Lasala vs. National Food Authority 1 Lasala vs. National Food Authority, G.R. No.

171582,
August 19, 2015, 767 SCRA 430.
Ponente: BRION, J. Topic: ANNULMENT OF JUDGMENT
Facts:
Lasala, through his company PSF Security Agency, used to provide security guard
services to the NFA. Sometime in 1994, Lasala's employees who were deployed to the NFA filed
with the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) a complaint for underpayment of wages
and nonpayment of other monetary benefits. The NLRC ruled for the employees and held Lasala
and the NFA solidarily liable for the employees' adjudged monetary award. Consequently, the
sheriff garnished the NFA's P383,572.90 worth of bank deposits with the Development Bank of
the Philippines. Believing that it had no liability to Lasala's employees, the NFA filed with the
RTC, Branch 220, Quezon City, a complaint for sum of money with damages and an application
for the issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment against Lasala. In response, Lasala filed an
answer with counterclaim and opposition to the prayer for preliminary attachment. In his
counterclaim, Lasala prayed for the payment of moral damages of P1,000,000.00; exemplary
damages of P500,000.00; attorney's fees of P300,000.00, compensatory damages of
P250,000.00; and unpaid wage differential of P1,500,000.00, for a total amount of
P3,550,000.00. Initially, the trial court granted the NFA's prayer for the issuance of a writ of
preliminary attachment. However, this writ was eventually nullified when Lasala questioned it
with the CA. Meanwhile, on May 2, 1997, the trial court dismissed the NFA's complaint for
failure of the lawyer deputized by the Office of the Government Corporate Counsel (OGCC),
Atty. Rogelio B. Mendoza (Atty. Mendoza), to present the NFA's evidence-in-chief, due to his
repeated hearing absences. The NFA replaced Atty. Mendoza and administratively charged him
with dishonesty, grave misconduct, conduct grossly prejudicial to the best interests of the service,
and gross neglect of duty. It subsequently employed Atty. Ernesto D. Cahucom (Atty. Cahucom)
as its new counsel. Although the NFA's complaint was dismissed, Lasala's counterclaim
remained, and he presented evidence to support it. Interestingly, Atty. Cahucom, the NFA's new
counsel, did not submit any evidence to controvert Lasala's counterclaim evidence. When asked
during trial, Atty. Cahucom simply waived his right to cross-examine Lasala and did not exert
any effort to counter his testimony. Thus, in its September 2, 2002 decision, the trial court
granted Lasala's counterclaim in the total amount of P52,788,970.50. Notably, this amount is
substantially higher than the amount of P3,550,000.00, Lasala originally prayed for. Despite the
huge award to Lasala, the NFA failed to appeal its case to the CA. Atty. Cahucom did not inform
the NFA's management about the trial court's adverse ruling. When asked to explain, he reasoned
out that he only discovered the decision after the lapse of the period for appeal. Having lost its
chance to appeal, the NFA filed with the trial court a petition for relief from judgment (petition
for relief) grounded on excusable negligence. In its petition, the NFA through Atty. Cahucom,
attributed its failure to appeal to one of the NFA's employees. Allegedly, this employee received
the copy of the trial court's September 2, 2002 decision but did not inform Atty. Cahucom about
it. It was only after the lapse of the period for the filing of a motion for reconsideration and an
appeal that the NFA learned about the adverse ruling. The trial court did not accept the NFA's
reasoning; thus, it denied the petition for relief for insufficiency in substance. Thus, on the
grounds of lack of jurisdiction and extrinsic fraud, the NFA, through the OGCC, filed with the
CA a petition and an amended petition for annulment of judgment (petition for annulment) of the
trial court's September 2, 2002 decision which had granted a substantially higher award than
what Lasala originally prayed for in his counterclaim. The CA granted the petition and annulled
the trial court's September 2, 2002 decision.

Issues:
Whether or not: a.) The filing of a petition for relief barred the filing of a petition for
annulment of judgment; and; b.) The CA correctly annulled the trial court's September 2, 2002
decision on the ground of lack of jurisdiction (due to grave abuse of discretion).

Held:
On the first issue, a.) No. The prior filing of a petition for relief he said order does not per
se bar the filing of a petition for annulment of judgment. Annulment of judgment may only be
resorted to if the ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief or other appropriate
remedies, are no longer available without the petitioner's fault. Thus, the petitioner must be able
to provide a plausible explanation for not resorting first to the more common remedies
enumerated under the Rules. As annulment is an equitable remedy, it cannot be used to
compensate litigants who lost their case because of their negligence or because they slept on
their rights. This safeguard has been put in place to address the concern that defeated litigants
would use and abuse Rule 47 to avoid or delay an already final and executory judgment. In the
present case, the NFA actually availed of the remedy of petition for relief at the trial court level.
Lasala now argues that res judicata should have prevented the CA from recognizing the NFA's
petition for annulment, as the dismissal of the NFA's petition for relief serves as a prior judgment
that bars the filing of a subsequent petition for annulment of judgment. Res judicata refers to the
rule that a final judgment or decree on the merits by a court of competent jurisdiction is
conclusive of the rights of the parties or their privies in all later suits on all points and matters
determined in the former suit. Its elements are the following: (1) the former judgment or order
must be final; (2) the judgment or order must be on the merits; (3) it must have been rendered by
a court having jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties; and (4) there must be, between
the first and the second action, identity of parties, of subject matter, and cause of action. There is
res judicata when all these requisites concur. Clearly, the fourth requisite is absent and cannot
apply to the present case. There is identity of parties in the petitions for relief and annulment of
judgment, but no identity of subject matter and cause of action. To determine the existence of
identity of cause of action between the two cases, the Court has often applied the identity of
evidence test — i.e., whether the evidence to support and establish the present and former causes
of action are the same. The petition for relief prayed that the execution of the trial court's adverse
ruling be restrained, and for the recognition of the NFA's right to appeal on the ground of
excusable negligence. On the other hand, the petition for annulment and its amendment sought
the setting aside of the trial court's decision because of extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction.
Clearly, the pieces of evidence that NFA presented in its petition for relief are different from the
evidence it presented in the current case — the former, grounded on excusable negligence,
sought relief from judgment because one of its employees failed to give a copy of the trial court
decision to Atty. Cahucom on time to file an appeal. The present case, on the other hand, seeks to
annul the trial court's judgment based on the fraudulent acts of its former counsels (including
Atty. Cahucom's), and because the lower court lacked jurisdiction over Lasala's counterclaim.
The distinctions between the grounds invoked and reliefs prayed for between the two petitions
highlight the need for different pieces of evidence to prove them. Thus, their causes of action are
not identical, and res judicata does not bar the filing of the present petition for annulment. On the
second issue,
b.) No. The CA committed an error; it violated the restrictive application of a petition for
annulment; only extrinsic fraud and/or lack of jurisdiction may annul a final judgment. In a
petition for annulment based on lack of jurisdiction, the petitioner cannot rely on jurisdictional
defect due to grave abuse of discretion, but on absolute lack of jurisdiction. As we have already
held, the concept of lack of jurisdiction as a ground to annul a judgment does not embrace grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. In Republic v. G Holdings, we
explained: Jurisdiction is not the same as the exercise of jurisdiction. As distinguished from the
exercise of jurisdiction, jurisdiction is the authority to decide a cause, and not the decision
rendered therein. Where there is jurisdiction over the person and the subject matter, the decision
on all other questions arising in the case is but an exercise of the jurisdiction. And the errors
which the court may commit in the exercise of jurisdiction are merely errors of judgment which
are the proper subject of an appeal. (emphasis supplied) In other words, the lack of jurisdiction
envisioned under Rule 47 is the total absence of jurisdiction over the person of a party or over
the subject matter. When the court has validly acquired its jurisdiction, annulment through lack
of jurisdiction is not available when the court's subsequent grave abuse of discretion operated to
oust it of its jurisdiction. Despite this erroneous ruling of the CA, we hold that annulment of the
trial court's September 2, 2002 decision is still proper as the NFA validly raised and substantiated
the allowed grounds of extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction. The actions of Attys. Mendoza
and Cahucom, under the unique circumstances of this case, amount to extrinsic fraud that
warrants the grant of NFA's petition for relief from judgment. And the trial court's September 2,
2002 decision should also be annulled on the ground of lack of jurisdiction (nonpayment of
docket fee for his permissive counterclaim). Extrinsic fraud in a petition for annulment refers to
"any fraudulent act of the prevailing party in litigation committed outside of the trial of the case,
where the defeated party is prevented from fully exhibiting his side by fraud or deception
practiced on him by his opponent, such as by keeping him away from court, by giving him a
false promise of a compromise, or where an attorney fraudulently or without authority connives
at his defeat." In Bayog v. Natino, for instance, we held that the unconscionable failure of a
lawyer to inform his client of his receipt of the trial court's order and the motion for execution,
and to take the appropriate action against either or both to protect his client's rights amounted to
connivance with the prevailing party, which constituted extrinsic fraud. We find the exceptional
circumstances in Bayog to be present in the case now before us. The party in the present case, the
NFA, is a government agency that could rightly rely solely on its legal officers to vigilantly
protect its interests. The NFA's lawyers were not only its counsel, they were its employees tasked
to advance the agency's legal interests. Further, the NFA's' lawyers acted negligently several
times in handling the case that it appears deliberate on their part. First, Atty. Mendoza caused the
dismissal of the NFA's complaint against Lasala by negligently and repeatedly failing to attend
the hearing for the presentation of the NFA's evidence-in-chief. Consequently, the NFA lost its
chance to recover from Lasala the employee benefits that it allegedly shouldered as indirect
employer. Atty. Mendoza never bothered to provide any valid excuse for this crucial omission on
his part. Parenthetically, this was not the first time Atty. Mendoza prejudiced the NFA; he did the
same when he failed to file a motion for reconsideration and an appeal in a prior 1993 case where
Lasala secured a judgment of P34,500,229.67 against the NFA. For these failures, Atty. Mendoza
merely explained that the NFA's copy of the adverse decision was lost and was only found after
the lapse of the period for appeal. Under these circumstances, the NFA was forced to file an
administrative complaint against Atty. Mendoza for his string of negligent acts. Atty. Cahucom,
Atty. Mendoza's successor in handling the case, notably did not cross-examine Lasala's
witnesses, and did not present controverting evidence to disprove and counter Lasala's
counterclaim. Atty. Cahucom further prejudiced the NFA when he likewise failed to file a motion
for reconsideration or an appeal from the trial court's September 2, 2002 decision, where Lasala
was awarded the huge amount of P52,788,970.50, without any convincing evidence to support it.
When asked to justify his failure, Atty. Cahucom, like Atty. Mendoza, merely mentioned that the
NFA's copy of the decision was lost and that he only discovered it when the period for appeal
had already lapsed. The actions of these lawyers, that at the very least could be equated with
unreasonable disregard for the case they were handling and with obvious indifference towards
the NFA's plight, lead us to the conclusion that Attys. Mendoza's and Cahucom's actions
amounted to a concerted action with Lasala when the latter secured the trial court's huge and
baseless counterclaim award. By this fraudulent scheme, the NFA was prevented from making a
fair submission in the controversy. To further invalidate the NFA's petition for annulment, Lasala
argues that extrinsic fraud as a ground is no longer available since the NFA failed to raise it in its
petition for relief when it could have done so. Under Section 2, Rule 47 of the Rules of Court,
extrinsic fraud as a ground will not be allowed if it had already been availed of or could have
been availed of in a motion for new trial or petition for relief. Attys. Mendoza and Cahucom's
actions which amounted to extrinsic fraud should have been earlier raised at the trial court's level
since their actions had been consummated when the petition for relief was filed. The NFA's
failure to do so amounted to a waiver of this ground in its petition for annulment. We find
Lasala's reasoning to be grossly erroneous. Remedial Law Lasala vs. National Food Authority 5
The NFA did not waive its right to raise extrinsic fraud precisely because the circumstances
prevented its inclusion in the petition for relief. Notably, Atty. Cahucom was the one who drafted
and filed the petition for relief, which he based not on his own negligence, but on that of another
NFA employee. Since part of the extrinsic fraud against the NFA was attributable to Atty.
Cahucom, it could not be expected that he would raise his own act as a ground and incriminate
himself in the petition for relief. In our analysis, the NFA could not have availed of this ground
because Atty. Cahucom himself prevented it. Moreover, it was only in 2002, when then NFA
Administrator Arthur Yap ordered a legal audit of all existing NFA cases, that the NFA's
management discovered the mishandling of the case against Lasala. In these lights, we rule that
the prohibition under Section 2, Rule 47 should not apply to the NFA. Although available during
the filing of the petition for relief, the NFA could not have raised this ground because it was
fraudulently precluded from doing so. Lasala's counterclaim for wage adjustment against the
NFA is not a compulsory but a permissive counterclaim. The cause of action for this
counterclaim already existed even before the filing of the NFA's complaint against Lasala. Thus,
it did not arise out of, nor is it necessarily connected with, the NFA's complaint for sum of
money and prayer for preliminary attachment. Because it is not an incident of the NFA's claim, it
can be filed as a separate case against the NFA, unless already extinguished. Under this situation,
Lasala's nonpayment of docket fee for his permissive counterclaim prevented the trial court from
acquiring jurisdiction over it. The court may allow payment of such fee but only within a
reasonable time and in no case beyond the prescriptive period for the filing of the permissive
counterclaim. In the present case, we annulled the trial court's decision granting Lasala's
permissive counterclaim on both grounds of lack of jurisdiction and extrinsic fraud. Although the
prescriptive period for the refiling of the annulled action shall be deemed suspended from its
original filing until the finality of the judgment of annulment, we rule that Lasala may no longer
refile his permissive counterclaim as it has already prescribed. Under Section 8, Rule 47, the
prescriptive period to file the annulled original action shall not be suspended when the extrinsic
fraud is attributable to the plaintiff in the action. In the present case, the original action
contemplated is Lasala's counterclaim against the NFA. On this basis, we hold that the existence
of extrinsic fraud in the present case did not toll the prescriptive period for the filing of Lasala's
counterclaim. To reiterate, the unique facts of this case show that Attys. Mendoza and Cahucom
patently, blatantly, and unjustifiably mishandled the case to the utter prejudice of the NFA. The
degree to which they disregarded their duty to protect the NFA's interests amounted to actions in
concert with Lasala which constituted the extrinsic fraud against the NFA.
 MARIO J. MENDEZONA et.al vs. JULIO H. OZAMIZ, et.al, G.R. No. 143370.
February 6, 2002.
Topic: MOTIONS; MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL; REQUISITES.
Facts:
A deed of sale with usufructuary rights dated April 28, 1989 executed by Carmen
Ozamis, then 86 years old, in favor of petitioners, her nephews, was sought to be annulled by
private respondents alleging that the same was simulated for absence of consideration and that
the vendor was not in full possession of her faculties during its execution. Nine (9) other
important documents signed either before or after April 28, 1989 were, however, not assailed by
respondents. The trial court rendered judgment in favor of petitioners. It held that the property
was sold under a valid contract, voluntarily and deliberately entered into while the vendor was of
sound mind, for sufficient and good consideration without force or undue influence. The trial
court found that it was unfair for respondents to claim unsoundness of mind of the vendor when
it benefits them and otherwise when it disadvantages them. On appeal, the trial court's decision
was reversed. It found that there was no consideration, as petitioners failed to present the checks
evidencing payment and that at the time of the execution of the document, the mental faculties of
Carmen Ozamis were already seriously impaired. Petitioners moved for a new trial and/or
reception of evidence claiming that RTC Judge Durias whose name had cropped up as possible
witness as early as the pre-trial of the case, could testify as to the mental condition of the vendor.
They contended, among other things, that the appellate court totally ignored the testimony of
Judge Teodorico Durias regarding the mental condition of Carmen Ozamiz a month before the
execution of the Deed of Absolute Sale in question. The said testimony was taken in the Special
Proceeding No. 1250 in the Regional Trial Court of Oroquieta City. However, Judge Durias was
not presented as a witness in Civil Case No. CEB-10766 in the Regional Trial Court of Cebu
City. Petitioners alleged that Judge Durias's testimony is a newly-discovered evidence which
could not have been discovered prior, to the trial in the court below by the exercise of due
diligence. The appellate court denied both motions. Hence, the instant petition.
Issue:
Whether to consider the testimony of Judge Durias as newly discovered evidence.
Held:
No. The requirement of reasonable diligence has not been met by the petitioners. A motion for
new trial upon the ground of newly discovered evidence is properly granted only where there is
concurrence of the following requisites, namely: (a) the evidence had been discovered after trial;
(b) the evidence could not have been discovered and produced during trial even with the exercise
of reasonable diligence; and (c) the evidence is material and not merely corroborative,
cumulative or impeaching and is of such weight that if admitted, would probably alter the result.
All three (3) requisites must characterize the evidence sought to be introduced at the new trial.
As early as the pre-trial of the case at bar, the name of Judge Durias has already cropped up as a
possible witness for the defendants, herein respondents. That the respondents chose not to
present him is not an indicia per se of suppression of evidence, since a party in a civil case is free
to choose who to present as his witness. Neither can Judge Durias' testimony in another case be
considered as newly discovered evidence since the facts to be testified to by Judge Durias which
were existing before and during the trial, could have been presented by the petitioners at the trial
below. The testimony of Judge Durias has been in existence waiting only to be elicited from him
by questioning. It has been held that a lack of diligence is exhibited where the newly discovered
evidence was necessary or proper under the pleadings, and its existence must have occurred to
the party in the course of the preparation of the case, but no effort was made to secure it; there is
a failure to make inquiry of persons who were likely to know the facts in question, especially
where information was not sought from co-parties; there is a failure to seek evidence available
through public records; there is a failure to discover evidence that is within the control of the
complaining party; there is a failure to follow leads contained in other evidence; and, there is a
failure to utilize available discovery procedures. Thus, the testimony of Judge Durias cannot be
considered as newly discovered evidence to warrant a new trial.

EPIFANIO SAN JUAN v. JUDGE RAMON A. CRUZ, GR NO. 167321, 2006-07-31

Facts:
Loreto Samia San Juan executed a Last Will and Testament naming Oscar Casa as one of the
devisees therein. Upon Loreto's death. Atty. Teodorico A. Aquino filed a petition for the probate
of the will in the Regional Trial Court. While the petition was pending, Oscar Casa died
The firm of Aquino, Galang, Lucas, Espinoza, Miranda & Associates entered their appearance as
counsel of Federico Casa, Jr., who claimed to be one of the heirs of Oscar Cas... the probate court
issued an Order denying the entry of appearance of said law firm, considering that Federico
Casa, Jr. was not the executor or administrator of the estate of the devisee
Aquino filed a pleading entitled "Appointment of Administrator" signed by Candelaria, Jesus,
Arlyn, Nestor, Edna, Benhur, Federico, Rafael and Ma. Eden, all surnamed Casa... praying that
one of them, Federico Casa, Jr., be designated as... administrator of the estate of the deceased and
that he be substituted for the deceased.
Epifanio San Juan filed a "Motion to Declare Appointment of Administrator As Inadequate or
Insufficient."[4] He maintained that the heirs should present an administrator of the estate of
Oscar Casa as the... representative of the estate in the case.
In his reply, Aquino stated that, under Section 16, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court, the heirs of Oscar
Casa may be substituted for the deceased without need for appointment of an administrator or
executor of the estate. He also claimed that the court is enjoined to require the... representative to
appear before the court and be substituted within the prescribed period.
the RTC issued an Order denying the motion of San Juan. The court held that there was, after all,
no need for the appointment of an administrator or executor as substitute for the deceased
devisee. It is enough... the court declared that a representative be appointed as provided in
Section 16, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court
San Juan emphasized that it is only in the absence of an executor or administrator that the heirs
may be allowed by the court to substitute the deceased party. He averred that the purported heirs
simply agreed among themselves to appoint a representative to be substituted for... the deceased,
which is contrary to the requirement of a prior hearing for the court to ascertain who the rightful
heirs are.The probate court issued an Order sustaining Aquino's argument and denied the motion
for reconsideration of San Juan.
Issues:
whether there is a need for the... appointment of an administrator of the estate of Oscar Casa, or
whether it is enough that he be substituted by his heirs.

HELD:
priority is given to the legal representative of the deceased
The heirs of the estate of Oscar Casa do not need to first secure the appointment of an
administrator of his estate, because from the very moment of his death, they stepped into his
shoes and acquired his rights as devisee/legatee of the deceased Loreto San Juan. Thus, a prior...
appointment of an administrator or executor of the estate of Oscar Casa is not necessary for his
heirs to acquire legal capacity to be substituted as representatives of the estate.[42] Said heirs
may designate one or some of them as their representative... before the trial court.
Hence, even on the threshold issue raised in the RTC and in the petition for certiorari in the CA,
the assailed order of the RTC is correct.
Antonio v. Register of Deeds of Makati City, June 20, 2012

Petitioner Remedios Antonino had been leasing since March 21, 1978 a residential property
located at Makati City and owned by private respondent Tan Tian Su. Under the governing
lease contract, Antonino was accorded with the right of first refusal in the event Su would decide
to sell the subject property. The parties executed a document denominated as Undertaking
Agreement where Su agreed to sell to Antonino the subject property
for P39,500,000.00. However, in view of a disagreement as to who between them would
shoulder the payment of the capital gains tax, the sale did not proceed as intended.
Antonino filed a complaint against Su with RTC of Makati City, for the reimbursement of the
cost of repairs on the subject property and payment of damages. Later that same day, he filed an
amended complaint to enforce the Undertaking Agreementand compel Su to sell to her the
subject property. The RTC dismissed his complaint on the grounds of improper venue and non-
payment of the appropriate docket fees. According to the RTC, his complaint is one for specific
performance, damages and sum of money, which are personal actions that should have been filed
in the court of the place where any of the parties resides. Antonino and Su reside in Muntinlupa
and Manila, respectively, thus Makati City is not the proper venue.
On December 23, 2004, Su filed an Omnibus Motion, praying for the cancellation of the notice
of lis pendens, which Antonino caused to be annotated on the title covering the subject property
and the issuance of a summary judgment on his counterclaims in view of the dismissal of the
complaint and Antonino’s failure to appeal therefrom.
On January 3, 2005, Antonino filed a Motion for Reconsideration, claiming that her complaint is
a real action and the location of the subject property is determinative of its venue. She prayed
for the reinstatement of her complaint and issuance of an order directing the clerk of court to
assess the proper docket fees. This was denied by the RTC holding that there was non-
compliance with Sections 4 and 5 of Rule 15 of the Rules of Court. She thus filed a Motion for
Reconsideration claiming that there was due observance of the rules on motions. In a Joint
Resolution, the RTC denied Su’s Omnibus Motion and Antonino’s Motion for Reconsideration.
On April 1, 2005, Antonino filed with the CA a petition for annulment of judgment. The CA
dismissed the petition. Antonino filed a motion for reconsideration but was also denied by the
CA.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Antonino’s use of the remedy of a petition for annulment of judgment as against
the final and executory orders of the RTC is proper.
RULING:
No. As ruled in Ramos v. Judge Combong, Jr: Annulment of judgment is a recourse equitable in
character, allowed only in exceptional cases as where there is no available or other adequate
remedy.Rule 47 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, governs actions for
annulment of judgments or final orders and resolutions, and Section 2 thereof explicitly provides
only two grounds for annulment of judgment, i.e.,extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction. The
underlying reason is traceable to the notion that annulling final judgments goes against the grain
of finality of judgment. Litigation must end and terminate sometime and somewhere, and it is
essential to an effective administration of justice that once a judgment has become final, the issue
or cause involved therein should be laid to rest. The basic rule of finality of judgment is
grounded on the fundamental principle of public policy and sound practice that at the risk of
occasional error, the judgment of courts and the award of quasi-judicial agencies must become
final at some definite date fixed by law.
In Barco v. Court of Appeals, the Court emphasized that only void judgments, by reason of
“extrinsic fraud” or the court’s lack of jurisdiction, are susceptible to being annulled. Apart from
the requirement that the existence of “extrinsic fraud” or “lack of jurisdiction” should be amply
demonstrated, one who desires to avail this remedy must convince that the ordinary and other
appropriate remedies, such as an appeal, are no longer available for causes not attributable to
him. This is clearly provided under Section 1, Rule 47 of the Rules of Court.
As the Court previously clarified in Republic of the Philippines v. “G” Holdings, Inc.,“lack of
jurisdiction” as a ground for the annulment of judgments pertains to lack of jurisdiction over the
person of the defending party or over the subject matter of the claim. It does not contemplate
“grave abuse of discretion” considering that “jurisdiction” is different from the exercise thereof.
As ruled in Tolentino v. Judge Leviste: Jurisdiction is not the same as the exercise of
jurisdiction. As distinguished from the exercise of jurisdiction, jurisdiction is the authority to
decide a cause, and not the decision rendered therein. Where there is jurisdiction over the person
and the subject matter, the decision on all other questions arising in the case is but an exercise of
the jurisdiction. And the errors which the court may commit in the exercise of jurisdiction are
merely errors of judgment which are the proper subject of an appeal. Antonino’s recourse to
annulment of judgment is seriously flawed and the reasons are patent. There is therefore no
reason to disturb the questioned issuances of the RTC that are already final and executory.
Padilla-Rumbaua v. Rumbaua, G.R. No. 166738, August 14, 2009
FACTS:
Rowena and Edward were childhood neighbors in Dupax del Norte, Nueva Vizcaya. Sometime
in 1987, they met again and became sweethearts but Edward’s family did not approve of their
relationship. After graduation from college in 1991, Edward promised to marry Rowena as soon
as he found a job. The job came in 1993, when the Philippine Air Lines (PAL) accepted Edward
as a computer engineer. Edward proposed to Rowena that they first have a “secret marriage” in
order not to antagonize his parents. Rowena agreed; they were married in Manila on February
23, 1993. Rowena and Edward, however, never lived together; Rowena stayed with her sister
in Fairview, Quezon City, while Edward lived with his parents in Novaliches.
Rowena and respondent saw each other every day during the first six months of their marriage.
At that point, Edward refused to live with Rowena for fear that public knowledge of their
marriage would affect his application for a PAL scholarship. Seven months into their marriage,
the couple’s daily meetings became occasional visits to Rowena’s house in Fairview; they would
have sexual trysts in motels. Later that year, Edward enrolled at FEATI University after he lost
his employment with PAL.
In 1994, the parties’ respective families discovered their secret marriage. Edward’s mother tried
to convince him to go to the United States, but he refused. To appease his mother, he continued
living separately from Rowena. Edward forgot to greet Rowena during her birthday in 1992 and
likewise failed to send her greeting cards on special occasions. Edward indicated as well in his
visa application that he was single.
In April 1995, Edward’s mother died. Edward blamed Rowena, associating his mother’s death to
the pain that the discovery of his secret marriage brought. Pained by Edward’s action, Rowena
severed her relationship with Edward. They eventually reconciled through the help of Rowena’s
father, although they still lived separately.
In 1997, Edward informed Rowena that he had found a job in Davao. A year later, Rowena and
her mother went to Edward’s house in Novaliches and found him cohabiting with one Cynthia
Villanueva (Cynthia). When she confronted Edward about it, he denied having an affair with
Cynthia. Rowena apparently did not believe Edwards and moved to to Nueva Vizcaya to recover
from the pain and anguish that her discovery brought.
Rowena filed a Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage against Edward. Aside from her
oral testimony, the petitioner also presented a certified true copy of their marriage contract; and
the testimony, curriculum vitae, and psychological report of clinical psychologist Dr. Nedy
Lorenzo Tayag (Dr. Tayag).
Dr. Tayag declared on the witness stand that she administered the following tests on Rowena: a
Revised Beta Examination; a Bender Visual Motor Gestalt Test; a Rorschach Psychodiagnostic
Test; a Draw a Person Test; a Sach’s Sentence Completion Test; and MMPI. She thereafter
prepared a psychological report with his findings. According to his evaluation, the character
traits of Edward reveal him to suffer Narcissistic Personality Disorder – declared to be grave,
severe and incurable. However, at the end of his findings, Dr. Tayag incorporated his personal
idea about love. Love, according to him, means:
“Love happens to everyone. It is dubbed to be boundless as it goes beyond the expectations
people tagged with it. In love, “age does matter.” People love in order to be secure that one will
share his/her life with another and that he/she will not die alone. Individuals who are in love had
the power to let love grow or let love die – it is a choice one had to face when love is not the love
he/she expected.”
The Regional Trial Court nullified the marriage of Rowena and Edward.
The Republic, through the OSG, appealed the RTC decision to the CA. The CA reversed and set
aside the RTC decision, and denied the nullification of the parties’ marriage.
In its ruling, the CA observed that Dr. Tayag’s psychiatric report did not mention the cause of
the Edward’s so-called “narcissistic personality disorder;” it did not discuss the Edward’s
childhood and thus failed to give the court an insight into the Edward’s developmental years. Dr.
Tayag likewise failed to explain why she came to the conclusion that the Edward’s incapacity
was “deep-seated” and “incurable.”
Rowena then went up to the Supreme Court. Among her prayer is the remanding of the case to
the RTC for further reception of evidence. She argues that the inadequacy of her evidence
during the trial was the fault of her former counsel, Atty. Richard Tabago, and asserts that
remanding the case to the RTC would allow her to cure the evidentiary insufficiencies.
ISSUES:
a) Whether a remand of the Case to the RTC is improper.
b) Whether Dr. Tayag’s Report is sufficient to justify the nullification of their marriage.
RULING
When the case reached the Supreme Court, it ruled that Rowena failed to establish the Edward’s
psychological incapacity.
First, as to the remand of the case to the RTC, the Court said:
A remand of the case to the RTC for further proceedings amounts to the grant of a new trial that
is not procedurally proper at this stage. Section 1 of Rule 37 provides that an aggrieved party
may move the trial court to set aside a judgment or final
order already rendered and to grant a new trial within the period for taking an appeal. In
addition, a motion for new trial may be filed only on the grounds of (1) fraud, accident, mistake
or excusable negligence that could not have been guarded against by ordinary prudence, and by
reason of which the aggrieved party’s rights have probably been impaired; or (2) newly
discovered evidence that, with reasonable diligence, the aggrieved party could not have
discovered and produced at the trial, and that would probably alter the result if presented.
In the present case, the Rowena cites the inadequacy of the evidence presented by her
former counsel as basis for a remand. She did not, however, specify the inadequacy. That the
RTC granted the petition for declaration of nullity prima facie shows that the Rowena’s counsel
had not been negligent in handling the case. Granting arguendo that the Rowena’s counsel had
been negligent, the negligence that would justify a new trial must be excusable, i.e. one that
ordinary diligence and prudence could not have guarded against.
As to the findings of Dr. Tayag, the Supreme Court notes that said findings was based mainly on
her assessment of Rowena. The Court states:
We cannot help but note that Dr. Tayag’s conclusions about Edward’s psychological incapacity
were based on the information fed to her by only one side – Rowena – whose bias in favor of her
cause cannot be doubted. While this circumstance alone does not disqualify the psychologist for
reasons of bias, her report, testimony and conclusions deserve the application of a more rigid
and stringent set of standards in the manner we discussed above. For, effectively, Dr. Tayag
only diagnosed Edward from the prism of a third party account; she did not actually hear, see
and evaluate Edward and how he would have reacted and responded to the doctor’s probes.
The Court therefore ruled that:
“We find these observations and conclusions insufficiently in-depth and comprehensive to
warrant the conclusion that a psychological incapacity existed that prevented Edward from
complying with the essential obligations of marriage. It failed to identify the root cause of
Edward’s narcissistic personality disorder and to prove that it existed at the inception of the
marriage. Neither did it explain the incapacitating nature of the alleged disorder, nor show that
Edward was really incapable of fulfilling his duties due to some incapacity of a psychological,
not physical, nature.