical failure and the pilot made a forced landing. In these circumstances the pilot
may not be able to control the aircraft and so impact with trees during landing. The fuel leak and
resulting explosion might be cited as causes in the findings of this accident.

Smoke in the cabin, and the pilot’s resulting reduced visibility, might also be cited as factors. An oil
leak, oil exhaustion, engine bearing over- temperature, fractured connecting rod, and fractured
crankcase were all also cited in the findings but were not assigned as causes or factors. Reasons
and their sequence are usually analysed and documented using fault trees analysis.

To simplify the presentation of probable cause information in most cases, the hundreds of unique
codes used by investigators to identify the probable cause are grouped into broad cause/factor cat-
egories.

This broad cause/factor classification provides an overview of fundamental accident origins by divid-
ing all accident causes and factors into three groups: aircraft, environment, and personnel. Personnel-
related causes or factors were cited in 89% of the 1,758 general aviation accident reports for 2000
in the US, for which cause/factor data were available.

Environmental causes/ factors were cited in 45% of these accident reports, and aircraft related
causes/factors were cited in 29%. In year 2000, only 74 of 792 environmental citations (9.3% of all
environmental causes/ factors) were listed. For example, rough terrain might be cited as a con-
tributing factor, but not a cause, to explain why an aircraft was damaged during a forced landing due

49
to engine failure. In that case, the origin(s) of the engine failure would be cited as “cause,” but the
terrain would be cited as a factor because it contributed to the accident outcome.

A further common cause or factor of GA accidents is the weather. Because general aviation aircraft
are smaller, slower, and limited in maximum altitude and range than CA aircraft, they can be more
vulnerable than larger aircraft to hazards posed by weather.

Smaller aircraft are affected to a greater degree by adverse wind conditions, and precipitation, icing,
and convective weather have a greater effect on aircraft that lack the speed, altitude, and/or range
capabilities to avoid those conditions.

Weather conditions cited most often as a cause or factor in general aviation accidents are related
to winds, including “crosswind,” “gusts,” and “tailwind.” Of the top five environmental causes/factors
cited in general aviation accidents in year 2000 in the US, three were related to wind. The effects of
wind during take-offs and landings are the most severe for GA.

Conclusion for Flight Risk Analysis

Statistics of accidents show that existing risk analysis is based on after-flight procedures and data
processing. So a number of conclusions can be drawn:

- The main techniques used to determine possible causes of an accident are fault tree analysis and
the analysis of the sequence of events/factors leading up to the accident
- Unfortunately the approaches to safety management and above mentioned techniques are con-
servative in nature and do not lead to any immediate improvement of flight safety. These rather
conservative approaches are derivatives from existing safety environment and management ap-
proaches which are based on more static, rather than dynamic, ways to improve safety.
- A new approach for safety management and model of accident analysis/prevention is required
which takes account of the varying risks during the phases of flight and dynamically adapts the
safety strategy accordingly.

50
Where we are in the book

Within our plan of clarification what is active control and its place in aviation figure below might be
useful. This chapter did cover two areas of the whole context ( surrounded by red lines). The prob-
lems of safety, efficiency as well as ecology include of aviation includes the same models (probabilis-
tic, fault-tree analysis, Markov processes) and supportive tools and required activities (training) and
might go down to manufacturing, maintenance and utilisation of aircrafts. Further brief analysis of
reliability of functioning we have started in the chapter might be extended in the next chapter with
reasoning why active control (yellow box) has no alternatives.

active system control

area
market

state of the art problems types features

aircraft system properties

safety efficiency ecology
classification
Reliability models NRT RT tbc…
exploitation

manufacturing maintenance utilisation

Probability FTA MP Active Control Training Tools Devices

Simulators Flight control system Flight recorders External systems

51