Timothy Morton, Insichsein: Hegel on buddhism

I hate Zizek on buddhism. Here are my three paradoxical responses to Zizek on buddhism. --I hate him so much because I really love him (for his other arguments) --I hate him because I have to admit to myself that I agree with his argument about buddhism --I am nauseated by his repetition of asinine Hegelianisms about buddhism. In other words: --I generally admire and respect what Zizek has to say about anything. --I actually agree, from a certain point of view, with what he says about buddhism: for example, as an indictment of western New Age interpretations that are also intrinsic to certain eastern forms of buddhism. --I nevertheless completely disagree with the substance of his arguments which are based on a common Hegelian misunderstanding of the soteriological aims of buddhism. Zizek's own method of calming himself and thus preventing a cardiac arrest is itself a form of mediation bsed on an idea of wanting to cease the flow of karma. (A version of his negative form of) buddhism is keeping him alive so that he can say more nasty things about it. I love it.

Hegel on buddhism
Timothy Morton

Timothy Morton, Insichsein: Hegel on buddhism

The spell is diminished only where the subject, in Hegel's language, is involved Theodor Adorno, Negative Dialectics, 68 1

When, in Negative Dialectics, Adorno castigates the materialistic consumption of an easily available form of Zen as a corny exoticism, the decoration of a vacuously uncritical form of modern subjectivity, he may not be aware of the extent to which traditional (non-western) buddhists may already agree with him (68). And when he describes a genuine kind of self-reflection, the subject meditating upon its real captivity, he does not note that this is indeed a more genuine form of buddhist meditation. Moreover, when Adorno approvingly cites the notion of Hegelian involvement, he appears not to be aware of the irony that such an idea has links in Hegel's writing with his encounters with buddhism. Buddhism, then, seems to be on both sides of the equation. How might one begin to account for such a state of affairs? One understands that Adorno has Heidegger in his sights, with his (for Adorno) paradoxically reifying view of Being and his concomitant later interest in Zen. Adorno tacks closely to the passage in Hegel's Logic where buddhism is discussed (119-20). His argumentthat Heidegger reifies modern subjectivity much as a quiescent Zen produces a fascist modern subjectwould have been even more effective had he been aware of some of the historical and philosophical determinants of reified nothingness. Moreover, this would have enabled an intensification of Adorno's

Timothy Morton, Insichsein: Hegel on buddhism

already intensely dialectical account of nothingness and nihilism towards the end of Negative Dialectics, which he associates explicitly with the thought of Schopenhauer (376-81). In a book committed to thought's encounter with what it is not, the western misapprehsension of buddhism could have encountered Mahayana buddhism. In Adorno, what for Hegel was consciousness without content has become nonconceptual vagary (68). Hegel's notion of pure consciousness without content is an apt theorization of some of the aesthetic phenomena of the Romantic period.2 But to what extent does this notion, under scrutiny, undermine the idea of a stable, solid self upon which some of the popular ideas of Romantic art depend (such as the idea of the egotistical sublime)? Hegel discovered a form of modern consciousness reflected in the buddhist idea of emptiness, or as he puts it, nothingness.3 For Hegel, nothingness is a state of pure negation, devoid of positive determinations. It is, therefore, a dialectical dead end. Staying with this nothingness would not be the same as the tarrying with the negative to which he exhorts philosophy in the Preface to the Phenomenology (**), but a premature retirement of Spirit in a pasture in which, to use his striking image, all cows are black (**). Moreover, the notion of nothing or zero is significant in the history of the west: borrowed from Arabic mathematics, zero enables negative numbers, which facilitates double-entry bookkeeping, a cornerstone of capitalismzero enables debt, the creation of speculative capital.4

Timothy Morton, Insichsein: Hegel on buddhism

This essay is an exploration of something that Hegel tries to hide in plain view. Hegel dismisses buddhism without keeping it utterly out of reach. Discussions of Hegel's view of buddhism have tended to be oblique or limited to simple reference.5 This essay combines historicist and philosophical analysis to demonstrate that whether Hegel already had what Heidegger calls a preunderstanding for buddhism in his thinking; whether the fragmentary Chinese and Tibetan whispers that reached him from his sources on buddhism acted as a cause of his view; whether he was always already disposed to view emptiness as nothingness and buddhist soteriological practice as Insichsein or beingwithin-self (that is, ultimately without concrete determinants), or whether buddhism did influence him indirectly; my thesis stands: that there is a remarkable and historically probable collusion between Hegel's view of the nothingness of the in-itself or, as first stated in the Logic, Fichte's phrase I = I,6 and the dominant form of Tibetan buddhism of which he was aware. Three sections follow this one. The first establishes Hegel's view of buddhism. The second explores more thoroughly those notions of buddhist emptiness with which Hegel was familiar. This digression into Buddhist thinking will turn out to be crucial for argument, as I demonstrate that Hegel's idea of nothingness drastically reduces emptiness to what Buddhism itself ironically considers a rather substantial thing in which one has to believe. The final section outlines the ways in which Hegel's view of emptiness insufficiently accounts for the different kinds of buddhist view contemporary with Hegel. The main

Timothy Morton, Insichsein: Hegel on buddhism

buddhist text on emptiness, the Prajnaparamita sutra, is reproduced in an Appendix in its abbreviated twenty-five-line form.

Hegel's view of buddhism

Hegel's direct sources for his view of buddhism are, primarily, the work of Samuel Turner, an English researcher who had gained access to the court of the Dalai Lama and his associate the Panchen Lama (the findings were published around 1800); and the sixth and seventh volumes of the Allgemeine Historie on buddhism (1750).7 From the former, Hegel gleaned information about the idea that lamas were reincarnations of previous lamas (or high teachers). From the latter, he obtained the concept of the empty or nothing, which is the main focus of this paper. In the Logic Hegel makes one explicit remark about buddhism, and some others that pertain to his understanding of buddhism in his later lectures on religion. Buddhism here plays the same role as it does in the later work on religion and history: that of placeholder for a view which must be acknowledged but ultimately surpassed on the onward march towards the full realization of the notion in Christianity. We could easily blame Hegel for a form of imperialism and stop there, but it will be more revealing to find out what he says, and not only for its parallels with the view to which he was indirectly exposed.

Timothy Morton, Insichsein: Hegel on buddhism

In all historical probability, the very people who started the Tibetan whispersthe dominant Gelugpa sect of the mid to late eighteenth century, had developed their own form of xenophobia, which manifested both as an intolerance towards outsiders (still evident in some Tibetan teachers' attitudes towards westerners and even those from other Tibetan sects), and as a strict doctrinal discipline. This specific discipline is most legible in the incongruities in Hegel's perception of buddhism. There is a general understanding of what the Mahayana (of which more later) calls the absolute truth (nothingness in Hegel), fused with a perception of strict Hinayana self-denial, and tinged with the Vajrayana culture of lamaism, as Hegel calls it, which would have been highly visible to Samuel Turner. Thus for Hegel, buddhism is a mixture of asceticism, a limited philosophical view of the absolute, and superstition. Hegel does not so much hear as overhear these Gelugpa whispers about emptiness. The Gelugpas (who were and are headed by the Dalai Lama), with their very thorough and gradual path of study, scholarship and debate, would have been loath to dish out anything beyond the strict Hinayana teachings which must be held by all monastic practitioners of whatever level (unlike some of the yogic practitioners associated with other sects in Tibet)hence asceticism. Emptiness (nothingness) would have been a general cultural understanding, as the Mahayana view was pervasive in Tibet: just being born meant taking refuge vows almost as young children in Christian cultures are baptized, and entering a monastery, as every aspiring young man or woman would tend to do, would entail taking the bodhisattva vows of entry into the Mahayana. So most

Timothy Morton, Insichsein: Hegel on buddhism

Tibetans would be familiar with what Hegel calls nothingness as part of the cultural background. And the Vajrayana, remaining secret even to most of the monks with whom Turner would have come into contact, would be perceived as trappings by a visitorthe supernatural elements, the idea of incarnate lamas, the rituals. Paragraph 87 of the Logic describes Pure being as mere abstraction and therefore the absolutely negative: which, in a similarly immediate aspect,

is just Nothing.8 Hegel continues:

Hence was derived the second definition of the Absolute: the Absolute is the Nought. In fact this definition is implied in saying that the thing-in-itself is the indeterminate, utterly without form and so without contentor in saying that God is only the supreme Being and nothing more; for this is really declaring him to be the same negativity as above. The Nothing which the Buddhists make the universal principal, as well as the final aim and goal of everything, is the same abstraction. (127)

Hegel here compares what he knows of buddhism from the Allgemeine Historie with Spinozist and Enlightenment attitudes towards God, that he is a supreme Being and nothing more. (One should qualify this, however, by recalling

Timothy Morton, Insichsein: Hegel on buddhism

Hegel's spirited defense of this view, which he calls a true pantheism, in the section on buddhism in Religion.) The notes that follow are revealing:

It is natural too for us to represent Being as absolute riches, and Nothing as absolute poverty. But if when we view the whole world we can only say that everything is, and nothing more, we are neglecting all speciality and, instead of absolute plenitude, we have absolute emptiness. The same stricture is applicable to those who define God to be mere Being; a definition not a whit better than that of the Buddhists, who make God to be Nought, and who from that principle draw the further conclusion that selfannihilation is the means by which man becomes God. (128)

(Hegel may misinterpret Spinoza's idea of nothingness: Hegel subscribes to a non-Parmenidean, relativistic or meontic form of nothing, while Spinoza could be said to opt for a more radical oukontic nothing.)9 If we study the lectures on the philosophy of religion, we will be able to read back into a later passage in the Logic, the beginnings of the section on essence (a dialectical progression from the idea of being), Hegel's understanding of what he means by Insichsein or beingwithin-self, which is his view of buddhist practice:

Timothy Morton, Insichsein: Hegel on buddhism

Unfortunately when the Absolute is taken only to be the Essence, the negativity which this implies is often taken only to mean the withdrawal of all determinate predicates. This negative action of withdrawal or abstraction thus falls outside of the Essencewhich is thus left as a mere result apart from its premissesthe caput mortuum of abstraction. But as this negativity, instead of being external to Being, is its own dialectic, the truth of the latter, viz. Essence, will be Being as retired within itselfimmanent Being. (162)

Because it lacks predicates, this apophatic essentiality will seem too abstract for Hegel. One image that he gives of it in Religion is ironically not buddhist but Hindu: The image of Buddha in the thinking posture, with feet and arms intertwined so that a toe extends into the mouththis [is] the withdrawal into self, this absorption in oneself (252). This rather image is alarming more in the eyes of the narrator than in itself: babies do this all the time. Hegel wants us to see that buddhism is infantile, and that what it needs to do is pull its toe out, and start doing dialectics. The image of self-swallowing stands above the wildness of desire and is the cessation of desire (252), and also the cessation of predication:

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[buddhists] say that everything emerges from nothing, everything returns to nothing. That is the absolute foundation, the indeterminate, the negated being of everything particular, so that all particular existences or actualities are only forms, and only the nothing has genuine independence, while in contrast all other actuality has none; it counts only as something accidental, an indifferent form. For a human being, this state of negation is the highest state: one must immerse oneself in this nothing, in the eternal tranquillity of the nothing generally, in the substantial in which all determinations cease, where there is no virtue or intelligence, where all movement annuls itself. All characteristics of both natural life and spiritual life have vanished. To be blissful, human beings themselves must strive, through ceaseless internal mindfulness, to will nothing, to want [nothing], and to do nothing. (253-4)

For Hegel, the buddhist constantly equates form with mere accidentality, which in itself is indifferent nothing. When one attains this, declares Hegel, putting buddhism in its place, there is no longer any question of something higher, of virtue and immortality. Instead, Human holiness consists in uniting oneself, by this negation, with nothingness, and so with God, with the

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absolute (254). At this point in his career, Hegel views buddhism as even lower in the hierarchy of religions than Hinduism, which proliferates dream-like images of the absolute in all the varied figures of the Hindu pantheon. Later, in revising Religion and in The Philosophy of History, he was to reverse their respective positions.10 Buddhism, more than the Taoism which in his scheme precedes it in its understanding of the absolute, at least grasps that there is something determinate to be recognized and sought, unlike more animistic religions. It is just that what is recognized is still, for Hegel, on a very abstract level, as abstract as the statement I = I (Logic, 125). Buddhism is still in the position ascribed in the Logic to the doctrine of Becoming, whose maxim is that Being is the passage into Nought, and Nought the passage into Being (131). Hegel's thinking about this, of course, is crucial in the history of philosophy: for example, all too briefly, Schopenhauer's view of buddhism as annihilation of desire; through Nietzsche; Heidegger; the nuancing and critique of I = I in Sartre. Aside from their potential political implications for hearing the plight of the exiled Tibetans, the drastically distorted remarks of Slavoj Zizek on Western Buddhism in Critical Inquiry and elsewhere continue the equation of emptiness with nothingness, and nirvana with the realization of this nothingness. Notwithstanding the irony that Lacanian (and therefore Sartrean, and therefore Hegelian) notions of nothingness inform his view of why the Christian legacy is worth fighting for, for Zizek this is only a hippy form of laziness, lacking the commitment to moral absolutes that he praises in the

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proclamations of Pope John Paul II.11 Using the zeugma dust to dust, from the Book of Common Prayer, which resembles Hegel's I = I in its circular brevity, Zizek rubbishes nirvana as primordial Void.12 Though, as I will argue, certain buddhist views can tend towards nihilism, they by no means justify any action based on the misinterpretation that since everything is empty anyway, one might as well steal or kill. The notion of emptiness is inseparable from compassion. Since reality goes beyond any conceptualization, we can afford to lose a little of our precious territory, our ego-clinging, our sense of a self to which we are holding on for dear life. It is the Prajnaparamita sutra that Schopenhauer explicitly quotes at the end of the first volume of The World as Will and Representation in declaring that the point where subject and object no longer exist is nothing, a nothing that oscillates between an aestheticized asceticism, an ocean-like calmness of the spirit, and a more existentially horrific empty nothingness.13 Despite the fact that towards the beginning of paragraph 71, from which these statements are taken, Schopenhauer indicates that nothing can only be relative, and not a positive entity, he cannot resist imbuing it with a certain charm or horror; despite, one might add, his Kantian insistence on the ways in which aestheticized asceticism transcends desire. Such a paradoxical, ambiguous nothingness is the place at which the western notion of the aesthetic, itself a reconciler of subject and object, mistakenly meets the buddhist notion of emptiness. The image of the toe-swallowing meditator is remarkably similar to

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what De Quincey says about Kant, that in his aesthetic self-absorption he was a stomach devouring itself (**). For Hegel, nothingness in this sense is a false, reified concreteness. Apparently, there is not enough mediation in meditation. Again, at this point Hegel's sources would have proved no help: the contemporary Gelugpas (and nowadays still, in some cases) could be hostile towards meditation practice, and many have reserved it for a notional point after the completion of one's studies. Their view of what Hegel is calling nothingness is more popular with buddhist scholars than with meditatorswho ironically were more likely to prefer approaches (such as Cittamatra, discussed below) which could be used as provisional stepping stones (mediations) on the way towards perfect understanding, under the assumption that the owl of enlightenment flies only at dusk. Hegel might even have preferred such a view and compared it more favorably with Christianity. The Philosophy of History does not add much on the buddhist view to what has already been said: but there is an increased reliance on Turner's account of the court of the Dalai Lama. Hegel displays a horrified fascination with the feminine education of the young incarnate lama (or tulku) in a kind of prison of quiet and solitude, living chiefly on vegetables and revolt[ing] from killing any animal, even a louse (171). The prison of quiet and solitude is only the objective form of the view of nothingness, which is represented in Religion as the orouboric, self-swallowing man. Such a man does not hold the Spiritual Essence as his peculiar property, but is regarded as partaking in it only

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in order to exhibit it to others, in a spirit not unlike that of French or American republicanism (171). Hegel must have been disturbed by the extent to which the culture of the lama uncannily echoed the Europe of absolute freedom and terror, while simultaneously retaining a monarchical structure, an unsynthesized parody of the very state for which he himself argued.

There is no spoon

One very significant aspect of the soteriological practice of buddhism is the progressive realization of ever more profound views of reality: understanding what reality is will help to lessen the suffering caused by the grasping and fixation that turns the wheel of samsara or migratory existence (Tibetan: khorwa) round and round. The historical Buddha supposedly turned the wheel of dharma or teaching three times during his life. The teachings comprise two different vehicles or yanas for taking the practitioner from confusion and suffering to enlightenment: the Hinayana and Mahayana, the latter of which was taught in two different ways. The first turning is often called the Hinayana, or Shravakayana to denote the hearers or ordinary practitioners who heard these teachings. (The idea is that in his compassion the Buddha told the same thing in three different ways to three different capacities of audience. Still others assert that the different types of audience heard the same words in different ways. This is the first way in which the teachings were told or heard.)

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The Hinayana, or narrow vehicle, is not all that narrow in its view: the narrowness is the immediacy of focus on the individual practitioner himself or herself, the goal being soso tharpa or individual liberation (from suffering in samsara). The view of the Hinayana is egolessness. This can be construed first as egolessness of self, in which the self is deconstructed into a congeries of phenomenological atoms. Secondly, at least in some forms of Hinayana, one realizes partial egolessness of dharmas (dharmas here in the other sense of dharma, that of elements of reality), consisting of the chain of cause and effect known in Tibetan as tendrel (dependently originated arising; Sanskrit pratityasamutpada). (This is considered partial egolessness of dharmas from the point of view of the second vehicle, the Mahayana or greater vehicle.) In other words, things do not really exist: this glass of water is only made out of bits and pieces of other things, and so on; and the same goes for our actions and thoughts. In the Hinayana view, then, there is already some degree of emptiness (English understatement) compared with the habitual notions one has of having a single solid self. Notice that in this view, reality is already not split into subject and object, entirely: we are dealing with pieces of phenomenological experience; phenomenological atoms if you will that according to Hinayana scripture occur every 60th of a second. These dharmas, or phenomenological atoms, are comprised of a perceiver and a perceived, sense organs and perceptual fields, including the sense consciousnesses construed as aspects of consciousness: a rainbow, for instance, depends upon water, sunlight, and a certain point of view.

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So there is some emptiness here. The view of an Arhat or realized being who has followed the path of the Hinayana, is, according to the Mahayanists, equal to that of a bodhisattva on the sixth bhumi or level of enlightenment. In the Mahayana, there are eleven such bhumis. Grasping reality ceases, though there is still some subtle fixation on what reality is. Despite Zizek's harsh words about a peaceful state of mind, it is interesting, from a Marxist perspective, that at the very start of the industrial phase of capitalism, an image of absolute tranquillity was thrown up out of orientalist studies of Tibet and China. Writing in Minima Moralia a century and a half later, Adorno corrects a reflex towards seeing production as (painful) labor in nirvanic language:

A mankind which no longer knows want will begin to have an inkling of the delusory, futile nature of all the arrangements hitherto made in order to escape want, which used wealth to reproduce want on a larger scale. Enjoyment would be affected, just as its present framework is inseparable from operating, planning, having one's way, subjugating. Rien faire comme une bte, lying on water and looking peacefully at the sky, being, nothing else, without any further definition and fulfilment, might take the place of process, act, satisfaction. . .None of the abstract concepts comes closer to fulfilled utopia than that of eternal peace.14

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Being, nothing else, without any further definition and fulfilment: in Adorno's use of the words of Maupassant we reencounter Hegel's notion of nothingness. The second turning comprised the Mahayana teachings. Mahayana means great vehicle, because its view is proclaimed to be vast and profound: profound because it delves down to the bottomlessness of reality; and vast because it expands to care for all sentient beings throughout all space and time. In the Mahayana one takes a vow called the bodhisattva vow, in which one promises to help all other sentient beings to enlightenment before attaining enlightenment oneself. Of course, paradoxically, the wish to open up one's resources to other sentient beings is itself very enlightening and one finds oneself enlightened more rapidly than on the Hinayana path of individual liberation. The mahayana path is based on understanding and realizing the view of emptiness, and of extending one's warmth and compassion towards other sentient beings: giving birth, in order words, to bodhicitta or mind of enlightenment. Even if he were correct about nothingness, Hegel would still have overlooked the compassion side of this coin. Tibetan buddhists use the terms trangdon and ngedon to differentiate among the teachings. According to all Mahayanists, the Hinayana view of egolessness is trangdon, that is, a partial view. Now according to some Mahayanists, notably the ones with whom Hegel's sources came into contact (in particular the Gelugpa sect of Tibetan buddhism who had assumed political control throughout the eighteenth century), the second turning of the wheel of

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dharma is fully ngedon or definitive, while the teachings of the third turning are partially ngedon, designed to aid those who had difficulty with the view of emptiness (Tibetan: tongpa; Sanskrit: shunyata) expounded in the second turning. According to other lineages, for example, the Kagy and Nyingma sects of Tibetan buddhism (the Kagy are headed by the Karmapa, who is their equivalent of the Gelugpas' Dalai Lama)15 the third turning teachings are ngedon, and the second turning partially ngedon. The third turning teachings are often called luminosity to distinguish them from the second turning teachings on emptiness, though they are said not to contradict this view, but to complement it. (And from a Kagy or Nyingma point of view, they complete it.) In The Matrix, that popular classroom teaching aid, the protagonist Neo observes a young boy playing with a metal spoon, supposedly causing it to bend by realizing the truth that in reality there is no spoon.16 It is actually easy to explain the second turning view to readers of literary theory: all they have to do is imagine Derrida's view of language and writing to apply to the whole of reality, and rename Derrida Nagarjuna, the Indian exponent of the Madhyamaka or middle way on which the view of emptiness, tongpa-nyi, is based. Nagarjuna (first to second century AD) did not provide a philosophical view so much as a deconstructive method of reducing to absurdity any argument that asserted something single, lasting or independent about reality (in buddhism, these three together comprise a view based on self or ego). In the manner of

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Derrida insisting that diffrance is not a concept, Nagarjuna insisted that anyone who accepted his philosophy as a belief was incurably insane. In Tibet the second turning is associated most strongly with Chandrakirti, a student of Nagarjuna, and is known as rangtong, or emptiness of self, selfemptiness. How is rangtong different from the egolessness of the Hinayana? Because in this view, the very tools with which we analyzed egolessness of self, themselves have no single lasting independent existence. There is a panoply of Hinayana terms for understanding reality, such as the five skandhas. These are the five heaps that go up to make a sense of self, in the absence of a real one. They are what the Prajnaparamita Sutra refers to in the phrase no form, no feeling, no perception, no formation, no consciousness; then we have the sense organs, the sense consciousness and sense fields (this is all Hinayana phenomenology). An easy way of understanding the sutra would be to put all the terms in the middle section of the Sutra into quotation marks. In reality, there is no form, no feeling, no perception and so forth. The meaning of the Sutra is summed up in the first declaration of Avalokiteshvara, where he says Form is emptiness; emptiness also is form [that is, substance and shapedetermination]; emptiness is no other than form, form is no other than emptinessthere is too little room here to go into the vertiginous levels of emptiness progressively proclaimed in this chiasmus. Nevertheless, the whole Sutra declares that the very conceptual tools with which the Hinayanists broke down reality are themselves subject to deconstruction: they do not in themselves give rise to a

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metaphysics of presence. There is no spoon. Its spooniness is a coming together of various causes and conditions, which are themselves empty of inherent existence for the same reason: and the ways in which we break those down, talking about cause and effect, for example, or sense fields, is also subject to deconstruction. Nagarjuna's student Chandrakirti developed the deconstructive form of argument known as the tiny vajra (diamond, lightning bolt, sceptre), a mini-Madhyamika exercise, to show that phenomena cannot be said to arise and that therefore they cannot be said to dwell or cease either. Since for a Berkeley or a Hume ideas could be said simply to be congeries of sensation and designation, one can see how Hegel would have associated buddhist thought with certain aspects of Enlightenment philosophy; though there are more resemblances between the Madhyamikan view of emptiness and skepticism than there are to Spinozan pantheism. Why did Nagarjuna call his (non)view the middle way, anyway? It is designed to steer a course between asserting that things existin this view, that would be theism, or what Derrida and others call ontotheologyand asserting that they do notthat would be nihilism, which for Nagarjuna still implies holding on to a concept, in which case there is a separation of knower and known, and the return of dualism. Nihilism is believing in nothing (in some senses, actually quite impossible). As Adorno puts it, in a devastatingly brief attack on modern chic: Faith in nothingness would be as insipid as would faith in Being. It would be the palliative of a mind proudly content to see through the whole swindle (379). One can already see that Hegel's choice of nothingness

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to designate what he understands of emptiness is at least somewhat prey to an accusation that it is truly existent, in the sense of being single, independent and lasting. Hence his view that buddhism involves the stripping away of all determinants from the self by a rigorous asceticism and (for him) a paradoxical identification with the nothingness. Ironically, the nothingness that Hegel calls the truth of I = I has at least a dash of somethingness. In Hegel's conception of what reincarnation is all about, this view mitigates the potential idolatry of the ways in which Tibetans appeared (and still appear according to current western media) to worship a living god in the form of the Dalai Lama. He is not really a person pretending to be a god, declares Hegel, just a spokesperson (or somewhat between an incarnation and a spokesperson) for this nothingness. For all the kinds of cultural superiority such a statement could project, and despite the imperial uses to which such a patronizing generosity could be put, Hegel was not far from the truth. (Incidentally, the inverse misapprehension prevented the Tibetans from converting to Christianity when the first missionaries arrived. In order to describe the state of the risen Christ, they used the Tibetan for zombie literally a body activated by an abstract forceand failed to impress many people.) One can tell that Hegel was inspired by the rangtong view in his use of highest to describe emptiness. According to the rangtong view, reality in its highest absolute nature is empty: if you saw reality properly the perceptual field would at first dissolve, as it does for Neo at the end of The Matrix; the first bhumi (level) of Mahayana realization is said to be an experience of everything

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disappearing.17 But in the next view under discussion, emptiness is not the ultimate point of reality, but its basis.

Shredded wheat

The reason why things exist at all is because they are empty, but that does not somehow get rid of them. Like shredded wheat, the following view has nothing added or taken away. In the shentong or third turning view, reality is indeed beyond conceptualisationincluding the subtle conceptualisation that holds on to that idea, in whatever form, as a thing to be known. This is what makes the shentong view avoid nihilism, and a certain smugness bred of holding the ultimate philosophical joker up your sleeve. Shentong means emptiness of other. In the shentong view emptiness is only the basis of phenomenal appearance. It is associated in Tibet with the Indian teacher Asanga (third to fourth century AD), and is associated with Yogachara, which means basically a school of thought that is helpful to meditators. One might at this point almost declare, there is a spoon, because it is empty. According to Tsoknyi Rinpoche, a teacher in the Nyingma lineage of Tibetan buddhism, the reason we can tell this glass of water is empty is because it exists. In other words its emptiness is not in spite of its existence. It is not the ultimate state of the glass; it is the basis for the glass's existence. To carry on the analogy with deconstruction, diffrance by no means abolishes the distinctions

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between signs; pace something one of my literary theory students once wrote about deconstruction being a communistic theory that reduced distinction to absolute lack of determinationjust a huge vague soup of nonmeaning, in which everything means nothing to an equal extent. (Moreover, it seems strange, from a buddhist point of view, which scholars are at pains to declare in the titles of their books on deconstruction and religion, notably buddhism, that they are healing or mending deconstruction. From a buddhist point of view, it would have been more apt to say that they are sharpening it or making it tougheror just doing it.)18 To the uneducated ear the shentong view almost sounds like a version of idealism, or perhaps even solipsism, especially as it is full of phrases such as the clear light nature of mind, which could easily be heard as a form of theism. This is indeed how it sounds to certain Tibetans, notably those with whom Hegel's sources came into contact. Another contemporary Tibetan teacher, Khenpo Tsultrim Gyamtso of the Kagy lineage, writes that Because Shentong makes the same distinction between the three natures as the Cittamatrins do, and because it stresses the true existence of the luminous knowing aspect of mind, many Rangtong masters have confused it with the thought of Cittamatra or mind-only (Tibetan: semtsam).19 This is another way in which Hegel, following the rangtong view and being himself an idealist, could become confused about the shentong view; indeed, one of Hegel's indirect sources, de Koros, was himself confused about this. One must here recall that the Cittamatra view itself goes beyond the pantheism of the Coleridgean and

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Wordsworthian one mind within us and abroad: the kind of pantheism that Hegel benignly defends in his closing remarks in the section on buddhism in the Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion.20 Cittamatra certainly has no tendencies towards solipsismwhy? Because we have already gotten over a sense of self in the Hinayana, whose view is egolessness; it does not somehow get to come back. The mind-only view is very helpful in resolving our concepts about the dualism of inside and outside: All our concepts are based on accepting outer objects as separate from the inner perceiving mind and taking them to be real. Mind-only, in which all phenomena are perceived as more or less real existents of mind, answers the question of How does the interface of mind and matter actually work? (Khenpo Tsultrim Gyamtso, 50). However, continues Khenpo Tsultrim Gyamtso, there are very important differences between Cittamatra and Shentong. Firstly, Shentong does not accept the Cittamatra view that consciousness is truly existent. [It] hold[s] the Madhyamaka view that it is non-arising and without self-nature. They consider themselves to be the Great Madhyamikas because their system involves not only recognizing freedom from all conceptual contrivance, but also the realization of the Wisdom Mind (Jnana) that is free from all contrivance (96). From this standpoint, knowing reality as something to be known is still a form of objectification, howsoever subtle. The buddhist path first emphasizes clearing away gross obstacles to the proper view: the kleshas or afflictive mental states (anger, jealousy, pride and so forth). This helps to eliminate the grasping that is one aspect of the Third Noble Truth (the Noble Truths are common to all schools

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of buddhism). Then the practitioner must deal with fixation, the holding on to reality, informed by more subtle misconceptions about it. Thus the Hinayana is oriented towards working on the self; the Mahayana towards working with the other (and with otherness). From the shentong point of view the rangtong tends towards nihilisma paradoxical (and ultimately untenable) belief in nothing; the idea of emptiness in the rangtong is still somewhat conceptualit is precisely the idea that no concept can be applied to the notion of emptiness; in other words it is paradoxically not fully nonconceptual. Reality is empty, but not of the qualities of a buddha, transcendent intelligence, wisdom and compassion: luminosity. Remember that the subject object dualism has long been surpassed. So what we are dealing with here is a selfluminous reality, beyond conceptualisation, endowed with all the qualities of a buddha. After which point, in buddhism, there is only poetry, the direct proclamation of enlightened mind otherwise known as Vajrayana. The point of all of the three turnings is to help sentient beings become more compassionate and kind to themselves and others, in part by realizing that there was never much in the first place to hold on to in the way of the territory of selfhood. The self that Insichsein is within, never had that much existence in the first place; there was not much A for A to equal itself in the first place, a point taken up in Wittgenstein, and in Derrida on the copula.21 For a buddhist, to say that emptiness is absence of determination is a determination. Hegel's view of emptiness as nothingness is, from the buddhist point of view, an error that had profound consequences not only for the reception of buddhism in the west,

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but for the history of continental philosophy to come, and was useful in constructing a historical narrative that promotes Christianity at buddhism's expensewhen they could be taken as equal. The shentong view of luminosity and buddha-nature strikingly resembles what David Clark has to say about Schelling's view of the Behmenist Ungrund in his essay on Jean-Luc Marion's God without Being: the Ungrund is contaminated from the start by the universe it subtends, making the impulse to misrecognize the groundless as the primal ground, and thereby firmly reappropriate it to ontotheology, quite irresistible (in ed. Leonard, 161); p. 162 'the Ungrund's non-being is neither the void of nothingness nor the nonsense of non-entity', so that the question then becomes how to avoid speaking of it, or as Derrida, quoted in Clark, observes: how, in speaking, not to say this or that, in this or that manner?. . . .How to avoid. . .even predication itself? Buddhism is less tongue tied than this: reality has all the qualities of a buddha, wakefulness, intelligence, compassionattributes which are often called luminosity to distinguish it from sheer lack of existence. What we are constantly forgetting in our fascination with this emptiness, especially as intellectualsa fascination reminiscent of Sartre's formulation, in which, as a matter of fact, it is we who are the nothingness and the in-itself that is the beinglike a gigantic object in a desert world (as Sartre puts it, 246)what we are forgetting here, in our fixation, is precisely the original nonseparation of subject and objectthat which buddha nature is seeing is precisely buddha nature, that there is nothing to be seen because the difference between seer and

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seen has been transcended. In fact, any slight introduction of such a difference would entail a legitimate attack from the rangtong or prasangika Madhyamika view, and quite right too. The consequence is that in their apophatic anxiety, many writers on this topic fall into the mode of being portrayed by Jeremy in Yellow Submarinea poor creature whose scholarship leaves him a nowhere man who hasn't got a point of view. This is not quite enough to inspire the practitioner, according to the Kagy and Nyingma sects of Tibetan buddhism. There is surely something of this in Adorno's marshalling of the medieval apophatic tradition with the buddhist view of nirvana (however distorted) against Nietzschean nihlism, which supplies fascism with slogans: The medieval nihil privativum in which the concept of nothingness was recognized as the negation of something rather than as autosemantical, is as superior to the diligent overcomings as the image of Nirvana, of nothingness as something (380). The rangtong is traditionally said to be good for academics, who like tying themselves in knotsor think that they can untie them and will worry at them incessantly until they themselves disappear (Magliola in ed. Loy, 102). It is a shame that buddhism has been construed in the West to imply a view that the ultimate reality is nothingness or absence of determination. Buddhist intellectuals still have work to do to correct the distorted picture of Buddhism that has become a complacently unexamined commonplace in some postmodernist intellectual circles, that have simply received without question the (pessimist and nihilist) assessments of Buddhism transmitted by such thinkers as Hegel, Schopenhauer and Nietzsche.

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This study is relevant to the questions raised in Hegel's aesthetics. On the one hand, the primitive artistic pantheism of the East appears to jam together the two halves of art, nature and idea, as unsuitable and opaque to one another. Thus are produced forms which cannot adequately bear their content, either becoming bizarre, grotesque and tasteless (rather like Hegel's view of the proliferating dreams of Hinduism), or turning the infinite but abstract freedom of the substantive Idea disdainfully against all phenomenal being as null and evanescent.22 Hegel was keen in the Introductory Lectures on Aesthetics to criticize the idea of God as merely One, the supreme Being as such: in this formula we have only enunciated a lifeless abstraction of the irrational understanding (77). On the other hand, the inwardness of the Romantic art form is analogous to a pure consciousness of God. . .in which the distinction of objectivity and subjectivity is done away (90). Could the inwardness with which Hegel characterizes buddhism have anything to do with this, or is it merely to be construed as marginal to Hegel's thought? A place, weak as it is, is assigned to the notion of irony: the nothingness of all that is objective which gives rise to a sickly form of quiescence and feeblenesswhich does not like to act or to touch anything for fear of surrendering its inward harmony. Hegel here offers what could later be used as a critique of his student Schopenhauer, whose fusion of buddhism and the aesthetic presents just such a morbid saintliness and yearning, based on an abstract inwardness (of mind), a retirement into itself (73). Surely there is an echo of this in the buddhism of Insichsein?

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The University of California, Davis

Appendix

The Prajnaparamita Sutra in twenty-five lines. (There are various versions, both larger than this and much smaller.) My insertions in square brackets; page numbers refer to pages in this essay. Translated into Tibetan by Lotsawa bhikshu [monk] Rinchen De with the Indian pandita [scholar] Vimalamitra. Translated into English by the Nalanda Translation Committee, with reference to several Sanskrit editions.

The Sutra of the Heart of Transcendent Knowledge.

Thus have I heard. Once the Blessed One was dwelling in Rajagriha at Vulture Peak mountain, together with a great gathering of the sangha of monks and a great gathering of the sangha of bodhisattvas. At that time the Blessed One entered the samadhi [meditation state] that expresses the dharma called profound illumination, and at the same time noble Avalokiteshvara, the bodhisattva mahasattva [great bodhisattva; see 000], while practicing the profound prajnaparamita, saw in this way: he saw the five skandhas to be empty of nature [see 000].

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Then, through the power of the Buddha, venerable Shariputra said to noble Avalokiteshvara, the bodhisattva mahasattva, How should a son or daughter of noble family train, who wishes to practice the profound prajnaparamita? Addressed in this way, noble Avalokiteshvara, the bodhisattva mahasattva, said to venerable Shariputra, O Shariputra, a son or daughter of noble family who wishes to practice the profound prajnaparamita should see in this way: seeing the five skandhas to be empty of nature. Form is emptiness; emptiness also is form. Emptiness is no other than form; form is no other than emptiness. In the same way, feeling, perception, formation, and consciousness are emptiness. Thus, Shariputra, all dharmas are emptiness. There are no characteristics. There is no birth and no cessation. There is no impurity and no purity. There is no decrease and no increase. Therefore, Shariputra, in emptiness, there is no form, no feeling, no perception, no formation, no consciousness; no eye, no ear, no nose, no tongue, no body, no mind; no appearance, no sound, no smell, no touch, no taste, no dharmas; no eye dhatu [space, capacity] up to no mind dhatu, no dhatu of dharmas, no mind consciousness dhatu; no ignorance, no end of ignorance up to no old age and death, no end of old age and death; no suffering, no origin of suffering, no cessation of suffering, no path, no wisdom, no attainment, and no nonattainment. Therefore, Shariputra, since the bodhisattvas have no attainment, they abide by means of prajnaparamita. Since there is no obscuration of mind, there is no fear. They transcend falsity and attain complete

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nirvana. All the buddhas of the three times, by means of prajnaparamita, fully awaken to unsurpassable, true, complete enlightenment. Therefore, the great mantra of prajnaparamita, the mantra of great insight, the unsurpassed mantra, the unequalled mantra, the mantra that calms all suffering, should be known as truth, since there is no deception. The prajnaparamita mantra is said in this way: OM GATE GATE PARAGATE PARASAMGATE BODHI SVAHA [oh beyond, beyond, completely beyond, beyond all concept of beyond, awake, so be it] Thus, Shariputra, the bodhisattva mahasattva should train in the profound prajnaparamita. Then the Blessed One arose from that samadhi and praised noble Avalokiteshvara, the bodhisattva mahasattva, saying, Good, good, O son of noble family; thus it is, O son of noble family, thus it is. One should practice the profound prajnaparamita just as you have taught and all the tathagatas will rejoice. When the Blessed One had said this, venerable Shariputra and noble Avalokiteshvara, the bodhisattva mahasattva, that whole assembly and the world with its gods, humans, asuras [jealous gods], and gandharvas [musicians of the gods] rejoiced and praised the words of the Blessed One.

For their kind help with and encouragement of this project, I would like to thank

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David Clark, Jeffrey Cox and Mark Lussier.

Theodor Adorno, Negative Dialectics, tr. E.B. Ashton (New York: The Seabury

Press, 1973).
2

See David Simpson, Romanticism, Criticism and Theory, in Stuart Curran,

ed., The Cambridge Companion to British Romanticism (Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 1993), 10.
3

For recent work on Hegel and buddhism, see Liberman, Kenneth, Negative

Dialectics in Madhyamika and the Continental Tradition in Ninian Smart, ed., East-West Encounters in Philosophy and Religion, Smart, Ninian (Long-Beach : Long Beach, 1996), (**); Heinrich Dumoulin, Buddhism And NineteenthCentury German Philosophy, Journal of the History of Ideas 42 (1981), 457-470.
4

See Robert Kaplan, The Nothing That Is: A Natural History of Zero (Oxford

and New York: Oxford University Press, 2000; first published London: Allen Lane, 1999).
5

See for example Louis Dupr, Transitions and Tensions in Hegel's Treatment

of Determinate Religion, in David Kolb, ed., New Perspectives on Hegel's Philosophy of Religion (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1992), 8192, esp. 84, 92; John Burbirdge, Is Hegel a Christian?, in Kolb, ed., New Perspectives, 93-107, esp. 104.
6

Attributed to Fichte in Vorselungen ber die Geschischte der Philosophie; see

Daniel P. Jamros, The Human Shape of God: Religion in Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit (New York: Paragon House, 1994), 126.

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Hegel was also somewhat familiar with the following indirect sources: Jean

Pierre Abel-Rmusat; de Koros; Allgemeine Historie der Reisen zu Wasser und zu Lande; oder, Sammlung aller Reisebeschreibungen (Leipzig, 1750), vols. 6, 7; Samuel Turner, Copy of an Account Given by Mr. Turner, of His Interview with the Teshoo Lama at the Monastery of Terpaling, Enclosed in Mr. Turner's Letter to the Honourable the Governor General, Dated Patna, 2d March, 1784, in Asiatic Researches 1:197-205; An Account of a Journey in Tibet, in Asiatic Researches 1:207-220; An Account of an Embassy to the Court of the Teshoo Lama, in Tibet: Containing a Narrative of a Journey through Bootan, and Part of Tibet (London, 1800), which Turner dedicated to the East India Company.) See Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion, ed. Peter C. Hodgson, tr. R. F. Brown, P. C. Hodgson, and J. M. Stewart, with the assistance of H. S. Harris (Berkeley, Los Angeles, and London: University of California Press, 1988), 265 n. 183, 185, 266 n. 188, 504-5.
8

Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, Hegel's Logic, tr. William Wallace, foreword

by J. N. Findlay, third edition (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 1975; first published 1873), 125, 127.
9

See Cyril O' Regan, The Heterodox Hegel (Albany: State University of New

York Press, 1994), 147.

Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich, The Philosophy of History, tr. J. Sibree,

prefaces by Charles Hegel and the translator, J. Sibree; new introduction by C. J. Friedrich (New York : Dover Publications, 1956; first published Willey, 1900).

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11

Slavoj Zizek, Melancholy and the Act, Critical Inquiry 26.4 (Summer, 2000),

657-81, esp. 674-7; see also The Fragile Absolute: Or, Why is the Christian Legacy Worth Fighting For? (London and New York: Verso, 2000), esp. 23, 27-40, 128, 166-7.
12

Slavoj Zizek, Did Somebody Say Totalitarianism? Five Interventions in the

(Mis)use of a Notion (London: Verso, 2001), 524 (54).

Arthur Schopenhauer, The World as Will and Representation, trans. E. F. J.

Payne, 2 vols. (New York: Dover, 1969 (1958)), 1: 411-12.

Theodor Adorno, Sur l' eau, Minima Moralia: Reflections from Damaged

Life, tr. E. F. N. Jephcott (London and New York: Verso, 1978; German Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1951), 157.
15

For political reasons the Dalai Lama has assumed greater control over the

Tibetan nation as the oppression of the Chinese has continued. Also to be factored into this discussion should be an understanding of the Ri-me or unbiased lineage, started by Jigme Lingpa, (1730-98), which had roots earlier but started to come into prominence in the nineteenth century. This nonsectarian approach has stressed the wisdom inhering in all schools of buddhism.
16 17
18

The Matrix, dir. The Wachowski Brothers (Warner Brothers, 1999). Sakyong Mipham Rinpoche, Sutrayana Seminary, 1999.
David Loy, ed., Healing Deconstruction: Postmodern Thought in Buddhism and Christianity

(Atlanta: Scholars Press, 1966): a title whose double meaning is still singular. See also Robert Magliola, Derrida on the Mend (West Lafayette: Purdue University Press, 1984).
19

Ven. Khenpo Tsultrim Gyamtso, Rinpoche, Progressive Stages of Meditation

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on Emptiness, tr. Shenphen Hookham (Oxford: Longchen Foundation, 1986, 1988), 76.
20 21

Hegel, Religion, 260-3. Wittgenstein, Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus 5.5303. Jacques Derrida, Of

Grammatology, tr. Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak (Baltimore and London: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1987).
22

George Friedrich Hegel, Introductory Lectures on Aesthetics, tr. Bernard

Bosanquet, ed. and intro. Michael Inwood (Harmdondsworth: Penguin, 1993), 83.