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Chapter

About Operational Game Scenario

Modeling
Vasiliy Shevchenko

Abstract

An original generalizing class of game-theoretic models (operational games

or KOSH games) is presented, using which many micro-and macro - economic
interactions are naturally modeled. Basic concepts of the theory of operational
games and classification of such games, equations of dynamics of operational
game interactions, and procedures for modeling scenarios of such interactions are
described. Examples of operational games and some practical results of using this
theory are given. The possibilities of fundamental and applied development of the
considered direction of game-theoretic research are analyzed. The importance of
this research is due to the fact that the original idea of the founders of game theory,
which is to create an adequate accurate language for describing economic processes,
has not been implemented to this day. In this paper, an attempt is made to imple-
ment this by accurately defining the concept of “operation” using static games of a
well-defined type and considering dynamic ensembles of such static games.

Keywords: game theory, operations research, microeconomics, macroeconomics,

scenario modeling, information and analytical system, digital platform

1. Introduction

In the fundamental work [1], a super-task was set to build an adequate accurate
language for a complete and interrelated description of economic (in the broad
sense) processes. This work is associated with the emergence of mathematical game
theory. At the same time, its authors (J. von Neumann and O. Morgenstern) were
very skeptical about the use of differential equations to describe economic processes
(considering, that this mathematics adequately describes physical processes is not
suitable for Economics, that some other mathematics is necessary here) and called
for starting with building a description of the simplest facts of economic life that
meets the standards of scientific rigor. Game theory, which began with the consid-
eration of antagonistic (zero-sum) matrix games, which are a natural formalization
of the well-known salon games, has now branched out into a number of powerful
directions and confidently claims to become a generalizing standard in the accurate
description of economic (social) processes [2–6]. At the same time, the description
of any game always contains a finite set of players, a set of choices, and the principle
of optimality for each player.
Games are divided into static (in which players make their choice once, at a
designated point in discrete time, but before choosing, they can think, count, and
exchange information) and dynamic (with multiple consecutive choices, possibly
in continuous time). Dynamic games can be repetitive (played in discrete time,

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The Role of Gamification in Software Development Lifecycle

past draws do not affect the current one), multi-step (also in discrete time, but past
draws affect the current one), differential (a controlled differential dynamic system
is considered, in which control is divided between players with different goals).
There is also a class of cooperative games that have a large number of players with
simple behavior.
You can name thousands of scientific papers in the field of game theory. Many
of them are informative and interesting. Which of these works to rely on is up to
each researcher. This research is based on the fundamental works [2–6] of one
of the leading schools of game theory, the school of Yu.B. Hermeyer and N. N.
Moiseev, which are relevant to this work. In [2], games with non-opposite interests
are proposed for consideration, analyzed, and developed. This class of static and
multistep games differs from antagonistic games (zero-sum games) in part, that
mutually beneficial cooperation, coalition interaction, and agreements are possible
between players. As a basic principle of optimality that formalizes the interests
and behavior of players, the principle of guaranteed results is considered, in which
players expect the worst from other players and nature and, based on this, maxi-
mize their winnings. But other principles of optimality are also considered. A class
of static hierarchical Hermeyer games is defined, which differ among themselves in
the scheme of information interaction between the center player and players at the
lower level of the hierarchy.
In [3], a class of games with a hierarchical vector of interests is proposed, which
considers a set of zero-level players (individuals) who are United in coalitions
that are first-level players. Players of the first level, in turn, unite in coalitions that
are second-level players. And so on. The interests of each zero-level player are
described as a convolution (linear, minimal, or otherwise) of their winning func-
tion as a zero-level player, multiplied by the so-called altruism coefficients of the
winning functions of those first-level players (coalitions) that they belong to, and
so on. The zero-level player determines the importance of the interests of all players
of other levels, in which he participates directly or through a chain of coalitions,
by his system of altruism coefficients. For a particular type of games in which each
zero-level player distributes the resources available to him (the resource vector)
among coalitions, Nash equilibria are constructively defined for convolution in the
form of a minimum. Further, in the works of N. S. Kukushkin, strong equilibria
were determined for both minimum convolution and linear convolution.
In [4], the original coalition principle of optimality (compromise with a meta-
goal) is proposed and considered, in which, along with their own interests (goals),
players have a common interest – a metagoal. A Pareto set is constructed for a
multi-criteria problem, in which the criteria are the players ‘own interests, and then
the maximum point for the metagoal is determined on this set.
In [5, 6], various issues related to multi-step games are investigated, and the
applied possibilities of using the considered game models are analyzed.
A generalizing field closely related to game theory is the theory of operations
research [7–10]. Due to the importance of this area in the context of this work,
the main points of formation of the basic concepts of operations research will be
discussed in the Section 2 devoted to this issue.
The term “operation” is very General and universal. Arithmetic or algebraic
operation. Surgery. Military operation. Economic operation. Financial operation.
Political or geopolitical operation. We can draw a natural conclusion that there is
something in common in all this. But what is it, exactly?
Until the beginning of the 20th century, rather complex operations were studied
only at a qualitative, descriptive level. Only mathematical and algebraic operations
were studied at the level of strict definitions (at the level of established require-
ments for the concept of strictness).

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Yu. B. Hermeyer proposed a very General qualitative definition of an operation

as “a set of purposeful actions” [7]. It was assumed that operations are performed
by intelligent and goal-setting entities (players, agents) alone or together, and that
each of them wants to move towards achieving a particular goal when perform-
ing each operation. The goal can be formulated as a single-criteria (one specific
indicator is maximized) or multi-criteria (the desire to increase several indicators)
principle of optimality of the player (agent). Unfortunately, Yu.B. Hermeyer failed
to increase the level of strictness of the definition of an operation by presenting
mathematical definitions of the concepts “action” and “a set of ”.
In [7], a methodology for operations research is also proposed, in which the
decision-maker (the operating side (OS), the first player, the LPR) and the opera-
tions researcher who helps the OS make decisions are distinguished.
When you carefully consider the definition of operation proposed by Yu. B.
Hermeyer, it becomes clear that it contains everything that is designated by the
word “operation”. Indeed, the surgeon and assistants perform a set of purposeful
actions, wanting to achieve a very specific result. Conducting a military operation is
a set of purposeful actions to complete the task. The salesman wants to do his job by
performing actions to move and deliver packages to recipients, minimizing his own
costs. And so on.
The theories of non-antagonistic games and hierarchical games of Hermeyer
[2], and the theory of games with a hierarchical vector of interests of Vatel-
Hermeyer [3] are also associated with the name of Yu.b. Hermeyer. We can say
that game theory and operations research theory merged for him, as well as for his
friend and colleague N. N. Moiseev, into one whole, which requires the develop-
ment of a single universal mathematical basis. This is quite consistent with the
aspirations and attitudes of the founders of game theory [1]. But how do you find
such a unified mathematical basis? Students and followers of Y. B. Hermeyer and
N. N. Moiseev worked in the direction of its search.
Significant progress has been made in the study of issues related to uncertainty,
aggregation, related constraints, and awareness in hierarchical games, and a
decision support methodology based on the idea of “compromise with metacel”
has been developed [4–6]. Based largely on the models of V. V. Leontiev to identify
production functions and utility functions of the agents under consideration,
the differential-difference direction of modeling macroeconomic processes was
developed [11].
The theory of active systems was born in IPC RAS (V. N. Burkov) and actively
developed in the theoretical and applied directions [12]. the idea of this theory is to
generalize the theory of automatic regulation (TAR) in order to accurately describe
socio-economic processes by assuming that some elements of TAR systems can be
active, act expediently, and have expressions of will. In the works of one of V. N.
Burkov’s students D. A. Novikov and his colleagues, an attempt is made to organi-
cally synthesize the theory of active systems and mathematical game theory.
Analytical research of rather complex game-theoretic models, at the current
level of “quickness of mind “ of researchers, is very difficult. In this regard, it is very
relevant to simulate the processes of interaction of many people.
The most advanced school of simulation modeling (not only in Russia) can be
called the school of one of the students of N. N. Moiseev Yu.N. Pavlovsky [13].
This school was successfully conducted simulation SDI (it has been shown that the
implementation of the so-called strategic defense initiative is impossible due to the
fact that to control the entire surface of the planet would take more than a hundred
thousand satellites), the Peloponnesian wars, geopolitical interaction between the
three political-military alliances (the West, the Soviet Union with the allies, all the
rest). A number of simulation models were built and successfully used by The F. I.

3
The Role of Gamification in Software Development Lifecycle

Ereshko school. A fruitful attempt to generalize the simulation methodology is

presented in [14].
These achievements determined the possibility of generalizing the concept of
accurate descriptions of social processes, the unifying formalism of game theory,
the idea of the operation as the “ a set of purposeful actions,” the developments of
simulation and of the theory of active systems, other achievements of the human
mind in the exact modeling of complex, large-scale systems. As a candidate for such
generalization, representatives of the Hermeyer-Moiseev school (in the process of
solving of practical problems of scenario forecasting and decision support in indus-
trial corporations, complexes, and industries) formed the theory of operational
games and the related methodology of operational game scenario modeling [15–24].
Structurally, the work is structured as follows:
Section 2 analyzes the history of the formation of closely related game theory
and operations research theory. The Central points of formation of basic represen-
tations of these theories are marked. The novelty of the proposed approach, which
naturally grows out of these basic concepts, is indicated.
Section 3 presents the proposed precise definitions of the concepts “action”,
“operation”, and other definitions necessary to describe operational games. The
equations of dynamics of operational game processes are written out and analyzed.
The classification of operating games and the principles of their use for solving
applied problems are considered.
Section 4 uses simple examples to illustrate the methodology for constructing
various scenarios for operational game interaction.
Section 5 outlines the prospects for fundamental and applied research of this
class of game models.

2. Formation of the theory of operations research

The emergence of operations research as a field of precise research is rightly

associated with the names of Mikhail Pavlovich Osipov and Frederick William
Lanchester (1868–1946), who were the first to analyze military operations using
differential Equations [8]. Almost simultaneously (M. P. Osipov was ahead of F. W.
Lanchester after publishing their work “The Influence of the number of fighting
parties on their losses” in the magazine “Military collection” in 1915), they pro-
posed to consider and use the differential equation of Osipov-Lanchester, describ-
ing a military operation with a confrontation between two opponents. The status
of each of the opponents in each moment of the confrontation was described by a
number of troops and destructive power of weapons defined by the product quality
on the number of weapons. Further, the study of operations using mathematical
relations in the form of equations (including difference and differential equations)
and restrictions (not only in the form of inequalities) has been widely extended to
other areas of human activity.
In the second half of the 20th century, the scientific term “operations research”
becomes generally accepted. This is due to the work of Russell Lincoln Ackoff
(1919–2009), published in the 1960s [9]. R. L. Ackoff defines operations research
as “the application of the scientific method by complex research teams to solve
problems related to the management of organized (human-machine) systems in
order to obtain solutions that best meet the goals of the entire organization.” This
definition can be considered a preliminary qualitative (descriptive) definition on
the way to formalizing the social Sciences, which, of course, was based on other
founders of the theory of operations research, including Yuri Borisovich Hermeyer
(1918–1975) and Elena Sergeevna Wentzel, who worked in the same defense

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research organization. Hermeyer, a researcher and mathematician from God, a

child who survived clinical death during a famine in the Volga region, winner of the
first mathematical Olympiad in the USSR, was responsible for the development of
torpedo control systems. Having started working at the invitation of his classmate
in Moscow state University, N. N. Moiseev, at the legendary Computing center of
the USSR Academy of Sciences (later named after its founder A. A. Dorodnitsyn),
Yuri Borisovich creatively rethought and generalized the existing achievements of
game theory and operations research [2, 3, 7]. Operation was defined by him as “a
set of purposeful actions”. In game theory, he became the founder of the theories of
hierarchical Hermeyer games and games with a hierarchical vector of interests of
Vatel-Hermeyer. The works of one of his closest associates, E. S. Wentzel, are also
widely known [10].
To date, the definition of an operation Y. B. Germeyer can be called conven-
tional. But it also needs to be clarified, since it lacks precise mathematical defini-
tions of the concept of “action” and the operation of combining actions in the
aggregate. The strictness of the definition of purposefulness by Hermeyer and
his followers generally meets the “standards of scientific rigor”. Purposefulness is
linked to the concept of the “optimality principle”, which is generally understood
as several functions of variables describing the state of the game process (at the
current moment or, in General, throughout the game process up to the current
moment), maximized by a purposefully acting player (agent). The concepts of a
decision maker (DM) and an operations researcher (OR) conducting research in
the interests of the DM are introduced. In the case of a multi-criteria optimality
principle, the OR task is to construct a Pareto set, and the DM task is to choose
from this set. The followers of Yu. B. Hermeyer and N. N. Moiseev thoroughly
investigated the issues of information exchange in hierarchical game interactions
of a non-antagonistic nature, the issues of studying games with uncertainties and
associated restrictions, the issues of bluffing and aggregation of information,
the issues of finding equilibria and using the principle of guaranteed results in
such games.
Other areas of work in game theory and operations research are also interesting.
But it is hardly possible to do anything useful without going past what the founders
did. It is possible that someone will offer a completely different view of the formal-
ization of the Sciences of social interactions. But this, so far, is not visible.
The novelty of what is proposed by the author and his colleagues [15–24] can be
represented as follows:
To date, we have considered multi-step games in which all players at each step
(during each clock cycle of discrete time) play one common static game. When
considering real game interactions, it is impossible to formulate or analyze such
a game that adequately describes what is happening in reality. In this connection,
we propose to assume that at each step, many (ensemble) static games are played
that formalize real operations. If we talk about Economics, this corresponds to the
wishes of the founders of game theory [1] to build accurate descriptions of “the
simplest facts of economic life” that correspond to the “norms of scientific rigor”.
The game as a whole can be called a dynamic ensemble of static games (in the next
step, the same static games are played again in new conditions).
Due to the fact that there are a lot of static games (operations) being played at
any moment, they may conflict with each other (requesting the same resources,
which are not enough for all requests, for example). This introduces the concept of a
“regulatory rule”, which in one way or another adjusts the operation requests so that
there is no conflict.
In reality, actions not only implement certain technologies, but also improve
them. In this regard, actions are divided into simple and operator actions.

5
The Role of Gamification in Software Development Lifecycle

Operator actions change parameters and functions that describe available

actions and operations.
All this will be discussed later.

3. A basic concept of the operational games theory

Mathematically precise definition of the concept of “operation” is not known to

this day (at least, for the author). To suggest such a definition is very relevant, since
it would be the key to formalizing both Economics and many other qualitative social
Sciences. In this case, it is necessary to take as a basis one or another qualitative
definition of the concept of operation. Which one is the researcher’s choice. Next
will be made based on the definition of Y. B. Germeyer [7].
Let us make the definition of an operation proposed by Yu.b. Hermeyer (“a
set of purposeful actions”) more strict, starting with the question of what we
will understand by “action”. At the level of “subtle matters”, even a magic spell
can be considered as an action. May be one day this understanding will become
normal. But this is a matter for the future. In the present time, it is reasonable to
limit ourselves to the consideration of processes in which motion is observed in a
particular finite-dimensional space, and the values of a finite number of numerical
variables change (in discrete or continuous time). Then it is natural to consider
any movement in a given space as an action (of players or/and natural factors). At
the same time, formalizing real processes, it is natural to assume that each action
(possibly representable as a set of simpler actions) is performed by a well-defined
finite number of persons (players, agents), including nature. These players can
participate in the Commission of an action either independently of each other,
or by agreeing on something, having developed a common decision. In General,
by agreeing on something. Any agreement is reached within the framework of a
certain procedure of game interaction. The result of any agreement is a solution
that can be formally represented as a vector of non-necessarily numeric variables.
This vector will determine how exactly (on what scale, on which of the possible
options) this action will be performed. From these considerations, a more precise
definition of the operation appears below, in which the set of participants is called
the set of LPR, the procedure for reaching an agreement is called the convolution
function, and the decision made by the participants is called the vector of operation
controls. However, in addition to moving actions in the finite-dimensional space
of game interaction, we also consider operator actions that change the attributes of
the description of operations (parameters of the convolution function and other
functions describing the operation).
Strictly formally stated above, in the case of discrete time consideration of game
interaction) is described as follows:
Let there be N players (one of which can be nature) interacting on a discrete
time interval, whose phase state is denoted by the vectors xi , i= 1,…, N
xi ∈ Gxi ⊆ Rni . The dimensions of the vectors n1 ,…, nN . We assume that their
interaction is realized by performing simultaneous operations, during which the
position of the game process changes in its phase space (which is the Cartesian
product of the players ‘phase spaces = G Gx1 ×…× GxN G ⊆ Rn1 +…+ nN ) and parameters
of the operations themselves. When describing the operation, we will set

• a subset of the set of players I j ∈ {1,,…,,N} (the set of LPR operations) that
take part in making decisions on its implementation, in determining the
vectors u j of controls of the j-th operation during its implementation;

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( (
• function (vector-function) of convolution of the operation f j γ kj k ∈ I j ,ξ j , ) )
which is an algorithm for determining the control vector of the operation by
selecting players from the set of LPR operations γ kj (from their sets of choices
for this operation Η kj ) and by realizations of uncertainties associated with this
operation ξ j ∈Ξ j ;

• sets of simple PR j and operator PRoj actions of this operation that are imple-
mented during the operation and change the position of the game process in
the phase space (simple actions) and the parameters of the operations them-
selves (operator actions).

The set of operations of the operating game is denoted by =

OP {op1 ,…,opM } .
We will consider the sets of simple and operator actions PR and PRo to be
uniform (common) for all operations. These sets belong to the sets of operations
actions. The numbers of actions in the sets PR and PRo are denoted by Q and Q o ,
the numbers of actions of the j-th operation are Q j and Q oj . We will also assume
that the control vector of operations is unified for a given dimension L, which is
common for all operations (some of its components may not be used in each specific
operation). Each l-th simple or operator action of the j-th operation is generally
associated with several sum functions of this action, depending on the control
vector: S jl1 ,…, S jlα jl for a simple action or S ojl1 ,…, S ojlβ jl for the operator. These
amounts (positive, negative, zero) are changed by the implementation of the action
associated with this sum, the coordinate of the phase space G or the associated
parameter of the action or operation.
At each moment of time of game interaction, the choices made by the players
and the implementation of uncertainties determine some of the following opera-
tions: movement in the space Rn1 +…+ nN But this move may take the process out of the
allowed G area. In this regard, in each operating game, a regulatory rule must be
defined that corrects the management of operations so that this does not happen. In
the simplest and most common case of resource constraints, these rules can be
proportional cuts to the resources requested by operations, operation priority
systems, and others. We assume that such a rule is defined and the control vectors
defined by the operation convolution functions become arguments of the transac-
tion sum functions after correction by the control rule. The corrected control
vectors will be marked with a wave ( u j ).
Each sum S jlm of a simple action of an operation is associated with a certain
coordinate of the game interaction space Rn1 +…+ nN xir i ∈ {1,…,,N}, r ∈ {1,…,ni } ,
which this sum changes. Let us denote the δ irjlm indicator equal to one if S jlm is
associated with xir , and zero otherwise. Then the system of equations for the
dynamics of phase variables in the operational game interaction in discrete time is
written as.
M Q j α jl

( )
xir ( t + 1) =xir ( t ) + ∑∑∑δ irjlm ·S jlm u j ( t ) i =1,…, N ;
=j 1=l 1 m
= 1

r= 1,…, ni (1)

Similarly, (1) is written and the system of equations of dynamics of those

parameters of actions and operations that can change the operator actions. If there

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The Role of Gamification in Software Development Lifecycle

are K such parameters and they are ordered, we denote them π 1 ,…,π K . The system
of equations of their dynamics is written as
M Q j β jl

jlm · S jlm ( u
π q ( t + 1) =π q ( t ) + ∑∑∑δ oq  j ( t ) ) q =1,…, K ;
o
(2)
=j 1=l 1 m
= 1

Systems (1–2) together with the regulatory rule allow you to play (simulate)
any operational game interaction of this operating game, if you know the players
‘choices and the implementation of uncertainties at each moment of the discrete
time interval of this interaction. Players ‘choices are determined by their principles
of optimality and their adopted behavior strategies (in the form of a program or
synthesis), which can be very different. Uncertainties may or may not be described
by certain probability distributions.
A very flexible language for describing legal and other restrictions, player obli-
gations, assumptions about the behavior of other players, and the implementation
of uncertainties is records of the form

IF condition THAT action OTHERWISE sanction , (3)

in which < condition> has the format of a logical sentence, the terms of which
can be any simple statements about the values (or intervals of values) of phase
variables, player elections, implementations of uncertainties, the presence and
fulfillment of certain obligations, the players ‘awareness from the beginning of the
game to the current moment; <action> and < sanction> have an imperative format
for regulating (possibly interval) player elections at the current time.
To define the information structure of an operational game, you need to
determine which subset of the complete information about the course of the game
interaction each player has at each moment of this interaction. Full information
is understood as accurate knowledge of the dynamics of phase variables, choices,
implementations of uncertainties, sets of obligations, restrictions, and selected
strategies for player behavior.
The dynamics of players ‘States is described as the dynamics of turnover and
balance (or only balance) of their base accounts (variables of the space for devel-
oping game interaction) that arise as a result of various operations performed by
players (production, investment, credit, purchase and sale of products and services,
R & d, innovation and modernization, and others). The dynamics of arbitrarily
complex indicators is represented as the dynamics of turnover and balance of
analytical accounts, which are generally any computable functions of turnover and
balance of basic and other analytical accounts.
Operations are described by the corresponding sets of LPR (players involved in
making decisions about how, with which controls, these operations will be per-
formed); sets of actions (transactions on basic accounts), the amounts of which are
certain functions of the operation controls; convolution functions that determine
the operation controls depending on the choices of players involved in the opera-
tion, and the implementation of uncertain factors.
Systems (1)–(2) have quite clear content meaning. In any operational interac-
tion, there are many potentially possible operations that can be performed by
participants. For each such operation, the technology of its implementation is
known, including

• the number of possible participants, possibly different with a limit on the

maximum number of participants;

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• a list of actions that are performed during the operation, each of which can be
implemented in different ways, with different implementation parameters;

• procedure for participants to agree on parameters for implementing actions.

At any given moment, some operations are performed, some are not. Some
actions may be modernization in nature and change the technology of operations
themselves.
In order to determine what happened at the current moment in discrete time, you
need to go through the entire set of possible operations, for each of which you find
out whether it was performed or not at the moment and determine how exactly it was
performed, if so. During each operation, there is a swing (as the participants wanted
to do it) and a blow (as it really happened), which is why the control vectors with
the wave appear (the regulatory rule corrects the swing). The system (1) calculates
the final movement in the interaction space, and the system (2) calculates the final
change in the operation technologies themselves.
In the case of a surgical operation, actions are known practiced movements
of the scalpel and other tools, in economic operations, economic facts related to
production, purchase and sale, lending, investment, taxation, modernization,
R & d, training, consumption, health care, etc. If we consider only production,
exchange (purchase and sale of products, services, labor), investment, credit, tax
and consumer transactions, writing out the system (1) will naturally lead to the
well-known and used equations of the material and financial balance.
The universal nature of systems (1)–(2) opens up very interesting prospects.
In particular, it is possible to raise and solve the issue of creating a software envi-
ronment (platform) for generating in the menu regime a wide range of program
systems for supporting micro - and macroeconomic decision-making.
In [16], we consider not only operational games with continuous accounts (vari-
ables) and discrete time, which are referred to as RD-games. Equations of dynamics
of operational game processes can also be written for cases of continuous accounts
and continuous time (RC-games), discrete accounts and discrete time (ZD-games),
discrete accounts and continuous time (ZC-games). Differential games can be
represented as RC games. The chess, checkers, and other finite games played by
moves can be represented as ZD games. In the form of ZC games-game processes in
continuous time, in which only a finite space of possible States of game interaction
is essential.

4. Methodology for creating scenarios of operational game interactions

After formalization by the operational games theory some real-world game

interaction (in salon game, in production and economic activities of enterprises and
corporations, industrial complexes and sectors of the economy, in macroeconomic
and geopolitical processes) you can start to study various possible scenarios of game
interactions. It is necessary for the formation of the strategies of the operational
side (of the player in whose interests research is conducted), optimal or rational in
any sense, in various scenarios. This requires a methodology.
In a particular operational RD-game, a set of players is defined; a discrete time
clock; a set of considered accounts (variables of the game’s configuration space),
actions, and operations. Operational gameplay refers to the game interaction of
all or part of the players for a given period of time, during which players make
choices during operations, accept and fulfill (or fail to fulfill) obligations, exchange

9
The Role of Gamification in Software Development Lifecycle

information between them, and natural uncertainties are realized. What do you
need to know in order to play analytically or imitatively a particular operational
game process?
First, you need to know the initial balances (values) of accounts (variables) at
the beginning of the considered segment of game interaction. Second – the initial
characteristics of actions and operations: the parameters of the convolution func-
tions and the sum functions of actions, which, if there are operator actions, can
change during the game interaction, as well as the account balance. Third, it is
necessary to use one or another hypothesis of the implementation of uncertainties
in the course of game interaction, determined and modeled by probability distribu-
tions or otherwise. Fourth – for each player other than the operating party (the first
player), it is necessary to make an assumption about his awareness and formulate a
hypothesis about his strategy of behavior with such awareness, given in the General
case in the form of synthesis. Knowing all this, we can conduct a simulation game
simulation of this process, developing an optimal, in one sense or another, strategy
for the behavior of the operating party.
This defines the methodology for modeling scenarios of operational game
interactions. Operational game scenario modeling uses the concepts of “scenario
condition”, “full scenario condition”, “scenario”, and “scenario plan”.
A scenario condition is any finite sequence of entries of the form (3), each
of which can relate to any of the players or to the implementation of an unde-
fined factor.
A full scenario condition is a scenario condition that determines the implemen-
tation of an indeterminate factor and the election of all players except one (the
operating side).
A scenario is a combination of a complete scenario condition and the”optimal
“(rational) strategy of the operating side when this condition is met.
A scenario plan is a set of scenarios of one of the players that describes all
possible or practically interesting implementations of game interaction for
this player.
Let us look at examples of creating scenarios for fairly simple operational game
interactions.
Salon games, in most cases, are held in discrete time (by moves) and in a finite
space of possible States of game interaction, and therefore are adequately modeled
as ZD games. But in the case of, for example, poker, in which arbitrary money bets
can be made, it is more correct to use the RC games considered in this paper.
In this case, the accounts (variables that describe the state of the game) will be:

• accounts of players ‘available funds;

• money at stake;

• the state of the deck (at the beginning of each draw-one of 54! possible locations
of cards in the deck, then – one of the factorial of the number of remaining
cards in the deck);

• the state of the card sets in the players ‘hands and the binary States of the
players themselves (in-game or out-of-game).

Possible actions include:

• moving money from players to the pot at stake (an action with one sum equal
to the amount of money being moved);

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• moving money from the Bank to players (also a single-sum action);

• player exits from the current game;

• move cards from the deck to players during the initial distribution of cards to
players in the draw;

• players taking a certain number of cards from the deck determined by the
rules;

• players discard a certain number of cards from their own set of cards.

Possible operations include:

• individual operations of players related to depositing money in the Bank, replac-

ing cards with cards from the deck, and withdrawing from the current draw;

• shuffle the deck before drawing;

• distribution of cards to players at the beginning of the draw;

• issuance of the Bank based on the results of the draw.

Multitudes of decision-makers, functions, convolution, vector controls, sets of

action operations are defined the obvious way. Uncertainty is present in one opera-
tion – in the shuffle of the deck before the start of the draw. This operation itself can
be modeled as having an empty set of LPR and consisting in an indefinite choice of
one of 54! variants of the deck state under the influence of natural factors. But it can
also be modeled differently, both by the operations researcher and by the players
themselves, based on certain (possibly mystical) ideas about this process.
Players ‘awareness is determined by the rules of the game (which are different
for different types of poker).
To form a complete scenario condition in each draw of such a game for one or
another player means to make certain assumptions about how the deck was laid
and what other players have in their hands, what amounts other players have and
what strategies their behavior in the game is. These assumptions can include (and
usually do include) probability distributions. Developing their own strategy of
behavior, the player can strive to maximize the mathematical expectation of their
own winnings.
When modeling the game interaction between a seller and a buyer in the market
(for example, several types of fruits and vegetables), we will have to consider as
accounts the wallets of the buyer and seller and the availability of all types of goods
sold by both of them. You also need invoices describing the quality of each product.
Players ‘interests can be described in one or multiple criteria. The seller is usually
better informed about the quality of the goods than the buyer. During the bidding
process, information is exchanged about the prices offered by participants, the
availability and quality of goods.
In more complex game interactions associated, for example, with the produc-
tion and economic activities of enterprises and corporations, industrial complexes
and industries, the set of players, accounts, actions, and operations is significantly
expanded. The variety of options for awareness and strategies of player behavior,
risks and uncertainties, of course, becomes much richer. But the proposed formal-
ism for describing operational game processes can withstand this as well.

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5. Opportunities for development and application of operational games

theory

The class of operating game models is original. Its novelty is due to the fact that

• the original formal definition of the operation is used, specifying the defini-
tion proposed by Yu. b. Hermeyer: “a set of targeted actions”;

• unlike traditional multi-step games, in which one static game is played at each
step, in which all players participate, in operational games, an “ensemble of
static games” is played at each step;

• possible resource conflicts between static ensemble games are resolved using
the “regulatory rule”.

The proposed concept of operation is very flexible. The vast majority of actions
that we do, in fact, either change some variables that formally describe the external
world, or teach us something, improve the technologies at our disposal. This is how
operations are defined above.
It is quite clear at the qualitative level that such operations can naturally be
enlarged and detailed. In this connection, the question arises about the formal
definition of the consolidation and detailing of operations, as well as about the
formal definitions of the Union and decomposition of the players themselves. There
are also many other fundamental questions related to equilibria and the analysis of
the information structure in operational games.
At the first stage of testing operational game scenario modeling on solving
applied problems, both micro-and macro-economic problems were considered.
In terms of decision support for the management of production and economic
activities and the development of enterprises and corporations, operational game
models were developed and used that allow for What If analysis of a wide variety
of scenarios for managing these activities with different implementations of
exogenous factors [15, 16, 20, 21]. In the process of modeling the functioning of
the Moscow industrial complex, scenario forecasting of the dynamics of the main
indicators of the development of this complex and its branches was carried out
[16, 18, 19]. We also built operational game models of a macroeconomic nature
designed for What If analysis of national economic development management and
modeling of geopolitical processes.
Developing this area of research, it is advisable to adjust the existing paradigm
of economic and mathematical modeling. It is reasonable to replace the monetarist
description of rational behavior of agents (players) as the desire to maximize profits
with the natural desire of existing micro - and macro-agents to maximize total
assets, including net assets and reasonable estimates of available human (taking
into account the levels of health, skills, education) and natural resources. In legal
terms, it is advisable to restrict operations that reduce the total assets of the planet
as a whole.

6. Conclusions

The theory of operational games and the methodology of operational game sce-
nario modeling based on this theory have proved to be a workable tool for adequate
modeling of both micro-and macro-economic processes, collective and social
interactions of a wide range. In this connection, there are very promising areas of

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fundamental and applied research. This tool allows us to talk about creating a new
generation of platforms for generating information and analytical decision support
systems.

Acknowledgements

The author expresses deep gratitude to the departed colleagues A. F. Kononenko

and S. A. Otenko, together with whom the basic concepts of the theory of opera-
tional games were formed. The author is grateful to many friends and relatives who
actively experienced with him at the birth of all that is presented in this work.

Author details

Vasiliy Shevchenko
FRC CSC RAS, Moscow, Russia

*Address all correspondence to: [email protected]

© 2020 The Author(s). Licensee IntechOpen. This chapter is distributed under the terms
of the Creative Commons Attribution License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/
by/3.0), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium,
provided the original work is properly cited.

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The Role of Gamification in Software Development Lifecycle

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