THE DIOCESE OF BACOLOD, REPRESENTED BY THE MOST REV. BISHOP VICENTE M.

NAVARRA and THE

BISHOP HIMSELF IN HIS PERSONAL CAPACITY v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS AND THE ELECTION
OFFICER OF BACOLOD CITY, ATTY. MAVIL V. MAJARUCON G.R. No. 205728, January 21, 2015, LEONEN, J.

FACTS

Bishop Vicente M. Navarra posted two (2) tarpaulins, each with approximately six feet (6′) by ten feet
(10′) in size, for public viewing within the vicinity of San Sebastian Cathedral of Bacolod. One of the
tarpaulins stated: “Conscience Vote” and lists of candidates as either “(Anti-RH) Team Buhay” with a
check mark or “(Pro-RH) Team Patay” with an “X” mark.The electoral candidates were classified
according to their vote on the adoption of the RH Law.

Those who voted for the passing of the law were classified as comprising “Team Patay,” while those who
voted against it form “Team Buhay.

When the said tarpaulin came to the attention of Comelec, it sent a letter to Bishop Navarra ordering the
immediate removal of the tarpaulin because it was in violation of Comelec Resolution No. 9615 as the
lawful size for election propaganda material is only two feet (2’) by three feet (3’); otherwise, it will be
constrained to file an election offense against the latter.

Concerned about the imminent threat of prosecution for their exercise of free speech, Bishop Navarra,
et al. prayed for the Court to declare the questioned orders of Comelec as unconstitutional, and
permanently restraining the latter from enforcing them after notice and hearing.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the controversial tarpaulin is an election propaganda which the Comelec has the power
to regulate; otherwise its prohibition shall constitute an abridgment of freedom of speech.

RULING:

It is not election propaganda.

While the tarpaulin may influence the success or failure of the named candidates and political parties,
this does not necessarily mean it is election propaganda. The tarpaulin was not paid for or posted “in
return for consideration” by any candidate, political party, or party-list group.

Personal opinions, unlike sponsored messages, are not covered by the second paragraph of Sec. 1(4) of
Comelec Resolution No. 9615 defining “political advertisement” or “election propaganda.”

The caricature, though not agreeable to some, is still protected speech. That petitioners chose to
categorize them as purveyors of death or of life on the basis of a single issue—and a complex piece of
legislation at that—can easily be interpreted as an attempt to stereotype the candidates and party- list
organizations. Not all may agree to the way their thoughts were expressed, as in fact there are other
Catholic dioceses that chose not to follow the example of petitioners.

But, the Bill of Rights enumerated in our Constitution is an enumeration of our fundamental liberties. It
is not a detailed code that prescribes good conduct. It provides space for all to be guided by their
conscience, not only in the act that they do to others but also in judgment of the acts of others.
Soriano vs. Laguardia

The Supreme Court upholds the Movie and Television Review and Classification Board's authority to
issue a preventive suspension order against Eliseo Soriano, host of Ang Dating Daan, for offensive
remarks made on his program, ruling that the suspension is a valid restriction on his freedom of speech
and expression to protect the welfare of children and promote public interest.

Case Digest (G.R. No. 164785 & 165636)

Facts:

Petitioner Eliseo F. Soriano, host of the television program Ang Dating Daan, was issued a preventive
suspension order by the Movie and Television Review and Classification Board (MTRCB) for making
offensive and obscene remarks on his program.

Soriano made offensive remarks on August 10, 2004, including calling someone a "lehitimong anak ng
demonyo" and using profane language.

Several members of the Iglesia ni Cristo (INC) filed complaints against Soriano with the MTRCB.

The MTRCB issued a preventive suspension order against Soriano for 20 days and later imposed a three-
month suspension after finding him liable for his remarks.

Issue:

Whether the preventive suspension order and subsequent suspension imposed by the MTRCB violate
Soriano's freedom of speech and expression.

Ruling:

The Supreme Court ruled in favor of the MTRCB and upheld the preventive suspension order and the
three-month suspension.

Ratio:

The MTRCB has the authority to issue preventive suspension orders as part of its regulatory and
supervisory mandate.

Soriano's offensive remarks were not protected speech and could be subjected to regulation and
restraint.

The regulation of broadcast media, including the imposition of sanctions for violations, is justified due to
the unique nature of broadcast media and its accessibility to children.

The government has an interest in protecting the dignity of individuals, promoting the moral well-being
of the youth, and respecting the privacy of the home.

The preventive suspension and subsequent suspension imposed on Soriano were reasonable restrictions
on his freedom of speech and expression.
BAYAN, KARAPATAN, KILUSANG MAGBUBUKID NG PILIPINAS (KMP), GABRIELA, Fr. Jose Dizon, Renato
Constantino, Jr., Froyel Yaneza, and Fahima Tajar, Petitioners,
vs.
EDUARDO ERMITA, in his capacity as Executive Secretary, Manila City Mayor LITO ATIENZA, Chief of the
Philippine National Police, Gen. ARTURO M. LOMIBAO, NCRPO Chief Maj. Gen. VIDAL QUEROL, and
Western Police District Chief Gen. PEDRO BULAONG, Respondents.

G.R. No. 169838

April 25, 2006

FACTS:

Petitioners, Bayan, et al., alleged that their right as organizations and individuals were violated when the
rallies they participated in on October 4, 5 and 6, 2005 were violently dispersed by policemen
implementing Batas Pambansa No. 880. 26 petitioners were injured, arrested and detained when a
peaceful mass action they was preempted and violently dispersed by the police.

Petitioners contended that BP 880 is clearly a violation of the Constitution and the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and other human rights treaties of which the Philippines is a
signatory. They assert that the right to peaceful assembly, are affected by BP 880 and the policy of
“Calibrated Preemptive Response” (CPR) being followed to implement it. They argue that BP 880
requires a permit before one can stage a public assembly regardless of the presence or absence of a
clear and present danger. It also curtails the choice of venue and is thus repugnant to the freedom of
expression clause as the time and place of a public assembly form part of the message which the
expression is sought.

Furthermore, it is not content-neutral as it does not apply to mass actions in support of the government.
The words “lawful cause,” “opinion,” “protesting or influencing” suggest the exposition of some cause
not espoused by the government. Also, the phrase “maximum tolerance” shows that the law applies to
assemblies against the government because they are being tolerated.

ISSUE:

Whether the Calibrated Pre-emptive Response and the Batas Pambansa No. 880, are unconstitutional.

HELD:

The constitutionality of BP 880 was sustained but the provision on Calibrated pre-emptive response
(CPR) was declared as null and void.

The Constitution provides that no law shall be passed abridging the freedom of speech, of expression, or
of the press, or the right of the people peaceably to assemble and petition the government for redress of
grievances. The right to peaceably assemble and petition for redress of grievances, together with
freedom of speech, of expression, and of the press, is a right that enjoys dominance in the sphere of
constitutional protection. For this rights represent the very basis of a functional democratic polity,
without which all the other rights would be meaningless and unprotected.
However, it must be remembered that the right is not absolute. It may be regulated that it shall not be
injurious to the equal enjoyment of others having equal rights, nor injurious to the rights of the
community or society. The power to regulate the exercise of such and other constitutional rights is
termed the sovereign “police power,” which is the power to prescribe regulations, to promote the
health, morals, peace, education, good order or safety, and general welfare of the people.

BP 880 is not an absolute ban of public assemblies but a restriction that simply regulates the time, place
and manner of the assemblies. BP 880 thus readily shows that it refers to all kinds of public assemblies
that would use public places. The reference to “lawful cause” does not make it content-based because
assemblies really have to be for lawful causes, otherwise they would not be “peaceable” and entitled to
protection. Neither the words “opinion,” “protesting,” and “influencing” in of grievances come from the
wording of the Constitution, so its use cannot be avoided. Finally, maximum tolerance is for the
protection and benefit of all rallyist and is independent of the content of the expression in the rally.

Furthermore, the permit can only be denied on the ground of clear and present danger to public order,
public safety, public convenience, public morals or public health. This is a recognized exception to the
exercise of the rights even under the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and The International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.

With regard to the Calibrated pre-emptive response (CPR), insofar as it would purport to differ from or
be in lieu of maximum tolerance, it is declared as NULL and VOID and respondents are ENJOINED to
REFRAIN from using it and to STRICTLY OBSERVE the requirements of maximum tolerance. The
constitutionality of Batas Pambansa No. 880 is SUSTAINED
 G.R. No. 203335, February 18, 2014 ]
JOSE JESUS M. DISINI, JR., et. al., PETITIONERS,
vs.
THE SECRETARY OF JUSTICE, THE SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF
THE INTERIOR AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT, THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR OF
THE INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATIONS TECHNOLOGY OFFICE, THE
CHIEF OF THE PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE AND THE DIRECTOR OF THE
NATIONAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, RESPONDENTS.
Ponente: ABAD, J.:

Facts:
These consolidated petitions seek to declare several provisions of Republic Act
(R.A.) 10175, the Cybercrime Prevention Act of 2012, unconstitutional and
void.

The cybercrime law aims to regulate access to and use of the cyberspace.
Using his laptop or computer, a person can connect to the internet, a system
that links him to other computers and enable him, among other things, to:

1. Access virtual libraries and encyclopedias for all kinds of information that he
needs for research, study, amusement, upliftment, or pure curiosity;

2. Post billboard-like notices or messages, including pictures and videos, for

the general public or for special audiences like associates, classmates, or
friends and read postings from them;

3. Advertise and promote goods or services and make purchases and

payments;

4. Inquire and do business with institutional entities like government agencies,

banks, stock exchanges, trade houses, credit card companies, public utilities,
hospitals, and schools; and

5. Communicate in writing or by voice with any person through his e-mail

address or telephone.

This is cyberspace, a system that accommodates millions and billions of

simultaneous and ongoing individual accesses to and uses of the internet. The
cyberspace is a boon to the need of the current generation for greater
information and facility of communication. But all is not well with the system
since it could not filter out a number of persons of ill will who would want to
use cyberspace technology for mischiefs and crimes. One of them can, for
instance, avail himself of the system to unjustly ruin the reputation of another
or bully the latter by posting defamatory statements against him that people
can read.

And because linking with the internet opens up a user to communications from
others, the ill-motivated can use the cyberspace for committing theft by
hacking into or surreptitiously accessing his bank account or credit card or
defrauding him through false representations. The wicked can use the
cyberspace, too, for illicit trafficking in sex or for exposing to pornography
guileless children who have access to the internet. For this reason, the
government has a legitimate right to regulate the use of cyberspace and
contain and punish wrongdoings.

Notably, there are also those who would want, like vandals, to wreak or cause
havoc to the computer systems and networks of indispensable or highly useful
institutions as well as to the laptop or computer programs and memories of
innocent individuals. They accomplish this by sending electronic viruses or
virtual dynamites that destroy those computer systems, networks, programs,
and memories. The government certainly has the duty and the right to prevent
these tomfooleries from happening and punish their perpetrators, hence the
Cybercrime Prevention Act.

But petitioners claim that the means adopted by the cybercrime law for
regulating undesirable cyberspace activities violate certain of their
constitutional rights. The government of course asserts that the law merely
seeks to reasonably put order into cyberspace activities, punish wrongdoings,
and prevent hurtful attacks on the system.

Issues:
Petitioners challenge the constitutionality of the following provisions of the
cybercrime law that regard certain acts as crimes and impose penalties for
their commission as well as provisions that would enable the government to
track down and penalize violators. These provisions are:

1. Section 4(a)(1) on Illegal Access;

2. Section 4(a)(3) on Data Interference;
3. Section 4(a)(6) on Cyber-squatting;
4. Section 4(b)(3) on Identity Theft;
5. Section 4(c)(1) on Cybersex;
6. Section 4(c)(2) on Child Pornography;
 7. Section 4(c)(3) on Unsolicited Commercial Communications;
8. Section 4(c)(4) on Libel;
9. Section 5 on Aiding or Abetting and Attempt in the Commission of
Cybercrimes;
10.Section 6 on the Penalty of One Degree Higher;
11.Section 7 on the Prosecution under both the Revised Penal Code (RPC)
and R.A. 10175;
12.Section 8 on Penalties;
13.Section 12 on Real-Time Collection of Traffic Data;
14.Section 13 on Preservation of Computer Data;
15.Section 14 on Disclosure of Computer Data;
16.Section 15 on Search, Seizure and Examination of Computer Data;
17.Section 17 on Destruction of Computer Data;
18.Section 19 on Restricting or Blocking Access to Computer Data;
19.Section 20 on Obstruction of Justice;
20.Section 24 on Cybercrime Investigation and Coordinating Center
(CICC); and
21.Section 26(a) on CICC’s Powers and Functions.
Some petitioners also raise the constitutionality of related Articles 353, 354,
361, and 362 of the RPC on the crime of libel.

Held:
Petitioner’s
Section Legal Provision Contention SC’s Ruling

Section 4. Cybercrime Constitutional.

Offenses. – The The Court finds
following acts nothing in Section
constitute the offense 4(a)(1) that calls for
of cybercrime the application of the
punishable under this strict scrutiny
Act: standard since no
(a) Offenses against the fundamental freedom,
confidentiality, like speech, is involved
integrity and Fails to meet the strict in punishing what is
availability of computer scrutiny essentially a
data and systems: standard required of condemnable act –
laws that interfere accessing the
Sec. 4(a)(1) – (1) Illegal Access. – The with the fundamental computer system of
Illegal Access access to the whole or rights another without right.
 any part of a computer It is a universally
system without right. condemned conduct.

Sidenote: Ethical
hackers are not
covered by the
provision, and thus,
are not punishable.

Constitutional.
But Section 4(a)(3)
does not encroach on
these freedoms at all.
It simply punishes
what essentially is a
form of vandalism, the
act of willfully
destroying without
right the things that
(3) Data Interference. – belong to others, in
The intentional or this case their
reckless alteration, computer data,
damaging, deletion or electronic document,
deterioration of or electronic data
computer data, message. Such act has
electronic document, or no connection to
electronic data Suffers guaranteed freedoms.
message, without right, from overbreadth as There is no freedom to
Sec. 4(a)(3) – including the it intrudes into the destroy other people’s
Data introduction or area of protected computer systems and
Interference transmission of viruses. speech and expression private documents.

Section 4(a)(6) Violates equal Constitutional.

provides: protection clause in The law is reasonable
Section 4. Cybercrime that, not being in penalizing <the
Offenses. – The narrowly tailored, it person> for acquiring
following acts will cause a user using the domain name in
constitute the offense his real name to suffer bad faith to profit,
of cybercrime the same fate as those mislead, destroy
Sec. 4(a)(6) – punishable under this who use aliases or reputation, or deprive
Cybersquatting Act: take the name of others who are not ill-
 (a) Offenses against the another in satire, motivated of the
confidentiality, parody, or any other rightful opportunity of
integrity and literary device. registering the same.
availability of computer The challenge to the
data and systems: constitutionality of
Section 4(a)(6) on
xxx ground of denial of
equal protection is
(6) Cyber-squatting. – baseless.
The acquisition of
domain name over the
internet in bad faith to
profit, mislead, destroy
the reputation, and
deprive others from
registering the same, if
such a domain name is:

(i) Similar, identical, or

confusingly similar to
an existing trademark
registered with the
appropriate
government agency at
the time of the domain
name registration;

(ii) Identical or in any

way similar with the
name of a person other
than the registrant, in
case of a personal
name; and

(iii) Acquired without

right or with
intellectual property
interests in it.

Section 4(b)(3) Violates the Constitutional.

Sec.4(b)(3) – provides: constitutional rights to The law punishes
Computer- Section 4. Cybercrime due process and to those who acquire or
related Identity Offenses. – The privacy and use such identifying
Theft following acts correspondence, and information without
constitute the offense transgresses the right, implicitly to
of cybercrime freedom of the press. cause damage.
punishable under this Petitioners simply fail
Act: to show how
xxxx government effort to
curb computer-related
b) Computer-related identity theft violates
Offenses: the right to privacy
and correspondence as
xxxx well as the right to due
process of law.
(3) Computer-related
Identity Theft. – The Also, the charge of
intentional acquisition, invalidity of this
use, misuse, transfer, section based on the
possession, alteration, overbreadth doctrine
or deletion of will not hold water
identifying information since the specific
belonging to another, conducts proscribed
whether natural or do not intrude into
juridical, without guaranteed freedoms
right: Provided: that if like speech. Clearly,
no damage has yet been what this section
caused, the penalty regulates are specific
imposable shall be one actions: the
(1) degree lower. acquisition, use,
misuse or deletion of
personal identifying
data of another. There
is no fundamental
right to acquire
another’s personal
data.

Further, petitioners
fear that Section
4(b)(3) violates the
freedom of the press in
that journalists would
be hindered from
accessing the
unrestricted user
account of a person in
 the news to secure
information about him
that could be
published. But this is
not the essence of
identity theft that the
law seeks to prohibit
and punish. Evidently,
the theft of identity
information must be
intended for an
illegitimate purpose.
Moreover, acquiring
and disseminating
information made
public by the user
himself cannot be
regarded as a form of
theft.

Constitutional.
The understanding of
those who drew up the
cybercrime law is that
the element of
“engaging in a
business” is necessary
to constitute the illegal
(c) Content-related cybersex. The Act
Offenses: actually seeks to
(1) Cybersex.– The punish cyber
willful engagement, prostitution, white
maintenance, control, slave trade, and
or operation, directly pornography for favor
or indirectly, of any and consideration.
lascivious exhibition of Violates freedom of This includes
sexual organs or sexual expression insofar as interactive
activity, with the aid of between husband and prostitution and
Sec.4(c)(1) – a computer system, for wife or consenting pornography, i.e., by
Cybersex favor or consideration. adults. webcam.
 Petitioners point out
that the provision of
ACPA that makes it
unlawful for any
person to “produce,
direct, manufacture or
create any form of
child
pornography” clearly
relates to the Constitutional.
prosecution of persons
who aid and abet the
core offenses that It seems that the above
ACPA seeks to merely expands the
punish. Petitioners are scope of the Anti-Child
wary that a person Pornography Act of
who merely doodles 2009.
(2) Child Pornography. on paper and imagines
— The unlawful or a sexual abuse of a 16-
prohibited acts defined year-old is not
and punishable by criminally liable for The question of aiding
Republic Act No. 9775 producing child and abetting the
or the Anti-Child pornography but one offense by simply
Pornography Act of who formulates the commenting on it will
2009, committed idea on his laptop be discussed
through a computer would be. Further, if elsewhere below. For
system: Provided, That the author bounces off now the Court must
the penalty to be his ideas on Twitter, hold that the
imposed shall be (1) anyone who replies to constitutionality of
Sec 4(c)(2) – one degree higher than the tweet could be Section 4(c)(2) is not
Child that provided for in considered aiding and successfully
Pornography Republic Act No. 9775. abetting a cybercrime. challenged.

Unconstitutional.
(3) Unsolicited
Commercial
Communications. – The But, firstly, the
transmission of government presents
commercial electronic no basis for holding
communication with that unsolicited
Sec.4(c)(3) – the use of computer electronic ads reduce
Unsolicited system which seeks to the “efficiency of
Commercial advertise, sell, or offer computers.” Secondly,
Communications for sale products and people, before the
services are prohibited arrival of the age of
unless: computers, have
(i) There is prior already been receiving
affirmative consent such unsolicited ads by
from the recipient; or mail. These have never
been outlawed as
(ii) The primary intent nuisance since people
of the communication might have interest in
is for service and/or such ads. What
administrative matters is that the
announcements from recipient has the
the sender to its option of not opening
existing users, or reading these mail
subscribers or ads. That is true with
customers; or spams. Their
recipients always have
(iii) The following the option to delete or
conditions are present: not to read them.

To prohibit the
transmission of
(aa) The commercial unsolicited ads would
electronic deny a person the
communication right to read his
contains a simple, valid, emails, even
and reliable way for the unsolicited
recipient to reject commercial ads
receipt of further addressed to him.
commercial electronic Commercial speech is
messages (opt-out) a separate category of
from the same source; speech which is not
accorded the same
(bb) The commercial level of protection as
electronic that given to other
communication does constitutionally
not purposely disguise guaranteed forms of
the source of the expression but is
electronic message; and nonetheless entitled to
protection. The State
(cc) The commercial cannot rob him of this
electronic right without violating
communication does the constitutionally
not purposely include guaranteed freedom of
misleading information expression. Unsolicited
 in any part of the advertisements are
message in order to legitimate forms of
induce the recipients to expression.
read the message.

The above penalizes the

transmission of
unsolicited commercial
communications, also
known as “spam.”

The libel provisions of Constitutional.

Art. 353 – Definition of the cybercrime law
Libel carry with them the
Art. 354 – Requirement requirement of See SC’s discussion on
for Publicity “presumed malice” the Fermin case.
even when the latest
Art. 355 – Libel means jurisprudence already
by writings or similar replaces it with the
means higher standard of As to the ICCPR,
“actual malice” as a General Comment 34
Note: RPC Libel basis for does not say that the
requires existence of conviction. Petitioners truth of the
malice. Where the argue that inferring defamatory statement
offended party is a “presumed malice” should constitute an
public individual, actual from the accused’s all-encompassing
malice is required to be defamatory statement defense. As it happens,
proven. If the offended by virtue of Article Article 361 recognizes
party is a private 354 of the penal code truth as a defense but
individual, malice is infringes on his under the condition
presumed. constitutionally that the accused has
guaranteed freedom of been prompted in
Sec.4(c)(4) Libel. — expression. making the statement
Art. 353, 354, The unlawful or by good motives and
and 355 of prohibited acts of libel for justifiable
Revised Penal as defined in Article Petitioners would go ends. Besides, the
Code 355 of the Revised further. They contend UNHRC did not
Penal Code, as that the laws on libel actually enjoin the
amended, committed should be stricken Philippines, as
Sec.4(c)(4) of through a computer down as petitioners urge, to
Cybercrime Law system or any other unconstitutional for decriminalize libel. It
– Libel similar means which otherwise good simply suggested that
may be devised in the jurisprudence defamation laws be
future. requiring “actual crafted with care to
malice” could easily be ensure that they do
overturned as the not stifle freedom of
Court has done in expression.
Fermin v. People even
where the offended
parties happened to be
public figures. The Court agrees with
the Solicitor General
that libel is not a
constitutionally
Also, petitioners protected speech and
contend that the laws that the government
violate the has an obligation to
International protect private
Covenant of Civil and individuals from
Political Rights to the defamation.
effect that penal
defamation laws
should include defense
of truth. The internet is
characterized as
encouraging a
freewheeling,
anything-goes writing
style. In a sense, they
are a world apart in
terms of quickness of
the reader’s reaction
to defamatory
statements posted in
cyberspace, facilitated
by one-click reply
options offered by the
networking site as well
as by the speed with
which such reactions
are disseminated
down the line to other
internet users.
Whether these
reactions to
defamatory statement
 posted on the internet
constitute aiding and
abetting libel, acts that
Section 5 of the
cybercrime law
punishes, is another
matter that the Court
will deal with next in
relation to Section 5 of
the law.

Unconstitutional as
to Aiding or Abetting
in Sec.4c4 (Libel),
4c3 (Unsolicited
Commercial
Communications),
and 4c2 (Child
Pornography).

Sec. 5. Other Offenses. Constitutional as to

— The following acts Aiding or Abetting
shall also constitute an in Sec.4a1 (Illegal
offense: Access), 4a2 (Illegal
(a) Aiding or Abetting Interception), 4a3
in the Commission of (Data Interference),
Cybercrime. – Any 4a4 (System
person who willfully Interference), 4a5
abets or aids in the (Misuse of Devices,
commission of any of Petitioners assail the 4a6 (Cyber-
Sec. 5 – Other the offenses constitutionality of squatting), 4b1
Offenses enumerated in this Act Section 5 that renders (Forgery), 4b2
shall be held liable. criminally liable any (Fraud), 4b3
person who willfully (Identity Theft), and
(a) Aiding or (b) Attempt in the abets or aids in the 4c1 (Cybersex).
Abetting in the Commission of commission or
Commission of Cybercrime. — Any attempts to commit Constitutional as to
Cybercrime person who willfully any of the offenses Attempting to
attempts to commit any enumerated as commit any of these
of the offenses cybercrimes. It suffers offenses.
enumerated in this Act from overbreadth,
(b) Attempt in shall be held liable. creating a chilling and
the Commission deterrent effect on The question is: are
of Cybercrime protected expression. online postings such as
“Liking” an openly
defamatory statement,
“Commenting” on it, or
“Sharing” it with
others, to be regarded
as “aiding or
abetting?” – NO.

The old parameters for

enforcing the
traditional form of
libel would be a square
peg in a round hole
when applied to
cyberspace libel.
Unless the legislature
crafts a cyber libel law
that takes into account
its unique
circumstances and
culture, such law will
tend to create a
chilling effect on the
millions that use this
new medium of
communication in
violation of their
constitutionally-
guaranteed right to
freedom of
expression. Vague and
overbroad. The
severity of criminal
sanctions may well
cause speakers to
remain silent rather
than communicate
even arguably unlawful
words, ideas, and
images.
The terms “aiding or
abetting” constitute
broad sweep that
generates chilling
effect on those who
express themselves
through cyberspace
posts, comments, and
other
messages. Hence,
Section 5 of the
cybercrime law that
punishes “aiding or
abetting” libel on the
cyberspace is a nullity.

Section 5 with
respect to Section
4(c)(4) Libel is
unconstitutional. Its
vagueness raises
apprehension on the
part of internet users
because of its
obvious chilling
effect on the freedom
of expression,
especially since the
crime of aiding or
abetting ensnares all
the actors in the
cyberspace front in a
fuzzy way. In the
absence of legislation
tracing the
interaction of
netizens and their
level of
responsibility such
as in other countries,
Section 5, in relation
to Section 4(c)(4) on
Libel, Section 4(c)(3)
on Unsolicited
Commercial
Communications,
and Section 4(c)(2)
on Child
Pornography, cannot
stand scrutiny.
But the crime of
aiding or abetting the
commission of
cybercrimes under
Section 5 should be
permitted to apply to
Section 4(a)(1) on
Illegal Access,
Section 4(a)(2) on
Illegal Interception,
Section 4(a)(3) on
Data Interference,
Section 4(a)(4) on
System Interference,
Section 4(a)(5) on
Misuse of Devices,
Section 4(a)(6) on
Cyber-squatting,
Section 4(b)(1) on
Computer-related
Forgery, Section
4(b)(2) on
Computer-related
Fraud, Section
4(b)(3) on
Computer-related
Identity Theft, and
Section 4(c)(1) on
Cybersex. None of
these offenses
borders on the
exercise of the
freedom of
expression.

The crime of
willfully attempting to
commit any of these
offenses is for the
same reason not
objectionable. A
hacker may for
instance have done all
that is necessary to
illegally access another
party’s computer
system but the
security employed by
the system’s lawful
owner could frustrate
his effort. Another
hacker may have
gained access to
usernames and
passwords of others
but fail to use these
because the system
supervisor is alerted. If
Section 5 that
punishes any person
who willfully attempts
to commit this specific
offense is not upheld,
the owner of the
username and
password could not
file a complaint against
him for attempted
hacking. But this is not
right. The hacker
should not be freed
from liability simply
because of the
vigilance of a lawful
owner or his
supervisor.

Petitioners of course
claim that Section 5
lacks positive limits
and could cover the
 innocent. While this
may be true with
respect to cybercrimes
that tend to sneak past
the area of free
expression, any
attempt to commit the
other acts specified in
Section 4(a)(1),
Section 4(a)(2),
Section 4(a)(3),
Section 4(a)(4),
Section 4(a)(5),
Section 4(a)(6),
Section 4(b)(1),
Section 4(b)(2),
Section 4(b)(3), and
Section 4(c)(1) as well
as the actors aiding
and abetting the
commission of such
acts can be identified
with some reasonable
certainty through
adroit tracking of their
works. Absent
concrete proof of the
same, the innocent will
of course be spared.

Sec. 6. All crimes Constitutional.

defined and penalized
by the Revised Penal
Code, as amended, and Section 6 merely
special laws, if makes commission of
committed by, through existing crimes
and with the use of through the internet a
information and qualifying
communications circumstance. As the
technologies shall be Solicitor General
covered by the relevant points out, there exists
Sec.6 provisions of this a substantial
 Act: Provided, That the distinction between
penalty to be imposed crimes committed
shall be one (1) degree through the use of
higher than that information and
provided for by the communications
Revised Penal Code, as technology and similar
amended, and special crimes committed
laws, as the case may using other means. In
be. using the technology in
question, the offender
often evades
identification and is
able to reach far more
victims or cause
greater harm. The
distinction, therefore,
creates a basis for
higher penalties for
cybercrimes.

Unconstitutional as to
online libel and online
child pornography.
For the others, to be
determined by courts.

When two different

laws define two
crimes, prior jeopardy
as to one does not bar
prosecution of the
other although both
Sec. 7. Liability under offenses arise from the
Other Laws. — A same fact, if each crime
prosecution under this involves some
Act shall be without important act which is
prejudice to any not an essential
liability for violation of element of the
any provision of the other. With the
Revised Penal Code, as Violation of the right exception of the
amended, or special against double crimes of online libel
Sec.7 laws. jeopardy and online child
pornography, the
Court would rather
leave the
determination of the
correct application of
Section 7 to actual
cases.

Online libel is
different. There should
be no question that if
the published material
on print, said to be
libelous, is again
posted online or vice
versa, that identical
material cannot be the
subject of two separate
libels. The two
offenses, one a
violation of Article 353
of the Revised Penal
Code and the other a
violation of Section
4(c)(4) of R.A. 10175
involve essentially the
same elements and are
in fact one and the
same offense. Indeed,
the OSG itself claims
that online libel under
Section 4(c)(4) is not a
new crime but is one
already punished
under Article 353.
Section 4(c)(4) merely
establishes the
computer system as
another means of
publication. Charging
the offender under
both laws would be a
blatant violation of the
 proscription against
double jeopardy.

The same is true with

child pornography
committed online.
Section 4(c)(2) merely
expands the ACPA’s
scope so as to include
identical activities in
cyberspace. As
previously discussed,
ACPA’s definition of
child pornography in
fact already covers the
use of “electronic,
mechanical, digital,
optical, magnetic or
any other means.”
Thus, charging the
offender under both
Section 4(c)(2) and
ACPA would likewise
be tantamount to a
violation of the
constitutional
prohibition against
double jeopardy.

Section 8 provides for Constitutional.

the penalties for the
following crimes:
Sections 4(a) on The matter of fixing
Offenses Against the penalties for the
Confidentiality, commission of crimes
Integrity and is as a rule a legislative
Availability of prerogative. Here the
Computer Data and legislature prescribed
Systems; 4(b) on a measure of severe
Computer-related penalties for what it
Offenses; 4(a)(5) on regards as deleterious
Misuse of Devices; cybercrimes. They
when the crime Penalties are too appear proportionate
Sec.8 punishable under 4(a) severe. to the evil sought to be
 is committed against punished. xxx Judges
critical infrastructure; and magistrates can
4(c)(1) on Cybersex; only interpret and
4(c)(2) on Child apply them and have
Pornography; 4(c)(3) no authority to modify
on Unsolicited or revise their range as
Commercial determined by the
Communications; and legislative department.
Section 5 on Aiding or The courts should not
Abetting, and Attempt encroach on this
in the Commission of prerogative of the
Cybercrime. lawmaking body.

Sec. 12. Real-Time Unconstitutional.

Collection of Traffic
Data. — Law
enforcement Petitioners assail the See full text for the
authorities, with due grant to law discussion regarding
cause, shall be enforcement agencies the right to privacy,
authorized to collect or of the power to collect touching the topics of
record by technical or or record traffic data informational privacy
electronic means traffic in real time as tending and the technicalities
data in real-time to curtail civil liberties of traffic data and
associated with or provide computer data
specified opportunities for transferred through
communications official abuse. They the internet.
transmitted by means claim that data
of a computer system. showing where digital
Traffic data refer only messages come from, In much the same
to the communication’s what kind they are, way, ICT users must
origin, destination, and where they are know that they
route, time, date, size, destined need not be cannot communicate
duration, or type of incriminating to their or exchange data
underlying service, but senders or recipients with one another
not content, nor before they are to be over cyberspace
identities. protected. Petitioners except through some
invoke the right of service providers to
All other data to be every individual to whom they must
collected or seized or privacy and to be submit certain traffic
disclosed will require a protected from data that are needed
court warrant. government snooping for a successful
into the messages or cyberspace
Service providers are information that they communication. The
Sec.12 required to cooperate send to one another. conveyance of this
and assist law data takes them out
enforcement of the private sphere,
authorities in the making the
collection or recording expectation to
of the above-stated privacy in regard to
information. them an expectation
that society is not
prepared to
recognize as
The reasonable.
court warrant required
under this section shall The Court, however,
only be issued or agrees with Justices
granted upon written Carpio and Brion
application and the that when seemingly
examination under random bits of traffic
oath or affirmation of data are gathered in
the applicant and the bulk, pooled
witnesses he may together, and
produce and the analyzed, they reveal
showing: (1) that there patterns of activities
are reasonable grounds which can then be
to believe that any of used to create
the crimes enumerated profiles of the
hereinabove has been persons under
committed, or is being surveillance. With
committed, or is about enough traffic data,
to be committed; (2) analysts may be able
that there are to determine a
reasonable grounds to person’s close
believe that evidence associations,
that will be obtained is religious views,
essential to the political affiliations,
conviction of any even sexual
person for, or to the preferences. Such
solution of, or to the information is likely
prevention of, any such beyond what the
crimes; and (3) that public may expect to
there are no other be disclosed, and
means readily available clearly falls within
for obtaining such matters protected by
evidence. the right to privacy.
However, SC struck
down the provision as
 unconstitutional
because of the
vagueness of the
provision. What
constitutes “due
cause”? The authority
that Section 12 gives
law enforcement
agencies is too
sweeping and lacks
restraint. While it says
that traffic data
collection should not
disclose identities or
content data, such
restraint is but an
illusion. Admittedly,
nothing can prevent
law enforcement
agencies holding these
data in their hands
from looking into the
identity of their sender
or receiver and what
the data contains. This
will unnecessarily
expose the citizenry to
leaked information or,
worse, to extortion
from certain bad
elements in these
agencies.

Sec. 13. Preservation of Section 13 constitutes Constitutional.

Computer Data. — The an undue deprivation
integrity of traffic data of the right to
and subscriber property. They liken The data that service
information relating to the data preservation providers preserve on
communication order that law orders of law
services provided by a enforcement enforcement
service provider shall authorities are to issue authorities are not
be preserved for a as a form of made inaccessible to
minimum period of six garnishment of users by reason of the
Sec.13 (6) months from the personal property in issuance of such
 date of the transaction. civil forfeiture orders. The process of
Content data shall be proceedings. Such preserving data will
similarly preserved for order prevents not unduly hamper the
six (6) months from the internet users from normal transmission
date of receipt of the accessing and or use of the same.
order from law disposing of traffic
enforcement data that essentially
authorities requiring its belong to them.
preservation.
Law enforcement
authorities may order a
one-time extension for
another six (6) months:
Provided, That once
computer data
preserved, transmitted
or stored by a service
provider is used as
evidence in a case, the
mere furnishing to such
service provider of the
transmittal document
to the Office of the
Prosecutor shall be
deemed a notification
to preserve the
computer data until the
termination of the case.

The service provider

ordered to preserve
computer data shall
keep confidential the
order and its
compliance.

Sec. 14. Disclosure of The process Constitutional.

Computer Data. — Law envisioned in Section
enforcement 14 is being likened to
authorities, upon the issuance of a it is well-settled that
securing a court subpoena. Petitioners’ the power to issue
Sec.14 warrant, shall issue an objection is that the subpoenas is not
 order requiring any issuance of subpoenas exclusively a judicial
person or service is a judicial function. function. Executive
provider to disclose or agencies have the
submit subscriber’s power to issue
information, traffic data subpoena as an
or relevant data in adjunct of their
his/its possession or investigatory powers.
control within seventy-
two (72) hours from
receipt of the order in
relation to a valid
complaint officially
docketed and assigned
for investigation and
the disclosure is
necessary and relevant
for the purpose of
investigation.

Constitutional.

Sec. 15. Search, Seizure

and Examination of On its face, however,
Computer Data. — Section 15 merely
Where a search and enumerates the duties
seizure warrant is of law enforcement
properly issued, the authorities that would
law enforcement ensure the proper
authorities shall collection,
likewise have the preservation, and use
following powers and of computer system or
duties. data that have been
Within the time period seized by virtue of a
specified in the court warrant. The
warrant, to conduct exercise of these
interception, as defined duties do not pose any
in this Act, and: threat on the rights of
Petitioners challenge the person from whom
(a) To secure a Section 15 on the they were taken.
computer system or a assumption that it will Section 15 does not
computer data storage supplant established appear to supersede
medium; search and seizure existing search and
Sec.15 procedures. seizure rules but
(b) To make and retain merely supplements
a copy of those them.
computer data secured;

(c) To maintain the

integrity of the relevant
stored computer data;

(d) To conduct forensic

analysis or examination
of the computer data
storage medium; and

(e) To render
inaccessible or remove
those computer data in
the accessed computer
or computer and
communications
network.
Pursuant thereof, the
law enforcement
authorities may order
any person who has
knowledge about the
functioning of the
computer system and
the measures to protect
and preserve the
computer data therein
to provide, as is
reasonable, the
necessary information,
to enable the
undertaking of the
search, seizure and
examination.

Law enforcement
authorities may request
for an extension of time
to complete the
examination of the
computer data storage
 medium and to make a
return thereon but in
no case for a period
longer than thirty (30)
days from date of
approval by the court.

Constitutional.

But, as already stated,

it is unclear that the
user has a demandable
right to require the
Sec. 17. Destruction of service provider to
Computer Data. — have that copy of the
Upon expiration of the data saved indefinitely
periods as provided in for him in its storage
Sections 13 and 15, Petitioners claim that system. If he wanted
service providers and such destruction of them preserved, he
law enforcement computer data subject should have saved
authorities, as the case of previous them in his computer
may be, shall preservation or when he generated the
immediately and examination violates data or received it. He
completely destroy the the user’s right against could also request the
computer data subject deprivation of service provider for a
of a preservation and property without due copy before it is
Sec.17 examination. process of law. deleted.

Unconstitutional.
Sec. 19. Restricting or
Blocking Access to
Computer Data.— Violative of the
When a computer data constitutional
is prima facie found to Petitioners contest guarantees to freedom
be in violation of the Section 19 in that it of expression and
provisions of this Act, stifles freedom of against unreasonable
the DOJ shall issue an expression and searches and seizures.
order to restrict or violates the right
block access to such against unreasonable
Sec.19 computer data. searches and seizures.
Computer data may
constitute personal
property, and thus, are
protected from
unreasonable searches
and seizures whether
while stored in their
personal computers or
in the service
provider’s systems.

The content of the

computer data can also
constitute speech. In
such a case, Section 19
operates as a
restriction on the
freedom of expression
over cyberspace.
Certainly not all forms
of speech are
protected. Legislature
may, within
constitutional bounds,
declare certain kinds
of expression as illegal.
But for an executive
officer to seize content
alleged to be
unprotected without
any judicial warrant, it
is not enough for him
to be of the opinion
that such content
violates some law, for
to do so would make
him judge, jury, and
executioner all rolled
into one.
 Not only does Section
19 preclude any
judicial intervention,
but it also disregards
jurisprudential
guidelines established
to determine the
validity of restrictions
on speech. Section 19,
however, merely
requires that the data
to be blocked be
found prima facie in
violation of any
provision of the
cybercrime law.
Taking Section 6 into
consideration, this can
actually be made to
apply in relation to any
penal provision. It
does not take into
consideration any of
the dangerous
tendency test,
balancing of interest
test, and clear and
present danger test.

Sec. 20. Noncompliance. Constitutional.

— Failure to comply
with the provisions of
Chapter IV hereof Petitioners challenge But since the non-
specifically the orders Section 20, alleging compliance would be
from law enforcement that it is a bill of punished as a violation
authorities shall be attainder. The of Presidential Decree
punished as a violation argument is that the (P.D.) 1829, Section 20
of Presidential Decree mere failure to comply necessarily
No. 1829 with constitutes a incorporates elements
imprisonment of legislative finding of of the offense which
prision correctional in guilt, without regard are defined therein.
its maximum period or to situations where xxx Thus, the act of
a fine of One hundred non-compliance would non-compliance, for it
Sec.20 thousand pesos be reasonable or valid. to be punishable, must
 (Php100,000.00) or still be done
both, for each and “knowingly or
every noncompliance willfully.” There must
with an order issued by still be a judicial
law enforcement determination of guilt,
authorities. during which, as the
Solicitor General
assumes, defense and
justifications for non-
compliance may be
raised. Thus, Section
20 is valid insofar as it
applies to the
provisions of Chapter
IV which are not
struck down by the
Court.

Sec. 24. Cybercrime

Investigation and
Coordinating Center.–
There is hereby
created, within thirty
(30) days from the
effectivity of this Act,
an inter-agency body to
be known as the
Cybercrime
Investigation and
Coordinating Center Petitioners mainly
(CICC), under the contend that Congress
administrative invalidly delegated its
supervision of the power when it gave
Office of the President, the Cybercrime
for policy coordination Investigation and
among concerned Coordinating Center
agencies and for the (CICC) the power to Constitutional.
formulation and formulate a national
enforcement of the cybersecurity plan
national cybersecurity without any sufficient It passes the
plan. standards or completeness test and
Sec. 26. Powers and parameters for it to sufficient standard
Sec.24 and 26a Functions.– The CICC follow. test.
 shall have the following
powers and functions:
(a) To formulate a
national cybersecurity
plan and extend
immediate assistance
of real time
commission of
cybercrime offenses
through a computer
emergency response
team (CERT); x x x.

Hence,
VOID for being UNCONSTITUTIONAL:

1. Section 4(c)(3) of Republic Act 10175 that penalizes posting of

unsolicited commercial communications;
2. Section 12 that authorizes the collection or recording of traffic data in
real-time; and
3. Section 19 of the same Act that authorizes the Department of Justice to
restrict or block access to suspected Computer Data.
VALID and CONSTITUTIONAL:

1. Section 4(a)(1) that penalizes accessing a computer system without

right;
2. Section 4(a)(3) that penalizes data interference, including transmission
of viruses;
3. Section 4(a)(6) that penalizes cyber-squatting or acquiring domain
name over the internet in bad faith to the prejudice of others;
4. Section 4(b)(3) that penalizes identity theft or the use or misuse of
identifying information belonging to another;
5. Section 4(c)(1) that penalizes cybersex or the lascivious exhibition of
sexual organs or sexual activity for favor or consideration;
6. Section 4(c)(2) that penalizes the production of child pornography;
7. Section 6 that imposes penalties one degree higher when crimes
defined under the Revised Penal Code are committed with the use of
information and communications technologies;
8. Section 8 that prescribes the penalties for cybercrimes;
 9. Section 13 that permits law enforcement authorities to require service
providers to preserve traffic data and subscriber information as well as
specified content data for six months;
10.Section 14 that authorizes the disclosure of computer data under a
court-issued warrant;
11.Section 15 that authorizes the search, seizure, and examination of
computer data under a court-issued warrant;
12.Section 17 that authorizes the destruction of previously preserved
computer data after the expiration of the prescribed holding periods;
13.Section 20 that penalizes obstruction of justice in relation to
cybercrime investigations;
14.Section 24 that establishes a Cybercrime Investigation and
Coordinating Center (CICC);
15.Section 26(a) that defines the CICC’s Powers and Functions; and
16.Articles 353, 354, 361, and 362 of the Revised Penal Code that penalizes
libel.
Further, the Court DECLARES:
1. Section 4(c)(4) that penalizes online libel
as VALID and CONSTITUTIONALwith respect to the original author of the
post; but VOID and UNCONSTITUTIONAL with respect to others who simply
receive the post and react to it; and
2. Section 5 that penalizes aiding or abetting and attempt in the commission of
cybercrimes as VALID and CONSTITUTIONAL only in relation to Section 4(a)(1)
on Illegal Access, Section 4(a)(2) on Illegal Interception, Section 4(a)(3) on Data
Interference, Section 4(a)(4) on System Interference, Section 4(a)(5) on Misuse
of Devices, Section 4(a)(6) on Cyber-squatting, Section 4(b)(1) on Computer-
related Forgery, Section 4(b)(2) on Computer-related Fraud, Section 4(b)(3) on
Computer-related Identity Theft, and Section 4(c)(1) on Cybersex;
but VOID and UNCONSTITUTIONAL with respect to Sections 4(c)(2) on Child
Pornography, 4(c)(3) on Unsolicited Commercial Communications, and 4(c)(4)
on online Libel.
Lastly, the Court RESOLVES to LEAVE THE DETERMINATION of the correct
application of Section 7 that authorizes prosecution of the offender under
both the Revised Penal Code and Republic Act 10175 to actual cases, WITH
THE EXCEPTION of the crimes of:
1. Online libel as to which, charging the offender under both Section
4(c)(4) of Republic Act 10175 and Article 353 of the Revised Penal
Code constitutes a violation of the proscription against double
jeopardy; as well as
 2. Child pornography committed online as to which, charging the offender
under both Section 4(c)(2) of Republic Act 10175 and Republic Act
9775 or the Anti-Child Pornography Act of 2009 also constitutes a
violation of the same proscription,
and, in respect to these, is VOID and UNCONSTITUTIONAL.
SO ORDERED.
Toyota Motor Philippines Corporation vs
Toyota Motor Philippines Corporation
Workers Association
G.R. No. 158786 – G.R. No. 158789 – 537 SCRA 171 – Labor Law – Labor Relations
– Categories of Illegal Strikes

In May 2000, Mediator-Arbiter Ma. Zosima Lameyra issued an order certifying Toyota
Motor Philippines Corporation Workers Association as the exclusive bargaining agent
of all Toyota rank-and-file employees. Toyota filed a motion for reconsideration
assailing the said order. Lameyra denied the motion and Toyota eventually appealed the
order before the DOLE Secretary.

Meanwhile, the Union submitted its collective bargaining agreement (CBA) proposals
to Toyota but the latter refused to bargain pending its appeal before the DOLE
Secretary. The Union then filed a notice of strike with the National Conciliation and
Mediation Board (NCMB). The NCMB converted the notice of strike to a preventive
mediation considering that the DOLE Secretary was yet to decide on Toyota’s appeal.

In relation to Toyota’s appeal, the parties were invited to a hearing. Union members
were not allowed to attend the hearing as they were aptly represented by the Union. But
despite this, many Union members and officers failed to render overtime and work on
the following day which caused Toyota to lose P53,849,. The union members went to
the hearing and assembled before the Bureau of Labor Relations.

Subsequently, Toyota terminated 227 employees. The terminated employees allegedly

abandoned their work.

This resulted to another rally within Toyota’s premises as the strikers barricaded the
entrances of Toyota preventing non-strikers from going to work.

In April 2001, the DOLE Secretary assumed jurisdiction over the labor dispute and
issued a return-to-work order. The Union ended its strike in the same month. However,
in May and June 2001, union members still conducted rallies and pickets.
ISSUE: Whether or not the strikes conducted by the Union on different occasions are
illegal.

HELD: Yes. The strike conducted before the BLR as well as the strike conducted when
the 227 employees were terminated is illegal because both did not go through the proper
procedure required by the Labor Code. It cannot be said that the strike conducted before
the BLR is beyond the ambit of the strikes contemplated in the Labor Code. The Union
argues that the “strike” is actually a protest directed against the government and is
covered by their constitutional right to peaceably assemble and petition the government
for redress of grievances. The SC disagreed with this argument because the Union failed
to provide evidence that the Mediator-Arbiter was biased against them. Further, if this
were the kind of protest they were claiming, they should have secured a rally permit.
Further still, this case involves a labor dispute. The employees may shroud their “strike”
as mere demonstrations covered by the constitution but in reality these are temporary
work stoppages.

The strikes conducted after the DOLE Secretary assumed jurisdiction over the labor
dispute are illegal for they violated the return-to-work order.

The Supreme Court also cited the 6 categories of illegal strikes which are:

1. When it is contrary to a specific prohibition of law, such as strike by employees

performing governmental functions; or

2. When it violates a specific requirement of law, [such as Article 263 of the Labor
Code on the requisites of a valid strike]; or

3. When it is declared for an unlawful purpose, such as inducing the employer to commit
an unfair labor practice against non-union employees; or

4. When it employs unlawful means in the pursuit of its objective, such as a widespread
terrorism of non-strikers [for example, prohibited acts under Art. 264(e) of the Labor
Code]; or

5. When it is declared in violation of an existing injunction, [such as injunction,

prohibition, or order issued by the DOLE Secretary and the NLRC under Art. 263 of
the Labor Code]; or
6. When it is contrary to an existing agreement, such as a no-strike clause or conclusive
arbitration clause.
Atty. Edillon did not want to pay the membership dues. He questioned the so-called

infringement of the integration of the Integrated Bar on right to association.

Facts:

1. Respondent, Atty. Marcial Edillon, stubbornly refused to pay his membership dues

to the IBP despite the due notice of the Board of Governors of the IBP which

recommended to the SC the removal of his name from the Roll of Attorneys.

2. Edillon contends that membership and the obligation to pay membership dues

infringe his constitutional right because he is compelled, as a precondition to

maintaining his status as a lawyer in good standing, to be a member of the IBP and

to pay the corresponding dues.

Ruling:

1. An “Integrated Bar” is a State-organized Bar, to which every lawyer must belong, as

distinguished from bar associations by individual lawyers themselves, membership

in which is voluntary. Integration of the Bar is essentially a process by which every

member of the Bar is afforded an opportunity to do his share in carrying out the

objectives of the Bar as well as obliged to bear his portion of its responsibilities.

Organized by or under the direction of the State, an integrated Bar is an official

national body of which all lawyers are required to be members. They are,

therefore, subject to all the rules prescribed for the governance of the Bar,

including the requirement of payment of a reasonable annual fee for the effective

discharge of the purposes of the Bar, and adherence to a code of professional

ethics or professional responsibility breach of which constitutes sufficient reason

for investigation by the Bar and, upon proper cause appearing, a recommendation

for discipline or disbarment of the offending member.

2. The State, in order to promote the general welfare, may interfere with and regulate

personal liberty, property and occupations. Persons and property may be

subjected to restraints and burdens in order to secure the general prosperity and

welfare of the State for, as the Latin maxim goes, “Salus populi est suprema lex.”

The public welfare is the supreme law. To this fundamental principle of

government the rights of individuals are subordinated. Liberty is a blessing without

which life is a misery, but liberty should not be made to prevail over authority

because then society will fall into anarchy. It is an undoubted power of the State to

restrain some individuals from all freedom, and all individuals from some freedom.

3. To compel a lawyer to be a member of the Integrated Bar is not violative of his

constitutional freedom to associate. Integration does not make a lawyer a member

of any group of which he is not already a member. He became a member of the

Bar when he passed the Bar Examinations. All that integration actually does is to

provide an official national organizations for the well-defined but unorganized and

incohesive group of which every lawyer is already a member.

4. Bar integration does not compel the lawyer to associate with anyone. He is free to

attend or not attend the meetings of his Integrated Bar Chapter or vote or refuse

to vote in its elections as he chooses. The only compulsion to which he is subjected

is the payment of annual dues. The SC, in order to further the State’s legitimate

interest in elevating the quality of professional legal services, may require that the cost of improving the
profession in this fashion be shared by the subjects and beneficiaries of the regulatory program – the
lawyers.
CHAVEZ v. PCGG, GR No. 130716, 1998-12-09

Facts:

Petitioner asks this Court to define the nature and the extent of the people's constitutional right to
information on matters of public concern.

Does this right include access to the terms of government negotiations prior to their consummation... or
conclusion?

May the government, through the Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG), be required to
reveal the proposed terms of a compromise agreement with the Marcos heirs as regards their alleged ill-
gotten wealth?

Petitioner Francisco I. Chavez,... initiated the prosecution of the Marcoses... bring this action... the
reported execution of a compromise, between the government (through PCGG) and the Marcos heirs, on
how to split or share these assets.

Petitioner, invoking his constitutional right to information[3] and the correlative duty of the state to
disclose publicly all its transactions involving the national interest,[4] demands that respondents make
public any and all... negotiations and agreements pertaining to PCGG's task of recovering the Marcoses'
ill-gotten wealth.

He claims that any compromise on the alleged billions of ill-gotten wealth involves an issue of
"paramount public interest," since it has a "debilitating effect on the country's... economy" that would
be greatly prejudicial to the national interest of the Filipino people. Hence, the people in general have a
right to know the transactions or deals being contrived and effected by the government.

Respondents, on the other hand, do not deny forging a compromise agreement with the Marcos heirs.

They claim,... PCGG may not yet be compelled to make any disclosure, since the proposed terms and
conditions of the Agreements have not become effective and binding.

In seeking the public disclosure of negotiations and agreements pertaining to a compromise settlement
with the Marcoses as regards their alleged ill-gotten wealth, petitioner invokes the following provisions
of the Constitution:

"Sec. 7 [Article III]. The right of the people to information on matters of public concern shall be
recognized. Access to official records, and to documents, and papers pertaining to official acts,
transactions, or decisions, as well as to government research data... used as basis for policy
development, shall be afforded the citizen, subject to such limitations as may be provided by law."

"Sec. 28 [Article II]. Subject to reasonable conditions prescribed by law, the State adopts and implements
a policy of full public disclosure of all its transactions involving public interest."

Respondents' opposite view is that the above constitutional provisions refer to completed and operative
official acts, not to those still being considered.

Issues:
Whether or not this Court could require the PCGG to disclose to the public the details of any agreement,
perfected or not, with the Marcoses;

Ruling:

The petition is imbued with merit.

Public Disclosure of Terms of Any Agreement, Perfected or Not

The "information" and the "transactions" referred to in the subject provisions of the Constitution have as
yet no defined scope and extent.

There are no specific laws prescribing the exact limitations within which the right may be exercised or
the correlative state duty may be... obliged.

However, the following are some of the recognized restrictions: (1) national security matters and
intelligence information, (2) trade secrets and banking transactions, (3) criminal matters, and (4) other
confidential information.

Limitations to the Right: (1) National Security Matters... there is a governmental privilege against public
disclosure with respect to state secrets regarding military, diplomatic and other national security
matters.

But where there is... no need to protect such state secrets, the privilege may not be invoked to withhold
documents and other information,[25] provided that they are examined "in strict confidence" and given
"scrupulous protection."

Likewise, information on inter-government exchanges prior to the conclusion of treaties and executive
agreements may be subject to reasonable safeguards for the sake of national interest.

(2) Trade Secrets and Banking Transactions... aside from national security matters and intelligence
information, trade or industrial secrets (pursuant to the Intellectual Property Code[27] and other related
laws) as well as banking... transactions (pursuant to the Secrecy of Bank Deposits Act[28]) are also
exempted from compulsory disclosure.

(3) Criminal Matters

Also excluded are classified law enforcement matters, such as those relating to the apprehension, the
prosecution and the detention of criminals,[30] which courts may not inquire into prior to such arrest,
detention and prosecution.

Efforts at effective law... enforcement would be seriously jeopardized by free public access to, for
example, police information regarding rescue operations, the whereabouts of fugitives, or leads on
covert criminal activities.

(4) Other Confidential Information

The Ethical Standards Act[31] further prohibits public officials and employees from using or divulging
"confidential or classified information officially known to them by reason of their office and not made
available to the public."
Other acknowledged limitations to information access include diplomatic correspondence, closed door
Cabinet meetings and executive sessions of either house of Congress, as well as the internal
deliberations of the Supreme Court.

Scope: Matters of Public Concern and Transactions Involving Public Interest... the information sought
must be "matters of public concern," access to which may be limited by law.

Similarly, the state policy of full public disclosure extends only to "transactions... involving public
interest" and may also be "subject to reasonable conditions prescribed by law."

"In determining whether or not a particular information is of public concern there is no rigid test which
can be applied.

'Public concern' like 'public interest' is a term that eludes exact definition. Both terms embrace a broad
spectrum of subjects which the public... may want to know, either because these directly affect their
lives, or simply because such matters naturally arouse the interest of an ordinary citizen. In the final
analysis, it is for the courts to determine on a case by case basis whether the matter at issue is of interest
or... importance, as it relates to or affects the public."

Under Republic Act No. 6713, public officials and employees are mandated to "provide information on
their policies and procedures in clear and understandable language, [and] ensure openness of
information, public consultations and hearings whenever appropriate x x x," except... when "otherwise
provided by law or when required by the public interest."

In general, writings coming into the hands of public officers in connection with their official functions
must be accessible to the public, consistent with the policy of transparency of governmental affairs.

Access to Information on Negotiating Terms

The 'transactions' used here,... is generic and, therefore, it can cover both steps leading to a contract,
and already a consummated contract,... Considering the intent of the framers of the Constitution, we
believe that it is incumbent upon the PCGG and its officers, as well as other government representatives,
to disclose sufficient public information on any proposed settlement they have decided to take up with
the... ostensible owners and holders of ill-gotten wealth.

Such information, though, must pertain to definite propositions of the government,... not necessarily to
intra-agency or inter-agency recommendations or communications[44] during the stage when common...
assertions are still in the process of being formulated or are in the "exploratory" stage.

There is a need, of course, to observe the same restrictions on disclosure of information in general, as
discussed earlier -- such as on matters involving national security, diplomatic or... foreign relations,
intelligence and other classified information.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED.