Sadang, Philip Duvan B.

1–A
Case digest in Constitutional Law 1

NATIONAL TERRITORY
1. Case: Magallona vs. Ermita; G.R. No. 187167; August 16, 2011
Facts:
The legislative landscape commenced with the enactment of Republic Act No. 3046 (RA 3046)
by Congress, delineating the maritime baselines of the Philippines as an archipelagic State.
Subsequent to this, Republic Act No. 9522 (RA 9522) was introduced to align RA 3046 with the
provisions of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS III). RA 9522
entailed modifications to certain baselines, categorization of the Kalayaan Island Group (KIG)
and Scarborough Shoal as "regimes of islands," and an overall endeavor to ensure compliance
with UNCLOS III.
In response, petitioners mounted a constitutional challenge against RA 9522, asserting two
principal grounds: firstly, that it purportedly diminished Philippine maritime territory, thereby
violating constitutional tenets, and secondly, that it allegedly jeopardized national security,
sovereignty, and marine resources.

Issue:
The pivotal question before the court pertains to the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 9522.

Ruling:
The court, after careful consideration, rendered a verdict affirming the constitutionality of RA
9522. It elucidated that UNCLOS III primarily addresses sea-use rights and does not bear upon
territorial acquisition. Baselines laws, exemplified by RA 9522, serve the essential function of
precisely defining maritime zones and continental shelves in accordance with the stipulations of
UNCLOS III. The court dismissed the contentions put forth by the petitioners, underscoring the
alignment of RA 9522 with international norms, its strategic optimization of baseline locations,
and the noteworthy augmentation of the Philippines' overall maritime space.
Furthermore, the court emphasized that the classification of the KIG and Scarborough Shoal as
"regimes of islands" adheres to UNCLOS guidelines. This designation, far from supporting the
petitioners' claims of territorial loss, aligns with established international legal standards. The
ruling, therefore, not only upheld the constitutionality of RA 9522 but also refuted the allegations
of territorial diminution, affirming the law's compliance with the intricacies of UNCLOS III.
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THE DOCTRINE OF STATE IMMUNITY
a. Cases:
1. Shell Philippines vs. Jalos; GR 179918; September 8, 2010
Facts:
Shell and the Republic of the Philippines entered a service contract (Service Contract 38) for
petroleum exploration in Palawan. Following the discovery of natural gas in the Malampaya
area, Shell initiated the development, involving the construction of a gas pipeline. Subsistence
fishermen, claiming adverse effects on their livelihood, filed a complaint against Shell. Rather
than answering, Shell moved for dismissal, contending that the Pollution Adjudication Board
(PAB) had jurisdiction over pollution-related cases and asserting state immunity. The trial court
dismissed the complaint, deeming it pollution-related.

Issues:
1. Whether or not the suit is actually against the State and is barred under the doctrine of state
immunity.

Ruling:
With regard to the Shell claims that it cannot be sued without the State's consent under the
doctrine of state immunity from suit. To begin with, Shell is not an agent of the Republic of the
Philippines but merely a service contractor for the exploration and... development of one of the
country's natural gas reserves. While the Republic appointed Shell as the exclusive party to
conduct petroleum operations in the Camago-Malampayo area under the State’s full control and
supervision,25 it does not follow that Shell has become the State’s "agent" within the meaning
of the law. Moreover, Shell’s primary obligation under the contract is not to represent the
Philippine government for the purpose of transacting business with third persons. Its contractual
commitment is to develop and manage petroleum operations on behalf of the State.
WHEREFORE, the Court GRANTS the petition and REVERSES the decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV 82404 dated November 20, 2006. Respondent Efren Jalos, et al's
complaint for damages against Shell Philippines Exploration B.V. in Civil Case P-1818-03 of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 41, Pinamalayan, Oriental Mindoro is ordered DISMISSED without
prejudice to its refiling with the Pollution Adjudication Board or PAB.
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2. Municipality of San Fernando La Union vs Firme; GR 52179; April 8, 1991

Facts:
On the morning of December 16, 1965, a tragic collision occurred involving a passenger
jeepney driven by Bernardo Balagot, owned by the Estate of Macario Nieveras, a gravel and
sand truck owned by Tanquilino Velasquez and driven by Jose Manandeg, and a dump truck of
the Municipality of San Fernando, La Union, driven by Alfredo Bislig. The collision resulted in
the death of several passengers in the jeepney, including Laureano Baniña Sr., and injuries to
four others.
On December 11, 1966, the private respondents initiated a complaint for damages against the
Estate of Macario Nieveras and Bernardo Balagot, the owner and driver of the passenger
jeepney. In response, the jeepney defendants filed a Third Party Complaint against the
petitioner municipality and the driver of its dump truck.
The petitioner municipality raised various affirmative defenses, including lack of cause of action,
non-suability of the State, prescription of cause of action, and attributing negligence to the
owner and driver of the passenger jeepney as the proximate cause of the collision. The
petitioner also filed a motion for reconsideration and a new trial.

Issues:
Whether the respondent court committed grave abuse of discretion by not promptly resolving
the defense of non-suability of the State, thereby lacking jurisdiction.
Whether the municipality could be held liable for the torts committed by its employee, the driver
of the dump truck.

Ruling:
The court determined that while the respondent judge did not commit grave abuse of discretion
in deferring the resolution of the non-suability defense, there was an excess of jurisdiction in
holding the municipality liable for the quasi-delict committed by its regular employee.
Non-suability of the State, as enshrined in Article XVI, Section 3 of the Constitution, stipulates
that the State may not be sued without its consent. The general rule is that the State enjoys
immunity unless it consents to be sued. This consent may be express or implied, such as when
the government enters into business contracts or initiates legal actions. Regarding municipal
corporations, including the petitioner municipality, they are considered agencies of the State
when engaged in governmental functions, enjoying sovereign immunity from suits. However,
they may still be subject to suit when performing proprietary functions, as explicitly provided in
their charter.

The court emphasized the crucial distinction between suability and liability, clarifying that
suability depends on the consent of the state to be sued, while liability is determined by
applicable laws and established facts. In addressing the issue of the municipality's liability for
the torts committed by its employee, the court applied the test of whether the employee, acting
on behalf of the municipality, was performing governmental or proprietary functions. The driver
of the dump truck claimed he was on his way to procure materials for the repair of municipal
streets, and absent evidence to the contrary, the court presumed the regularity of the
performance of official duty.
The court concluded that the municipality could not be held liable for the torts committed by its
regular employee, who was engaged in the discharge of governmental functions. Consequently,
the court granted the petition, modifying the decision to absolve the petitioner municipality of
any liability in favor of the private respondents.
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3. Froilan vs. Pan Oriental Shipping Co., 95 Phil. 905 (1954)

Facts:
Froilan filed a complaint against Pan Oriental Shipping Co. regarding the ownership of a vessel
(FS-197) he purchased from the Shipping Commission. The Cabinet later restored Froilan's
rights after disputes. The Government of the Republic of the Philippines intervened, seeking
possession of the vessel due to Froilan's unpaid balance. Froilan tendered a check, leading to
the lower court's dismissal of the government's intervention. Pan Oriental Shipping Co. then
filed a counterclaim, which was also dismissed.

Issue:
Whether the lower court erred in dismissing Pan Oriental Shipping Co.'s counterclaim based on
the state's immunity from suit.

Ruling:
The court ruled that the state waived its immunity by filing the complaint in intervention, allowing
Pan Oriental Shipping Co.'s counterclaim to proceed. The lower court's decision was reversed.

-----------------------------------------
Facts:
Froilan initiated legal action against Pan Oriental Shipping Co. concerning the ownership of the
vessel FS-197, which he had purchased from the Shipping Commission. The acquisition
involved a down payment of P50,000, with the remaining balance payable in installments.
However, due to various reasons, including non-payment, the Shipping Commission took
possession of the vessel, effectively canceling the contract. The Cabinet later intervened,
restoring Froilan's rights under the original contract. Despite Froilan's repeated demands, Pan
Oriental Shipping Co. refused to relinquish possession.
The Government of the Republic of the Philippines intervened, asserting that Froilan had failed
to fulfill the purchase price, interest, and insurance premium obligations, totaling P162,142.95,
excluding dry-docking expenses. The government sought possession of the vessel under the
original contract or, alternatively, to conduct an extrajudicial sale under the Chattel Mortgage
Law. Froilan attempted to settle his debt by tendering a check to the Board of Liquidators.
The lower court, addressing the government's intervention, ruled in Froilan's favor, stating that
his payment constituted discharge of his obligation to the government. Subsequently, Pan
Oriental Shipping Co. filed a counterclaim, seeking the vessel's delivery from the government if
it recovers it from Froilan. The lower court dismissed this counterclaim.

Issue:
The primary issue on appeal was whether the lower court erred in dismissing Pan Oriental
Shipping Co.'s counterclaim based on the state's immunity from suit.

Ruling:
The lower court erred in dismissing the defendant's counterclaim by the fact that the State is
immune from suit. State is not immune from suit in this case because by filing its complaint in
intervention, the Government in effect waived its right of nonsuability. Immunity of the state from
suits does not deprive it of the right to sue private parties in its own courts. The state as plaintiff
may avail itself of the different forms of actions open to private litigants. By taking the initiative in
an action against a private party, the state surrenders its privileged position and comes down to
the level of the defendant. The defendant automatically acquires, within certain limits, the right
to set up whatever claims and other defenses he might have against the state
The court determined that the state waived its immunity by initiating the complaint in
intervention. Consequently, Pan Oriental Shipping Co.'s counterclaim was allowed to proceed,
and the lower court's dismissal was reversed.
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4. Traders Royal Bank vs IAC; GR 68514; December 17, 1990;

Facts:
In 1940, the Philippine government initiated eminent domain proceedings to acquire land for the
construction of EDSA. However, the records were lost during World War II. In 1958, the estate
of N.T. Hashim, the landowner, claimed compensation for the property, which had been
converted into a public highway. A compromise was reached in 1966, but the Commissioner of
Public Highways failed to fulfill the agreed payment. In 1969, seeking reimbursement, the
Commissioner filed an action for an injunction.

Issues:
Can the petitioners invoke the State's immunity from suit?
Can the State challenge the validity of the compromise agreement executed by the Solicitor
General?
Are the court orders, including the issuance of a writ of execution and the delivery of the
garnished amount, valid?

Ruling:
The petitioners cannot invoke the State's immunity from suit. The case is considered a
continuation of pre-war expropriation proceedings initiated by the State, and the court's
jurisdiction is appropriate for determining just compensation.
The State cannot challenge the validity of the compromise agreement, as it was properly
executed by the Solicitor General with approval and subsequent ratification by the respondent
estate.
The court orders, specifically the issuance of a writ of execution and the delivery of the
garnished amount, are deemed null and void. Government funds are not subject to execution or
garnishment. The ruling emphasizes that legislative appropriation is necessary for any amount
beyond the provisional deposit to fulfill the judgment.

-------------------------------------------------
Facts:
On April 9, 1981, Traders, a banking institution operating under Philippine laws, entered into a
loan agreement with the NMPC, a government instrumentality tasked with the function of
disseminating government information, programs and policies, represented by Director Gregorio
S. Cendaña. Under the loan agreement, Traders approved a credit accommodation in the
amount of two million five hundred twenty thousand pesos (P2,520,000) in favor of NMPC and
PSI through a domestic stand-by letter of credit to guarantee payment of the coverage or
broadcast rights for the 1981 season of the Philippine Basketball Association (PBA). Among the
conditions imposed were that NMPC and PSI would deposit with Traders all collections obtained
from the sponsoring companies and that during the term of said letter of credit they would
maintain in their current account with the bank a balance of at least P500,000 or 20% of the
face value of the letter of credit. NMPC and PSI did not make any payments on their obligation
and did not comply with the conditions agreed upon. Hence, Traders filed in the Court of First
Instance of Rizal at Pasay City a complaint against NMPC and PSI to collect the whole amount
of P2,520,000. They also alleged that defendants were selling substantial portions of their
assets. Subsequently, NMPC filed motions to dismiss, which were denied by the lower court.
This brought them to file before the then Intermediate Appellate Court a petition for Certiorari,
prohibition and mandamus alleging that the lower court gravely abused its discretion in denying
the motion to dismiss and in failing to dissolve the writ of attachment on the grounds that
government property cannot be attached, removed, concealed or disposed of and that the
attachment bond of Traders was not renewed. The appellate court granted its petition. It ruled
that NMPC's act of entering into a contract did not mean that it voluntarily waived its immunity
from suit "inasmuch as NMPC truly has no personality of its own.”

Issue:
Whether or not NMPC’s act of entering into a contract means that it voluntarily waived its
immunity from suit

Ruling:
The doctrine of state immunity from suit is constitutionally recognized and is germane to the
concept of sovereignty. As such, the doctrine may be waived by general or special law.
Immunity from suit may also be waived by an implied consent to be sued as when, through its
officers and agents, the state enters into a contract in furtherance of a legitimate aim and
purpose. By doing so, the state descends to the level of the citizen and its consent to be sued is
implied from the very act of entering into such contract. A problem usually arises when a
government entity, though unincorporated and therefore not possessed of a distinct juridical
personality, enters into a contract which, by its nature, is proprietary in character. Should this
transpire, the test of the state's suability is this: "If said non-governmental function is undertaken
as an incident to its governmental function, there is no waiver thereby of the sovereign immunity
from suit extended to such government entity." In others words, if the transaction, contract or
operation undertaken by the government entity is a necessary incident of its prime
governmental function, said entity is immune from suit.
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5. Commissioner of Public Highways vs San Diego; 31 SCRA 616, 625 (1970) Commissioner of
Public Highway v. San Diego -C.J. Enrique Fernando

Facts:

In 1940, the Philippine Government initiated an eminent domain proceeding to expropriate a

parcel of land for the construction of Epifanio de los Santos Avenue. The government took
possession of the land, making a provisional deposit with the City Treasurer. The records of the
expropriation case were lost during World War II. In 1958, the estate of the landowner claimed
P522,620.00 as the fair market value of the property. A complaint for recovery of P672,030.00
was filed in 1963 against the Bureau of Public Highways, the Auditor General, and the City
Engineer. In 1966, a compromise agreement was reached, and the government agreed to pay
P209,076.00 for the expropriated lot. In 1968, the estate filed for the execution of the judgment,
resulting in the garnishment of P209,076.00 from the Bureau of Public Highways' account with
the Philippine National Bank. The bank complied with the garnishment, and the funds were paid
to the estate. The Bureau of Public Highways filed a special civil action against respondents,
seeking to declare the orders null and void.

Issue:
Whether government funds are subject to execution or garnishment.
Ruling:
The court ruled that government funds are not subject to execution or garnishment. The court
cited the fundamental precept that disbursements of public funds must be covered by the
corresponding appropriation as required by law. The orders for execution and garnishment were
declared null and void. The compromise agreement was deemed valid and binding, and the
appointment of a special sheriff was declared unauthorized. The court ordered reimbursement
of the garnished amount and informed the Philippine National Bank's Board of Directors about
the decision.
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SEPARATION OF POWERS
a. Cases:
1. Estrada vs Desierto; G.R. No. 146710-15; March 2, 2001
Former President Joseph Estrada filed two petitions: one for prohibition against the
Ombudsman's preliminary investigation on charges of plunder, graft, and corruption, and
another for quo warranto against Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo. The accusations stemmed from
Governor Chavit Singson's claim that Estrada received money from jueteng lords, triggering an
impeachment trial.

Facts:
Singson's accusations led to a joint investigation and impeachment proceedings.
A controversial Senate vote and public protests (EDSA II) ensued, leading to Arroyo's oath as
president.
Estrada signed a vaguely worded letter, resulting in Arroyo assuming power and the Senate
terminating the impeachment trial.
Estrada faced charges, prompting his petitions alleging non-resignation, leave of absence,
presidential immunity, and prejudicial publicity.

Issues:
1. Did Estrada resign?
2. Is Estrada on leave, making Arroyo Acting President?
3. Is Estrada immune from prosecution?
4. Should Ombudsman's investigation be stopped due to prejudicial publicity?

Rulings:
Resignation: The Court found Estrada's intent to resign during negotiations, even if not explicitly
stated.
Leave of absence: The Court deferred to Congress on the political nature of a president's ability
to discharge duties. Congress had recognized Arroyo as president.
Immunity: The Court ruled that resignation or retirement doesn't shield a president from
prosecution; charges against Estrada were valid.
Prejudicial publicity: The Court required stronger evidence of bias, dismissing the claim based
on insufficient proof.
The Supreme Court dismissed both petitions.
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2. Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company vs. Tobias; GR No. 177780; January 25, 2012 –
Abuse of Discretion
Facts:
Tobias was charged with estafa for falsifying public documents in connection with a loan from
Metrobank. Despite Tobias's motion for re-investigation, the City Prosecutor of Malabon found
probable cause and recommended charges. Tobias appealed to the DOJ, which, after re-
investigation, directed the withdrawal of charges against him. Metrobank moved for
reconsideration, but it was denied.

Issue:
The central question was whether the Court of Appeals (CA) made a decision consistent with
the law when it upheld the Department of Justice's (DOJ) withdrawal of charges based on the
executive's discretionary authority in determining probable cause.

Ruling:
The court ruled in favor of the CA, citing the doctrine of separation of powers. It emphasized that
courts cannot interfere with the executive's discretionary authority unless there is a clear and
grave abuse of discretion. The decision highlighted the need for evident abuse, as
demonstrated in Balanganan v. Court of Appeals, where the Secretary of Justice was found to
have exceeded jurisdiction by imposing an undue requirement for "hard facts and solid
evidence" before initiating criminal prosecution.
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DELEGATION OF POWERS
a. Cases:
1. Jesus Garcia vs Drilon; GR 179267; June 25, 2013;
Facts:
Rosalie Jaype-Garcia sought a Temporary Protection Order (TPO) against her husband, Jesus
C. Garcia, citing physical, emotional, and economic abuse due to his marital infidelity. The affair
with a bank manager led to confrontations and fights, resulting in mental and emotional distress
for Rosalie. The TPO was issued by the RTC of Bacolod City, continually renewed as financial
support was denied. Jesus challenged the TPO's validity, questioning the constitutionality of
R.A. 9262.

Issues:
Does R.A. 9262 violate equal protection?
Does R.A. 9262 violate due process?
Does R.A. 9262 unduly delegate judicial power to barangay officials?

Ruling:
R.A. 9262 does not violate equal protection, as it addresses the real differences and gender
bias in violence against women.
R.A. 9262 does not violate due process; the TPO ex parte is justified to protect victims promptly.
The classification under R.A. 9262 is not limited to existing conditions, ensuring ongoing
protection for women and children facing violence.
the Court upheld the constitutionality of R.A. 9262, emphasizing its necessity in addressing the
specific challenges faced by women and children experiencing domestic violence. The TPO,
issued ex parte, was justified as a swift protective measure, and the gender-based classification
was found to be reasonable and aligned with the law's objectives.
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2. Imbong vs Ochoa; GR 204829; April 8, 2014;

FACTS:
Multiple petitions were filed challenging the constitutionality of RA No. 10354, the Responsible
Parenthood and Reproductive Health Act of 2012 (RH Law), based on various grounds,
including concerns about abortion, health hazards, religious freedom, freedom of speech, and
constitutional violations related to family rights, freedom of expression, and academic freedom.

Issues:
1. Violating the constitutional principle of non-delegation of Legislative authority – Congress
delegates to the FDA the power to determine whether a product is non-abortifacient and to be
included in the Emergency Drugs List (EDL)
2. Infringing upon the powers devolved to LGUs – infringes upon the powers devolved to LGUs
and the ARMM under the Local Government Code and RA No. 9054

Ruling:
1. Petitioners question the delegation by Congress to the FDA of the power to determine
whether or not a supply or product is to be included in the Essential Drugs List (EDL). The Court
finds nothing wrong with the delegation. The FDA does not only have the power but also the
competency to evaluate, register, and cover health services and methods.
2. Petitioners claim that the RH Law infringes upon the power devolved to local government
units (LGUs). Section 17 vested upon the LGUs the duties and functions pertaining to the
delivery of basic services and facilities. The essence of the express reservation of power (Sec.
17 (c)) by the national government is that, unless an LGU is particularly designated as the
implementing agency, it has no power over a program for which funding has been provided by
the national government under the annual general appropriations act, even if the program
involves the delivery of basic services within the jurisdiction of the LGU. The provisions relied
upon by the petitioners simply delineate the powers that may be exercised by the regional
government, which can, in no manner, be characterized as an abdication by the State of its
power to enact legislation that would benefit the general welfare. Congress cannot be restricted
to exercise its inherent and plenary power to legislate on all subjects which extends to all
matters of general concern or common interest.
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FUNDAMENTAL POWERS OF THE STATE

a. Power of Eminent Domain
1. NAPOCOR vs. CA; GR 113194; March 11, 1996 – Just Compensation
FACTS :
In 1978, National Power Corporation (NAPOCOR), took possession of a land situated in Marawi
City, owned by Mangondato. Napocor believed that the said land is part of the public land
reserved for hydroelectric power purposes. Mangondato demanded compensation from
NAPOCOR for taking the land. NAPOCOR refused to compensate insisting that the property is
public land. Mangondato claimed that the subject land is his duly registered private property.
More than a decade later NAPOCOR agreed to the fact that the property belongs to
Mangondato. CFI and CA ordered NAPOCOR to pay P21,995.000.00, NAPACOR question the
said value.

ISSUE:
1. At what point in time should the value of the land subject of expropriation be computed: at
the date of the taking or the date of the filing of the complaint?
2. When is There "Taking" of Property?

RULING:
1. At the time of the complaint.
The general rule in determining "just compensation" in eminent domain is the value of the
property as of the date of the filing of complaint, as follows:
Sec. 4. Order of Condemnation. When such a motion is overruled or when any party fails to
defend as required by this rule, the court may enter an order of condemnation declaring that the
plaintiff has a lawful right to take the property sought to be condemned, for the public use or
purpose described in the complaint, upon the payment of just compensation to, be determined
as of the date of the filing of the complaint.
2. There is taking of property when:
(1) an expropriator enters a private property;
(2) the entrance into private property must be for more than a momentary period;
(3) the entry into the property should be under warrant or color of legal authority;
(4) property must be devoted to a public use or otherwise informally appropriated or injuriously
affected;
(5) the utilization of the property for public use must be in such a way to oust the owner and
deprive him of all beneficial enjoyment of the property.

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2. City of Manila vs Te; 658 SCRA 88; 2011

FACTS:
Melban Tan Te, respondent, had acquired the property from the heirs of Emerlinda Dimayuga
Reyes in 1996, and back then it was being occupied by a number of families whose leasehold
rights had long expired even prior to said sale. In 1998, respondent had sought before the
Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila, Branch 15 the ejectment of these occupants from the
premises.
On March 15, 1998, then Manila City Mayor Joselito L. Atienza approved Ordinance No. 7951 -
an expropriation measure enacted on February 3, 1998 by the city council - authorizing him to
acquire by negotiation or expropriation certain pieces of real property along Maria Clara and
Governor Forbes Streets where low-cost housing units could be built and then awarded to bona
fide residents therein.
The favorable ruling in that case evaded execution; hence, the court, despite opposition of the
City of Manila, issued a Writ of Demolition at respondent'sq instance. It appears that in the
interim between the issuance of the writ of execution and the order of demolition, the City of
Manila had instituted an expropriation case affecting the same property. Respondent had
moved for the dismissal of that first expropriation case for lack of cause of action, lack of
showing of an ordinance authorizing the expropriation, and noncompliance with the provisions
of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7279, otherwise known as the Urban Development and Housing Act
of 1992. The trial court found merit in the motion and dismissed the complaint without prejudice.
Series of trial had been executed. The petitioner changes it adopts a different theory which is
the power of eminent domain. They didn’t need to comply with provision of RA No. 7279 since it
is a valid expropriation for public purpose and respondent was already compensated of 1M
deposited in trust.

ISSUES: Whether or not the expropriation is for public purpose?

RULING: Yes, the expropriation is for public purpose. The public use requirement for a valid
exercise of the power of eminent domain is a flexible and evolving concept influenced by
changing conditions. Urban renewal or development and the construction of low-cost housing
are recognized as a public purpose, not only because of the expanded concept of public use but
also because of specific provisions in the Constitution.
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3.Republic vs. Castelvi; 58 SCRA 336

Facts:
In 1947, the Republic leased a property in Pampanga from Castellvi through the Armed Forces
of the Philippines (AFP). When Castellvi declined to renew the lease in 1956, the Republic
proposed expropriation due to permanent installations. Castellvi filed an ejectment case, and
concurrently, an expropriation proceeding was initiated by the Republic.

Issue:
The key issue was whether compensation for the expropriation should be based on the
property's value in 1947 when the lease began or in 1959 when the expropriation complaint was
filed.

Ruling:
The Supreme Court ruled that the "taking" for eminent domain did not occur in 1947 but when
the expropriation complaint was filed in 1959. The requisites for eminent domain were partially
met, but since the entry was deemed "momentary" under a lease, and ownership and beneficial
enjoyment were retained by Castellvi, just compensation was determined as of the filing date in
1959, following Rule 67, Section 4 of the Rules of Court.
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4. Mactan Cebu International Airport vs Lozada, Jr.; GR 176625; February 25, 2010
FACTS:
Petition seeks to overturn CA's Feb 28, 2006, Decision and Feb 7, 2007, Resolution. RTC
initially ruled in favor of petitioners (MCIAA and ATO), directing return of Lot No. 88 upon
expropriation payment. Lot, spanning 1,017 sqm in Lahug, Cebu, was originally owned by
Anastacio Deiparine and subjected to expropriation for Lahug Airport expansion.
Lot occupied by U.S. Army in 1947, transferred to various agencies, finally to CAA. Bernardo
Lozada, Sr. acquired Lot 88 during expropriation. Trial court ordered Republic to pay Lozada fair
market value; he received P3018.00. ATO proposed a compromise, suggesting resale at
expropriated price if owners refrain from appealing. Lahug Airport expansion did not materialize,
and ATO, now known as Air Transportation Office, did not sell lots, citing a potential emergency
airport need. President Aquino directed Lahug Airport closure; Congress passed RA 6958 for
Mactan-Cebu Int'l Airport Authority.

ISSUE:
The key issue is whether the abandonment of the intended use gives the private owner the right
to reacquisition.

RULING:
The court ruled affirmatively. Eminent domain is contingent upon the property's use for the
specified public purpose. If the intended purpose is abandoned, former owners can seek
reversion, returning compensation. The expropriator must commit to the stated purpose; failure
necessitates return or filing a new petition. The denial of the petition is based on the lack of
proper exercise of eminent domain, violating due process.
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b. Police power
1. Chavez vs Romulo; GR 157036; June 9, 2004
Facts:
The case involves a petition filed by Francisco I. Chavez, a licensed gun owner, seeking to
prohibit the implementation of guidelines issued by Hermogenes E. Ebdane, Jr., Chief of the
Philippine National Police (PNP). These guidelines restrict the carrying of firearms outside of
residences. Chavez's request to reconsider the guidelines was denied, leading to the filing of
the petition against public respondents Ebdane, Alberto G. Romulo, and Gerry L. Barias.

Issue:
Whether Chief Ebdane is authorized to issue the guidelines.
Whether the guidelines, restricting the carrying of firearms outside the residence, constitute a
valid exercise of police power.
Ruling:
The court affirmed the authority of the PNP Chief, stating that under delegated authority, the
Chief has the power to issue regulations regarding firearms.
The court ruled that the guidelines, aimed at maintaining peace and order due to the
proliferation of crimes, particularly by groups like the New People’s Army, are a valid exercise of
police power. The restriction on carrying firearms outside the residence was considered
reasonable, with the option for individuals to re-apply for permits. The court dismissed the
petition.
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2. MMDA vs Garin; GR 130230; April 15, 2005

Facts:
Dante Garin, a lawyer, had his driver's license confiscated by the MMDA for illegal parking in
Binondo, Manila. The traffic violation receipt (TVR) he received outlined instructions for
reporting to the MMDA Traffic Operations Center and warned of criminal charges if the license
wasn't redeemed within 30 days. Garin sought the return of his license through a letter to
MMDA Chairman Prospero Oreta. Receiving no response, Garin filed a complaint, arguing that
the absence of implementing rules for RA 7924 allowed the MMDA to unlawfully deprive
motorists of their licenses, violating due process and constituting an undue delegation of
legislative authority.

Issue:
The main issue was whether the state, in exercising its police power, can validly withhold a
motorist's license.

Ruling:
The court held that a license to operate a motor vehicle is a privilege, not a property right,
subject to suspension or revocation by the state in the exercise of its police power for public
safety. However, the MMDA was not vested with police power or legislative authority. Its
functions were deemed administrative, and the absence of a law expressly granting it the power
to confiscate licenses without further legislative enactment was considered an unauthorized
exercise of police power. The court emphasized that the MMDA could enforce existing traffic
rules but couldn't enact ordinances. The case became moot due to the implementation of a new
system, rendering the need to decide on license confiscation obsolete.
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3. Buklod ng Magbubukid vs E.M. Ramos; GR 131481; March 10,2011;

Facts:
The case involves a 372-hectare property in Dasmarinas, Cavite, initially owned by Manila Golf
and Country Club and later acquired by EMRASON for residential development. In 1972, the
Municipal Council passed Ordinance No. 29-A, approving EMRASON's application for
subdivision. Delays occurred, and the property faced mortgage-related challenges. In 1990, the
DAR initiated acquisition notices under the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (CARL), which
EMRASON contested.

Issue:
The central question is whether the property can be subjected to the Comprehensive Agrarian
Reform Program (CARP) under the CARL.

Ruling:
No, the court ruled against placing the property under CARP. The CARL exempts lands
converted to non-agricultural uses before June 15, 1988. As the property was reclassified as
residential in 1972 through Resolution No. 29-A, it was deemed exempt from CARP. The court
emphasized that the tax declarations classifying it as agricultural could not prevail over the
earlier reclassification resolution.

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4. Ynot vs. IAC; GR 74457; March 20, 1987

On January 13, 1984, the petitioner transported six carabaos in a pump boat from Masbate to
Iloilo when the same was confiscated by the police station commander of Barotac Nuevo, Iloilo
for the violation of E.O. 626-A. A case was filed by the petitioner questioning the constitutionality
of executive order and the recovery of the carabaos. After considering the merits of the case,
the confiscation was sustained and the court declined to rule on the constitutionality issue. The
petitioner appealed the decision to the Intermediate Appellate Court but it also upheld the ruling
of RTC.

Issue:
Is E.O. 626-A unconstitutional?

Ruling:
The Respondent contends that it is a valid exercise of police power to justify EO 626-A
amending EO 626 in basic rule prohibiting the slaughter of carabaos except under certain
conditions. The supreme court said that The reasonable connection between the means
employed and the purpose sought to be achieved by the questioned measure is missing the
Supreme Court do not see how the prohibition of the inter-provincial transport of carabaos can
prevent their indiscriminate slaughter, considering that they can be killed anywhere, with no less
difficulty in one province than in another. Obviously, retaining the carabaos in one province will
not prevent their slaughter there, any more than moving them to another province will make it
easier to kill them there
The Supreme Court found E.O. 626-A unconstitutional. The executive act defined the
prohibition, convicted the petitioner and immediately imposed punishment, which was carried
out forthright. Due process was not properly observed. In the instant case, the carabaos were
arbitrarily confiscated by the police station commander, were returned to the petitioner only after
he had filed a complaint for recovery and given a supersedeas bond of P12,000.00. The
measure struck at once and pounced upon the petitioner without giving him a chance to be
heard, thus denying due process.
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5. Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel Operators vs. City of Manila – July 31, 1967
City Ordinance 4760, enacted by the municipal board of the City of Manila, aimed to regulate
hotels and motels. The ordinance introduced a fee structure, mandated guest registration with
personal data disclosure, restricted the acceptance of minors without guardians, and imposed
limitations on room leasing frequency. Violation carried the penalty of automatic license
cancellation. Dissatisfied with the ordinance, the petitioners filed a case seeking prohibition
against the Mayor of Manila, who was responsible for enforcing city ordinances.

Issue:
The central issue addressed whether the regulations outlined in City Ordinance 4760,
specifically concerning hotels and motels, were constitutionally valid.

Ruling:
The Supreme Court ruled in favor of the ordinance's validity. Emphasizing its purpose to
address societal concerns such as rising rates of prostitution and adultery, the court affirmed the
state's authority to impose reasonable restrictions under the police power. The lower court's
decision, which declared the ordinance unconstitutional and void, was reversed. Consequently,
the injunction was lifted, allowing the enforcement of City Ordinance 4760.
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c. Power of Taxation
1. Gerochi vs Department of Energy; GR 159796; July 17, 2007 – Police Power vs
Taxation
Facts:
The Electric Power Industry Reform Act of 2001 (EPIRA) was enacted by Congress on June 8,
2001, and took effect on June 26, 2001. Following this, the National Power Corporation-
Strategic Power Utilities Group (NPC-SPUG) filed two petitions with the Energy Regulatory
Commission (ERC). The first petition sought the NPC's share for Missionary Electrification from
the Universal Charge, and the second petition requested approval to withdraw funds from the
Special Trust Fund (STF) for watershed rehabilitation. The ERC provisionally approved the
Universal Charge for Missionary Electrification, later modifying it to P0.0373/kWh. Additionally,
the ERC authorized the NPC to withdraw P70,000,000.00 from the STF for watershed
rehabilitation. Consequently, Panay Electric Company, Inc. (PECO) charged consumers the
Universal Charge based on ERC decisions. In response, petitioners sought relief from the
Supreme Court, challenging the constitutionality of the Universal Charge and seeking a refund.

Issue:
The central issue in this case was whether the Universal Charge imposed under Section 34 of
the EPIRA is considered a tax.

Ruling:
The Supreme Court ruled that the Universal Charge is not a tax but an exaction in the exercise
of the State's police power. While tax power is unlimited and intended for public purposes,
police power regulates the use of liberty and property for public welfare. The Universal Charge,
as imposed, serves regulatory purposes outlined in the EPIRA and is deemed an exaction for
the State's police objectives. Consequently, the case was dismissed for lack of merit.
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2. MIAA vs CA; GR 155650; July 20, 2006

Facts:
The Manila International Airport Authority (MIAA), operating the Ninoy Aquino International
Airport (NAIA) Complex, initially paid real estate tax based on an Office of the Government
Corporate Counsel (OGCC) opinion. The City of Parañaque later issued tax delinquency
notices, prompting MIAA's petition to the Court of Appeals, which was dismissed. MIAA,
claiming exemption under its charter and the Local Government Code (LGC), appealed to
restrain the imposition of real estate tax.

Issue:
The central question was whether MIAA's airport lands and buildings are exempt from real
estate tax, considering the LGC's withdrawal of tax exemptions for government-owned
corporations.

Ruling:
The court ruled in favor of MIAA, stating that its airport lands and buildings are exempt from real
estate tax under LGC Section 243(a), which exempts real property owned by the Republic of the
Philippines. The court emphasized the principle that local governments cannot tax national
government instrumentalities, clarifying that MIAA, as a government instrumentality, is not
subject to real estate tax. The ruling highlighted the Republic's continued ownership of the
properties and specified that portions leased to private entities are taxable.