Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Baguio City

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 181822 April 13, 2011

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.
JOEL BALUYA y NOTARTE, Accused-Appellant.

DECISION

PERALTA, J.:

On appeal before the Court is the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA), dated September 25, 2007
in CA-G.R. CR No. 02370, which affirmed with modification the Decision 2 of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Manila, Branch 38, dated April 3, 2006 in Criminal Case No. 03-218310, finding herein
appellant Joel Baluya guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of kidnapping and serious illegal
detention and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua.

In an Information dated September 4, 2003, appellant was indicted before RTC of Manila for the
crime of kidnapping and serious illegal detention, allegedly committed as follows:

That on or about August 31, 2003, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused, being then a
private individual, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously kidnap, take, detain and
carry away one GLODIL CASTILLON Y MAAMBONG, a minor, nine (9) years old, son of Gloria
Castillon y Maambong, while the latter was playing outside of their residence along Laon Laan St.,
Sampaloc, this City, by poking a knife on his back, twisting his hands and forcibly bringing him to
Novaliches, Quezon City, thus detaining and depriving him of his liberty under restraint and against
his will and consent.

CONTRARY TO LAW.3

On November 5, 2003, appellant, duly assisted by his counsel, entered a plea of "not guilty" to the
offense charged.4

Thereafter, trial ensued.

The facts, as established by the prosecution, are as follows:

Around 10:30 a.m. of August 31, 2003, the victim, Glodil Castillon (Glodil), who at that time was nine
(9) years old, was playing in front of their house located along Laon Laan St., Sampaloc,
Manila.5 While in the midst of play, he saw herein appellant. Appellant then called Glodil's attention
and summoned him to come forth.6 Immediately thereafter, appellant seized him by twisting his right
arm, pointed a knife at him and told him that if appellant's wife, Marissa, would not show up Glodil's
mother would not see him anymore.7 Appellant and Glodil then boarded a jeepney and went to
Blumentritt.8 When they were in Blumentritt, appellant called up Glodil's mother, Gloria, telling her to
show him his wife so that she will also be able to see Glodil.9 Gloria then asked appellant to allow
her to talk to her son as proof that Glodil was indeed with him.10 Appellant then passed the telephone
to Glodil, but the latter was only able to momentarily talk with his mother because appellant
immediately grabbed the telephone from him.11 Thereafter, Glodil's mother reported the incident to
the police.12 Meanwhile, appellant and Glodil again boarded a jeepney and went to Novaliches. 13 It
was Glodil's first time to reach Novaliches.14 Upon reaching Novaliches "Bayan," they headed
straight to a barbershop where they fetched appellant's three minor children. 15 They then proceeded
to a church where appellant left his children and Glodil in the playground within the church
premises.16 Glodil played, ate and slept with appellant's children until the afternoon of the same day.
During that period, appellant returned from time to time to check on them and bring them food. 17 At
3:30 p.m. of the same day, appellant again called up Gloria and, while shouting, asked if his wife
was already there.18 He then threatened Gloria by saying that "kapag hindi mo ipakita sa akin si
Marissa, hindi mo na makikita ang anak mo."19 Subsequently, Gloria was able to talk to Marissa and
convince her to meet with appellant at the Novaliches public market.20 Unknown to appellant, the
police already had a plan to arrest him, which they did when he showed up to meet with his wife. In
the meantime, around 4:00 p.m. of August 31, 2003, Glodil was able to seize an opportunity to
escape while appellant was away.21 He walked from the place where appellant left him in Novaliches
until he reached their house and it took him around four hours to do so. 22 He was able to trace back
their house by reading the signboard of the jeepneys and following the route of those that pass by
his place of residence.23

On the other hand, the defense interposed the defense of denial alleging that on August 31, 2003,
appellant went to the house of his common-law-wife's aunt, Gloria, at Laon Laan St. in Sampaloc,
Manila for the purpose of asking the latter if his wife, with whom he has been separated, has been
there.24 Gloria told him that his wife went to their house once but has not seen her since then. 25 After
an hour of talking with Gloria, appellant bid her goodbye. It was then that Glodil approached him and
asked if he could go with him to Novaliches.26 Since Glodil already went with him to Novaliches
several times in the past, appellant acceded to the child's request on the condition that he ask his
mother for permission, which the latter readily gave.27 Appellant and Glodil then proceeded to the
former's house in Novaliches.28 After taking lunch, appellant took his children and Glodil to the
playground and left them there.29 When he returned around 4:30 p.m., Glodil was no longer
there.30 His children told him that Glodil's aunt, by the name of Rosaly, fetched him. 31 Appellant then
brought home his children. Around 6:00 p.m. of the same day, the police, together with Gloria and
his wife, arrived at his house wherein he was apprehended and brought to a police station in
Novaliches.32 After having been subjected to a medical examination, he was turned over to Police
Station 4 in Balic-Balic, Manila, where he was subsequently charged with kidnapping. 33 Appellant
alleges that his wife and her aunt came up with the scheme of accusing him with kidnapping so that
his wife would be able to take their children from him.34 Appellant also claims that Gloria is angry with
"warays" and because he is a "waray" she is also angry with him.35

In its Decision dated April 3, 2006, the RTC found the version of the prosecution credible and,
accordingly, rendered judgment as follows:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered finding accused Joel Baluya GUILTY of the crime of
Kidnapping with Serious Illegal Detention and sentences him to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua with all the accessory penalties provided by law and to pay the costs.

SO ORDERED.36

Aggrieved by the trial court's decision, appellant appealed his conviction to the Court of Appeals
(CA).

The parties filed their respective appeal briefs.37

On September 25, 2007, the CA rendered its Decision, the dispositive portion of which reads thus:

WHEREFORE, the DECISION DATED APRIL 3, 2006 is AFFIRMED, subject to the modification that
accused JOEL BALUYA y NOTARTE is ordered to pay to victim Glodil M. Castillon the amounts of
₱30,000.00 as moral damages and of ₱15,000.00 as nominal damages.

Costs of suit to be paid by the accused.

SO ORDERED.38

On October 24, 2007, appellant filed his Notice of Appeal of the CA Decision. 39

On June 16, 2008, this Court required the parties to file their respective supplemental briefs if they
so desired.40 Both appellant and appellee, however, manifested that they were adopting their
previous arguments and that they were willing to submit the case on the basis of the records already
submitted.

Thus, the following Assignment of Errors in appellant's brief, dated October 27, 2006, are now
deemed adopted in this present appeal:

I
 THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THE ACCUSED GUILTY BEYOND
REASONABLE DOUBT OF THE CRIME CHARGED.

II

THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN GIVING CREDENCE TO THE TESTIMONY OF

THE PROSECUTION WITNESSES THAT THE VICTIM WAS FORCIBLY TAKEN AND
DEPRIVED OF HIS LIBERTY UNDER RESTRAINT AND AGAINST HIS WILL AND
CONSENT.

III

THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN FAILING TO DETERMINE THE ALLEGATION

OF MINORITY OF THE VICTIM.41

Appellant argues that the prosecution failed to prove the presence of all the elements of the crime
charged. In particular, the defense contends that there is no evidence to show that the victim was
deprived of his liberty.

The Court is not persuaded.

The elements of kidnapping and serious illegal detention under Article 267 42 of the Revised Penal
Code (RPC) are:

1. the offender is a private individual;

2. he kidnaps or detains another or in any other manner deprives the latter of his liberty;

3. the act of detention or kidnapping is illegal; and

4. in the commission of the offense, any of the following circumstances are present: (a) the
kidnapping or detention lasts for more than 3 days; or (b) it is committed by simulating public
authority; or (c) any serious physical injuries are inflicted upon the person kidnapped or
detained or threats to kill him are made; or (d) the person kidnapped or detained is a minor,
female, or a public officer.43

In the instant case, the Court is convinced that the prosecution has adequately and satisfactorily
proved all the aforesaid elements of kidnapping and serious illegal detention.

The presence of the first element is not in issue as there is no dispute that appellant is a private
individual.

As to the second element of the crime, the deprivation required by Article 267 of the RPC means not
only the imprisonment of a person, but also the deprivation of his liberty in whatever form and for
whatever length of time.44 It involves a situation where the victim cannot go out of the place of
confinement or detention or is restricted or impeded in his liberty to move. 45 If the victim is a child, it
also includes the intention of the accused to deprive the parents of the custody of the child. 46 In other
words, the essence of kidnapping is the actual deprivation of the victim's liberty, coupled with
indubitable proof of the intent of the accused to effect such deprivation. 47 In the present case, Glodil
was in the control of appellant as he was kept in a place strange and unfamiliar to him. Because of
his tender age and the fact that he did not know the way back home, he was then and there deprived
of his liberty. The intention to deprive Glodil's parents of his custody is also indicated by appellant's
actual taking of the child without the permission or knowledge of his parents, of subsequently calling
up the victim’s mother to inform her that the child is in his custody and of threatening her that she will
no longer see her son if she failed to show his wife to him.

Appellant's arguments that the victim is free to go home if he wanted to because he was not
confined, detained or deprived of his liberty and that there is no evidence to show that Glodil
sustained any injury, cannot hold water. The CA is correct in holding that for kidnapping to exist, it is
not necessary that the offender kept the victim in an enclosure or treated him harshly. Where the
victim in a kidnapping case is a minor, it becomes even more irrelevant whether the offender forcibly
restrained the victim.48 As discussed above, leaving a child in a place from which he did not know the
way home, even if he had the freedom to roam around the place of detention, would still amount to
deprivation of liberty.49 For under such a situation, the child’s freedom remains at the mercy and
control of the abductor.50 It remains undisputed that it was his first time to reach Novaliches and that
he did not know his way home from the place where he was left. It just so happened that the victim
had the presence of mind that, when he saw an opportunity to escape, he ran away from the place
where appellant left him. Moreover, he is intelligent enough to read the signboards of the passenger
jeepneys he saw and follow the route of the ones going to his place of residence.

Appellant alleges that Glodil was not forcibly taken, but instead voluntarily went with appellant to
Novaliches. The general rule is that the prosecution is burdened to prove lack of consent on the part
of the victim. However, where the victim is a minor, lack of consent is presumed. 51 Aside from his
self-serving testimony, appellant failed to present competent evidence to overcome such
presumption. Thus, the presumption stands that Glodil, being only nine (9) years old on August 31,
2003, is incapable of giving consent and is incompetent to assent to his seizure and illegal detention.

The defense further argues that appellant had no intention to detain Glodil and that his purpose is to
merely use him as "a leverage against Glodil's mother, who refused to produce Marissa, his live-in
partner." The Court, however, cannot fathom how appellant could have used Glodil as leverage or
bargaining tool to force Marissa to meet with him without depriving him of his liberty. In any case,
appellant's motive is not relevant, because it is not an element of the crime.

With respect to the third element of the offense charged, the prosecution proved that appellant's act
of detaining the victim was without lawful cause.

As to the last element of the crime, appellant contends that the victim's minority was not sufficiently
proven. However, the Court agrees with the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) that the victim's
minority was alleged by the prosecution in the information and was not disputed. 52 During his direct
examination, the victim testified as to his minority claiming that, at the time that he was presented at
the witness stand, he was only 10 years old.53 This fact was affirmed by his mother who also testified
as to his minority at the time that he was abducted.54 As correctly contended by the OSG, appellant
did not raise any issue as to the victim's minority when the victim's and his mother's testimonies
were offered.

Central to the issues raised in the Brief filed by appellant is a question of the factual findings of the
RTC. More particularly, appellant questions the credibility of the witnesses for the prosecution
claiming that it is easy for the victim to fabricate his story and falsely claim that he was forcibly taken
at knife point.

However, the trial court gave credence to the testimonies of Glodil and his mother finding them to be
trustworthy and believable. The age-old rule is that the task of assigning values to the testimonies of
witnesses and weighing their credibility is best left to the trial court which forms its first-hand
impressions as witnesses testify before it.55 It is thus no surprise that findings and conclusions of trial
courts on the credibility of witnesses enjoy, as a rule, a badge of respect, for trial courts have the
advantage of observing the demeanor of witnesses as they testify.56 Further, factual findings of the
trial court as regards its assessment of the witnesses' credibility are entitled to great weight and
respect by this Court, particularly when the CA affirms the said findings, and will not be disturbed
absent any showing that the trial court overlooked certain facts and circumstances which could
substantially affect the outcome of the case.57 In the instant case, the Court finds no reason to depart
from this rule. Appellant failed to present sufficient evidence to prove that the RTC and the CA
overlooked certain facts and circumstances which, if considered, might affect the result of the case. 1âwphi1

Also, against the categorical testimonies of the prosecution witnesses, appellant can only offer the
defense of denial. However, denial is a self-serving negative evidence, which cannot be given
greater weight than that of the declaration of a credible witness who testifies on affirmative
matters.58 Like alibi, denial is an inherently weak defense, which cannot prevail over the positive and
credible testimonies of the prosecution witnesses.59 Denial cannot prevail over the positive
testimonies of prosecution witnesses who, as in this case, were not shown to have any ill motive to
testify against petitioner.60

WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 02370, dated September
25, 2007, finding appellant Joel Baluya y Notarte guilty beyond reasonable doubt of kidnapping and
serious illegal detention, is AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.
DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson

ROBERTO A. ABAD JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ*

Associate Justice Associate Justice

JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA

Associate Justice

ATTESTATION

I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case
was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Second Division, Chairperson

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in
the above Decision were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Court’s Division.

RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice

Footnotes

* Designated as an additional member in lieu of Associate Justice Antonio Eduardo B.

Nachura, per raffle dated July 10, 2010.

1
Penned by Associate Justice Lucas P. Bersamin (now a member of this Court) with
Associate Justices Portia Aliño-Hormachuelos and Estella M. Perlas-Bernabe, concurring.

2
Penned by Judge Priscilla J. Baltazar-Padilla (now a member of the Court of Appeals).

3
Records, p. 1.

4
See RTC Order, id. at 8.

5
TSN, April 19, 2004, pp. 4-6.

6
TSN, April 21, 2004, p. 5.

7
Id. at 5-6; TSN, April 19, 2004, pp. 7-8.

8
TSN, April 21, 2004, p. 6.

9
Id. at 7-8; TSN, October 13, 2004, p. 7.

10
TSN, October 13, 2004, p. 7
11
Id. at 8; TSN, April 21, 2004, p. 8.

12
TSN, October 13, 2004, p. 8.

13
TSN, April 21, 2004, p. 9.

14
Id.

15
Id. at 12.

16
Id. at 13.

17
TSN, April 19, 2004, pp. 12-13; TSN, April 21, 2004, p. 14.

18
TSN, October 13, 2004, pp. 9-10.

19
Id. at 10.

20
Id. at 13-14.

21
TSN, April 19, 2004, p. 14; TSN, April 21, 2004, p. 16.

22
TSN, April 19, 2004, pp. 14-15.

23
TSN, April 21, 2004, pp. 14-18.

24
TSN, October 12, 2005, pp. 3-4.

25
Id. at 5-6.

26
Id. at 6-7.

27
Id. at 7-8.

28
Id. at 8.

29
Id.

30
Id. at 10.

31
Id.

32
Id. at 11-12.

33
Id. at 14.

34
Id. at 11.

35
Id. at 25.

36
Records, p. 85.

Brief for the Accused-Appellant, CA rollo, pp. 41-52; Brief for the Plaintiff-Appellee,
37

CA rollo, pp. 73-84.

38
CA rollo, p. 105.

39
Id. at 107.

40
Rollo, p. 23.
41
CA rollo, p. 43.

42
ART. 267. Kidnapping and serious illegal detention. - Any private individual who shall
kidnap or detain another, or in any other manner deprive him of his liberty, shall suffer the
penalty of reclusion perpetua to death;

1. If the kidnapping or detention shall have lasted more than three days.

2. If it shall have been committed simulating public authority.

3. If any serious physical injuries shall have been inflicted upon the person
kidnapped or detained; or if threats to kill him shall have been made.

4. If the person kidnapped or detained shall be a minor, except when the accused is
any of the parents, female or a public officer.

The penalty shall be death where the kidnapping or detention was committed for the
purpose of extorting ransom from the victim or any other person, even if none of the
circumstances abovementioned were presented in the commission of the offense.

When the victim is killed or dies as a consequence of the detention or is raped, or is

subjected to torture or dehumanizing acts, the maximum penalty shall be imposed.

43
People v. Madsali, G.R. No. 179570, February 4, 2010, 611 SCRA 596, 615-616.

44
People v. Siongco, G.R. No. 186472, July 5, 2010, 623 SCRA 501, 511.

45
Id.

46
People v. Acbangin, 392 Phil. 232, 240 (2000).

47
People v. Obeso, 460 Phil. 625, 634 (2003).

48
People v. Castillo, 469 Phil. 87, 109 (2004).

49
Id.

50
Id.

51
People v. Siongco, supra note 44, at 512.

52
See records, p. 1.

53
TSN, April 19, 2004, p. 89.

54
TSN, October 13, 2004, pp. 4-5.

People v. Alvin del Rosario, G.R. No. 189580, February 9, 2011; People v. Dennis D.
55

Manulit, G.R. No. 192581, November 17, 2010; People v. Lacaden, G.R. No. 187682,
November 25, 2009, 605 SCRA 784, 794.

56
People v. Lacaden, id. at 794-795.

57
Id.

58
People v. Madsali, supra note 43, at 608.

59
Id.

60
Id.
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