Study of Anti-Competitive Behaviour with reference to

ARTICLE
Decided Case Laws under the Competition Act 2002
The CCI ensures that the companies at fault are penalized and discouraged from such practices in the
future. By promoting competition the CCI also benefits the consumers and the CCI would continue to
ensure there is no dominance of a few firms on the market by making it sure that both the small and
big firms can co-exist peacefully in the economy.

continue to ensure there is no dominance of a few firms

on the market by making it sure that both the small and
big firms can co-exist peacefully in the economy. In this
background, the article is examining the five dimensions
of the Competition Act, 2002 with reference to few decided
case laws on this matter.

A brief about Competition Act, 2002

The main purpose of Competition Act, 2002 is that
promotes or seeks to maintain market competition by
Prof. R Balakrishnan, FCS & FICWA regulating anti-competitive conduct by companies and the
same is regulated by the Competition Act, 2002. The main
Governance Professional of Governance Institute (UK)
objective of the Competition Act, 2002 enacted was to
[email protected] encourage and preserve market completion and to safeguard
the interests of consumers, guarantee trade freedom for

W
other participants in the market and also protect from anti-
Introduction competitive behaviour in the market by ensuring freedom
and liberty to trade in the market. The law makers in our
hen there are free trade and fair
country also acknowledges that market flaws might produce
competition in the market, then any
less than ideal results that are expected. In view of this, it is
economy thrives to achieve its best
very important and vital for corporates to understand the
desired results. Unfair competition
risks around Competition Act.
practices like monopolies, cartels,
etc. thwart the growth of smaller Five dimensions of the Competition
firms and businesses which are essential to the growth of
an economy. The CCI protects such businesses from unfair Act, 2002
competition and its adverse effects. The CCI also ensures The following are the five dimensions of the Competition
that the companies at fault are penalized and discouraged Act 2002. We shall go through each one of them in details
from such practices in the future. By promoting competition with reference to decided case laws on the subject so that one
the CCI also benefits the consumers and the CCI would can have a better understanding.

Table – 1
Five dimensions of the Competition Act 2002
Section Dimension Brief details
Sec. 3 Anti-competitive agreements The agreement which is to limit production and/or supply; agreement to allocate
markets; bid rigging or collusive bidding are all prohibited under the Act
Examples i. Tie-in-arrangements,
ii. Exclusive supply agreements,
iii. Exclusive distribution agreements,
iv. Refusals to deal, and
v. Resale price maintenance,
where such agreement causes or is likely to cause an appreciable adverse effect
on competition in India.
Sec.4 Abuse of dominance position Abuse of dominant position is prohibited under the Act
Examples i. Imposing unfair condition or price.
ii. Predatory pricing.
iii. Limiting production/market or technical development.
iv. Certain barrier to entry.
v. Applying dissimilar conditions to similar transactions.
vi. Denying market access.

CHARTERED SECRETARY MAY 2023 | 61

ARTICLE Study of Anti-Competitive Behaviour with reference to Decided Case Laws under the Competition Act 2002

Sec. 6 Combinations, Combinations, include acquisition of shares, voting rights, assets/control,

mergers, amalgamations and takeovers.
Horizontal Horizontal Combinations are formed between the enterprises that operate in
the same level of production process and there are substitute goods available
for the same. Sometimes such a combination can be bad in law as it reduces
the competition in the market and which leads to “high pricing power of one
power” of one combination. This is bad for the consumers because they are
forced to buy the goods at a higher price value.
Vertical Vertical combination is a non-horizontal combination, wherein the firms are
in different levels of supply and distribution of a product. The formation of
vertical combinations leads to a pro-competitive environment in the market
which further results in process control, more market share and establishing
a better supply chain.
Conglomerate Conglomerate Combinations involve enterprises or firms that are unrelated
in their business fields and they form a merger or combination. For example: If
one company is involved in the production of goods, while another company
provides services for the same. Then they tend to collaborate with each other
for making better profit standing in the market.
However, the huge disadvantage for such a combination can lead to
monopolization of this conglomerate which eventually to denial of entry for
the new competitors in the market.
Sec.49 Advocacy The Act provides for advocacy with maximum impact with least intervention.
- Advisory The Act also encourage the Advisory to tame anti-competitive public action.
Reference:- Competition Act, 2002

Anti-competitive Agreements such as price fixing agreements [section 3(3)(b)]; (b)

limit or control output, technical development, services
Any agreement for goods or services which has an etc.[section 3(3)(b); (c) market allocation and share or
appreciable adverse effect on competition is prohibited divide markets[section 3(3)(c)] and (d) indulge in bid-
as per the provisions of the Competition Act, 2002. rigging or collusive bidding[section 3(30(d)]. These type
Anti-competitive agreements if entered into shall be of agreements i.e. fixing the prices, limiting or controlling
void. Section 3(1) of the Competition Act, 2002 states production, allocating markets or customers and rig
that no enterprise shall be entered into any agreement bids/ collusive bidding are presumed to have appreciable
with respect of production, supply, distribution, storage, adverse effect on competition (AAEC). Illustrative cases
acquisition or control of goods/provision of services, of these agreements could be cartels-engaged in same
which causes or is likely to cause appreciable adverse or similar products for example cement manufacturer,
effect on competition within India. From the above, we bid rigging. Collusive bidding – examples cold be LPG
can conclude that first up all there should be an agreement cylinders, Phosphorus explosive supplier etc., market
and secondly such agreement must cause or is likely to allocation and limiting of production and supplies.
cause an appreciable adverse effect on competition in a
relevant market in India. The relevant market may be a vertical Anti-competitive
geographical or the market of a product.
Agreements
Types of Anti-competitive Vertical anti-competitive agreements are agreements
Agreements between enterprises at different stages or levels of the
production chain and such agreements include; (a) tie-ins;
There are two kinds of anti-competitive agreements viz. (b) exclusive supply; (c) exclusive distribution; (d) refusal
horizontal anticompetitive agreements [section 3(3)] and to deal and (e) resale price maintenance. These types of
vertical anticompetitive agreements [Section 3(4)]. vertical anticompetitive agreements are less sensitive
than the Horizontal Agreement.
Horizontal Anti-competitive
Agreements Decided case law on resale price
maintenance
Horizontal anti-competitive agreements are agreements
between parties in the same line of production. Example In one of the decided case by the CCI, Maruti Suzuki
of horizontal anti-competitive agreements could be- an India Limited (Maruti) was levied a penalty ` 200 crore
agreement between manufactures, agreement between for restricting discounts by dealers (the readers could
distributors and horizontal agreements are presumed to go through the complete order of this case in detail at
have appreciable adverse effect on competition if they (a) the web site of mondaq under caption CCI Imposes
directly or indirectly determine purchase or sale prices fine of ` 200 crore on Maruti for Anti-Competitive

62 | MAY 2023 CHARTERED SECRETARY

 Study of Anti-Competitive Behaviour with reference to Decided Case Laws under the Competition Act 2002

ARTICLE
Policies. The CCI passed a final order against Maruti
for indulging in anti-competitive conduct of Resale Price
Maintenance in the passenger vehicle segment by way of
implementing Discount Control Policy vis-à-vis dealers, The main purpose of Competition Act, 2002
and accordingly, imposed a penalty of ` 200 crore (rupees is that promotes or seeks to maintain market
two hundred crore only) upon Maruti, besides passing a competition by regulating anti-competitive
cease-and-desist order. The CCI found that Maruti not conduct by companies and the same is regulated
only imposed the Discount Control Policy on its dealers, by the Competition Act, 2002.
but also monitored and enforced the same by monitoring
dealers through master service agreements (MSAs),
imposing penalties on them and threatening strict action
like stoppage of supply, collecting and recovering penalty,
and utilisation of the same. Hence, such conduct of purchasers, and consequently, it was one-sided and
Maruti which resulted in appreciable adverse effect on abusive. The Delhi Land and Finance (DLF) was fined Rs.
competition within India, was found by the CCI to be 6300 million (USD 140 million) at the rate of the average
in contravention of the provisions of Section 3(4)(e) read turnover for the last preceding three financial years for
with Section 3(1) of the Competition Act, 2002. Maruti abusing their dominant position in industry against
went in appeal with National Company Appellate Law buyers. DLF went in appeal to the Competition Appellate
Tribunal after depositing 10% of the penalty amount Tribunal (COMPAT) and in the appeal M/s DLF Limited
before making the appeal petition and the National v/s Competition Commission of India and Others, the
Company Law Appellate Tribunal would be hearing this Competition Appellate Tribunal upheld a penalty of
case. INR 6,300 million. (reference: - the website of Mint on
the topic seven large penalties imposed by CCI - https://
Abuse of dominance position www.livemint.com/Politics/ 28q9vf3FP7bU8JaIPpX0pL/
Seven-large-penalties-imposed-by-CCI.html)
Dominant position refers to a position of strength enjoyed
by an enterprise or group in the relevant market in India, Decided case law on exclusionary
which enables to operate independently of competitive abuses
forces prevailing in the relevant market; or affect its
competitors or consumers or the relevant market in its Exclusionary activities are those in which the dominant
favour. The Competition Act, 2002 does not prohibit body utilizes its strength to confine entry of competition
dominant position but it only frowns upon the ‘abuse’ into the relevant market. The relevant case law on this
thereof. matter is that of Shri Shamsher Kataria v/s Honda Siel
Cars India Limited & Others, where there already existed
Types of abuse could be exploitative abuses or exclusionary agreement between the dominant entities and the
abuses. The examples of exploitative abuses could be by Overseas Suppliers of unique vehicle parts which kept the
the conduct which results in exploitation of others in Overseas Suppliers from providing parts to free repairers,
the value chain and the examples could be imposition of such understandings were held to be anti-competitive as
unfair or discriminatory conditions and imposition of they limited passage of new firms. The agreements entered
unfair or discriminatory prices – for example predatory were in violation of section 3(4) [anticompetitive vertical
pricing. The examples of exclusionary Abuses could agreements] and section 4 (abuse of dominant position)
be the conduct which interferes with the competitive of Competition Act, 2002. The agreement contained the
process, for example making conclusion of contract restrictive classes such as restricting free availability
subject to acceptance of supplementary obligations, of auto spare parts in the market and imposing unfair
denial of market access, limiting production of goods, prices, restricting from directly selling spare parts to
provision of services; scientific development and using the independent repairers and car users in the market.
dominance in one relevant market to enter into or protect Further to this, original equipment manufacturers (OEM)
other relevant market – example DLF India, Coal India were not providing technological information, diagnostic
who are the dominant player in the market. tools and software programmes to independent
repairers that are required to maintain the service and
Decided case law on exploitative repair advanced technology advanced automobiles. The
abuses above led to imposition of unfair and discriminatory
conditions in purchase of spare parts for independent
In the case of, Pankaj Agarwal v. DLF, Case No. 13 repairers and amounts to market denials. Each OEM is
& 21 of 2010 and case No. 55 of 2012, where, for a the only source of spare parts and there is nil possibility
situation relating to the distribution of apartment, the of interchangeability of spare parts and therefore each
agreements drafted singularly by Delhi Land and Finance OEM is in a dominant position. The authorized dealers
(DLF), empowered them to be discretionary about the are required to source spare parts directly from OEM
designation of super-area, secretive about data pertinent or their approved vendors only. Agreements between
to the buyer, like the number of the apartment on the OEM and authorized dealers do not allow them to deal
floor, and to drop portions and relinquish booking sums. with in competing brands of cars or sell spare parts and
The CCI held the agreements to be exploitative against diagnostic tools to independent repairers.

CHARTERED SECRETARY MAY 2023 | 63

ARTICLE Study of Anti-Competitive Behaviour with reference to Decided Case Laws under the Competition Act 2002

The CCI held that all the OEM restrict the availability The Competition Act 2002 also has a standstill clause
in the diagnostic tools/repairs manuals etc., which is under section 6(2) (A). It says that no combination will
required to effectively repair models of their respective take effect 210 days from the date of giving notice to the
brand of automobiles to independent service providers CCI until the CCI passes an order on the Combination.
and multiple brand retailers. Such practices amount This clause ensures that the parties in consideration don’t
to denial of market access by OEM under section 4(2) stop competing in the market because if the CCI finds
(c) of the Competition Act, 2002. The CCI also found the combination anti-competitive then the damage their
the OEM guilty of leveraging under section 4(2)(e) by cooperation would have done in the meantime can’t be
using dominance in market of sale of spare parts for reversed.
protecting the relevant market of after sale service and
repairing. Finally, this section exempts certain transactions from
the purview of Section 6 under Section 6(4). Accordingly,
The CCI imposed a penalty of 2% of the total turnover any acquisition of control, acquired by way of a share
in India was imposed on the OEMs (Rs. 25.54 Billion subscription or a financing facility by a public financial
approx.) and ordered them to submit a compliance institution or a foreign institutional investor or a bank or
report within 180 days. The OEM gave been directed a venture capital fund that is done pursuant to a loan or
to cease and desist from anticompetitive conducts, an investment agreement is exempt. For these categories
allow OESs to sell their spare parts in the open market of investment, section 6(5) mandates that they submit the
and put it in place an effective system to ensure details of such investment with the CCI within 7 days
availability of aftermarket spare parts, diagnostic from the date of such acquisition. Again, these have to
tools and other relevant information in the public be submitted in a form and fees that are given under the
domain. Combination Regulations.

Appeal was made by the OEM and the matter went to the The Commission is authorized to impose fine which may
High Court of Delhi who confirmed the penalty levied extend to 1 per cent of the total turnover or the assets of
by the CCI stating that while imposing a penalty the the combination, whichever is higher, for failure to notify,
principal followed by CCI were in accordance with the or in case the parties implement the combination without
principle laid down by the Supreme Court in the case of waiting for the statutory period of 210 days. (reference
Excel Crop and Hindustan Steel Ltd v State of Orissa and – website of CCI – case number 03/2011 Shri Shamsher
hence valid and acceptable. Kataria vs 14 other car companies - https:// www. cci. gov.
in/antitrust/orders/details/750/0)
Combinations
Decided case law on combination
Section 5 of the Competition Act, 2002 is the principal
section that defines what a combination is. It gives a As per the provision of section 43A, the CCI has a power
situation in which an ordinary transaction, if falling to impose penalty for non-furnishing of information on
within any of the subsections, becomes and qualifies as combinations. The decided case law on his matter is
a combination. Accordingly, it includes two categories relating to the penalty of 2 crore (approx. US$ 0.3 million)
of transactions which are (a) acquisition of one or more imposed by the CCI on SCM Solifert Limited and Deepak
enterprises that is done by one or more persons or a Fertilizers and Petrochemicals Limited (DEPCL). On
group; or (2) a merger or amalgamation of enterprises. The July 3, 2013, SCM along with DFPCL had purchased
section further declares that such acquisition or merger 24.46% of the share capital of Mangalore Chemicals and
or amalgamation will become a combination if any of the Fertilizers Limited (MCFL) on the BSELtd. being the
conditions are met as specified in the Competition Act, first acquisition. This was followed by a press release on
2002 under its section 5(a) or 5(b) or 5(c). the same day by Deepak Fertilizers and Petrochemicals
Limited, which was filed with the stock exchanges,
Section 6 regulates these combinations and section 6(1) in compliance with the requirements of the Listing
prohibits the formation of combinations that are likely Agreement.
to have an appreciable adverse effect on competition
(AAEC) in the relevant market in India and further Thereafter on April 23, 2014, SCM and DFPCL made a
declares that such combinations should be deemed purchase in the open market for 0.8% of the shares of
void. Further, section 6(2) declares that the parties MCFL (‘Second Acquisition’) and subsequently, an open
entering into a combination will have to inform the offer was made for acquiring up to 26% of the shares
CCI by giving a notice. This notice has to be given in a of MCFL in terms of the SEBI (Substantial Acquisition
form, with fees, which is governed by the Combination of Shares and Takeovers) Regulations, 2011 (‘Public
Regulations mentioned above. Additionally, this notice Announcement’). SCM filed a notice disclosing details of
the First Acquisition and notifying the Second Acquisition
has to be given to the CCI for clearance within 14 days
within 30 days of the Public Announcement. CCI passed an
of either approval by the Board of directors, in case of order approving the proposed combination.
mergers or amalgamation or execution of any agreement
or document which has the effect of transferring control, However, because SCI and DFPL did not seek approval
shares, voting rights, or assets that may make it eligible prior to consummating the First Acquisition, CCI
under Section 5(c) or Sections 5(a) & (b) respectively. commenced proceedings for filing the belated notice. In

64 | MAY 2023 CHARTERED SECRETARY

 Study of Anti-Competitive Behaviour with reference to Decided Case Laws under the Competition Act 2002

ARTICLE
this regard, SCM claimed that the First Acquisition was awareness among stakeholders such as Industry, Academia,
exempt, under Schedule 1 of the CCI (Procedure in regard Central and State Governments, Public Sector Undertakings
to the Transaction of Business relating to Combinations) (PSUs), Trade Associations etc., before they fall on wrong
Regulations, 2011 (‘Combination Regulations’). SCM side of competition law.
argued that the First Acquisition was as an acquisition of
shares less than 25% in MCFL solely as an investment. On As per the provisions of the section 49 of the Competition
this basis, SCM assumed that the First Acquisition would Act, 2002, the Central Government may, in formulating a
qualify for the Item 1 exemption available under Schedule 1 policy on competition (including review of laws related to
of Combination Regulations. In any event, SCM submitted competition) or on any other matter, and a State Government
that a notice was filed within the 30 days of the Public may, in formulating a policy on competition or on any other
Announcement made pursuant to the Second Acquisition. matter, as the case may be, make a reference to the CCI for
Further, it was submitted that with regard to the Second its opinion on possible effect of such policy on competition
Acquisition, the shares were credited to an escrow account, and on the receipt of such a reference, the CCI shall, within
created specifically to avoid consummation prior to CCI sixty days of making such reference, give its opinion to
approval. the Central Government, or the State Government, as the
case may be, which may thereafter take further action as it
The CCI dismissed SCM’s submissions after noting that deems fit. In order to bring awareness to all stake holders
the First Acquisition was notifiable. This was because the a dedicated division of the CCI, under the nomenclature
acquisition of shares was not made solely as an investment. of Advocacy Division undertakes a wide array of activities
By its own admission, SCM in the Press Release and the such as seminars, conferences, workshops, interactive
Public Announcement had claimed that the investment was sessions, moot court competitions, internships, road shows,
‘very strategic’. Further, the CCI noted that MCFL was not competitions assessments of legislations, essay competitions,
very profitable, which further went to show that the First publications of comprehensive advocacy material on various
Acquisition could not be considered to be an investment by aspects of competition law etc.by adopting innovative
a prudent investor. approaches so that changes occurring in the market due
to various factors- digitalisation, innovative disruptions
Arising out of the above, the CCI imposed a penalty of rupees etc.- are adequately addressed to the needs of the target
two crore as discussed earlier. The concerned companies stakeholders.
filed an appeal with the Competition Appellate Tribunal
(COMPAT) and the Tribunal upheld the decision of the Advisory services by the CCI
CCI’s order of levying the penalty of ` 2.00 crore. Again,
another appeal was prepared by the parties and the matter As per the provision of section 21(1) of the Competition
Act, 2002, where in the where in the course of a proceeding
went to the Honourable Supreme Court of India. On April 17,
before any statutory authority an issue is raised by any
2018, in the matter of SCM Solifert Limited v. CCI, SC upheld party that any decision which such statutory authority has
COMPAT’s order which affirmed CCI’s decision imposing taken or proposes to take, is or would be, contrary to any
a penalty of ` 2 crore. The Honourable Supreme Court of the provisions of the Competition Act, 2002, then such
while agreeing with CCI’s rationale held that SCM had not statutory authority may make a reference in respect of such
complied with section 6(2) of the Competition Act 2002 and issue to the CCI. Upon receipt of a reference as under sub-
there was a failure to file notify for the First Acquisition. In section (1) of section 21 of the Competition Act, 2002, the
relation to the second acquisition, the Honourable Supreme CCI shall, after hearing the parties to the proceedings, give
Court held that SCM ought to have notified the transaction its opinion within sixty days of receipt of such reference to
prior to the acquisition and rejected SCM’s claim that it was such statutory authority which shall thereafter pass such
order on the issues referred to in that sub-section as it
enough to hold the shares in an escrow account, which could
deems fit.
not be accessed ( reference – website of AZB & partners –
Advocates and Solicitors on SC upholds decision to impose The role of the CCI under the provision of section 21 is that
penalty on SCM Solifert Limited and Deepak Fertilizers of advisory in nature. The concerned authorities may act on
and Petrochemicals Limited - https://www.azbpartners. the opinion given by the CCIdepending upon the case to
com/bank/sc-upholds-decision-to-impose-penalty-on-scm- case basis.
solifert-limited-and-deepak-fertilizers-and-petrochemicals-
limited/) Some of the important orders
passed by the CCI
Advocacy by the CCI
The following are some of the orders passed by the CCI
The term advocacy includes all activities of a competition on account of abuse of the dominant position, practicing
agency that are intended to promote competition apart from unfair trade practices, denial of market access, price
those that involve enforcement of the competition law. The fixing cartelisation etc. Against these orders, the affected
CCI, in order to reach out to each and every stakeholder in parties had gone on appeal to the Competition Appellate
an effective manner, brought out the mandated section 49 Tribunal and thereafter the to the Supreme Court etc.
of the Competition Act for the advocacy of various facets The following orders are only the initial orders passed
of Competition Law and role and functions of the CCI. by the CCI for the information of the readers and the
Advocacy is imperative as competition law is a relatively outcome of the appeal proceedings are not discussed
newer legislation in our country requiring creation of here.

CHARTERED SECRETARY MAY 2023 | 65

ARTICLE Study of Anti-Competitive Behaviour with reference to Decided Case Laws under the Competition Act 2002

Table – 2
Some of the important orders passed by the CCI
S. Penalty levied
Year Case details Gist of the matter
No. by CCI - Rs.
1 2011 DLF For abusing its dominant position. 630 crore
2 2015 Hyundai car manufacturer Violation of anti-trust laws in the supply of 420 crore
genuine spare parts and diagnostic tools.
3 2013 Coal India and 3 other subsidiaries i.e. Mahanadi For misuse of their monopoly to supply poor 1,773 crore
Coalfields Ltd, Western Coalfields Ltd & South quality coal and fixing prices.
Eastern Coalfields Ltd
4 2014 Maruthi Suzuki India Ltd and other 13 car Misuse of dominant position. 2,554 crore
makers
5 2015 Jet Airways (India) Ltd, Alleged cartelization in fixing fuel surcharge 257.91 crore
IndiGo and SpiceJet Ltd on air cargo.
6 2016 11 cement companies i.e. ACC, Ambuja Concept of cartelization – price fixing prices 6,715 crore
Cement, Binani Cement, Century Cement, of cement.
Shree Cements, India Cements, JK Cements,
Lafarge, Ramco, Ultra Tech and Jaiprakash
Associates. companies as well as their trade
association
7 2016 Lupin Anti-competitive practices – refusal to supply 72.96 crore
etc.
Reference:- website of Mint on the topic seven large penalties impsed by CCI and the relevant site is https://www.livemint.
com/Politics/ 28q9vf3FP7bU8JaIPpX0pL/ Seven-large-penalties-imposed-by-CCI.html
8 2015 Google Inc. & Ors vs. Competition Commission Abuse of its dominant position in Android 1,337 crore
of India mobile device markets.
Reference:- website of Competition Commission of India stating CCI imposes a monetary penalty of Rs 1337.76 crore on
Google for anticompetitive practices in relation to Androi d Mobile Devices - https://pib.gov.in/ PressReleaseIframe Page.
aspx? PRID= 1869748

Conclusion 3. Website of Competition Commission of India in its

caption our vision- https://www.cci.gov.in/
The companies could formulate a competition compliance
programme for ensuring the adherence of the applicable 4. Website of mondaq under caption (CCI imposes fine of
provisions of the Competition Act 2002 and in this INR 200 crore on Maruti Suzuki for Anti-Competitive
Policies – https://www.mondaq.com/india/antitrust-
connection, the Government of India had brought out a
eu-competition-/1124360/cci-imposes-fine-of-inr-200-
booklet titled as “Compliance Manual for Enterprises”
crores-on-maruti-suzuki-for-anti-competitive-policies)
and the same is available at the website at https://www.
cci.gov.in/images/publications_compliance_manual/en/ 5. Website website of Mint on the topic seven large
compliance-manual1652179683.pdf. By implementing penalties imposed by CCI - https://www.livemint.
the competition compliance programme, the companies com/Politics/28q9vf3FP7bU8JaIPpX0pL/Seven-large-
could reduce the risk of contraventions and its penalties-imposed-by-CCI.html)
consequences; CCP are generally inexpensive vis-à-vis 6. Website of Competition Commission of India – case
penalties which can be imposed; helps in early detection number 03/2011 Shri Samsher Kataria vs 14 other car
of contraventions; early detection reduces quantum of companies - https:// www. cci. gov.in/ antitrust/ orders/
penalties as well as compensation to third parties; ensure details/750/0)
compliance with the orders passed by the CCI and action
7. Website of AZB & partners – Advocates and Solicitors on
can be taken against delinquent employees who have SC upholds decision to impose penalty on SCM Solifert
contravened or have been party to contravention. Limited and Deepak Fertilizers and Petrochemicals
The Company Secretaries in the companies could be the Limited - https://www.azbpartners.com/bank/sc-
compliance officer and the Company Secretary could upholds-decision-to-impose-penalty-on-scm-solifert-
also represent before the CCI, DG and COMPAT and limited-and-deepak-fertilizers-and-petrochemicals-
the company secretary could facilitate in creating right limited/
opinion in taming the rigor of anti- -competitive law or 8. Mint – seven large penalties imposed by CCI - https://
policy for the company. www.livemint.com/Politics/ 28q9vf3FP7 bU8JaIP pX0pL
/Seven-large-penalties-imposed-by-CCI.html
References:
9. Compliance manual for enterprises at the website https://
1. Competition Act 2002 w w w.cci.gov.in/images/publications_compliance_
2. Companies Act 2013 manual/en/compliance-manual 1652179683.pdf. CS

66 | MAY 2023 CHARTERED SECRETARY