R qt2403f
R qt2403f
1
This is the first feature in a series to showcase the BIS international banking and financial statistics
and their uses. We thank Iñaki Aldasoro, Doug Araujo, Stefan Avdjiev, Claudio Borio, Gaston Gelos,
Branimir Gruić, Bryan Hardy, Benoit Mojon, Andreas Schrimpf, and Hyun Song Shin for their helpful
comments, and Swapan-Kumar Pradhan for excellent research assistance. The views expressed are
those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect those of the Bank for International Settlements.
The nationality view has a long history in BIS banking statistics. The expansion of
international banking activity in financial centres in the 1970s led central banks and
regulators to ask banks to consolidate offshore positions with those of their head
offices. Consolidated reporting also became best practice in G10 countries and forms
the basis of the Basel Framework for regulating internationally active banks. These
efforts led to enhancements to the BIS international banking statistics (IBS), which for
decades have had the dimensions needed for both a residence and nationality view
(in contrast to other benchmark statistical collections used in international finance).
This feature is a primer on how BIS statistics can be used to understand topics in
international finance from both a residence and nationality perspective. Moving from
residence (entities in Switzerland) to nationality (Swiss entities anywhere in the world)
fundamentally alters the interpretation of international statistics. The difference in the
respective financial positions can be large: a shift to nationality makes financial
centres “disappear“ as assets (and liabilities) are reallocated to the countries where
the parent companies that own (owe) them are headquartered. This in turn reveals
just how concentrated international finance is in large multinational lenders and
borrowers from a handful of countries. A shift in their globally consolidated balance
sheets has implications far beyond their home country.
The nationality view sheds new light on many topics of policy interest. It provides
debt measures that are better aligned with what national issuers ultimately owe. The
nationality view also reveals who drives changes in cross-border banking. For
example, financial retrenchment in the wake of the Great Financial Crisis (GFC) of
2007–09 was seen by some as broad-based deglobalisation but in fact was largely
driven by European banks scaling back their foreign operations. Lastly, measures of
countries’ “financial openness” that account for multinational banking show most
countries to be more open than previously thought.
The rest of this feature is organised as follows. The first section covers definitions
and concepts that distinguish the residence view from the nationality view. The
second compares how much, and for which countries, measures of international
assets and liabilities differ under these two views, using BIS statistics and vendor data.
The third section describes three examples where the nationality view provides new
insights: foreign currency debt, the post-GFC retrenchment in global banking and the
financial openness of countries. The final section concludes.
200 20
100 10
0 0
–100 –10
–200 –20
–300 –30
2002 2007 2012 2017 2022 2002 2007 2012 2017 2022
Total US JP Deficit countries: Surplus countries:
Cross-border financial centres GB CN US IN JP DE
ES Others CN Others
1
See technical annex for details.
2
All institutional units are allocated to one of five sectors: non-financial corporations, financial
corporations, general governments, households and non-profit institutions. Each institutional unit is
resident in only one economic territory.
Box A
Statistics in international finance differ in how they link financial positions to individual countries. This box
provides a simple framework for understanding the country dimensions in international data and classifies
benchmark statistics accordingly.
The framework is based on two economic units that transact with each other, one as a lender and one as a
borrower (Graph A1). The top two nodes relate to the residence view; they identify the country in which the
lender and borrower reside. The arrow (l → c) represents flows or positions between them. The key principle in
the residence view is that financial positions of all units resident in the same country are aggregated, regardless
of whether these units are controlled by, or otherwise connected to, parent entities located in other countries.
The bottom two nodes in Graph A1 relate to a nationality view. While nationality can be defined in various
ways, the relevant criterion in international finance is often the location where corporate decision-making and
control resides. The lender and borrower units in this case can be interpreted as consolidated corporate groups,
each assigned the nationality of the country of their headquarters. The key principle in the nationality view is
that the financial positions of all units controlled by the same headquarters are aggregated along the perimeter
of their consolidated balance sheet, even if the units that comprise the group reside in different countries.
The residence and nationality views both have merit; the appropriate choice depends on the analytical
question. To understand where funds are sourced and used, and how they relate to economic activity in
particular countries, the geography of capital flows provided by the residence view (l → c) is most natural. By
contrast, a consolidated view of the lenders’ exposures to a particular country (n → c) is needed if the goal is to
monitor the exposure to risks incurred there: country risk is the risk that borrowers do not fulfil their obligations
for country-specific reasons beyond the counterparty’s control; transfer risk stems more narrowly from policy
measures such as capital controls, payment moratoriums and limitations on convertibility. Supervisory
evaluation of counterparty credit risk between two entities in turn requires consolidating the borrower side too
(n → u) to account for parent company guarantees and other credit risk mitigants.
SNA = system of national accounts; BoP/IIP = balance of payments/international investment position; LBS/R and LBS/N = locational banking
statistics by residence and by nationality; CBS = consolidated banking statistics; CPIS = IMF Coordinated Portfolio Investment Survey; CDIS =
IMF Coordinated Direct Investment Survey; Supervisory data = bank supervisory data; IDS = international debt securities; Vendor data = eg
syndicated loans (Dealogic).
1
The nodes (n, l, c, u) represent lenders (left) and borrowers (right) on the basis of residence (top) or nationality (bottom). The arrows and
text in large font describe how these country dimensions relate to each other; the small font lists data sets related to the nodes and arrows.
How do benchmark data sets in international finance relate to the nodes and arrows in Graph A1? The small
font lists data sets next to the nodes and arrows that they relate to. The SNA and BoP/IIP are compiled on a
residence basis and cover the financial positions (assets and liabilities) of resident units. These statistics link units
directly to economic activity in the same country and abroad, but without information about the allocation of
their external positions across counterparty countries. These data sets are thus listed (in grey) next to the upper
nodes in Graph A1 and not next to arrows. The BIS IDS are similarly unilateral in that they track only bond
liabilities without information about lenders (bond holders). However, the IDS can be organised by both
borrower residence and borrower nationality and thus are listed near nodes c and u.
Bilateral data sets, ie those that capture information about both lender and borrower units, link two nodes
in Graph A1 and are thus listed next to arrows. The CPIS and CDIS are collected on a residence basis and track
cross-border positions with counterparties in specific countries (l → c). By contrast, the BIS CBS consolidate
positions on the lender side (n) to track banks’ claims on borrowers resident in particular countries (n → c). The
BIS LBS can be organised by both residence (LBS/R) and nationality (LBS/N) and thus are listed next to both the
(l → c) and (n → c) arrows.
Few bilateral data sets consolidate on both the lender and borrower sides. This is the value of non-public
supervisory data (eg that compiled in the BIS International Data Hub) used for monitoring counterparty credit
risk exposures and funding dependencies. Some vendor data, eg syndicated loans from Dealogic, can also be
consolidated by lender and borrower nationality, but the identity of lenders is typically lost once loans are traded
in the secondary market. Full consolidation is also possible, in principle, in transaction-level data in trade
repositories covering derivatives, repos and other financial instruments, although data aggregation remains a
challenge (IFC (2017, 2018)).
GB JP US CH IT BE DK FI GR CN KR MO SA TR IN PH CL HK SG IE JE BH PA CY
FR DE CA ES AU SE AT NO PT TW RU BR MY ZA MX ID NL LU KY GG BS IM BM
National banks onshore2 Foreign banks onshore3 National banks in all LBS countries4
5
All banks onshore, without split
1
See technical annex for details. 2 Banks headquartered and located in the country shown on the x-axis. 3 Banks located in the country
on the x-axis but headquartered elsewhere. 4 Banks headquartered in the country on the x-axis; positions booked by offices in LBS reporting
countries. 5 All banks located in the country shown on the x-axis (split is masked).
3
Banking is reflected in several functional categories of the IIP. Loans and deposits are recorded in
“other investment”. This category makes up a greater share in economies where banks have a more
significant role. It accounted for 40% or more of external liabilities for 100 economies, with only 16
of these being advanced economies.
4
Graph 2 shows bank sector claims; the IBS afford a similar view of bank sector liabilities.
US DE CA ES SE AT FI GR CN ID CL BR PH ZA TW KY IE HK SG BH BS IM
GB FR IT AU JP BE DK MX KR TR IN RU MY MO NL LU BM PA CY GG JE
Syndicated loans
D. Advanced economies E. Emerging market economies F. Cross-border financial centres
Lhs Rhs Lhs Rhs
15 2.0 1.5 0.60 1.0
US JP FR AU IT CH BE FI PT CN BR ID TW TR CL PH NL LU IE BM PA BH BS
GB CA DE ES SE NO DK GR AT IN MX RU KR ZA MY MO KY HK SG JE GG IM CY
The first example, which follows directly from the discussion above, shows that several
countries have incurred more foreign currency debt than is evident in residence-
based statistics. This is not a new point. Gruić and Wooldridge (2012), McCauley et al
(2015) and Aldasoro et al (2021) examined the debt of non-bank borrowers in several
large EMEs and found that the offshore issuance of corporate bonds significantly
increased debt amounts in several cases. Coppola et al (2021) conduct a systematic
reallocation of corporate bonds to the ultimate obligors, redrawing the global map
of bond obligations.
BIS statistics go a long way towards providing a nationality-based view of
countries’ foreign currency debt. The BIS global liquidity indicators (GLIs) provide
estimates of non-banks’ US dollar-, euro- and Japanese yen-denominated debt on a
residence basis, shown as black dots in Graph 4.5 The stacked bars show estimated
amounts on a nationality basis, constructed using the IDS and syndicated loans to
reallocate obligations to the country of the ultimate obligor.6
Some countries owe more foreign currency debt on a nationality basis when debt
incurred by offshore affiliates is taken into account. Among advanced economies,
Japanese non-banks have considerably larger dollar liabilities than the residence-
based measure indicates (Graph 4.A). This is mainly because of syndicated loans
obtained by offshore affiliates of Japanese companies (contained in the red bar).
Similarly, German non-banks’ nationality-based measure is also larger, due to both
bond issuance by and loans to corporate affiliates offshore. By contrast, for some
countries, the nationality debt measure is actually lower than the residence measure.
This is most obvious for Luxembourg, the Netherlands and Ireland, which host foreign
affiliates that tap international debt markets (and which were treated as cross-border
financial centres in Graphs 2 and 3).
5
The GLIs are compiled by adding cross-border and local loans to non-banks (from the IBS) to
outstanding international bonds (in those currencies) issued by resident non-banks (from the IDS).
The figures in Graph 4 include debt denominated in a foreign currency (eg euro-denominated debt
is excluded in the figures for euro area countries).
6
The adjustment of the residence-based loan portion of the GLI is done using syndicated loans, for
which the residence and nationality of the borrower is available. However, not all loans are syndicated;
no adjustment is made for non-syndicated loans.
Sources: Dealogic; Euroclear; LSEG; Xtrakter Ltd; BIS global liquidity indicators (GLIs); BIS locational banking statistics; authors’ calculations.
Deglobalisation in banking?
Consider next the evolution of international banking in the aftermath of the GFC.
Some observers asserted that global finance had passed its high-water mark and that
financial deglobalisation had begun.7 The decline in cross-border banking positions
from most major banking locations seemed to confirm this.
Viewing this through the lens of consolidated balance sheets reveals the banking
systems driving these changes. McGuire and von Peter (2009), IMF (2015) and
McCauley et al (2019) show that rather than being a general shift, the retreat of global
banking was driven by a few banking systems. European banks cut their global
operations as they deleveraged their unsustainably risky balance sheets (Graph 5.A).
By contrast, US, Canadian, Japanese, Australian and other banking systems
maintained or continued to grow their foreign claims (Graph 5.B). These patterns do
not come to light as forcefully in the residence view.
7
See Ghezzi et al (2009). Forbes (2014), Forbes et al (2017) and Eichengreen (2016).
40 12 16 8 8
30 9 12 6 4
20 6 8 4 0
10 3 4 2 –4
0 0 0 0 –8
03 08 13 18 23 03 08 13 18 23 09 11 13 15 17 19 21 23
Gaps in the plotted series indicate breaks in series reflecting, for example, bank mergers or changes in the reporting population. Country
codes denote the nationality of banks.
1
By bank nationality shown in the legends. See technical annex for details. 2 Cumulative change since Q1 2008 in cross-border claims
booked by AT, BE, DK, FR, DE, IT, NL and CH banks’ offices outside the home country. 3 Cumulative change since Q1 2008 in cross-border
claims booked by all banks other than the selected European banks; includes claims booked in home offices and offices abroad.
Sources: IMF, World Economic Outlook; BIS consolidated banking statistics; BIS locational banking statistics; authors’ calculations.
Finally, consider the financial openness of economies. How strong is the trend toward
greater international financial integration, especially after the GFC? Lane and Milesi-
Ferretti (2007, 2018) have addressed this question by tracking countries’ external
assets and liabilities as a ratio to GDP. Their work has sparked a line of research that
examines country portfolios and valuation effects (Lane and Shambaugh (2010a,
2010b), Gourinchas and Rey (2014) and Bénétrix et al (2015)).
However, measures of financial integration need not start and stop at the border.
Foreign ownership and control add a whole new dimension to financial integration,
one that the residence perspective ignores. If Australians own banks in New Zealand,
8
Moreover, European banks also shed local claims booked by their foreign affiliates around the world,
which is not reflected in any country’s external position.
Lhs Rhs
80 350
0 0
–80 –350
–160 –700
CH CL SG FI AT BE AU BR SE TR IN NO DE FR PA LU
ES HK PT JP CA IT DK MX US KR CN GR GB NL IE
1
Change in financial openness
1
Change in financial openness when shifting from a residence-based measure to a measure that consolidates bank-related positions. No
adjustment is made to positions of other sectors. The consolidated foreign positions of CN banks are estimated using the BIS locational
banking statistics by nationality.
Sources: IMF, International Investment Position and World Economic Outlook; BIS consolidated banking statistics; BIS locational banking
statistics; authors’ calculations.
9
Existing statistics identify the immediate counterparty but do not allow us to pierce through possibly
several layers of ownership all the way to the ultimate beneficial owner (see Box A). In practice, this
means that the counterparties to local bank positions are assumed to be nationals of that location.
Conclusion
This feature presents how BIS statistics can be used to understand topics in
international finance from both a residence and nationality perspective. The latter
groups balance sheets by the country of headquarters, based on the organising
principle of ownership and control. This is needed to assess the global impact of
decisions taken by multinational firms and intermediaries.
The nationality view fundamentally alters our understanding of countries’ and
sectors’ international positions. The bulk of the positions recorded in financial centres
are reallocated to the countries where firms are headquartered. This reallocation
yields new measures of countries’ indebtedness and their financial openness and
reveals the importance of multinational firms and intermediaries in international
finance. Understanding who drives changes in international positions, and whom
these changes ultimately affect, is crucial for monitoring financial stability.
This cannot be seen in most international financial statistics. BIS statistics are an
exception. The BIS IBS provide a joint residence- and nationality-based view of banks’
asset and liability positions as well as a similar picture for non-banks, but only for
their international bond liabilities. A blind spot is the consolidated asset side of non-
banks’ balance sheets. The question of who ultimately owns the trillions of dollars’
worth of government and corporate bonds traded across borders becomes
increasingly salient as non-bank financial institutions gain a larger share in the global
financial system.
References
Aldasoro, I, B Hardy and N Tarashev (2021): “Corporate debt: post-GFC through the
pandemic.” BIS Quarterly Review, June, pp 1–14.
Avdjiev, S, M Everett, P Lane and H S Shin (2018): “Tracking the international footprints
of global firms”, BIS Quarterly Review, March, pp 47–66.
Avdjiev, S, R McCauley and H S Shin (2016): “Breaking free of the triple coincidence
in international finance,” Economic Policy, vol 31, no 87, pp 409–51.
Bank for International Settlements (2015): BIS 85th Annual Report, 2014/15.
______ (2019): “Reporting guidelines and practices for the BIS international banking
statistics”, July.
Bénétrix, A, P Lane and J Shambaugh (2015): “International currency exposures,
valuation effects and the global financial crisis”, Journal of International Economics,
vol 96, supplement 1, pp 98–109.
Bernanke, B (2005): “The global saving glut and the US current account deficit”,
remarks at the Sandridge Lecture, Virginia Association of Economics, Richmond,
Virginia, 10 March.
Bertaut, C, B Bressler and S Curcuru (2021): “Globalization and the reach of
multinationals implications for portfolio exposures, capital flows, and home bias”,
Journal of Accounting and Finance, vol 21, no 5.
Technical annex