SECURITY ISSUES IN SOUTH ASIA Stephen P. Cohen* SOME OBSERVERS MICHT be inclined to regard any exami- nation of the security of South Asia as a study in irrelevancy. India, Pak- istan, and Bangladesh are states which face the most difficult problems of population growth, economic development, and political stability. Such states cannot “afford” the diversion of their precious resources for war and weap- ons, This argument has been forcefully presented in many Western reactions to India’s recent nuclear detonation. Significantly, this is not a serious issue in South Asia itself. In neither Pakistan nor India is there a substantial body of public opinion opposed to increased arms spending, and in Bangladesh the independence movement was in part stimulated by a feeling that East Pakistani defenses were being neglected by West Pakistani leadership. With very few exceptions South Asians accept their present levels of arms spending as necessary. The nu- clear explosion program in India was a domestic political triumph, and Pakistan's response has merely been to threaten emulation. There is thus a difference in perspective between regional elites and outside observers, espe- cially those in the West, about the necessity of national security. That this difference is not recent, but rooted in the very origins of India and Pakistan, is made evident by even a cursory examination of the history oi strategic thought on the subcontinent. ‘The fact that the Indian and Pakistani military establishments shared a common beginning in the old British Indian Army led many outsiders— both before and after partition—to view the two states as logical members of a regional security arrangement. However, plans for a unified regional defense also underestimated the ambitions of Indian and Pakistani officers. *A revision of a paper read to the XXVI Annual Meeting of the Association of Asian Studies, Boston, Massachusetts, April 1-3, 1974. 1K. Subrahmanyam, an influential Indian defense analyist, has even argued that India’s defense spending is comparatively modest in scope and has not had a deleterious effect upon development. For a full exposition of this view see his Defense and Develop- ment (Calcutta: Minerva Press, 1973). 202STEPHEN P. COHEN 208 ‘Their eagerness to take command over their respective armies was not due to Bonapartist ambitions but was simply a manifestation of their profession- al confidence and pride.* This had been instilled by the British and refined and purified in World War II, These Indian and Pakistani officers owed allegiance to craft and profession, and were quick to apprise their new mas- ters of their own expectations. Thus, early efforts at joint security arrange- ments came to nothing and the British were gradually phased out of senior command positions, removing the last link between the Indian and Pakistani armies. From that point on, defense questions have remained at or near the focus of attention for the two governments. The level of their weapons has steadily increased as have their external military ties and the frequency and magnitude of armed conflict, culminating in the partial dismemberment of Pakistan in 1971. It is our contention that the present military balance is not entirely a function of political conflict, and that outside disparagement of regional arms spending is likely to be ineffective if not counter-productive. The mili- tarization of relations in South Asia has itself introduced a self-perpetuating factor. This paper will explore three permutations of that factor. These are: (1) the use of the military, for both internal and external purposes; (2) attitudes of the military, especially the officer corps; and (3) civilian atti- tudes towards the military. We will thus be examining the strategic and tactical dynamics associated with the various functions performed by the military, the view held by the military of the present situation, and civilian management of military and security affairs. Uses of the Military in South Asia While armies everywhere perform a surprisingly wide variety of roles or tasks, two such roles are of special importance in South Asia.? These are internal security and external combat, As we shall note below even these roles can be blurred and confused at times, but they do provide convenient categories for analysis, Internal Security: “There isa substantial internal security capacity with- in the military of South Asia. This capacity is most important in connection with the maintenance of various political establishments, but it has had an impact on the military itself, and there has always been a certain ambiguity between internal and external security tasks. ‘The most important historical task of the old Indian Army (and its suc- cessors) has been to deter or suppress civic disorder and regional sepa- ratism. This is no small task in a subcontinent characterized by extreme ethnic, religious, and cultural heterogeneity. This internal security function *For a full discussion see Stephen P. Cohen, The Indian Army (Berkeley: Univer- sity of Californie Press, 1971), pp. 114 ff. "Thave discussed a wider variety of such roles in Arms and Politics in Bengladesh, India, and Pakistan (Buffalo: Council on International Studies, Special Study No. 49, 1973). For a similar theoretical framework see Paul Y. Hammond, “The Cross-National Comparison of Force Postures,” in Frank B, Horton Til, et al. (eds.), Comparative De- fense Policy (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1974), pp. 298-309.204 SECURITY ISSUES IN SOUTH ASIA has been a precondition for the establishment and maintenance of nation- states in the region as well as the conduct of “normal” inter-state relations, including warfare. Despite the integrative role of the Congress Party, Awami League, and Pakistan People’s Party, or the much-vaunted civil services, South Asia would look quite different today than it does were it not for the capacity of central governments to coerce and enforce. The British correctly worried about the disintegration of the subcontinent—but they underesti- mated the capacity of Indians and Pakistanis to operate the state security mechanism. Some of those who did not underestimate this capacity had an- other fear: that the martial Punjabis would terrorize and dominate the rest of the subcontinent—a prediction that was partially and tragically accurate. ¢ military’s internal security function tends to become confused with local, parochial police tasks, on the one hand, and international conflict, on the other. As for the former, despite the creation of various armed police and paramilitary units, the regular armies of India, Pakistan and Bangladesh are increasingly being pressed into service to suppress civil disorder. For the latter, South Asian governments have not been reluctant to claim ex- ternal involvement and provocation when confronted with severe law and order problems. Internal and external security considerations are almost indistinguishable in disputes with Nagas, Mizos, and Baluchis, and over- lapped in the Bangladesh rebellion. Conversely, regional governments have been capable of ignoring external involvement in internal disorder when it was politically expedient to do so. External Military Relations: It is not quite accurate to characterize all of the hostile military relationships in South Asia as purely conflictual. Most of them—whether between equals or unequals—contain a remarkably high admixture of cooperation as well as conflict. The most durable of these relationships, of course, remains the Indo- Pakistan dispute—something more than a “communal conflict with armor,” but something less than perpetual warfare. The strategic balance between the two countries is weighed even more in India’s favor than before 1971, but not to the point where India maintains overwhelming predominance and war is unlikely.* Even without external assistance (but assuming political unity), Pakistan could impede and hamper an Indian invasion into a populated area. With such external assistance Pakistan can stil] defend much of her territory, and perhaps engage in limited pre-emptive or politically motivated strikes into Indian (or disputed) territory. In brief, it can still raise the cost of an Indian conquest of at least the Pakistani plains to unacceptable levels. The loss of East Pakistan was if anything a strategic gain for the remainder of Pakistan, and may have been a financial benefit as well. There had long been a de facto neutralization of that area (basically indefensible, anyway) except for reciprocal forays of terrorists and guerillas, and its loss has simplified strategic planning in Pakistan. ‘While the International Institute of _Ststogis Studien’ Saree on ont generally thought to be reliable they been challenged in some parti s. See Gea. D. K. Fait, “About Miltary Build-upe,” Overseas Hindustan Times, October 1973.STEPHEN P. COHEN 205 Pakistan, long held in the grip of a garrison state mentality (although lacking garrison-state resources or discipline), has always tried to interna- tionalize its conflict with India, and has done so with some success. With very little to offer except hostility to India, it has managed to persuade both superpowers, China, and a number of European and Islamic states to pro- vide enough weapons and diplomatic cover for the defense of the Punjabi heartland. Neither these weapons nor Pakistan's own utilization of them have been sufficient to wrest Kashmir from the Indians or to present a cred- ible threat to Indian territory or urban concentrations, and at the same time protect Pakistan’s own vital areas. There are signs that the situation is being recognized for what it is—a stalemate—on both sides of the Indo-Pak border. The other great conflict relationship in the subcontinent—the simmer- ing but potent dispute between India and China—also contains within it elements of cooperation. In part because the disputed territory is intrinsi- cally worthless (although with magnificent scenery), it has been easy for both sides to arrange informal lines of demarcation, pull back their front line forces and establish a no-man’s land. Additionally, force levels have heen substantially reduced, especially by the Chinese, who demonstrated considerable prudence during both 1965 and 1971 in not taking advantage of Indian preoccupation with the Pakistanis. Each side has had an interest in maintaining troops in the Himalayas for quite specific purposes: the In- dians to pacify domestic opinion and external patrons, the Chinese to em- ize that they intend to retain territory on which they have a strong claim (and the point is not lost on other nations with border conflicts with the PRC). Thus, the conflict retains some utility for both sides, and will con- tinue to do so as long as the Soviet Union finds in the Indian position a suitable counterpoint to its own hostile relationship with the PRC. It is, almost, a conflict of convenience. However, the India-China conflict also bears. the seeds of a calamitous nuclear holocaust. Many Indians claim to be unconvinced by the PRC's professions of “no first use’ of nuclear weapons. They do so for two rea- sons: some do not trust the Chinese, and some regard the Chinese threat as the key with which they can set free the Indian nuclear genie. The latter group, which is not necessarily synonymous with the former, see an Indian nuclear capacity as essential in dealing with the superpowers as much as with China or Pakistan. In short, they seek to emulate the Chinese nuclear program in order to fulfill an Indian national destiny. At some point in the future, the Indians may trade in their tacit (or secretly explicit?) Soviet nuclear umbrella for a home-made version if the costs of the Soviet relation- ship become too great. The period between a policy decision to create a nuclear military ca- ‘There were occasional border incidents through the mid-1960s, but these have diminished in recent years. “There is now a vast Indian literature on the “bom! G. Mirchandari, India’s Nuclear Dilemma (New Delhi’ ” For a useful overview see C. Popular Book Services, 1968).206 © SECURITY ISSUES IN SOUTH ASIA pacity and the date on which India achieves a credible deterrent against the Chinese is likely to be very unstable. India will continue to require ex- ternal guarantees of its security, tacit or explicit, but the degree to which it ‘obtains such guarantees makes it politically and even militarily vulnerable ‘to a Chinese probe serious enough to shake the Indians but not serious ‘enough to trigger outside intervention. And there is the possibility that India itself might provoke a conflict with the Chinese, especially if it could be limited to unpopulated areas. For these reasons (and for others), an Indian nuclear program—if it emerges—might initially encompass only air-deliverable “tactical” weapons coupled to existent conventional aircraft, Such a system would satisfy do- mestic pressures for nuclear weapons and would not be provocative to China. It would also provide some defense against seaborne intervention or island bases such as Diego Garcia, and would thus serve some defensive but still unprovocative function vis a vis the superpowers. If the two conflict relationships described above have trace elements of ambiguity, then other subcontinental relationships are permeated with it. These are the military ties between the stronger and the weaker states of the region (weaker states being defined here as those states which cannot or may not be able to manage their own internal security, let alone intervene across their borders). South Asia has a liberal supply of such states: Nepal, Bangladesh, Burma, Sri Lanka, and, potentially, Pakistan. The ambiguity and tenseness of the relationship between these states and the larger regional powers is even greater than between the latter and the superpowers. The former is complicated by ethnic spillover, historical patterns of cultural dominance and dependence and exploitation. Furthermore, some of these states have the misfortune of being located on or in territory of significant importance to one or more of the regional great powers, or are geographi- cally accessible to several outside powers. Their leadership is forced to play the classic balancing game, hoping that the larger powers of the region will somehow neutralize each other. Yet their weakness draws outside interest like a magnet and often their choice of who to ask to cooperate (or inter- vene) is just about their only choice if they are to retain power. This can be a powerful tool when properly exploited. Used one way it can involve so many outside powers in a security crisis that they really do cancel each other out quite effectively (Sri Lanka in 1971) ; used another way, it can provide a deterrent to domestic opposition forces whose activi- ties might trigger an overwhelming external intervention (Nepal, Baluchi tribesmen, and possibly Bangladesh in the future). Military “assistance” from stronger to weaker states in South Asia can assume a variety of forms. There are two particularly important variables, the magnitude of assistance and the degree to which recipient regimes vol- untarily request such assistance. These yield four common forms of inter- state military involvement: limited, voluntary assistance (police coopera- tion); massive, voluntary assistance (former alliances, such as between India and Bangladesh) ; limited involuntary involvement (border incidents,STEPHEN P. COHEN 207 skirmishes, and guerilla raids) ; and massive involuntary penetration (war and occupation). ‘These are ideal-types and there are numerous combinations and varia- tions. For example, recent Iranian operations with Pakistani forces seemed to have had one eye on cooperation with the Pakistani government but an- other on its possible collapse. The Indian-Bangladesh relationship is even more ambiguous: Indian would prefer an independent and militarily secure Bangladesh, but it would also prefer direct Indian control to a situation of extreme anarchy and disorder and potential intervention from another source. In all such cases—not just Bangladesh—disorder and chaos may result in extra-regional meddling, or have a profound importance upon one’s own domestic stability. Here India has a special interest in stable, status quo governments on its periphery, even in Pakistan. This situation might seem to be unduly hazardous for the smaller and weaker states of South Asia. However, rapprochement—especially between India and China—might lead to the effective exclusion of outside powers. This, in turn, would also mean the creation of spheres of influence and the subsequent legitimation of intervention, invited or uninvited.” Note should be made of military relationships which involve extra- regional powers, especially the superpowers. For the latter, South Asia is and will remain an area of peripheral interest, and military policy will large- ly be a function of security requirements elsewhere. For the U.S. this means the Persian Gulf area and the Middle East,* for the Soviet Union it means China. Each has been consistently willing to sacrifice local political inter- ests for security gains vis a vis other regions. ‘The latest product of this attitude is the gradual militarization of the Indian Ocean.” Ironically, that may have the effect of creating Soviet and American “interests” in a region where few existed before. As we have argued above, Soviet concerns will probably be dominated by the need to keep India in an anti-Chinese alignment, a task which may prove to be in- creasingly difficult as India’s military self-sufficiency grows, American terests in the subcontinent—aside from those linked to the Middle East— are more complex and uncertain. For some in the U.S. the prime consideration has been and will be the apparent alignment of India with the U.S.S.R., as demonstrated by the Indo- "China has strongly protested the recent incorporation of ‘Sikkim into the Indian aad as an “associate state” but at apparently will do nothing about oh reearding Indian's geression” as “lifting a rock only to drop it on one’s own feet. Indians, they contlose, will be “sternly punished by history.” Jen-Min Jik-pao, Gcunbe 3, 1974. "In the hierarchy of American interests—at least as now perceived by Washington Fg Asia is foe marginal, probably ranking somewhere below Latin America but so far) al *A useful survey can be found in Alvin J. Cottrell and R. M. Burrell (eds.), The Indian Ocean: Its Political, Economic, and Military Importance (New York: Praeger, 1972). Perhaps of greater pertinence, given the developments in the Middle East since 1973, are the Hearings on the Poentel Epacie Expansion of US. Military Facilities in the In- dian’ Ocean, Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives (March 6, 12, 14, 20, 1974).208 SECURITY ISSUES IN SOUTH ASIA Soviet Treaty of 1971. But for those more closely attuned to developments in the subcontinent the real alternative lies elsewhere: to encourage India ‘to develop a substantial internal military capacity to permit it to be inde- pendent, and thus to balance out both China and the U.S.S.R. This runs the risk of encouraging nuclear proliferation, which would probably be a neces- sary correlate to great-power status. And, of course, it means giving up on any hope of retaining a balance of power in South Asia (and Pakistan may still be able to secure enough non-U.S. support to make the region highly unstable for many years). The situation is a good illustration of the contra- dictions between one of the major objectives of the Nixon Doctrine—en- couraging local power centers in the hope that a stable security balance can be created—and U.S. interests in restricting nuclear proliferation. Attitudes of South Asian Military Elites We have discussed security and defense problems of South Asia with. out reference to the indi i for their execution: the military. Their attitudes are in part shaped by policy and in part have an important effect on policy; both effects are worth noting. '? Internat Security: “Aid to the civil,” or the maintenance of internal se. curity. is one of the most despised tasks that the military of South Asia can be called on to perform (it is not quite the most despised in India; civic action is disliked even more there, for unlike aid to the civil i regarded as a legitimate military activity). Internal security raises a host of problems for the professional sold while not particularly dangerous it takes time away from training for conventional war, it may unnecessarily tempt or corrupt, and it may seriously erode the status and popularity of the military among the population being restrained (for this reason jt is com- mon practice to use soldiers from one region or ethnic group to restore order among a population from a different group, thus cushioning the po- litical impact on the rank and file). Despite their dislike for the task, South Asian soldiers recognize its in- evitability and necessity. Internal security responsibilities have been thrust upon them for over two hundred years, and are, if anything, increasing. Attempts have been made to limit aid to the civil operations by the creation of numerous paramilitary police organizations, but the military tend to be- lieve that the nature of South Asian society is such that they will never be entirely rid of these responsibilities. Such operations can have broader political implications, One of the most important motivations behind the original coup in Pakistan was the military's judzment that civilian leaders were so incompetent that they would Periodically plunge all or part of Pakistan into domestic chaos. Not only did For an expanded presentation see my: “Military Ideology: South Asia,” in Frank B. Hotton, op. cét. pp. 73-87, and the professiona] journals of two South Asjan military swtablishments, the Pakistan Army Journal and the United Services Institution of India fonarnsSTEPHEN P. COHEN 209 the military resent being called out of the barracks to make Pakistan safe for the politicians, they feared a growing identification with them. Addi- tionally and perhaps crucially, they felt that aid to the civil operations were eroding their own professionalism and capabilities for conventional war with India. Conventional War: The military of South Asia approach conventional war with conventional zeal. They aze truly professional in their interest in and devotion to the military arts, and this applies to soldiers drawn from the less “martial” regions of the subcontinent as well as the ever-militant Pun- jabis. As do most professionals they tend to view war as inevitable—if not likely—and given the bloody history of the subcontinent since 1947, one cannot say that they exaggerate. However, there are elements of corporate self-interest and pride in this judgment, with special variations in the armies of India, Pakistan, and Bangladesh. The Pakistani military lived for years under the shadow of one of the most durable myths of the subcontinent, that of the martial races. They were to be the very embodiment of the martial Muslim, the legates of the great Islamic empires. One Muslim was variously estimated as worth five to ten Hindus, a ratio which was only recently revised downward to, perhaps, two to one. When reality intruded upon this fantasy it was easy to find scapegoats or excuses. Foreign patrons failed to provide timely assistance or up-to-date technology ; or politicians were too willing to settle for a compro- mise; or—most recently—elements of the population were untrustworthy, ‘The depth of self-deception within Pakistan is best measured by the anguish which accompanied the self-appraisal after the 1971 debacle, in which alt of the old racial and martial cliches were at last subject to a modicum of scrutiny, Although the evidence is not conclusive, one would expect that the Pakistani military is reconciled to an essentially defensive strategy vis a vis India, Lacking a domestic arms industry or an unimpeded supply of modern weapons, and with the terrible example of East Pakistan still fresh, this would seem to be an optimum strategy. Because of their own heterogeneous composition, the Indian military have not been trapped by the martial races myth. Indian officers tend to have a reasonably objective appraisal of their actual and potential external en- emies; they are acutely aware of their own weaknesses, especially in new, sophisticated military technologies, and if anything have been cautious in their advice to civilian superiors.!? It is doubiful that their attitudes towards ‘In the period following the Chinese nuclear detonation in 1964, the military were ‘conspicuous by their absence from the national debate. It ‘s very likely that they put no nure upon the government to develop an Indian nuclear capability until, perhaps, it jecame clear that the government was intent on doing so for teasons of its Own. From the military point of view an Indian nuclear weapons system would be institutionally disruptive. Who would control its use? Against which targeis would it be employed? How great an effect would such a weapon have on the organization of conventional air, ground, and sea units? Indeed, for services which are in part rooted in 19th century ‘organizational forms and relatively unsophisticated military technologies, the presence of nuclear weapons might prove to be quite unsettling, and, on balance, not worth the effort of their development,210 SECURITY ISSUES IN SOUTH ASIA Pakistan are any more hostile or aggressive than those of Indian civilians, and in fact may be more sympathetic. This is probably not the case vis a vis China. Although the “stain” of the 1965 standstill has been removed by the conquest of 1971, that of 1962 still remains.'? There is not a little feeling of desire for revenge among many Indian officers, although this is certainly tempered by a fear of unorthodox Chinese tactics coupled with a substantial Chinese nuclear capability. Clearly, revenge is impossible unless either China begins to come apart at the edges, an Indian (or Soviet?) nuclear umbrella is acquired, or a Sino-Soviet conflict erupts, and the Chinese leave their southern flank exposed. Until one or more of these events occur the Indian military will be content to bide its time, and even then might not be overly enthusiastic for combat in such desolate wastes. Institutional interests have had some differential effect on the attitude of the Indian officer corps, especially with regard to preparations for an Indian Ocean capability, Starved for funds, the Indian Navy has long sought to demonstrate the need for its expansion and the creation of both a Western and an Eastern Indian Ocean fleet. But capital costs have been too high for civilian decision-makers, especially given the more urgent requirements for AFVs and aircraft. Now the Indian Navy may get a second hearing, espe- cially if the Soviet Union is cooperative. But, any such arrangement may require an unacceptable quid pro quo, and would in any case leave the In- dian naval forces quite dependent upon the U.S.S.R. for spares and replace- ments (a la Indonesia, whose magnificent Sovietsupplied navy is quietly rusting away). Image and Status: No discussion of the role of the military in South ‘Asian security problems would be complete without some remarks about their very special role in their respective political systems and societies. All South Asian armies must rely upon very fragile and backward economic and communications infrastructures. They are not particularly “modern” compared with Western armies, but they are very modern compared with their own societies. Two measures of this are the extraordinary difficulty they have in filling positions requiring technological expertise, and in the lengthy period of time it takes to train even a jawan.'8 All of this means that they must try to obtain a grossly disproportionate percentage of scarce human and material resources from their own societies. Until now there has been little difficulty in justifying military budgets in terms of national security requirements, but if political rapprochement is achieved, this may be a greater problem in the future. It has also meant that the military have been eager to seck foreign technological and military as- sistance and advice. All of the major South Asian armies feel that such °F or example, “it will be a long time before we recover from the trauma of 1962. Not even the upsurge in military confidence resulting from our achievements in 1971 has ‘quite succeeded in healing the scars left by the debacle in NEFA. ‘Some memories rankle” .” Maj-Gen. D. K. Palit (retd.), Overseas Hindustan Times, October 15, 1973, “The basic training period for a jawan lasts at least forty weeks at the regimental training center, to be followed by additional training with his unit.STEPHEN P. COHEN 211 foreign links are essential to their own development: they bring in relatively modern technologies and they involve contact with modern foreign armies and modern strategies and tactics. South Asian officers feel that it is essential that some of their numbers be exposed to the latest developments in counter- insurgency strategy, limited war, nuclear planning, etc.’ Additionally, such links, especially with Western armies, strengthen and reinforce the Western- ized elements of many South Asian officer corps. The latter factor should not be exaggerated, for more and more South Asian officers are drawn from less- Westernized middle castes and classes, and as the Indians and Pakistanis have demonstrated they will turn to Soviet or Chinese armies for assistance if it is not available from the West. A final generalization we can make about the military in South Asia— especially the officer corps—is that they are acutely aware of their elitist position within their own societies. They bear the typical admixture of guilt and pride characteristic of such elites, and therefore are doubly concerned about the management of their public image. Their relative status in an in- tensely hierarchical society profoundly affects their lives in such matters as salary, education, marriage prospects and post-service employment. For this reason, as well as their potential (or actual) power, civilians have been loath to attack them. Civilian Perspectives on Security Affairs Historically, the existence of significant civilian attitudes towards se- curity problems has only been a recent development outside of a few special groups. Neither the Congress-led nationalist movement nor the Muslim League thought security problems had much of a priority, and after a burst of civilian interest in the 1920s civilian interest faded away.’® Thus, after independence, neither India nor Pakistan had any clearly defined notions of defense or security policy beyond a fragmentary understanding of their British imperialist legacy. As the South Asian security situation resolved itself into a two-party conflict there occurred a gradual development of civilian expertise, especially in the area of fiscal manipulation. The 1962 conflict with China forced the pace of civilian interest in India (but by that time the military had already seized control over the entire security and foreign policy apparatus in Pak- istan). From that point on India saw a regular burgeoning of security and defense studies, culminating in the development of a quite sophisticated civilian security lobby. The exceptions to the lack of early interest in security problems were two: the castes and regions which had close ties with the military itself, and © This feeling is reciprocated by the militarily advanced states, including the U.S. Training of Indian and Pakistani military personnel was not excluded when the U.S. formulated its restrictive policy on grants and arms sales to those two naticns in 1971. In the FY 1973 budget, just under $500,000 was allocated for training Indian and Pak- istani officers. See, Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate, Hearings on the Foreign Assistance Act of 1973 (Washingtor |S. Government, February 22, 1973). 3*Cohen, The Indian Army, pp. 57 f.212 SECURITY ISSUES IN SOUTH ASIA terrorist groups. In a sense, the former came to dominate West Pakistan (and thus, all of Pakistan) through the military government, and the latter may yet come to dominate Bangladesh. Although such groups exist in India, they are more than balanced by pragmatic managerial types drawn from all regions. Despite individual variations, there are common trends in all three major South Asian states with regard to the emergence of new civilian atti- tudes towards the military and towards security problems. One such develop- ment—new for India, but a familiar story in Pakistan—is the increasing dependence of civilian regimes on the military for domestie political suppor! In part, this is an extension of the process of reliance upon technocrats and administrators which has always characterized government in South Asia since the advent of the British, But in part it reflects the recent increase in internal disorder, the widening gap between center and periphery. Further, as distrust between civilian and military recedes, especially in India, and as a military-bureaucratic-industrial complex develops, civilians have tended to grow more reliant upon military skills, which may in turn lead to a tacit military veto over certain kinds of policy decisions. India, especially, is some distance away from even a military-civilian partnership, but given the trends described above, such a partnership becomes more attractive, at least for civilians, There can be little doubt that the groundwork has been laid for such a development, given the glorification of the military in India and an increasing reliance upon security-related symbols for integrative purposes. Pakistan and Bangladesh present special cases. In both states civilians underwent terrible suffering at the hands of professional soldiers and in both states strong civilian control has gained a new respectability. But in both states the situation is more unstable than in India and a deterioration in the law and order situation might yet result in a popular, civilian demand for military rule. A second security-related development in India and Pakistan (bur not yet Bangladesh) has been the militarization of their approach to foreign policy. A large number of foreign policy questions are of necessity seen primarily in terms of their military dimension. This development has oc- curred for at least three reasons. Firstly, the India-Pakistan relationship has always been supersensitive to foreign arms transfers. As we have noted, the military balance between the two states is such that it might be possible by some combination of technology, numbers and luck for one state to achieve at least a tactical military victory over the other. This possibility has existed for a number of years, and for the same length of time much of Indian and Pakistani foreign policy has been oriented towards the struggle to obtain foreign weapons—or prevent the other side from obtaining them. Secondly. the military dimensions of foreign policy have important symbolic overtones for many South Asian civilians. A modern military has come to represent more than efficient military force; it is also an expression of national achievement and pride. A squadron of jet aircraft, an armoredSTEPHEN P, COHEN 213 division, an aircraft carrier—these are all tangible and real measures of the achievements of twenty-five years, even if the aircraft are Russian, the tanks French, and the carrier British. Such weapons yield more political mileage than any number of tubewells or a fractional increase in per capita income. And, if they are indigenously built, as they increasingly are, their value is further heightened. Then, as in the case of India, the weapons industry serves both as a warning to potential enemies and as a prospective source of foreign exchange. Indian arms salesmen are busy in the Persian Gulf, Africa, and Southeast Asia, attempting to break into an expanding and profitable market, while Pakistan has raised the idea of combining its relatively skilled labor force with Middle Eastern capital to develop an Islamic armaments industry. Conclusion We will conclude this paper by attempting to highlight some of the more problematical variables which will contribute to the future security equation in South Asia. The first is the management of security affairs in the face of a possible deterioration of the integrity of South Asian states. Bangladesh, India, and Pakistan each reveal a different facet of the problem. In Bangladesh it simply would be a question of the military coming to power to restore civil order, or forming a “united front” with moderate civilian leadership. Here there is no question of the legitimacy of civilian rule, only its capability. For Pakistan this legitimacy has yet to be firmly established, at least in the minds of some soldiers. The maintenance of civil- ian authority will be a touch and go situation for some time, dependent as much upon personality as policy. In India, a growing civilian-military com- plex appears to have established itself as a powerful and deep-rooted lobby, at least at the center, and will be a force to reckon with for many years to come. But a breakdown in the political system in any of these states will not mean reversion to the pre-British situation. They all have militaries which are unified and integrated. This fact would shape and influence any external involvement that might occur. In Bangladesh, a serious deterioration would very likely lead to Indian military cooperation, invited or uninvited. But in the cases of India and Pakistan, external involvement, especially by the Great Powers, would be less to assist in internal security affairs than to ensure that Indian or Pakistani external capabilities were not affected. The U.S.S.R. and China have only a marginal interest in Indian and Pakistani internal development but do have a stake in these nations’ military preparedness, as long as their own conflict thrives. To restate our argument, it is possible to envision a situation in which one had an army without a state (Bangladesh), and external intervention was required to rebuild the latter, or, a situation in which the state could no longer maintain the army at advanced levels of manpower and technology (India or Pakistan), and intervention was required to ensure the fulfillment of foreign policy commitments. In the latter case a domestic military-civilian214 SECURITY ISSUES IN SOUTH ASIA lobby might well encourage intervention to maintain its own privileged position, rather than face the alternative of drastically reduced defense spending. ‘A second problematic variable is the uncertainty surrounding the inten- tions of various superpowers towards the region. Even with the region’s low intrinsic value, a substantial Soviet and American military presence could be established in the Indian Ocean purely on the basis of extra-regional con- siderations. This would still have an enormous impact on local security cal- culations, especially in India. While, for example, the U.S. and India are unlikely to fight over a bi-lateral disagreement, conflict could emerge as a result of “broader” global or superpower considerations, as it has elsewhere. Bangladesh and Pakistan are small enough so that pride would not stand in the way of capitulation to overwhelming outside pressure, but this may not be the case with Indian elites.1® It is for this reason, not because of any widespread fear of China, that pressures for a nuclear program will con- tinue.?? In many ways the security-related decisions facing the Indians are more difficult than those for either Pakistan or Bangladesh. India alone of the regional states can legitimately aspire to great power status. But it cannot escape the twin dilemmas of cost and effectiveness. Despite the low percent- age of GNP spent on defense, the price of the maintenance of the present security apparatus is appalling, given the economic situation; and, even if it can be maintained or expanded, it may have only limited effectiveness vis a vis expanding superpower activities. To summarize the tenor and direction of this article it would be appro- priate to conclude that our title is a misnomer. The South Asian security system is an insecurity system, and the trade-offs for each regional govern- ment involve minimizing insecurity, not maximizing security. Insecurity, whether due to internal disorder or external conflict, has become the norm after 25 years of independence, and one cannot honestly say that the situa- tion will radically change for the better in the foreseeable future. Military bureaucracies have become an entrenched component of the political order even where they have not taken it over; their civilian allies are numerous and powerful, and outside powers have done precious little to ameliorate the situation. ¥The story may be apocryphal, but a retired Indian Navy officer claims that while the Indian Navy never seriously considered the Enterprise and its task force as hostile in December 1971, there was “some talk” in the Air Force about a suicide squadron to “get” the ship. Lt. Cdr. Ravi Kaul, “The Indo-Pakistani War the Changing Balance of Power in the Indian Ocean,” Naval Review, 1973, reprinted in Committee on Foreign fia House of Representatives, Hearings .. ., op cit. "The reaction of much of the Western and many wealthy states (that India cannot “afford” a nuclear explosion) coupled with pressures on India to sign the NPT, trill only serve to accelerate the Indian push towards auclesr selfculfciency and perhaps E weapons program. STEPHEN P. COHEN is Associate Professor of Political Science and Asian Studies, University of Mlinois at Urbana-Champaign.