Incidents in Air Transport

Wind Gradients and Turbulence

N° 5
December 2006 This edition presents four events linked to meteorological phenomena, strong winds at altitude
or convective movements associated with cumulonimbus. Although different in nature, these
examples have some common points: the sudden deterioration of the conditions, late detection,
sometimes inappropriate reactions, lack of information transfer within flight crews (PIREP).
Since they are difficult to characterize in flight and meteorological forecasts are often inaccurate,
these phenomena can be underestimated and poorly managed. Making those involved more
aware, in-flight updating of information allowing for better anticipation and increased vigilance
when approaching areas of risk can all help flight crews to avoid or to reduce the effects.
Other cases can be found on the BEA website (www.bea.aero) such as the report on the
F-GITF accident (1996).

Wind gradient on entering a jet stream

History of flight area of moderate turbulence that extended from

FL200 to FL420, centred on the jet stream.
► Preparation
At the end of December, the crew of a Boeing The forecast charts showed a wind from the
737-500 was preparing the second leg of the northern sector, weak on the surface, about
day, between Lyon Saint-Exupéry and Paris 30 kt at FL100, 110 kt at FL180 and 145 kt at
Charles-de-Gaulle. FL300. A SIGMET contained in the flight dossier
mentioned moderate to severe turbulence
The meteorological situation over France was between FL180 and FL380 on the route. It was
characterized by an airflow from the north, to valid until the time of take-off.
which a jet stream of about 160 kt at FL310
was associated, above the Rhône Valley. Some ► Climb
zones of clear-air turbulence were associated The co-pilot was PF. A short time after take-off,
with this jet stream. facing north, the Captain told the cabin crew that
they could unfasten their seatbelts.
On the TEMSI EUROC chart (valid 1 h 30 later)
the crew noted that the planned route entered an During the climb, the crew heard the controller
make a remark to the crew of another airplane
that had reached FL220, although it was only
cleared to climb to FL200 so as not to interfere
with the arrivals at Geneva. This crew explained
that the autopilot had not captured FL200.

After having passed through FL100, still facing

north and climbing towards FL200, the co-pilot
activated the autopilot in LNAV and VNAV
modes and entered the accelerated speed climb
value of 325 kt in the FMS.

While the airplane was flying in clear air, passing

through FL170, the Captain performed a visual
Bureau d’Enquêtes et d’Analyses check of the circuits and instruments. He noted
pour la sécurité de l’aviation civile
that the speed was approaching VMO (340 kt),
Zone Sud and that it was about 15 kt above the selected
Bâtiment 153 speed. He informed the co-pilot and made a
200 rue de Paris nose-up input on the control column, causing the
Aéroport du Bourget
selection of CWS Pitch mode, which he saw on
93352 Le Bourget Cedex
FRANCE
the FMA and which he called out. Despite this
Tél. : +33 1 49 92 72 00 Extract from the TEMSI EUROC chart action, the speed remained abnormally high, still
Fax : +33 1 49 92 72 03 increasing and turbulence was felt.
[email protected]
 At FL191, the altitude warning indicated that the
airplane was approaching the level selected.
Pitch was then 17° nose-up and the vertical
speed about 11 000 ft/min. Immediately, the
Captain pushed forward the control column,
selected the recommended speed of 280 kt
in turbulent atmosphere on the Mode Control
Panel and moved the thrust levers towards the
rear stop. The airplane crossed FL200 with a
14° nose-up pitch. Cross section of wind speeds forecast north of Lyon

The Captain applied further pitch-down inputs, When positioning the turbulence indicator field
leading to a vertical acceleration of -0.15 on the chart, the forecaster draws the various
g. Three flight attendants at the aft of the clear air turbulence zones above FL200. He then
airplane were lifted, struck the cabin ceiling traces the jet streams analogically, overlaying
and fell down, injuring themselves slightly. The the speed values of winds over 80 kt. On these
passengers’ seatbelts had remained fastened. tracks, he identifies the points that correspond
The airplane descended after having reached to the extreme values, marked with the wind
FL207. This sequence lasted 28 seconds. The speed and the flight level.
co-pilot alerted the controller of the level bust,
which he attributed to turbulence. In the area of the incident, the heart of the jet
2 stream was at FL280, 3,000 feet below the level
indicated on the TEMSI chart. Winds above 80
Additional information kt were forecast between FL160 and FL425,
which corresponds to a depth of jet stream of
► Calculation of the equivalent headwind 26,500 feet.
encountered
The headwind, recalculated on the basis of the The comparison between the forecast wind
recorded parameters, increased by 100 kt in 63 values and those encountered by the airplane
seconds, going from 40 kt to 140 kt between shows that the wind speed was underestimated
FL140 and FL190. This can be broken down by 20 kt on average by the computer model. The
into two phases: for 47 seconds the increase wind gradient was forecast.
in the equivalent headwind was about a knot
a second, and then it went up to three knots a
second.

► Airplane Systems
Autopilot and autothrust
In VNAV mode the autopilot maintains speed by
acting on the pitch, the engine thrust remaining
regulated at the climb rate. The pilot can override The above entry indicates that the axis of the jet-stream is
the autopilot by using the flight controls. When The above
at FL350 entry
and the 80indicates
kt isotachthat the axis ofwith
(associated the jet-stream
the limits of
he acts on the control column, the autopilot the is at env1elope)
jet's FL350 and the 80 kt isotach
is located between(associated
FL300 andwith the
FL380
passes into Pitch CWS mode. The airplane is limits of the jet’s envelope) is located between FL300
and FL380
If the AP is in CMD mode, with
(1)
then flying manually in pitch(1).
transparent pitch piloting (CWS P), Implementation at Météo France of amendment 73 to
the AP passes over to acquisition, Vertical Speed Indicators (VSI) ICAO Annex 3
then to altitude hold on approach The airplane’s vertical speed indicators show
to the selected level. the vertical speed as calculated by the IRS. The ► Evolution of the presentation of information
values shown are graduated from -6 000 ft/min linked to a jet stream
to +6 000 ft/min. They were at upper limit level Since 8 February 2005, the differences in
for eighteen seconds. minimum and maximum altitude in relation
to the jet stream (speeds above 80 kt) are
► Meteorological Forecasts presented next to the strength symbols.
The TEMSI EUROC chart is prepared by This representation, which makes it possible
a forecaster. Using computer software, he to know the depth of the jet stream and to
overlays different fields of meteorological identify possible wind gradients, did not exist
(2)
The symbols used are decided parameters, established by forecast models, on at the time of the incident. This evolution
on by pilots and meteorologists the background of a geographical map. resulted from Amendment 74 to Annex 3
in ICAO working groups (ICAO – Meteorological Service for International
and submitted to the World He then positions the relevant graphic elements Air Navigation(2)).
Meteorological Organisation. that encode the meteorological information.

incidents in Air Transport

► Operator’s procedures By flight crews
The airplane’s operations manual contains, Available wind charts only give values spaced
amongst other things, the following procedures out in the vertical plane. The significant intervals
in the chapter on “Unfavourable meteorological between these values do not make it possible
conditions - flight in turbulent atmosphere”: to forecast a wind gradient that occurs over a
reduced altitude section. A strong wind gradient
– “Put on the permanent signs as soon as may lead to rapid variations in the indicated
turbulence is encountered” speed. Autoflight laws attempt to correct
– “Engage autopilot in CWS in severe turbulence these variations while limiting the amplitude
areas” of the corrections, which can lead to speed
– “The AFS can be used in turbulence at the excursions.
discretion of the crew. Short speed excursions of
10 kt to 15 kt can occur and the AFS can remain ► Crew’s reaction
unless the performance is unacceptable…” The Captain did not expect a wind gradient
– “The recommended climb speed(3) for entering of such amplitude. He was surprised by the In cruise, the N1
(3)

severe turbulence is 280 kt/M 0, 73…” increase in speed. As a first analysis, he recommended is accessible
– “ The horizon is the basic instrument to control attributed it to a lack of reactivity of the autopilot, on the FMS CRZ page.
the airplane’s attitude. (…) Do not make sudden which he then overrode. As this action did not
or high amplitude pitch corrections. React have the desired effect, the crew thought there
carefully, thoughtfully (…) Great variations was an airspeed indicator problem. Taking into
in altitude are possible in very turbulent account the suddenness of the phenomenon
atmosphere. If the margins in relation to high and its amplitude, they were not able to re- 3
ground allow it, these variations are permissible. analyse it. Stress-generating circumstances
Maintain airplane attitude at all costs, then and time pressure generate a focus on a few
correct the speed, the altitude and the heading parameters and can reduce the attention span.
…”. While the Captain was checking the results of
his pitch up action on the airspeed indicator, he
didn’t notice that the pitch, vertical speed and
Lessons learned altitude indications were becoming incompatible
with stabilisation at the authorised flight level.
This event is not directly linked to a turbulence The flight parameters show that the vertical
phenomenon but to wind, which is often the accelerations suffered by the airplane were
cause. Information on turbulence can thus mainly the consequence of the manual inputs
be useful to identify the presence of such on the control column.
gradients.
The level bust by another crew a few minutes
► Identification of a wind gradient earlier, possibly linked to the same phenomenon,
By the meteorological services may have led the Captain to accentuate his pitch
At the time of the event, it was difficult for the down input to limit passing FL200.
forecaster to make the extent of the vertical height
of the jet stream appear clearly. The evolution of ► Information to flight crews
the symbol system will allow this phenomenon A radio announcement on meeting significant
to be more comprehensible. However, the meteorological phenomena can lead the ATC
representation of a significant wind gradient services to relay it and to crews in the same
remains difficult. The SIGMET is an additional area to anticipating them.
means of warning of a particular meteorological
phenomenon. Clear air turbulence is often
caused by a wind gradient.

Turbulence at the top of cumulonimbus

History of flight at a high Mach level (managed speed of 340 kt)

in order to make up for lateness. The pilots had
An A320 was performing a Paris-Geneva leg at just finished their meal and were preparing the
the end of the morning. During the first rotation, arrival. The co-pilot, PF, entered the information
the pilots had encountered storms around corresponding to a change of QFU in the FMGS
Geneva but not on the rest of the route. They for the landing. The cabin crew was finishing the
didn’t expect to encounter any on this flight trolley service. The airplane was flying on the
during cruise. The airplane was flying at FL270 edge of a cloud layer when the Captain noticed

n° 5n°- 3 - avril 2005

December 2006
 a cumulonimbus straight ahead, whose top was
several thousand feet above. He disengaged
autopilot and turned left in order to avoid it.
He made the cabin announcement “This is the
cockpit, turbulence, cabin crew seated, belts
fastened”. Seeing that he wasn’t going to avoid
the cloud, he selected Mach 0.77 and set the
wings horizontal. The airplane entered an area
Developing storm cell
of heavy precipitation (hail) and turbulence. For
about twenty seconds, it was subject to vertical
accelerations varying from –0.7 g à +3 g. A
momentary loss of the N1 generator led to the
(4)
Certification specifies a flight left side screens shutting down(4).
envelope between – 1 g and +
2.5 g. The generator shutdown The airplane rose 750 ft above its former level.
was attributed to the turbulence The unsecured documentation and the meal
associated with a low oil level. trays were thrown about. The “Fasten seatbelts”
signs were off at time of the turbulence. A Satellite image
passenger who was not attached was injured.
Despite the announcement made by the Captain,
the cabin crew did not have time to strap the Massif Central: EMBD TS OBS ON LFMM
4 themselves in. At the aft, two flight attendants FIR, NORTH MASSIF CENTRAL, TOP CB FL
took the service trolleys into the galleys, without 320/340 MOVE SLW NE, INTSF.
having time to stow them securely nor the time
to strap themselves in. They were lifted above The crew received via ACARS the latest Geneva
their seats, and then fell down, one of them ATIS announcing a change in QFU nine minutes
being slightly injured. Forward, a flight attendant before passing through the turbulence.
was taking the service trolley back towards the
galley, preceded by the chief flight attendant. Situation encountered
Both were lifted off their feet several times with The cumulonimbus they passed through had
the service trolley before hitting the ceiling and begun to be detected by the Bourges radar
falling back down, injuring themselves slightly. fifteen minutes before the event. A weak
precipitation nucleus indicated that the cloud
was not very developed at that time. The sky
Additional information was full of more or less thick cirrus, from the
cumulonimbus generated two hours previously
► Meteorology to the southwest. The visibility was thus
mediocre at altitude. The radar and satellite
images show that the development of the
cumulonimbus was very rapid.

The precipitation became significant four

minutes before the airplane passed.

► Use of the onboard weather radar

The top of the cumulonimbus being mainly made
up of ice crystals, their detection by the onboard
weather radar required an active search with
changes to the gain, tilt and range, to be able
to detect humid zones. This must be done in
sufficient time to allow avoidance. In addition,
Radar image of the precipitation the rapid formation of these clouds requires
frequent repetition of the search.

During this flight, the radar(5) was in WX mode,

Information available to the crew gain on AUTO, the tilt set at -2° and the distance
(5)
The radar detects rain, wet The crew had a meteorological dossier made selected on the ND at 160 NM on the Captain’s
hail and dry ice particles if their up of the TEMSI EUROC chart valid 6 hours side and 80 NM on the co-pilot’s side. The
diameter is above 3 mm. before the event, forecasting cumulonimbus Captain expected to encounter storm activity
in the midst of cloud mass on the route up to on arrival at Geneva, but not in cruise. The co-
FL340, all of the TAF’s and METAR’s and a pilot focused his attention on programming the
SIGMET for the Marseille FIR, whose validity FMGS for the arrival. The crew did not carry
had expired, that related to the development out any particular search for storms with the
of storms in the cloud layer over the north of aid of the radar.
incidents in Air Transport
► Operational considerations Lessons learned
The crew’s meal can be taken during the flight,
even if it is a short leg(6). The operation manual ► Forecast
describes the procedure to follow in case of The TEMSI EUROC chart in the flight dossier
entry into a zone of severe turbulence: mentioned cumulonimbus on the route, but
these were not present on the first round trip. The total planned flight time
(6)

• SEAT BELT ON The crew stayed with this assumption without at 340 kt was 48 minutes, of
• CC ALERTED considering the sometimes rapid considering which twenty in cruise
• AP ON evolutions in storm phenomena.
• IAS/MACH SELECTED ► Vigilance during the flight
(cf. recommended speed) The crew’s attention was not drawn to the
• A/THR OFF possible presence of cumulonimbus in cruise.
• N1 AJUSTED Priority was given to making up the lost time by
(cf. N1 required) the choice of a high Mach speed(7). Bearing in The operator’s
(7)

mind the short duration of the flight, the crew instructions for
The recommended speed in a turbulent was busy with activities (meal, reprogramming making up lost time
atmosphere depends on the level and is listed the FMGS) which did not encourage surveillance require accelerating
in a QRH table. At FL270, it is 275 kt. The N1 of meteorological phenomena on the radar or without suggesting
required to maintain the recommended speed outside. any restrictions linked
is on the same table. to environmental
► Cabin safety conditions.
► Arrangement of the cockpit and the cabin The failure to secure a part of the documentation 5
The flight bag, which had been secured before in the cockpit created a risk for people and
the flight behind the co-pilot’s seat, did not equipment in case of severe turbulence. The
move during the turbulence. However, the meal cabin crew, during the meal service, did not
trays placed on the bag as well as the manuals have time to secure the equipment and sit down.
placed in metal boxes flew around during the Since then, the operator has added a procedure
turbulence. The co-pilot’s headset, hanging on in case of severe unpredicted turbulence that
its hook, was broken by falling objects. allows cabin crew to block the equipment on the
spot, sit down on the nearest seat and fasten
seatbelts.

Severe turbulence at the edge of cumulonimbus

History of flight ► Cruise and approach

The co-pilot was PF. The weather radar was
► Preparation on and some course alterations were made in
A Beech 1900D was performing a flight between cruise at FL200 to avoid isolated storm cells.
Lyon and Angoulême at the end of the day, The meteorological conditions transmitted by
during July. The crew had a flight dossier the AFIS agent twenty minutes before arrival
including: were:
wind from 300° / 12 to 15 kt and visibility over
- the TEMSI EUROC chart, valid two hours 10 km, with presence of cumulonimbus at 5,000
before the incident, that forecast for the whole ft, with no precipitation. While the airplane was
route and on arrival, cloud cover with isolated beginning final approach to runway 28, a very
cumulonimbus (base 4,000 to 8,000 ft, tops active storm cell coming from the southwest
FL300 to FL360) ; reached the aerodrome. The wind turned rapidly
to 220° and strengthened with gusts. The AFIS
- the charts of forecast winds that were from agent informed them of a lightning strike on the
the southern sector, below 30 kt up to FL180 aerodrome. At 4 NM on final, the wind broadcast
and about 50 kt above. The meteorological was 220° / 30 to 45 kt. The crew anticipated the
conditions forecast on arrival were good with, procedure in case of wind shear.
temporarily, the possibility of storms associated
with isolated cumulonimbus in the midst of the ► Go around and hold
cloud layer. There was enough fuel on board Taking into account the turbulence and the
for forty minutes holding and a diversion to cross wind that exceeded the airplane’s landing
Poitiers. limitation (22 kt) the Captain took over the

n° 5 - December 2006
 controls and performed a go around at about 160 kt and 250 kt (VMO); vertical acceleration
400 ft. When the AFIS agent announced gusts moved between -0.3 g and +1.9 g (9). Bank
up to 55 kt, he followed a different route than angle twice reached 42° to the right with pitch
that of the published go-around, in the opposite values of 10° nose down.

Additional information

► Meteorology

The MSA in the

(8)
Forecasts
sector is 2,800 ft. The forecasts mentioned the risk of storms.
The phenomenon developed rapidly, leaving no
Extract from the TEMSI chart time to amend the meteorological information. A
SIGMET indicating Cb in the midst of the cloud
direction from the storm cell and climbed mass had been issued but crew did not get it.
towards 5,000 ft so as to increase the safety This information appeared, in addition, on the
margin in relation to the high ground (8). The TEMSI chart(10). The development of the squall
crew flew to the northeast of the aerodrome line was not in contradiction with the information
supplied.

6 Ground observations
The satellite images, the precipitation radars
and recording of the lightning strikes underline
the intensity of the phenomena.

Use of onboard radar

During the approach, the crew saw the position
(9)
The airplane is certified of the storm cells on the onboard weather
between -2.0 g and +3.0 g in radar. It was thanks to this information that the
smooth configuration holding area was selected. However, during the
manoeuvres to stay out of the clouds and in the
dark, use of the radar was problematic because
it did not make it possible to see the areas not in
front of the airplane and its image was unusable
during turns due to the tilt of the antenna.

Overlay of two radar meteorological images taken at a 30 Lessons learned

minute interval and the radar track of the airplane.
The environmental parameters for an approach
performed in stormy conditions can deteriorate
to review the meteorological situation and by very rapidly. The approach was aborted due
The ISOL notation
(10)
manoeuvring to stay out of the clouds. These to these phenomena. The initially appropriate
associated with the presence of manoeuvres were performed with the AP in hold choice of the holding area was not updated.
Cb signifies that up to 50% of configuration at 150 kt, in a calm atmosphere. After some minutes, the very active storm cell
the area can be affected. The crew took the decision to divert towards that had led to the go around at Angoulême
Limoges, located fifteen minutes flying to the reached this area. The turbulence suffered by
east, and then retracted the flaps. In a turn to the airplane was directly linked to this cell. The
the right, the airplane then entered an area of smooth configuration of the airplane at time of
severe turbulence that lasted 2 min 30 s. the turbulence made it possible for it to remain
within the flight envelope, which is greater than
The PF disengaged the autopilot. The altitude that with flaps extended.
increased up to 6,200 ft before dropping towards
4,000 ft in one minute then increased up to
5,500 ft; the indicated speed varied between

incidents in Air Transport

 Severe clear air turbulence

History of flight hot air forcing the upper cold air. This tightening,
located between FL300 and FL400 generated
In February, an A340 took off from Paris Charles a vast area of clear air turbulence.
de Gaulle bound for the United States. Over
Greenland, the crew of a US Air force airplane,
in cruise at FL350, reported severe clear air
turbulence on the HF frequency(11). Six minutes
later the A340, in cruise at FL320 in the same
area, around 45 W, encountered severe Civil crews do not monitor
(11)

turbulence. The Captain put on the « Fasten HF frequencies, so this

seatbelts » sign and made the turbulence message towards ATC was
announcement for the cabin crew. The severe not heard by the crew of the
turbulence lasted about five minutes, during A340. The controller asked
which a passenger injured his arm, and then them
diminished progressively. A doctor who was twelve minutes later if
present on board gave first aid assisted the they had encountered any
cabin crew. Considering the general condition turbulence and a SIGMET
of the passenger and the doctor’s advice, the message was issued
Horizontal position of the isotachs (the brown line
Captain decided not to divert. At the end of
corresponds to the axis of the cross section below)
subsequently. 7
flight, the Captain mad an oral report to the
technical staff without mentioning the turbulence
in the log. A mechanic made a detailed visual
examination of the airplane. No reference to the
AMM was put in the log.

Additional information

► Meteorological situation
On the route, the situation was as follows:
- the north Atlantic had two depressions, one
centred over Hudson Bay extending with a
trough to the north of Newfoundland turning
towards the Azores and the second centred
over the Gulf of Gascony.
Cross section of the isotachs
- between these two depressions, a narrow but
powerful wedge(12) forced warm air beyond the
polar circle from Greenland to Norway. ► Meteorological forecast
- this situation, quite unusual at this time of the The situation described above was forecast
year and at this latitude, generated a 120 kt ten hours before take-off by the French Arpège (12)
Between 20° W and
jet stream oriented SSE/NNW to the south of forecast model. However, the TEMSI chart 30° W with a gradient of
Greenland. supplied by the WAFS world centre in England 3 °C per 1,000 ft between
indicated moderate turbulence in this area. The FL300 and FL340. The
The cross section of the atmosphere, following was noted in the flight dossier: «area tropopause was at FL385 at
perpendicular to the jet stream shows a of CAT MOD from 45 W to 78 W then nothing a temperature of -66 °C.
tightening of the isotachs towards the top, the notable on the rest of the route ». Only one air
report (AIREP) concerning this turbulence was
received by the ATC.
Airplane
Trajet route
de l’avion

►Flight data
The « Fasten seatbelts » sign was used three
Area
Zone where CAT
ou la CAT
was
a étéencountered
rencontrée times before the area of the event. Eighteen
minutes before the event, the wind strength
went progressively from 60 kt to 120 kt, and
then dropped by 100 kt in two minutes.

Simultaneously the wind direction varied from

southeast to southwest. A first acceleration of
+1.5 g brought the warning sign on. A series of
accelerations varying between +1.96 g +0.26 g
was then recorded over five minutes. More
Extract from the TEMSI chart available to the crew moderate turbulence continued for an hour and
n° 5 - December 2006
 twenty minutes. The autopilot and the autothrust acceleration, its speed increasing by 60 kt,
(ATHR) remained active throughout this phase immediately lost when penetrating the CAT
of flight. The Mach selected of 0.81 in cruise zone at the top of the jet stream. The wind shear
was reduced, first to 0.784 then to 0.776 until suffered was proportional to the temperature
the end of the turbulence. The speed (CAS) gradient(13). Information on forecasts for the area
varied between 256 kt and 308 kt. and the intensity of the turbulence could not alert
the crew with any precision(14). Only the AIREP
(13)
Variation of 10 °C in ► Procedures in a turbulent atmosphere message transmitted by the American crew
about a minute. The recommended mach or speeds for could have done so, but it was not re-transmitted
penetration into turbulence are defined so as in time. The crew did not however transmit this
(14)
According to the to ensure the lift required at the load factors type of message themselves. Rules of the air
message in the flight caused by vertical gusts, while limiting the define the rules applicable to the transmission
dossier the CAT zone structural constraints as much as possible. In of AIREP’s. SIGMET’s can then be issued on
extended over 900NM on case of moderate turbulence, the procedure this basis.
the planned route. specifies maintaining autopilot and reducing
speed to a value greater than the recommended ► Conduct of flight in turbulent atmosphere
speed. When the turbulence is severe, it is The pilot selected a Mach number, and not
recommended to de-activate the ATHR and drop a speed, in accordance with the instructions
the speed below the recommended value (280 in moderate turbulence, which led to speeds
kt at level FL 320). The table in the onboard above the recommended speed (308 kt
documentation is given in indicated airspeed maximum) without, however, approaching
8 up to FL350 and in Mach above that. VMO(15). These actions were not sufficient in
face of the strength of the turbulence that was
in fact encountered.
Lessons learned
(15)
The conditions being such ► Inspection of the airplane
that the tropopause, very high ► Choice of the route and updating The pilot did not write up the severe turbulence
in this area at this time of the meteorological information in the log. He was not aware, at that time, of the
year, made it possible to keep Crossing a jet stream perpendicularly to the accelerations that the airplane was subjected
a sufficient margin with the forecast position of the latter on the TEMSI chart to. From its side, the airline’s operations control
maximum speed in operation. could lead to the supposition of a turbulence centre did not possess the means to instantly
encounter, even if the centre of the jet stream access the technical flight data for this airplane.
has a laminar flow. The airplane penetrated the In the absence of acceleration data, a check
turbulent area downwind. In fact, the forecast of the airplane was only superficial and the
on the position of the jet stream was relatively procedure in the AMM was not applied.
imprecise. The airplane suffered significant

Summary
Wind gradient on entering a jet stream ....................................................................................................... 1
Turbulence at the top of cumulonimbus....................................................................................................... 3
Severe turbulence at the edge of cumulonimbus......................................................................................... 5
Severe clear air turbulence.......................................................................................................................... 7

Ministère des Transports, de l’Equipement, du Tourisme et de la Mer

Bureau d’Enquêtes et d’Analyses pour la sécurité de l’aviation civile
Director of Publication: Paul-Louis Arslanian - Editor: Pierre Jouniaux
Design/production: BEA Information and Communication Department
incidents in Air Transport [email protected]