22 Monitoringintervention
22 Monitoringintervention
Table of Contents
Module 22
Session plan
Module no 22
Duration 45 mins
Student None
prerequisites
Participant Handouts:
materials Factors affecting monitoring lapses.
Monitoring tips and hints.
Root causes and mitigation strategies.
Behavioural markers pertinent to monitoring ability
Slide – Aims
Slide – Objectives
“unintentional errors” in the University of Texas LOSA archives went undetected by flight
crew.
In one LOSA conducted in 2000, 19 percent of errors and 69 percent of “undesired
states” could have been eliminated by more effective crew monitoring and cross-checking.
“Undesired state” refers to any unwanted situation or occurrence affecting aircraft safety
or operations, such as exceeding an aircraft limitation or landing on a closed runway.
These figures suggest that better monitoring performance by the flight crew can improve
safety by detecting and correcting errors before they get out of hand.
Monitoring matters
The CAA in conjunction with the Loss of Control Action Group, have produced a very
informative document called Monitoring Matters. CAA Paper 2013/02. This CAA paper is
publically available and can be downloaded from the internet.
The document gives guidance on the Development of Pilot Monitoring Skills.
The Loss of Control Action Group is a joint Civil Aviation Authority/industry initiative
supported by: British Airways, easyJet, Flybe, Jet2, Thomas Cook Airlines, Thomson Airways
and Virgin Atlantic Airways.
Abstracts of this document are included in this module.
Loss of Control is prioritised as the most important of the significant seven safety issues
and the application of effective pilot monitoring is identified as a key safety net in the
prevention of and recovery from Loss of Control accidents and incidents. Monitoring is an
essential ingredient in achieving synergy with highly automated and complex aircraft
systems and effective crew co-ordination.
There have been many fatal accidents attributed to Loss of Control, resulting in a large
loss of life. Crew monitoring is frequently the last line of defence that stands between safe
operation and an accident scenario.
What is monitoring?
A good analogy of monitoring can be ‘plate spinning’ – whilst all the plates are going round
evenly a cursory tap keeps them on the stick. However as soon as one starts to wobble
and requires more attention than the rest you take your eye off the ball and before you
know where you are others are wobbling too and eventually all are on the floor.
Monitoring is not quite this dramatic but whilst you are ahead of the game, concentrating
on the next event, keeping an eye on all the flight parameters, system modes etc.
everything runs fairly smoothly. But as soon as something draws your attention away and
you become out of the loop it becomes difficult to play catch up.
Definition
In the context of flight operations, the term monitoring it is defined as:
Monitoring is the name given to the extensive behavioural skill set which all pilots in the
cockpit would be expected to demonstrate.
The designated Pilot Flying (PF) is responsible for flying the aircraft in accordance with the
operational brief and monitoring the flight path. The Pilot Monitoring (PM) will have an
explicit set of activities designated by the Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs), and as
such will have a specific and primary role to monitor the aircraft’s flight path,
communications and the activities of the PF.
Both pilots will be responsible for maintaining their own big picture gained through cross
checking each other’s actions, communication of intent and diligent observation of the PF
selections, mode activations and aircraft responses.
How do we monitor?
Question
All accurate monitoring activities result in an output following judgement and decision
making and this can take the form of:
▪ Verbalization to other pilot or self.
▪ Non-verbalisation in the form of gesture/eye contact.
▪ Note-taking in the case of auditory monitoring.
▪ Reinforcement of collective Situation Awareness (SA).
▪ Maintenance of mental model.
Barriers to monitoring
What are the barriers to monitoring?
There are many factors that hamper monitoring including system and ergonomic design,
organisational factors, external environment and human vulnerabilities.
It should be emphasised that in nearly all accident case studies there are multiple causal
factors including design deficiencies and pilot handling responses but for the purpose of
this session we will focus on monitoring lapses.
Split into 2 groups. Discuss your assigned task and note your answers on flip chart:
Group 1 - List the barriers to monitoring
Group 2 – What promotes good monitoring
Generate a discussion as appropriate based on what their answers bring out. Then follow
on with some information on root causes before looking at group 2 contributions.
Answers may include:
▪ Inattention.
▪ Fixation/preoccupation - Fixated on a particular display or instrument
may lead to failure to complete the scanning process.
▪ Distraction.
▪ Workload. When the workload is high or poorly managed, monitoring
can be treated as a low priority task.
▪ If the workload is too low this can lead to complacency, boredom, low
arousal level.
▪ Stress.
▪ Tiredness & fatigue.
▪ Startle reaction.
▪ Incapacitation.
▪ Confirmation bias.
▪ Looking but not seeing - The pilot may become habituated in carrying
out the instrument and display scanning task and fail to accurately
process the information.
▪ Physical ergonomics – seating position, degraded vision, degraded
hearing.
▪ Authority gradients in the cockpit can impair monitoring if the PM is
intimidated by the PF and is unwilling to question their judgement.
▪ Lack of knowledge, poor situational awareness (SA) and confusion.
▪ Limited attentional resource, tiredness.
▪ Attention tunnelling.
▪ Disorientation.
Generate a discussion as appropriate based on what their answers bring out. Then follow
on with some information on good monitoring.
Task management
Good monitoring relies upon effective task management and ‘making time for monitoring’.
It is evident from many case studies that carrying out tasks associated with the landing
checklist, emergency drills, landing charts and handling the FMS can take priority over
monitoring tasks.
Flight path monitoring/selective radial instrument scan must be a priority task that is not
compromised by other priority tasks.
Task scheduling
For example, carrying out the normal checklist.
Sharing
For example; balancing the monitoring workload and being aware when the PM has very
limited capacity.
Shedding
For example; prioritising tasks, this is considered as a strategy to achieve good monitoring
practice.
Knowledge
An essential component of the monitoring task is knowledge. The monitoring task
becomes easier when you are familiar with displays and controls functionality and
layout, system responses and handling manoeuvres. The application of knowledge
equates with intent which is fundamental to the monitoring task. If you do not know
how the system is going to behave or how the aircraft is going to respond, then you will
not be able to make a judgement on correct operation (monitoring task). Similarly, if
you are unaware of the other crew member’s intent then this will also impair the
monitoring task.
Skill
Monitoring the flight path is simply flying with your eyes, observing cockpit displays
and indications to ensure that the aircraft response matches mode selections and
guidance target entries. Monitoring skill therefore can be considered, in part, to be the
ability to judge whether the aircraft attitude, speed and trajectory matches your
expectations.
Monitoring skill relates to the ability of the pilot to:
▪ Recognise and respond to any deviations from the plan in a timely and
effective manner.
▪ Recognise and advise on deviations in appropriate configuration
states.
▪ Recognise and advise on abnormal conditions.
▪ Alert changes in automation modes (in accordance with SOP).
▪ Advise on achievement of approaching clearance heights.
▪ Advise on external threats (weather, terrain, traffic).
▪ Recognise and advise on any errors by Crew Member.
Experience
Good monitoring correlates highly with mental capacity which in turn may be factored by
the pilot’s amount of flying experience. The more familiar you are with a set of
procedures/system operation, the greater the ability to operate effectively on mental
autopilot. Therefore, carrying out some of the operational tasks utilising lower levels of
concentration can release more capacity for the monitoring task. However, this doesn’t
necessarily mean that pilots with a lot of flying hours are good monitors.
Attitude
A good monitor will possess a healthy scepticism on the integrity of the systems and
will cross check the autopilot performance against the raw flight path parameters.
They will also be aware of and also possibly be a little suspicious about the capability
of other crew members thereby cross checking actions judiciously. They will act
dutifully in the execution of their monitoring task and be assertive when necessary.
Communication
Effective communication is intrinsically linked to monitoring skills. It involves
communications between; flight crew and controller; flight crew members; flight crew
and cabin crew. Communication allows sharing goals and intentions to enhance crew’s
situational awareness and monitoring.
The following is an extract from an AAIB report11 of a fatal accident involving a solo pilot
flying a Bolkow 208C light aircraft from Long Marston Airfield to Peterborough Sibson
Airfield. It serves to emphasise the importance of planning and monitoring particularly in
unfamiliar territory
The aircraft was on final approach to land at Sibson Airfield when it struck the
uppermost cable of a set of power transmission lines situated approximately
0.5 nm from the airfield. The runway in use had a significantly displaced
threshold to provide aircraft on approach with adequate clearance from the
transmission lines. Evidence suggested that the pilot made an approach to
the start of the prepared runway surface, rather than the displaced threshold.
The pilot’s unfamiliarity with the airfield, distraction due to a departing aircraft
in front and inadequacies in the briefing material available to him may have
been contributory factors to the accident.
There is still the requirement to carry out the checklist drills and emergency briefings.
▪ Resist the temptation to take short cuts and avoid repeating the well-
known checklists from memory. Although it may be embarrassing, there
are times when just saying a drill out loud will re-enforce the actions
These are a few strategies that could be employed to enhance good monitoring behaviour:
▪ Stay in the loop by mentally flying the aircraft even when the autopilot
or other pilot is flying the aircraft.
▪ When you have been distracted ensure that you always check the Flight
Monde Annunciator (FMA) and your flight instruments to get back in the
loop as soon as possible.
▪ Monitor the flight instruments just as you would when you are manually
flying the aircraft.
This handout shows root causes and gives consideration to mitigation strategies. However,
it should be stressed that this is not necessarily the only solution and the benefit in fully
appreciating the broad range of circumstances leading to monitoring lapses will be gained
in developing your own table.
Through practice
It goes without saying that the only effective way of developing monitoring skills is through
flight exposure during simulator training and line flying. The monitoring is far more
demanding for the PM when the PF is manually flying the aircraft mainly due to the
likelihood of flight path and speed excursion compared with when the AP is managing the
flight (assuming all the flight plan inputs have been cross monitored previously). Therefore,
manual flying is the best way to develop the predictive monitoring skills. The other
monitoring skills (passive, active, periodic and mutual) relate mainly to SOP adherence
which will improve with practice and feedback.
▪ They are cross monitoring each other (ideally this will become a force of
habit).
▪ There is a gap between the challenge and response to make sure that
they have actually checked it (encourage them to say what they see).
▪ They are holding any checklist/chart/QRH in a position that facilitates
continued monitoring (alternatively recognise when there is no spare
capacity to carry on monitoring and encourage them to focus attention
on QRH).
▪ They have their seat at the design eye position so that they are able to
monitor the required instruments, panels, displays and controls.
The old adage ‘we all learn from our mistakes’ is true and events which introduce
failures that good monitoring should capture, should be considered.
Intervention
Slide – Intervention
Group task
Ask the group to work together (split into multiple groups if large numbers) and to list
their contributions for the following questions:
▪ At what point should the Pilot Monitoring (PM) intervene?
▪ Consider how the PM should intervene
▪ What challenges might the PM face and how can they mitigate this?
Slide – Intervention
How should the PM intervene and what challenges might they face?
Work through the group’s contributions and promote discussion as appropriate. If
their answers don’t include the following points, then consider adding this information
to the discussion.
System design and automation may aid intervention, as too may procedures and
regulation, which can be referenced and cited in the event of a needing to challenge.
Use assertive communication, do not be afraid to speak up, ‘if you see something –
say something’.
In the event that a subordinate crew member needs to challenge the performance of a
Captain, the situation can be very difficult for junior crew members, particularly if they
are still in their new-hire, probationary period.
If the culture of the organisation does not address fear, intimidation, and reprisal, then
crew members might be very reluctant to suggest to an established Captain that
mistakes are being made.
Other factors affecting the intervention process may be company culture, national
culture, personality and confidence.
Summary
Slide – Summary
Slide – Objectives
References
1. NTSB. Safety Study: A review of flight crew involved, major accidents of U.S. Air
Carriers, 1978 through 1990. Report no. NTSB/SS-94/01. Washington, D.C.,
United States: NTSB, 1994.
2. International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO). Safety Analysis: Human Factors and
Organizational Issues in Controlled Flight into Terrain (CFIT) Accidents, 1984–
1994. Montreal, Quebec, Canada: ICAO, 1994
3. The NASA Aviation Safety Reporting System (ASRS) is a confidential incident-
reporting system. The ASRS Program Overview said, “Pilots, air traffic controllers,
flight attendants, mechanics, ground personnel and others involved in aviation
operations submit reports to the ASRS when they are involved in, or observe, an
incident or situation in which aviation safety was compromised. ASRS de-identifies
reports before entering them into the incident database. All personal and
organizational names are removed. Dates, times and related information, which
could be used to infer an identity, are either generalized or eliminated.”