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IMCA Safety Flashes summarise key safety matters and incidents, allowing lessons to be more easily learnt for the benefit of all.
The effectiveness of the IMCA Safety Flash system depends on members sharing information and so avoiding repeat incidents.
Please consider adding [email protected] to your internal distribution list for safety alerts or manually submitting
information on incidents you consider may be relevant. All information is anonymised or sanitised, as appropriate.
What happened
The Chief officer was fatally injured when he was struck on the head by a tensioned mooring line that sprang out
of an open roller fairlead. Teal Bay was loading grain when moored alongside an anchored bulk carrier. The mooring
line was being used to pull Teal Bay forward and it sprang free when its lead angle became too great for the open
fairlead to restrain it.
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• There was insufficient planning for both the mooring and the warping; this happened because, for both
evolutions, there was a lack of time available to plan and the crew was unfamiliar with the operation;
• Despite the crew's efforts and the assistance of a tug, it took over two hours for the casualty to be seen by a
medical professional. Given the severity of his injuries, it is unknown whether the delays in the Chief officer
receiving medical attention had any bearing on his death; however, the lack of coordination by the parties
involved in organising the medical response created delays that lessened his chances of survival.
Recommendations and actions taken
• Fleetwide safety alert to highlight the safety issues raised;
• Additional safety training with crew, including modules on safe mooring operations and ship-to-ship transfer;
• Planned to remove open fairleads and replace them with a closed type or universal type of fairlead;
• Reviewed and SMS procedures and risk assessments.
Members may wish to refer to:
• Mooring incident: mooring line slipped off and snapped back
• Lost time injury (LTI) during mooring operations
What happened
VALARIS DS-4’s crew were able to start all but one of the drill ship’s diesel generators but did have difficulties
bringing the bow and stern thrusters online. VALARIS DS-4 was re-moored after the crewmembers were able to
start all but one of the azimuth thrusters.
What went right (what reduced the adverse consequences of this marine incident)
• Anchors had been pre-deployed when the drill ships were berthed;
• The arrival of tugs to hold ENSCO DS-8 alongside the berth.
Recommendations made
The report’s conclusions, recommendations and proposals for action included:
• Ensure thrusters can be started appropriately and in a timely way – in this case, all six should have been able to
start simultaneously;
• Develop new and better mooring plans and emergency response procedures;
• Review and revise their procedures for planning for vessel lay-ups.
Members may wish to refer to:
• Don’t lose your tow in heavy weather
• Grounding of bulk carrier Kuzma Minin at Falmouth
What happened
BSEE inspectors have observed multiple crane components in poor condition on idle facilities throughout the Gulf
of Mexico. Additionally, BSEE inspectors have noted various crane components missing that were previously
attached by crane cables.
After extended periods of inactivity, with little or no operator inspection and maintenance, lifting equipment
deteriorates due to harsh offshore environmental conditions. BSEE inspectors have observed corrosion on
numerous crane cables, which support main blocks, auxiliary balls, overhaul/headache hook balls, and anti-two
block equipment. Without proper oversight, the weakened cables have parted, resulting in cables and associated
crane components dropping from elevation.
In addition, diminished integrity of wire rope and synthetic slings exposed to weather elements have also been
identified as dropped object hazards. These slings are sometimes used to support heavy water hoses and diesel
fuel hoses. If the slings fail, there is a potential for severe consequences. The dropped objects can potentially pose
a safety risk to personnel boarding the facility or individuals nearby the facility, such as offshore support vessel
crewmembers or commercial/recreational fishermen. The dropped objects can also become marine debris, posing
environmental risks.
As most inactive cranes on idle structures have been taken permanently out of service, they no longer require an
annual inspection by a qualified inspector. Consequently, in most cases preventative or corrective maintenance has
been disregarded.
BSEE recommendations
• Removing all blocks and balls from inactive cranes on idle facilities. If immediate removal is not possible,
temporarily secure the blocks/balls with straps or slings that are in adequate condition to prevent dropped
objects hazards;
• Conducting a full-function operation inspection when an out of service crane is being put back into service,
paying special attention to the lubrication of the wire ropes. All slings on idle facilities that are kept on outboard
brackets should be appropriately stored or discarded to eliminate the possibility of falling overboard;
• Clearing diesel and hydraulic reservoirs and associated hoses on cranes that have been permanently taken out
of service, to eliminate pollution potential.
Members may wish to refer to
• NTSB: Fire on laid up Dive Support Vessel
• Potential engine room flooding: maintenance and equipment failure issues on a laid-up vessel
• Lifejacket battery caught fire [during cold layup]
Facility personnel used a pallet jack, a piece of two-inch pipe, and a two-by-four piece of wood to lift the boom
tip and pull the lead mechanic from under the boom tip and then administered appropriate first aid.
What went right: The response of the facility personnel was critical in providing lifesaving interventions until
treatment could be provided at the hospital on shore.
The company’s incident investigation found that the root causes were:
• The Job Safety Analysis (JSA) was only completed by one employee and did not include rigging up the mid-
section to the bridle prior to removing pins or the use of safety boom connector pins. In addition, the lead
mechanic signed off on the JSA without actually reviewing it;
• There was no requirement for onshore management or the crew to review the JSA before starting work.
Figure 1 – Example of how mid- Figure 3 – Boom connector Figure 4 – Boom section on injured
section should have been rigged safety pin person’s (IP) leg
Recommendations:
• Review of policies and procedures, ensuring compliance with the JSA requirements;
• Reinforcing the use of Stop Work Authority particularly when the scope of work changes;
• Understanding the importance of staying out of the line of fire when working near heavy equipment and
considering all possible pinch points when walking down the job;
• Verifying all safety equipment is available and in place before the job starts;
• Providing specific written procedures to individuals disassembling cranes;
• Ensure that you do actually review the paperwork, risk assessment, JSA etc before you sign off on it and before
you start the job!!
• Ensuring specialized contractors create and maintain written procedures and checklists for common jobs;
• Conducting drills based on realistic injury and first-aid scenarios and inspect medical supplies and kits at the
facility level.
Members may wish to refer to:
• High potential near-miss – Lifting equipment failure
• BSEE: potentially catastrophic crane and lifting incidents
What happened
While positioning a removable hatch cover on the vessel (Figures 1 and 2), three of the four D-ring securing straps
failed (Figures 3 and 4), causing an uncontrolled snap-back of the lifting sling assembly that struck the crewmember
in the head. The three fractured securing straps showed similar failures with a significant amount of corrosion
beneath the paint and on the underside of the straps. It is likely that just one D-ring failed initially, which would
have instantly doubled the load on the two adjacent corner D-rings, both of which were apparently weakened and
The Coastguard recommend that vessel owners, operators, and other maritime stakeholders:
• Immediately identify high-risk D-rings and similar lifting-point fittings. High risk factors include: Age, weather
exposure, and lifting load. These factors will cumulatively cause corrosion losses on the fitting, increasing its
stress and fatigue vulnerability during each lifting cycle;
• Thoroughly inspect all high-risk lifting points for damage, hidden corrosion, and wastage. Audio gauging, pull-
testing, or even replacement may be appropriate;
• Consult with the manufacturer's instructions to ensure safe lifting limits are in place and that the effects of
service life are considered in their determination;
• Establish a maintenance schedule for periodically inspecting all lifting points and audio gauging or testing any
fittings as they age into high-risk status.
The USCG encourages marine inspectors, investigators, and surveyors to maintain an acute awareness of these
issues and initiate corrective actions as needed.