Indenture Trustee
Indenture Trustee
I. INTRODUCTION
A trust indenture is a contract that corporations and governmental
entities use to issue securities and borrow money from the general public or
large institutional investors.1 A necessary and important instrument in United
States economics,2 trust indentures typically provide terms and conditions of
extending credit, govern activities of security issuers while the securities are
outstanding, set forth remedies for security holders in case of issuer default,
and contain provisions defining the rights, duties, and obligations of the
parties to the agreement.3
This introduction will briefly discuss what an indenture trustee is and
provide an overview of the history, purpose, and intent of the laws governing
trust indentures. Finally, it will introduce the most litigated issues regarding
indenture trustees. The rest of the note will display how the First, Second,
and Third Circuit Courts of Appeals, as well as the states within their
geographic areas, have decided such issues.
of a personal trust has responsibilities to protect the trust solely in the interest
of the beneficiaries, the indenture trustee, while having a primary
responsibility to the security holders, owes to the obligor “important and
practical fiduciary duties, and in the interest of all parties, it must be able to
work cooperatively with the obligor.”8 Additionally, indenture trustee
relationships are distinct from personal trusts because the primary governing
law for indentures, the Trust Indenture Act of 1939 (“TIA”),9 requires the
trustee be a bank that meets specified eligibility criteria.10 Market
considerations and state laws governing municipal bonds are consistent with
this rule for indentures not governed by the TIA, so all indenture trustees are
financial institutions. Thus, trust indentures create contractual relationships
similar to mortgages or ordinary trusts, but are not identical to those
relationships.11
While the concept of mortgages and trusts were developed in an early
period of common law, the corporate trust indenture is a relatively recent
development.12 For this reason, despite their importance to the economy,
courts poorly understand trust indentures.13
8 Id. at 27.
9 Trust Indenture Act of 1939, 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 77aaa–77bbbb (2010). The Trust Indenture Act
(“TIA”) is discussed further infra Part I.B.
10 Id. § 77jjj (“Eligibility and disqualification of trustee”).
11 LANDAU & KRUEGER, supra note 1, at 23.
12 “It was first introduced around 1830, but until the latter part of the nineteenth century, the trust
indenture was used infrequently.” Id. at 22.
13 Id. at 23.
14 POWELL, supra note 4, at 6.
15 Martin D. Sklar, The Corporate Indenture Trustee: Genuine Fiduciary or Mere Stakeholder?, 106
22 See id.
23 POWELL, supra note 4, at 63.
24 Id.
25 Id.
26 See id. at 7.
27 Id. at 61.
28 Id. at 63–64.
29 See id. at 64.
30 Trust Indenture Act of 1939, 15 U.S.C.A. § 302(a) (2010).
31 Id.
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D. ISSUES
Section 315 of the TIA sets forth the duties of indenture trustees before,
during, and after an issuer’s or debtor’s default.34 The prudent-person
standard, to which indenture trustees are held post-default, is a topic that has
various interpretations across jurisdictions, especially when intertwined with
bankruptcy issues, claims under distinct causes of action (i.e., breach of
contract, negligence, breach of implied covenant of good faith and fair
dealing), and breaches of state-imposed common law fiduciary duties.
Although courts mostly agree that trust indentures do not impose full
fiduciary responsibilities on the trustee,35 some argue that the TIA should
impose such responsibilities. However, doing so risks impairing indentures’
effectiveness, potentially removing certainty from a well-developed market
and making it more difficult for trustee banks to accept appointments. Courts
have swung back and forth between considering the indenture trustee a mere
stakeholder, and imposing broader, fiduciary-like duties. The main public
policy rationales involve a balance between adequately protecting the
security holders’ interests and ensuring that “banks and trust companies will
be willing to assume the role of indenture trustee and to therefore ease the
raising of capital.”36 Advocates of imposing broader duties argue that the
imposition of such duties would not hinder the raising of capital.37
This note examines the facts of cases in different jurisdictions to
determine when courts have found breaches of indenture trustees’ duties
under the TIA and, if applicable, under state common law. Specific attention
is given to the Second Circuit and New York state and federal courts because
most U.S. trust indentures are governed by New York law. The patterns in
the cases’ holdings provide guidance for understanding how the rules are
interpreted for indentures subject to the TIA. Although indentures not
governed by the TIA, such as municipal bonds, are beyond the scope of this
note, it is worth noting that cases involving such exempt indentures tend to
be consistent with and follow interpretations under the TIA.38 Many courts
are unfamiliar with debt issuances under indentures and the customary
provisions and limitations on indenture trustees’ duties. This note seeks to
clarify both what the “prudent-person” standard under the TIA requires and
what actions courts have held to be a breach of this standard.
The following case review shows that, despite some anomalous cases,
the majority position is that trustees owe no duties beyond the indenture
agreement to bondholders prior to default. Further, in the event of default,
trustees’ duties rise to a prudent-person standard in handling the
bondholders’ affairs but do not necessarily rise to a “fiduciary” standard.
New York common law imposes two extracontractual pre-default duties,
which will be discussed below. Distinctly, the Third Circuit, holds that
trustees have duties similar or equal to those of fiduciaries after an event of
default.
II. CASES
39 Peterson v. U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n, 918 F. Supp. 2d 89 (D. Mass. 2013).
40 Id. at 104.
41 Id. at 91.
42 See id. at 93–94.
43 Id. at 103.
44 See id. at 104.
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2. Puerto Rico
In Wells Fargo Bank Minn., N.A. v. El Comandante Capital Corp.,45 the
issue before the Puerto Rico District Court was whether bondholders could
replace an existing indenture trustee with another, more experienced and
skillful one, after default.46 The court held that bondholders may take such
an action post-default.47
In so holding, the court noted that a trustee’s skill and expertise in
administrating securities on behalf of noteholders become critical following
default.48 A “prudent” indenture trustee “must make countless, discretionary
decisions regarding how best to protect the interests of the beneficiaries of
the trust.”49 The court then quotes from a secondary source that although “[i]t
is impossible to prescribe the exact conduct to be followed in the event of
default,” it remains critical for bondholders to be able to appoint a competent
trustee.50 In this case, the original indenture trustee, Banco Popular, was not
experienced in defaulted securities,51 while the successor trustee, Wells
Fargo, was.52 In allowing the bondholders to replace their trustee, the court
emphasized the importance of the trustee’s conduct post-default. However,
the court did not hold that an indenture trustee owes any duties higher than
the prudent-person standard under the TIA.
45 Wells Fargo Bank Minn., N.A. v. El Comandante Capital Corp., 332 F. Supp. 2d 448, 456 (D.P.R.
2004).
46 Id. at 457.
47 Id. at 456–57.
48 Id. at 456.
49 Id.456–57.
50 Id. (quoting LANDAU & KRUEGER, supra note 1, at 171).
51 Id. at 455.
52 Id.
53 Meckel v. Cont’l Resources Co., 758 F.2d 811, 813 (2d Cir. 1985).
54 Id.
55 Id.
56 Id. at 813–14.
57 Id.
58 Id. at 815.
59 Id.
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The Meckel opinion quotes the text of the TIA, stating that a trustee’s
duties are limited to those set forth in the indenture.60 The court supported
the enforceability of a clause in the indenture that limited Citibank’s duties
to those set forth in the indenture.61 The court went on to hold:
An indenture trustee is not subject to the ordinary trustee’s duty of
undivided loyalty. Unlike the ordinary trustee, who has historic
common-law duties imposed beyond those in the trust agreement, an
indenture trustee is more like a stakeholder whose duties and
obligations are exclusively defined by the terms of the indenture
agreement.62
Thus, in the Second Circuit, an indenture trustee is bound only by what
is in the indenture; no additional duties are implied.63 Meckel reaches this
conclusion by upholding a 1936 decision from a New York state trial court,
Hazzard, which will be discussed below.64
The other crucial Second Circuit case is Elliot Associates v. J. Henry
Schroder Bank & Trust Co.65 In Elliot, an issuer wanted to redeem debentures
that were convertible into stock.66 The indenture trustee waived a notice
requirement in the indenture that required fifty days’ notice to the trustee if
the issuer seeks to redeem the debentures,67 accepting a single week’s notice
from the issuer instead.68 Debenture holders were given notice forty-two
days in advance of the redemption, and were advised to convert the
debentures into stock.69 The holders alleged that by waiving the fifty-day
requirement without considering impact of that waiver on debenture holders,
the indenture trustee breached fiduciary duties.70
The Second Circuit refused to find an implied pre-default duty of the
indenture trustee to secure greater benefits for debenture holder “over and
above” the duties and obligations it undertook in the indenture.71 The court
denied the existence of such an implied duty under the TIA as well as the
TIA’s legislative history.72 The original draft of the TIA imposed a “prudent
man” duty on the indenture trustee both before and after default.73 The
Second Circuit explained that getting rid of the prudent-man standard from
the trustee’s pre-default obligations under the Act, paired with Congress’
subsequent enactment of the existing version of the Act (which limits the
trustee’s pre-default duties to the indenture), supported its conclusion that no
60 Id. at 815–16.
61 Id. at 816.
62 Id. (emphasis added).
63 Id.
64 See id.; Hazzard v. Chase Nat'l Bank, 159 Misc. 57, 287 N.Y.S. 541 (Sup. Ct. 1936).
65 Elliott Assoc.’s v. J. Henry Schroder Bank & Tr. Co., 838 F.2d 66, 70 (2d Cir. 1988).
66 Id. at 68–69.
67 Id.
68 Id. at 69.
69 Id.
70 Id. at 70.
71 Id. at 70–71.
72 Id.
73 Id. at 71.
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implicit duties are imposed on the trustee to limit its pre-default conduct74
outside of refraining from “engaging in conflicts of interest.”75
Next, in LNC Investments v. National Westminster Bank, the defendant
was an indenture trustee on bonds secured by an aircraft.76 The indenture
trustee’s post-default duties under the TIA were triggered when the bond
issuer filed for bankruptcy.77 Because of the automatic stay, the indenture
trustee was prevented from taking possession of the aircraft, which was the
collateral.78 By the time the issuer released the collateral to the indenture
trustee, its value had diminished.79
Bondholders brought suit against the indenture trustee for breach of
contract, violation of the TIA, and breach of fiduciary duties under New York
state law. They alleged that “indenture trustees, immediately upon [issuer]’s
chapter 11 filing should have asked the bankruptcy court to lift the automatic
stay or to issue an order that [issuer] provide ‘adequate protection’ of the
collateral.”80
The jury in the trial court found that the trustee in this case acted
prudently.81 The Second Circuit upheld the jury’s verdict.82 The court
resolved a dispute over whether a jury instruction was proper by upholding
the district court’s use of a prudent-person standard to assess the trustee’s
post-default conduct.83 The Second Circuit noted that “the question is not
what appears to be prudent in light of our current understanding of the law,
but rather what was prudent in light of what reasonably could have been
known to Trustees at the time they allegedly should have made the motion.”84
Thus, the district court’s standard was the proper one by which to judge the
indenture trustee’s prudence; the jury was instructed to take into
consideration the unsettledness of the law regarding whether the trustee
could have moved in bankruptcy court to lift the stay or receive adequate
protection of the collateral.85
Only a few distinctions exist between New York state common law
regarding the issue of indenture trustees’ duties and the requirements of the
TIA; these are discussed in the Semi-Tech cases.86 In Semi-Tech, the Second
Circuit affirmed all but one of the district court’s conclusions and adopted
them as law.87 In this case, Bankers Trust (“BT”) was the indenture trustee
for a note offering by Semi-Tech.88 Semi-Tech subsequently filed for
bankruptcy.89 Noteholders alleged that BT breached “statutory, contractual,
74 Id. at 70–71.
75 Id. at 71. The opinion does not comment on the nature or extent of an indenture trustee’s post-
default duties.
76 LNC Inv.’s, Inc. v. Nat’l Westminster Bank, 308 F.3d 169, 171 (2d Cir. 2002).
77 Id.
78 Id.
79 Id.
80 Id. at 172.
81 Id. at 175.
82 Id. at 176.
83 Id. at 174–76.
84 Id. at 176.
85 Id. at 173.
86 See Semi-Tech Litig., LLC v. Bankers Tr. Co., 450 F.3d 121 (2d Cir. 2006); Semi-Tech Litig.,
LLC v. Bankers Tr. Co., 353 F. Supp. 2d 460, 472 (S.D.N.Y. 2005).
87 450 F.3d at 123.
88 Semi-Tech Litig., LLC, 353 F. Supp. 2d at 462.
89 Id.
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90 Id.
91 Id.
92 Id. at 463–64.
93 Id. at 464.
94 Id. at 466.
95 Id. at 472.
96 Id. at 473; see Trust Indenture Act of 1939, 15 U.S.C.A. § 314 (2010) (“Reports by obligor;
evidence of compliance with indenture provisions”).
97 Semi-Tech Litig., LLC, 353 F. Supp. 2d at 472 (citing Beck v. Mfr.’s Hanover Tr. Co., 632
whether it seeks to rely upon any statement or opinions set forth in that
evidence.”103
Another issue in the Semi-Tech cases was whether BT had a duty to be a
prudent person and inquire into the matters asserted by the certificates.104
Under the TIA, the prudent-person duty is triggered by the event of default.105
Here, the district court held that BT had no duty to inquire into the matters
stated by the certificate106: “Until the prudent person duties were triggered,
the trustee’s obligations were to comply with the indenture (which imposed
no duty to inquire) and to insist that all documentation conform to it.”107
The Second Circuit affirmed, and adopted “as the law of this circuit” that
(1) BT failed to fulfill its duty under TIA § 315(a) to examine for conformity
both the indenture and the officers’ and accountants’ certificates it received
from Semi-Tech (pursuant to TIA § 314),108 and (2) BT did not violate any
prudent-person duties.109 However, contrary to the district court, the Second
Circuit held that BT failed to comply with TIA § 315(b), requiring BT to give
notice to the noteholders “of all defaults known to trustee,” with the option
(except as to a default in payment) first to demand cure.110 The district court
reasoned that since BT failed to examine the certificates, the nonconformities
were not “known to the trustee” and the trustee therefore did not violate §
315(b) by failing to give notice to the noteholders of those defaults.111 The
Second Circuit disagreed, holding that BT’s failure to examine the
certificates does not excuse it from having to give notice of the defaults.112
Regarding New York common law, the Second Circuit affirmed the
Southern District’s holding that defendant-trustee’s contractual duties were
identical to its statutory duties because “the indenture incorporates the TIA
duties by reference.”113
1. New York
New York state courts hold that New York common law imposes some
extracontractual pre-default duties on indenture trustees. Hazzard v. Chase
National Bank, which was decided before the TIA was enacted, is often cited
to represent the original New York common law impositions on indenture
trustees.114 At issue in Hazzard was a series of debentures issued by utility
holding companies.115 As security, the holding companies deposited the stock
of several operating utility companies with an indenture trustee.116 The
indenture trustee later substituted these shares with the stock of another
103 Id.
104 Id. at 480–82.
105 See Trust Indenture Act of 1939, 15 U.S.C.A. § 315(c) (2010).
106 Semi-Tech Litig., LLC, 353 F. Supp. 2d at 482.
107 Id.
108 Semi-Tech Litig., LLC, 450 F.3d at 123.
109 Id.
110 Id. at 127.
111 Semi-Tech Litig., LLC, 353 F. Supp. 2d at 479–80.
112 Semi-Tech Litig., LLC, 450 F.3d at 127 (because “BT had a duty under § 315(a) to examine the
certificates, its failure to do so cannot excuse its failure to comply with the duty under § 315(b) to take
action with respect to known defaults”).
113 Id. at 123.; Semi-Tech Litig., LLC, 353 F. Supp. 2d at 472.
114 See Hazzard v. Chase Nat. Bank of City of New York, 287 N.Y.S. 541 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1936).
115 Id. at 544.
116 Id. at 549–50.
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holding company.117 The security was still valuable, but both of the holding
companies filed for bankruptcy.118 Debenture holders brought suit, alleging
that the indenture trustee either acted in bad faith or was grossly negligent in
permitting the stock substitution.119 The court entered judgment for the
defendant, noting that the limitation of the indenture’s liability for gross
negligence in the indenture was valid.120 The court described the indenture
trustees’ liability as measured by the express agreement between the trustee
and “obligor of the trust mortgage.”121 It went on to hold that “where the
terms of the indenture are clear, no obligations or duties in conflict with them
will be implied.”122
Hazzard was largely fundamental to the Second Circuit’s seminal
holding in Meckel that an indenture trustee is more like a stakeholder whose
duties and obligations are exclusively defined by the terms of the indenture
agreement, whereas ordinary trustees have historic common-law duties
imposed beyond those in the trust agreement.123
Almost sixty years after Hazzard, a New York state appellate court
defined the duties of indenture trustees under New York state law in Beck v.
Manufacturers Trust.124 In Beck, plaintiffs were holders of bonds issued by
the National Railway Company of Mexico, a Utah corporation.125 There were
two series of bonds, which had both been in default since their due dates.126
The defendant was the indenture trustee for those bonds.127 The indenture
trustee auctioned off collateral securing payment of the bonds at an upset
price, assigning the bonds to the purchaser of the collateral, Mexrail.128 The
plaintiffs argued that the assignments Mexrail offered as payment for the
collateral were not valid tender for the purchase because the bonds assigned
to Mexrail were not outstanding.129 The plaintiffs alleged that the trustee
breached the trust indenture and its fiduciary duties by setting the upset price
of the collateral and negotiating its sale.130
The Supreme Court of New York Appellate Division explained that if
the matter at issue was whether the trustee acted in accordance with the terms
of the trust indentures, it would affirm the dismissal of the plaintiff’s
complaint.131 However, the court continued:
[b]ecause we are of the view that the Trustee of the collateral securing
payment of the defaulted bonds here at issue had fiduciary
responsibilities to the trust beneficiaries and that those responsibilities
were in some respects broader than the obligations specified in the
117 Id.
118 Id.
119 Id. at 550.
120 Id. at 566–67.
121 Id.
122 Id.
123 Meckel v. Cont’l Resources Co., 758 F.2d 811, 816 (2d Cir. 1985).
124 Beck v. Mfr.’s Hanover Tr. Co., 632 N.Y.S.2d 520, 522 (Sup. Ct. 1995).
125 Id.
126 Id.
127 Id.
128 Id. at 522–23.
129 Id.
130 Id. at 523–24.
131 Id. at 526.
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under the circumstances in the conduct of his own affairs.”143 The court
suggested that the common law should impose a similar requirement upon
indenture trustees in the event of default.144
The Beck court came to three conclusions. First, the trustee in Beck acted
within its “limited fiduciary capacity” with respect to the bond acquisition.145
Second, the trustee imprudently set the sale price for the collateral by relying
on unverified valuations that were not independent.146 This constituted a
“clear breach” of the trustee’s fiduciary obligations, and “a decidedly
imprudent exercise of the powers which the trustee certainly possessed to
ensure the fairness of the ‘auction.’”147 Finally, an indenture trustee could not
enforce broad exculpatory provisions to excuse the trustee’s failure to
exercise powers under the indenture.148
In LNC Investments, Inc. v. First Fidelity Bank, National Association,
First Fidelity Bank was the “Collateral Trustee” under an indenture.149
Eastern Airlines and First Fidelity established a trust to issue bonds in order
to buy airplanes, which were leased to an airline.150 Eastern filed for
bankruptcy, triggering the automatic stay that prevented the trust from
recovering the airplanes.151 Prior to the bankruptcy, the planes were appraised
at $682 million and Eastern was cautioned that their value would decline
rapidly in the near future.152 By the time First Fidelity successfully moved to
lift the stay,153 the “value of the collateral had plummeted, leaving the
certificate holders undersecured.”154 Such under-collateralization resulted in
second-series certificate holders receiving only part of their principal and no
interest, and third-series certificate holders receiving neither principal nor
interest.155
Plaintiff-bondholders contended that these losses could have been
prevented if the trustees had requested that the court lift the stay when
bankruptcy was first declared.156 They claimed that the trustees’ failure to do
so breached the “prudent-man” requirement of the TIA, and the agreement,
as well as “fiduciary duties under the indenture and New York common
law.”157
The Southern District of New York explained that pre-default, New York
common law imposes two extracontractual duties on indenture trustees.158
First, the indenture trustee must avoid conflicts of interest.159 Second, the
143 See id.; Trust Indenture Act of 1939, 15 U.S.C.A. § 315(c) (2010); N.Y. Real Prop. Law § 126
(Consol., LEXIS through 2019 Chapters 1–187 (except for 96, 106)).
144 Beck, 632 N.Y.S.2d at 528.
145 Id. at 529
146 Id. at 529–30.
147 Id. at 530.
148 Id. at 527.
149 LNC Inv.’s, Inc. v. First Fid. Bank, Nat’l Ass’n, 935 F. Supp. 1333, 1336 (S.D.N.Y. 1996).
150 Id.
151 Id.
152 Id.
153 Id. On November 14th, 1990, First Fidelity moved to lift the stay, and on January 18, 1991, the
160 Id.
161 Id.
162 Id.
163 Id. (quoting In re E.F. Hutton Southwest Prop.’s II, Ltd., 953 F.2d 963, 969–72 (5th Cir. 1992)).
164 Id. at 1348.
165 Id. The SDNY discusses the meaning and implications of the language in Beck, quoted above and
reproduced below:
The trustee must in the postdefault context act prudently, but only in the exercise of those rights and
powers granted in the indenture. The scope of the trustee’s obligation then is still circumscribed by the
indenture, albeit less narrowly. The trustee is not required to act beyond his contractually conferred rights
and powers, but must, as prudence dictates, exercise those singularly conferred prerogatives in order to
secure the basic purpose of any trust indenture, the repayment of the underlying obligation. Beck v. Mfr.’s
Hanover Tr. Co., 632 N.Y.S.2d 520, 528 (Sup. Ct. 1995).
166 First Fid. Bank, Nat’l Ass’n, 935 F. Supp. at 1347–48.
167 Id. at 1348.
168 Id.
169 Id.
170 Id.
171 Id.
172 Id.
173 Id. (emphasis added).
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not prohibit First Fidelity from taking action to protect the investors absent
instruction.174 Thus, “First Fidelity could be held liable alone for its failure
to discharge [its independent] obligations.”175
In AG Capital v. State Street, an indenture trustee, State Street, and
issuer, Loewen, were parties to an indenture.176 In June of 1999, Loewen filed
for bankruptcy protection.177 The plaintiff-bondholders accepted a
discounted value for the debt securities and agreed to release and indemnify
the indenture trustee from any liability. This release did not release or
indemnify the indenture trustee as to any claim based on its negligence.178
When Loewen’s bankruptcy came around, this failure created uncertainty
about whether the instrument holders had secured-creditor status.179 These
allegations gave rise to the plaintiffs’ claims against State Street for breach
of contract, breach of the TIA, and negligence in breaching New York’s
common law fiduciary duties.180
On these facts, the court concluded that the plaintiffs’ breach of contract
and TIA claims were barred by the release mentioned above, and that “no
fiduciary duties exist.”181 The court reinstated the plaintiffs’ cause of action
relating to the indenture trustee’s negligence due to a factual dispute as to
whether State Street owed a duty of care to the plaintiffs and, if so, whether
State Street violated that duty.182
The court explained that New York state and federal case law are
consistent with TIA § 315(a)(1).183 The court cites Hazzard to show that New
York law treats the indenture trustee’s duties as not “[defined by] the
fiduciary relationship.”184 New York courts have held that, prior to default,
indenture trustees “owe note holders an extracontractual duty to perform
basic, nondiscretionary, ministerial functions redressable in tort if such duty
is breached.”185 As a result,
an indenture trustee owes a duty to perform its ministerial functions
with due care, and if this duty is breached the trustee will be subjected
to tort liability. However, . . . the alleged breach of such duty neither
gives rise to fiduciary duties nor supports the reinstatement of
plaintiff’s [breach of fiduciary duty] causes of action.186
187 Id.
188 Ellington Credit Fund, LTD. v. Select Portfolio Servicing, Inc., 837 F. Supp. 2d 162, 175
(S.D.N.Y. 2011).
189 Id.
190 Id. at 191 (citations omitted) (internal quotations omitted).
191 Id.
192 Id. at 192.
193 Id.
194 Id. (citing Beck v. Mfr.’s Hanover Tr. Co., 632 N.Y.S.2d 520, 527 (Sup. Ct. 1995)).
195 Id.
196 Dresner Co. Profit Sharing Plan v. First Fid. Bank, N.A., No. 95 Civ. 1924 (MBM), 1996 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 17913, at *1–3 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 3, 1996).
197 Id. at *17.
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long as the trustee was precluded from contractually limiting the duties it
imposed upon fiduciaries, and so long as he explicitly assumed particular
duties.”211 The TIA was intended to create liability for both breach of the
indenture provisions and “breach of fiduciary obligations which it expressly
preserved from limitation by contract.”212
Merely making a loan to the company is protected under § 311 of the
TIA.213 The court here held that the mere existence of a dual relationship—
as trustee under the indenture and as preferred creditor of the obligor on the
bonds—does not, by itself, constitute a violation of the duties under TIA
§ 315(d), despite a potential conflict of interest.214 Congress permitted this
inherent conflict when drafting the TIA, enacting protections for the interests
of the bondholders.
Additionally, the court concluded that willful misconduct encompasses
“knowing, intentional action in flagrant disregard of the interests of the
bondholders.”215 Making a loan to the company does not fall under this
category, but the court denied the indenture trustee’s motion to dismiss
because of the possibility that under the circumstances known to the
indenture trustee, negotiating such a deal constituted a knowing, intentional
action in flagrant disregard of the interests of the bondholders.216
In conclusion, New York common law imposes two extracontractual pre-
default duties on indenture trustees,217 and New York courts have interpreted
Beck to impose fiduciary-like obligations on indenture trustees.218 Courts in
other circuits recognize these specificities about New York law.219 To the
extent that state law differs from the TIA, the Second Circuit has noted that
the TIA governs indentures.220 The Second Circuit further agrees with the
Third Circuit221 that since Congress enacted the TIA to uniformly govern
indentures, federal law controls trust indentures.222
(“Federal courts may recognize implied federal law, and may recognize also a need for uniform federal
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law with respect to certain features of a statute, but simultaneously may recognize that other parts of the
regulatory framework neither imply nor authorize a preemptive federal rule.”).
223 Lorenz v. CSX Corp., 1 F.3d 1406, 1409 (3d Cir. 1993).
224 Id.
225 Id.
226 Id.
227 Id.
228 Id.
229 See id.
230 Id.
231 Id. at 1410.
232 Id.
233 Id. at 1414.
234 Id.
235 Id.
236 Id. at 1415.
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avoid conflicts of interest with the debenture holders.”237 Under New York
law, the covenant of good faith and fair dealing—which prohibits either party
from “doing anything which would prevent the other party from receiving
the fruits of the contract”—is inherent in every contract.238 However, the
covenant cannot be used to insert new terms that were not bargained for, as
“a covenant is implied only when it is consistent with the express terms of
the contract.”239 Therefore, the court considered whether the indentures in
this case contained provisions which entitled debenture holders to receive
notice of the MAC dividend, the letter agreements with B&O, or any of the
remedies in the PTC/Guttmann action.
The court found that the indenture at issue contained no provisions
explicitly requiring the trustee to provide such notice to the holders.240 The
court also found that the letter agreements did not affect the plaintiffs’ rights
under the indenture and cannot be characterized as supplemental
indentures.241 Thus, the court concluded that although it would have been
advantageous for the plaintiffs to have been informed of the letter
agreements, “so long as an indenture trustee fulfills its obligations under the
express terms of the indenture, it owes the debenture holders no additional,
implicit duties or obligations, except to avoid conflicts of interest.”242 In
affirming the Pennsylvania district court, the Third Circuit held that Chase
could not have breached the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing
because it did not deprive the plaintiff of any right under the indenture.243
In Peak Partners v. Republic Bank,244 Keystone Owner Trust issued
mortgage-backed securities to plaintiff hedge fund Peak Partners (“Peak”);
US Bank Trust National Association (“US Bank”) was the indenture
trustee.245 Pursuant to the indenture, US Bank was responsible for making
monthly distributions to the noteholders from the funds in the collection
account operated by Republic Bank (“Republic”), the servicer (and
codefendant of US Bank).246 In May 2000, US Bank discovered there were
insufficient funds in the collection account to make the required monthly
distribution, and that it had overpaid principal payments to noteholders every
month since Keystone’s first distribution in 1998.247 US Bank used
Republic’s servicer certificates to calculate the amount available for
distribution. These documents failed to reflect the servicing fee that Republic
was deducting every month before entering received mortgage payments into
the collection account, which indicated that US Bank had been making
overpayments over the course of a nineteen-month period.248 US Bank
notified noteholders of this error on June 13, 2000.249
237 Id.
238 Id.
239 Id.
240 Id.
241 Id. at 1416.
242 Id.
243 Id. at 1418.
244 Peak Partners, LP v. Republic Bank, 191 F. App’x 118 (3d Cir. 2006).
245 Id. at 119–20.
246 Id. at 120.
247 Id.
248 Id. at 120–21.
249 Id.
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250Id. at 121.
251Id.
252 Id.
253 Id. at 121–22.
254 Id. at 122.
255 Id. (citing Meckel and Hazzard and reiterating the two extracontractual duties imposed by New
York to void conflicts of interest with beneficiaries and perform non-discretionary ministerial tasks).
256 Id.
257 Id.
258 Id. (quoting Beck, 632 N.Y.S.2d at 528).
259 Id.
260 Id. at 123.
261 Id. at 124.
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trustee’s alleged misconduct.268 The trial court dismissed the plaintiffs’ claim
and the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania sustained the dismissal.269
The bonds in this case were secured by mortgages that had gone into
default; the trustee’s failure to notify the bondholders of each default led to
the plaintiffs’ allegations that the trustee willfully breached its duty.270
However, the trustee did give notice to the bondholders’ agent, the mortgage
guarantor company.271 The defendants argued that by the terms of the
mortgage, they were not required to send notices to the bondholders
individually and that they performed their duties by giving notice to the
guarantor.272
The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania began its discussion by stating that
the nature and extent of a indenture trustee’s duties are primarily to be
ascertained from the trust instrument, and that such duties are “those
assumed under the terms and conditions of the contract itself, rather
than inherent in the general law governing trust relationships.”273 In this case,
the terms of the trust and the trustee’s duties were set forth in the mortgage,
to which each bond referred.274 Under the mortgage’s terms, the trustee was
not required to take any action unless requested by the bondholders.275 The
mortgage also included exculpatory provisions, which relieved “the
defendant of any duty to notify the individual bondholders of defaults by the
mortgagor, or to recognize the same for any purpose under the mortgage,
unless requested in writing by twenty-five percent of the bondholders to take
action.”276 The court noted that such exculpatory provisions are not given
effect if they are illegal, are opposed to public policy, or permit trustees to
act in bad faith.277 The court affirmed the defendant’s motion to dismiss,
holding that the provisions in the mortgage were enforceable.278
The Western District of Pennsylvania encountered the issue of indenture
trustee’s duties in a 1946 reorganization proceeding, In re Pittsburgh
Terminal Warehouse & Transfer.279 In Pittsburgh Terminal, Buchanan, the
president of the debtor company, was also an “officer or director” of the
indenture trustee company.280 Buchanan caused misleading reports of the
results of the operations of the debtor to be issued and published.281 The
reports concealed from bondholders that although the company had paid
dividends to stockholders, there were no earnings available for payment of
such dividends by reason of failure of the debtor to make charges for
depreciation, obsolescence, and repairs against operating income.282 The
indenture trustee and its officers had no notice of the debtor’s accounting
methods in 1931 when the president died.283 Further, none of the officers of
the indenture trustee owned stock of the debtor company in 1931,284 and
stockholders knew that no depreciation was taken until 1931 and did not
object.285
In the reorganization proceeding, the debtor objected to paying the
indenture trustee because the indenture trustee allegedly failed in the
performance of its duties under the indenture.286 The court concluded that the
indenture trustee was not negligent and had not defaulted in its performance
of its duties under the indenture, but that the indenture trustee was in breach
of trust for not filing suits against the directors of the debtor in bankruptcy.287
The objections were dismissed and judgement was entered in favor of the
indenture trustee;288 the fact that two of the members of the bondholders’
committee were officers of the indenture trustee does not of itself make the
indenture trustee liable for payments that the debtor made.289
In Becker, bondholders brought suit against indenture trustees, alleging
that they were negligent and breached their fiduciary and contractual duties
to bondholders by failing to maintain “perfected” security interests in the
property securing the bonds.290 The bondholders alleged that they were
awarded less in bankruptcy than they would have been if security interests
had been perfected.291 Defendant-trustees cited Peak Partners to disclaim
any duty, whether contractual or common law, to maintain security interests,
and argued they are only responsible for losses caused by gross negligence
or willful misconduct.292 In 1992, Lower Bucks Hospital (“LBH”) entered
into a bond financing transaction. The Borough of Langhorne Manor Higher
Education and Health Authority (“Authority”) agreed to issue bonds and loan
LBH the proceeds from sales of the bonds, and LBH agreed to pay principal
and interest on the bond debt.293 The indenture was between the original
indenture trustee and the Authority. On January 13, 2010, LBH filed for
Chapter 11 relief, which constituted an event of default under the transaction
agreements.294 The indenture trustee, BNYM, chose to act as the
bondholders’ sole representative in the bankruptcy case.295
On August 12, 2010, BNYM filed a proof of claim for the bondholders
against LBH for the outstanding bond debt.296 LBH sued BNYM to avoid its
claims of liens and security interests against the hospital’s gross revenues
and reserve accounts.297 LBH and BNYM entered into a settlement in which
BNYM released LBH from indemnification obligations and negotiated a
reduced recovery for the bondholders.298 The bondholders released all claims
283 Id.
284 Id.
285 Id.
286 Id.
287 Id.
288 Id. at 291.
289 Id. at 290.
290 Becker v. Bank of N.Y. Mellon Tr. Co., N.A., 172 F. Supp. 3d 777, 781 (E.D. Pa. 2016).
291 Id.
292 Id.
293 Id. at 782.
294 Id. at 783–84.
295 Id. at 784.
296 Id.
297 Id.
298 Id. at 784–85.
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against the trustee, including those for damages resulting from conduct that
caused the security interests and liens to become unperfected and voidable.
299
311 Id.
312 Id.
313 Id. at 790.
314 Id.
315 Id. (emphasis added).
316 Id. at 791.
317 Id.
318 In re Worldwide Direct, Inc., 334 B.R. 112, 118 (Bankr. D. Del. 2005).
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paid.319 However, the court did not approve all the trustee’s administrative
expenses: the trustee was not entitled to expenses it incurred to “fulfill its
fiduciary duties to the Noteholders as the Indenture Trustee or to the creditors
as a member of the [Creditors’ Committee].”320 In denying such recovery, the
court noted that indenture trustees have a fiduciary duty to noteholders and
are required to act with the same care as if it owned the investment.321 The
indenture in this case required the trustee's services be performed with “the
same degree of care and skill in their exercise as a prudent Person would
exercise or use under the circumstances in the conduct of his own affairs.”322
Two years later, the Delaware Bankruptcy Court applied Worldwide
Direct in Miller v. Greenwich Capital Financial Products to conclude that
indenture trustees owe fiduciary duties to securities holders, not bankruptcy
estates, and that indenture trustees must act in the best interests of those
holders.323 On this basis, the court in Miller dismissed a bankruptcy estate’s
breach of fiduciary duty claim, concluding that an indenture trustee owes no
fiduciary duties to a bankruptcy estate.324
In In re Nortel Networks, noteholders objected to fees an indenture
trustee claimed in an issuer’s bankruptcy matter.325 The bankruptcy court
discussed whether the indenture trustee acted prudently in assigning work to
and supervising its lawyers, as well as whether the fees charged were
reasonable.326 Pursuant to the indenture, the trustee was authorized in
performing its duties “to act through agents or attorneys,” and to “consult
with counsel of its selection.”327 The indenture required disputes over its
terms to be governed by New York law.328 The court explained that under
New York law, “the fiduciary duties of an indenture trustee are governed by
a ‘prudent person’ standard.”329 As such, the court looked at whether the
indenture trustee acted prudently in assigning the lawyers to their tasks and
whether the lawyers’ work was reasonable. Solus Alternative Asset
Management (“Solus”), which asserted that it owned a majority of the notes,
instructed the trustee to replace the attorneys with a firm it chose.330 The
indenture trustee did not do so since Solus failed to provide the indenture
trustee with proof of its majority ownership of the notes.331 The court found
that, with one sole exception, the indenture trustee acted prudently
throughout the bankruptcy case and performed its duties appropriately.332
III. CONCLUSION
Despite some ambiguity, the majority of the opinions discussed above
indicate a clear pattern. The Second Circuit views indenture trustees’ pre-
default duties as only those explicitly set forth in the indenture, with the
exception of the duty to avoid conflicts of interest. New York courts have
held that any “fiduciary” duties implied by New York common law are
identical to trustees’ duties under the TIA.336 However, New York cases still
enumerate two extracontractual pre-default duties: (1) to avoid conflicts of
interest; and (2) to perform basic nondiscretionary ministerial tasks.337 The
duty to avoid conflicts, however, does not prevent indenture trustees from
becoming creditors of an issuer, despite the inherent conflict of interest.338
Indenture trustees’ post-default duties in New York more closely resemble
those of a fiduciary, but courts continue to disagree about whether those
duties reflect the full panoply of fiduciary duties.339
For its part, the Third Circuit generally agrees that trustees’ duties prior
to default are defined exclusively by the express terms of the indenture
agreement and that there are no additional duties except to avoid conflicts of
interest.340 It also recognizes that the trustee is more like a stakeholder in its
relation to the bond issue,341and like New York, has held that trustees have
an extracontractual duty to perform basic nondiscretionary ministerial
tasks.342
Pennsylvania views indenture trustees’ duties as higher, finding that they
have fiduciary obligations to safeguard the interests of holders after an event
of default has occurred.343 Unlike New York, the Pennsylvania district court
supported a ruling that indenture trustees owed actionable fiduciary duties to
bondholders.344 Delaware deviates from the Second Circuit as well, holding
that, after default, bondholders should have the same care as if they owned
the investment.345
unique notes; and (7) retain and rely on the lawyers who represented and advised the indenture trustee.
Id.
333 Id. at *5.
334 Id. at *7.
335 Id.
336 Semi-Tech Litig., LLC v. Bankers Tr. Co., 353 F. Supp. 2d 460, 472 (S.D.N.Y. 2005).
337 Steven Wolowitz & Christopher J. Houpt, Commercial Litigation in New York State Courts §
19:31, in N.Y. PRAC. SERIES (4th ed. 2015); see LNC Inv.’s, Inc. v. First Fid. Bank, Nat’l Ass’n, 935 F.
Supp. 1333, 1347 (S.D.N.Y. 1996).
338 Morris v. Cantor, 390 F. Supp. 817, 818 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
339 See Wolowitz & Houpt, supra note 337, at § 91:31.
340 Lorenz v. CSX Corp., 1 F.3d 1406, 1415 (3d Cir. 1993).
341 Peak Partners, LP v. Republic Bank, 191 F. App’x 118, 120–22 (3d Cir. 2006).
342 Id.
343 Becker v. Bank of N.Y. Mellon Tr. Co., N.A., 172 F. Supp. 3d 777, 788 (E.D. Pa. 2016).
344 Id.
345 In re Worldwide Direct, Inc., 334 B.R. 112, 129 (Bankr. D. Del. 2005).
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