Petronas Technical Standards: Design of Pressure Relief, Flare and Vent Systems

PETRONAS TECHNICAL STANDARDS
Design of Pressure Relief, Flare and Vent Systems
PTS 16.52.04
January 2017
© 2017 PETROLIAM NASIONAL BERHAD (PETRONAS)

All rights reserved. No part of this document may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system or transmitted in any form
or by any means (electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise) without the permission of the copyright
owner. PETRONAS Technical Standards are Company’s internal standards and meant for authorized users only.
175.139.195.121 [email protected] 07/25/2023 01:59:52 GMT

PTS 16.52.04
DESIGN OF PRESSURE RELIEF, FLARE AND VENT SYSTEMS January 2017
Page 2 of 55
FOREWORD
PETRONAS Technical Standards (PTS) has been developed based on the accumulated knowledge,
experience and best practices of the PETRONAS group supplementing National and International
standards where appropriate. The key objective of PTS is to ensure standard technical practice across
the PETRONAS group.
Compliance to PTS is compulsory for PETRONAS-operated facilities and Joint Ventures (JVs) where
PETRONAS has more than fifty percent (50%) shareholding and/or operational control, and includes
all phases of work activities.
Contractors/manufacturers/suppliers who use PTS are solely responsible in ensuring the quality of
work, goods and services meet the required design and engineering standards. In the case where
specific requirements are not covered in the PTS, it is the responsibility of the
Contractors/manufacturers/suppliers to propose other proven or internationally established
standards or practices of the same level of quality and integrity as reflected in the PTS.
In issuing and making the PTS available, PETRONAS is not making any warranty on the accuracy or
completeness of the information contained in PTS. The Contractors/manufacturers/suppliers shall
ensure accuracy and completeness of the PTS used for the intended design and engineering
requirement and shall inform the Owner for any conflicting requirement with other international
codes and technical standards before start of any work.
PETRONAS is the sole copyright holder of PTS. No part of this document may be reproduced, stored
in a retrieval system or transmitted in any form or by any means (electronic, mechanical, recording or
otherwise) or be disclosed by users to any company or person whomsoever, without the prior written
consent of PETRONAS.
The PTS shall be used exclusively for the authorised purpose. The users shall arrange for PTS to be
kept in safe custody and shall ensure its secrecy is maintained and provide satisfactory information to
PETRONAS that this requirement is met.

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ANNOUNCEMENT
As part of the recent transformation exercise, the PTS numbering system has been revised to 6-digit
numbers and drawings, forms and requisition to 7-digit numbers. All newly revised PTS will adopt this
new numbering system, and where required make reference to other PTS in its revised numbering to
ensure consistency. Users are requested to refer to PTS 00.01.01 (PTS Index) for mapping between
old and revised PTS numbers for clarity. For further inquiries, contact PTS administrator at
[email protected]

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Table of Contents
1.0 INTRODUCTION ..................................................................................................... 6
1.1 SCOPE .............................................................................................................................. 6
1.2 GLOSSARY OF TERM ........................................................................................................ 6
1.3 SUMMARY OF CHANGES ................................................................................................. 7
2.0 PRESSURE RELIEF DEVICES ..................................................................................... 8
2.1 LOCATION, INSTALLATION AND ARRANGEMENT OF RELIEF DEVICES ............................ 8
2.2 PREVENTION OF MALFUNCTIONING OF RELIEF VALVES .............................................. 10
3.0 FLARE AND VENT SYSTEMS .................................................................................. 11
3.1 UPSTREAM ZERO CONTINUOUS HYDROCARBON GAS FLARING AND VENTING .......... 11
3.2 DOWNSTREAM FLARING AND VENTING ....................................................................... 13
3.3 FLARE GAS RECOVERY SYSTEM ..................................................................................... 13
3.4 FLARE AND VENT SYSTEMS LOAD STUDY...................................................................... 15
3.5 DISPOSAL SYSTEM SELECTION ...................................................................................... 18
3.6 DESIGN OF PIPING SYSTEMS ......................................................................................... 23
3.7 SIZING OF UPSTREAM PIPING ....................................................................................... 24
3.8 SIZING OF DOWNSTREAM PIPING................................................................................. 25
4.0 FLARE/VENT SYSTEM FACILITIES .......................................................................... 27
4.1 GENERAL REQUIREMENTS FOR DESIGN OF KNOCKOUT DRUMS ................................. 27
4.2 SIZING OF FLARE KNOCK OUT DRUM............................................................................ 27
4.3 KO DRUM LIQUID HOLD UP AND TRANSFER OUT CAPABILITIES .................................. 29
4.4 PUMP OUT CAPACITY .................................................................................................... 30
4.5 KO DRUM HEATING REQUIREMENT ............................................................................. 31
4.6 INSTRUMENTATION ...................................................................................................... 31
4.7 OTHER REQUIREMENTS ................................................................................................ 33
4.8 WATER SEAL VESSELS .................................................................................................... 34
4.9 FACILITIES OF LIQUID DISPOSAL.................................................................................... 35
5.0 FLARE HEAT RADIATION LEVELS ........................................................................... 37
5.1 HEAT RADIATION LEVELS .............................................................................................. 37
5.2 DISPERSION LEVELS ....................................................................................................... 39
5.3 NOISE LIMITS ................................................................................................................. 40
6.0 FLARE DETAILS..................................................................................................... 41
7.0 FLARE AND VENT PURGING.................................................................................. 42

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7.1 BACKGROUND ............................................................................................................... 42

7.2 PURGING DESIGN CONSIDERATIONS ............................................................................ 42
7.3 PURGE REDUCTION SEALS ............................................................................................ 45
7.4 FLAME/DETONATION ARRESTORS ................................................................................ 46
8.0 VENT SNUFFING .................................................................................................. 48
8.1 BACKGROUND ............................................................................................................... 48
8.2 VENT SNUFFING REQUIREMENTS ................................................................................. 48
9.0 FLARE PILOTS AND IGNITION ............................................................................... 49
9.1 GENERAL ....................................................................................................................... 49
9.2 FLARE PILOT REQUIREMENTS ....................................................................................... 49
9.3 FLARE IGNITION REQUIREMENTS ................................................................................. 51
10.0 DOCUMENTATION ............................................................................................... 52
10.1 ENGINEERING ANALYSIS ............................................................................................... 52
10.2 DISPOSAL SYSTEM SIZING CALCULATIONS.................................................................... 52
10.3 DATA SHEETS................................................................................................................. 52
10.4 FLARE LOAD DOCUMENTATION.................................................................................... 52
10.5 ELECTRONIC FILES ......................................................................................................... 52
10.6 FLARE EQUIPMENT FILES .............................................................................................. 53
11.0 BIBLIOGRAPHY .................................................................................................... 54

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1.0 INTRODUCTION
This PTS provides the minimum process design requirements and evaluation of pressure
relieving devices, flare and vent systems for upstream and downstream oil, gas and
petrochemical facilities. This PTS was developed for safe and reliable operations of the
equipment at PETRONAS assets.
This PTS is to be used in conjunction with the latest edition of ASME Section VIII, API Std. 520
Part I and II, API Std. 521 and API Std. 2000.
1.1 SCOPE
This PTS covers the design of pressure relief, flare and vent systems for overpressure and
underpressure protection of equipment and associated piping.
This PTS excludes the pressure relief requirement under ASME Section I – Rules of
Construction for Power Boilers.
1.2 GLOSSARY OF TERM
General Definition of Terms & Abbreviations
Refer to PTS 00.01.03 for PTS Requirements, General Definition Of Terms, Abbreviations &
Reading Guide.
Specific Definition of Terms
None.
Specific Abbreviations
No Abbreviation Description
1 AIV Acoustic Induced Vibrations
2 CDTP Cold Differential Test Pressure
3 CSC Car Seal Closed
4 CSO Car Seal Open
5 FIV Flow Induced Vibrations
6 GHG Greenhouse Gases
7 HSE-MS Health, Safety and Environment Management

System
8 LC Locked Closed

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No Abbreviation Description
9 LO Locked Open
10 PFD Probability of Failure on Demand
11 TERV Thermal Expansion Relief Valve

Table 1.1: Specific Abbreviations
1.3 SUMMARY OF CHANGES

This PTS 16.52.04 (January 2017) replaces PTS 16.52.04 (March 2014).

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2.0 PRESSURE RELIEF DEVICES
Equipment and piping systems shall(PSR) be protected to ensure the internal/external pressure
does not exceed the design pressure of the equipment and piping systems. Pressure relief
devices shall be installed in accordance with ASME Section VIII requirements to maintain the
integrity of the relief system in relieving system pressure below the allowable pressure
accumulation.
2.1 LOCATION, INSTALLATION AND ARRANGEMENT OF RELIEF DEVICES
Location and installation of relief devices shall conform to the ASME Section VIII as stipulated
in the referenced PTS. The following criteria shall apply:
i. Pressure relief devices shall(PSR) be installed on the protected equipment in the

vapor space above liquid level or to the piping connected to the vapor space,
normally the highest point of the vessel or upstream of the demister mat .
ii. All relief valves shall be installed in the upright position. Both the inlet and outlet
piping shall(PSR) be free draining and without pockets. Each relief valve shall have
individual dedicated discharge pipes.
iii. The highest practical elevation should apply when locating a relief device
discharging to atmosphere to safe location.
Refer to API Std. 520 Part II for details on typical PSV sizing and valve
arrangements.
Sparing of Relief Devices
Spare relief valve and isolation arrangements shall be installed considering online
maintenance and inspection requirement. The general guideline is as per following table.
Relief Scenario All (Except Thermal Relief)
Single Equipment N+1
Spare Train N
N = Number of PSV required
Table 2.1: Spare Relief Valve and Isolation Arrangements
Isolation Valves for Relief Devices
i. Isolation, interlocking, venting and drain provision shall be made for on-line
servicing of PRV. Refer to PTS 16.53.03 and API Std. 520 for details.
ii. The port size of inlet and outlet discharge of isolation valves shall be in accordance
to ASME Section VIII so that flow area shall not be smaller than the inlet and outlet
of relief device. For upstream and downstream of PRV, full bore ball or gate valves
shall be employed.

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iii. For NPS 150 mm and below, ball valve shall be used. For NPS 200 mm and higher,
ball or gate valves shall be used. When gate valves are used, they shall be installed
with the stems oriented in horizontal position, or if this is not feasible, the stem
could oriented downward to a maximum of 45o, from the horizontal to keep the
gate from falling off and blocking the flow.
iv. Adequate relief device isolation shall be ensured between process systems and
the flare or closed systems to which relief is discharged and shall be as follows:
a) In cases where online maintenance and testing is not required a single
relief valve with no sparing arrangement only an outlet isolation valve is
required.
b) In cases where online maintenance and testing is required then isolation
shall be required for both inlet and outlet of relief valve.
c) For multiple relief valves with sparing arrangement, both an inlet and
outlet isolation valve is required.
d) The spare relief device may be replaced by a spool piece with a similar
geometry while the spare relief device is kept secured in ware house.
v. Block valves in the relief headers, if provided, shall(PSR) be kept in locked open
position. Preferred arrangement for isolation of equipment or a system from flare
header is to provide single block valve with bleed and removable spools on
equipment side to facilitate positive isolation during maintenance activities.
vi. Blind at battery limit of unit flare header shall(PSR) be ensured that position of blind
is open when the unit is online and at no time the relief path is blocked.
vii. Blind at battery limit of unit flare header shall(PSR) be inserted when the unit is
undergoing maintenance.
viii. Butterfly valve may be considered for isolation valve in firewater, cooling water
and service or utility water services.
Operational Control of an Isolation Valve
i. Relief valves which are spared shall(PSR) have interlocking system at inlet and
outlet isolation valves in compliance with PTS 16.53.03.
ii. A vent connection shall be made available between the upstream isolation valve
and the relief valve to check for valve passing.
iii. TERV of a pipeline system shall have an upstream and downstream isolation
valves. Plant procedures shall have strict controls to avoid line shut in during relief
valve maintenance.
ix. Isolation valves for relief valve (without sparing) and emergency depressuring
valves shall(PSR) be Locked Open (LO) or Car Seal Open (CSO) when in service to
ensure the device is subject to the system pressure and activated when the
system pressure reaches the set pressure of the relief device.

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2.2 PREVENTION OF MALFUNCTIONING OF RELIEF VALVES
Hydrates and Blockages
i. Pressure relief valve inlet and discharge piping shall(PSR) be designed to prevent
blockage, deposit formation, vapour condensation and accumulation of liquid.
ii. Discharge piping routing shall be made to avoid condensation and accumulation
of corrosive liquids. H2S flare header should be heat-traced to eliminate
accumulation of H2S in the flare header and the relief valve discharge piping.
iii. For liquid with high pour point, piping upstream and downstream of relief devices
should be heat traced and insulated. The system shall be designed such that there
is no liquid at the main vapour flare header.
iv. Provision of heat tracing at the relief valve and along its inlet and outlet piping
shall be provided for relief vapours which have potential for crystallization of the
vapour (e.g. urea services) to avoid any compromise to the relief device and
downstream piping.
v. Corrosive process fluids such as VCM, Sulfolane, H2S, Acid Gas, HF, HCL and many
other corrosive fluids, can attack the internals of a relief device. For corrosive
service, the following shall be complied with:
a) Installation of a rupture disk upstream of the relief valve
b) Purging/flushing of the inlet piping with clean fluid (i.e. nitrogen) which
will not contaminate the process or create additional hazard.
vi. Heat tracing shall be provided around the relief valve and inlet and outlet piping
as necessary to prevent blockages due to hydrate formation (due to minor
leakages across PSV seats), freezing, solidification, high pour point liquids and
crystallization.
Heat tracing system shall comply with PTS 12.30.06 or PTS 13.13.01.
Leakages
Seat tightness testing for relief valves shall be carried out in accordance with API Std. 527.
Bonnet Venting
Vent shall be routed to a safe location or discharging into a closed system for balanced PRV in
a toxic service. The amount of toxic gas leakage shall be estimated based on complete failure
of the bellows. A dispersion study of the leakage of toxic gas from the bonnet or vent tubing
is required to ascertain the toxicity and HC gas level in manned and key designated areas.

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3.0 FLARE AND VENT SYSTEMS
A flare or vent disposal system collects and discharges gas and/or liquids from atmospheric or
pressurized process components to the atmosphere to safe locations for final release during
normal operations and abnormal conditions (emergency relief). In vent systems, the gas
exiting the system is dispersed in the atmosphere. Streams requiring disposal are:
i. Relief vapour and /or liquids
ii. Depressurizing vapours
iii. Waste streams in conjunction with maintenance, start-up or shutdown activities
Disposal streams shall be collected in a closed system preferentially to a flare unless they meet
the requirements of atmospheric venting per environmental regulatory requirement e.g.
Malaysian Department of Environment (DOE) and Department of Occupational Safety and
Health (DOSH).
Flare system inclusive of knock out drum, seal pot/drum , flare stack, flare ignition package,
relief devices inlet lines , blowdown inlet lines, discharge headers , subheaders, tail pipes shall
be designed to maintain its integrity under all operating scenarios including emergency
shutdowns, startups, Simultaneous Production (SIPROD) etc.
3.1 UPSTREAM ZERO CONTINUOUS HYDROCARBON GAS FLARING AND VENTING
The upstream E&P facilities covering all offshore and onshore E&P facilities and terminals shall
comply with E&P requirement regarding “PETRONAS Carbon & Water Commitments” as
follows:
i. Zero continuous flaring and venting to be incorporated in the design of new

facilities for both Greenfield and Brownfield projects;
ii. Zero continuous venting for all existing assets with more than 20 years remaining
life for upstream (base year 2012); and
iii. Reduce flaring and venting for all facilities where operationally and economically-
feasible.
Zero Continuous Flaring and Venting is defined as elimination of the non-safety routine flaring
and venting (Category 1) of hydrocarbon by utilising it for sales, combustion fuel, reinjection
or any other beneficial purposes.

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Category Sources Governance

(Malaysia)
1 Continuous flare and vent – Flare and vent of hydrocarbon and PPGUA –
CO2 gases in the process of oil and gas production. The cap
continuous flare and vent activities could arise from: on annual
 Facilities without access to compression; flare
 Facilities without other means to transport gas volume
to utilization points such as sales, reinjection,
EOR and etc.
 Facilities with compressors, but insufficient
capacity
2 Operational flare and vent – PPGUA –

Flare/vent gas resulting from planned and unplanned facilities limiting
downtime, such as shut down or maintenance, start-up flaring hours
and venting, and emergency flaring and venting of flaring or
venting
3 Fugitive emissions from non-combusted gas through valves, Some

flanges, fittings and etc. elements
Instrument venting from gas-driven pneumatic devices, are
valve actuators, and small pumps, such as chemical injection, covered in
sumps, transfers and etc. PPGUA
Purge Flare/Pilot Gas – Gas required sustaining pilot flames and
eliminating oxygen ingress.
Others - Includes small predictable volumes of routine tank
flashing, glycol re-boiler, amine overheads, pigging and
produced water systems.
Table 3.1 : Definition of Zero Continuous Flaring and Venting
The following minimum requirements have been set to comply with the PETRONAS E&P
Flaring and Venting Framework:
i. All projects and operations shall conduct carbon footprint assessment as per PTS
18.72.05;
ii. Carbon cost shall be integrated into project economic evaluation;
iii. All new projects and existing operations shall install high accuracy (minimum
Tolerance Class C per PTS 14.10.02) flow meters to measure the continuous flaring
and venting loads;
iv. The GHG emission inventory shall be incorporated into HSE Tier 1, 2, and 3
assurance process as per PTS 18.72.05. For this purpose, all GHG emission
inventory design document and monitoring records on GHG emission shall be
maintained for all audit and verification works.

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3.2 DOWNSTREAM FLARING AND VENTING
Downstream facilities venting and flaring shall comply with the following requirements:
i. Continuous venting of flammable hydrocarbon mixture (except for purging) or

toxic gases to atmosphere during normal operation is prohibited.
ii. The system design shall consider no flammable mixture formation in any part of
the system. Air/Oxygen ingression into relief system shall(PSR) be prevented.
iii. The hot vented stream from the systems being protected by relief devices or
piping discharges cannot contain any hydrocarbon liquid/vapour that will be
above its flash point if released and self-ignite.
iv. Venting to atmosphere from storage tanks shall be allowed provided it meets
Petronas HSE requirements and applicable environmental discharge regulations.
v. Venting to atmosphere shall be subject to Owner’s approval and meeting

PETRONAS, local or international regulations. The minimum requirement is listed
below:
a) Risk assessment analysis /QRA shall(PSR) be performed – to determine the
adequacy of safeguards and mitigations in preventing the release of toxic,
flammable or combustible liquids to the atmosphere.
b) Gas dispersion and heat radiation studies conducted – to ensure that the
concentrations of toxic and flammable components in the dispersed
vapour and heat radiation do not reach harmful levels at the nearby work
area and outside property limit
3.3 FLARE GAS RECOVERY SYSTEM
Flare gas recovery system shall be designed such that the integrity of the overall flare system
is not jeopardized.
A flare gas recovery system may be provided for both HP and LP flare system. The flare gas
recovery system shall recover the hydrocarbon gas from the flare system and return the gas
to the main process units. The gas shall be recovered downstream of the flare KO drum.
The typically recommended recovery systems are as follows.
i. To raise the operating pressure in the flare system sufficiently high to return the
gas directly to the main process units
ii. To install re-compressor or ejector system

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Flare gases can have significant variations in compositions thus they shall be evaluated in
detail during the specification of flare gas recovery system. Flare gas from specific units that
are not compatible with the flare gas recovery (including its treatment and conditioning)
system and/or the final recovery destinations shall be determined. For example, relief streams
containing acid gas typically are routed directly to the flare thereby bypassing the flare gas
recovery system. Highly inert streams can also be incompatible with flare gas recovery system.
For the flare gas recovery compressor, analysis of low pressure flare and vent gases shall be
carried out to define a minimum continuous flare gas recovery load. In existing installations,
analysis of continuous flaring and purging rates shall be used to define the capacity for flare
gas recovery system.
Flare gas recovery system shall be sized to accommodate the sum of normal flow of gas into
the flare or vent system (if any) plus the anticipated leakage from relief valves, blowdown
valves and process pressure spill-off valves. The leakage rate shall be obtained from
consultation with the instrument and valve suppliers as well as operational data and
experience.
The flare stack shall be isolated from the flare gas recovery system at the main flare header
by providing liquid seal or by installing a normally closed control valve. This valve, also called
as flare fast opening valve (FOV), shall have quick opening and shall open during abnormal or
emergency flaring and during instrument air failure.
If process requirement enforce narrow operating range wherein maintaining liquid seal is not
achievable or acceptable, an alternate method is to use a control valve to regulate the suction
pressure of the flare gas recovery system. This pressure control valve shall be interlocked to
go fully open upon sensing higher-than-normal header pressure or when the recovery
compressors are unloaded or shutdown.
The flare gas recovery compressors shall trip on low pressure in the suction header. It is also
recommended to install an oxygen (O2) analyser at the main flare header downstream of the
flare gas recovery system which shall trip the compressor upon sensing high oxygen content
i.e. possible air ingress into the flare header.
Pressure Alarm High (PAH) in the flare or vent KO drum shall open the FOV.
FOV shall be provided with a bypass containing a bursting disc, as a final mechanical protection
device. A positive path to the flare can also be provided by installing a low-pressure, high-
capacity pilot operated relief valve around the FOV. The sensing line for the pilot shall be
provided with a clean gas purge and a backflow preventer.
A flare gas recovery system involving either a liquid seal drum or an FOV to the flare shall be
installed with a continuous supply of nitrogen purge gas (with fuel gas backup). The purge gas
shall be introduced downstream of the liquid seal drum or FOV in order to prevent an internal
explosion and flame flashback.
Reference shall be made to Section 5.7.11 of API Std. 521 for more details on flare gas recovery
system.

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3.4 FLARE AND VENT SYSTEMS LOAD STUDY
Separate Flare and vent system load study shall be conducted during basic and detail
engineering phase to determine governing case for highest flare load. Refer to Section 4 of
API Std. 521 for details on determining relief loads for various overpressure scenarios.
The flare system including unit sub headers, sizing basis shall consider the larger of relief rates
due to:
i. Common failure (power failure, heating/cooling medium failure, and instrument

air failure).
Global Relief Scenario Multiple Discharges Multiple Discharges

from a Single Process from Multiple Process
Unit Units
Cooling Water Failure Yes Yes
Partial Power Failure Yes Yes
Total Power Failure Yes Yes
General Steam Failure Yes Yes
General Instrument Air Yes Yes

Failure
Fire Yes No
Table 3.2: Types of Common Failures
ii. Single/partial failure (power failure, heating/cooling medium failure, and

instrument air failure).
iii. Emergency blowdown
Generally design basis for flare header hydraulics for the fire scenario shall
assume that all emergency depressuring systems that protect equipment within
a common fire circle are activated. However, the emergency depressuring valves
intended for other scenarios (e.g., power failure) may also be operated. The
effect of opening additional emergency depressuring valves within the unit
shall be evaluated. Depending on the risk this may lead to flare system design
modifications.
While evaluating depressurisation load from multiple units consider one fire zone
at a time and segregation of depressurisation loads can be permitted as per Fire
zone identified by FERA/QRA analysis. Actions of operators and instrumentation
control during the common mode failure will tend to limit the peak flows, and
stagger the times of occurrence. The sizing of the manual depressurizing lines and
pressure control valve bypasses shall be within the flare system capacity.

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iv. Fire case
Relief flows for fire conditions shall be calculated by assuming a fire in only one of
the established potential fire areas, thus taking each fire area in turn.
v. Blocked outlet
Relief flowrate for blocked outlet scenarios shall be examined based on single
credible failure.
Since the simultaneous occurrence of two or more unrelated contingencies is unlikely,

unrelated contingencies should not be used as a basis for determining the maximum
backpressure and set pressure ratio. Therefore, while lines from individual relief valves should
be sized for the maximum calculated design flow, sections of a main header or sub-header
should be sized for a specific maximum contingency. The main flare header shall be sized for
both of the following cases:
i. Flare loads from each individual unit;
ii. Simultaneous flare loads from multiple units.
Relief loads from units which are determined to release simultaneously during a global utility
failure scenario shall be at 100%.
In order to verify the total relief load, dynamic simulation of the process units, which could
generate simultaneous relief and/or depressurization shall be carried out, taking into account
the classification of Instrumented Protective Functions (IPFs).
Flare loads from systems with pressure control valves shall be the larger of:
i. the required relief flow for the scenario;
ii. the maximum control valve flow (100 % open with system at relieving
conditions).
Sizing of the vent lines for vessels that are protected by only a vent line to the flare (i.e., no
PRV) example closed drain drum shall account for fire relief loads.
Use of Instrumented Protective Function for flare load mitigation:
i. To reduce the total load on the common relief system, the use of
Instrumented Protective Functions (IPF) may be considered consisting of one
or more initiators, a Logic Solver, and one or more Final Elements on a pressure
system to eliminate the cause of overpressure (e.g. close the heat input and thus
prevent the individual relief case).

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ii. Designing the IPFs for flare load mitigation is a complex problem. The IPF
approach commonly specifies the required Safety Integrity Level (SIL) as SIL-3 for
the entire flare system with respect to backpressure analysis however SIL
classification study shall be carried out in order to confirm the required SIL. For
non-backpressure analysis, (e.g. thermal radiation, noise, velocity, and
environmental analysis) the overall SIL shall be defined with the use of risk matrix.
Refer to PTS 14.12.10 for details on IPF.
iii. The IPF approach considers the following Steps:

a) Definition of general (or global) relief scenarios and load determination;
b) Construction of the flare header network model and determination
of the back pressures for the unmitigated flare load (base load plus IPF
mitigated loads);
c) Identification of IPF candidate systems based on controlling general
scenarios, limiting equipment in the flare system, IPF application points
and configuration;
d) Determining the most detrimental IPF load (the load which, if the IPF fails
to function, results in the highest backpressure effect on a PRV).
Depending on system configuration, the most detrimental IPF load
may not be the largest IPF load;
e) Confirming the hydraulic design adequacy for the base flare load
(occurring when all associated IPFs work properly) combined with the
most detrimental IPF load;
f) Determining the individual and partial IPFs' required reliabilities;
g) Confirming the overall IPF system reliability by determining which
combination of up to three concurrent individual and partial IPF
failures result in the acceptable backpressure being exceeded and by
determining the probability of failure on demand (PFD) of the overall IPF;
h) Confirming that the PFD meets the required SIL. If the required SIL is not
met, IPF or piping system modifications are required.

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3.5 DISPOSAL SYSTEM SELECTION
Relief vapour and liquids, depressurized vapours and waste streams associated with
maintenance, start-up and shutdown requires a disposal system where they are being
collected in a closed system and routed through pipe headers preferentially to a flare. Some
of these streams can be vented to atmosphere or can be sent back into the process or storage.
Disposal through flare requires flare headers design to consider the following:
i. Governing case relief scenario for flare header sizing.
ii. Composition and constituents (Toxic, Corrosive, acid gas etc.) of flared gas.
iii. Highest relief fluid temperature.
iv. Lowest relief fluid temperature.
v. Flare header backpressure.
Design of Flaring and Venting System
The design shall meet minimum requirement as listed below:
i. Vent drum without water seal shall be designed to handle deflagration1 pressure.
NOTE(S):
1. Deflagration is defined as explosion in which the flame front is advancing at less than speed of sound in the
unburnt combustible mixture.
ii. Lightning and electrostatic discharge protection for example grounding of vents,
toroidal ring, flame arrestor (if in clean service) shall be provided.
iii. Automatic vent snuffing system using CO2 or nitrogen shall be provided with
adequate monitoring facilities for CO2/N2 storage.
iv. Gas dispersion and heat radiation studies conducted for the full range of possible
flows through any individual modulating pressure relief devices. This is to ensure
that the concentrations of toxic and flammable components in the dispersed
vapour and heat radiation do not reach harmful levels at the nearby work area
and outside property limit. In the event of accidental ignition of the vent, flames
shall not impinge upon adjacent equipment and thermal radiation to equipment
and personnel are within ALARP for the regulated safety and environmental
limits. Refer to PTS 18.72.09 for details on dispersion analysis.
v. Discharge piping shall discharge vertically with no pockets and shall be above the
tallest plant structure within a horizontal radius of 15 m.

PTS 16.52.04
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Atmospheric and Low Pressure Tank Vents
For the pressure relief and venting of low pressure tanks including refrigerated tanks,
reference shall be made to API Std 2000.
Atmospheric and low pressure tanks shall be connected to vent headers instead of flare
headers and routed to safe location. Inert gas blanketing shall(PSR) be provided to avoid
formation of explosive mixtures inside the tank and to avoid HC emissions from tanks.
Relief Back Into Process or Storage
i. The following streams can be considered to discharge relief streams into an

unrestricted lower pressure part of the process system or into storage or receiver
vessel:
a) Streams which if vented or flared would cause environmental problems.
b) Liquid streams where its recovery is of economic value
ii. When relieving to a lower pressure system, the lower pressure system shall(PSR)
be designed such that:
a) None of the contingencies resulting due to discharge of the relief valve
would also overpressure the lower pressure equipment/storage.
b) Maximum relieving pressure in the low pressure vessel does not exceeds
the bellows rating of the higher pressure relief valve if applicable.
c) Relief valves of the lower pressure equipment is adequate to handle any
additional relief discharge arising from the high pressure equipment
relief.
d) If the relief valves of the lower pressure system, is handling the discharge
of the higher-pressure relief valve, the system shall be checked that the
additional load are adequate.
e) The lowest pressure of the flare header shall be checked for the
conventional relief valve with its spring setting for Cold Differential Test
Pressure (CDTP) based on the highest superimposed back pressure would
not cause inadvertent discharge.
Multiple & Segregated Flare Systems
Multiple and segregated flare systems may be required in order to:
i. Segregate sources of release into high and low pressure systems. This may be
required to accommodate the differing back pressure limitations of
individual relief/depressuring devices. If there are a large number of high pressure
sources with large gas volumes and relatively few low pressure sources, then it
is generally more economical to install one high pressure relief header and one
low pressure relief header., However, an economic analysis is usually required
to ascertain the optimum number of flare systems, and to which system
each relief device should discharge.

PTS 16.52.04
Page 20 of 55
ii. Enable a high pressure low radiation tip to be used with a consequent saving on
flare structural requirements. This may also mean that only the low pressure gas
requires assistance in order to burn cleanly.
iii. Segregate sources with widely differing potentials for liquid release.
iv. Segregate sources of cold, dry gas from significant quantities of warm, moist gas
and thereby avoid the possibility of freezing and hydrate formation.
v. Segregate corrosive or potentially corrosive fluids (e.g. CO2 and H2S) from non-
corrosive or moist fluids.
vi. Meet requirements dictated by the plant geometry or layout and/or economics.
vii. Segregate disposal streams containing products which, upon mixing with other
relief streams, may endanger the operation of the flare system through
exothermic reactions or may result in formation of deposits or solidification of
entrained heavy liquids.
The selected design should use the minimum practicable number of separate
systems but remain operable and safe under all foreseeable conditions. The
systems installed may be totally independent, or may share common facilities
such as flare knockout drums and flare tips in certain circumstances.
Emergency Disposal of Hydrogen Sulphide Containing Gas
i. Streams which are rich in hydrogen sulphide shall not be discharged into a
common HC flare or vent system unless the common flare system material of
construction complies with H2S services.
ii. H2S flare header shall be heat-traced above 60 oC to prevent blockage due to
potential deposits and accumulation of ammonium salts and pyrophoric iron
sulphide. Crude oil could contain nitrogen compounds which in some conversion
processes (e.g. hydrocracking and catalytic cracking) these compounds will partly
be converted to ammonia. When entering the flare and relief system, ammonium
salts such as ammonium sulphide and ammonium carbonate can be formed.
These salts are not formed when the temperature is higher than 60 oC, in which
case the ammonia will exit the flare and relief system as a gas and formation of
ammonium deposits is prevented.
iii. For the reasons mentioned above, H2S-rich streams shall have a separate
line-up, preferably a separate flare stack equipped with a tip of the air pre-mix
type. As a general guideline, for large H2S releases, the installation of gas assist
flare burner tips shall be considered since large burner nozzles are impractical.
iv. Highly corrosive or very toxic vapours streams shall(PSR) be neutralized before
being discharge to atmosphere.

PTS 16.52.04
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v. The emissions from the flare tip shall comply with environmental regulatory
requirement e.g. Malaysian Department of Environment (DOE) and Department
of Occupational Safety and Health (DOSH). Relief, blowdown, and dispersion
study shall be conducted to address dispersion to meet environmental and
occupational regulatory requirement.
vi. The hydrogen sulphide containing relief stream may be combined with HC gas at
flare header provided relief, blowdown, and dispersion study shall be conducted
based on below scenarios to address dispersion to meet environmental and
regulatory requirement:
a) continuous HC release
b) intermittent HC release (only during start-up and shutdown)
c) emergency HC release (e.g. PRV, emergency depressuring)
vii. When hydrogen sulphide rich gas has to be flared, incomplete combustion may
cause a hydrogen sulphide smell resulting in complaints by people in the vicinity.
At a low exit velocity back burning may occur, causing sulphide stress corrosion,
especially below the refractory.
viii. The combustion efficiency of a large diameter open pipe flare is poor when gas is
at low exit velocities has to be flared. Good combustion can only be guaranteed if
a minimum exit velocity of 0.5 Mach is maintained.
ix. The design of flare tip shall be referred to PTS 12.42.02.
x. This means that when H2S rich gas has to be released into the HC flare system,
more combustible purge (sweep) gas has to be injected as well on account of the
larger size of the flare, which could offset the saving on capital expenditure.
xi. If a hydrogen sulphide flare relief system is used, this shall be heat-traced up to 4
m below the top of the stack. No water seal vessel shall be applied thus the design
pressure of the knockout drum shall be 7 barg. To prevent flashback and
consequential detonation, purge gas shall be used. In addition, facilities for
injection of assist gas in the flare for adequate combustion and plume buoyancy
shall be provided.
Discharge of Oxygen-containing Gas
i. Streams that contain oxygen (or air) shall not be discharged into a common flare
or vent system, unless this system is free from H2S and no flammable mixtures are
created. These streams typically originate from plant sections that operate under
sub-atmospheric pressure or vacuum, where some air will inevitably be drawn in.
NOTE(S): Even small amounts of oxygen can convert H2S into elemental sulphur by partial oxidation (Claus
reaction).The generation of elemental sulphur in the common flare or vent system could give rise to serious local
blockages over a prolonged period. Such blockage will become apparent only during a major relief load, and
could remain otherwise undetected.

PTS 16.52.04
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ii. Flammable mixtures with gas and oxygen (air) shall not be permitted in a common
flare or vent system due to the risk of a detonation blast wave inside the header
piping. The ignition source in the header could be pyrophoric deposits or
discharges of static electricity. This type of explosion could lead to pressures in
excess of the header's design pressure and severe loss of integrity.
iii. If an oxygen-containing stream is considered for intermittent routing to the flare
system such as on trip of a waste gas burner, a sufficient fixed purge of fuel gas
or nitrogen shall be added and an oxygen analyzer/trip shall be provided. The
stream shall not be released automatically to the flare system
iv. Relief devices in oxygen service shall meet the requirements of PTS 16.52.05.
Disposal of Hydrogen-Rich Streams

i. Streams with a high hydrogen content are susceptible to ignition by static
electricity as a result of the electrostatic discharges at the sharp edge of the vent
outlet.
ii. Ignition of hydrogen from atmospheric vents can also result from the chemical
reaction between hydrogen and iron oxides frequently found in vessels and
piping. In order to avoid this, toroidal ring at vent outlets shall(PSR) be provided.
TERV Discharge Disposal

i. TERVs should discharge back into the process, the storage system, or a plant
disposal system. However, if the discharged liquid cannot be accepted in any
of these outlets, TERVs may discharge into an open drainage system, subject
to HSE compliance. and. Light hydrocarbons should be discharged only to a
location where vapours may safely disperse, and subject to Owner’s approval.
ii. Systems containing very toxic fluids shall never be discharged into an open
drainage system.
iii. Liquids containing components which impair gravity separation emulsifying
agents or spent chemicals which tend to flocculate upon dilution shall not be
discharged into the oily open drainage. Liquids containing components that
impair biological activity shall not be discharged into open drainage systems
leading to a biological waste treatment unit.

PTS 16.52.04
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3.6 DESIGN OF PIPING SYSTEMS
Relief, Vent and Flare system piping shall be designed as per following:
i. Inlet and outlet piping for PRVs and emergency depressurizing shall(PSR) not have
check valves since their failure may result in a blocked relief path.
ii. All inlet and outlet piping to and from relief valves shall be free draining away
from the relief valve. The flare headers shall also be free draining to flare Knock
out drums.
iii. Outlet lines to the header to be heat-traced from the relief device if there are
possibilities that vapours in the flare system can condense, freeze, and form coke
or crystallize.
iv. The flow area through pipes and fittings between a pressure vessel and the relief
device shall be the same as that of the inlet valve as a minimum (isolation valves
shall be full bore).
v. Upstream and downstream piping of a relief device shall have no flow restrictions
and shall not be pocketed.
vi. The cross sectional area of the connection for a multiple relief valves
configuration connected in a single connection shall be equal to the combination
of inlet areas of the valves, and inlet pressure loss requirement shall be applied.
vii. All flare and vent relief headers shall be sized to limit ρV2 <200,000 kg/ms2.
Design Piping Load

i. The relief system piping shall be required to hydrostatic testing. If hydrostatic
testing is impractical such as riser piping to flare tip, the piping section shall be
subjected to 100% RT (radiation testing).
ii. The header and support shall be designed for the presence of liquid. The initial
assumption for the amount of liquid present for a given diameter when there is
no or very little information is available can be in accordance with the table below:
Nominal Diameter (DN) Assumption
≤ 300 Full
400 to 450 ½ full
500 to 900 ⅓ full
≥ 900 ¼ full
Table 3.3: Liquid Presence in Headers
Liquid or Two-phase Flow Releases
i. Downstream piping system of relief device shall(PSR) consider the following:

a) Potential for slug flow
b) Transient load conditions of simultaneous vapour and liquid relief

PTS 16.52.04
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ii. If no slug flow, the maximum lateral force at flare header induced by two phase
flow at sonic velocity as follows:
a) 45,000 N in a DN 900 for the two-phase flow rate not exceeding 500 kg/s
b) 18,000 N in a DN 600 for the two-phase flow rate not exceeding 200 kg/s
iii. The following requirement shall be complied with:

a) The back sloping of flare headers between the Flare KO drum and the flare
stack should not exceed 15 m to prevent slug flow.
b) 45° entrances for liquid exceeding 150 m3/h or superficial liquid velocity
in the subheader exceeding 1.3 m/s.
Design Temperature
The maximum and minimum design temperature shall(PSR) be determined by carrying out heat
transfer calculations considering isenthalpic flash for all relief (except fire) and
depressurization scenarios. Refer to PTS 16.50.01 for details.
3.7 SIZING OF UPSTREAM PIPING
Pressure losses from the inlet piping
i. The PRV shall be designed with no chattering effect. Maximum 3% of PRV set
pressure is allowed for inlet piping pressure drop from protected equipment to
PRV based on rated capacity. Exceptions to this requirement are only allowed in
the case of a pilot- operated valve with a suitably arranged remote pilot
connection close to the source of overpressure.
ii. In clean services modulating type pilot relief valves can be used. For flowing pilots
remote sensing lines shall be sized to limit pressure loss to 3% of the set pressure
based on maximum flow rate of pilot at 110% of set pressure. For non-flowing
pilots remote sensing lines with flow area of (45 mm2) should be sufficient since
no system flows through these type of valves when main valve is open and
relieving.
iii. For systems containing pressure relief valves in combination with rupture
disks, the pressure drop across the rupture disk shall be ignored if the inlet losses
are based on the PRV's capacity adjusted with the certified Combination
Capacity Factor. However, if inlet loss assessment involves rigorously calculating
the inlet pressure of the PRV, the effects of the rupture disk shall be taken into
account.
iv. For liquid service relief valve where pressure losses exceeds the 3 % of PRV set
pressure can be equipped with a special liquid trim (linear flow characteristic) or
vibration dampener to mitigate chattering in consultation with the PSV supplier.
v. Hydraulic calculations shall be performed to account for the permanent pressure

losses.

PTS 16.52.04
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3.8 SIZING OF DOWNSTREAM PIPING
Pressure losses from the outlet piping
Pressure drop calculations on the outlet line shall be done for all relief devices outlet piping
considering maximum and minimum flare header back pressures and ensure the downstream
piping systems meet the allowable back pressure and velocity requirements. Refer to Section
5.4.1 of API Std. 521 for the flowrates to be used.
Relief devices maximum allowable backpressure shall(PSR) meet the following:
i. 10% Set pressure (superimposed plus built up) for conventional relief valves
ii. 30-50% Set pressure (superimposed plus built up) for balanced bellows PRVs
iii. More than 50% set pressure (superimposed plus built up) for pilot operated
valves. The backpressures shall not reduce the pilot operated valve capacity
below that required for the scenario. If a diaphragm pilot operated valve is used,
the backpressures shall not exceed the mechanical limit of the diaphragm pilot
operated valve.
iv. At higher backpressures, capacity correction factors, shall be applied to account

for possible flow reduction.
v. For a balanced bellow relief valve, the total backpressure shall not exceed the
mechanical rating of the bellows PRV and valve outlet rating.
Velocity in the relief header shall not exceed maximum Mach no of 0.7 for main and sub flare
header and maximum Mach no of 1.0 for tailpipes and laterals.
For flare system outlet piping, AIV and FIV study should be conducted wherever high velocities
are expected in order to avoid fatigue failure due to AIV and FIV.
Conventional common discharge systems
i. The relief of fluid at outlet of PRV shall discharge into sub-headers before
combining with other sub-headers into the main flare header which is routed to
a knock out drum close to a flare stack.
ii. The piping for flare/vent headers shall be welded to prevent possible leakage.
Upstream headers shall be connected to the top of downstream headers.
Subheaders shall be connected into the main header without any welds on the
lower one third of the circumference of the main header.
iii. Disposal piping shall be self-draining to the knockout drum. No pocket, free
draining of 1:200 for sub-header and 1:500 for main header sloping to flare KO
drums.
iv. Piping stress study shall be conducted in the relief header to identify thermal
expansion loops and pipe support requirements. Due to safety and maintenance
issues, expansion bellows shall not be applied.

PTS 16.52.04
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v. Pressure reading device shall be provided in the main flare header for indication
of the flare backpressure to operations and be made be available in the control
room.
vi. Isolation, venting and drain provision shall be made for on-line servicing of PRV.
vii. A small drain pot or drip leg installed to accommodate small quantities of liquid
shall be regularly inspected to avert blockage of the header.
viii. Relief device discharge piping shall be supported independently of the relief
device.
Individual Vent Outlets
i. Individual local vents are provided when it is impractical to route to a common

header e.g. discharge from storage tanks.
ii. Atmospheric relief discharge piping shall be corrosion resistant (hot dip
galvanised or stainless steel construction) and shall have a weep hole of 13 mm
diameter with an elbow at the lowest point to prevent accumulation of liquid.
iii. The relief device discharge piping shall be supported independently of the relief
device.
iv. The end of the discharge piping shall be cut off squarely and be fitted with a
toroidal ring where hydrogen content of the vapor exceeds 20 mol% to avoid
ignition by static electricity.
v. Vents shall be designed to prevent ingress of rain.
vi. Outlet of vents and drains in vents shall be arranged to discharge so that localised
overheating is prevented if vapours from vents are accidently ignited.
Requirement for Flow Measurement
i. An ultrasonic flow meter shall be provided at the main flare header, downstream
of the final flare knockout drum
ii. Flow meters installed in each main flare header shall be capable of:
a) Identifying significant changes in flow rate for the purpose of assisting
operators in identifying upset occurrence.
b) Measuring the normal operating mass flow rate for the purpose of
monitoring flare and vent losses.
c) Measuring low flow rates to determine purge gas quantity.
iii. The installed flow device shall not block the flare header and create any low points
within the device and associated piping.

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4.0 FLARE/VENT SYSTEM FACILITIES
4.1 GENERAL REQUIREMENTS FOR DESIGN OF KNOCKOUT DRUMS
A knock out drum (KOD) shall(PSR) be required in the flare/vent header system to ensure:
i. The separation of entrained liquid from the relief gas prior to disposal; and
ii. Maximum collection of liquid which is discharged in emergency situations.
The sizing of the knockout drum is governed by both the amount of maximum liquid and gas
that can be relieved by credible scenarios afore mentioned.
Additional flare gas knockout facilities and/or separate flare headers shall be installed for the
following cases:
i. Presence of cold flashing liquids in relief streams e.g. liquefied gas which may
cause blockages in the main KO drum or liquid seal drum.
ii. Presence of high temperature liquids which may cause high stress due to thermal
expansion in the main flare system high temperature fluids.
iii. Presence of cold cryogenic liquid (LNG) which when flowing at the bottom of flare
header and warm cause cryogenic pipe bending.
iv. Recovering liquid relief streams which are toxic or streams that requires
segregation because of chemical reaction or neutralization.
v. Presence of high pour point liquids which may result in solidification at flare
header.
vi. Require to overcome problems with header elevations.
vii. Require to prevent liquid entering the main flare system in cases where
emergency relief from other plants may generate liquid slugs which can impact
elbows and tees.
4.2 SIZING OF FLARE KNOCK OUT DRUM
A unit knockout drum shall be installed in the event that the system is expected to have liquid
reliefs to avoid two phase and slug flow reliefs in flare/vent headers. The unit KO drum shall
be located in system of higher pressure relative to the main flare/vent knock out drum
Method 1: Gas Capacity Factor method:
The following formula defines the gas/ liquid separation efficiency of a knockout drum based
on the gas capacity factor, k:

PTS 16.52.04
Page 28 of 55
Q Sg
k = √
Ag Sl − Sg
Where:
k = Gas capacity factor (m/s)
Q = Gas flow rate (m3/s) at operating conditions
Ag = Area available for gas flow (m2)
For vertical vessels, Ag is the cross sectional area of the vessel
For horizontal vessels, Ag is the cross sectional area of the gas cap available
above the LZA (HH) level (see also 4.1.2)
Sg = Gas density (kg/m3) at operating conditions
Sl = Liquid density (kg/m3) at operating conditions
Refer to PTS 16.52.09 for detailed discussion on sizing of Gas-Liquid separators.
The knockout drum size for an atmospheric vent stack shall comply with gas capacity factor
(k) of 0.07 m/s maximum whilst for flare knockout drums, higher k value is used.
The following flow conditions whichever are most definitive, shall be determined for gas
capacity factor (k) for flare knock out drum.
No. Flow Conditions Description Maximum k for

final knockout
drum (m/s)
1 Essential Dry Gas Relief with essentially dry gas or with 0.25 m/s typical
Relief inside battery limit KO drum
2 Two Phase Relief Significant liquid quantities in relief or 0.1 m/s for half-
without inside battery limits KO Drum open pipe
Table 4.1: Flow Conditions

PTS 16.52.04
Page 29 of 55
Method 2: API Std. 521 method:
Procedure to size horizontal flare KO drum based on droplet size is specified in Section 5.7.9.5
of API Std. 521. User may choose to size flare KO drum based on API method if found
economical.
In cases where two stage flare knockout drums (in series) are employed, the upstream KO
drum can be size smaller to separate large droplet size provided the downstream KO drum
is sized to meet the separation requirements and the risk of slug flow between the KO drums
is acceptable. The knockout drums may have a liquid boot for the collection and draining of
liquid. Proper level measurement and control shall be provided for discharging the collected
liquid. The discharged liquid shall be routed to the associated treatment or storage systems.
In the case of horizontal knockout drums with two-inlets, the flow (Q) which determines the
required cross sectional area shall be 0.5 of the maximum relief flow, taking into consideration
any possible maldistribution1 of the flow entering the knockout drum. If such is the case, it is
important to ensure that the length of the vessel is not less than five times its diameter (L/D
>5) and the knockout drum inlet piping is designed symmetrically.
NOTE(S): 1. Computational Fluid Dynamics (CFD) study should be carried out to check on vapour flow maldistribution.
If half open pipe is used it shall be directed internally towards the head of the vessel.
If a major gas relief coincides with the major liquid relief, the available cross sectional area for
the gas cap shall be above the liquid level reached after the major liquid relief.
4.3 KO DRUM LIQUID HOLD UP AND TRANSFER OUT CAPABILITIES
The liquid space in the knockout drum depends on the maximum amount of liquid the
knockout drum has to contain during an emergency situation. The volume above the LZA (HH)
level of normal operations can be taken as available to accommodate reliefs from emergency
situations.
If a maintenance drains system is integrated into the knockout facility, the knockout vessel
shall be sized for the volume expected from normal maintenance activities. The level due to
normal maintenance activities shall not reduce the volume required for emergency liquid hold
up.
Knockout vessels that are also being used as a maintenance drain system will include
maintenance volumes in liquid section of the vessel.
Adequacy of liquid hold up is critical shall consider sufficient hold up time for liquid space on
top of LZA (HH) liquid level.
Liquid space above LZA (HH) shall be designed to contain the maximum emergency liquid relief
rate from the largest single contingency, including common mode contingencies, for a period
of at least 15 min for the unit knockout drum and at least 20-30 min for the flare knockout
drum, without taking credit for pump out capacity.
Where liquid relief is likely to continue for longer than mentioned above, the hold-up time
should be increased accordingly. The above time period has been selected on the basis that

PTS 16.52.04
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corrective measures to control the relief will be taken within this time.
If a horizontal knockout drum is used, the provision of a liquid boot at the bottom may be
considered. The LZA (HH) level could then be set in the top part of the boot, in which case the
full vertical cross sectional area of the knock-out drum is available for gas/liquid separation.
If the KO drum is linked to a single plant or single unit, corrective measures can be taken by
instrument action reacting on high level trip i.e. LZA (HH). This instrumentation shall be
subjected to an IPF classification.
After the maximum emergency liquid relief the liquid level shall remain:
i. For Vertical Vessel

a) 0.3 D or 0.3 m whichever is greater below the bottom of inlet device.
ii. For Horizontal Vessel

a) 15-30 minutes above LZAHH and not less than 0.15 m.
4.4 PUMP OUT CAPACITY
The knockout drum shall be equipped with electrically driven pumps (one operating, one
spare). Pump out rate from the flare knock out vessel shall be based on the time needed to
pump out the vessel after the liquid load has stopped typically in the range of 2 to 8 hours.
Hold-up volume needs to be sufficient to contain the maximum amount of liquid generated
during any emergency situation. Pump start-up can be initiated by the operator in response
to the high level alarm, and the stream routed as appropriate. The pump can be automatically
shut down at low level.
If it is justified not to install a pump (instead relying on auto-evaporation and/or occasional

pump-out e.g. by vacuum truck and/or drainage to a safe location), the level required for
pump control need not be taken into account and the required control level might be less than
that determined in separator design. A vacuum truck should not be used unless the flare is
shut down or fluid is drained to an intermediate point such as a sump.
If pumps are applied, they shall be designed so that liquid back-flow cannot occur from the
disposal system back into the flare liquid knockout vessels, either through gravity flow from
storage or from pressurised disposal systems, or back through the pump in the standby
operation mode. Requirement of check valves and backflow prevention redundancy shall be
verified.
For cryogenic services where the use of pump to evacuate liquid from KO drum is not feasible
due to low NPSHA and/or cavitation, an alternate arrangement of evacuation of liquid shall
be evaluated. For example, liquid from the flare KO drum should be drained via gravity to a
separate vessel and liquid from the vessel then be sent to its destination using pressurized
nitrogen or fuel gas.
For onshore oil treatment facilities where main PSV discharge is sent to flare KO vessel, the
Flare KO Drum Pump design shall consider two pumps running simultaneously when the level
reach high high (HH) with stand by pump stop at normal liquid level. The duty pump shall stop

PTS 16.52.04
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at the low low (LL) liquid level. Additionally, the suction and discharge line shall be designed
for two pumps running in parallel.
4.5 KO DRUM HEATING REQUIREMENT
Electrical or steam heating with or without temperature control shall be provided if the liquid
could solidify or freeze (i.e. if the pour/freeze point is above Lowest One-Day Mean Ambient
Temperature and for wet cold blowdown). In this case external heat tracing shall also be
provided to the piping upstream and downstream of the pumps.
Where hot oil is used as the heating medium, the design shall consider the throttling valve
either on the supply or return line to allow for better handling of the required temperature
inside the KO drum.
Heating shall be provided to vaporise volatile liquid (e.g. liquid propane) using electric heater
or a steam coil. When using steam the following shall be verified:
i. The possibility of (steam) condensate freeze-up shall be eliminated.
ii. Adequate steam trap shall be installed.
iii. The impact of steam leaks on flare integrity due to freezing issues shall be
considered.
A knockout vessel that requires a heating system to boil off light hydrocarbon may be provided
with external heaters (e.g. external bolt-on heating panels) in lieu of internal heaters (e.g.
bayonet heaters). Maintenance and inspection of internal heaters may be required taking the
knockout drum out of service.
4.6 INSTRUMENTATION
The instrumentation requirements shall conform to PTS 16.52.09 with specific requirements
inherent to the operation of a flare knockout drum.
The pump-out system can be fully automated or using a start /stop operation based on level
indications, automatic with pump start on LA (H) and pump stop on LA (L). It is also common
practice for the pump start-up to be initiated by the operator in response to the high level
alarm, and the stream is routed as appropriate. In this case the pump can be configured for
an automatic shutdown at low level LA (L). For unmanned and remote platforms the flared
liquids pump-out system may be fully automated.
It is essential that the specified distances be applied irrespective of pump-out mode, since it
will ensure the design of a proper volume in the vessel for normal level control:

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No. Level in Height Within Vessel Considerations

KO
drum
1 LZA (LL ) 0.15 m Above Vessel Bottom. Lower than 0.15 m for large diameter
vertical KO drum.
Boot for horizontal KO drum.
2 LA (L) 0.2 m above LZA (LL ) or Sufficient hold up to avoid nuisance

alarm.
60 sec for pump-out capacity
of liquid volume.
3 LA (H) 0.2 m above LA (L ) ) or Sufficient liquid hold up in between

levels.
5 Minute for pump-out
capacity of liquid volume.
4 LZA 0.2 m above LA (H ) or KO Drum shall have two redundant high

(HH) level alarms to give the operator a
60 sec for pump-out capacity timely alarm of high level in the drum
of liquid volume. soon enough to take corrective action
Serves as indication of malfunction in

the pump-out facilities or that a major
liquid relief is entering the KO drum.
5 LZA 15-30 minutes above LZAHH. Alarm is optional.

(HHH)
Table 4.2: Design of Volume in the Vessel for Normal Level Control
i. Alarms shall use independent (i.e. separate nozzles), transmitters (not level
switches) and be set to alarm so that the operator has sufficient amount of time
to respond.
ii. IPF classification, in accordance with PTS 14.12.10, which will determine the
correct hardware and testing frequency shall be done to have proper safety
integrity (SIL 1 as a minimum) and availability. The alarm should also have a very
high priority within the framework of the site’s alarm management system.
iii. Knockout vessels may have an alarm at the liquid level where droplets greater
than the specified criteria (e.g., 500 µm) begin to get carried-out from the drum.
This level is considered the LZA (HHH) point.
iv. High-high level shall result in an automatic plant shutdown.

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v. TZA (L) low temperature switch is required to prevent a pump from being started
if low temperature liquid has collected in the flare knockout drum. TZA (H), high
temperature switch is required to prevent a pump from being started, if high
temperature liquid has collected in the flare knockout drum. The high
temperature liquid could generate too much vapour when pumped into the slops
tank. As an alternative, passing the liquid through a cooler to the slop oil tank may
be considered.
4.7 OTHER REQUIREMENTS
Nozzle sizes
i. Momentum criterion shall comply with the following:
No. Type of Inlet Momentum Considerations for Outlet Nozzle

Device Criterion
1 Half open pipe 5,000 N/m2 Outlet nozzle shall have a momentum
criterion of 6,000 N/m2
Table 4.3: Momentum Criterion for Nozzle
ii. The above criterion need not be followed in the essentially dry case, though the
momentum (nozzle load) shall be considered in developing the mechanical
design.
iii. In general, vapour outlet nozzles should not be fitted with any devices (e.g.
deflection plates, baffles, demister pads, vane packs, etc.), because of the
potential for such devices to fail or plug and obstruct the outlet. Such devices
should be used only if the drum is equipped with an alternate outlet nozzle sized
for the drum’s design vapor flow rate and fitted with a rupture disk (or buckling
pin device) whose burst pressure is selected both to protect the drum against
overpressure and to permit proper operation of the drum and relief system in the
event the normal vapour outlet becomes obstructed.
Design pressure
The minimum design pressure of flare/vent knockout and water seal vessels shall(PSR) be 7
barg (100 psig) considering a deflagration pressure equivalent to 7 to 8 times of maximum
absolute operating pressure of knockout drum. Refer to NFPA 69 for details.

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4.8 WATER SEAL VESSELS
The purpose of water seal vessels is to:
i. Prevent the flashback from the tip of the vent or flare to cause damage to flare
tip and further upstream sections.
ii. Keep positive pressure in the flare/vent and relief system so as to prevent the air
from entering the system and also provide suction pressure for a flare/vent gas
recovery system if used.
The maximum vapour quantity to be released determines the design of the water seal vessels.
Dedicated water seal vessel for each flare stack shall be provided. For two or more flare stacks
operating in parallel the dip legs should be set staggered.
The water seal vessels shall be installed nearest possible to the flare stack, with the shortest
lines between the seal vessel and the flare stack and no expansion loops downstream of the
seal drums.
Proper designs of water seal vessels should prevent the ejection of water seals during a
flaring/venting event and is a critical consideration when selecting the location of the
flare/vent stack. The head loss for vent line to atmosphere for non-condensable shall be less
than the liquid seal height to avoid relief streams and vapour release at grade.
The vessel-free area for gas flow above the liquid level should be a minimum of 0.91 m or
three times the inlet pipe cross-sectional area to prevent surges of gas flow to the flare and
to provide space for disengagement.
Surging in seal drums can be minimized with the use of V-notches on the end of the dip leg. If
the water sloshes in the seal drum, it will cause pulsations in the gas flow to the flare, resulting
in noise and light disturbances. Hydraulics, sizing calculation for water seal drum and liquid
seal height calculations, design of anti-sloshing devices and internals in water seal drum shall
be submitted by vendor.
The water seals shall be protected against freezing with the installation of an internal coil
(steam heater) and/or electrical heat tracing (EHT), continuous water makeup and purge. It is
also critical to provide a low temperature alarm and EHT alarms.
Water seal vessels shall(PSR) not be used for LNG as it may form a barrier in the flare relief
system in the event of a cold release. Alternative sealing fluids such as glycol/water mixture
or alternative methods such as heating the seal fluid when cold temperature is detected can
be considered
When two or more flare stacks are operating in parallel, the installation of anti-flashback
devices should be done at the bottom of the flare stacks. Anti-flashback devices are not
necessary in the event where one flare is spare to another flare. Nonetheless, operating
procedures shall prevent the occurrence of flashbacks (e.g. higher purge rates) should the
operational flare is switched to the spare flare.

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When an alternative sealing system is used the reliability of such sealing system shall be as
reliable as the liquid seal system in order to maintain an open path to the flare system and to
prevent from getting into the flare system from the flare tip.
The alternative sealing system such as instrumentation relief bypass with purge shall use
normally closed full size emergency control valves that will open to flare when overpressure.
In such a design there will be a bypass with either a rupture disk or a buckling pin relief valve
around the control valve to ensure an open flow path to flare in case the control valve
malfunctions. The pressure switch of the emergency control valve which is set at a lower
setting than the relief setting, thus protects the rupture disk against premature ruptures. The
reliability and redundancy of the control valve systems shall be in accordance to PTS 14.12.10.
A purge only system which relies solely on purge flow is not a preferred sealing system.
Refer to Section 5.7.8 and Annex D of API Std. 521 for typical details of water seal drum.
4.9 FACILITIES OF LIQUID DISPOSAL
A suitable system to safely dispose of the liquid shall be selected based on the relevant criteria
[i.e. the required capacity nature of the liquid (e.g. viscosity and pour point), economic value,
expected frequency and duration of disposal). It is also important to take into consideration
the economic merits as well as the potential impacts on the environment in the selection
process.
The installation of the High Integrity Pressure Protection System (HIPPS) with the necessary
features (i.e. instrumentation, shutdown valves and others as defined by the HIPPS installation
requirements) shall be considered where it is not possible to relieve large amount of upstream
inventory in the trunk line. When designing for HIPPS, the effect of ESD valve closure to the
inlet trunk lines, and/ or flow lines as a result of the HIPPS installation shall be studied.
In cases where a relation between the emergency liquid release and a certain process is
identified, releasing the liquid back to its feed vessel or another suitable vessel may be helpful,
while making sure that the process does not overfill or overpressure the receiving vessel.
Slop Oil Storage
A slop oil storage should be used to store small quantities of liquids which are occasionally
released and subsequently collected in the flare/vent knockout drum with the following
considerations:
i. There shall be sufficient storage available;
ii. The volatility of the liquid shall be within an acceptable range;
iii. The temperature of the liquid shall not be more than 70 °C, with an intermediate
cooler which is required to function despite power failures;
iv. The pour point of the liquid shall be kept at a location which is not too high

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Liquid Disposal Burners
i. Liquid burners may be used to dispose of the liquids over prolonged periods in
the event where there are large streams of liquids which have no economic or
environmental incentives to recover. The liquid burners may be used to dispose
of the liquids over prolonged periods.
ii. Assist gases should also be considered to increase the efficiency of high
combustion and to enhance the turn down capability of the liquid burner.
iii. A sufficient purge shall be provided to prevent flashback.
Burn Pits
i. Drain lines can be routed directly to the pit as it has storage capacity. There shall
be a sterile area with a radius of not less than 100 m which should not be
combined with the sterile area of the main flare.
ii. To protect the piping to burn pits or liquid disposal burners against fire, burying
them or putting them in a trench covered by concrete slabs can be considered.
iii. A sufficient purge shall be provided to prevent flashback as and when required,
together with sufficient pilots, pilot monitoring and re-ignition systems for pilots.

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5.0 FLARE HEAT RADIATION LEVELS
5.1 HEAT RADIATION LEVELS
Calculation Method
i. The basic calculation method to determine the heat radiation levels of burning
flares shall be referred to API Std. 521.
ii. Dispersion, noise level, vent tips and purging are all part of an overall complete
design of a flare system. The following data inputs are required to perform a flare
stack calculation.
a) Relieving Rate
b) Gas composition
c) Flare Gas Temperature
d) Mach No
e) Sterile Area
f) Allowable Radiation
g) Fraction of Heat Radiated, F
h) Site data i.e. air temperature and wind velocity (average prevailing wind
speed shall be used up to maximum wind speed of 9 m/s)
iii. Based on Section 5.7.2.3 of API Std. 521, the Heat Radiation Level and Fraction of
Heat Radiated (F) can be found and used to derive the flare stack height and sterile
area radius.
iv. For smokeless flaring, refer to Section 5.7.3.2 of API Std. 521 for suggested steam
injection rates. Flare system manufacturer shall be consulted for the exact
requirements.
Allowable Levels for Heat Radiation
i. Sterile area is defined as the restricted area within the 6.3 kW/m2 radiation plus
solar radiation. Sterile area radius shall be calculated based on maximum flare
design load considering prevailing wind speed to meet the radiation intensity
requirement.
ii. Personnel movement shall be restricted and only equipment essential for flare
operation shall be allowed within this area.
iii. This being the case, the number of equipment located in the sterile zone should
be minimal.
iv. Despite the fact that equipment that are within the sterile area should be located
as close as possible to the flare stack, the following considerations shall be taken
into account when locating these equipment:
a) Risks to people
b) Risks to equipment
c) Thermal radiation levels

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d) Slug flow occurrences

e) Liquid carryover possibilities
v. It is also mandatory to ensure that the electrical equipment and instrumentation

shall be able to withstand the thermal radiation in the sterile area.
vi. The exposure duration required to reach the pain threshold shall be designed
following Section 5.7.2.3 of API Std. 521 with the exemption that solar radiation
effects are neglected.
vii. Radiation calculations shall be performed regardless whether the flare stack is
temporary or permanent.
viii. The following flare radiation limits (at grade and at elevated structures) shall(PSR)
be used as the basis for design flare loads:
Location Radiation limit

(kW/m2)
Public, sustained exposure 1.58
Public, short term exposure 2.37
Cooling water towers 3.15
Sustained exposure where there is adequate training 4.73

with respect to flare thermal radiation
Short-term exposure where there are large numbers 4.73

of people exposed and/or activities that cannot by
stopped in a timely manner (e.g., turnaround
activities).
For onshore, sterile area shall be provided. At the 6.30

boundary of the sterile area. Maximum short-term
exposure where there is adequate training with
respect to flare thermal radiation. Entry into an area
where this or a greater level of radiation is expected
requires special precautions (e.g. reducing potential
flare loads, use of personal protective equipment)
Cable trays 12.0
Metal equipment. In accordance with API Std 2510A, 22.1

vessels receiving more than 22.1 kW/m2 require
cooling, otherwise they may overheat and lose
strength.
NOTE(S): The controlling case for hydraulic design and the controlling case for flare radiation may not
necessarily be the same.
Table 5.1: Flare Radiation Limits

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ix. Personnel are commonly protected from high thermal radiation intensity by
restricting access to any area where the thermal radiation can exceed 6.3 kW/m2.
x. The boundary of a restricted access area can be marked with signage warning of
the potential thermal radiation hazard.
xi. Personnel admittance to, and any work within the restricted access area shall be
controlled administratively.
xii. Personnel within the restricted access area shall have immediate access to
thermal radiation shielding or protective clothing suitable for escape to a safe
location.
xiii. Adequate heat shields at the first platform along with temporary shelters (i.e. in
accordance with grade) shall be made available within the sterile area to
safeguard personnel.
xiv. For equipment outside the sterile area, consideration shall be made for
equipment with elevated work platforms. The access to the platform should be
by stairways located at the side facing away from the flare stack.
xv. Shelters shall be made available if there is a possibility that personnel could be
exposed to a radiation levels higher than 6.3 kW/m2.
xvi. The same guidelines for flare stacks apply to liquid burners, with an exception of
lower height of the structure. An F factor of 0.3 shall be used in order to specify
the heat radiation.
5.2 DISPERSION LEVELS
It is always important to note that any emergency release shall be done at safe location. This
implies that the location of the design shall ensure that any personnel or equipment present
in close proximity to the release is not affected or exposed to a hazardous situation. The
dispersion calculations shall be based on the release of the most unfavourable concentrations
in the stream as well as the most undesired but realistic weather conditions:
Wind Speed of 5 m/s with atmospheric stability D
Wind Speed of 2 m/s with atmospheric stability F

NOTE(S): Stability is based on Pasquill – Gifford Stability Category
The following shall be met in order to meet the above criterion:
i. Dispersion shall be such that within the hazardous contour (the area within which
either an ignition source or personnel could be present):
a) the concentration of the flammable components is not greater than 50%
of the lower flammability limit;
and

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b) the final concentration of toxic and very toxic compounds at the areas
where personnel or outsiders may be exposed to is lower than the IDLH
value (Immediate Dangerous to Life or Health)
ii. Irritation levels or noticeable stenches is not detected within the plant. It is
possible to assume that the flare is operating as required (combustion efficiency
>98%).
Atmospheric stability, wind speed, humidity and other sensitivities shall be considered when
using physical effects modelling to ascertain the hazardous contours sensitivities with respect
to wind speed, humidity, surface structure etc.
5.3 NOISE LIMITS
PTS 12.01.02 shall apply. For emergency conditions the noise level at the bottom of the stack
shall not exceed 115 dB (A).
For normal operation (including starting-up and shutting-down):
i. A noise level of not greater than 85 dB (A) shall be detected for flow rates as high
as 15% of the maximum flaring capacity or the maximum relief rate that can
happen during normal operation; whichever higher, at the perimeter of the sterile
area. This also applies to start up and shutdown conditions.
ii. If noise level limits are imposed on the areas outside the vicinity of the plant, then
the sound power level created during normal operation shall be considered when
allocating sound power levels to noise sources within the plant.

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6.0 FLARE DETAILS
Flare process and system design, flare type and configuration selections and requirements
shall be indicated in EDRS in combination with PTS 12.42.02 and this PTS. The design shall
include feasibility of site inspection and maintenance as and when required. No double pipe
type flare stack or other types shall be used as it is impractical to carry out site inspection and
maintenance.
Details of Flare shall be referred to PTS 12.42.02.
A complete system design requires flare and vent tips, among other components, to ensure a
safe and reliable discharge of hydrocarbons from pressure relieving and vapour-depressuring
systems. A flare system design comprises of fundamental elements as follows:
i. Reliable pilots which are proven for severe service;
ii. Regulated natural gas supply to pilots;
iii. Pilot monitoring;
iv. Pilot ignition;
v. Flame retention device placed on the flare tip;
vi. Main flame monitoring; and
vii. UPS power supply to operate all monitoring and ignition systems.

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7.0 FLARE AND VENT PURGING
7.1 BACKGROUND
The flare and vent stacks are vulnerable to air ingress down the stack as they are idle at most
times. The stacks and flare headers shall(PSR) have a purge unless otherwise specified which
serves to prevent excessive air intrusion and possible internal deflagration. The criteria
applicable to the purge rates required to prevent oxygen ingress and to reduce the possibility
of detonation within the flare and vent system is detailed out in this section, taking into
consideration the passive aids that may be utilised.
7.2 PURGING DESIGN CONSIDERATIONS
Purging
Air ingress and formation of air hydrocarbon explosive mixture in the flare and vent system
shall(PSR) be prohibited by ensuring continuous purging. To secure the purge gas supply the
purge gas source shall be reliable. Typically purge facilities using nitrogen or HC gas will have
locked open block valves with restriction orifice or a globe valve to set the purge rates.
Purge gas should be non-condensable, inert gas like N2 (with oxygen content less than 4%)
and hydrocarbon gas depending on their availability.
Purge gas shall be provided at the far ends of flare system network such as flare subheaders
and significant branches. Purge gas is required to clear air from the system prior to startup
and from preventing vacuum pulling back air into the flare system after a hot gas discharge is
flared.
Purge gas can be conservatively estimated considering a velocity of 0.012 m/s (at standard
conditions) in the main header for stacks with buoyancy or velocity seals. Refer to Section
5.7.6 of API Std. 521 for calculation of purge gas requirement without any effect of velocity or
buoyancy seal.
Design Considerations
The following points shall be taken into consideration in designing a flare or vent system
purge:
i. Formation of flammable air/fuel mixtures in the stack may occur as a result of

oxygen ingress, which may subsequently cause a flashback upon being ignited.
Consequently, this may give rise to deflagration in most cases and potentially a
detonation under certain circumstances;
ii. Formation of deposits i.e. partial oxidation of sulphur compounds may occur due
to oxygen ingress which may then cause flare blockage;
iii. The occurrence of back burning or a licking flame is likely to happen should there
be too little purge gas used, hence reducing the service life of the flare tip;

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iv. An unstable flame caused by too little purge gas used could also result in
inefficient burning which may have negative impacts or stench towards the
surroundings;
v. The selection of fuel gas as purge gas should be assess on CO2 equivalents emitted
to value the impact to project economics .
vi. The injection of sweet gas either continuously or intermittently is necessary in the
event where the relief system is required to handle corrosive gas or gas which is
prone to condensation or solidification, on top of purge gas. The injection shall be
performed at strategic locations in the flare relief system.
vii. Natural gas that is used for purging shall be clean and dry from a continuous
supply source that will not be interrupted.
viii. Steam shall not be considered to be used as a purging medium.
ix. Nitrogen can be used as purge gas for facilities that are expected to have
infrequent relief.
Air Ingress into Stack
i. Air Ingress into the stack can occur in the following scenario:
a) Air may diffuse down into the stack;
b) A differential pressure may be present at the top of the stack due to the
wind action across the tip at low flow rates;
c) The density of relief gas may be lower than air, potentially affecting the
system. This is particular relevant in the case where two or more stacks
are operating in parallel whereby the relief gas may have a higher
tendency to leave through one stack only while the heavier air enters
through the other stack and mix with the relief gas and thus, giving rise
to an explosive mixture;
d) The contents of the relief system may condense and/ or shrink causing an
underpressure within the relief system as a result of the increase in heat
removal due to a hot release or a rain shower on the header as in the case
after a major hot, heavy gas relief. Air ingress due to vacuum conditions
caused by recovery through a flare gas compressor is possible. The 2
scenarios that could lead to air ingress are:
 A liquid seal drum or emergency control valve with relief bypass
is not used and the recovery rate is greater than the purge rate.
 The seal is lost after a relief event and the slow reestablishment
of seal.
e) Air ingress is likely to occur during a plant (relief system) shutdown when
some connections are open and the purge system is inoperative or
insufficient for a prolonged period; and
f) Air ingress may take place through a corrosion hole or through a cracked
open flange leading to an internal fire in the stack which jeopardizes its
structural integrity.

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ii. The flare tip Manufacturer usually specifies the purge requirements for vertical
flare stacks in hydrogen service and flare stacks with seals. The required
continuous purge rates for open flare stacks without seals in hydrocarbon service
can be calculated in accordance to Section 5.7.6 of API Std. 521 for other gas
compositions. The standard criteria is to limit the oxygen content volume fraction
to 6 % at a distance of 7.62 m down below in the flare stack. Purge gas rates higher
than those derived from the equation may be required to establish an initial air
free condition during start-up.
iii. One of the ways to avoid air ingress into the flare stack, vent KO drum, flare
network and subsequent catastrophic consequences, is to continuously purge of
hydrocarbon gases. This continuous hydrocarbon gas purge flow in the flare
network helps to build up some positive backpressure at the vent knock out drum.
This is the normal operating pressure for the vent KO drum when no other sources
(relief valves, blowdown valves etc.) are emitting any relief flow. Thus continuous
purge gas flow maintains a small positive backpressure in the vent KO drum, vent
header and helps to keep the air out.
iv. It is important for the source of the continuous purge gas flow to be located at
the farthest end of the flare/vent network from the flare stack. This way the
constant positive back pressure can be obtained throughout the flare network, at
all the relieving sources
v. The minimum average lower heating value for normal minimum flare streams
which are usually considered for the purge streams is 11.2 MJ/m3.
vi. Flares operating under normal conditions (i.e. not emergency conditions) shall
comply with the local regulations where applicable in terms of maximum design
velocity and minimum heating values.
vii. It is important to ensure that the purge gas source shall(PSR) be reliable to secure
the purge gas supply and the purge shall(PSR) be supplied through a locked open
block valve. A purge system without a seal vessel shall have a reliability
comparable to that of the seal drum.
viii. Analysis should be conducted on the system to check for air ingress and reverse
flame propagation should there be no seal vessel used or as an additional
hindrance against air ingress. If the air ingress is greater than volume of flare stack
a high rate emergency purge would be required.
ix. The flare and vent stack shall have a purge flow measuring device with indication
in the central control room and should be installed with low flow alarms. Backflow
protection shall also be installed.
x. Inert gas like nitrogen or low pressure fuel gas can be used for purging. Automated
switchover to HC gas or to nitrogen for purging is recommended to ensure secure
purge gas supply in flare header and stack.

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xi. In the event where it is possible to relieve cold gas such as in the NGL plants and
freezing of water can take place, the use of water shall(PSR) be replaced with glycol
in the seal drum to prevent freezing. However, in the event where it is possible to
relieve very cold gas such as in the LNG plants, it is important not to use a seal
vessel despite it being filled with glycol. In this case, the installation of an anti-
flashback device at the stack inlet is critical if two stacks have to operate in
parallel. It is not required for anti-flashback devices to be installed in single stack
operations on the assumption that the possibility of air ingress to happen in LNG
plants which only handle cold gases at sub ambient temperatures is very unlikely
xii. The purge gas and flare tip shall consider the following:
a) The available purge gas type (e.g. hydrogen rich gas possesses a higher
tendency to back burning);
b) The economic value of the purge gas;
c) Meeting regulatory requirements on air emission;
d) The composition of the gas to be flared;
e) The layout of the vent and flare system;
f) Flare gas recovery system;
g) The type of flare tips (avoid flare tips prone to back burning);
h) The flaring philosophy;
i) The consequences of air ingress.
7.3 PURGE REDUCTION SEALS
The overall purge gas requirement can be reduced, but not eliminated, with various types of
devices.
Gas seals of the labyrinth type such as molecular seals shall not be used.
Gas seals that are capable to prevent air infiltration along the wall of the stack by returning
air to the unrestricted central zone of the stack shall be used.
The purge rate requirements for a particular type of seal can be obtained from the
Manufacturers.
The material for purge reduction seals shall be the same as the flare tip which shall be placed
close to the flare tip base flange to facilitate inspection and maintenance activities.

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7.4 FLAME/DETONATION ARRESTORS
Generally, the use of flame or detonation arrestors as an alternative to a continuous purge for
flare tip flash back protection is not allowed due to the following:
i. Potential blockage;
ii. Potentially undetected mechanical damage;
iii. Provision of an obstruction to flow; and
iv. Ineffectiveness as a result of heat buildup.
The use of flame or detonation arrestors should only be considered in the event where the
purge gas is not viable and relief fluid is clean. If employed, place the arrestors near the tip of
the vent while still being accessible for maintenance and inspection. This is to prevent
explosions occurring in a vent pipe.
It is vital to provide complete details of the intended service, location and arrangement of an
arrestor to the Manufacturer to help make a suitable selection. In order to prevent the flame
front from accelerating, installation of arrestors should be made at or near the end of vent
pipes.
All installed flame or detonation arrestors shall be certified and installed as specified by the
Manufacturer. They shall(PSR) be inspected regularly while paying particular attention to:
i. The arrestors without a constant vent stream running through them;
ii. The arrestors used on an inbreathing service which can cause flammable
atmosphere in vessels or tanks
iii. The arrestors used on any services with relatively higher blockage risks.
The provision of a constant nitrogen purge stream through normally non-flowing flame
arrestors may be considered to enable detection of blockages can be done early.
Flame arrestors shall be installed in open vent lines if inbreathing via the vent lines may result
in a flammable atmosphere in vessels or tanks.
Use of flame arrestor shall be prohibited in the scenarios below in order to avoid flow
restrictions in relief path:
i. Relief valves releasing to atmosphere
ii. P/V valves on tanks
iii. Open vents where the vented material can polymerize or condense causing
blockage.

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Pressure vacuum relief valves may not be able to stop a flame front from entering the
equipment under certain conditions. Therefore additional safeguards should be evaluated in
applications where the development of the flammable range of composition is possible.
The certification such as UL listing and installation of flame and detonation arrestors shall be
done according to the specifications provided by the Manufacturer of the arrestors.

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8.0 VENT SNUFFING
8.1 BACKGROUND
In the event of an accidental ignition of vented gases, remote controlled snuffing system on
all vent stacks should be considered in order to avoid continuous burning. Pressure relief vents
that discharge flammable vapours to atmosphere shall have remotely controlled manually
operated steam, carbon dioxide or nitrogen snuffing facilities if the vent discharge is more
than 30 m above grade and if the site has frequent thunderstorms.
8.2 VENT SNUFFING REQUIREMENTS
The snuffing medium may be nitrogen, carbon dioxide or steam (if available); Halon or
other CFCs shall not be used due to their adverse effects on the environment.
The snuffing system shall be operated from a manual station. Once the flame is
extinguished, the control system shall ensure that metal temperatures at the tip of the vent
drop sufficiently to prevent spontaneous ignition of gas and the danger of flashback.
The snuffing facilities shall be sized to extinguish the stack at least three times in
succession when it is burning and discharging at a rate corresponding to 1 % of the
maximum vent flow rate. Adequate monitoring facilities shall be provided for vent snuffing
system to ensure that the flame has been successfully extinguished and alert the operator on
the inventory status of vent snuffing cylinders.

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9.0 FLARE PILOTS AND IGNITION
9.1 GENERAL
All flare systems shall be provided with continuous pilot burners to ignite the flare gas as it
leaves the tip. The pilots shall each be provided with an ignition system in case they are
extinguished. Pilot and ignition management systems including routine monitoring and
testing shall be in place.
Further requirements and information regarding pilots and ignition systems are given in
API Std. 527.
9.2 FLARE PILOT REQUIREMENTS
The pilots provided at the flare tip shall be capable of sustaining stable combustion under all
flaring and meteorological conditions. Pilots should therefore be checked by means of a flame
stability model. Pilots shall be in accordance with API Std. 537, plus the following:
i. Pilots shall be certified through testing of the stability requirements under the
specified wind and rain criteria in any wind direction. The testing shall include
exposure of the pilot gas mixer to the same environmental conditions as the pilot
tip and demonstrate the ability to relight the pilot under the same conditions.
ii. Pilots shall be of the self-aspirating type with air mixer and gas orifice integral to
the pilot assembly. Pilot systems with a common air mixer and gas orifice at grade
shall not be used.
iii. For pipe flare tips up to 400 mm diameter, at least two pilot burners shall be
provided. Three pilot burners shall be provided for flare tips larger than 400 mm.
Four pilot burners shall be provided for flare tips larger than 1100 mm. For
proprietary flare tips the Manufacturer’s proposal should be considered in view
of the API Std. 537 requirements.
iv. The pilot tip shall be constructed of type 310 S stainless steel.
Each of the pilots shall be ignited by means of an individual ignition line.
The location of the pilots' mixer should be such that they are not engulfed by the flame of the
main flare even in strong winds. Ignition of the main flare shall be ensured under these
conditions.
The materials and design of the pilots and their method of support should be such that they
require minimum maintenance and are suitable for at least a five year service period. The
ignition lines to the pilot burners shall be stainless steel (AISI 321) to prevent the possibility of
internal corrosion, with the top 4 m being type 310S stainless steel.
Allowance shall be made for differential expansion between the flare stack and the pilot lines,
with particular attention being paid to the support brackets.

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The use of advanced pilot systems is recommended. These systems are equipped with a
venturi device in the pilot nozzle, which allows a reduction in fuel gas consumption and
increases pilot gas exit velocity and so enhances air entrainment and improves flame
stability. The Manufacturer’s recommendations should be followed concerning the quantity
of the fuel gas required for proprietary pilot light systems. The pilot flame can be further
stabilised by the installation of windshields around the pilot nozzles.
The fuel gas and the pressurized air used to supply the pilot lighting and ignition system shall
be dried and filtered to prevent blockage of the lines. Clean reliable and non-interruptible
fuel gas shall be used for the pilots. The hydrocarbon and water dew points of the fuel gas
and the water dew point of the air shall be such that condensation is not possible under
any mode of operation. The filter shall be installed between the carbon steel fuel gas supply
line to the flare and the stainless steel supply lines to the pilots and ignition system. In
addition, the gas should be of a constant composition, since a change in the Wobbe Index of
the gas may affect flame stability.
The pilot gas supply lines shall be arranged without pockets and any build-up of
condensation shall be alarmed at the control room before blockage can occur.
The pilot gas mixers/orifices shall be heat traced in plants subject to hoarfrost conditions.
One stainless steel gas supply line along the stack shall be used for each pilot burner.
Individual lines allow testing of the individual pilot flameout monitoring and auto-ignition
systems. The pilot gas supply piping arrangement shall include the following components:
i. A filter between carbon steel and stainless steel piping systems;
ii. Parallel pressure regulators at grade together with a high- and low-pressure
alarm and pressure indicator in a common manifold arrangement before
branching into the individual pilot gas lines, each including a quarter turn
isolation valve and downstream pressure gauge; and,
iii. Each pilot shall include a strainer at the base of the gas mixer.
As a minimum, one 'K' type thermocouple located in a thermowell in the pilot head shall be
provided for each pilot. The thermocouple may be fixed or retractable. On fixed
thermocouples, thermowells extended to the base of the pilot should be used (inherent with
the retractable thermocouple design). Retractable thermocouples provide the capability for
online maintenance, and allow monitoring for pilots with a service life in excess of 3 years.
Another acceptable method of direct pilot detection is acoustic monitoring, when applied
together with individual flame-front ignition lines to each pilot. The flame ionization method
may also be considered as an alternative but only if there is evidence of successful
application for at least 5 years' service.
Pilot monitoring shall be continuous and trended in a DCS system or equivalent. Failure of a
pilot shall be indicated in a local panel as well as in the control room by an alarm. Flame failure
shall initiate pilot re-ignition (see 9.3). A local multifunctional PLC system should be used to
handle pilot monitoring and ignition systems. PLC systems also offer diagnostic and historical
trending capability.

PTS 16.52.04
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A back-up bottled gas supply shall be provided for start-up/normal operation if there is no
other reliable source of fuel gas available.
9.3 FLARE IGNITION REQUIREMENTS
Considerable reliability problems have been encountered with ignition systems; it is

therefore essential that the whole of the pilot ignition system is correctly designed,
operated, routinely tested, and maintained.
The ignition system should be of the flame-front generator (FFG) type, designed to ignite the
pilot burners at the design wind conditions. Separate ignition lines shall be provided for each
pilot. For cold climate conditions, flame front systems shall include a small compressed
air purge to avoid water (products of combustion) from back-flowing and accumulating in the
FFG lines. FFG systems with separate flame-front ignition lines to each pilot can be fitted with
acoustic pilot monitoring systems.
The pilot shall be re-ignited from a safe location at grade from where the flare tip is visible.
The use of a backup electronic spark ignition system shall also be considered.
For FFG systems, it is essential to create a (near) stoichiometric gas/air mixture, e.g. by
carefully designed restriction orifices and carefully controlled gas and air supply pressures.
For the flame front lines, particular care should be taken when routing the lines to ensure no
pocketing. The line material shall be stainless steel.
The gas and the air used to supply the ignition system shall be dry and filtered to prevent
blockage of the lines. Clean reliable and non-interruptible fuel gas shall be used for the flame
front generators.

PTS 16.52.04
Page 52 of 55
10.0 DOCUMENTATION
10.1 ENGINEERING ANALYSIS
The engineering calculations of the relief loads, the relief device sizing, the pressure system
hydraulics, the relief device inlet loss calculations, the relief device backpressures, the disposal
system hydraulics, knockout drum sizing, flare radiation, etc. require documentation.
Documentation requirements are specified in this PTS and in PTS 12.32.01.
10.2 DISPOSAL SYSTEM SIZING CALCULATIONS
Disposal system loads (both liquid and vapour) shall be tabulated to demonstrate the basis for
establishing the design load. Some non-controlling relief loads shall also be tabulated; these
include loads that may affect KO vessel sizing or flare header flow regime as well as all those
loads (both liquid and vapour) that may exist during common mode scenarios. An example is
a large vapour relief valve with a non-controlling liquid relief scenario that can affect KO drum
sizing.
10.3 DATA SHEETS
Data sheets for flare system elements shall be provided at the time of inquiry.
Data sheets shall include all pertinent data defining size, type, materials, and fluid properties.
10.4 FLARE LOAD DOCUMENTATION
Relief and flare header loads shall be tabulated showing the governing individual relief loads
as well as the combined relief flows.
Schematic diagrams of the relief and flare header system shall be provided for each common
mode failure.
Schematic diagrams shall show:
i. Line sizes and equivalent lengths;
ii. Appropriate flows with process conditions;
iii. Resulting backpressures, and allowable backpressures
10.5 ELECTRONIC FILES
Microsoft Word and Excel shall be used to produce documentation as applicable.
Unless otherwise specified, individual electronic documents that require more than one
program to produce shall be provided in a single file (e.g., Excel spreadsheet integrated into a
Word file).
Documents provided in Adobe Acrobat files shall also be provided in the native format (e.g.
Word, Excel, and AutoCAD) so that future modifications can be made.

PTS 16.52.04
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Flare system hydraulic software shall be subject to the approval of the Owner.
10.6 FLARE EQUIPMENT FILES
The flare equipment file shall contain the following documentation:
i. Flare load schematics that show the following for each common mode failure:
a) Header line pipe size and equivalent lengths;
b) Flows (with MW, temperature, and phase);
c) Calculated backpressures at each node;
d) Resulting backpressure (calculated) at the PRV;
e) Allowable backpressure.
ii. Set of flare header isometrics with reference points that allow mapping from the
isometric drawing to the flare load schematic.
iii. Narrative description of how the common-mode flare loads were determined
(e.g., extent of utility failure, which pumps are assumed to operate, etc.).
iv. Relevant process data, loads, and process conditions.
v. Hydraulic calculations.
vi. Relevant notes and correspondence.
vii. For a new flare system, the Basis for Design document and all specifications.

PTS 16.52.04
Page 54 of 55
11.0 BIBLIOGRAPHY
In this PTS, reference is made to the following Standards/Publications. Unless specifically

designated by date, the latest edition of each publication shall be used, together with any
supplements/revisions thereto:
PETRONAS TECHNICAL STANDARDS

Index to PTS PTS 00.01.01
PTS Requirements, General Definition of Terms, Abbreviations & PTS 00.01.03
Reading Guide
Noise Control PTS 12.01.02
Piping General Requirements PTS 12.30.02
Protective Steam Heating of Piping Systems PTS 12.30.06
Relief Valve – Selection, Sizing, Specification, Inspection and Testing PTS 12.32.01
Flare Details (Based on ISO 25457) PTS 12.42.02
Electrical Heat Tracing And Frost Heave Prevention Systems PTS 13.13.01
Field Instrument Design Requirements PTS 14.10.02
Classification, Verification And Implementation Of Instrumented PTS 14.12.10
Protective Functions
Design Conditions: Temperature, Pressure & Toxicity PTS 16.50.01
Gaseous Oxygen Systems PTS 16.52.05
Two Phase Gas and Liquid Separator PTS 16.52.09
Interlocking System for Relief Valves PTS 16.53.03
Greenhouse Gas (GHG) Monitoring, Reporting and Verification PTS 18.72.05
Standard
Air Emission Management PTS 18.72.09
INTERNATIONAL STANDARDS
Part I: Sizing and selection API Std 520 Part I
Part II: Installation API Std 520 Part II
Pressure-relieving and Depressuring Systems API Std 521
API Std 527
Flare Details for General Refinery and Petrochemical Service API Std 537
Venting Atmospheric and Low Pressure Storage Tanks (Non- API Std 2000
refrigerated and Refrigerated)
Fire-protection Considerations for the Design and Operation of API Std 2510A
Liquefied Petroleum Gas (LPG) Storage Facilities

PTS 16.52.04
Page 55 of 55
ASME Boiler and Pressure Code – Section VIII: Rules for Construction ASME VIII
of Pressure Vessels

Petronas Technical Standards: Design of Pressure Relief, Flare and Vent Systems

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PETRONAS TECHNICAL STANDARDS

Design of Pressure Relief, Flare and Vent Systems

© 2017 PETROLIAM NASIONAL BERHAD (PETRONAS)

175.139.195.121 [email protected] 07/25/2023 01:59:52 GMT

175.139.195.121 [email protected] 07/25/2023 01:59:52 GMT

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7.1 BACKGROUND ............................................................................................................... 42

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1.2 GLOSSARY OF TERM

General Definition of Terms & Abbreviations

Specific Definition of Terms

1 AIV Acoustic Induced Vibrations

2 CDTP Cold Differential Test Pressure

3 CSC Car Seal Closed

4 CSO Car Seal Open

5 FIV Flow Induced Vibrations

6 GHG Greenhouse Gases

7 HSE-MS Health, Safety and Environment Management

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10 PFD Probability of Failure on Demand

11 TERV Thermal Expansion Relief Valve

1.3 SUMMARY OF CHANGES

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2.0 PRESSURE RELIEF DEVICES

2.1 LOCATION, INSTALLATION AND ARRANGEMENT OF RELIEF DEVICES

i. Pressure relief devices shall(PSR) be installed on the protected equipment in the

Sparing of Relief Devices

Relief Scenario All (Except Thermal Relief)

Single Equipment N+1

Isolation Valves for Relief Devices

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Operational Control of an Isolation Valve

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2.2 PREVENTION OF MALFUNCTIONING OF RELIEF VALVES

Hydrates and Blockages

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3.0 FLARE AND VENT SYSTEMS

i. Relief vapour and /or liquids

ii. Depressurizing vapours

iii. Waste streams in conjunction with maintenance, start-up or shutdown activities

3.1 UPSTREAM ZERO CONTINUOUS HYDROCARBON GAS FLARING AND VENTING

i. Zero continuous flaring and venting to be incorporated in the design of new

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Category Sources Governance

2 Operational flare and vent – PPGUA –

3 Fugitive emissions from non-combusted gas through valves, Some

ii. Carbon cost shall be integrated into project economic evaluation;

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3.2 DOWNSTREAM FLARING AND VENTING

i. Continuous venting of flammable hydrocarbon mixture (except for purging) or

v. Venting to atmosphere shall be subject to Owner’s approval and meeting

3.3 FLARE GAS RECOVERY SYSTEM

The typically recommended recovery systems are as follows.

ii. To install re-compressor or ejector system

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3.4 FLARE AND VENT SYSTEMS LOAD STUDY

i. Common failure (power failure, heating/cooling medium failure, and instrument