National Security and Nuclear Weapons in

the 21st Century

September 2008
 Foreword

In July 2007, along with Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, we issued a statement that
summarized the need for maintaining a credible U.S. nuclear deterrent and urged
bipartisan Congressional support for the Reliable Replacement Warhead program. This
paper, National Security and Nuclear Weapons in the 21st Century, expands on the July
2007 statement by addressing in greater detail the considerations behind U.S.
requirements for nuclear weapons. The paper also describes the relationship among
strategic nuclear force structure, the stockpile of nuclear warheads, and the nuclear
warhead research and production infrastructure. We believe the logic presented here
provides a sound basis on which this and future administrations can consider further
adjustments to U.S. nuclear weapons policy, strategy, and force structure.

Many of the policy issues and strategic capabilities discussed in this paper are based on
the December 2001 Nuclear Posture Review and represent continuity with decisions
made by prior administrations. For example, the Clinton Administration developed the
“lead and hedge” strategy as a way to reduce the size of the deployed strategic nuclear
force, while also ensuring that the United States would be able to respond to future
challenges that could be more stressing than estimated at that time. Under this strategy
the United States would take the “lead” in nuclear reductions, but would “hedge” through
an inventory of non-deployed nuclear warheads and a force structure capable of
deploying those warheads. The current administration seeks to build on that approach by
relying, over time, more heavily on a responsive nuclear weapons design and
manufacturing infrastructure to manage risk, and less on an inventory of non-deployed
warheads.

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We believe that this approach continues to have merit. In the dynamic, unpredictable
security environment of the 21st century, the relationship between standing forces and
infrastructure readiness will need to be adjusted to allow more effective management of
various types of risk – geopolitical, technical, and operational. In this context, the
Reliable Replacement Warhead (RRW) program deserves continued study and
development. The RRW concept is both promising and fully consistent with U.S.
Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty commitments. Ultimately, a reliable replacement
warhead will be needed to sustain nuclear force capabilities, revitalize the nuclear
infrastructure, and reduce the nuclear stockpile in a manner that is consistent with U.S.
security objectives, including alliance commitments.

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 Table of Contents

Page
Foreword i
Table of Contents iii
Executive Summary 1
Does the United States Still Need Nuclear Weapons? 3
The Emerging Security Environment 5
Responses of U.S. Allies to the New Security Environment 9
Sizing the U.S. Force: Political and Military Considerations 10
Managing Risk and the U.S. Nuclear Posture 16
Conclusions 23
Annex I – Stockpile Planning Through 2012 I

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 Executive Summary1
During the Cold War, the greatest security concern of the United States was the military
capabilities of the Soviet Union. Potential threats from China and regional states such as
North Korea were considered to be lesser included cases that could be addressed by the
capabilities deployed to counter the Soviet threat. The current global security
environment is radically different. The primary national security challenge now facing
the United States is the nexus of violent extremists and regional states of concern that
have, or seek to attain, weapons of mass destruction (WMD). Some governments have
demonstrated a willingness to transfer advanced weapons or sensitive weapon
technologies to other states, or to support terrorist groups. China, a rapidly growing
economic power and the only recognized nuclear weapons state under the Nuclear
Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) that is both modernizing and expanding its nuclear force,
is also a potential concern. Concerns exist regarding Russia’s modernization of its large
nuclear force (including the world’s largest non-strategic nuclear arsenal). Concerns also
exist with respect to recent bellicose statements from Russian leaders directed at both the
United States and its allies and friends. Against this backdrop, both the United Kingdom
and France have recently initiated programs to revitalize their nuclear complexes and
maintain their nuclear forces well into the 21st century.
Early in his first term, President Bush called for a fundamental reorientation of the United
States’ strategic force posture. In recognition of the changed security environment the
President directed the Department of Defense (DoD) to develop a portfolio of strategic
capabilities–including missile defenses and advanced conventional strike assets–and to
size the nuclear force to meet 21st century requirements. The Nuclear Posture Review
(NPR) Report to Congress of December 2001 outlined a new policy framework to adapt
U.S. strategy, planning, and forces to a rapidly changing security environment. It
identified the roles of, and benefits provided by, a strategic triad of capabilities that
includes offensive capabilities (nuclear, non-nuclear and non-kinetic), defenses (both
active and passive), and a responsive infrastructure, all supported by improvements in
intelligence, planning, and command and control. Even as they are reduced in numbers,
nuclear weapons remain an essential and enduring element of this new strategic triad, and
underpin in a fundamental way these new capabilities.
Nuclear forces continue to represent the ultimate deterrent capability that supports U.S.
national security. Extended deterrence is key to U.S. alliances, both in the North Atlantic
Treaty Organization (NATO) and in Asia, assuring allies and friends of the credibility of
U.S. security commitments. U.S. nuclear weapons deter potential adversaries from the
threat or use of weapons of mass destruction against the United States, its deployed
forces, and its allies and friends. In the absence of this “nuclear umbrella,” some non-
nuclear allies might perceive a need to develop and deploy their own nuclear capability.

1
This paper has been redacted and edited from a classified paper with the same title, dated February 2008.

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While maintaining these security commitments, the United States has made significant
reductions in its nuclear arsenal. The United States has reduced its operationally
deployed strategic nuclear weapons (ODSNW) by about 50 percent over the past 15
years, and plans to reduce them to a level of 1,700 to 2,200 by 2012 as called for by the
Moscow Treaty. This represents a cut of about 80 percent from the highest levels during
the Cold War. The United States has reduced its non-strategic nuclear weapons by over
90 percent since 1991. To maintain a credible deterrent at these lower levels, the United
States requires nuclear forces that can adapt to changing needs, and a responsive
industrial infrastructure that can maintain existing capabilities and manufacture new or
replacement components as needed.
While the service lives of existing warhead types are being extended through
refurbishment, at present the United States does not have the ability to produce new
nuclear weapons. Successive efforts at extending the service life of the current inventory
of warheads, however, can decrease confidence in the nuclear stockpile as the warheads
deviate further from baseline designs which were originally validated using nuclear test
data. Furthermore, in the absence of a production capability for new warheads, the
United States retains a significant stockpile of non-deployed legacy weapons as a hedge
against technical failure of a warhead type and against adverse geopolitical or operational
developments that could require augmentation of the force. Even so, after careful
analysis, the United States has significantly reduced, and continues to reduce, its nuclear
stockpile. By 2012, the nuclear stockpile will be at its lowest level since the Eisenhower
era and at about one-quarter of its level at the end of the Cold War.
Maintaining a safe, secure, and reliable nuclear weapons stockpile and supporting
infrastructure is of vital importance to U.S. interests. Currently, the U.S. is pursuing an
alternative to the strategy of service life extensions for existing warheads. The long-term
goal is to rely more on a revived infrastructure and less on the non-deployed stockpile to
respond to unforeseen events. We seek replacement of existing warheads with Reliable
Replacement Warheads (RRW) of comparable capability that would have advanced
safety and security features, be less sensitive to manufacturing tolerances or to aging of
materials, and be certifiable without nuclear testing. The desired size of a responsive
nuclear infrastructure, measured in terms of the number of warheads it could produce or
refurbish per year, would depend on a number of key variables, but once RRWs are
deployed in significant numbers, many of the warheads now retained in the stockpile as a
hedge against reliability problems could be retired. Until a truly responsive nuclear
infrastructure is operational, however, the United States will need to retain an appropriate
inventory of non-deployed warheads to manage geopolitical, technical and operational
risks.

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 Does the United States Still Need Nuclear Weapons?
The world has changed a great deal in the last decade and a half. The Cold War stand-off
with the Soviet Union is over, and Russia is no longer an ideological adversary. The
United States has made historic reductions in its operationally deployed strategic nuclear
forces and plans to reduce them to a level of 1,700 to 2,200 by 2012, as called for by the
Moscow Treaty. The U.S. has also greatly reduced its non-strategic nuclear forces and
the total nuclear warhead stockpile. These significant nuclear reductions are fully
warranted in the new security environment.
The United States continues to maintain nuclear forces for two fundamental reasons.
First, the international security environment remains dangerous and unpredictable, and
has grown more complicated since the dissolution of the Soviet Union. Political
intentions can change overnight and technical surprises can be expected. Second, nuclear
weapons continue to play unique roles in supporting U.S. national security. Although not
suited for every 21st century challenge, nuclear weapons remain an essential element in
modern strategy.
To meet the needs of this more complex security environment, the 2001 Nuclear Posture
Review envisioned a more flexible New Triad that consists of: strike systems (nuclear,
non-nuclear, and non-kinetic); defenses (both active and passive); and a responsive
infrastructure; all supported by robust planning, intelligence and command and control
capabilities. New strategic capabilities, including long-range, precision conventional
strike and improved ballistic missile defenses, will be developed and fielded over the
coming decade. These future offensive and defensive capabilities will increase the
options available to national leaders to address a broader range of potential contingencies
and will mitigate risks associated with significant nuclear reductions.
Within this more flexible portfolio, nuclear weapons are less prominent, but the roles
they play continue to be vital. The policies of successive U.S. administrations have
shown a marked continuity in the purposes assigned to nuclear forces. U.S. nuclear
forces have served, and continue to serve, to: 1) deter acts of aggression involving
nuclear weapons or other weapons of mass destruction; 2) help deter, in concert with
general-purpose forces, major conventional attacks; and 3) support deterrence by holding
at risk key targets that cannot be threatened effectively by non-nuclear weapons. Because
of their immense destructive power, nuclear weapons, as recognized in the 2006 National
Security Strategy, deter in a way that simply cannot be duplicated by other weapons.
From the beginning, the U.S. nuclear arsenal has defended not only the United States and
its military forces, but also, and importantly, U.S. allies in Europe, Asia, and elsewhere.
The role nuclear forces play in the deterrence of attack against allies remains an essential
instrument of U.S. nonproliferation policy by significantly reducing the incentives of a
number of allied countries to acquire nuclear weapons of their own. Nuclear forces
continue to be a key element in U.S. alliances with other countries, for example, NATO
allies, Japan, South Korea, and Australia. In general, U.S. nuclear forces act as a

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counterbalance to the military capabilities of hostile states that endanger international
order.
The United States has made great strides in developing and deploying both very advanced
conventional weapon systems and missile defenses. However, nuclear weapons possess
unique attributes and make unique contributions to national security. They continue to
have an important deterrent effect on nations that have or that seek to acquire weapons of
mass destruction to offset U.S. conventional superiority. Against many targets, U.S.
nuclear weapons have a lethality that cannot be matched by non-nuclear munitions. Both
advanced conventional weapons and missile defenses can enhance deterrence, but the
ability to deter certain threats rests ultimately and fundamentally on the availability and
continued effectiveness of U.S. nuclear forces. The United States will need to maintain a
nuclear force, though smaller and less prominent than in the past, for the foreseeable future.

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 The Emerging Security Environment
Although trends in the security environment are uneven, we live in a complicated,
unpredictable, and dangerous world. Challenges that the United States may confront in
the decades ahead include:
• States of Concern: States that either have or seek weapons of mass destruction and
the means to deliver them and whose behavior is outside of international norms;
• Violent Extremists and Non-State Actors: Non-state organizations that are
motivated by goals and values at odds with our values, and that resort to violent
means to further their goals; some seek WMD and the means to deliver them; and
• Major Existing Nuclear States Outside of NATO: China and Russia are each
modernizing their nuclear capabilities; the future political direction of each remains
uncertain.
States of Concern
Ongoing efforts of certain nation-states to develop weapons of mass destruction and
delivery systems constitute a major threat to the United States, its deployed forces, and its
allies and friends. North Korea's nuclear test of October 2006 and its declared acquisition
of nuclear weapons, coupled with its development of long-range missiles, are of great
concern. North Korea, Iran, and others are also of particular concern because of their
past record transferring sensitive weapons technology to others.
The illicit pursuit of nuclear weapon programs by North Korea and Iran jeopardizes the
global nonproliferation regime and threatens regional stability. Both North Korea and
Iran have violated their nuclear safeguards obligations under the Nuclear
Nonproliferation Treaty regime. Both North Korea and Iran may possess WMD
capabilities other than nuclear weapons.
As a result of the Six-Party Talks, North Korea has provided a declaration of its nuclear
programs and has agreed to disable them. The United States welcomes such steps, but
North Korean declarations must be verified as accurate and their actions must lead to full
denuclearization. The United States seeks North Korea’s return to full compliance with
the NPT as a non-nuclear weapons state. Iran continues to pursue nuclear enrichment
capabilities in defiance of the United Nations Security Council. It appears that Iran is
keeping its nuclear weapons options open while not disclosing its past weapons work to
the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), and not allowing IAEA inspectors to
verify that those activities have stopped. Iran is also developing increasingly longer-
range missiles as witnessed by the recent launch of a Space Launch Vehicle/Intermediate
Range Ballistic Missile (IRBM), and procuring substantial numbers of short- and
medium-range ballistic missiles. Iran’s leaders have made numerous threats to destroy
regional friends of the United States, have made direct threats against the United States,

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and continue to pursue policies that are hostile to U.S. interests and jeopardize regional
security.
Other states are assessed to possess chemical and biological weapon development
programs and some have demonstrated a willingness to support terrorist groups and to
transfer weapons to those groups. Deterring the transfer of WMD to violent extremists
and their facilitators is one of the most demanding and highest priority goals for the
United States.
The United States must also be concerned about the prospect for shifts in the alignment
among states of concern. If significant changes occur, adjustments to U.S. deterrent
capabilities may be warranted.
Violent Extremists and Non-State Actors
The United States and its allies face a threat from violent extremists and other non-state
actors. Some of the most serious non-state actors receive support from states that seek to
use extremists and non-state actors as proxies. For example, the terrorist threat from
Hezbollah is backed by Iran and Syria.2 Some violent extremist groups seek WMD for
use in their acts of terrorism. U.S. policy is to hold state sponsors of terrorism
accountable for the actions of their proxies.
Major Existing Nuclear States Outside of NATO
China
The Department of Defense (DoD) 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) states:
“U.S. policy remains focused on encouraging China to play a constructive, peaceful role
in the Asia-Pacific region and to serve as a partner in addressing common security
challenges, including terrorism, proliferation, narcotics, and piracy.” The QDR also
notes, when looking forward, that “China has the greatest potential to compete militarily
with the United States and field disruptive technologies that could, over time, offset
traditional U.S. military advantages.”
China's long-term, comprehensive transformation of its military forces is improving its
capabilities for force projection and anti-access/area denial operations. China’s near-term
focus on preparing for contingencies in the Taiwan Strait, including the possibility of
U.S. intervention, is an important driver of its modernization. However, China's
expanding military capabilities also affect East Asian military balances. Improvements in
China's strategic capabilities have implications beyond the Asia-Pacific region.
China has had a fully functional and operating nuclear weapons infrastructure for over
thirty years and is the only major nuclear power that is expanding the size of its nuclear
arsenal. It is qualitatively and quantitatively modernizing its nuclear forces, developing
and deploying new classes of missiles, upgrading older missile systems, and developing
2
Testimony by the Director of National Intelligence to the Senate Armed Services Committee on February 27, 2007.

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methods to counter ballistic missile defenses. Improvements in China’s nuclear forces
complement advances in conventional strike capabilities, including the development of
advanced cruise missiles, medium-range ballistic missiles, and anti-ship ballistic
missiles. China’s January 2007 successful test of a direct-ascent, anti-satellite weapon
suggests it seeks to expand beyond traditional concepts of anti-access/area denial in the
land, air, and sea dimensions of the battlefield into space and cyber-space.
China has a variety of short-, medium- and long-range ballistic missiles deployed or in
development, suggesting a level of commitment and confidence in this particular area of
advanced military technology as well as an ability to deploy multiple ballistic missile
systems with overlapping missions. China’s nuclear-capable ballistic missiles include:
• the CSS-5 Mod 1 (DF-21) and CSS-5 Mod 2 (DF-21A) medium range ballistic
missiles (MRBMs);
• the CSS-5 based JL-1 submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBM);
• a developmental JL-2 SLBM to be deployed aboard a new class of SSBN, the Type
094;
• the CSS-2 (DF-3A) IRBM; and
• CSS-3 (DF-4), CSS-4 Mod 2 (DF-5A), CSS-10 Mod 1 (DF-31), and CSS-10 Mod 2
(DF-31A) intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs).
The United States continues to encourage China to increase openness and to be more
transparent about its motivations, decision-making, key conventional and nuclear
capabilities, and strategic intentions. The U.S.-China Dialogue on Nuclear Policy and
Strategy and the U.S.-China Security Dialogue are important mechanisms to build greater
understanding and reduce the risk of miscommunication and miscalculation.
Russia
The United States is engaging Russia in important areas of common interest (e.g.,
counter-terrorism, nuclear security and nonproliferation), and does not consider Russia to
be an adversary. However, despite diligent U.S. efforts to improve relations with
Moscow, Russia’s transition to a more democratic state with a less confrontational, more
cooperative foreign policy has seen recent setbacks. Greatly assisted by profits from its
oil and natural gas resources, Russia continues to modernize its strategic nuclear forces.
Russia’s current nuclear modernization includes:
• a new road-mobile and silo-based Topol-M (SS-27) ICBM;
• a new SS-27 derivative with a Multiple Independently-targetable Re-entry Vehicle
(MIRV) payload the Russians call the RS-24,
• a new Bulava (SS-30) SLBM;

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 • a new Borey-class Ballistic Missile Submarine (SSBN);
• a new long-range strategic nuclear cruise missile designated the KH-102;
• modernization of Blackjack (Tu-160) heavy bombers;
• increased training for nuclear operations in all military branches; and
• upgraded nuclear weapons storage sites.
In addition, and quite unlike the United States, Russia maintains a fully functional
nuclear weapons design, development, test and manufacturing infrastructure capable of
producing significant quantities of nuclear warheads per year.
For a variety of reasons, Russia has explicitly placed increased emphasis on nuclear
weapons in its national security policy and military doctrine, and has re-incorporated
theater nuclear options into its military planning.
Even as the United States and its allies work to engage Russia cooperatively, and to
promote greater transparency and predictability with respect to nuclear forces and other
military capabilities, considerable uncertainty remains about Russia’s future course.
Recent statements by former President Putin have highlighted Russia’s nuclear
modernization program and operational readiness (e.g., the resumption of Russian long-
range bomber patrols near U.S. and allied territories). Former President Putin’s
statements, together with Russia’s across-the-board modernization of its strategic
capabilities, increase concern regarding Russia’s intentions. Russia has also threatened to
target possible future U.S. ballistic missile defense sites in Eastern Europe. In light of
these uncertainties, maintaining a nuclear force second to none, consistent with the
Moscow Treaty, remains a prudent approach. For the same reasons, continuing U.S.
security commitments to NATO and other allies –including the commitment of U.S.
nuclear capabilities– remain vital.
Conclusions
Nothing in the developments highlighted above suggest that U.S. nuclear weapons are no
longer needed. Russia and China continue to attach great significance to their nuclear
forces and their modernization. Regional dynamics lead other nations, such as India and
Pakistan, to attach a similar significance to their nuclear forces. Nuclear programs in Iran
and North Korea and further proliferation of nuclear weapons and technology remain a
serious concern. Nuclear design knowledge has proliferated significantly over the last 60
years and cannot be reversed. These proliferation concerns were dramatically validated
by the discovery early this decade of the wide-reaching proliferation network run by A.Q.
Khan. The United States cannot afford to ignore these realities or the prospect that the
future may hold similar risks. These trends clearly indicate the continuing relevance of
nuclear weapons, both today and in the foreseeable future, and the need to maintain a
viable U.S. nuclear capability well into the 21st century.

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 Responses of U.S. Allies to the New Security Environment
Both the United Kingdom and France have each made sober assessments of the risks and
uncertainties in the new security environment, and each has reached similar conclusions
regarding these facts and trends. Both have made decisions to maintain their nuclear
forces and infrastructure well into this century to guard against the challenges ahead.
The United Kingdom (U.K.) is committed to retaining an independent nuclear deterrent,
as former Prime Minister Tony Blair said, “as an essential part of our insurance against
the uncertainties and risks of the future.”3 As a result of decisions taken by the U.K.
Government in late 2006, and endorsed by the U.K. Parliament in March 2007, the U.K.
will develop a new generation SSBN to replace the current Vanguard-class submarine
from the mid 2020s. The U.K. is also participating in the life extension program for the
U.S. Navy’s Trident II D-5 SLBM, and is undertaking a review of the optimum life of its
current warhead stockpile and analysis of the range of replacement options that might be
available. It has a program of investment in sustaining capabilities to ensure it can
maintain its existing warhead type for as long as necessary and develop a replacement
should that be required. These measures will enable the U.K. to sustain a nuclear
deterrent force well into the future.
France has also committed to maintaining a modern nuclear force. In 1996 former
French President Chirac announced a portfolio of reforms for a new defense strategy.
France is implementing these announced initiatives. Recently, President Sarkozy
reaffirmed in the French White Paper on Defense and National Security that “nuclear
deterrence remains an essential concept of national security. The sole purpose of the
nuclear deterrent is to prevent any state-originating aggression against the vital interests
of the nation wherever it may come from and in whatever shape or form.”4 In support of
this policy, France is committed to the modernization of its sea-based ballistic missile
force and nuclear-capable combat aircraft. France is also committed to sustaining its
nuclear infrastructure. France maintains a fully functional and active nuclear warhead
design and production infrastructure that supports a nuclear force comprised of SLBMs
and air-launched missiles. Currently, France is developing:
• a new Triomphant-class SSBN to be deployed in 2010;
• a new SLBM (M-51) to be deployed in 2010;
• a new air-to-ground missile (ASMPA) to be deployed in ~2009; and
• new warheads for both their SLBMs and air-to-ground missiles.5

3
The Future of the United Kingdom’s Nuclear Deterrence, HMSO: London, 2006, page 5.
4
The French White Paper on Defense and National Security, Presidence de la Republique: Paris, 2008, page 2.
5
France designs and fields two new nuclear warhead designs approximately every decade.

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 Sizing the U.S. Force: Political and Military Considerations
The U.S. nuclear force structure is sized in light of the current and future global security
environment and by the broad policy goals U.S. nuclear forces are expected to support.
Analysis of the factors described below resulted in the conclusion that a force of 1,700 to
2,200 operationally deployed strategic nuclear warheads is sufficient to meet U.S.
strategic requirements. The United States currently plans on achieving such a force by
2012, consistent with U.S. obligations under the Moscow Treaty of 2002.6 This
represents a reduction of about 80 percent from the highest levels of ODSNW during the
Cold War. The United States already has reduced its ODSNW by about 50 percent over
the past 15 years. In addition, the United States has reduced its non-strategic nuclear
weapons by 90 percent since 1991. Thus, while maintaining its security obligations, the
United States has also been at the forefront of meeting the obligations of Article VI of the
Nonproliferation Treaty.
The force sizing methodology used during the Cold War was based primarily on targeting
needs associated with the prospect of a strategic conflict with the Soviet Union. Today,
however, the criteria for force sizing are no longer based on the size of Russian forces
and the cumulative targeting requirements for nuclear strike plans. Instead, the size of
the U.S. nuclear force is now based on the ability of the operationally deployed force, the
force structure, and the supporting nuclear infrastructure to meet a spectrum of political
and military goals. These considerations reflect the view that the political effects of U.S.
strategic forces, particularly with respect to both central strategic deterrence and extended
deterrence, are key to the full range of requirements for these forces and that those
broader goals are not reflected fully by military targeting requirements alone.
Furthermore, significant changes in the global security environment can occur rapidly.
Today’s force posture includes land- and sea-based ballistic missiles and long-range
bombers to provide national leaders the means to respond in a timely manner to future,
and as yet unforeseen, adverse geopolitical, operational and technical developments.
Finally, contemporary force sizing is guided by the fact that the DoD infrastructure for
strategic forces and the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) nuclear
warhead production infrastructure, even if both are fully functional, may not be capable of
responding as rapidly as needed to some kinds of unforeseen operational or technical
problems, or to address adverse changes in the geopolitical environment. A responsive
infrastructure and a modern stockpile are needed to provide a cushion or hedge against
such contingencies.
Much of the current force sizing logic was developed during the 2001 Nuclear Posture
Review (NPR), and the logic remains valid and compelling. It is also important to
6
Periodic reviews are conducted to monitor both political and technical developments that could affect U.S. force
sizing and the pace and scale of U.S. nuclear reductions. This or future administrations could adjust planned U.S.
force levels.

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acknowledge that the NPR, in turn, built upon earlier concepts developed in the
administrations of Presidents William J. Clinton and George H.W. Bush. For example,
the START II Treaty (which never entered into force) pioneered the notion of planning
for a strategic nuclear force posture within a specified range (3,000 - 3,500 accountable
warheads), while the START III treaty proposed during the Clinton Administration aimed
at the goal of 2,000 - 2,500 warheads. In the 1994 Nuclear Posture Review, the Clinton
Administration also developed the “lead and hedge” strategy as a way to reduce the size
of the deployed strategic nuclear force while also ensuring that the United States would
be able to respond to future challenges that could be more stressing than estimated at that
time. As such, the United States would take a “lead” role in nuclear reductions, but
would “hedge” against adverse trends by retaining a significant number of non-deployed
nuclear warheads that could be redeployed, if warranted, and a force structure capable of
uploading and employing those warheads, if needed. The strategy the United States
follows today is an extension of the approach first adopted in the 1990s and a testament
to the continuing strength of these ideas.
Assurance, Dissuasion, Deterrence, and Defeat
U.S. nuclear forces support the defense goals of assuring allies and friends, dissuading
nations from military competition with the United States, deterring adversaries from
attacking the United States and its allies, and, if necessary, defeating those who attack us.
The United States seeks to:
• Assure allies that U.S. security commitments remain valid and that the U.S. force
posture is sufficient and appropriate for plausible scenarios of concern.
o U.S. extended nuclear deterrence commitments to allies have been essential to
the success of U.S. alliances. For example, the U.S. nuclear deterrent has been,
and remains, the cornerstone of NATO’s collective security. Allied participation
in NATO’s nuclear responsibilities and decision making have played a major
role in assuring NATO members of the reality of the U.S. commitment to the
common defense. In Asia, the U.S. nuclear commitment to the security of allies
and friends has also played a significant role in mutual defense efforts.
o Despite the best efforts of the U.S. and others, the proliferation of weapons of
mass destruction (WMD) continues. The United States must ensure that its allies
around the world continue to judge U.S. strategic capabilities to be credible and
sufficient to guarantee their security. In the absence of allied confidence in U.S.
capabilities and commitments, these states could feel compelled to acquire
nuclear weapons of their own. Thus, maintaining continued allied confidence in
the U.S. extended nuclear deterrent is an essential element of U.S. nuclear non-
proliferation policy.

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 o Assurance of allies also requires that U.S. nuclear forces are not perceived as
inferior or at an overall disadvantage when compared to the capabilities of other
nuclear powers. The maintenance of 1,700 to 2,200 operationally deployed U.S.
strategic nuclear warheads is an important part of this perception. Beyond its
strategic capabilities, the United States also assures allies and friends through its
effective conventional forces, missile defenses, and non-strategic nuclear forces
that can be forward deployed, as appropriate.
• Dissuade adversaries and potential adversaries from developing threatening
capabilities (including engaging in a nuclear arms competition with the United
States).
o This goal, which has endured since the 1960s, includes shaping military
competition in ways favorable to the United States that also complicate military
planning for potential opponents. The planned U.S. nuclear force in 2012 will
support dissuasion goals by retaining a sufficient margin over countries with
expanding nuclear arsenals to discourage their leaders from initiating a nuclear
arms competition, while encouraging them to pursue more modest and less
confrontational strategies.
• Dissuade any potential near-peers from military competition. Nuclear weapons
are important in dissuading any potential near-peer competitor from realizing
possible advantages from the acquisition of counterforce nuclear capabilities. The
1,700 to 2,200 ODSNW the United States is planning to deploy in 2012 provides a
sufficient capability such that the costs of a direct nuclear competition with the
United States would be very high.
o The U.S. must also consider the potential of a robust industrial base, and
growing economic power, to support the strategic objectives of a potential near-
peer competitor. Maintaining 1,700 to 2,200 U.S. ODSNW also provides
substantial warning and response time should any potential near-peer competitor
aggressively seek to achieve nuclear parity with, or superiority over, the United
States. U.S. leaders would have opportunity to respond with a combination of
diplomatic and force posture initiatives should it become necessary. Finally,
maintaining a credible deterrent assures U.S. allies that might otherwise develop
independent nuclear arsenals in response to a near-peer’s military modernization
and expansion.
o The United States seeks friendly constructive relations with all nations.
However, should a potential near-peer competitor rebuff U.S. efforts to develop
a constructive relationship, the United States could reverse the direction of its
nuclear reductions and reconstitute elements of its nuclear forces. Reversing the
reductions would take significant time, but for the mid-term, this would be
significantly less costly and take much less time than building new systems and
warheads.
- 12 -
 • Deter adversaries from aggression, especially deterring the use or threatened use of
nuclear weapons or other WMD against the United States, its deployed forces, allies
and friends. The U.S. nuclear force must be of sufficient size and possess a wide
range of capabilities to provide credible threat options to deter existing and future
WMD-armed adversaries. Strategic capabilities—the nuclear force, along with non-
nuclear offensive capabilities and defenses—need to provide a wide range of
offensive and defensive options for national leaders to respond effectively and
appropriately to any level of aggression directed against the United States, its allies
or friends.
Estimates of the deterrence and defeat requirement for WMD-armed adversaries
take into consideration several factors:
o The decades-old, highly integrated operational plan for strategic nuclear forces—the
Single Integrated Operations Plan (SIOP) —was replaced in 2003 with a plan that
provides smaller, more flexible targeting options.7
o Strategic nuclear warheads available on a day-to-day basis provide a spectrum of
targeting options for consideration during rapidly developing, high-stakes
contingencies. This force, much smaller than the 1,700 to 2,200 ODSNW, and
routinely deployed and responsive to orders only from the President, serves
immediate deterrence and defeat goals.
o However, should unexpected developments pose a more imminent threat, the
projected day-to-day alert force could be increased relatively quickly (a few weeks
to months) up to the baseline 1,700 to 2,200 ODSNW. This could entail bringing
bombers to an alert status or placing additional strategic submarines at sea. Such
actions could be needed in response to an unexpected contingency, e.g., the
emergence of a new WMD-armed adversary, or severe deterioration in a U.S. near-
peer relationship resulting in a return to hostile confrontation and nuclear threats.8
Responsive Capability
The United States must also have the means to respond to dramatic adverse developments
that can reduce the effectiveness of the U.S. nuclear arsenal. Therefore, the United States
requires a responsive industrial infrastructure to maintain existing capabilities and
manufacture new or replacement components, as needed. Until a truly responsive nuclear
infrastructure is operational, the United States will need to retain an appropriate inventory

7
The 2001 Nuclear Posture Review stated that “[t]he United States no longer plans, sizes or sustains its forces as
though Russia presented merely a smaller version of the threat posed by the former Soviet Union [but] shifts
planning for America’s strategic forces from the threat-based approach of the Cold War to a capabilities-based
approach.” p. ii.
8
The number and types of nuclear force capabilities needed to deter a specific adversary in a particular circumstance
may differ significantly from those the President might decide to employ to defeat that adversary. However, during
force sizing decisions for the NPR, DoD leaders judged the force sizing criteria for deterrence and defeat to be
comparable.

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of non-deployed warheads to manage geopolitical, technical and operational risks.
The United States must also retain sufficient force structure to enable the deployment of
additional warheads for the most stressing, plausible challenges ahead. Such stressing
challenges could include growing, resurgent or recidivist military powers. Significant
increases to respond to such developments would take a few years, at a minimum.
The goal of maintaining a strategic force structure that would be flexible enough to
support reconstitution to support U.S. assurance, dissuasion, deterrence, and defeat
objectives, even under stressing circumstances, helped establish the basic parameters for
U.S. force sizing. Even in light of the limited ability of the existing infrastructure to
replace nuclear offensive capabilities, specific adjustments to the strategic nuclear force
structure have been considered to be prudent:
• Some elements of the START-compliant force have been retired (e.g., all 50
Peacekeeper ICBMs and 50 Minuteman III ICBMs);
• Consistent with the increased emphasis on advanced non-nuclear strike capabilities,
some force elements have been reconfigured for conventional force roles (e.g., four
SSBNs were converted to guided missile submarines (SSGNs) and the entire B-1
bomber force has been dedicated exclusively to conventional missions); and
• Some elements of the nuclear force have been downloaded (i.e., deployed with
fewer warheads than they have the capability to carry) to configurations that are
more appropriate for our 21st century strategy.
As improvements to the infrastructure for strategic forces are realized, increased reliance
will be placed on a more responsive infrastructure, and decreased reliance on maintaining
a reserve of non-deployed warheads.
Prior to the 2001 Nuclear Posture Review, force sizing considerations were based on
target defeat criteria with the objective of rendering a nuclear-armed adversary incapable
of prosecuting conflict, and terminating any conflict on terms favorable to the United
States. U.S. nuclear forces were sized to defeat all credible nuclear-armed adversary
targets, and the United States retained a small reserve to ensure sufficient capability to
deter further aggression in any post-exchange, post-conflict environment. Weapons were
dedicated to specific targets, and the requirements for target defeat did not change
dramatically year-to-year. As a result, the overall U.S. nuclear force posture
accommodated incremental change in the target base, because a fully-functioning nuclear
weapons infrastructure and the nuclear force structure, enabled the United States adjust to
change.
The Nuclear Posture Review of 2001 adopted the defense policy goals of Assurance,
Dissuasion, Deterrence and Defeat articulated in the Quadrennial Defense Review of
2001, and transitioned planning from a threat-based calculus for force sizing to a
capabilities-based approach. The NPR’s decision to reduce the strategic nuclear force

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posture to between 1,700 and 2,200 ODSNW by 2012 was based on a number of factors,
including the fact that Russia no longer presented an immediate threat. To that end, the
goal of a new strategic framework with Russia held significant consequences for the
required size and character of U.S. nuclear forces. Achieving a more cooperative, less
confrontational U.S.-Russian relationship was key to adjusting the size of the U.S.
nuclear force.
In addition, the 2001 Nuclear Posture Review made distinctions among the contingencies
for which the United States must be prepared. These contingencies were categorized as
immediate, potential, or unexpected. The resultant force size of 1,700 to 2,200 ODSNW
was judged to be sufficient to meet the requirements of assuring allies and dissuading
potential competitors. These factors have proven more determinant of overall force size
than the narrow, Cold War-era criterion of target defeat.

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 Managing Risk and the U.S. Nuclear Posture
To help manage geopolitical, operational9, and technical risks, the United States relies on
three inter-related aspects of its nuclear posture: 1) the composition of the operationally
deployed nuclear delivery systems and their capacity to deliver nuclear weapons; 2) the
size, yield, and mix of the nuclear stockpile that supports the operational force; and 3) the
ability of the supporting infrastructure to maintain, produce, and repair nuclear weapon
delivery systems and warheads. The following sections discuss how each aspect of the
U.S. nuclear posture contributes to the overall management of risk.
Baseline: The Planned Strategic Nuclear Force for 2012
The United States maintains a triad of strategic nuclear forces that includes land-based
ICBMs, SSBNs armed with SLBMs, and long-range bombers able to deliver both stand-
off cruise missiles and gravity bombs. (The United States also maintains a small non-
strategic nuclear force, consisting of dual-capable aircraft deployed in NATO countries,
and some non-deployed, nuclear-armed sea-launched cruise missiles.) Each leg of the
triad brings unique capabilities. Together, the legs of the nuclear triad combine to
provide operational flexibility and help ensure that an adversary cannot pose a threat that
could potentially negate the entire force.
The planned composition of the U.S. strategic nuclear force in 2012 is:10
• 450 Minuteman III ICBMs;
• 14 Ohio class SSBNs; and
• 20 B-2 and 56 B-52 bombers
This force structure allows the deployment of 1,700 to 2,200 warheads, provides
flexibility to adjust the loading of warheads among the three legs of the triad in response
to technical concerns or operational needs, and provides sufficient capacity to increase
the number of deployed warheads in response to adverse geopolitical developments.
On a day-to-day basis, some portion of the 1,700 to 2,200 ODSNW will be on alert and
readily available. The number of U.S. strategic nuclear warheads maintained on day-to-
day alert has decreased dramatically in the post-Cold War era. In 1987, the United States
had many thousands of strategic nuclear warheads on alert; today’s alert force is much
reduced and projected to be even less in 2012.

9
Operational risks are threats to the survivability or effectiveness of U.S. nuclear forces stemming from actions by
potential adversaries.
10
The Administration decided in 2001 to withdraw four SSBNs from strategic nuclear service for modification as
cruise missile and special-forces-capable submarines. B-1 bombers were also removed from the nuclear role in
2001. All 50 Peacekeeper ICBMs were fully retired by September of 2006. Following the 2006 Quadrennial
Defense Review, the Department of Defense announced plans to retire an additional 50 Minuteman III ICBMs,
retire all Advanced Cruise Missiles (ACM), and reduce the number of Air Launched Cruise Missiles (ALCMs).

- 16 -
For the near-term, the planned strategic nuclear force structure provides the diversity,
survivability, and flexibility to adapt to a range of plausible, but unforeseeable future
needs. A pressing concern is the aging of the strategic nuclear force. The Minuteman III
ICBM force is to be life-extended to 2030, and the United States needs to develop a
follow-on to its current Trident SSBN, and a next generation bomber.
The Nuclear Warhead Stockpile
The current stockpile of nuclear warheads includes sufficient quantities of each warhead
type to support deployed nuclear forces. Additionally, because the United States does not
have the ability to produce new warheads, a pool of non-deployed warheads is retained to
be used in cases of reliability failures and as a hedge against adverse political
developments.
In 2004, DoD and NNSA jointly conducted a study of nuclear stockpile needs to support
the planned, operationally-deployed force. The study considered the need for deployed
warheads (both strategic and non-strategic), spares for logistics and maintenance,
warheads that would be destroyed during annual surveillance and quality assurance
inspections, and a pool of non-deployed warheads that could be used as either reliability
replacements or to augment the planned deployed force. The study recommended a
reduction in the nuclear stockpile of over 40 percent by 2012. The President approved
the findings and directed the reductions. Subsequently, the stockpile analysis has been
refined and the planned 2012 stockpile size reduced further to the lowest total since the
Eisenhower Administration, and a quarter of its level at the end of the Cold War.
Concerns with the Stockpile
The stockpile stewardship program, initiated in the mid-1990s, has largely been
successful. At present, our judgment is that the nuclear warhead stockpile remains safe,
secure, and reliable.11 For the near-term, the administration continues to have confidence
that warhead life extension programs for W76 warheads for Trident II missiles, and for
B61 gravity bombs, are needed and are wise investments to sustain existing nuclear
capabilities. However, the current path for sustaining the warhead stockpile—successive
refurbishments of existing Cold War warheads designed with small margins of error—
may be unsustainable in the future. Specifically, the directors of the nation’s nuclear
weapons laboratories have expressed concern about the ability to ensure confidence in the
reliability of the legacy stockpile over the long term, without nuclear testing.
Successive efforts at extending the service life of the current inventory of warheads will
drive the warhead configurations further away from the original design baseline that was
validated using underground nuclear test data. Repeated refurbishments will accrue
technical changes that, over time, might inadvertently undermine reliability and

11
For example, see the written statement of Thomas P. D’Agostino, then acting Under Secretary for Nuclear
Security and Administrator, NNSA, before the House Armed Services Subcommittee on Strategic Forces, March 20,
2007.

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performance. The skills, materials, processes, and technologies needed to refurbish and
maintain these older warhead designs are also increasingly difficult to sustain or acquire.
Some of the materials employed in these older warheads are extremely hazardous.
Moreover, it is difficult to incorporate modern safety and security features into Cold War-
era weapon designs.
As a consequence, the stockpile stewardship program is expanding its range of
component and material testing and analysis, and is likely to identify more areas of
concern. However, without nuclear testing, at some time in the future the United States
may be unable to confirm the effect of the accumulation of changes to tested warhead
configurations. As the United States continues to observe a moratorium on underground
nuclear testing, certification of the safety, surety, and reliability of the existing stockpile
of weapons (with their narrow performance margins) will become increasingly difficult.
In the near-term, the United States has no choice but to continue to extend the life of
these legacy warheads.
However, the Departments of Defense and Energy are pursuing an alternative to this
strategy of indefinite life extension; namely, the gradual replacement of existing
warheads with warheads of comparable capability that are less sensitive to manufacturing
tolerances or to aging of materials. The generic concept is often referred to as the
Reliable Replacement Warhead (RRW). The RRW concept promises other attractive
benefits such as improved safety and security, production processes that are less complex,
elimination of many hazardous materials in existing warheads, and production of less
hazardous waste.12 The directors of the nuclear weapons laboratories believe that modern
scientific tools developed for the stockpile stewardship program, including advanced
computer modeling and experimental facilities, will enable design and certification of the
RRW without nuclear testing.
In the longer term, RRW will be key to sustaining confidence in the U.S. nuclear
stockpile. Assuring allies and convincing adversaries of the safety, security, and
reliability of U.S. nuclear forces will, in turn, contribute to the full range of political and
military benefits of the U.S. nuclear deterrent. Allies with continued confidence in U.S.
extended deterrence will have less motivation to develop nuclear weapons of their own.
Moreover, once the RRW is deployed in significant numbers as replacements for low-
margin-of-error legacy warheads, some or all of the reserve warheads retained in the
stockpile for reliability purposes can be retired and dismantled without incurring
significant risk.

12
It has become clear that the security threat to nuclear warheads has fundamentally changed. The security features
in today’s stockpile are commensurate with the technologies available during the Cold War, and with the threats of
that time. Modern safety and security features, mandated today, cannot be fully incorporated through retrofits to the
legacy stockpile. Modern safety and security technology is best incorporated into the stockpile during the design
phase, when there is flexibility in accommodating new features.

- 18 -
The Nuclear Warhead Infrastructure
During the Cold War, the U.S. nuclear weapons infrastructure, comprising design and
engineering laboratories, as well as testing and production facilities, played an important
role in risk management. During this period the United States did not maintain a
significant inventory of non-deployed warheads as reliability back-ups or for force
augmentation; instead, the United States relied on a large operationally deployed force
and an active nuclear weapons infrastructure to meet emerging needs in a timely manner.
When a serious technical problem did occur with a given warhead, this infrastructure had
sufficient capacity to respond rapidly and implement solutions so that a reliable, certified
nuclear force could be maintained. Accordingly, existing U.S. nuclear weapons were
designed for a short service life of approximately 10-15 years, and the nuclear
infrastructure routinely replaced warheads with new designs to meet emerging
requirements.13
During the late 1980s and early 1990s, a series of events combined to change
fundamentally how the United States manages the risks associated with maintaining its
nuclear force. These events included the shut down and dismantlement of the nation’s
nuclear weapon “pit” fabrication plant at Rocky Flats, Colorado in 1989; two Presidential
Nuclear Initiatives issued by President George H. W. Bush in 1991 and 1992, which
halted all nuclear weapon development and production then underway; and President
Clinton’s announcement in 1993 of an indefinite moratorium on nuclear testing.
Consequently, the United States is now the only nuclear weapons state party to the NPT
that does not have the capability to produce a new nuclear warhead. The United States
has not designed a new nuclear warhead since the 1980s and has not built a new warhead
since the early 1990s. As a result, the nuclear weapons infrastructure has atrophied and
existing U.S. nuclear weapons ― most of which were designed 20 to 30 years ago ― are
being maintained well beyond the service life for which they were designed. Critical
personnel, with experience in the design and testing of nuclear weapons, are also aging
and retiring, and in the absence of a viable nuclear infrastructure, their expertise cannot
be replaced. Moreover, as new design efforts are further delayed, the ability and
availability of experienced designers and engineers to mentor the next generation will
decrease over time.
The hedging strategy adopted by the United States for mitigating geopolitical and
technical risks by retaining a significant number of reserve warheads is a direct result of
the events of the 1980s and early 1990s and the atrophy of the nuclear infrastructure.
During this same period the need to manage risk was also considered in other initiatives.
For example, the Stockpile Stewardship Program (initially Science-based Stockpile
Stewardship) was developed to mitigate the risks associated with the moratorium on
13
Even with active design, engineering, and production efforts in operation, however, strategic reserves of critical
materials, such as tritium, plutonium, and highly enriched uranium, were maintained in case the material production
portion of the infrastructure was off-line for a time.

- 19 -
nuclear testing, while life extension programs were developed to sustain existing nuclear
forces absent a fully operational nuclear infrastructure.
In the long-term, the goal is for the United States to rely more on a revived nuclear
infrastructure to respond to unforeseen events, and less on reserve warheads in the
stockpile. However, until there is confidence in the infrastructure’s demonstrated
capability to respond to unexpected developments by producing nuclear weapon
components in sufficient quantities, especially plutonium pits, the United States will need
to retain more reserve warheads than otherwise would be desired as a hedge against
technical problems or adverse geopolitical changes.
The RRW program will be a key enabler for a more responsive nuclear infrastructure,
and will help train a new generation of U.S. experts capable of sustaining nuclear
deterrent forces. Key milestones in developing the RRW and a responsive infrastructure
include:
• Completion of the RRW Phase 2/2A Design Definition and Cost Study. Completion
of this study will provide estimates of the costs to develop, produce, and deploy
replacement warheads. These estimates will inform the decision whether or not to
seek Congressional authorization and funding to begin RRW engineering
development and to refine future plans.
• Completion and approval by DoD/NNSA of an RRW certification plan to achieve
RRW safety and reliability goals without nuclear testing.
• Achievement of an interim production capacity of 30-50 pits per year at TA-55, the
pit production area at Los Alamos National Laboratory.
• Demonstration that RRW can be certified without underground nuclear testing.
Once the first RRW is produced, weapons designers and engineers will confirm,
as part of the certification process, that the RRW meets the original design goals.
• Achievement/demonstration of expanded pit production of 50-80 pits per year.
This would require the construction of a new Chemistry and Metallurgy
Research-Replacement (CMRR) Nuclear Facility.
With a viable design, congressional approval, and appropriate funding, these steps could
be completed in about ten years. Accomplishing these milestones would result in
increased levels of confidence as the United States proceeds with stockpile and
infrastructure transformation. In combination, these milestones represent a vital first step
in this transformation. Sustained production of RRW and several years of experience
with RRW in the stockpile will permit characterization of any inadvertent defects
introduced during development and production. This will help support subsequent
decisions to curtail some warhead life extension programs and move forward with a
warhead replacement strategy.

- 20 -
Finally, an issue of critical importance for the 21st century is the production capacity
needed for a responsive nuclear weapons infrastructure, i.e., the rate at which it can
refurbish existing warheads or produce replacement warheads. The time required to
replace the existing stockpile depends critically on the overall size of the stockpile, the
viability of pit reuse options, and the rate at which new plutonium pits can be produced.
Currently, the United States has a very small pit production capacity (about ten pits per
year) at Los Alamos. A variety of pit production alternatives have been evaluated as part
of the planning for transforming the nuclear weapons complex infrastructure. The best
alternative, for all potential pit production capacities, is to increase the existing
production facilities at Los Alamos to its estimated maximum capacity of 50-80 pits per
year.
Should a capacity greater than 50-80 pits per year be required, this could be achieved by
either an upgrade to the CMRR or an addition of a new manufacturing annex at TA-55.14
Several key factors must be considered when judging the desired production capacity of
the nuclear weapons infrastructure:
• First, depending on warhead type, the best estimate of minimum pit life is 85-100
years. Although this exceeds previous estimates, degradation from plutonium aging
still introduces uncertainty in overall system performance, particularly for systems
with tighter margins. As the stockpile continues to age, the United States must plan
to replace considerable numbers of pits in stockpiled weapons.
• Second, at significantly smaller stockpile levels than today, the U.S. must anticipate
that an adverse change in the geopolitical threat environment, or a technical problem
or development, could require manufacture of additional warheads on a relatively
rapid timescale.
• Third, if a decision is made to field RRW, the U.S. will require an expanded pit
production capacity to introduce sufficient numbers of these warheads into the
stockpile.
• Finally, production rates correlate directly to the retirement of legacy warheads.

14
By way of comparison, U.S. planned pit production capacity is very modest – much more than a factor of ten
below Cold War levels when the U.S. was producing thousands of warheads.

- 21 -
This relationship, and the timelines required to replace current warheads in the stockpile,
can be seen below.15 In the case of a total stockpile of 3,500 warheads the replacement
process would take well over half a century at a rate of 80 pits per year.

Calendar Year (CY) in Which Stockpile Replacement Would Be Completed

Pits per Year: 50 80 100 125 150
Total Stockpile Size
4,500 CY2114 CY2080 CY2069 CY2060 CY2054
3,500 CY2092 CY2066 CY2058 CY2051 CY2047
2,500 CY2070 CY2052 CY2047 CY2042 CY2039

Such timelines suggest that a flexible infrastructure capable of higher production rates
could help meet a requirement to respond in a timely way to stressing developments in
the international security environment. At the same time, such an infrastructure could
provide the benefits of an RRW—safety, surety, and reliability without underground
testing—much earlier than would otherwise be the case, even with smaller stockpiles
than currently planned. Near-term planning for 50-80 pits-per-year capacity will be
executed in a way that does not preclude further expansion if desired in the future.
Changes to military requirements, stockpile size, and risk factors may ultimately lead to a
revised rate.
Many questions regarding the future nuclear stockpile and nuclear force cannot be
answered with precision today. The answers will depend on knowledge gained by further
work on programs such as RRW, by efforts to modernize the nuclear warhead
infrastructure, and by closely watching emerging trends around the world.

15
The calculations assume the following:
• Based on starting production in 2008
• Facilities do not operate at 100 percent efficiency – down time must be scheduled for training, equipment
maintenance, and periodic reconfiguration;
• The existing pit manufacturing facility at Los Alamos gradually increases the production rate until its design
goal is reached;
• A new facility immediately begins to operate at its design capacity (at 90 percent efficiency) in the future (when
production at the existing facility would be phased out).

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 Conclusions
The United States is making historic reductions in its deployed nuclear forces and its
nuclear stockpile. The resulting nuclear force, along with a portfolio of advanced
conventional offensive and defensive strategic capabilities, will support the goals of
assurance, dissuasion, and deterrence, and allow the United States to respond decisively
against aggression should deterrence fail.
The future security environment is characterized by a broad range of uncertainties; some
current trends are not favorable. The future direction that states may take, including
some established nuclear powers with robust nuclear force modernization programs,
could adversely affect U.S. security and that of U.S. allies and friends. The United States
seeks to assure its allies and friends that the U.S. nuclear deterrent continues to serve as
the ultimate guarantor of their security, obviating any need for them to develop nuclear
weapons of their own. Credible U.S. nuclear capabilities and the security commitment to
allies remain an indispensable part of U.S. efforts to limit nuclear proliferation.
Maintaining a credible nuclear force for the nation will require partnership between the
Executive Branch and the Congress; this partnership will be no less critical in the future
than in the past. Over the next two decades, Congress and the American people will be
asked to consider initiatives that will help determine how fast and how far the United
States can go in transforming its strategic capabilities and nuclear infrastructure to
manage the risks and challenges of the 21st century.

- 23 -
 Annex I
Stockpile Planning through 2012
Although the United States would be permitted to deploy up to 2,200 ODSNW in 2012
under the Moscow Treaty, no decisions have been made about the number or mix of
specific warheads to be fielded in 2012. Factors bearing on these decisions will be
addressed in periodic reviews of future geopolitical trends, the health of the U.S. nuclear
weapons stockpile, and progress towards fielding the New Triad and restoring a
responsive nuclear weapons infrastructure.
Although the United States will reduce its ODSNW to 1,700 to 2,200, this will not reduce
the total stockpile to 1,700 to 2,200 warheads. The operationally deployed force of 1,700
to 2,200 strategic warheads is not the total size of the nuclear stockpile. Additional
warheads will be needed for routine maintenance of the stockpile including logistics
spares and to replace those warheads that are eliminated during destructive surveillance
testing—the so-called Quality Assurance Reliability Test (QART) units. Further, a
reduced number of warheads for U.S. non-strategic nuclear forces (already reduced from
Cold War levels) will be retained, among other reasons, to meet commitments to allies.
In addition, some warheads will be retained for prudent risk management to mitigate
geopolitical and technical risks. Mitigating geopolitical risk will require that sufficient
numbers of non-deployed warheads be retained to augment the operationally deployed
force should world events require a more robust deterrence posture.
As the stockpile ages and becomes both smaller and less diverse in terms of the number
of warhead types that are deployed, there is inevitably less flexibility to adjust for
technical failures that could arise. Any concerns that develop about stockpile safety and
reliability become even more pressing. Mitigating technical risk, therefore, will cause us
in the near term to retain additional warheads, over and above the operationally deployed
force, for reliability replacement, and also to seek to preserve diversity of warhead types
in the overall stockpile.
The capability and credibility of the nation’s deterrent is particularly sensitive to
technical problems that could render a warhead unacceptable. This problem has been a
primary impetus for the RRW program and highlights the urgency of getting on with the
task of restoring a responsive and capable nuclear weapons infrastructure. To a certain
extent, the U.S. currently hedges against potential problems by retaining a sufficiently
large number of warheads in reserve.