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Econ 2010a - Assignment 1

This document outlines 6 problems related to game theory concepts like Nash equilibria, extensive form games, and correlated equilibria. Problem 1 asks to find conditions for an extensive form game to have a given normal form. Problems 2-4 provide specific games and ask to find all Nash equilibria. Problem 5 proves properties of max-min and min-max values in 2 and 3 player games. Problem 6 computes Nash equilibria and finds a correlated equilibrium.

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Jason Bridges
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25 views3 pages

Econ 2010a - Assignment 1

This document outlines 6 problems related to game theory concepts like Nash equilibria, extensive form games, and correlated equilibria. Problem 1 asks to find conditions for an extensive form game to have a given normal form. Problems 2-4 provide specific games and ask to find all Nash equilibria. Problem 5 proves properties of max-min and min-max values in 2 and 3 player games. Problem 6 computes Nash equilibria and finds a correlated equilibrium.

Uploaded by

Jason Bridges
Copyright
© © All Rights Reserved
We take content rights seriously. If you suspect this is your content, claim it here.
Available Formats
Download as PDF, TXT or read online on Scribd
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Econ 2010a

Fall, 2018

Assignment 1

Due November 9

1. Consider the normal form game

L R

U x1,x2 z1,z2

D y1,y2 w1,w2

Give necessary and sufficient conditions on the payoffs for there to exist an extensive-

form game of perfect information with this normal form.

For problems 2-6, the term “Nash equilibria” includes mixed strategy equilibria.

2. Find all Nash equilibria of the following three-player extensive-form game:

1 A 2 A (1, 1, 1)

D D

L R L R

(3, 3, 2) (0, 0, 0) (4, 4, 0) (0, 0, 1)

1
3. Each of n people ( n  2 ) announces an integer in the set {1,…, K}. A prize of $10 is split

equally among all the players whose number is closest to 3/4 of the mean number. Find

all Nash equilibria of the game.

4. General A is defending territory accessible by two mountain passes against an attack by

General B. General A has four divisions at her disposal, and General B has three

divisions. Each general allocates her divisions between the two passes. General A wins

the battle at a pass if and only if she assigns at least as many divisions to the pass as does

General B; she successfully defends her territory (i.e., she wins the game) if and only if

she wins the battle at both passes (otherwise A wins). Formulate this situation as a game

in normal form and find all its Nash equilibria.

5. (A) In class we showed that max min gi ( pi , p−i ) = min max gi ( pi , p−i ) for i = 1,2 in a
pi p− i p− i pi

finite two-player zero-sum game. Show that the same equation holds for any finite two-

player game.

(B) Show that in any finite three-player-game

() max min gi ( pi , p−i )  min max gi ( pi , p−i )  player i’s payoff in any Nash
pi p− i p− i pi

equilibrium

Give an example in which both inequalities in ( ) are strict for some player i.

(C) Show that the first inequality in ( ) becomes an equality if players can use correlated

strategies

2
6. In the following game, compute all Nash equilibria and find a correlated equilibrium that

is not a convex combination of Nash equilibria:

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