PD 8010-3:2009+A1:2013

BSI Standards Publication

PUBLISHED DOCUMENT

Pipeline systems –
Part 3: Steel pipelines on land –
Guide to the application of pipeline risk
assessment to proposed developments
in the vicinity of major accident hazard
pipelines containing flammables –
Supplement to PD 8010‑1:2004

This publication is not to be regarded as a British Standard.

PD 8010-3:2009+A1:2013 PUBLISHED DOCUMENT

Publishing and copyright information

The BSI copyright notice displayed in this document indicates when the
document was last issued.

© The British Standards Institution 2013

Published by BSI Standards Limited 2013

ISBN 978 0 580 81738 0

ICS 23.040.10, 75.200

The following BSI references relate to the work on this standard:

Committee reference PSE/17/2
Drafts for comment 07/30138021 DC; 13/30277256 DC

Publication history
First published December 2008

Amendments issued since publication

Date Text affected

31 July 2013 A1. See Foreword.

PUBLISHED DOCUMENT PD 8010-3:2009+A1:2013

Contents
Foreword iii
Introduction 1
1 Scope 3
2 Normative references 3
3 Abbreviations 3
4 Risk assessment of buried pipelines – Overview 4
5 Failure of hazardous gas or liquid pipelines 5
6 Individual risk assessment 14
7 Societal risk assessment 16
8 Factors affecting risk levels 20
Annexes
Annex A (informative) Summary of HSE methodology for provision
of advice on planning developments in the vicinity of major accident
hazard pipelines in the UK 30
Annex B (informative) Failure frequencies for UK pipelines 36
Annex C (informative) Example of a site-specific risk assessment 45
Bibliography 50
List of figures
Figure 1 – Overview of PD 8010-3 2
Figure 2 – Event tree for the failure of a hazardous pipeline 6
Figure 3 – Risk calculation flowchart for flammable substances 8
Figure 4 – Calculation of pipeline length affecting an individual in the
vicinity of a pipeline 15
Figure 5 – Framework for the tolerability of individual risk 16
Figure 6 – Societal risk FN criterion line applicable to 1 km of
pipeline 18
Figure 7 – Site-specific pipeline interaction distance 19
Figure 8 – Reduction in external interference total failure frequency
due to design factor 23
Figure 9 – Reduction in external interference total failure frequency
due to wall thickness 24
Figure 10 – Reduction in external interference total failure frequency
due to depth of cover 25
Figure 11 – Indicative reduction in external interference total failure
frequency due to surveillance frequency (dependent on frequency and
duration of unauthorized excavations) 26
Figure A.1 – Planning application process and need for site-specific
risk assessment 33
Figure B.1 – Generic predicted pipeline failure frequencies for
third‑party interference 37
Figure B.1a – Proportion of ruptures to be applied to the total failure
rate derived from Figure B.1 38
Figure B.2 – Figure deleted
Figure B.3 – Figure deleted
Figure B.4 – Figure deleted
Figure B.5 – Survival value trend lines for rupture due to natural
landsliding 43
Figure C.1 – Proposed development 45
Figure C.2 – Risk for outside exposure 47
Figure C.3 Societal risk FN curves and PD 8010-3 FN criterion line –
proposed development before and after slabbing 48

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List of tables
Table 1 – Range of applicability of reduction factor for design factor,
Rdf, and reduction factor due to wall thickness, Rwt 25
Table 2 – Failure frequency reduction factors, Rp, for pipeline
protection 26
Table A.0 – Risk reduction factors for slabbing applied by HSE 31
Table A.1 – Typical (1 × 10−6) and (0.3 × 10−6) risk distances for ethylene,
spiked crude and natural gas liquids (NGLs) 34
Table B.1 – Table deleted
Table B.2 – Table deleted
Table B.3 – Table deleted
Table B.3a – Example calculations of pipeline failure frequency due to
external interference 39
Table B.4 – Table deleted
Table B.5 – Table deleted
Table B.6 – Table deleted
Table B.7 – Table deleted
Table B.8 – Table deleted
Table B.9 – Table deleted
Table B.10 – Table deleted
Table B.11 – Table deleted
Table B.12 – Critical defect lengths and equivalent hole diameters for
UKOPA pipeline cases operating at a design factor of 0.72 40
Table B.13 – Failure frequency due to external corrosion 40
Table B.14 – Material and construction failure frequency vs. wall
thickness 41
Table B.15 – Indicative UK landsliding incident rates 42

Summary of pages
This document comprises a front cover, an inside front cover,
pages i to iv, pages 1 to 52, an inside back cover and a back cover.

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Foreword
Publishing information

This part of PD 8010 is published by BSI Standards Limited, under
licence from The British Standards Institution, and came into effect
on 1 January 2009. It was prepared by Subcommittee PSE/17/2,
Pipeline transportation systems, under the authority of Technical
Committee PSE/17, Materials and equipment for petroleum. A list
of organizations represented on this committee can be obtained on
request to its secretary.

Supersession

PD 8010-3:2009+A1:2013 supersedes PD 8010-3:2009, which is
withdrawn.

Relationship with other publications

PD 8010‑3 should be read in conjunction with PD 8010‑1. The series
comprises:
• Part 1: Steel pipelines on land;
• Part 2: Subsea pipelines;
• Part 3: Steel pipelines on land – Guide to the application of
pipeline risk assessment to proposed developments in the vicinity
of major accident hazard pipelines containing flammables –
Supplement to PD 8010‑1:2004;
• Part 4: Steel pipelines on land and subsea pipelines – Code of
practice for integrity management.
A new part of the series, PD 8010-5, is in preparation.

Information about this document

This publication is not to be regarded as a British Standard.
This part of PD 8010 includes worked examples and benchmark
solutions that can be used as a basis for specific studies.
The start and finish of text introduced or altered by Amendment No.1
is indicated in the text by tags . Minor editorial changes are not
tagged.
Amendment A1 introduces the following principal changes:
• clarification on application criteria for ALARP assessment and
land use planning;
• updates to slabbing protective measures and depth of cover;
• updates to HSE methodology;
• updates to UKOPA failure frequency data.

Use of this document

As a code of practice, this part of PD 8010 takes the form of guidance
and recommendations. It should not be quoted as if it were a
specification and particular care should be taken to ensure that claims
of compliance are not misleading.
Any user claiming compliance with this part of PD 8010 is expected
to be able to justify any course of action that deviates from its
recommendations.

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As with any risk assessment, judgement has to be employed by the

risk assessor at all stages of the assessment. This part of PD 8010 is
intended to support the application of expert judgement. The final
responsibility for the risk assessment lies with the assessor, and it is
essential that the assessor is able to justify every key assumption made
in the assessment and that these assumptions are documented as part
of the assessment.

Presentational conventions

The provisions in this Published Document are presented in roman
(i.e. upright) type. Its recommendations are expressed in sentences in
which the principal auxiliary verb is “should”.
Commentary, explanation and general informative material is presented
in smaller italic type, and does not constitute a normative element.

Contractual and legal considerations

This publication does not purport to include all the necessary provisions
of a contract. Users are responsible for its correct application.
Compliance with a Published Document cannot confer immunity from
legal obligations.
Attention is particularly drawn to the Pipelines Safety
Regulations 1996 [1] and to the requirements for risk assessments in
UK health and safety legislation, in particular:
• the Health and Safety at Work etc Act 1974 [2];
• the Management of Health & Safety at Work Regulations 1992,
amended 1999 [3].

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Introduction
PD 8010‑1:2004, Clause 5 and Annex F provide guidance on the
route selection and location of new pipelines in populated areas
in terms of the acceptable proximity to significant inhabited areas.
Clause 5 classifies locations adjacent to pipelines into location
classes 1, 2 and 3 according to population density and/or nature of the
immediate surrounding area.
The general approach to the risk assessment process follows the
stages outlined in PD 8010‑1:2004, Annex E. The present part of
PD 8010 includes recommendations for:
• determining failure frequencies;
• consequence modelling;
• standard assumptions to be applied in the risk assessment
methodology for land use planning zones;
• conducting site‑specific risk assessments;
• risk reduction factors to be applied for mitigation methods;
• benchmark results for individual and societal risk levels.
This part of PD 8010 provides guidance for the risk assessment of
developments in the vicinity of major hazard pipelines containing
flammable substances notified under the Pipelines Safety
Regulations 1996 [1]. It does not cover toxic substances which are
also notified under these Regulations. The guidance is specific to
the calculation of safety risks posed to developments in the vicinity
of UK major accident hazard pipelines, but the principles of the risk
calculation are generally applicable. The use of such risk assessments
to determine the acceptability of developments in accordance with
land use planning applied in Great Britain is discussed in Annex A. The
guidance does not cover environmental risks.
An overview of the document content is given in Figure 1.
The guidance in this part of PD 8010 is provided for the benefit
of pipeline operators, local planning authorities, developers and
any person involved in the risk assessment of developments in
close proximity to existing major accident hazard pipelines. It
is based on the established best practice methodology for pipeline
risk assessment, and is intended to be applied by competent risk
assessment practitioners.
For significant developments or infringements the pipeline operator
might wish to carry out risk assessment using societal risk analysis for
comparison with suitable risk criteria to allow the operator to assess
whether the risks remain within acceptable limits. Clause 7 describes
the application of societal risk, and includes a recommended
FN criterion line.

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Figure 1 Overview of PD 8010-3

Scope Clause 1
Safety risks caused
by flammable
substances only

Risk assessment of buried Clause 4

pipelines

Consequences: Failure of a gas or liquid

Prediction 5.3 pipeline
Probability of 5.4 Event tree 5.1
ignition Prediction of failure 5.2, 8.2
Thermal radiation frequency Annex B
and effects 5.5

Calculation of
risk and risk
criteria
Individual Clause 6
Societal Clause 7

Factors affecting risk levels Clause 8

Failure frequency 8.1
Failure frequency reduction 8.2, Annex B
factors
Implementation of risk mitigation
measures 8.3

Supporting annexes:
Summary of HSE methodology for the Annex A
provision of land use planning advice in the
vicinity of UK MAHPs
Failure frequencies for UK pipelines Annex B
Example of a site-specific risk assessment Annex C

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1 Scope
This part of PD 8010 provides a recommended framework for carrying
out an assessment of the acute safety risks associated with a major
accident hazard pipeline (MAHP) containing flammable substances
as defined in the Pipelines Safety Regulations [1]. It provides
guidance on the selection of pipeline failure frequencies and the
modelling of failure consequences for the prediction of individual and
societal risks.
The principles of this part of PD 8010 are based on best practice for
the quantified risk analysis of new pipelines and existing pipelines.
It is not intended to replace or duplicate existing risk analysis
methodology, but is intended to support the application of the
methodology and provide recommendations for its use.
This part of PD 8010 is applicable to buried pipelines on land that
can be used to carry category D and category E substances that are
hazardous by nature, being flammable and therefore liable to cause
harm to persons. The guidance does not cover environmental risks.

2 Normative references
The following referenced documents are indispensable for the
application of this document. For dated references, only the edition
cited applies. For undated references, the latest edition of the
referenced document (including any amendments) applies.
PD 8010-1:2004, Code of practice for pipelines – Part 1: Steel pipelines
on land
UKOPA. Specification – Impact protection slabs. UKOPA/13/027.
Ambergate, Derbyshire: UKOPA, 2013.

3 Abbreviations
For the purposes of this part of PD 8010, the following abbreviations
apply.
ALARP as low as reasonably practicable
FFREQ methodology recommended by UKOPA for prediction of
pipeline failure frequencies due to external interference
HSE Health and Safety Executive
LFG liquefied flammable gases, including liquefied petroleum
gases (LPG), liquefied natural gas (LNG), and natural gas
liquids (NGL)
MAHP major accident hazard pipeline
MAOP maximum allowable operating pressure
MDOB minimum distance to occupied building
PoF probability of failure
SMYS specified minimum yield strength
Tdu thermal dose units

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TS tensile strength
UKOPA United Kingdom Onshore Pipeline Operators Association
VCE vapour cloud explosion

4 Risk assessment of buried pipelines –

Overview
The failure of a pipeline containing a flammable substance (which
can be a gas, a liquid, a dense-phase supercritical fluid or a two- or
three-phase fluid) has the potential to cause serious damage to the
surrounding population, property and the environment. Failure
can occur due to a range of potential causes, including accidental
damage, corrosion, fatigue and ground movement. The acute safety
consequences of such a failure are primarily due to the thermal
radiation from an ignited release, whether directly (from the main
release) or indirectly (from secondary fires).
Quantified risk assessment applied to a pipeline involves the
numerical estimation of risk by calculation resulting from the
frequencies and consequences of a complete and representative set of
credible accident scenarios.
In general terms, a quantified risk assessment of a hazardous gas or
liquid pipeline consists of the following stages:
a) gathering data (pipeline and its location, meteorological
conditions, physical properties of the substance, population) (5.1);
b) prediction of the frequency of the failures to be considered in the
assessment (5.2);
c) prediction of the consequences for the various failure scenarios
(5.3), including:
• calculation of release flow rate;
• estimation of dispersion of flammable vapours;
• determination of ignition probability;
• calculation of the thermal radiation emitted by fire in an
ignited release;
• quantification of the effects of thermal radiation on the
surrounding population;
d) calculation of risks and assessment against criteria:
• estimation of individual risk (Clause 6);
• estimation of societal risk (Clause 7);
e) identification of site-specific risk reduction measures (Clause 8).
Pipeline failure frequency is usually expressed in failures per kilometre
year or per 1 000 kilometre years (km·y). Failure frequency should be
predicted using verified failure models and predictive methodologies
[4, 5, 6, 7], or otherwise derived from historical incidents that
have occurred in large populations of existing pipelines that are
representative of the population under consideration, as recorded in
recognized, published pipeline data. Various factors may then be taken
into account for the specific pipeline design and operating conditions
to obtain the failure rate to be applied.

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NOTE Predictive models can be generated for all damage types and
failure modes depending on the data available. In the UK, third-party
interference is the dominant mode, and predictive models based on
operational data are available [4, 5, 6, 7]. In general, failure frequency
due to other damage types is derived using historical data [8, 9, 10].
The consequences of pipeline failures should be predicted
using verified mathematical models, the results validated using
experimental data at various scales up to full or comparison with
recognized solutions, as well as comparison of model predictions
with the recorded consequences of real incidents. The results of a
consequence analysis should take into account all feasible events,
in terms of the effect distance (radius) over which people are likely
to become casualties. This should take into account people both
outdoors and indoors.
Pipelines present an extended source of hazard, and can pose a risk to
developments at different locations along their route. Where a length
of pipeline over which a location-specific accident scenario could
affect the population is associated with a specific development, the
full length over which a pipeline failure could affect the population
or part of the population should be taken into account in the risk
assessment. This length is known as the interaction distance (see
Clause 6 and Clause 7).

5 Failure of hazardous gas or liquid pipelines

5.1 General
Failure of a hazardous gas or liquid pipeline has the potential to cause
damage to the surrounding population, property and the environment.
Failure can occur due to a range of potential causes, including
accidental damage, corrosion, fatigue and ground movement. The
consequences of failure are primarily due to the thermal radiation
that is produced if the release ignites. This can be caused directly, or
indirectly by igniting secondary fires. Illustrative event trees for the
failure of a hazardous pipeline are shown in Figure 2.
NOTE 1 For detailed explanation of some of the consequence models
which have been applied by HSE to derive existing Land Use Planning
zones, see [11] to [14].
Failure of a high pressure pipeline can occur as a leak or rupture.
Leaks are defined as fluid loss through a stable defect; ruptures are
defined as fluid loss through an unstable defect which extends during
failure, so the release area is normally equivalent to two open ends.
The escaping fluid can ignite, resulting in a fireball, crater fire or jet
fire which generates thermal radiation. Typical event trees for the
failure of gas and liquid pipelines are shown in Figure 2.
NOTE 2 Spray fire is equivalent to a jet fire from a liquid line. Fireballs
are technically not possible but vapour cloud explosions (VCEs) can occur
where the liquid in the pipeline produces heavier-than-air vapour.

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Figure 2 Event tree for the failure of a hazardous pipeline

Immediate Delayed Delayed

ignition local remote
ignition ignition
Y
Fireball + spray + pool fire

Rupture Y Pool fire A)

B)
VCE or flash fire
Y Running fires C)
N
N VCE B) or flash fire
Pipe failure Ground/water pollution C)
N

Y
Spray + pool fire
Puncture Y
Pool fire A)
Y
N Running fire C)
N
Ground/water pollutionC)
N
a) Event tree for a liquid pipeline failure

Release Immediate Delayed Delayed

obstructed ignition local remote
ignition ignition
Y Fireball +
crater fire
Y
Y
Crater fire D)
Y Flash fire B), E) +
N
N crater fire
Rupture No ignition
N

Y Fireball +
jet fires F)
Y
N Jet fires D), F)
Y Flash fires B), E) +
N
N jet fires
No ignition
Pipe failure N

Y Impacted jet
(crater) fire
Y
Y Impacted jet
(crater) fire D)
N No ignition
N

Puncture
Y
Jet fire

Y
N Jet fire

N No ignition
N
b) Event tree for a gas pipeline failure
A) D)
Ground/water pollution is also likely to occur. There will be a limited flash fire which is not
B) normally considered separately.
If the vapour cloud could engulf any confined or
E)
congested region, the possibility of a VCE should be Only credible for heavier than air gases.
considered. F)
It is also possible for the release from one pipe end is
C)
Extent/distance will depend on ground permeability. obstructed and the other unobstructed.

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For the assessment of a rupture release of a gaseous fluid, it is

normally assumed that the ends of the failed pipe remain aligned in
the crater and the jets of fluid interact. It is possible, e.g. at a location
close to a bend or for a small diameter pipeline, for one or both pipe
ends to become misaligned and produce one or two jets which are
directed out of the crater and are unobstructed. Such releases can
produce directional effects, making their assessment more complex.
Where such a location or pipe is being assessed, the standard case
would normally be assessed, then the sensitivity of the location to
directional releases reviewed. A more detailed assessment might
then be required which would go beyond the standard methodology
described in this part of PD 8010.
NOTE 3 For large diameter pipelines (i.e. >300 mm), the standard
assumption is that the pipe ends are aligned.
If immediate ignition of a fluid release occurs, a fireball can be
produced which lasts for up to 30 s and is followed by a crater fire. If
ignition is delayed by 30 s or more, it is assumed that only a crater fire
(jet obstructed) or a jet fire (jet unobstructed) will occur.
For gases or vapours that are heavier than air, or form cold
heavier‑than-air gas clouds when released, the possibility of a flash
fire or VCE should be taken into account. The extent of such gas
clouds depends on prevailing weather conditions at the time of
release, the location of possible sources of ignition, and areas of
congestion or confinement. The modelling of the consequences and
effects of VCEs are not discussed in detail in this part of PD 8010.
NOTE 4 In the case of natural gas, this scenario is not usually considered,
as the release has a large momentum flux at the source and this normally
has a significant vertical component. For the duration of the release
relevant to the risk analysis, the transition to a low momentum (passive)
release does not occur until the released natural gas has dispersed (is
diluted) below the lower flammability limit.
The stages of pipeline risk assessment are represented in Figure 3.
In general terms, a quantified risk assessment of a hazardous gas or
liquid pipeline consists of four stages:
a) input of data (pipeline and its location, meteorological
conditions, physical properties of the substance, population);
b) prediction of failure mode and frequency;
c) prediction of consequences:
• calculation of release flow rate;
• determination of ignition probability;
• calculation of thermal radiation emitted by fire in an ignited
release;
• quantification of the effects of thermal radiation on the
surrounding population;
d) calculation of risks.

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Figure 3 Risk calculation flowchart for flammable substances

Pipe geometry, material properties, operational parameters

Input Location details (area category, depth of cover, protection etc)
Population details
data Fluid properties
Meteorological conditions

Determine failure rate data for leaks and ruptures due to:

External Material &

Ground
interference + Corrosion + construction + + Other
defects movement

Failure
frequency Calculate failure frequency

Determine consequences based on:

Release Type of
Dispersion Ignition
rate + + + fire

Consequences
Thermal
radiation

Individual Effects of
risk thermal
Risk radiation

calculations
Societal
risk

The first stage of the risk assessment process is to gather the required
data to characterize the pipeline, its contents and the surrounding
environment. These data are used at various stages of the analysis.
The data should be obtained from engineering records, operating
data, the pipeline operating limits in the pipeline notification and an
examination of the pipeline surroundings. The principal input data
required for a pipeline quantified risk analysis are:
• pipeline geometry – outside diameter, wall thickness;
• pipeline material properties – e.g. grade (SMYS, TS), toughness
(or Charpy impact value), and any other data required to apply a
fracture mechanics model or to calculate the design factor;
• pipeline operational parameters – maximum allowable operating
pressure, temperature, pipeline shutdown period and boundary
conditions;
• location details, including:
• length and route of the pipeline to be assessed;
• topographical information in any region of interest (e.g. ground
slope direction, location of drainage channels and ditches);
• location classification (class 1, class 2);

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• depth of cover;
• additional protection measures for the pipeline (e.g. concrete
slabbing);
• details of any above- and below-ground pipeline marking;
• development and building categories in the vicinity and their
distance from the pipeline;
• population and occupancy levels within the consequence
range of the pipeline;
• road/rail crossing details, including traffic density;
• river crossings;
• physical properties of the material being transported, including:
• information to characterize the pressure, volume and
temperature behaviour of the fluid throughout the range of
conditions relevant to the analysis (e.g. from thermodynamic
charts, tables or rigorous equations of state);
• information to characterize any phase change within the
fluid, e.g. from vapour to liquid (or vice versa), or to bound
the dense phase region;
• information about the density and viscosity of the fluid as a
function of pressure, temperature;
• atmospheric conditions, for example:
• details about ambient temperatures and pressures at the
location of interest;
• atmospheric humidity;
• information about wind speeds and directions.
Any site-specific variations in the data should be assessed, and
justifications for any additional assumptions to be applied locally
should be documented. In the case of depth of cover, site-specific
depths should be taken into account. Where additional pipeline
protection such as slabbing is to be taken into account, the design and
installation should be assessed to ensure that additional loading is not
imposed upon the pipeline, and direct contact should be maintained
between the pipe coating and the surrounding soil.

5.2 Prediction of failure frequency

Failure of a pipeline can occur due to a number of different causes
such as:
• external interference;
• corrosion [internal and external, including stress corrosion
cracking (SCC) and alternating current (AC)/direct current (DC)
induced corrosion];
• material or construction defects;
• ground movement;
• other causes, such as fatigue, operational errors etc.
The failure modes that should be assessed include leaks of various
sizes (punctures) and line breaks (ruptures). A key parameter in setting
the boundary between a leak of a stable size and a rupture is the
critical defect length.

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The critical defect length is the axial length of a through-wall defect

which becomes unstable at the specific pipeline conditions, and above
which a defect will continue to propagate along the pipeline until
the defect size becomes equivalent to a rupture. This is primarily
dependent on the pipeline diameter, wall thickness, material
properties, fluid properties (in particular the compressibility) and
operating pressure. The critical defect length is significant for external
interference, where long, narrow crack-like defects can occur. In such
cases, the crack opening area through which the fluid release occurs is
transposed into an equivalent hole size which can be used for release
calculations. Typical critical hole sizes for high pressure gas pipelines
are given in Annex B.
NOTE 1 Critical defect length and equivalent hole diameter applies
to external interference where axial, crack-like defects can occur; the
equivalent hole sizes which relate to such defects do not apply to
rounded punctures, or stable holes due to corrosion or material and
construction defects.
Leak sizes can range from pinholes up to a hole size equivalent to the
critical defect size for the pipeline for external interference failures. A
rupture release is typically represented by a full bore, double-ended
break. The release is typically assumed to make a crater into which
product is released from both ends of pipe.
Typical failure frequencies for UK MAHPs are given in Annex B. Where
other data sources are used, these should be documented.
NOTE 2 In most cases the risk will be dominated by the rupture scenario.
NOTE 3 The maximum possible hole size in high pressure gas pipelines is
limited according to the critical defect size.
In a risk assessment, the likelihood of each failure scenario is evaluated
and expressed in terms of failure frequency and pipeline unit length.

5.3 Prediction of consequences

In the context of pipelines carrying flammable substances, for releases
that ignite causing immediate hazards to people and property,
consequence models are needed to predict the transient gas or liquid
release rate, the ignition probabilities, the characteristics of the resulting
fire (i.e. fireball, crater, jet, flash, spray or pool fire), the radiation field
produced and the effects of the radiation on people and buildings
nearby. The following aspects should be taken into account:
• outflow as a function of time (influenced by failure location,
upstream and downstream boundary conditions, and by any
response to the failure); pipeline rupture outflow requires
complex calculations involving pressure reduction in the pipeline
or two-phase flow for flashing liquids [15, 16]. Outflow from holes
is calculated using conventional sharp-edged orifice equations for
gas or liquid using a suitable discharge coefficient [13];
• thermal radiation from the initial and reducing flow into the
fireball if the release is ignited immediately;
• thermal radiation from jet and crater fires. Jet fires that are
unobstructed can have considerable jet momentum, resulting
in a “lift-off” distance before the flame occurs, and therefore
thermal radiation effects which can be greater in the middle and
far field distance, depending on the release direction and degree

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of wind tilt. Crater fires can be modelled as large cylindrical

flames starting at ground level having thermal radiation effects
progressively reducing through near, middle and far distance;
• extent of the area covered by a flammable gas cloud causing a
possible flash fire downwind of the release, and possible ignition
points in downwind areas;
• spillage rate and duration of release from a liquid pipeline
affecting the local area and possibly causing a spray or pool fire.
Other consequences that are generally found to have a negligible
effect on risk compared to fire effects include:
• release of pressure energy from the initial fractured section;
• pressure generated from combustion during the initial phase if
the release is ignited immediately;
• missiles generated from overlying soil or from pipe fragments;
Additional aspects to be taken into account for pressurized liquid
releases include:
• spray fires;
• immediate and delayed ignition pool fires;
• release of flammable liquids into water courses and the potential
for running fires.
The consequence model should also take into account:
• wind speed, because this affects the crater fire and jet fire tilt and
extent of the flash fire and hence the resulting radiation effects
downwind;
NOTE Weather category, as well as wind speed, also affects gas
dispersion for flash fire prediction. In the UK, the conventional
assumption is that night-time weather is modelled as Pasquill
Category F and windspeed 2 m/s, and daytime as Category D and
windspeed 5 m/s.
• wind direction – required for a site-specific risk assessment where
wind direction will affect the populated area non-symmetrically
around the location of the fire;
• humidity – this affects the proportion of thermal radiation
absorbed by the atmosphere;
• the type of ground environment, including topography where
appropriate, into which a liquid is released.
There is considerable evidence from actual events and research work
that immediate ignition events involving sudden large releases of
flammable gases can cause a fireball to occur. Typical fireball burn times
are 10 s to 30 s depending on pipeline diameter and pressure. Large
releases of liquefied flammable gases, and flammable liquids containing
LFGs such as spiked crude oil, can also cause a fireball to occur.
When modelling either crater fires or unobstructed jet fires following
a rupture, the transient nature of the release should be modelled.
This calculation requires an estimate of the initial and steady state
release rates and an estimate of the inventory of the pipeline network
which is discharging to the release point. For generic calculations, the
typical assumption made is that the break occurs half-way between
compressor or pump stations (or pressure regulating station), with
pressure being maintained from the upstream compressor, pump or

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pressure reduction station and no reverse flow (with depressurization)

occurring at the downstream check valve or regulator.
When modelling jet fires from punctures, the release can be considered
to be steady state. The consequence model usually assumes a vertical
wind-blown jet flame. More elaborate models are possible with
different angles of flame. The consequences predicted by such models
are increased directionally, but the conditional probability is reduced.
Flash fires occur when a plume of unignited heavier-than-air gas
or vapour drifts downwind before finding a source of ignition. The
ignition causes the fire to flash back to the source of release and then
to cause a jet, crater or pool fire. A vapour cloud can drift further in
night-time conditions (category F2) than daytime (category D5). The
probability of flash fires is considered low, being dependent on the
release source and the distribution of ignition sources in the vicinity of
a pipeline.
For non-flashing liquid releases from pipelines, the release rate is
often dictated by the pumping rate at the point of release, depending
on hole size. Small to medium holes can cause sprays and the hazard
distance from spray fires can be significant. Large holes (>50 mm) in
high pressure pipelines are likely to release the full pumping rate, so
the consequences of large holes are similar to pipeline rupture. The
amount released from a liquid pipeline is a function of the time taken
to stop pumping, depressurization of the pipeline, and drain-down of
adjacent sections of the pipeline.
Spray releases occur when a flammable liquid is released at high
velocity through a punctured pipeline.

5.4 Probability of ignition

The risks from a pipeline containing a flammable fluid depend
critically on whether a release is ignited, and whether ignition occurs
immediately or is delayed.
It is usually assumed that immediate ignition occurs within 30 s,
and delayed ignition occurs after 30 s. Generic values for ignition
probability can be obtained from data from historical incidents and
these are product-specific. The various ignition possibilities such as
immediate, delayed and obstructed or unobstructed, are drawn out
logically on an event tree (see Figure 2) to obtain overall probabilities.
Extensive references [12, 14,] are available for deriving probability of
ignition for various situations (class 1, class 2, urban, roads, railways
etc.). Probabilities used by HSE are discussed in Annex A.

5.5 Thermal radiation and effects

Fatal injury effects are assumed for cases where people in the open
air or in buildings are located within the flame envelope. Outside the
flame envelope, the effects are dependent on direct thermal radiation
from the flame to the exposed person or building. Thermal radiation
is calculated from the energy of the burning material. There are two
main methods of calculation in use: the view factor method, which
assumes a surface emissive power from the flame, and the point
source method, which assumes that all the energy is emitted from
one (or several) point sources within the flame. The energy from the
fireball pulse is usually calculated using the view factor method.

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The thermal radiation effect at distances from the failure, calculated

as the radiation dose, is summed through the complete fire event to
determine the effect on people and property in terms of the piloted
ignition distance for buildings, the escape distance for people out of
doors, and the distance for which escape to safe shelter is possible.
The thermal radiation effect from crater fires and jet fires is generally
calculated by assuming that all persons outdoors, and indoors within
the piloted ignition distance, try to escape. The cumulative thermal
dose is then calculated, and the distance from the fire at which escape
is possible without exceeding a threshold dose. The thermal dose unit
(tdu), is defined as:
tdu = W 4/3t
where:
t is time, in seconds (s);
W is the intensity of thermal radiation, in kilowatts per square
metre (kW/m2).
NOTE 1 W is not independent of time for a transient release, and is
normally summed over exposure until safe shelter, the dose limit or a
cut-off thermal radiation level of, for example, 1 kW/m2 is reached.
Experimental and other data indicate that thermal radiation
dose levels can have differing effects on a population depending on
individual tolerance to such effects. The variation of effects has been
estimated from burn data for human beings. Based on this evidence,
a thermal radiation dose of 1 800 tdu is often used in risk assessments
to represent a significant level of harm from hydrocarbon fires. All
people receiving this dose or greater are assumed to become casualties,
suffering life threatening burn injuries. In a random sample of an
average population, 5% of those receiving a dose of 1 800 tdu are
expected to become fatalities. Developments such as schools, hospitals
and old people’s homes may be classed as sensitive developments (see
Clause 7). For such developments, where a more cautious approach
might be appropriate, a casualty criterion of 1% lethality (corresponding
to a “dangerous dose”) may be used for the corresponding population.
Such an approach allows sensitive developments to be included in an
assessment of a wider mix of developments.
NOTE 2 The “dangerous dose” concept is defined as causing:
a) severe distress to almost everyone in the area;
b) a substantial fraction of the exposed population requiring medical
attention;
c) some people being seriously injured, requiring prolonged treatment;
d) highly susceptible people being killed.
NOTE 3 To assess the safe escape distance, a number of factors need
to be taken into account, including speed of escape for people outside
running away from the fire, location and types of buildings, populations
indoors, daytime and night, etc.
NOTE 4 If a risk assessment is being undertaken to assess the benefit
of potential risk reduction measures in support of a land use planning
application then it might be more appropriate to use an equivalent
casualty criterion to that used by the HSE.
NOTE 5 For a more direct comparison with an assessment carried out
by HSE for land use planning purposes, the assessment can be carried
out using the dangerous dose level of thermal radiation for the whole
population. Comparison with an acceptability criterion based on a higher

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level of thermal radiation will then be conservative for an average or

mixed population.
In order to assess safe escape distance, a number of factors should be
taken into account, including escape speed for people outside running
away from the fire, location and types of buildings, populations
indoors and outdoors, daytime or night time, etc.
The progression of a fire through the different stages of the event can
be complex. The prediction of the thermal radiation effects is required
to be summed through the event. This can prove difficult to achieve
in a continuous way, hence the event might need to be subdivided
into its stages and the effects summed later to obtain the thermal
radiation dose received during the time of exposure at a fixed point,
or by a moving target, in order to predict the effects on buildings and
on persons who can attempt to escape from the effects of the fire.
The distance from the fire at which buildings would burn (i.e. the
building burning distance) and also the distance at which persons are
able to escape from the effects of the fire (i.e. the escape distance) are
predicted based on either threshold ignition criteria for buildings and
the casualty criterion method, or a probit equation method for persons.
In the casualty criterion method, the thermal radiation predictions are
used to calculate the distances at which the specified criteria are met.
The casualty criterion method does not directly account for the fact
that individuals within the population have a range of sensitivity
to thermal radiation; however, this can be taken into account
using a probit equation method. In this method, escape probability
calculations are performed for each point on each escape path for
each 1% band of the population in turn. These values are then
integrated over the whole population to arrive at an overall casualty
rate. In each method, the possibility that the escaping person might
find shelter in a building beyond the building-burning distance can be
accounted for.

6 Individual risk assessment

Individual risk is a measure of the frequency at which an individual at
a specified distance from the pipeline is expected to sustain a specified
level of harm from the realization of specific hazards.
A simple explanation of the calculation of individual risk posed
by pipelines is given in this section. Further detail can be found in
references [7] and [11] to [15]. Risk calculations should be carried out
by competent experts using appropriate, quality assured software.
Individual risk contours for pipelines of given geometry, material
properties and operating conditions form lines parallel to the pipeline
axis. The distance from the pipeline at which a particular level of
risk occurs depends upon the pipeline diameter, operating pressure,
frequency of failure and failure mode.
The risks from the various failure scenarios should be collated and the
individual risk profile at various distances plotted on a graph. From
this plot it is possible to identify the risk of a specified effect (e.g.
fatality or dangerous dose) to an individual at a given distance from
the pipeline. Shown in cross-section perpendicular to the pipeline, the
risk levels are known as the risk transect.

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For a simple model where windspeed conditions are zero, the

consequences are circular, and the interaction distance (see Clause 4)
is calculated as shown in Figure 4. The interaction distance shown
can be multiplied by the pipeline failure frequency, the probability
of ignition and the consequences (thermal radiation and casualty
criteria) to obtain the risk at any distance from the point of release.
Distances to specified individual risk levels can be obtained from
the risk transect.

Figure 4 Calculation of pipeline length affecting an individual in the vicinity of a pipeline

1
1
2 2

4 4

a) Interaction distance = 2 × radius of circle = length of pipeline that could affect observer

R R
D

b) Interaction distance = 2 × R2 − D2

Key
1 Location of observer, at distance D from the pipeline
2 Circular effect distance/consequence distance, radius R
3 Pipeline
4 Interaction distance for observer at location 1

Criteria for individual risk levels have been determined by the HSE
in the UK. The framework for the tolerability of risk which gives
individual risk values for the defined regions, published by HSE [17],
is shown in Figure 5. HSE sets land use planning zones for major
hazard sites, including high pressure pipelines transporting defined
hazardous substances based on the individual risk levels for dangerous
dose. Three risk-based zones, the inner, middle and outer zones,
are defined by HSE based on the “dangerous dose or worse”. The
outer zone is defined as the consultation distance within which the
risk implications of planning developments should be considered by
the LPA. Land use planning zones applied to major accident hazard
pipelines in the UK defined by HSE are discussed in Annex A.
HSE sets land use planning zones for major hazard sites, including
high-pressure pipelines transporting defined hazardous substances
based on individual risk levels. Land use planning zones applied
to major accident hazard pipelines in the UK defined by HSE are
discussed in Annex A.

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Figure 5 Framework for the tolerability of individual risk

Unacceptable
region

-3
Increasing individual risks and societal concerns

1 x 10 (Worker)

-4
1 x 10 (Public)

Tolerable if ALARP
region

-6
1 x 10 (All)

Broadly acceptable
region

7 Societal risk assessment

Societal risk is the relationship between the frequency of the
realization of a hazard and the resultant number of casualties.
Societal risk can be generic, in which a constant distributed population
in the vicinity of a pipeline is assumed, or site-specific, in which the
details of particular developments, building layouts and population
distributions are taken into account. Site-specific assessments are
needed for housing developments, industrial premises, workplaces
such as call centres, commercial and leisure developments, and any
developments involving sensitive populations.
Developments such as schools, hospitals and old people’s homes
are classed as sensitive developments because of the increased
vulnerability of the population groups involved to harm from thermal
radiation hazards and the increased difficulty in achieving an effective
response (e.g. rapid evacuation) to mitigate the consequences of an
event such as a pipeline fire.
The hazards associated with pipelines tend to be high consequence
low frequency events, and therefore it is more appropriate that
societal risk is used to assess the acceptability of pipeline risk. The
calculation is carried out by assessing the frequency and consequences
of all of the various accident scenarios which could occur along a
specified length of pipeline.
Societal risk is of particular significance to pipeline operators because
the location of pipelines might be close to populated areas, so the
impact of multiple fatality accidents on people and society in general
should be taken into account. The original routing of the pipeline
is expected to have taken into account the population along the

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route, but infill and incremental developments might increase the

population in some sections of the route. Societal risk assessment
allows these developments to be assessed against the original routing
criteria where a location class 1 area has a population density of
up to 2.5 persons per hectare. When the societal risk has increased
significantly, the pipeline operator might then need to consider
justifiable mitigation measures to reduce the risk.
The criterion for societal risk is expressed graphically as an FN criterion
line, showing the cumulative frequency F (usually per year) of
accidents causing N or more casualties. For application to pipelines,
it is necessary to specify a length over which the frequency and
consequences of all accident scenarios are collated.
Developing criteria for tolerability for hazards giving risk to
societal concerns is not straightforward. Reference [17] describes
the derivation of a societal risk limit from a study of Canvey Island
and subsequently endorsed by the HSC’s Advisory Committee on
Dangerous Substances in the context of major hazards transport. From
this, HSE proposed that the risk of an accident causing the death of 50
people or more in a single event should be regarded as intolerable if
the frequency is estimated to be more than one in five thousand per
annum [17]. Subsequently HSE’s Hazardous Installations Directorate
have proposed [18] criteria for major hazard sites in the context of the
Control of Major Accident Hazards Regulations 1999 [19] (COMAH),
based on the following which enables criteria for case societal risk to
be defined for the FN diagram.
The unacceptable region is taken as the region above the line of
slope −1 through the defined point on the logF v. logN plot; and the
broadly acceptable region is taken as the region below a line two orders
of magnitude below, and parallel to, the −1 slope line (this line,
which defines the broadly acceptable region, is shown in Figure 6).
The “tolerable if ALARP” region lies between these two lines.
A typical medium-sized COMAH site might typically have a perimeter
exposing risk to the public outside the site of 2 km, so the equivalent
length of pipeline exposing the same risk to the public is 1 km.
Therefore the same FN risk curves could be applied to 1 km of pipeline.
In the absence of product-specific risk curves, it is therefore suggested
that the FN criterion line given in Figure 6 should be used to assess
societal risk due to MAHPs. This allows the assessment of the residual
risk from a specific pipeline to be compared with the risk from the
average class 1 pipeline population density (i.e. up to 2.5 persons
per hectare) adjacent to each 1 km length of pipeline, where the
population is assumed to be located in a strip centred on the pipeline
from the MDOB, extending out to the hazard distance of the worst
case event from the pipeline.
In effect the FN criterion line represents the upper limit of the
cumulative frequency of multiple fatality accidents in any 1 km section
of a pipeline route assumed to be acceptable as implied by conformity
to PD 8010-1. In the assessment of societal risk, the methodology
applied should be consistent with the risk limit in terms of the length
of pipeline considered. The FN criterion line shown here is applicable
to assessments carried out using 1 800 tdu, equivalent to a significant
likelihood of causing fatality.

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NOTE 1 The areas below the FN criterion line in Figure 6 represent

broadly acceptable risk levels and therefore relevant good practice in both
location classes 1 and 2.1)
NOTE 2 In some cases, a product-specific criterion line might be
available for assessing societal risk tolerability. An example of this is the
FN envelope presented in IGE/TD/2:2013 [36], Figure 6 for natural
gas. This envelope curve represents the boundary for a series of curves
applying to numerous different pipeline cases which are acceptable in
accordance with IGE/TD/1.

Figure 6 Societal risk FN criterion line applicable to 1 km of pipeline

1.E-02
Frequency (per year) of N or more casualties

1.E-03

1.E-04

1.E-05 B
1.E-06
A
1.E-07

1.E-08

1.E-09

1.E-10
1 10 100 1 000

Number of casualties

Key
A Broadly acceptable
B Tolerable if ALARP

Population density tends to vary along a pipeline route, with clusters

of population at some locations. Assessment of the societal risk in
accordance with the FN criterion line might still allow such variations
to be classified as an acceptable situation not requiring any upgrading
of the pipeline to reduce the risk.
The methodology for assessing risk scenarios, failure cases, failure
frequencies and consequences is similar to that used to obtain
individual risk levels.
To carry out a site-specific societal risk assessment, the maximum
distance over which the worst case event could affect the population
in the vicinity should be determined, e.g. the site length combined
with the maximum hazard range within which the population is to be
assessed (see Figure 7). This is defined as the site interaction distance.

1) Operators can apply this approach as part of demonstration of ongoing

compliance with the recommendations given in PD 8010-1 for population
density, location classification and/or demonstration of ALARP.

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The accident scenarios which are relevant for the pipeline section
within the site interaction distance should be listed, and the actual
population density within the area defined by the pipeline section
and the interaction distance (see Figure 7) determined. The frequency,
f, and effect area for each accident scenario should then be assessed
along the site interaction distance, and the number of people, N, who
would be affected, is determined for each scenario at each specific
location. This provides a number of fN pairs, which are then ordered
with respect to increasing number of casualties, N, and the cumulative
frequency, F, of N or more people being affected is determined, giving
a site-specific FN curve.

Figure 7 Site-specific pipeline interaction distance

 

Key
1 Thermal effect distance or escape distance
2 Pipeline
3 Site interaction distance
Existing buildings
New buildings

NOTE 3 The shape and dimensions of the site-specific hazard range is

dependent upon the characteristics of the released fluid, the presence
of directional effects and, for heavier-than-air gases and liquids, the
topography.
The site-specific FN curve should be compared with the FN criterion
line in Figure 6. As the FN criterion line relates to a 1 km length of
pipeline, the site-specific FN curve is obtained by factoring risk values
by a factor equal to 1 km divided by the site interaction distance.
The FN criterion line given in Figure 6 represents broadly acceptable risk
levels for pipeline operation. If the calculated site-specific FN curve falls
below the FN criterion line, the risk levels to the adjacent population are
considered broadly acceptable. If the site-specific FN curve is close to or
above the FN criterion line, then further mitigation might be required
to reduce risks to acceptable/negligible levels if this is economically
justifiable in terms of the requirement to demonstrate that the risks
are ALARP. Alternatively, the proposed development might be deemed
unacceptable in that the societal risk levels are too high.

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If the specified area of interest includes another pipeline, the risk

from this pipeline should be included in the assessment if it is
considered that:
• the pipelines could interact such that a failure on one pipeline
would lead to the failure of the other pipeline;
• the development site under consideration is within the
interaction distances of more than one major accident pipeline in
the specified area.
If pipeline interaction is considered likely then expert opinion should
be obtained on how to model the combined failure frequencies and
product outflow. The pipelines should be individually assessed and the
risk from each summed to obtain overall individual risk transects and
societal risk FN curves.
When assessing multiple pipelines, FN data should be obtained for
each pipeline assessed. When calculating the overall risk it is necessary
to combine the individual FN pairs from each assessment. This data
should then be factored by a value equal to 1 km divided by the sum
of the interaction lengths for each pipeline considered, and compared
to the FN criterion line.

8 Factors affecting risk levels

8.1 Individual factors influencing pipeline failure

frequency
All the key damage mechanisms should be taken into account when
carrying out a risk assessment. Typical causes classified in databases
include:
a) external interference;
b) corrosion, either internal or external;
c) mechanical failure, including material or weld defects created
when the pipe was manufactured or constructed;
d) ground movement, either natural (e.g. landslide) or artificial
(excavation, mining);
e) operational, due to overpressure, fatigue or operation outside
design limits.
Assessment of pipeline failure databases shows that external
interference and ground movement dominate pipeline rupture
rates, and these have the greatest effect on risk from pipelines. The
failure rates due to other damage mechanisms can be managed
and controlled by competent pipeline operators through testing,
inspection, maintenance and operational controls in accordance with
PD 8010-1:2004, Clause 13.
The failure rate for external interference is influenced by a number of
parameters, including the pipeline wall thickness, design factor and
material properties, as well as the location class, the pipeline depth of
cover and the local installation of pipeline protection such as slabbing.
The failure rate for natural ground movement and for artificial
ground movement depends upon the susceptibility to landsliding or
subsidence at the specific location. In some cases other causes might

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need to be considered in specific locations, such as the quality of girth

welds, the potential for stress corrosion cracking (SCC) or alternating
current (AC)/direct current (DC) induced corrosion.
The failure frequency associated with each damage mechanism should
be determined using published operational data sources [8, 9, 10], or
predictive models validated using such data. Typical failure frequencies
for UK MAHPs based on UKOPA data are given in Annex B.
The effect of risk reduction measures should only be taken into
account for the damage mechanism that would be affected by those
measures, e.g. the reduction in failure frequency due to increased
depth of cover or slabbing should only be applied to the external
interference damage contribution of the total failure frequency.
The risk analysis requires the principal input data described in 5.1. Any
site-specific variations should be assessed, and justifications for any
additional assumptions to be applied locally should be documented.
In the case of depth of cover, site-specific depths should be taken into
account. Where additional pipeline protection such as slabbing is to be
taken into account, the design and installation should be assessed to
confirm that it is in accordance with UKOPA/13/027.
In particular, the design should be assessed to ensure that it is
sufficiently wide to guard against lateral encroachment and sufficiently
thick to prevent it being breached by most common excavating
machinery. Because of the size and power of modern large-scale
excavating and boring equipment, it is not practical to design slab
protection that is capable of guaranteeing that the pipeline will never be
damaged by all machinery. However, the slab should be designed such
that it is capable of protecting the pipeline from the majority of types of
machinery that can be reasonably foreseen as potentially operating in
the vicinity of the pipeline.
The design should also ensure that the additional loading is not imposed
upon the pipeline, and that cathodic protection (CP) is maintained.
NOTE The determination of failure rate data requires several
parameters to be taken into account, including:
• pipeline diameter;
• pipe wall thickness;
• design factor;
• depth of cover;
• steel type and properties;
• location class (1 or 2).
In determining the external interference failure frequency, it is
recommended that the damage incidence rate for location class 2
areas should be assumed to be higher than for class 1 areas. Typically,
the factor applied is approximately four times that for location class 1
areas, i.e. the failure frequency in a class 2 area is four times that in a
class 1 area. Data relating to class 1 and 2 incident rates for UK MAHPs
is provided by UKOPA [9].
The failure rates obtained from database records or predictive models
should be justified for application to a site-specific case. Generic
failure data might not be applicable to specific cases. Information is
given in Annex B.

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8.2 Factors for reduction of the external interference

failure frequency for use in site-specific risk
assessments
NOTE 1 An example of a site-specific risk assessment is given in Annex C.
Examples of typical benchmark solutions are given in Annex B.
The primary residual risk for existing pipelines is that due to external
interference. Risk mitigation measures are identified and agreed as
necessary by the statutory authority or relevant stakeholder. These
should be installed prior to the completion and use of any new
development within the pipeline consultation zone. Risk mitigation
measures fall into two categories: physical and procedural. Procedural
measures rely upon management systems and can be subject to
change over time, and therefore might only be applicable for
short‑term risk control.
Physical measures include:
• wall thickness and design factor;
• slabbing;
• depth of cover.
Procedural measures include:
• additional surveillance;
• additional liaison visits;
• additional high visibility pipeline marker posts.
A site-specific risk assessment should take into account relevant details
of the pipeline, and should document justification of any assumptions
applied following assessment of these details.
The pipeline failure frequency due to external interference is obtained
as follows:
F = (PoF × I) / OE
where:
F is the pipeline failure frequency;
I is the number of external interference events causing
damage in a given pipeline population;
OE is the operational exposure of the pipeline population, in
kilometre years (km·y);
I/OE is the damage incidence rate.
NOTE 2 The number of external interference events causing damage ,
and the operational exposure, relate to the population that the pipeline
is part of, not just the pipeline itself. Pipeline failure frequencies derived
from published operational data sources are given in Annex B.
When predicting site-specific pipeline failure frequencies for external
interference, the parameters listed above should be taken into
account. A number of factors which describe the specific effects of
wall thickness, design factor, depth of cover, surveillance frequency
and damage prevention measures (slabbing and marker tapes) are
described in the present subclause. These factors can be used to assess
the effect of individual measures on a known or existing unadjusted
pipeline failure frequency for a particular pipeline, or to obtain a
failure frequency prediction for a given pipeline. Appropriate factors

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can be applied cumulatively to the base failure frequency for the

particular pipe diameter as shown in Annex B.
The influence of specific parameters on the predicted pipeline failure
frequencies is given as reduction factors as follows:
• Rdf – reduction factor for design factor, given in Figure 8 and
Table 1;
• Rwt – reduction factor for wall thickness, given in Figure 9 and
Table 1;
• Rdc – reduction factor for depth of cover, given in Figure 10;
• Rs – reduction factor for surveillance frequency, given in Figure 11;
• Rp – reduction factor for protection measures, given in Table 2.

Figure 8 Reduction in external interference total failure frequency due to design factor

1.0

0.8
Reduction factor

0.6

0.4

0.2
= e 0.97 (f -0.72)

0.0
0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8

Design factor

NOTE Figure 8 relates to a pipe wall thickness of 5 mm, and can be used to assess the influence of design
factor on failure frequencies due to external interference for pipelines with wall thickness equal to or
greater than 5 mm.

Figures 8 and 9 show simple reduction factors for design factor and
wall thickness which can be used in estimating the failure frequency
due to external interference. These two reduction factors have
been derived from the results of comprehensive parametric studies
[20, 21, 22] carried out using models which describe the failure of
a pipeline due to gouge and dent-gouge damage [23, 24, 25], and
damage statistics for such damage derived from the UKOPA pipeline
database [9]. The reduction factors take the form of a factor for the
design factor and a factor for wall thickness, which are applied either
to a predicted pipeline PoF or to a failure frequency predicted for a

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specific pipeline using a specific damage incidence rate. The range of

pipeline parameters over which the reduction factors are applicable is
given in Table 1.
The reduction factors given in Figures 8 and 9 are based on a
conservative interpretation of the parametric study results. Where
the pipeline parameters fall outside the range given for the applicability
of the reduction factors in Table 1, the reduction factors should not
be applied and a case-specific analysis should be carried out using
an appropriate failure frequency prediction model. The reduction
factors may be applied separately to modify existing risk assessment
results (i.e. to modify existing risk assessment results taking into account
local changes in wall thickness), or may be used more comprehensively
to estimate the failure frequency in screening risk assessments, using
both reduction factors in conjunction with the generic failure frequency
curve in Annex B as an alternative to using more complex structural
reliability based methods. Further details are given in Annex B.

Figure 9 Reduction in external interference total failure frequency due to wall thickness

1.0

0.8

e -0.24 (t-5) f = 0.72

0.6
= e -0.31 (t-5) f = 0.5
Reduction factor

e -0.39 (t-5) f = 0.3

0.4

0.2

0.0
4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20

Wall thickness (mm)

NOTE Figure 9 relates to design factors of 0.72, 0.5 and 0.3 and can be used to assess the influence of wall
thickness on failure frequency due to external interference for pipelines with design factor less than or equal
to these values.

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Table 1 Range of applicability of reduction factor for design factor, Rdf, and
reduction factor due to wall thickness, Rwt

Parameter Range of applicability of Rdf and Rwt

Design factor G0.72
Wall thickness H5.0 mm
Material grade GX65
Diameter 219.1 mm to 914.4 mm
Charpy energy H24 J (average)

Figure 10 shows a simple reduction factor for depth of cover which

can be used to assess the reduction in damage incidence rate in the
estimation of the failure frequency due to external interference.
This reduction factor has been derived from the results of published
studies [26]. Use of this reduction factor places a requirement on
the pipeline operator to carry out and document periodic checks to
confirm that the depth of cover is being maintained (see 8.3.4).

Figure 10 Reduction in external interference total failure frequency due to depth of cover

 

Figure 11 shows a simple reduction factor for a surveillance interval

which can be used to assess the reduction in damage incidence rate in
the estimation of the failure frequency due to external interference.
This reduction factor has been derived from the results of studies
carried out by UKOPA relating infringement incidence data to
damage incidence data [27]. The relationship is normalized to a
default fortnightly interval (typically an aerial survey), and allows the
effect of increasing or decreasing the surveillance interval to be taken
into account provided that the surveillance technique is the same.
If the method of surveillance also changes (e.g. walking or driving
surveys instead of aerial surveys), then consideration should also be

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given to factors including activity detection rates and the likelihood of

successful intervention before pipeline damage occurs.

Figure 11 Indicative reduction in external interference total failure frequency due to surveillance
frequency (dependent on frequency and duration of unauthorized excavations)

1.4

1.2

1.0
Risk reduction factor

0.8

0.6

0.4

0.2

0
0 5 10 15 20 25 30
Surveillance interval (days)

Table 2 gives reduction factors that apply to pipeline protection

measures, which can be used to assess the reduction in damage
incidence rate in the estimation of the failure frequency due to
external interference. These factors are based on expert studies [28].

Table 2 Failure frequency reduction factors, Rp, for pipeline protection

Measure Reduction factor Rp

Installation of concrete slab protection 0.1
Text deleted Text deleted
NOTE 1 Concrete slabbing with high visibility marker tapes has been shown to achieve significant risk
reduction factors below 0.1 [28].
NOTE 2 In order to use the reduction factor, the physical barrier mitigation measures should apply to the
whole pipeline interaction length for every failure that has to be considered.
NOTE 3 The above risk reduction factor is recommended for pipeline operators to apply when assessing
whether the risks have been made ALARP. The equivalent factors that are applied by the HSE when assessing
the acceptability of proposed new developments in the vicinity of MAHPs are summarized in Annex A.

The reduction factors given in Figure 8 and Figure 9 affect the pipeline
tolerance to defects and therefore the PoF, whereas the reduction
factors given in Figure 10, Figure 11 and Table 2 affect the damage
incident rate, I/OE.

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For site-specific risk assessments, the main factors affecting failure

frequency should be given careful consideration and the appropriate
reduction factor applied as follows:
a) probability of failure, RPoF, determined using the recommended
reduction factors given in this subclause for:
• Rdf (reduction factor for design factor);
• Rwt (reduction factor for wall thickness);
NOTE 3 Rdf and Rwt have been derived from a parametric study in
which Rdf is derived for a constant wall thickness of 5 mm, and Rwt is
derived for a constant design factor of 0.72. These reduction factors
can be applied together within the limits of applicability given in
Table 1, e.g. when used in conjunction with the base pipeline failure
frequencies given in Annex B.
b) the factor reduction on number of incidents (or incident rate), RIR,
determined using the recommended reduction factors given in
this subclause for:
• Rdc (reduction factor for depth of cover);
• Rp [reduction factor for protection (slabbing and marking)].
Factors for risk control measures along the pipeline route to reduce
the number of incidents may be applied as follows for other
mitigation measures, using reduction factors assessed by the risk
analyst for specific situations:
• Rs (reduction factor for surveillance frequency);
• Rlv (reduction factor for additional liaison visits);
• Rmp (reduction factor for additional high visibility marker posts).
NOTE 4 With respect to control of risk to developments in the vicinity
of pipelines, the application of Rs , Rlv might only be applicable for short
term/temporary developments only (e.g. fairs, festivals, temporary
construction sites etc.). No recommendations are made here for values of
Rlv and Rmp. Assessment should be carried out for specific cases.

8.3 Implementation of risk mitigation measures

8.3.1 General
The implementation of risk mitigation measures should be carried out
in accordance with PD 8010-1 and the recommendations given in 8.3.2
to 8.3.5.

8.3.2 Relaying the pipeline in increased wall thickness

The pipeline should be designed in accordance with PD 8010-1:2004,
Clauses 5, 6 and 8, constructed in accordance with PD 8010-1:2004,
Clause 10, and tested in accordance with PD 8010-1:2004, Clause 11.
Particular care is required where the consolidation of the pipeline
trench bed is disturbed allowing settlement. Settlement at the tie-in
points with the existing pipeline should be avoided. The function
and integrity of pipeline corrosion protection across the new section
and at the points of connection with the existing pipeline should be
confirmed to be adequate and fit for purpose in accordance with
PD 8010-1:2004, Clause 9.

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The rationale for the design of the new pipeline section should be
specified and justified in relation to the need for risk reduction, e.g.:
• design factor specified as 0.3 to reduce pipeline PoF at operating
conditions;
• selection of the wall thickness to achieve an acceptable pipeline
PoF;
• selection of wall thickness in relation to risks to new planned
development;
• selection of design factor and wall thickness based on ALARP
calculations (see Annex C).

8.3.3 Laying slabbing over the pipeline

Installation of slabbing to provide impact protection to the pipeline
should be carried out in accordance with PD 8010-1:2004, 6.9.7 and in
accordance with UKOPA/13/027. The structural loads imposed
on the pipeline by the slabbing should be taken into account. The
installation of concrete slabbing over the pipeline can restrict access
to the pipeline in the event of coating deterioration or corrosion
damage. It is therefore recommended that a coating survey is carried
out prior to the installation of slabbing, that the results of previous
in-line inspection are assessed to determine whether there are any
indications of corrosion in the length of pipeline to be slabbed that
might need assessment and/or repair prior to slabbing, and that
the functionality and integrity of the cathodic protection system is
confirmed before and after installation of the slabbing.

8.3.4 Taking account of increased depth of cover

Increased depth of cover at the location under consideration may
be taken into account where this exceeds the recommendations
given in PD 8010-1:2004, 6.8.3. A full survey of the actual depth
of cover over the full interaction distance at the location under
consideration should be carried out in order to record the depth of
cover. A justification of the permanence of the depth of cover should
be prepared, including the reason for the increased depth of cover,
the type of soil, the susceptibility to land sliding and the current and
future land use. The depth of cover should be rechecked at specified
locations during pipeline route inspections carried out in accordance
with PD 8010-1:2004, 13.3.2 to detect factors that could affect the
safety and operation of the pipeline. Such checks should be carried
out at intervals not exceeding 4 years.

8.3.5 Installing additional pipeline markers

PD 8010-1:2004, 10.14 recommends that pipeline markers be installed
at field boundaries, at all crossings and, where practicable, at changes
in pipeline direction. In addition, high visibility pipeline markers,
providing further information on contacts and emergency telephone
numbers, can be installed as an additional risk mitigation measure.
(See PD 8010-1:2004, 13.3.2 and E.9.)

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8.3.6 Increasing surveillance frequency

PD 8010-1:2004, 13.3.2 recommends that pipeline route inspections
should be carried out. Where route inspections are carried out at
two‑weekly intervals, increasing the surveillance frequency will
increase the likelihood of detection of activities that could damage
the pipeline. The surveillance frequency may be increased using
walking or vantage point surveys at specific locations as a risk
mitigation measure.
Full details of any additional mitigation measures installed or
implemented should be recorded in the pipeline records systems or
included in the major accident prevention document (MAPD) for the
pipeline.

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Annex A (informative) Summary of HSE methodology for

provision of advice on planning
developments in the vicinity of major
accident hazard pipelines in the UK
A.1 Land use planning zones
The Health and Safety Executive (HSE) sets land use planning zones
for major hazard sites, including high-pressure pipelines transporting
defined hazardous substances, so that it can provide advice to the
local planning authorities on the risks posed by major hazards to
people in the surrounding area and the risks can be given due
weight in making planning decisions.
Land use planning zones are used by HSE for MAHPs as defined by
Regulation 18 and Schedule 2 of the Pipeline Safety Regulations
1996 [1], and to pipelines that were notified under the Notification
of Installations Handling Hazardous Substances Regulations 1982 [29]
before the enactment of the Pipeline Safety Regulations 1996.
Land use planning zones define three areas:
• inner zone, which is immediately adjacent to the pipeline;
• middle zone, which applies to proposed significant
development;
• outer zone, which applies to proposed vulnerable or very
large populations.
The zone boundaries are determined by HSE using a process for
calculating individual risk levels, based on information provided to
HSE by the pipeline operator. HSE then notifies the inner, middle and
outer zone distances to local planning authorities. The outer zone
distance is also called the consultation zone, within which the risk
implications of proposed developments that significantly increase the
population density have to be considered by the local authority.
Local planning authorities in Great Britain are responsible for land use
planning decisions under the Town and Country Planning Act 1990 [30],
and HSE is a statutory consultee with responsibility to provide advice
with respect to public safety for specified developments planned
within or which straddle the consultation zone. Detailed guidance
defining the HSE advice (“advise against” or “do not advise against”)
for various types of development is contained in a comprehensive
document available from the HSE website entitled Planning advice for
developments near hazardous installations (PADHI+) [31].
A developer or local planning authority might wish to seek further
information to see whether the risk at the specific development
location is different from the generalized land use planning zone
notified by HSE, or whether additional risk reduction measures (risk
mitigation) can be applied at that location, to allow the planned
development to proceed. Land use planning zones notified to local
planning authorities by HSE are based on pipeline details provided in
the operator’s pipeline notification, and do not cover local variations.
Where local pipeline details differ from the notified conditions,
including whether the pipeline has additional protection [e.g. thicker
walled pipe or slabbing]Footnote deleted near the proposed development),

Footnote deleted.

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a detailed risk assessment can be carried out by HSE to assess any

change to zone boundaries.
With regard to slabbing, HSE applies the risk reduction factors
shown in Table A.0.

Table A.0 Risk reduction factors for slabbing applied by HSE

Barrier type Risk reduction factor

Concrete slab only 0.15
Slab and marker tapes 0.125

HSE does not apply the risk reduction factors Rs (reduction factor for
surveillance) or Rlv (reduction factor for liaison visits) described in 8.2
in any pipeline risk assessments undertaken for land use planning
purposes.
At the time when the pipeline operator becomes aware of the
possibility of a development near a pipeline, especially if it involves
an increase in population within 1 MDOB, they need to assess the
population increase against the original routing parameters. In some
cases they might decide to initiate a full societal risk assessment to
define acceptability or otherwise of the development against the FN
risk curve presented in Figure 6, before deciding whether to object to
the proposed development.
In these cases, there is a need to reassess the impact of site-specific
details on the risk levels within the interaction zone using an
established risk assessment methodology. The guidance in this part
of PD 8010 is provided for use by pipeline operators, local planning
authorities, developers and any person involved in the risk assessment
of developments in the vicinity of existing MAHPs. It is based on the
established best practice methodology for pipeline risk assessment.
It is recommended that the methodology be used for the prediction
of site-specific risk levels for consideration in the reassessment of land
use planning developments, so that specific local conditions can be
taken into account. The process is shown in Figure A.1. PADHI+
leads to HSE’s LUP advice, though it is only one factor that planning
authorities consider before they make a planning decision to grant or
not to grant planning permission.
HSE has adopted a risk-based approach for calculating the distances
to the zone boundaries from the pipeline, defining the levels of risk at
each boundary as follows:
a) boundary between inner and middle zone – based on the
greater of:
1) an individual risk of (1 × 10−5) per year of dangerous dose or
worse to a hypothetical householder; or
2) the pipeline MDOB;
NOTE 1 Because of the low levels of risk, some MAHPs will not have
an inner zone based on an individual risk level of (1 × 10−5) per year.
However, an inner zone equivalent to the MDOB has been applied
by HSE to MAHPs. This distance is calculated using the equation and
substance factors given in PD 8010-1:2004, 5.5.3.
NOTE 2 In the past, HSE has used a consequence-based approach for
calculating this distance.

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b) boundary between middle zone and outer zone – an individual

risk of (1 × 10−6) per year of dangerous dose or worse to a
hypothetical householder;
c) boundary between outer zone and no consultation required –
an individual risk of (0.3 × 10−6) per year of dangerous dose or
worse to a hypothetical householder.
NOTE 3 In cases where the calculation of risks indicates risk levels
are lower than (1 × 10−6) per year and therefore there is no middle
zone, the inner and middle zones are made equal to the MDOB.
Similarly, where risk calculations show levels lower than (0.3 × 10−6)
per year, all three zones, inner, middle and outer, are made equal to
the MDOB (PD 8010-1:2004, 5.5.3).
NOTE 4 The location of very large sensitive developments (e.g. very
large hospitals, schools, old people’s homes) is restricted to the outer
zone (see also Clause 7).
MDOBs are given in PD 8010-1:2004, 5.5.3. In the case of mixtures,
it might be appropriate to take into account proportions when
calculating this distance.
Dangerous dose is defined by HSE as a dose of thermal radiation that
would cause:
1) severe distress to almost everyone in the area;
2) a substantial fraction of the exposed population requiring
medical attention;
3) some people being seriously injured, requiring prolonged
treatment;
4) any highly susceptible/sensitive people being killed.
NOTE 5 Due to the uncertainties associated with such predictions, the
“dangerous dose” concept is used by HSE to define land use planning
zones. Normally, a dangerous dose for thermal radiation is defined as
1 050 tdu. These criteria are based on the assumption that the exposed
people are typical householders and indoors most of the time , and are
representative of a cross-section of the public.
The decision table in PADHI [31] is used with the three (or fewer) zones
set by HSE. These zones are routinely based on the details given in the
pipeline notification. In cases where local pipeline details differ from
notified details, then HSE risk assessors might be willing to reconsider a
proposed development case using the details relevant to the pipeline near
the development.
Further information on the above is available from HSE.

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Figure A.1 Planning application process and need for site-specific risk assessment

 

NOTE 1 In all cases where the PADHI+ decision is “do not advise against”, the pipeline operator needs to
consider the impact of increased population within the consultation zone and the effect on the original
routing decisions made for the pipeline, especially if the development is within 1 MDOB. If significant
population increase is likely to occur if the planning development goes ahead, the pipeline operator might
need to carry out a societal risk assessment to allow comparison with the societal risk criteria in Figure 6. If
unfavourable results are obtained from the societal risk assessment, the pipeline operator might consider
objecting to the proposed development.
NOTE 2 In cases where risk mitigation measures are being considered, the land use planning individual risk
assessment and the pipeline operator’s societal risk assessment need to be carried out in parallel, so that a
common understanding using the same data and risk assessment assumptions allows the effectiveness of the
mitigation to be agreed.

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A.2 Distances to risk zones

Current HSE land use planning distances to (1 × 10−6) and (0.3 × 10−6)
risk contours for ethylene, spiked crude and natural gas liquids (NGLs)
are given in Table A.1.
Zone distances based on these risk levels notified to the local planning
authorities are as calculated by HSE, and therefore might differ
from equivalent risk levels calculated using other methodologies.
Where possible, specific assumptions made by HSE are given in this
document, so that the effect can be quantified.

Table A.1 Typical (1 × 10−6) and (0.3 × 10−6) risk distances for ethylene, spiked crude and natural gas
liquids (NGLs)

Content of Distances to risk zones

pipeline MAOP Diameter Wall MaterialA) Distance to Distance to
thickness (1 × 10−6) risk (0.3 × 10−6)
contour risk contour
bar mm mm m m
Ethylene 95 219 7.03 X42 150 200
Ethylene 95 273 7.09 X52 190 230
Ethylene 99 273 5.56 X52 240 320
Spiked crude 64 914 9.52 X65 380 435
NGL 69 508 9.52 X52 432 485
−6 −6
NOTE The land use planning zones defined in Table A.1 as (1 × 10 ) and (0.3 × 10 ) risk distances were
calculated by HSE using historical rupture frequency data.
A)
As specified in ISO 3183‑2:1996.

A.3 Specific HSE methods and assumptions

NOTE Specific methods applied and assumptions made by HSE are
given in this Annex so that the impact on calculated risk values can be
considered.

A.3.0 Failure frequencies

Where ruptures are not recorded in operational data, HSE assumes a
low, non-negligible value.

A.3.1 Prediction of consequences

In predicting consequences, HSE calculates the reducing release rate
with time and so obtains the cumulative amount released. The time
required to release the cumulative amount is then compared with the
burn time of a fireball containing the cumulative amount released;
when the two times are equal, the largest fireball is obtained.
NOTE Uncertainties relating to the near field consequence analysis are
accommodated through the application of an inner zone based on the
MDOB, which is calculated using the formula and substance factors given
in PD 8010-1:2004, 5.5.3.

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A.3.2 Probability of ignition

Typical overall probabilities for flammable gases, other than natural
gas, used by HSE are:
• immediate ignition resulting in a fireball followed by jet fire: 0.2;
• delayed ignition resulting in a jet fire: 0.512;
• delayed ignition resulting in a flash fire followed by a jet fire: 0.128;
• no ignition: 0.16.
NOTE Other probabilities are observed in historical data.

A.3.3 Thermal radiation and effects

HSE assumes that the typical person will move away from the fire
at a speed of 2.5 m/s and will find shelter at a distance of 75 m in a
class 1 environment or at a distance of 50 m in a class 2 environment,
provided that the thermal radiation dose they receive does not exceed
1 050 tdu. If the cumulative thermal dose exceeds 1 050 tdu, then the
typical person is deemed to have received a dangerous dose.
The methodology used by HSE calculates the distance to the
spontaneous ignition of wood, and people inside buildings within
this distance are assumed to become fatalities. People inside buildings
outside the distance to the spontaneous ignition but within the
distance to the piloted ignition of wood are assumed to survive the
fireball, but are then assumed to try to escape from the building and
to be subject to the thermal radiation effects from the crater fire.
For people inside buildings that are beyond the distance to piloted
ignition, the building is assumed to provide full protection. People
inside buildings engulfed by pool fires or spray fires are assumed not
to escape. HSE assumes that the average householder is present 100%
of the time. The proportion of time the average householder spends
indoors during the day is 90%, and the proportion at night is 99%.
For further details of HSE’s consequence models, see [11, 14, 15, 32, 33].

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Annex B (informative) Failure frequencies for UK pipelines

B.1 General
In deriving the failure frequency for a specific pipeline, all credible
damage mechanisms and location specific factors that can influence
the frequency of failure due to each individual mechanism need to
be assessed.

B.2 All damage mechanisms

Pipeline failure frequencies for UK pipelines are derived from data
published by UKOPA. Guidance provided in this annex is based on the
UKOPA pipeline fault database report [9].
Failure frequencies are presented in this annex in failures per
1 000 km·y for the following hole sizes:
• pin hole: equivalent hole diameter up to 6 mm;
• small hole: equivalent hole diameter between 6 mm and 40 mm;
• large hole: equivalent hole diameter greater than 40 mm but less
than pipe diameter;
• rupture: equivalent hole diameter equal to or greater than pipe
diameter.
In deriving pipeline failure frequencies induced by specific damage
mechanisms for use in pipeline risk assessment, account needs to be
taken of pipeline-specific factors such as wall thickness, pressure,
diameter, material properties, location, environment and pipeline
operator management practices.
The recommendations given in B.3 to B.8 for failure frequency for the
different damage mechanisms apply to UK MAHPs.
Table deleted.

B.3 Prediction of pipeline failure frequency due to

external interference
Pipeline damage due to external (third-party) interference is random in
nature, and as operational failure data is sparse, recognized engineering
practice requires that a predictive model is used to calculate failure
frequencies for specific pipelines. These models allow the prediction of
failure frequencies taking into account pipeline diameter, wall thickness,
material properties and pressure. A model for predicting the failure
frequency due to external interference is described in reference [6].
A simple methodology developed using this model is given in B.4.
Tables deleted.

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B.4 Generic pipeline failure frequency curve for

external interference

B.4.1 General
A generic pipeline failure frequency curve for external interference
which can be used with the failure frequency reduction factors
for design factor and wall thickness given in Figure 8 and Figure 9
respectively is derived by predicting the failure frequency for pipelines
of varying diameter with a constant design factor of 0.72, a constant
wall thickness of 5 mm and a material grade of X65. This curve is
shown in Figure B.1. The generic failure frequency curve has been
generated using probabilities of failure produced using the original
dent-gouge model [23, 24, 25]. The failure model is two-dimensional,
and predicts the total probability of through wall failure, i.e. for
leaks and ruptures. Text deleted. However, the leak/rupture
failure mode is dependent upon the critical length of an axial defect,
which is dependent upon both the diameter and the wall thickness.
Figure B.1a gives the proportion of ruptures which should be
applied to the total failure rate obtained from Figure B.1.
NOTE 1 Predicted failure frequencies due to external or third-party
interference increase with material grade due to the consequent
reduction in wall thickness, so the generic curve given in Figure B.1 can be
conservatively applied to pipelines with material grades of X65 and lower.
NOTE 2 The generic curve given in Figure B.1 provides failure frequencies
for pipelines in R areas. Failure frequencies for pipelines in S areas can be
derived by multiplying the R area failure frequency by a factor of 4, as
recommended in 8.2.

Figure B.1 Generic predicted pipeline failure frequencies for third-party interference

 

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Figure B.1a Proportion of ruptures to be applied to the total failure rate derived from Figure B.1

  

Use of the generic failure frequency curve is conservative. In cases

where risk levels are critical, a pipeline specific analysis needs to be
carried out using an appropriate failure frequency prediction tool
(e.g. FFREQ).
Example calculations of failure frequency using the generic failure
frequency curve and the design factor and wall thickness failure
frequency reduction factors are given in B.4.2. Text deleted.

B.4.2 Estimation of pipeline external interference failure

frequency using the generic failure frequency curve
Examples estimating the failure frequency using the generic failure
frequency curve and the design factor and wall thickness failure
frequency reduction factors for specific pipeline cases are given in
Table B.3a.

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Table B.3a Example calculations of pipeline failure frequency due to external interference

Parameter Calculation Calculation details

Example 1 Example 2 Example 3
Outside diameter 219.10 mm 609.60 mm 914.40 mm
Wall thickness 6.30 mm 9.52 mm 11.91 mm
Design factor, f 0.30 0.50 0.72

Reduction factor for 0.67 0.81 1.00 Obtained from

design factor, Rdf Figure 8 using f
Reduction factor for 0.60 0.25 0.19 Obtained from
wall thickness, Rwt Figure 9 using wall
thickness
Generic total failure 0.219 0.203 0.197 Obtained from
frequency, GTFF Figure B.1 using
outside diameter
Proportion of 0.374 0.436 0.556 Obtained from
ruptures, RF Figure B.1a using f

Total failure 0.088 per 0.040 per 0.037 per TFF = GTFF × Rdf × Rwt
frequency, TFF 1 000 km·y 1 000 km·y 1 000 km·y
Rupture failure 0.033 per 0.018 per 0.021 per RFF = GTFF × RF
frequency, RFF 1 000 km·y 1 000 km·y 1 000 km·y

Subclauses and tables deleted.

B.5 Pipeline external interference failure frequency

predictions for specific pipe cases

B.5.1 Subclause deleted.

Text, figures and tables deleted.

B.5.2 Subclause deleted.

Text and table deleted.

B.5.3 Critical defect size

Damage caused by external interference typically includes gouges,
which are of a narrow slot shape, and are modelled as crack-like
defects. For high-pressure gas releases (in which the energy of the
depressurizing gas does not decay immediately), the critical size of
a crack-like defect at which the failure mode changes from leak to
rupture, i.e. when the critical length is exceeded, needs to be taken
into account. The maximum area through which the high pressure gas
escapes at the critical length is usually determined as an equivalent
hole size in order to calculate the maximum leak release rate [34].
Typical values of the equivalent hole diameter for critical defect lengths
for pipelines operating at a design factor of 0.72 are given in Table B.12.

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Table B.12 Critical defect lengths and equivalent hole diameters for UKOPA pipeline cases operating at a
design factor of 0.72
Dimensions in millimetres (mm)
Diameter Wall thickness Material grade Critical defect Critical hole
length diameter limit
rupture/leak
168.3 5.6 X42 28.97 2.41
219.1 5.6 X46 31.72 2.98
273 5.6 X52 33.09 3.42
323.9 5.6 X52 36.03 4.05
406.4 7.9 X52 47.92 5.09
508 7.9 X52 53.53 6.35
609 7.9 X60 57.99 7.52
762 7.9 X60 64.72 9.38
914 9.5 X65 85.91 12.73

B.6 Pipeline failure frequency due to corrosion

B.6.1 External corrosion

UKOPA data for external corrosion is given in Table B.13. The failure
frequency due to external corrosion in the UK is dependent upon
the year of construction and hence the age and applicable coating,
corrosion protection design standards and corrosion control procedures.
Corrosion control procedures for external corrosion include:
• monitored and controlled CP;
• regular in-line inspection; and
• defect assessment and remedial action.
The data shows that to date there is no operational experience of
rupture failure due to corrosion in the UK.

Table B.13 Failure frequency due to external corrosion

Units in failure frequency per 1 000 km·y
Wall thickness Pin hole A) Small hole A) Large hole Rupture A) Total
(mm)
G5 0.304 0.076 0 0 0.38
>5 G10 0.032 0.011 0.003 0 0.046
>10 G15 0 0 0 0 0
>15 0 0 0 0 0
A)
See B.2 for definitions.

NOTE HSE does not apply zero failure frequency values, but instead uses
derived leak and rupture failure frequencies where failures have not been
recorded.

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For pipelines commissioned before 1980, it is recommended that

the corrosion failure frequencies in Table B.13 be applied unless
corrosion control procedures have been used. Based on analysis of
UKOPA pipeline fault and failure data [35], for pipelines of wall
thickness up to 15 mm commissioned after 1980 and with corrosion
control procedures applied, the corrosion failure frequency rate can
be assumed to reduce by a factor of 10. For pipelines of any age
with wall thicknesses greater than 15 mm and with corrosion control
procedures in place, the corrosion failure frequency can be assumed to
be negligible. The UKOPA data indicates that corrosion failures occur
as leaks, and that no ruptures have been recorded to date in the UK.

B.6.2 Internal corrosion

Review of UKOPA data confirms that the incidence of internal corrosion
in MAHPs in the UK to date is low. The likelihood of occurrence of
internal corrosion depends upon the fluid transported, and needs to be
assessed on a pipeline specific basis, and the failure frequency needs to
be assessed taking into account corrosion control procedures and use
and frequency of in-line inspection.

B.7 Pipeline failure frequency due to material and

construction defects
UKOPA data for the failure frequency due to material and construction
defects is given in Table B.14; this shows that the failure frequency
reduces as the wall thickness increases. The UKOPA data indicates that
material and construction failures occur as leaks, and that no ruptures
have been recorded to date.

Table B.14 Material and construction failure frequency vs. wall thickness
Units in failure frequency per 1 000 km·y
Wall thickness Pin hole A) Small hole A) Large hole A) Rupture A) Total
(mm)
G5 0.418 0.019 0 0 0.437
>5 G10 0.040 0.016 0 0 0.056
>10 G15 0.017 0.000 0 0 0.017
>15 0 0.017 0 0 0.017
A)
See B.2 for definitions.

NOTE HSE does not apply zero failure frequency values, but instead uses
derived leak and rupture failure frequencies where failures have not been
recorded.
Analysis of the UKOPA pipeline fault and failure data [35] shows that
failure frequency due to material and construction defects in the UK
is dependent upon the year of construction and hence the age, design
and construction standards, in particular the material selection controls
and welding inspection standards applied. For pipelines commissioned
after 1980, the material and construction failure frequency rate can be
assumed to reduce by a factor of 5 (based on an analysis of UKOPA
pipeline fault data [35]).

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B.8 Pipeline failure frequency due to ground movement

B.8.1 General
There is insufficient historical data to establish a relationship between
ground movement failure data and individual pipeline parameters.
The failure frequency of a specific pipeline due to ground movement
is dependent upon the susceptibility to natural landsliding along the
route, and this needs to be assessed on a location specific basis.

B.8.2 Natural landsliding

UKOPA has concluded from a UK study that the primary factors
influencing pipeline rupture rates due to inland natural landsliding
are the landsliding rate, the pipeline wall thickness and the pipeline
girth weld quality.
It is recommended that a site-specific appraisal of landslide susceptibility
is obtained for the pipeline section involved in the risk assessment.
The indicative landslide incident rates for differing levels of landslide
susceptibility in the UK are presented in Table B.15.

Table B.15 Indicative UK landsliding incident rates

Landslide Description UK landslide incident rate

potential (number per 1 000 km·y)
Significant Landslide-prone geological formations are present 0.50
in areas of slopes with adequate relative relief for
instability. Active and dormant landslide deposits are
probably present.
Moderate Landslide-prone geological formations are present but 0.05
slope angles, relative relief or groundwater conditions
are not currently conducive to instability. Slope instability
might be triggered by significant changes in conditions.
Dormant landslide deposits might be present.
Low to nil Landslide-prone geological formations are generally 0.005
absent, or slope angles and relative relief are typically
too modest for instability. Groundwater changes are
unlikely to influence stability. Instability is likely to be
associated with extreme changes in conditions.
Weighted Background rate due to all landslide exposure. 0.02
average

The indicative pipeline failure frequency is obtained from the

landslide incident rate and the pipeline survival value:
F = LIR × SV
where:
F is the pipeline failure rate (number per 1000 km·y);
LIR is the landslide incident rate from Table B.15;
SV is a dimensionless survival value.
The survival values for rupture and leak failures are presented in
Figure B.5.

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Figure B.5 Survival value trend lines for rupture due to natural landsliding

Key
–––––––––––– High quality girth welds (rupture): SV . 0.15 × e–0.30 × wt
————— Poor quality girth welds (rupture): SV . 0.15 × e–0.18 × wt
---------- All welds (leak): SV . e–0.15 × wt

The girth weld classification used in Figure B.5 is as follows.

• “High quality” girth welds are welds with controlled limits on
planar and non-planar defects and satisfactory toughness and
strength to ensure that any failure is by gross section yielding
outside the weld zone.
• “Poor quality” girth welds are welds containing cracks or other
harmful defects and with inadequate toughness and strength to
avoid defect dominated failure. Failure is by net section yielding
within the weld zone.
In cases where the weld quality is unknown, it might be prudent to
adopt a survival value based on an assumption of “poor quality”
girth welds.
The survival values for a leak failure (taken to be equivalent to a
“large hole” as defined in B.2) are not dependent on a weld quality
classification.
Where a site-specific assessment indicates a significant potential
(high susceptibility) for natural landsliding, it might be necessary to
review slope stability and pipeline structural integrity by conventional
engineering assessment, including applicable code compliance.

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B.8.3 Artificial ground movement

There might be an additional risk of ground movement associated
with slope instability of artificial earth structures. These can include
cut-slopes and embankment structures. The construction of these types
of structure in the vicinity of a pipeline is normally managed through
the pipeline operator’s third-party notification and work supervision
processes. Any development work of this type that takes place without
notification needs to be identified through pipeline surveillance.
Artificial earthworks activity near pipelines is readily identified
and controlled. The additional pipeline failure rate due to future
earthworks construction is therefore considered to be negligible.

B.9 Pipeline failure frequency due to other causes

Pipeline failure rates due to causes other than those outlined in B.1
to B.8 need to be assessed on a pipeline-specific basis. Relevant causes
can include overpressure, fatigue etc., and will vary according to the
operating regime and/or location of the pipeline or pipeline section.
NOTE The UKOPA product loss data in Table B.1 indicates that other
causes account for approximately 28% of the total failure rate. The
UKOPA pipeline fault data report [9] confirms that 62.5% of the incidents
recorded in this category relate to pre-1970 pipelines, and are not relevant
to pipelines designed, constructed and operated in accordance with
current pipeline standards. Derivation of a failure rate based on this data
is therefore not recommended.

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Annex C (informative) Example of a site-specific risk assessment

C.1 Scenario
A planning application for a mixed development of houses and
two-storey apartments totalling 95 dwellings in a green field rural
area near a village has been lodged with the local planning authority.
On checking their records, the planning authority finds that there is
an ethylene pipeline located near the proposed site which has land
use planning zones. The closest house is 85 m from the pipeline.
Details are shown in Figure C.1.

Figure C.1 Proposed development

 

The planning authority checks pipeline risk zones against advice from
HSE, and discovers that for a larger development of more than 30
dwelling units, if more than 10% of the development is in the middle
zone, HSE advises against allowing this development to proceed.
The planning authority therefore informs the developer that they will
refuse planning permission on safety grounds.
The developer then contacts the pipeline operator to see whether
there are any special conditions associated with the pipeline that
could affect the planning application. After discussion with the
operator, the developer is able to confirm that the pipeline design
conditions are as notified to HSE and therefore the only possibility
would be to apply mitigating factors to reduce the risk zones.

C.2 Risk assessment

The developer commissions a risk assessor to review the land use
planning zones and possible mitigation that could be applied.
The following details are confirmed:
• product: ethylene (dense phase);
• pipeline diameter: 273 mm;
• wall thickness: 7.09 mm;
• steel: X52;
• maximum allowable operating pressure: 99.3 bar;

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PD 8010-3:2009+A1:2013 PUBLISHED DOCUMENT

• depth of cover: 1 100 mm;

• area classification: class 1 (rural).
From this the design factor is calculated as 0.53.
Failure rates are obtained using the predictive modelling and data in
Annex B.
a) Failure rate due to third party interference:
The following results were obtained from the third-party
predictive model:
• rupture rate is 0.022 9 per 1 000 km·y;
• leak rate is 0.020 per 1 000 km·y.
The total third-party failure rate is therefore 0.044 9 per
1 000 km·y.
b) The critical hole diameter for this pipeline to be used to
determine the release rate for leaks [i.e. the maximum leak hole
size (see Table B.12)] is calculated as 6.2 mm.
c) External corrosion: failure frequency due to leaks (Table B.13) =
0.046 per 1 000 km·y.
d) Material and construction: failure frequency due to leaks
(Table B.14) = 0.056 per 1 000 km·y.
e) Ground movement: the failure frequency due to landslides is not
known, so the UK background rate of 0.020 per 1 per 1 000 km·y
is applied for this case. The pipeline is known to have high-quality
girth welds, so the lower curve from Figure B.5 is applied. Based on
a wall thickness of 7.09 mm, the rupture survival value from Figure
B.5 is 0.018, so the rupture rate is therefore 0.02 × 0.018 = 3.6 ×
10−4 per 1 000 km·y. Similarly, the leak rate survival value is 0.345, so
the leak rate is 0.02 × 0.345 = 0.006 9 per 1 000 km·y. Total ground
movement failure rate is therefore 0.007 3 per 1 000 km·y.
From a) to e) above, the total failure frequency rate for this pipeline is
therefore determined as follows:
• failure frequency due to leaks = 0.128 9 per 1 000 km·y;
• failure frequency due to ruptures = 0.0233 5 per 1 000 km·y;
• total failure frequency rate = 0.152 2 per 1 000 km·y.
For this pipeline, the above assessment indicates that third party
interference accounts for 28% of failures and 98% of ruptures.
The risk assessor is therefore able to simulate risks from the following
main calculation steps:
• minimum distance to occupied buildings (MDOB): 54 m.
• fireball radius: 64 m;
• fireball duration: 9.6 s;
• fireball spontaneous ignition distance: 95 m;
• fireball 1 000 tdu in open air distance: 135 m;
• rupture 30 s jet flame escape distance: 115 m.
From this, the distance to risk levels are calculated as follows:
• 10−6 per year individual risk: 115 m;
• (3 × 10−7) per year individual risk: 310 m.

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These risk levels correspond well to HSE land use planning zones,
which are:
• inner zone: 85 m (as originally notified by HSE);
• middle zone: 180 m;
• outer zone: 240 m (as originally notified by HSE).

C.3 Mitigation measures

C.3.1 Possible measures
The following possible mitigation measures are proposed for risk
reduction:
a) install concrete slabbing and marker tape over the pipeline;
b) re-lay pipeline in heavy-wall pipe.
These measures are discussed in C.3.2 and C.3.3 respectively.

C.3.2 Installing concrete slabbing and marker tape over

the pipeline
Utilizing the recognized standard for slabbing and marker tape,
the third party failure frequency reduces by a factor of 0.1.
The new failure rates are therefore:
• rupture failure rate: (0.022 9 × 0.1 + 3.6 × 10−4) = 0.002 6 per
1 000 km·y;
• total failure rate: (0.042 9 × 0.1 + 0.046 + 0.056 + 0.007 3) =
0.113 61 per 1 000 km·y.
The re-calculated risk distances are:
• 10−6 per year individual risk: 64 m;
• (3 × 10−7) per year individual risk: 114 m.
This reduces the middle zone so that the new development is outside
the middle zone.
The distance adjacent to the proposed housing over which slabbing
and marker tape are required is the interaction distance as shown in
Figure C.2, based on the outside hazard distance from the pipeline.

Figure C.2 Risk for outside exposure

 

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The length of the development adjacent to the pipeline would

also need to be added to the 210 m interaction distance shown in
Figure C.2.
The operator also requests a societal risk assessment for the situation
before slabbing and after slabbing to be able to assess the risk
reduction achieved. The resulting graph is shown in Figure C.3.

Figure C.3 Societal risk FN curves and PD 8010-3 FN criterion line – proposed development before and
after slabbing

 

Key
A Number of casualties PD 8010-3 risk criterion line
B Frequency (per year) of N or more casualties Proposed development before slabbing
C Broadly acceptable Proposed development after slabbing
D Tolerable if ALARP

Measured against the 1 km societal risk criterion for an interaction

distance of 450 m (the site interaction length, which in this case is
equal to the length of the proposed development plus twice the
maximum hazard range), and applying the thermal radiation level
of 1 800 tdu for comparison with this criterion, this indicates that
the proposed development was above the “negligible/tolerable” risk
criterion line, whereas after slabbing the risk has reduced so that all
risks are within the “broadly acceptable” region, and are therefore
considered to be ALARP.

C.3.3 Re-laying the pipeline section in thick-wall pipe

The effect on risk of re laying the pipeline adjacent to the
proposed new development in 11.91 mm thick pipe is assessed.
a) Failure rate due to third party interference:
The following results were obtained from the third-party
predictive model:
• rupture failure rate due to third party interference is
0.001 5 per 1 000 km·y;
• leak rate is 0.004 per 1 000 km·y.

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The overall third-party failure rate is therefore 0.005 5 per

1 000 km·y.
b) External corrosion: failure frequency due to leaks (Table B.13) =
0.0 per 1 000 km·y.
c) Material and construction: failure frequency due to leaks
(Table B.14) = 0.017 per 1 000 km·y.
d) Ground movement: failure frequency: the rupture survival value
from Figure B.5 reduces to 0.004, so the rupture rate is therefore
0.02 × 0.004 = 8.4 × 10-5 per 1 000 km·y. Similarly, the leak survival
value reduces to 0.168 so the leak rate is 0.02 × 0.168 = 0.003 4
per 1 000 km·y. Total ground movement failure rate is therefore
0.003 4 per 1 000 km·y.
From a) to d) above, the total failure frequency rate for this pipeline is
therefore determined as follows:
• failure frequency due to leaks = 0.024 4 0 per 1 000 km·y;
• failure frequency due to ruptures = 0.001 6 per 1 000 km·y;
• total failure frequency rate = 0.025 9 per 1 000 km·y.
For this pipeline, the above assessment indicates that third party
interference accounts for 21% of failures and 95% of ruptures.
The re-calculated risk distances are:
• 10−6 per year individual risk: 43 m;
• (3 × 10−7) per year individual risk: 88 m.
This can reduce the middle zone so that all the new development is
outside the middle zone, and would again need to be justified by
ALARP considerations.
ALARP considerations would include cost benefit considerations based
on the reduction in total loss, or expectation value achieved by the
mitigation measures [18]. The judgement based on the results needs
to take account of:
• the uncertainty in the data and models used in the assessment;
• societal concerns including aversion;
• criteria specific to the individual pipeline operating company.

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Bibliography
For dated references, only the edition cited applies. For undated
references, the latest edition of the referenced document (including
any amendments) applies.

Standards publications

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[24] HOPKINS, P. The application of fitness for purpose methods to

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52 • © The British Standards Institution 2013

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