1.Reman Recio vs.

Heirs of Spouses Aguedo

FACTS
The petitioner conducted a series of negotiations with respondent Alejandro who
introduced himself as representing the other heirs. After the said negotiations, the
Altamiranos through Alejandro entered into an oral contract of sale with the petitioner
over the subject property.

in view of the said oral contract of sale, the petitioner made partial payments to the
Altamiranos in the total amount of One Hundred Ten Thousand Pesos (P110,000.00).
Alejandro duly received and acknowledged these partial payments as shown in a receipt
dated January 24, 1995. On April 14, 1995 the petitioner made another payment which
Alejandro again received and acknowledged through a receipt of the same date.

Subsequently, the petitioner offered in many instances to pay the remaining balance of
the agreed purchase price of the subject property in the amount of Three Hundred
Forty Thousand Pesos (P340,000.00), but Alejandro kept on avoiding the petitioner.
Because of this, the petitioner demanded from the Altamiranos, through Alejandro, the
execution of a Deed of Absolute Sale in exchange for the full payment of the agreed
price.7

the petitioner filed a complaint for Specific Performance with Damages. On March 14,
1997, the petitioner also caused to annotate on the TCT No. T-102563 a Notice of Lis
Pendens.8

Pending the return of service of summons to the Altamiranos, the petitioner discovered
that the subject property has been subsequently sold to respondents Lauro and
Marcelina Lajarca (Spouses Lajarca).

RTC RULED that The Deed of Sale, dated February 26, 1998, between the Altam[i]ranos
and the Lajarca Spouses is declared NULL and VOID as far as the aliquot share of
Alejandro Altam[i]rano is concerned.

Aggrieved, the Spouses Lajarca filed an appeal assailing the above RTC decision.

the CA affirmed with modification, the dispositive portion of which states: cralavvonlinelawlibrary

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the August 23, 2005 Decision of the Regional Trial
Court, Br. 85, Fourth Judicial Region, Lipa City, in Civil Case No. 97-0107, is
hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION.
The Deed of Sale, dated February 26, 1998, between the Altam[i]ranos and the Lajarca
Spouses is declared NULL and VOID as far as the aliquot share of Alejandro
Altam[i]rano is concerned

Not satisfied with the decision, the petitioner sought reconsideration but his motion was
denied in the CA Resolution

ISSUES
Whether or not the petitioner alleging in the main that the CA gravely and
seriously erred in modifying the RTC decision is correct .

RULING
No, At the core of the present petition is the validity of the verbal contract of sale
between Alejandro and the petitioner; and the Deed of Absolute Sale between the
Altamiranos and the Spouses Lajarca involving the subject property.

A valid contract of sale requires: (a) a meeting of minds of the parties to transfer
ownership of the thing sold in exchange for a price; (b) the subject matter, which must
be a possible thing; and (c) the price certain in money or its equivalent. 22

In the instant case, all these elements are present. The records disclose that the
Altamiranos were the ones who offered to sell the property to Nena but the transaction
did not push through due to the fault of the respondents.

That Alejandro�s sale of Lot No. 3 did not bind his co-owners because a sale of real
property by one purporting to be an agent of the owner without any written authority
from the latter is null and void. An SPA from the co-owners pursuant to Article 1878 of
the New Civil Code is necessary. However, the CA held that the contract of sale
between Alejandro and the petitioner is valid because under a regime of co-ownership,
a co-owner can freely sell and dispose his undivided interest, citing Acabal v.
Acabal.18 Furthermore, the Spouses Lajarca were not buyers in good faith because they
had knowledge of the prior sale to the petitioner who even caused the annotation of the
Notice of Lis Pendens on TCT No. T-102563.19

The CA, thereby, held that insofar as the verbal contract of sale between Alejandro and
the petitioner is concerned, Alejandro�s disposition affects only his pro indiviso share,
such that the transferee (the petitioner) receives only what corresponds to
Alejandro�s undivided share in the subject lot. Likewise, the CA declared the deed of
absolute sale between the Altamiranos and the Spouses Lajarca valid only insofar as
the aliquot shares of the other Altamiranos are concerned. Thus, in effect, the petitioner
and the Spouses Lajarca are co-owners of the subject property.
2.Inocencia Yu Dino vs. Court of Appeals and Roman Sio

Facts

Petitioners spouses Dino, doing business under the trade name "Candy Claire Fashion Garment" are
engaged in the business of manufacturing and selling shirts. 1 Respondent Sio is part owner and
general manager of a manufacturing corporation doing business under the trade name "Universal Toy
Master Manufacturing." 2

Petitioners and respondent Sio entered into a contract whereby the latter would manufacture for the
petitioners 20,000 pieces of vinyl frogs and 20,000 pieces of vinyl mooseheads at P7.00 per piece in
accordance with the sample approved by the petitioners. These frogs and mooseheads were to be
attached to the shirts petitioners would manufacture and sell. 3

Respondent Sio delivered in several installments the 40,000 pieces of frogs and mooseheads. The last
delivery was made on September 28, 1988. Petitioner fully paid the agreed price. 4 Subsequently,
petitioners returned to respondent 29,772 pieces of frogs and mooseheads for failing to comply with
the approved sample. 5 The return was made on different dates: the initial one on December 12, 1988
consisting of 1,720 pieces, 6 the second on January 11, 1989, 7 and the last on January 17, 1989. 8

Petitioners then demanded from the respondent a refund of the purchase price of the returned goods
in the amount of P208,404.00. As respondent Sio refused to pay, 9 petitioners filed on July 24, 1989
an action for collection of a sum of money in the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 38.

Petitioners claim that the Complaint they filed in the trial court on July 24, 1989 was one for the
collection of a sum of money. Respondent contends that it was an action for breach of warranty as the
sum of money petitioners sought to collect was actually a refund of the purchase price they paid for
the alleged defective goods they bought from the Respondent.

Issue

Whether or not the contract between the parties was a contract of a piece of work
Ruling
The following provisions of the New Civil Code are apropos: jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"ARTICLE 1467. A contract for the delivery at a certain price of an article which the vendor in the
ordinary course of his business manufactures or procures for the general market, whether the same is
on hand at the time or not, is a contract of sale, but if the goods are to be manufactured specially for
the customer and upon his special order, and not for the general market, it is a contract for a piece of
work." cralaw virtua1aw library

"ARTICLE 1713. By the contract for a piece of work the contractor binds himself to execute a piece of
work for the employer, in consideration of a certain price or compensation. The contractor may either
employ only his labor or skill, or also furnish the material."

As this Court ruled in Engineering & Machinery Corporation v. Court of Appeals, Et Al., 12 "a contract
for a piece of work, labor and materials may be distinguished from a contract of sale by the inquiry as
to whether the thing transferred is one not in existence and which would never have existed but for
the order of the person desiring it. In such case, the contract is one for a piece of work, not a sale. On
the other hand, if the thing subject of the contract would have existed and been the subject of a sale
to some other person even if the order had not been given then the contract is one of sale.

The contract between the petitioners and respondent stipulated that respondent would manufacture
upon order of the petitioners 20,000 pieces of vinyl frogs and 20,000 pieces of vinyl mooseheads
according to the samples specified and approved by the petitioners. Respondent Sio did not ordinarily
manufacture these products, but only upon order of the petitioners and at the price agreed upon. 14
Clearly, the contract executed by and between the petitioners and the respondent was a contract for a
piece of work. At any rate, whether the agreement between the parties was one of a contract of sale
or a piece of work, the provisions on warranty of title against hidden defects in a contract of sale apply
to the case at bar,

4.Engineering & Machinery Corporation vs. Court of

Appeals
Facts

Pursuant to the contract dated September 10, 1962 between petitioner and private respondent, the
former undertook to fabricate, furnish and install the air-conditioning system in the latter's building
along Buendia Avenue, Makati in consideration of P210,000.00. Petitioner was to furnish the
materials, labor, tools and all services required in order to so fabricate and install said system. The
system was completed in 1963 and accepted by private respondent, who paid in full the contract
price.

On September 2, 1965, private respondent sold the building to the National Investment and
Development Corporation (NIDC). The ownership of the building having been decreed back to
private respondent, he re-acquired possession sometime in 1971. It was then that he learned from
some NIDC, employees of the defects of the air-conditioning system of the building.

On the basis of this report, private respondent filed on May 8, 1971 an action for damages against
petitioner with the then Court of First Instance of Rizal (Civil Case No. 14712). The complaint alleged
that the air-conditioning system installed by petitioner did not comply with the agreed plans and
specifications.

Petitioner moved to dismiss the complaint, alleging that the prescriptive period of six months had set
in pursuant to Articles 1566 and 1567, in relation to Article 1571 of the Civil Code, regarding the
responsibility of a vendor for any hidden faults or defects in the thing sold.

Private respondent countered that the contract dated September 10, 1962 was not a contract for
sale but a contract for a piece of work under Article 1713 of the Civil Code. Thus, in accordance with
Article 1144 (1) of the same Code, the complaint was timely brought within the ten-year prescriptive
period.

Issues

Whether or not the contract dated September 10, 1962 was not a contract of sale or a
contract for a piece of work
Ruling

It was a contract for a piece of work , Article 1713 of the Civil Code defines a contract for a piece of
work thus:

By the contract for a piece of work the contractor binds himself to execute a piece of work for
the employer, in consideration of a certain price or compensation. The contractor may either
employ only his labor or skill, or also furnish the material.

A contract for a piece of work, labor and materials may be distinguished from a contract of sale by
the inquiry as to whether the thing transferred is one not in existence and which would never have
existed but for the order, of the person desiring it
10

he distinction between the two contracts depends on the intention of the parties. Thus, if the parties
intended that at some future date an object has to be delivered, without considering the work or
labor of the party bound to deliver, the contract is one of sale. But if one of the parties accepts the
undertaking on the basis of some plan, taking into account the work he will employ personally or
through another, there is a contract for a piece of work .
13
Clearly, the contract in question is one for a piece of work. It is not petitioner's line of business to
manufacture air-conditioning systems to be sold "off-the-shelf." Its business and particular field of
expertise is the fabrication and installation of such systems as ordered by customers and in
accordance with the particular plans and specifications provided by the customers. Naturally, the
price or compensation for the system manufactured and installed will depend greatly on the
particular plans and specifications agreed upon with the customers.

5.Raymundo S. De Leon vs. Benita T. Ong

On March 10, 1993, petitioner Raymundo S. de Leon sold three parcels of land 2 with improvements
situated in Antipolo, Rizal to respondent Benita T. Ong. As these properties were mortgaged to Real
Savings and Loan Association, Incorporated (RSLAI), petitioner and respondent executed a
notarized deed of absolute sale with assumption of mortgage

Thereafter, respondent undertook repairs and made improvements on the properties. 5 Respondent
likewise informed RSLAI of her agreement with petitioner for her to assume petitioner’s outstanding
loan. RSLAI required her to undergo credit investigation.

Subsequently, respondent learned that petitioner again sold the same properties to one Leona
Viloria after March 10, 1993 and changed the locks, rendering the keys he gave her useless.
Respondent thus proceeded to RSLAI to inquire about the credit investigation. However, she was
informed that petitioner had already paid the amount due and had taken back the certificates of title.

Respondent persistently contacted petitioner but her efforts proved futile.

On June 18, 1993, respondent filed a complaint for specific performance, declaration of nullity of the
second sale and damages6 against petitioner and Viloria in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Antipolo, Rizal, Branch 74. She claimed that since petitioner had previously sold the properties to
her on March 10, 1993, he no longer had the right to sell the same to Viloria. Thus, petitioner
fraudulently deprived her of the properties.

Petitioner, on the other hand, insisted that respondent did not have a cause of action against him
and consequently prayed for the dismissal of the complaint. He claimed that since the transaction
was subject to a condition (i.e., that RSLAI approve the assumption of mortgage), they only entered
into a contract to sell.

Issue

WON the contract was a contract to sell or a contract of sale

Ruling

The contract was a contract of sale

n a contract of sale, the seller conveys ownership of the property to the buyer upon the perfection of
the contract. Should the buyer default in the payment of the purchase price, the seller may either sue
for the collection thereof or have the contract judicially resolved and set aside. The non-payment of
the price is therefore a negative resolutory condition.12
On the other hand, a contract to sell is subject to a positive suspensive condition. The buyer does
not acquire ownership of the property until he fully pays the purchase price. For this reason, if the
buyer defaults in the payment thereof, the seller can only sue for damages. 13

In this instance, petitioner executed a notarized deed of absolute sale in favor of respondent.
Moreover, not only did petitioner turn over the keys to the properties to respondent, he also
authorized RSLAI to receive payment from respondent and release his certificates of title to her. The
totality of petitioner’s acts clearly indicates that he had unqualifiedly delivered and transferred
ownership of the properties to respondent. Clearly, it was a contract of sale the parties entered into.

6. Iglesia Filipina Independiente vs. Heirs of Taeza

FACTS

The plaintiff-appellee Iglesia Filipina Independiente (IFI, for brevity), a duly registered religious
corporation, was the owner of a parcel of land described as Lot 3653, containing an area of 31,038
square meters, situated at Ruyu (now Leonarda), Tuguegarao, Cagayan, and covered by Original
Certificate of Title No. P-8698.

On February 5, 1976, Lot Nos. 3653-A and 3653-B, with a total area of 10,000 square meters, were
likewise sold by Rev. Macario Ga, in his capacity as the Supreme Bishop of the plaintiff-appellee, to
the defendant Bernardino Taeza, for the amount of ₱100,000.00, through installment, with mortgage
to secure the payment of the balance. Subsequently, the defendant allegedly completed the
payments.

In 1977, a complaint for the annulment of the February 5, 1976 Deed of Sale with Mortgage was filed
by the Parish Council of Tuguegarao, Cagayan, represented by Froilan Calagui and Dante Santos,
the President and the Secretary, respectively, of the Laymen's Committee, with the then Court of
First Instance of Tuguegarao, Cagayan, against their Supreme Bishop Macario Ga and the
defendant Bernardino Taeza.

The said complaint was, however, subsequently dismissed on the ground that the plaintiffs therein
lacked the personality to file the case.

After the expiration of Rev. Macario Ga's term of office as Supreme Bishop of the IFI on May 8,
1981, Bishop Abdias dela Cruz was elected as the Supreme Bishop. Thereafter, an action for the
declaration of nullity of the elections was filed by Rev. Ga, with the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC)

On November 6, 2001, the court a quo rendered judgment in favor of the plaintiff-appellee. It held
1âwphi1

that the deed of sale executed by and between Rev. Ga and the defendant-appellant is null and
void.
3

ISSUE

WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT FINDING THE FEBRUARY 5,
1976 DEED OF SALE WITH MORTGAGE AS NULL AND VOID;

WON the contrat is enforceable if it was not void

RULING
The first two issues boil down to the question of whether then Supreme Bishop Rev. Ga is
authorized to enter into a contract of sale in behalf of petitioner.

Petitioner maintains that there was no consent to the contract of sale as Supreme Bishop Rev. Ga
had no authority to give such consent. It emphasized that Article IV (a) of their Canons provides that
"All real properties of the Church located or situated in such parish can be disposed of only with the
approval and conformity of the laymen's committee, the parish priest, the Diocesan Bishop, with
sanction of the Supreme Council, and finally with the approval of the Supreme Bishop, as
administrator of all the temporalities of the Church." It is alleged that the sale of the property in
question was done without the required approval and conformity of the entities mentioned in the
Canons; hence, petitioner argues that the sale was null and void.

In the alternative, petitioner contends that if the contract is not declared null and void, it should
nevertheless be found unenforceable, as the approval and conformity of the other entities in their
church was not obtained, as required by their Canons.

Pursuant to the foregoing, petitioner provided in Article IV (a) of its Constitution and Canons of the
Philippine Independent Church, that "[a]ll real properties of the Church located or situated in such
9

parish can be disposed of only with the approval and conformity of the laymen's

committee, the parish priest, the Diocesan Bishop, with sanction of the Supreme Council, and finally
with the approval of the Supreme Bishop, as administrator of all the temporalities of the Church."

Evidently, under petitioner's Canons, any sale of real property requires not just the consent of the
Supreme Bishop but also the concurrence of the laymen's committee, the parish priest, and the
Diocesan Bishop, as sanctioned by the Supreme Council. However, petitioner's Canons do not
specify in what form the conformity of the other church entities should be made known.

The Court finds it erroneous for the CA to ignore the fact that the laymen's committee objected to the
sale of the lot in question. The Canons require that ALL the church entities listed in Article IV (a)
thereof should give its approval to the transaction. Thus, when the Supreme Bishop executed the
contract of sale of petitioner's lot despite the opposition made by the laymen's committee, he acted
beyond his powers.

This case clearly falls under the category of unenforceable contracts mentioned in Article 1403,
paragraph (1) of the Civil Code, which provides, thus:

Art. 1403. The following contracts are unenforceable, unless they are ratified:

(1) Those entered into in the name of another person by one who has been given no authority or
legal representation, or who has acted beyond his powers;

HEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals, dated June 30, 2006,
and its Resolution dated August 23, 2007, are REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
7. Makati Sports Club Inc. vs. Cecile Cheng and Ramon Sabarre..

Facts

On October 20, 1994, plaintiff’s Board of Directors adopted a resolution (Exhibit 7) authorizing the
sale of 19 unissued shares at a floor price of ₱400,000 and ₱450,000 per share for Class A and B,
respectively.

Defendant Cheng was a Treasurer and Director of plaintiff in 1985. On July 7, 1995, Hodreal
expressed his interest to buy a share, for this purpose he sent the letter, Exhibit 13. In said letter, he
requested that his name be included in the waiting list. 1avvphi1

it appears that sometime in November 1995, McFoods expressed interest in acquiring a share of the
plaintiff, and one was acquired with the payment to the plaintiff by McFoods of ₱1,800,000 through
Urban Bank (Exhibit 3). On December 15, 1995, the Deed of Absolute Sale, Exhibit 1, was executed
by the plaintiff and McFoods Stock Certificate No. A 2243 was issued to McFoods on January 5,
1996. On December 27, 1995, McFoods sent a letter to the plaintiff giving advise (sic) of its offer to
resell the share.

It appears that while the sale between the plaintiff and McFoods was still under negotiations, there
were negotiations between McFoods and Hodreal for the purchase by the latter of a share of the
plaintiff. On November 24, 1995, Hodreal paid McFoods ₱1,400,000. Another payment of
₱1,400,000 was made by Hodreal to McFoods on December 27, 1995, to complete the purchase
price of ₱2,800,000.

On February 7, 1996, plaintiff was advised of the sale by McFoods to Hodreal of the share
evidenced by Certificate No. 2243 for ₱2.8 Million. Upon request, a new certificate was issued. In
1997, an investigation was conducted and the committee held that there is prima facie evidence to
show that defendant Cheng profited from the transaction because of her knowledge.

Thus, petitioner sought judgment that would order respondents to pay the sum of ₱1,000,000.00,
representing the amount allegedly defrauded, together with interest and damages.

After trial on the merits, the RTC rendered its August 20, 2003 decision, dismissing the complaint,
including all counterclaims.

Aggrieved, Makati Sports Club, Inc. (MSCI) appealed to the CA, arguing that the RTC erred in
finding neither direct nor circumstantial evidence that Cecile H. Cheng (Cheng) had any fraudulent
participation in the transaction between MSCI and Mc Foods, Inc. (Mc Foods), while it allegedly
ignored MSCI’s overwhelming evidence that Cheng and Mc Foods confabulated with one another at
the expense of MSCI.

After the submission of the parties’ respective briefs, the CA promulgated its assailed Decision,
affirming the August 20, 2003 decision of the RTC

Issue

WON Cheng Is the legal owner of the dispusted shares

Ruling

8. Alfonso Quijada et. al. vs. Court of Appeals et. al.

Facts

On July 5, 1988, plaintiffs-appellees (petitioners) filed this action against defendants-

appellants (respondents). In the complaint, plaintiffs-appellees (petitioners) alleged
that their deceased mother never sold, conveyed, transferred or disposed of the
property in question to any person or entity much less to Regalado Mondejar save the
donation made to the Municipality of Talacogon in 1956; that at the time of the alleged
sale to Regalado Mondejar by Trinidad Quijada, the land still belongs to the Municipality
of Talacogon, hence, the supposed sale is null and void.

"Defendants-appellants (respondents), on the other hand, in their answer claimed that

the land in dispute was sold to Regalado Mondejar, the one (1) hectare on July 29,
1962, and the remaining one (1) hectare on installment basis until fully paid. As
affirmative and/or special defense, defendants-appellants (respondents) alleged that
plaintiffs’ action is barred by laches or has prescribed.

"The court a quo rendered judgment in favor of plaintiffs-appellees (petitioners): firstly

because ‘Trinidad Quijada had no legal title or right to sell the land to defendant
Mondejar in 1962, 1966, 1967 and 1968, the same not being hers to dispose of
because ownership belongs to the Municipality of Talacogon’ (Decision, p. 4; Rollo, p.
39) and, secondly, that the deed of sale executed by Trinidad Quijada in favor of
Mondejar did not carry with it the conformity and acquiescence of her children, more so
that she was already 63 years old at the time, and a widow chanrobles virtual

Issue

Whether or not the sale by Quijada to Mondejar was valid

Ruling

Yes, The donation made on April 5, 1956 by Trinidad Quijada and her brother and
sisters 7 was subject to the condition that the donated property shall be "used solely
and exclusively as a part of the campus of the proposed Provincial High School in
Talacogon." 8 The donation further provides that should "the proposed Provincial High
School be discontinued or if the same shall be opened but for some reason or another,
the same may in the future be closed" the donated property shall automatically revert
to the donor. 9 Such condition, not being contrary to law, morals, good customs, public
order or public policy was validly imposed in the donation

When the Municipality’s acceptance of the donation was made known to the donor, the
former became the new owner of the donated property — donation being a mode of
acquiring and transmitting ownership 11 — notwithstanding the condition imposed by
the donee. The donation is perfected once the acceptance by the donee is made known
to the donor. 12 Accordingly, ownership is immediately transferred to the latter and
that ownership will only revert to the donor if the resolutory condition is not fulfilled.

In this case, that resolutory condition is the construction of the school. It has been
ruled that when a person donates land to another on the condition that the latter would
build upon the land a school, the condition imposed is not a condition precedent or a
suspensive condition but a resolutory one. 13 Thus, at the time of the sales made in
1962 towards 1968, the alleged seller (Trinidad) could not have sold the lots since she
had earlier transferred ownership thereof by virtue of the deed of donation. So long as
the resolutory condition subsists and is capable of fulfillment, the donation remains
effective and the donee continues to be the owner subject only to the rights of the
donor or his successors-in-interest under the deed of donation. Since no period was
imposed by the donor on when must the donee comply with the condition, the latter
remains the owner so long as he has tried to comply with the condition within a
reasonable period. Such period, however, became irrelevant herein when the donee-
Municipality manifested through a resolution that it cannot comply with the condition of
building a school and the same was made known to the donor. Only then — when the
non-fulfillment of the resolutory condition was brought to the donor’s knowledge — that
ownership of the donated property reverted to the donor as provided in the automatic
reversion clause of the deed of donation.

Sale, being a consensual contract, is perfected by mere consent, which is manifested

the moment there is a meeting of the minds 17 as to the offer and acceptance thereof
on three (3) elements: subject matter, price and terms of payment of the price. 18
Ownership by the seller on the thing sold at the time of the perfection of the contract of
sale is not an element for its perfection. What the law requires is that the seller has the
right to transfer ownership at the time the thing sold is delivered. 19 Perfection per se
does not transfer ownership which occurs upon the actual or constructive delivery of
the thing sold. 20 A perfected contract of sale cannot be challenged on the ground of
non-ownership on the part of the seller at the time of its perfection; hence, the sale is
still valid.

9. Hadja Fatima Magoya vs. Hadji Abubacar Maruhom

Facts

On December 20, 1982, respondent Hadji Abubacar Maruhom (respondent) was awarded a market
stall at the Reclamation Area by the Islamic City of Marawi.3

On December 1, 1985, respondent orally sold his stall to petitioner for ₱20,000.00. Later, on
December 10, 1985, respondent executed a Deed of Assignment,4 confirming the oral sale;
assigning, selling, transferring, and conveying his market stall to petitioners for a consideration of
₱20,000.00.

Respondent religiously paid the monthly rentals of ₱250.00, which was increased to ₱300.00 on
December 1, 1988; and to ₱400.00 beginning December 1, 1991. However, on June 1, 1993,
respondent simply stopped paying the rentals. Respondent promised to settle his unpaid account,
but he failed to make good his promise. Petitioner then demanded that respondent vacate the
property, but the demand just fell on deaf ears.
Accordingly, on August 22, 1994, petitioners filed a complaint5 for recovery of possession and
damages, with prayer for issuance of a temporary restraining order (TRO), with the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Marawi City.

In his Answer,6 respondent admitted selling the subject stall for ₱20,000.00 to petitioners, but
averred that the sale was with right to repurchase; and on condition that he would remain in
possession of the subject stall as long as he wants. He signed the Deed of Assignment on
petitioners’ assurance that the conditions they earlier agreed upon were contained in the deed.

WON the the sale was null and void since the Respondent was not the owner

RULING

Yes, The [respondent] did not present any evidence on his alleged ownership over [the] subject stall
except a certification (Exh. "1") dated December 20, 1982 from the City Government awarding [the]
same to him and subject even to the condition that he cannot sell, donate or otherwise alienate the
same without the consent of the City Government.

It appears therefore that [the] subject stall is owned by the City Government of Marawi and that
[respondent] cannot even sell or dispose of the same.ISSUE

The records show that Market Stall No. CTD 1583 is owned by the City Government of
Marawi. Indeed, the RTC and the CA correctly held that it was the City Government of Marawi, not
1avvphi1

respondent, that owned Market Stall No. CTD 1583. Respondent, as a mere grantee of the subject
stall, was prohibited from selling, donating, or otherwise alienating the same without the consent of
the City Government; violation of the condition shall automatically render the sale, donation, or
alienation null and void.18 Thus, we sustain the CA in declaring the Deed of Assignment null and
void, but we cannot abide by the CA’s final disposition.

10.

11. Domingo Carabeo vs. Spouses Norberto and Susan Dingco

Facts

On July 10, 1990, Domingo Carabeo (petitioner) entered into a contract denominated
as "Kasunduan sa Bilihan ng Karapatan sa Lupa"1 (kasunduan) with Spouses Norberto and Susan
Dingco (respondents) whereby petitioner agreed to sell his rights over a 648 square meter parcel of
unregistered land situated in Purok III, Tugatog, Orani, Bataan to respondents for ₱38,000.

Respondents tendered their initial payment of ₱10,000 upon signing of the contract, the remaining
balance to be paid on September 1990

Respondents were later to claim that when they were about to hand in the balance of the purchase
price, petitioner requested them to keep it first as he was yet to settle an on-going "squabble" over
the land.
respondents learned that the alleged problem over the land had been settled and that petitioner had
caused its registration in his name on December 21, 1993 under Transfer Certificate of Title No.
161806. They thereupon offered to pay the balance but petitioner declined, drawing them to file a
complaint before the Katarungan Pambarangay. No settlement was reached, however, hence,
respondent filed a complaint for specific performance before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Balanga, Bataan.

Petitioner countered in his Answer to the Complaint that the sale was void for lack of object certain,
the kasunduan not having specified the metes and bounds of the land.

Issue

WON the Kasunduan not having specified the metes and bounds of the land render the sale null and
void.

Ruling

It does not, That the kasunduan did not specify the technical boundaries of the property did not
render the sale a nullity. The requirement that a sale must have for its object a determinate thing is
satisfied as long as, at the time the contract is entered into, the object of the sale is capable of being
made determinate without the necessity of a new or further agreement between the parties. 9 As the
above-quoted portion of the kasunduan shows, there is no doubt that the object of the sale is
determinate.

12. Manuel Cantindig vs. Aurora Irene vda de Meneses

FACTS

The property subject of this controversy pertains to a parcel of land situated in Malolos, Bulacan,
with an area of 49,139 square meters, titled in the name of the late Rosendo Meneses, Sr., under
Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-1749 (hereinafter referred to as the Masusuwi Fishpond).
Respondent Aurora Irene C. Vda. de Meneses is the surviving spouse of the registered owner,
Rosendo Meneses, Sr.. She was issued Letters of Administration over the estate of her late husband
in Special Proceedings Case No. 91498 pending before the then Court of First Instance of the City of
Manila, Branch 22. On May 17, 1995, respondent, in her capacity as administratrix of her husband's
estate, filed a Complaint for Recovery of Possession, Sum of Money and Damages against
petitioners Manuel Catindig and Silvino Roxas,

Respondent alleged that in September 1975, petitioner Catindig, the first cousin of her husband,
deprived her of the possession over the Masusuwi Fishpond, through fraud, undue influence and
intimidation.

, petitioner Catindig unlawfully leased the property to petitioner Roxas. Respondent verbally
demanded that petitioners vacate the Masusuwi Fishpond, but all were futile, thus, forcing
respondent to send demand letters to petitioners Roxas and Catindig. However, petitioners still
ignored said demands.

Petitioner Roxas, on the other hand, asserted in his own Answer that respondent has no cause of
action against him, because Catindig is the lawful owner of the Masusuwi Fishpond, to whom he had
paid his rentals in advance until the year 2001.
ISSUE

WON Deed of Absolute Sale is valid

RULING

It is not, The trial court found that the Deed of Absolute Sale executed between respondent and
petitioner Catindig was simulated and fictitious, and therefore, did not convey title over the Masusuwi
Fishpond to petitioner Catindig. It gave due credence to the testimony of respondent that petitioner
1avvphi1

Catindig convinced her to sign the said deed of sale, because it was intended to be a mere proposal
subject to the approval of the trial court wherein the proceedings for the settlement of the estate of
Rosendo Meneses, Sr. was still pending.

It is a well-entrenched rule that where the deed of sale states that the purchase price has been paid
but in fact has never been paid, the deed of sale is null and void ab initio for lack of consideration.
Moreover, Article 1471 of the Civil Code, provides that "if the price is simulated, the sale is void,"
which applies to the instant case, since the price purportedly paid as indicated in the contract of sale
was simulated for no payment was actually made.8

Since it was well established that the Deed of Sale is simulated and, therefore void, petitioners’ claim
that respondent's cause of action is one for annulment of contract, which already prescribed, is
unavailing, because only voidable contracts may be annulled. On the other hand, respondent's
defense for the declaration of the inexistence of the contract does not prescribe. 9