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Thinking diaspora diplomacy after Russia’s war in Ukraine

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Thinking diaspora diplomacy after Russia’s war in

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Ieva Birka

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SPACE AND POLITY
https://doi.org/10.1080/13562576.2022.2104632

Thinking diaspora diplomacy after Russia’s war in Ukraine

Ieva Birka
Faculty of Social Sciences, University of Latvia, Rīga, Latvia

ABSTRACT ARTICLE HISTORY

Reflecting upon the implications of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine for Received 6 June 2022
the theorization of ‘diaspora diplomacy’, this Provocation uses the Accepted 18 July 2022
concept to frame the conflict and the ensuing power plays. The
KEYWORDS
extent of global community involvement requires the existing Diaspora diplomacy; Ukraine;
diaspora diplomacy definition to account for ‘quadratic nexus’ Russia; assemblages
configuration of ‘home’ and ‘host’ country, respective diasporas
and international actor engagement in diaspora diplomacy
practice. In reviewing the conflict, and the current response, four
themes emerge as central to the ‘quadratic nexus’ configuration
and deserving further attention: the politics of labelling, the
dynamics of engagement, third-party diasporas and diaspora
identities in diaspora diplomacy.

Russian President Vladimir Putin in his essay On the historical unity of Russians and
Ukrainians claimed that ‘Russians and Ukrainians were one people – a single whole’
(Russian Federation, 2021). Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky retorted that the
brotherhood is more akin to the relationship of the Biblical figure Cain, who killed his
brother Abel (RFE/RL, 2021). Notably, both messages were conveyed to the international
audience. Thus began the struggle of labelling, constructing conflicting identities and
engaging population in the Russian–Ukrainian conflict which evolved into a full-scale
war at the beginning of 2022. At one level, this reality is not especially new or surprising;
the role of diasporas as progenitors of interstate conflict has long been recognized and
exploited. Brubaker suggests the term ‘triadic nexus’ to describe the relationship
between a country of residence, a diaspora and an external homeland laying claim to a
population across national borders (Brubaker, 1996, p. 5). However, as particularly
evident in this conflict, both the Russian and Ukrainian states, and the respective dia-
sporas, have sought to evolve the ‘triadic’ configuration to include the global community.
As such, the ‘triadic’ has expanded to a ‘quadratic nexus’ of relations in diaspora diplo-
macy involving Russia, Ukraine, their respective diasporas and international actors in
different assemblages. The inclusion of the global community as actors in diaspora
assemblages is presenting to existing scholarship new analytical and normative
challenges.

CONTACT Ieva Birka [email protected] Faculty of Social Sciences, Political Science, University of Latvia, Lauvas iela
4, Rīga 1019, Latvia
© 2022 The Author(s). Published by Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group
This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives License
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/), which permits non-commercial re-use, distribution, and reproduction in any
medium, provided the original work is properly cited, and is not altered, transformed, or built upon in any way.
2 I. BIRKA

Diaspora diplomacy
Diaspora diplomacy, a facet of diplomatic scholarship (see Gonzalez III, 2012; Ho &
McConnell, 2017; Jovenir, 2013; Rana, 2011, pp. 94–111; Stone & Douglas, 2018; Tomic-
zek, 2011; Torrealba, 2017; Trent, 2012) proves difficult to define. Diaspora diplomacy
research has focused on the interconnections of diplomacy and diaspora, including the
boundaries of diasporas in international relations, diaspora as a task of diplomacy,
state-driven initiatives involving diasporas, diasporas in diplomatic negotiations, dia-
sporas capacities to lobby foreign policy and domestic agendas and so forth (See
Adamson & Demetriou, 2007; Barston, 2019; Gamlen, 2018; Newland, 2010; Rana,
2011). Ho and McConnell (2017:, p. 250) theorize the term diaspora diplomacy ‘as dia-
spora assemblages composed of states, non-state and other international actors that func-
tion as constituent components of assemblages’. The practice of diplomacy they
conceptualize as ‘the management of relations between groups, and how this is articu-
lated through practices of communication and representation’ (Ho & McConnell,
2017, p. 238). As such, diaspora diplomacy is a broad concept involving a variety of
actors in different power structures, working towards aims that can extend beyond the
borders of the ‘home’ country and the communication and representation aspects associ-
ated with the process. Further, these aims can conflict with interests of other assemblages,
and the power plays between nations, regions and/or populations involved serve to
elevate diaspora diplomacy to the international arena.
The concept of diaspora diplomacy assumes meaning only in given historical and geo-
graphical contexts and is always emergent and in a process of structuration. I argue that
the attempts to utilize the diaspora to speak to the global community, as well as the var-
iegated entanglements of international actors in diaspora diplomacy assemblages, in this
conflict is serving to populate the concept with new meaning and constitute a key
moment in its formation. The extent to which the global community has been embroiled
in and is responding to the conflict requires the widening of the diaspora diplomacy
definition, as there are no longer just ‘diaspora assemblages’ but global assemblages
involved in the process of diaspora diplomacy. Below, I will reflect on four aspects of
the conflict pertinent to diaspora diplomacy, involving the global community, that
require further in-depth investigation: the politics of labelling, the dynamics of engage-
ment, third-party diasporas and diaspora identities in diaspora diplomacy.

Labelling, engagement, third-party diasporas and diaspora identities

The Russian state is framing the current war as having everything to do with its diaspora
in Ukraine. The assertion made is that Russian speakers in Ukraine were ‘subjected to
genocide’ and that a ‘special operation’ was needed to protect them (Fisher, 2022). Is
this something new – no. Most recently, this justification of acting on behalf of ethnic
co-nationals in the ‘near abroad’ was used for Russian troop involvement in the
Russo-Georgian war in 2008, and the annexation of Crimea in 2014 (Toal, 2017). The
worrying element is that this pattern is repeating itself, and that the ‘Putin doctrine’, out-
lining Russia’s intentions to protect the rights of Russians everywhere, has asserted the
right to use military force (Russian Federation, 2014). The labelling of certain popu-
lations outside of Russian borders as co-ethnics, in a sense justifies aggression
 SPACE AND POLITY 3

domestically because in external homeland relations with the diaspora ‘shared nation-
hood makes the state responsible, in some sense, not only for its own citizens but also
for ethnic co-nationals who live in other states’ (Brubaker, 1996, p. 5). On the other
hand, the humanitarian intervention argument, on behalf of the diaspora, attempts to
justify Russia’s action to the rest of the global community (Milanovic, 2022).
Understanding exactly the population, the Russia state is laying claim to is difficult, as
is understanding Russian speaker identity and identification in Ukraine. There is the
unresolved question of ‘beached diasporas’ for whom ‘the borders of the Soviet Union
receded, rather than because they dispersed from their homeland’ (Laitin, 1998, p. 29).
Some identify Ukraine as their homeland, some identify Russia and some identify them-
selves as Soviet. Self-identified Russians in Ukraine made up 17 percent in 2001 (State
Statistics Committee of Ukraine, 2001). The Russian-speaking population is concen-
trated in the eastern Ukraine, with the majority in the Luhansk and Donetsk provinces,
where only 27 percent consider Ukrainian their native language (Kapinos, 2018).
However, there is often a discrepancy in data between reported mother tongue and
self-identified ethnicity. In the same eastern region of Ukraine, during the 2001
census, 58 percent self-identified as ethnic Ukrainian in Luhansk and 57 percent in
Donetsk (Yekelchyk, 2015, p. 21). O’Loughlin and Toal (2020, p. 304) have argued
that Ukrainian identities are fluid and contextual. The bi-lingual Ukraine posed no
major source of contention, surveys reveal the majority of the population, 67 percent,
believe that there is no problem between Ukrainian, and Russian-speaking citizens of
Ukraine (Rating Group Ukraine, 2022). Nonetheless, since 2014 two pro-Russian separa-
tist republics have existed in the Donbas region in eastern Ukraine. The Republics have
claimed to want referendums on independence from Ukraine and the right to join Russia
(Ukrainska Pravda, 2014).
The extent of how many Russian speakers in Ukraine welcome Russia’s interference
on their behalf, especially in the Donbas region, remains unknown. Data from 2014
suggests that the population of Crimea, with the exception of the Tatar minority, are
‘pro-Russia’ and welcome Russia’s involvement in the region (O’Loughlin & Toal,
2019). The 2014 survey data from Donetsk and Luhansk showed a small percentage,
19 percent, supporting Russian troop introduction into Ukraine (O’Loughlin & Toal,
2020, p. 309). The most recent poll conducted in Ukraine, without participants from
Crimea and Donbas, suggests that 2 percent of Ukrainians believe that Russia invaded
Ukraine to protect Russian-speaking citizens (Rating Group Ukraine, 2022). The
reality is that this might be irrelevant, as the pre-text of aiding ethnic co-nationals
abroad has helped the Russian state frame the conflict for the Russian-speaking audience
and justify the war (Dougherty, 2022). According to media reports, there even appears to
be significant support for the Russian invasion among the 3 million-strong Ukrainian
diaspora in Russia (Vorobyov, 2022).
The above demonstrates how labelling of diaspora populations has been used by the
Russian state to try to justify invasion to the global community but also to garner support
for the war domestically. However, not much research exists on how assemblages are
involved in the process of labelling and claiming, why this is done in the first place,
the effect this has domestically and globally, and the power dynamics of assemblages.
There is need to bring together scholarship on diaspora diplomacy and diaspora politics,
where Adamson (2019, p. 215) argues that diasporas should be viewed as the constructs
4 I. BIRKA

of political entrepreneurs who engage in transnational mobilization activities to achieve a

strategic end goal. In this case, an important role in the assemblage is played by the
media, with the support the media can generate for the labelling and claiming initiatives,
which in turn shapes further action. Additionally, Russia has used orchestrated social
media campaigns, such as ‘#IStandWithPutin, to demonstrate support for the conflict
abroad (Conger & Raj, 2022). However, in Russia, the media is not a free agent, and
as such, reveals the need to further investigate the power relations in assemblages.
Further, very little research exists on the actual dynamics of diaspora diplomacy
engagement, of how diaspora are activated and engaged, by whom, through what
mediums, in what assemblage constellations, and for what purpose, and understanding
why some diasporas are predisposed to such engagement. Exception to this is the
work of Brinkerhoff (2019) who distinguishes public diplomacy from diaspora diplomacy
specifically because of the diaspora identity issues that make diaspora susceptible targets
of engagement. According to Coolican (2021, p. 9), ‘The structure and policies of the
Putin regime have created a network of institutions specifically created to help enact
the political potential of the Russian diaspora, through the means of hard, soft, and
sharp power’. Currently, however, very little research in diaspora diplomacy has gone
into understanding exactly how external populations, once claimed, are mobilized and
engaged and what this means for the international community. There is need to
answer the call issued by King and Melvin (1999, p. 109) ‘analysts must determine
under what circumstances transborder nations cease to be the purview of poets and
pamphleteers and become instead the concern of foreign and defense ministries.’
On the Ukrainian side, what is new in relation to the dynamics of diaspora diplomacy
is the means of appealing to the diaspora, the level at which the calls to action have been
made directly to the transnational population by the country of origins highest officials,
the content of the appeal and the global platform used. In a televised appeal, Zelensky
asked the diaspora ‘Everyone who can come back to Ukraine, please come back to
defend Ukraine’ (Bosotti, 2022). Then, when addressing the Canadian parliament, he
included a direct message to the Ukrainian diaspora in Canada (Mazurenko, 2022). In
another example, the Ukrainian Defense Minister called upon the diaspora to share
information about what is happening in Ukraine in their countries of residence in a
bid to influence the popular opinion of citizens and directly influence their host
country governments (Gijs, 2022). The above illustrates recent developments in diaspora
diplomacy directly involving the global community, new methods of creating assem-
blages, of communicating and managing relations and utilizing diaspora diplomacy to
illicit.
The need to study the dynamics of engagement and structuration of diaspora identi-
ties is also apparent when analysing the response. Diaspora altruism, mobilization, and
stronger identification with the country of origin in times of conflict is nothing new.
However, there are new diaspora diplomacy facets to the response, the already mentioned
involvement of the global community and also specifically the involvement of third-party
diasporas. For example, the response to the conflict has seen fundraisers headed by Hol-
lywood stars of Ukrainian heritage that engage the global community (Sottile, 2022), the
efforts of Ukrainian IT diaspora to form an assemblage of sector-specific specialists from
around the world (Dave & Dastin, 2022), the means of crucial skills and knowledge trans-
fers to Ukraine involving the Ukrainian diaspora and third-party diasporas (Kestler-
 SPACE AND POLITY 5

D’Amours, 2022). When Zelensky issued the call for the diaspora to return, over half a
million Ukrainian citizens returned to Ukraine to take up arms (Ukrinform, 2022).
Further, the call has been answered by 20,000 volunteers, from 52 countries, with no
Ukrainian ethnic roots (Abend, 2022). Third-party participants in the diaspora diplo-
macy assemblages have previously been termed the ‘affinity diaspora’, ‘who have a
different national or ethnic identity to a nation state but who feel some special affinity
or affection for that nation state and who act on its behalf’ (Ancien et al., 2009, p. 8).
In elevating and recognizing the ‘affinity diaspora’ as a diaspora diplomacy assemblage
member within the international arena, some states have had to enact specific legislation
to facilitate their participation (Reuters, 2022). As such, within this conflict we see new
diaspora diplomacy assemblages being created and gaining legal standing, in which the
Ukrainian government, the Ukrainian diaspora, allied country governments and third-
party diasporas are coming together against the Russian state.
The process of diaspora diplomacy also has a bearing on identities internationally. The
Russian state labelling and acting on behalf of Russian speakers abroad has activated, or
intensified, the fear of what Mylonas (2012, p. 188) has termed the non-core group and its
relationship with a hostile external power. What does it mean in the context of Russia
having the second largest transnationally dispersed population with eleven million Rus-
sians residing outside of Russia (United Nations, 2021)? A recent study found that the
‘perception of Russia as a threat in Latvia is closely linked to seeing Russians and poor
ethnic relations in Latvia as a threat’ (Pupcenoks et al., 2022). In post-Soviet countries,
where the proportion of Russian speakers is high and social integration lacking, the
fear of Russian diaspora diplomacy undertakings will ultimately reflect on Russian speak-
ers and suspect their participation in Russia’s diaspora diplomacy assemblage. What is
the relationship of diaspora diplomacy with identity issues, can diaspora diplomacy
assemblages have an impact on social integration efforts, or because of distrust and per-
ceived affiliation with the hostile country, are social integration efforts likely to stall? How
are Russian speaker identities affected by the diaspora diplomacy process globally? Of
having assemblages, involving their countries of residence, formed against Russia?
What must also be kept in mind is the ‘inevitable diversity between groups of people
who are referred to variously (often interchangeably) as (ethnic) Russians, Russian speak-
ers and Russophones’ (Cheskin & Kachuyevski, 2019, p. 2). A recent initiative by the
ballet legend Baryshnikov brings the issue of diaspora diplomacy and structuration of
diaspora identities into focus. Baryshnikov, with other prominent Russians, launched
the fundraising platform for Ukraine called ‘True Russia’ (TrueRussia, 2022). This is a
bottom-up diaspora diplomacy attempt at forming an assemblage of Russian speakers
presenting an alternate Russian identity in the global community. The above identity
issues associated with the conflict and the involvement of the global community illustrate
the need to link diaspora diplomacy scholarship, and the various assemblages of actors
involved, to contextual and relational positioning and identity scholarship.

Conclusion
Russia’s war in Ukraine is proving to be a key moment for the elevation of the concept of
diaspora diplomacy to the global stage. As both countries try to engage the global com-
munity in the diaspora diplomacy process, the term is being refreshed, renewed and
6 I. BIRKA

imbued with new meaning. As we emerge from this war, the analysis of causes, conse-
quences, implications and future trajectories are bound to be scrutinized through the dia-
spora diplomacy lens. As such, this Provocation aimed to explore in more detail how the
current scholarship on diaspora diplomacy can frame Russia’s war in Ukraine, the exist-
ing shortcomings, and through the conflict response to illustrate how diaspora diplomacy
definition and research has to expand to accommodate global community involvement in
the ‘quadratic’ configuration involving ‘home’ country, ‘host’ country, respective dia-
sporas and international actors in diaspora diplomacy practice.
I have extracted from the above reflections four themes emerging as central to the
international community involvement in the ‘quadratic’ nexus of diaspora diplomacy
and requiring further study:

. the politics of labelling – understanding why and how diaspora diplomacy assemblages
work to label and claim populations, the issues surrounding the construction of such
identities to meet strategic goals, assemblage actors and power relations involved in gar-
nering support as a result of the process of labelling and the ensuing effect;
. the dynamics of engagement – understanding the structures, policies and methods of
creating and engaging assemblages, the constellations of actors involved, the com-
munication strategies and visions, new methods of engagement, individual predispo-
sition to engagement and the implications for the global community;
. third-party diasporas – elaborating and expanding upon the term ‘affinity diaspora’ to
include third-party diaspora participation as assemblage actors, understanding the
extent of participation, the emotional response, legal norms and grounds for recog-
nition internationally, and the power structure created by third-party diaspora
involvement;
. diaspora identities – the diversity of identities involved in diaspora diplomacy, the
resulting assemblages with global involvement and recognition, the influence of
such assemblages on identities and integration, as well as the impact of the conflict
in shaping and altering identities, and bottom-up diaspora diplomacy attempts at
forming and presenting alternate identification.

The raised questions of labelling, the dynamics of engagement, third-party diasporas

and structuration of diaspora identities through diaspora diplomacy highlight the appli-
cability of assemblages to the understanding of diaspora diplomacy. However, as this
conflict has shown, there are shortcomings in the scholarship and the concept of assem-
blages needs to expand to take into account the role allocated to the global community in
the process of diaspora diplomacy in the ‘quadratic nexus’ configuration, linking it with
research on diaspora politics, identity, positioning, and integration concepts, as well as
understanding of the structures and processes of assemblage formation. This historical
event will have long-lasting implications for the understanding of diaspora diplomacy,
as we begin to untangle how Russia’s war in Ukraine was constituted by diaspora diplo-
macy, and how diaspora diplomacy constituted by this particular event.

Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).
 SPACE AND POLITY 7

Funding
This work was supported by European Regional Development Fund: [Grant Number Nr. 1.1.1.2/
VIAA/1/16/013 / Nr. 1.1.1.2/16/I/001].

Notes on contributor
Ieva Birka is a Senior Researcher at the University of Latvia, Faculty of Social Sciences and
Advanced Social and Political Research Institute. She is the author and co-author of several pub-
lications focusing on issues of migration, social integration, feelings of belonging, dual citizenship,
and diaspora diplomacy.

ORCID
Ieva Birka http://orcid.org/0000-0002-4453-7825

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