Tamara Wood - The Role of Complementary Pathways in Refugee Protection
Tamara Wood - The Role of Complementary Pathways in Refugee Protection
Tamara Wood - The Role of Complementary Pathways in Refugee Protection
November 2020
This reference paper was prepared for UNHCR to inform People Forced to Flee: History, Change
and Challenge. This document reflects the personal views of the author(s), which may not
necessarily be shared by UNHCR, and UNHCR may not be held responsible for any use that may be
made of the information contained therein.
Abstract:
In the 2018 Global Compact on Refugees, Members States of the General Assembly committed to
increase the availability and predictability of ‘complementary pathways’ to protection and solutions
for refugees. Such pathways include family reunification, private or community sponsorship,
humanitarian admission programmes, and education and labour mobility opportunities. This report
takes a closer at the nature and types of complementary pathways that exist, and the role they do,
and could, play within the international refugee protection regime. It focuses on the following three
questions: 1) What are complementary pathways? 2) Why should complementary pathways be
expanded? 3) How should complementary pathways be developed and implemented?
Contents
List of acronyms..................................................................................................................1
Executive summary.............................................................................................................2
1. Introduction ..................................................................................................................7
1.1. Background .............................................................................................................7
1.2. Structure of this report .............................................................................................8
2. What are complementary pathways? ...........................................................................9
2.1. Common examples of complementary pathways...................................................10
2.1.1. Humanitarian visas and admission programs .................................................... 10
EU European Union
UN United Nations
Introduction
1. In 2018, the United Nations General Assembly adopted the Global Compact on
Refugees (Refugee Compact), a non-binding set of political commitments by states
to strengthen international responses to refugee movements and increase
cooperation and responsibility-sharing in the protection of refugees. One of Refugee
Compact’s core objectives is to expand access to third country solutions for refugees
– opportunities for refugees residing in first countries of asylum, with no prospects of
local integration nor return to their country of origin, to gain admission and lasting
stay in a third country where they can rebuild their lives. As part of this objective,
Members States of the General Assembly committed to increase the availability and
predictability of ‘complementary pathways’ to protection and solutions for refugees,
and to ensure that complementary pathways are made available on ‘a more
systematic, organized, sustainable and gender-responsive basis, [with] appropriate
protection safeguards’.
2. The Refugee Compact does not define complementary pathways, but cites a number
of current examples, including: family reunification, private or community
sponsorship programmes, humanitarian admission programmes, and education and
labour mobility opportunities. Complementary pathways such as these have clear
benefits for the protection of refugees. They provide an additional alternative to the
three traditional durable solutions – return, resettlement and local integration –
expanding options for displaced people to re-establish themselves and providing
mechanisms for international responsibility-sharing in the protection of refugees.
They may have additional benefits for host states, by facilitating the successful
integration of refugees within local communities, or enabling governments to address
their domestic labour and skills shortages. However, the role of complementary
pathways in refugee protection is not entirely straightforward. Access for refugees is
often limited, due to a lack of information or their inability to meet onerous
administrative criteria. In some cases, complementary pathways may not provide
adequate protection safeguards to ensure that refugees have their rights are
respected and can pursue their long-term aspirations.
4. This report addresses this need by considering the following three questions:
6. The most commonly cited examples of complementary pathways for refugees are:
family reunification, private or community sponsorship programmes, humanitarian
admission programmes, and education and labour mobility opportunities.
Complementary pathways commonly operate as standalone mechanisms for refugees’
travel and stay in the destination country. However, different types of complementary
pathways may also be used in combination – for example, where community
sponsorship is used to support refugees accessing education pathways or
humanitarian admission programs.
2. What are the common elements of the various different kinds of complementary
pathways and what are the differences? How can the categorisation of different
kinds of complementary pathways enhance understanding and promote further
development of such pathways?
9. Complementary pathways are largely intended to address the vast shortfall between
the number of refugee resettlement places available each year and the number of
refugees in first countries of asylum and for whom other durable solutions, including
return or local integration, are not available. This is not the only reason that states
should develop and implement complementary pathways, however. In addition to
their commitments under the Refugee Compact, a range of other international
frameworks support, and should guide, states in the expansion of complementary
pathways. These include: the Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular
Migration (Migration Compact); the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of
Refugees (Refugee Convention); numerous international and regional human rights
law instruments, including the ICCPR, ICESCR, the ILO Conventions and regional
human rights treaties; and the UN 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development,
including the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs).
10. Within these relevant normative frameworks, a number of the core objectives of
complementary pathways can be identified. These are: to meet the international
protection needs of people whose lives and freedoms are at risk; to provide durable
solutions to refugees who find themselves in first countries of asylum without access
to other durable solutions such as return or resettlement; to achieve self-reliance for
refugees by allowing them to re-establish themselves and pursue their own goals
and livelihoods; and to promote responsibility-sharing among states in the protection
of refugees. In addition, there are a number of other, more subsidiary, objectives that
complementary pathways serve. These include: fostering positive public attitudes to
refugees amongst host states and communities, by promoting integration and
emphasising refugees' skills, experiences and family relationships; addressing
domestic labour and skills shortages in destinations countries; promoting broader
access to safe, regular and orderly migration; and enhancing equitability in access to
international study and work opportunities.
11. Realising the various objectives that complementary pathways can achieve will not
always be straightforward, however. Indeed, given the multitude of actors and
interests potentially involved in complementary pathways, and the consideration of
factors (such as refugees' qualifications or available community support) not directly
connected to refugees' international protection needs, this report identifies a number
of issues and question that require further attention in order to ensure that
complementary pathways ultimately enhance, and do not undermine, the protection
of refugees. These include:
1. What gaps exist between the rights afforded to refugees under international law
and the rights afforded to refugees under existing or proposed complementary
pathways?
2. Under what conditions, or in what situations, might the multiple interests and
objectives involved in complementary pathways come into tension or conflict?
12. In order to ensure that complementary pathways achieve their intended objectives -
in particular, the core objectives of refugee protection, durable solutions and
international responsibility sharing - and that they uphold states' international
commitments and obligations, certain minimum standards are required. Questions
regarding the appropriate standards for complementary pathways include: must
complementary pathways guarantee refugees a durable solution, such as permanent
residence or citizenship? Do temporary migration channels provide sufficient access
to protection and durable solutions for refugees who access them? What is the
relationship between complementary pathways and asylum - in particular, can
complementary pathways provide meaningful solutions for refugees in states lacking
effective national asylum systems? How important is formal recognition of refugee
status in promoting the objectives of complementary pathways and the integrity of
the international protection regime?
13. This report proposes seven key principles or standards against which
complementary pathways may be assessed to determine whether, and to what
extent, they uphold their objectives, as well as the international commitments and
obligations of destination states. According to these principles or standards,
complementary pathways should:
• adopt clear eligibility criteria, including clear standards and procedures for
determining potential beneficiaries' international protection needs;
14. These principles or standards provide a starting point for thinking about how states
(and others) should go about developing, implementing and expanding
complementary pathways. However, further consideration should be given to exactly
what is required under each, and whether any additional standards should apply. In
particular, this report identifies the following key issue and question for further
discussion:
3. How can relevant standards be communicated to states and other actors? What
monitoring mechanisms are required to maintain 'quality control' over
complementary pathways and ensure that refugees accessing them are fully
informed of the potential benefits and/or risks they entail?
Conclusion
1.1. Background
In 2018, the United Nations General Assembly adopted the Global Compact on Refugees
(Refugee Compact) – a non-binding set of political commitments by states to strengthen
international responses to refugee movements and increase cooperation and
responsibility-sharing in the protection of refugees.1 As part of the Refugee Compact,
Members States of the General Assembly committed to increase the availability and
predictability of ‘complementary pathways’ for refugees2 and to ensure that
complementary pathways ‘are made available on a more systematic, organized,
sustainable and gender-responsive basis, [and] contain appropriate protection
safeguards’.3
Complementary pathways are not defined in the Refugee Compact itself, but UNHCR’s
‘Complementary Pathways for Admission of Refugees to Third Countries: Key
Considerations’ (Key Considerations) describes them as:
Complementary pathways for refugees contribute towards three of the four overarching
objectives of the Refugee Compact, namely: easing pressure on host countries, enhancing
refugee self-reliance and expanding access to third country solutions.6 They provide a
significant opportunity to enhance international protection worldwide, by increasing the
number of refugees who can access safety and solutions outside already-stretched first
countries of asylum. As well as increasing in numerical terms the number of refugees able
to access third country solutions, complementary pathways have additional potential
benefits, including: easing already tight labour market situations in countries of first
asylum,7 promoting leadership, independence and integration among refugees8 and
providing a ‘bridge’ between humanitarian and development assistance for refugees.9 The
Refugee Compact’s call to expand complementary pathways for refugees has been widely
endorsed by international organisations – including the International Labour Organization
(ILO), International Organization for Migration (IOM), European Commission and Amnesty
International10 – who urge states to ‘expand and increase’ avenues for the admission of
refugees,11 incorporate these avenues into their national laws and policies,12 and move
from a system that ‘encourages uncontrolled and irregular migratory flows to a fairer
system which provides orderly and safe pathways’.13
This report takes a critical look at complementary pathways with the aim of exploring three
main questions:
This report represents only a very preliminary step in exploring the ‘what, why and how’ of
complementary pathways. As such, Sections 2, 3 and 4 of this report each conclude by
setting out ‘key issues and questions’ for further consideration with respect to each
of the three main questons – what, why and how? These issues and questions require
significantly more analysis than is provided in this report, as well as input from a broader
range of stakeholders, including governments, international organisations, employers,
educational institutions, communities and refugees themselves. In this context, it is hoped
that this report might provide a useful starting point for those wishing to better understand
the nature and purpose of complementary pathways, and a conceptual framework to
support some of the further discussion and analysis required.
The exact meaning of the term ‘complementary pathway’, and what is required for a
particular migration opportunity or program to ‘count’ as a complementary pathway,
remains subject to ongoing discussion.22 Questions remain regarding the minimum, or
essential, components of complementary pathways, and whether some pathways (such as
community sponsorship) are really separate pathways, or rather tools that can be used to
support and facilitate other pathways, such as resettlement. One of the core challenges of
defining ‘complementary pathways’ is capturing the range and diversity of pathways and
programs that might fall within this term. For example, humanitarian admission programs,
such as dedicated humanitarian corridors and ‘protected entry procedures’, are
established for the express purpose of providing safe access to territory for those wishing
to seek asylum. They differ significantly in their objectives and operation from
complementary pathways such as education and labour mobility pathways – which are
designed for non-humanitarian purposes and directed primarily at the economic interests
of states.
The most common examples of complementary pathways for refugees are: humanitarian
visas and admission programs, community sponsorship, family reunification, labour
mobility, and education pathways.23 Each of these complementary pathways provides
an independent pathway for refugee admission and stay in another country. They may also
be combined in practice – for example, where humanitarian visas or community
sponsorship programs are used to facilitate refugees’ entry and access to education
programs.
Like labour mobility pathways, education pathways for refugees are of two main types. The
first is regular education migration pathways that may be accessed by, or adapted for,
refugees. In Japan, for example, the Japan International Christian University Foundation
(JICUF) facilitates refugees’ admission to study in Japan using regular student visas.47 The
second type of education pathway comprises humanitarian entry pathways that
incorporate access to education for refugees. The World University Service of Canada’s
(WUSC) Student Refugee Program, for example, provides a pathway to admission and
study in Canada that sits within Canada’s broader humanitarian programs.48 Education
pathways may be supported by scholarships and/or sponsorship arrangements that
provide support with fees, accommodation, language training and cultural integration. Only
some education pathways entail permanent residence. Others envisage post-education
access to employment or further study, or the opportunity to apply for residence.49 These
latter pathways are sometimes described as part of a ‘progressive approach to solutions’.50
As noted above, one of the key challenges in defining complementary pathways is how to
capture the diversity of such pathways within a single category. While the pathways
described above all generally satisfy UNHCR’s broad definition of complementary
pathways as ‘safe and regulated avenues’ by which ‘refugees may be admitted in a
country’ there also are considerable variations between them. These differences include in
relation to: who is eligible to access the pathway, who is responsible for selecting
beneficiaries, what rights or benefits are provided to refugees, the extent and nature of
UNHCR’s involvement, and the number of places offered each year.
These differences exist not only between the different examples of pathways described
above, but also within them. As noted above, for example, Canada’s WUSC Student
Refugee Program is similar to its resettlement. It provides permanent residence to more
than 130 refugees each year living in Jordan, Kenya, Lebanon, Malawi, Tanzania or
Uganda who travel to Canada to study at one of approximately 95 universities.51 In
contrast, JICUF’s Syrian Scholars Initiative provides two scholarships each year to Syrian
refugees living in Turkey to study at the International Christian University (ICU) in Japan.
Refugees are assisted by JICUF to enter Japan using regular student visas, with no
guaranteed pathway to longer term or permanent stay beyond the period of study.52
The distinction between custom complementary pathways and regular migration pathways
may also be significant for states in considering whether to implement complementary
pathways, because it indicates the degree or type of change required to existing
immigration programs in order to facilitate refugees’ access. That is, custom
complementary pathways may require the creation of new visa categories and associated
legislative changes, and may have implications for overall migration programs and quotas.
Conversely, regular migration programs may require more administrative adjustments or
flexibility within existing legal frameworks to be accessible to refugees.
As noted above, these models for categorising different types of complementary pathways
are not mutually exclusive. Indeed there may be correlations between the two. For
example, needs-based complementary pathways may require custom arrangements within
In order to balance the need for clarity with the diversity of complementary pathways, a
number of questions warrant further consideration by UNHCR, states, and other actors
currently engaged in the development and implementation of complementary pathways.
1. What is the purpose of defining ‘complementary pathways’? How might the definition of
complementary pathways differ depending on the various purpose/s for which they are
defined – for example, to encourage government action, to measure access or
benefits, or to assess progress towards other goals, such as international responsibility
sharing?
2. What are the common elements of the various examples of complementary pathways
and what are the differences? How can the categorisation of different complementary
pathways help to increase understanding and promote further development of such
pathways?
3. How should the needs for clarity and to assess progress towards the expansion of
complementary pathways be balanced with the overarching objectives of the Refugee
Compact and refugee protection?
The Refugee Compact’s call to states to expand complementary pathways for refugees
comes largely in response to the ‘tremendous gap’ between the number of refugee
resettlement places available around the world and the number of refugees in first
countries of asylum and for whom other durable solutions, including return or local
There are also a range of binding and non-binding international frameworks, in addition to
the Refugee Compact, that support, and should guide, states in their efforts to develop to
develop and expand complementary pathways for refugees. Within these frameworks,
complementary pathways are primarily a means of increasing access to protection and
solutions for refugees, and promoting international responsibility-sharing to relieve the
pressure on those ‘frontline’ states that host the vast majority of the world’s refugees.
However, there are other objectives that might be achieved via complementary pathways
as well, such as addressing skills and labour gaps in countries of destination (third
countries).
Complementary pathways contribute towards three of the four key objectives of the GCR,
namely: easing pressure on host countries, enhancing refugee self-reliance and
expanding access to third country solutions.56 However, they also fulfil, and should be
guided by, a range of other international commitments and obligations of states relating to
refugee protection, human rights and sustainable development.
To begin with, states’ commitments under the Refugee Compact should be viewed in
partnership with their commitments under the Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and
Regular Migration (Migration Compact) as well. Under the Migration Compact, states
signatories have pledged to ‘enhance availability and flexibility of pathways for regular
migration’,57 and in particular, to:
Develop or build on existing national and regional practices for admission and stay
of appropriate duration based on compassionate, humanitarian or other
considerations for migrants compelled to leave their countries of origin, due to
sudden-onset natural disasters and other precarious situations, such as by
providing humanitarian visas, private sponsorships, access to education for
children, and temporary work permits, while adaptation in or return to their country
of origin is not possible.58
Irrespective of debates regarding the relationship between the Refugee and Migration
Compacts, or the applicability of the Migration Compact to refugees,59 increasing access
and overcoming barriers to migration is a clear step towards increasing safe, orderly and
regular migration.
Importantly, complementary pathways also further the objectives of widely ratified, and
binding, 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees (Refugee Convention).
Though the Refugee Convention does not include specific responsibility-sharing
obligations, it recognises that refugee problems are international in scope and solutions
‘cannot… be achieved without international co-operation’60 and obliges states parties to
In addition to the rights set out in the Refugee Convention, refugees who access
complementary pathways are entitled to the broader range of rights that states must
provide to all persons, including those set out in the core international instruments such as
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and the International
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR).63 While some of these
rights – for example, the right to vote or stand for public office – may be limited to citizens
or permanent residents of a state, many others must be afforded to all persons within a
state’s territory or control, including non-nationals.64
More specific rights and standards may also apply to those moving under complementary
pathways, depending on their specific situation and the nature of the pathway. For
example, ILO standards relating to labour and migration, including ILO Guidelines on
‘Additional Pathways for Labour Mobility’, call on states to:
integrate international labour standards, the Decent Work Agenda and the
Multilateral Framework on Labour Migration, where possible, into national policies
and regional and bilateral agreements governing the development and expansion
of labour mobility pathways for refugees.65
More broadly, the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, adopted by the United
Nations General Assembly in 2015, includes 17 Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs),
designed to promote equal opportunities and human rights for all people across the
globe.66 Though the SDGs are not refugee-specific, it is ‘undeniable’ that solutions for
refugees are inextricably linked with efforts to promote sustainable development.67 Actions
taken by states to develop and implement complementary pathways for refugees could
further their progress towards meeting the SDGs. The links are especially clear for labour
or education-related opportunities for refugees, which contribute directly to a number of
specific SDGs, including quality education and work education opportunities for all.68
Complementary pathways could advance many more of the SDGs indirectly, including
health and well-being,69 sustainable cities and communities70 and partnerships.71
Complementary pathways are intended to ‘complement’ resettlement – that is, they are
‘additional to resettlement and do not substitute the protection afforded to refugees under
the international protection regime’.78 Nevertheless, the core objectives of complementary
pathways and resettlement are the same – namely, to provide protection and durable
solutions for refugees, and promote international responsibility sharing in the
protection of refugees.79
In addition to providing durable solutions, complementary pathways can also help to fulfil
refugees’ more immediate international protection needs such as access to safety and
the fulfilment of basic human rights. Particularly for refugees facing precarious legal status
and/or limited rights in countries of first asylum, complementary pathways can better
ensure refugees’ rights to education, healthcare, justice and self-determination. Even
Finally, and in accordance with the overarching objectives of the Refugee Compact,
complementary pathways promote more ‘predictable and equitable burden- and
responsibility-sharing’ in the protection of refugees.99 At a practical level, complementary
pathways promote responsibility-sharing in the same way as resettlement – by providing
refugees in countries of first asylum pathways to admission in third countries, thereby
relieving the pressure on those ‘frontline’ states – such as Jordan, Lebanon, Turkey and
Kenya – that host the majority of the world’s refugees. The push for complementary
pathways might further promote responsibility-sharing in a way that the push for
resettlement places alone does not. That is, implicit in calls for states to enhance access to
complementary pathways is the assumption that such pathways provide incentives, or
benefits, for states in a way that may encourage states that are reluctant to expand (or
even offer) resettlement place to open up complementary pathways instead. Labour
mobility and education pathways allow states to address their own labour shortages and
The additional benefits that complementary pathways entail, and that might provide
incentives to states and others engaged in providing them, can be framed as ‘subsidiary
objectives’ for complementary pathways. These subsidiary objectives are often expressed
(either explicitly or implicitly) in calls for the expansion of complementary pathways, and
often as part of efforts to make complementary pathways more ‘attractive’ to potential
countries of destination. They relate not only to the benefits that complementary pathways
provide to refugees, but also to how they might address the needs and interests of others,
including governments, host communities, private actors and even those refugee
communities left behind in countries of origin or first asylum.
Having skilled refugees engage in productive work has the potential to shift
attitudes as more people see how refugees contribute to development,
communities and local economies. Skilled refugees will be seen as assets, people
who can make valuable contributions.101
Manicom describes this as ‘complexifying’ refugees – emphasising refugees are not only
refugees, but also students, workers, family members and active members of the
community.102 This can have flow on benefits too, by fostering a more inclusive community
and welcoming environment for all refugees, irrespective of how they arrive.103 It can even
increase the capacity of communities to accept and absorb a greater number of refugees
in need, including via resettlement. In Canada, added refugee supports and resources that
were developed for Pictou County’s labour mobility program for refugees led to increased
capacity within the county’s resettlement program as well, enabling community groups to
sponsor an additional three families for resettlement.104
As noted above, complementary pathways can have specific benefits for the countries of
destination that provide them. In particular, labour mobility pathways for refugees could
assist receiving countries to address their own skills gaps and labour shortages. For
while many refugees remain stuck in protracted displacement around the world, elsewhere
‘countries around the world are facing skill gaps and demographic shortfalls, especially in
rural communities’.105 Complementary pathways linked to labour and employment provide
‘access to a hidden talent pool of experienced, talented employees who are eager to put
Complementary pathways are also part of broader efforts to promote safe, orderly and
regular migration. According to the European Commission, complementary pathways
could ‘help reduce irregular flows and facilitate relations with countries of origin and
transit’.107 Providing ‘safe and regulated avenues’ for refugee admission into third countries
could fulfil refugees’ needs for ‘safe, regular and sustainable access to safety’108 and
‘contribute to saving lives whilst reducing irregular migration’.109 In addition promoting safe,
orderly and regular migration is a key part of the desire of many states for a ‘more
managed approach to refugee protection’.110
In theory, the interest of refugees and states in promoting safe, orderly and regular
migration are the same, making this a potential ‘win-win’ outcome of complementary
pathways. In practice, however, states initiatives to promote regular migration often entail
the use of restrictive measures aimed at preventing irregular migration, such pushbacks,
carrier sanctions and detention in countries of transit. Measures that prevent irregular
migrants from reaching states’ territory may have the effect of limiting access to
international protection for those in most need. Thus, even where managed entry regimes
are available to refugees, ‘the right of refugees to arrive wherever they can reach without
penalization for unlawful presence must be respected’.111
Finally, while some complementary pathways – in particular, labour mobility and education
pathways – are framed as additional, voluntary measures that states can take to further
their contribution to refugee protection, viewed from another direction, they are simply
steps taken to reduce barriers and promote equitable access to existing international
employment and study opportunities. Those working within Canada’s labour mobility
program for refugees describe this as ‘levelling the playing field’ for refugees.112 By virtue
of their displacement, refugees face numerous barriers in accessing such opportunities,
including: lack of passport or other identity documents, lack of education records,
disruptions to work experience, lack of language training opportunities and insufficient
financial resources.113 There are corresponding barriers for employers or educational
institutions considering refugee applicants, including long delays in visa processing times
and difficulties verifying skills and qualifications of refugees.114 Lack of consideration for
the barriers faced by refugees means that ‘many refugees miss out on these opportunities
altogether’.115 In order to ensure equitable access to international education and
employment opportunities, governments must be proactive in reducing barriers and
facilitating travel and integration.116
There are clearly considerable benefits to be gained from the development and expansion
of complementary pathways for refugees. However, realising the benefits of
complementary will not always be straightforward. One of the main potential limitations
of complementary pathways is that access to many complementary pathways relies not
only on an assessment of refugees’ protection needs, but also on considerations, such as
refugees’ skills, education and family relationships, that are not necessarily related to
protection needs.117 This means that, beyond the basic criterion of being in need of
international protection, complementary pathways – with the exception of humanitarian
The debate around resettlement and alternative admission pathways is similar to the
“numbers vs. rights” debate in regard to immigration policy and reflects the trade-off
that states either admit more people but grant them fewer rights or else limit the
number of people admitted but grant them a more robust status and wide-ranging
entitlements.123
1. What gaps exist between the rights afforded to refugees under international law and
the rights afforded to refugees under existing or proposed complementary pathways?
2. Under what conditions, or in what situations, might the multiple interests and objectives
in complementary pathways come into tension or conflict?
3. How can protection outcomes for refugees under complementary pathways be
balanced with the interests to states and other actors in a way that maximises the
benefits for all actors involved?
In December 2018, 181 countries endorsed the UN General Assembly’s adoption of the
Refugee Compact, committing to increase the availability and predictability of
complementary pathways for admission to third countries. Some states have since made
more specific pledges towards this goal via the Refugee Compact’s Digital Platform.124 For
example, Argentina has committed to ‘[e]xpand the current humanitarian visa program and
other complementary pathways for admission to other nationalities’.125 The Republic of
Philippines has pledged to ‘explore the development of complementary pathways for the
admission of refugees, with the support of the Complementary Pathways Initiative’.126
Setting standards for complementary pathways is critical to ensuring that such pathways
achieve their intended objectives – in particular, the core objectives of refugee protection,
durable solutions and international responsibility sharing – and to ensuring that they
uphold states’ international commitments and obligations. As UNHCR notes, ‘[s]ome
pathways may not feature sufficient safeguards to meet the unique protection needs of
refugees’.127 Indeed, some migration pathways could result in exploitation or abuse of
As noted earlier in this report, these questions are sometimes framed as questions about
what ‘counts’ as a complementary pathway.128 However, they could alternatively be framed
in terms of the standards required in order for complementary pathways to promote, and
not undermine, the international refugee protection regime. This latter approach takes a
more inclusive view of what ‘counts’ as a complementary pathway, within which
discussions about the benefits and risks of individual pathways, and/or how particular
pathways might be improved, can take place.
With this in mind, the following seven standards are proposed as standards against which
complementary pathways can be assessed to determine whether, and to what extent, they
uphold their objectives and the international commitments and obligations of destination
states. Exactly what is required under each of these standards, and whether a minimum
threshold of acceptability should apply, may require further discussion, as may the
inclusion of additional standards or features not discussed here. However, these standards
provide a starting point for thinking about how states (and others) should go about
developing, implementing and expanding complementary pathways.
This relatively straightforward proposition can be difficult in practice and in light of the
diversity of state practice in the implementation of both complementary pathways and
resettlement itself. Some existing ‘complementary pathways’ do not fulfil the principle of
Finally, even where the principle of additionality is formally maintained – for example, by
ensuring that resettlement quotas are separate from, and not impacted by, the use of
complementary pathways – it is possible that the latter will impact on the form in less
visible ways, both positive and negative. On the one hand, government efforts to establish
complementary pathways may risk eroding the political capital and goodwill available for
future development and expansion of formal resettlement programs. On the other hand,
however, formal resettlement programs and complementary pathways may be mutually
supporting. This has been the case in Italy, for example, where civil society and faith-
based organisations working on Humanitarian Corridors collaborate regularly with those
working on resettlement to share examples of best practice and integrated settlement
services for those arriving in Italy.135
Despite the complexity and challenges involved in preserving the principle of additionality,
the principle that complementary pathways based on skills, qualifications and experience
of refugees must be complementary to, and not a replacement for, needs- or vulnerability-
based pathways such as resettlement remains essential to maintaining the integrity of
complementary pathways and the overarching goal of increasing access for refugees to
third country solutions.
On the one hand, not requiring formal recognition of refugee status for access to
complementary pathways reflects the practical impediments to refugee status
determination – including lack of resources and long delays – in many countries of first
asylum, particularly in situations involving large-scale displacement. It also reflects the fact
that refugee status is ‘declaratory’ – a refugee is a refugee as soon as he or she satisfies
the criteria in fact, and is not dependent on recognition as such by UNHCR or government
authorities.140 On the other hand, what this means in practice is that UNHCR or other
actors – for example, NGO staff facilitating complementary pathways – may end up
conducting ‘quasi’ refugee status determination to assess eligibility for their programs, but
without the requisite procedural standards and safeguards expected of states and
UNHCR. This leads to the possibility that some of the limited places available under
complementary pathways may be taken up by individuals who do not, in fact, qualify for
international protection, or conversely, that someone who qualifies for international
protection will be erroneously denied access to a complementary pathway.
As matter of law, and given that complementary pathways generally (and, arguably,
ideally) sit within states’ more general migration programs, it remains at the discretion of
states to decide who to admit and according to what criteria. However, identifying precisely
who has utilised complementary pathways is necessary for states’ reporting on their
complementary pathways commitments under the Global Compact on Refugees, and for
assessing progress towards the numerical goals set out in the Three-Year Strategy on
Resettlement and Complementary Pathways.141 Even more importantly, prioritising those
in need of international protection remains critical to achieving the core objectives of
complementary pathways – namely, protection, durable solutions and international
responsibility sharing. Where the resources and political goodwill available for
complementary pathways are limited, access for individuals not in need of international
protection reduces access for those who are.
The need for clear and principled eligibility criteria does not necessarily mean that formal,
individual refugee status determination must be undertaken every time. The use of
presumptions – for example, the presumption that Syrians living in Jordan and Lebanon
are in need of international protection – may be entirely appropriate in light of conditions in
countries of origin and/or first asylum, provided that are based on clear evidence and
information (such as UNHCR country guidance) and are applied transparently and with
appropriate safeguards within individual selection procedures. It does mean, however, that
careful scrutiny of eligibility criteria and ‘identification methodology’142 – selection
procedures used to determine access to complementary pathways – is necessary in
assessing the extent to which such pathways uphold their objectives and/or states’
international commitments and obligations.
According to UNHCR, complementary pathways should allow refugees ‘to potentially reach
a sustainable and lasting solution’.145 Some existing complementary pathways have
durable solutions embedded within them. In Canada, for example, refugees under
Community and Private Sponsorship programs are granted permanent residence on
arrival.146 However, obtaining guaranteed lasting solutions for refugees using
complementary pathways is a particular challenge, given that labour mobility ‘is often
seasonal, circular, temporary and only sometimes leads to permanent residence’147 and
students visas are commonly valid only for the duration of the individual’s studies. In some
cases, temporary visas such as these may provide pathways to other options – for
example, the option to transfer to a work visa following graduation.148 However, such
pathways are not usually guaranteed and may depend on meeting additional
requirements, such obtaining a secure job. The durability of solutions provided by
complementary pathways thus ‘depends on the terms under which [they] are followed and
the extent to which they are accessible.’149
On the one hand, the more limited form of durability provided by some complementary
pathways could be viewed as an ‘adaptation to modern conflict and displacement
situations… [where the] paradigm of “irreversible exile” is in many cases no longer
appropriate’.150 Refugees, like other migrants, don’t necessarily move ‘one way’ – circular
migration, onward migration and return migration are all concept that reflect the multi-
faceted and multi-staged nature of modern human mobility. Moreover, refugee protection
is not necessarily intended to be permanent, but rather to provide ‘rights-regarding
protection for duration of risk’.151 On the other hand, describing temporary complementary
pathways as ‘solutions’ could ‘mask failures to address the persistent precariousness
facing the most marginalized refugees and other displaced populations.’152
Promoting durable solutions for refugees is of critical importance in refugee protection and
one of the core objectives of complementary pathways. However, as Section 3 of this
report set out, it is not the only objective. Insisting that complementary pathways guarantee
access to permanent solutions may limit their potential uptake. It also fails to reflect the
fact that the skills and experience gained during temporary admission and stay may assist
refugees to access other opportunities, including more permanent legal status, and thus
form part of a ‘journey to a durable solution’.153 Rather than insisting that complementary
pathways guarantee refugees a durable solution, it may be worth considering what other
protection safeguards could be provided – for example, access to asylum procedures,
guaranteed return to the first country of asylum, or ongoing practical assistance154 – to
ensure that the rights of refugees utilising temporary pathways are respected and that
Perhaps most importantly, complementary pathways must uphold the principle of non-
refoulement, ensuring that no person is returned to a territory in which his or her life or
freedom is threatened. This principle applies as a matter of customary international law –
not only to refugees, as defined in relevant international and regional instruments, but also
to individuals at risk of other forms of serious harm, as defined under international human
rights law. While the principle of non-refoulement does not require a person to be given
permanent legal status, it creates particular challenges within temporary complementary
pathways for those who cannot return to their country of origin. In practice, the clearest
way of preserving the principle of non-refoulement is by ensuring that those who travel
under complementary pathways retain meaningful access to asylum in countries of
destination. In countries of destination where asylum mechanisms are lacking or largely
inefficient (for example, Japan) there may be other ways of preserving the principle of non-
refoulement, such as guaranteeing the individual’s right to return to first countries of first
asylum,156 or securing diplomatic assurances that they will not be returned to their country
of origin.157 The use of these alternative arrangements warrants significant caution
however, to ensure that the protection from refoulement they provide is legally enforceable
and not subject to removal at the whim of governments officials.158 Moreover, even where
complementary pathways do ensure individual access to asylum procedures in the
destination country, further care must be taken to ensure that the asylum system provides
sufficiently robust and that those awarded refugee status are able to access the assistance
and support they need.159
4.1.5. Scalability
While some complementary pathways – namely, family reunification and humanitarian
entry programs and visas, envisage the movement of significant numbers of people, other
pathways – such as labour mobility and education pathways – provide access to third
country solutions for only a very small number of refugees. Even relatively large programs,
such as WUSC’s Student Refuge Program, provide access to a tiny fraction of the
refugees in need of third country solutions.160 Since 2016, more than than 20,000 refugees
have registered their qualifications, experience and interest in international employment
with TBB’s Talent Catalog,161 yet only 127 have been matched with employers so far (and
not all of those have actually travelled to the country of destination).162 The apparent
disparity between supply and demand for some complementary pathways reflects not only
the number of places available, but also the complex administrative and logistical
challenges associated with securing refugees’ access to such pathways, including
difficulties accessing relevant documentation and establishing prior experience and
The small scale of complementary pathways is therefore not necessarily a reflection of the
preliminary stages that many complementary pathways are at. In some cases, it may
reflect a mismatch between complementary pathways and the needs and qualifications of
refugees. In others, it is the result of the very resource-intensive nature of securing
complementary pathways for individual refugees. In theory, by ‘allowing refugees to
access new and existing pathways autonomously, third country solutions for refugees can
be achieved on a greater scale’.165 In practice, however, providing access to refugees for
complementary pathways may be more intensive than regular resettlement. Establishing
new complementary pathways can require many years of engagement and negotiation to
open the way for even a very small number of refugees. Even then, in the absence of any
systematic programmes to support refugees, the barriers to access and tailored
adjustments needed to facilitate access to these pathways can require further extensive
advocacy and negotiation. As just one example of the kind of individualised negotiations
required, TBB reports negotiating with local professional regulatory bodies in Australia to
allow a Palestinian physiotherapist to be licensed in Australia despite not meeting their
formal requirements.166
Ultimately, complementary pathways that serve only a small number, or even just a few,
refugees contribute positive outcomes and should not be discouraged. However, if
complementary pathways are to provide a tool for protection and solutions on par with (or
beyond) that of resettlement, pursuing mechanisms and processes that allow for increases
in scale should be a central goal of efforts towards their development and implementation.
Ensuring adequate protection safeguards is a particular challenge for refugees who travel
this way. On the one hand, complementary pathways that refugees can access
independently of any assistance by UNHCR or other non-governmental organisation
provide the ‘gold standard’ in sustainability and promoting refugee self-reliance. The
experiences of refugees who have accessed such pathways may also provide valuable
lessons for those wishing to develop and expand more targeted, facilitated complementary
pathways. On the other hand, the absence of any independent oversight or refugee-
specific protection safeguards increases the risk that such pathways may fail to meet
states’ international obligations towards refugees or expose them to exploitation of other
harm.
On the one hand, it must be accepted that complementary pathways are not based
primarily on legal obligations and that private actors are entitled to select future
employees, students and even community members according to their own priorities and
criteria. On the other hand, the involvement of private actors in processes, such as
migration, that are traditionally associated with governments risks blurring the lines
between governments and others and may have implications on the ground, particularly
within refugee communities in countries of first asylum, where the different roles and
obligations of each may not always be clear. Particularly where private actors are involved
in selecting beneficiaries of complementary pathways, careful thought must be given the
criteria and identification methodology they use, how these are communicated to
stakeholders, including refugees themselves, and how to ensure that this does not
undermine the integrity or objectives of complementary pathways.
Complementary pathways have the potential to yield a wide range of benefits for refugees
– including access to employment, education, protection and durable solutions. Ensuring
that they do so, however, depends on the ways in which they are developed and
implemented. Here, according to a well-known maxim, the devil really is in the detail. The
criteria and identification methodology used for selecting beneficiaries for a particular
complementary pathways the longer term options for refugees who access that pathway
and the engagement of private actors in various stages of the process can all affect
whether, and to what extent, complementary pathways fulfil their core goals of promoting
protection, durable solutions and international responsibility sharing.
This report proposes that, rather than focus on the meaning of terms, or what ‘counts’ as a
complementary pathway, a set of standards be adopted by which complementary
pathways can be measured and assessed. This approach could incorporate specified
minimum thresholds or standards – for example, the preservation of asylum or principle of
additionality – to make it clear when a particular complementary pathway does not adhere
1. What standards are required to ensure that complementary pathways uphold their
objectives and states’ international commitments and obligations? How can the need
for ‘minimum standards’ be balanced with efforts towards more progressive
development in the objectives of complementary pathways?
2. What obligations do non-state actors have in the facilitation of complementary
pathways? What is their role in ensuring that complementary pathways meet relevant
standards?
3. How can relevant standards be communicated to states and other actors? What
monitoring mechanisms are required to maintain ‘quality control’ over complementary
pathways and ensure that refugees accessing them are fully informed of the potential
benefits and/or risks they entail?
5 Conclusion
The following case studies provide a more detailed analysis of four specific complementary
pathways. An overview is provided for each case study, followed by a discussion of key
features or characteristics of the pathway that illuminate the extent to which it serves some
of the objectives and standards relating to complementary pathways discussed in this
report. These case studies have been selected because they capture some of the diversity
of complementary pathways available, including differences in scale, structure, actors and
operational context. The analyses here are necessarily brief and do not address all of the
relevant objectives and standards relating to complementary pathways. Nevertheless, they
do provide an illustration of how the detailed characteristics of specific pathways relate to
broader objectives, frameworks and issues discussed in this report.
Overview
In 2017, the Japan International Christian University Foundation (JICUF) established the
Syrian Scholars Initiative, which provides ‘a full scholarship that supports Syrian students
who were displaced by the conflict throughout their entire undergraduate education at [the
International Christian University]’ – a private liberal arts college in Tokyo.178 The initiative
supports two students per year and application is open to Syrian nationals living in Turkey
who fulfil the basic criteria for entry into the college – including having graduated from high
school and having verified English language skills.179 Shortlisted applicants are interviewed
in Turkey, before the final selection is made by ICU. Successful applicants are provided
with full scholarships to cover expenses, housing, tuition, healthcare, visa and travel
costs.180
Refugees selected to study in Japan are supported by JICUF to apply for a regular student
visa to Japan. This support includes financial assistance to apply for a passport (which
many Syrians are able to obtain in Turkey, though at significant cost). Some refugees have
also received assistance in having their English language skills verified. The student visa is
temporary – valid for an initial two years, but with automatic renewal for the duration of the
course. However, students who obtain a job following their studies may apply to transfer to
a work visa. No students have yet completed their studies since the program was
established.
While JICUF’s Syrian Students Initiative is small in scale, providing access to only two
students per year, its successful establishment in a country that provides only very limited
access to asylum or resettlement makes it a valuable case study for the future
development of complementary pathways in contexts where resettlement is unlikely to
occur.
The student visa under which successful applicants travel to Japan is only temporary, and
thus does not provide a durable solution on its own, though refugee students who obtain
a job following their studies may apply to transfer to a work visa. Obtaining work in Japan
has reportedly proved a major hurdle for refugee students lacking Japanese language
skills. It is hoped that the refugee students entering via the JICUF program will be better
placed to pursue this path owing to the inclusion of Japanese language training in the
program and bilingual tuition at ICU.
Another key issue for JICUF’s program is preserving asylum given Japan’s lack of
effective asylum system.182 One way the program seeks to protect student refugees in the
event that they are unable, or do not wish, to secure employment in Japan is by limiting the
scope of the program to Syrian nationals, for whom the Japanese government is reportedly
willing to provide humanitarian status, including access to public services and the right to
work. For some refugees, another potential option if they are not able to remain in Japan
following their studies is to return to Turkey. Indeed, for some Syrians, obtaining a
university degree via JICUF’s program is part of their progression to be able to apply for
Turkish citizenship and thus part of the journey towards a durable solution in the first
country of asylum. However, return to Turkey is not necessarily guaranteed for refugees
accessing the JICUF program. While challenges in identifying suitable applicants from
within Turkey’s Syrian population – in particular, those who can obtain the high IELTS
score required to study at ICU – have meant that JICUF accepts applications from Syrians
who have already obtained permanent residence in Turkey (and therefore the right to
return), this arguably undermines genuine responsibility-sharing and the goal of
expanding third country solutions for refugees, by potentially providing pathways to
refugees who have already secured a durable solution of local integration.183
Finally, JICUF is currently working with other educational partners to explore opportunities
to scale up education pathways in the Asian region, for example by establishing a
consortium of universities offering similar pathways that could collaborate in the
recruitment of refugee students. This would be an effective way of scaling up the small
program currently in place and providing access to a larger number of refugees. Given the
low level of accession to the Refugee Convention in the region, however, questions
regarding the preservation of asylum and minimum standards for complementary
pathways will be important in this endeavour.
Overview
The World University Service of Canada (WUSC) Student Refugee Program was
established in 1978 and approximately 2,000 refugees have accessed the program since.
Applicants travel to Canada as part of the country’s more general sponsorship and
resettlement program. The pathway does not provide a ‘scholarship’ per se, though tuition
fee reductions or waivers are often provided as ‘in kind’ support within the sponsorship
framework and refugee students are supported by local WUSC groups around the country.
Applicants must be accepted to study by a participating educational institution, but the final
decision regarding entry lies with Canadian immigration officials.184
Eligibility for WUSC’s Student Refugee Program is open to recognised refugees who
have been living in Jordan, Kenya, Lebanon, Malawi, Tanzania or Uganda for at least
three years prior to application and who face barriers accessing post-secondary education
in their host country.185 Applicants must be aged 18-25, single with no dependants, and
competent in English or French. Recruitment is supported by UNHCR, who conduct
refugee status verification and identify priority populations for selection within the program.
Unlike many complementary pathways, WUSC’s Student Refugee Program provides a
limited role for vulnerability considerations in its selection process, by providing
concessions to specific ‘priority populations’. For example, lower academic and language
criteria are applied for young women, who face additional they face in accessing higher
education in developing countries.186
Because WUSC students travel to Canada as part of the country’s more general
sponsorship and resettlement program, they are granted permanent residence on arrival
and thus benefit immediately from a durable solution. Refugee students are support by
WUSC Local Committees at universities and colleges across the country who also assist
with providing settlement and integration support. Permanent residency provides the
potential opportunity for students to sponsor their family members in the future, and to
access citizenship after a period of three years. In essence, WUSC’s program is structure
along the same lines as resettlement, but with added educational criteria and benefits built
in. On the one hand, it represents the ‘gold standard’ in complementary pathways –
securing all of the various objectives and entailing few of the risks. On the other, the
program’s establishment arguably depends on the strength of Canada’s more general
resettlement and sponsorship programs, which may make replicating the WUSC model
elsewhere difficult.
Overview
During the early pilot phases of TBB’s Australian programs, refugees matched with
Australian employers were supported to apply for either a place within Australia’s regular
resettlement program,190 or a short-term work visa.191 TBB’s current work, however, is
focused on securing access for refugees to Australia’s skilled migration program, in a
program that allows ‘businesses the ability to sponsor candidates identified by TBB for a
number of skilled visas under more flexible arrangements that address some of the
barriers encountered in the phase 1 pilot.’192 which would provide permanent legal status
and more substantial practical support (for example, with education and healthcare) than
the alternatives.193 As part of this, TBB is currently negotiating with the Australian
government to secure some modifications to the skilled migration entry requirements for
refugees via a unique ‘Labour Agreement’, which would streamline refugee waivers in
relation to a number of administrative requirements, including documentation
requirements, formal skills validation and even language requirements, where refugees
have language skills deemed sufficient by the employer.194
Eligibility for TBB’s labour mobility programs is open to ‘persons in need of international
protection’,195 including ‘refugees, people seeking asylum, people fleeing conflict and
generalized violence and people who are stateless’.196 Formal recognition of refugee
status is not required for Syrian candidates as ‘there are many valid reasons refugees are
prevented from or opt not to register with the UN’.197 In practice, eligibility is based on the
presumption that Syrians residing in Jordan and Lebanon are refugees due to conditions in
the country of origin.198 Beyond this eligibility threshold, there are no vulnerability
considerations in place, and indeed TBB has been explicit in its opposition to incorporating
vulnerability assessments into the recruitment process, because ‘employers do not recruit
on vulnerability grounds. They recruit for skills.’199
Where refugees matched with Australian employers travelled to Australia under Australia’s
regular refugee resettlement program, this complementary pathways failed the
additionality requirement, by effectively taking away resettlement places from more
vulnerable refugees. TBB recognises this, and has emphasised that ‘in order to maintain
the integrity and humanitarian intent of the humanitarian program, skilled migration is a
more logical pathway out of displacement for skilled refugees.’200 Nevertheless, in
The desire to provide refugees with durable solutions is another reason for TBB’s current
emphasis on developing permanent skilled migration pathways for refugees to Australia. In
the pilot phase of this project, refugees who accessed employment via temporary work
visas faced a number of limitations, including lack of access to settlement services and
significantly limited support for family members, who were not eligible for Medicare, free
schooling and social safety nets.202
Overview
In Europe and the United States, family reunification pathways are generally separate
from, and therefore additional to, refugee resettlement. Eligibility for family reunification
depends on each country of destination’s respective criteria, but generally includes
immediate family members of persons lawfully residing in that country. Thus, the eligibility
of an individual beneficiary of this complementary pathways usually depends not on his or
her own refugee status but on that of their family members residing in the country of
destination. To qualify for assistance from the Central Mediterranean Family Reunification
Project, potential beneficiaries of this pathway must meet two additional criteria set by the
project itself – first, they are deemed to be ‘at risk’ children, and second, that family
reunification is in their best interests. This demonstrates that, even where criteria for
access to complementary pathways per se do not incorporate vulnerability considerations,
prioritising assistance for the most vulnerable by UNHCR and others provides another
assistance means of promoting access to complementary pathways for the most
vulnerable.
The biggest challenge to securing complementary pathways via this project is not the
formal criteria or benefits such pathways entail, but rather the bureaucratic hurdles faced
by refugees seeking to access them. Individuals frequently require extensive and tailored
case management and support to address the specific needs and situation of refugees and
to navigate that legal and administrative intricacies of individual countries’ family
reunification programs, each of which has its own administrative requirements and
requires expert knowledge and advice.210
Overview
Under the Italian ‘Humanitarian Corridors’ program, refugees travel to Italy on visas issued
under Article 25 of the European Union ‘Visa Code’, which provides for the exceptional use
of short stay visas by European states where it is considered necessary on humanitarian
grounds.213 Such visas have limited territorial validity, meaning that refugees travelling to
Because the humanitarian corridors program facilitates access to formal refugee status
procedures in the country of destination, the preservation of asylum and provision of
durable solutions to their displacement are achieved, at least in theory. It is worth noting,
however, that the standards of treatment afford to recognised refugees in Italy are
considered to be lower than those of many other European states, and indeed have been
criticised for failing to meet the minimum standards required by the 1951 Refugee
Convention. In addition, should the program expand beyond Syrian refugees to include
Humanitarian Corridors from countries such as Niger and Libya, further measures may be
required to ensure that those who travel to Italy are not at risk of refoulement should their
claim for asylum be rejected.
One of the chief benefits of Humanitarian Corridors is the facilitation safe, orderly and
regular migration as a pathway to protection. Indeed, the main purposes of the
Humanitarian Corridors include ‘to prevent the death of refugees trying to cross the
Mediterranean by boat [and] combat the deadly business of smugglers and human
traffickers’.217 By facilitating lawful travel using short stay visas designed specifically for
humanitarian purposes, Humanitarian Corridors directly reduce the need for refugees to
undertake dangerous journeys in search of safety and long-term solutions.
1 UNHCR, Report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees: Part II: Global compact
on refugees, UN GAOR, 73rd sess, Supp No 12, UN Doc A/73/12 (13 September 2018) (Refugee
Compact) para 7.
2 Refugee Compact, para 95.
3 Refugee Compact, para 94.
4 UNHCR, ‘The Three-Year Strategy (2019-2021) on Resettlement and Complementary Pathways’
(June 2019) 7.
5 Refugee Compact, para 95
6 Refugee Compact, para 7; see also UNHCR, Complementary Pathways for Admission of
opportunities for adult refugee labour market mobility: A conceptual framework for a VET, skills and
qualifications-based complementary pathway to protection’ (2019) 21.
8 Amnesty International, ‘Written Submission of Amnesty International to the Global Compact on
the labour market’ Background paper and draft ILO guiding principles for discussion at the ILO
tripartite technical meeting on the access of refugees and other forcibly displaced persons to the
labour market (Geneva, 5–7 July 2016) (2016) 29.
10 See, eg, Amnesty International (n 8); International Labour Organization (ILO), ‘Guiding principles
on the access of refugees and other forcibly displaced persons to the labour market’ adopted at the
adopted by the Tripartite Technical Meeting on the Access of Refugees and other Forcibly
Displaced Persons to the Labour Market (Geneva, 5-7 July 2016) (ILO Guiding Principles);
International Organization for Migration (IOM), ‘Complementary Pathways’ (undated)
<https://eea.iom.int/complementary-pathways>; European Commission, ‘Towards a Reform of the
Common European Asylum System and Enhancing Legal Avenues to Europe’ Communication from
the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council’ (Brussels, 6 April 2016).
11
Amnesty International (n 8).
12 ILO Guiding Principles (n 10) para 31.
13 European Commission (n 10) 2.
14 UNHCR, Three-Year Strategy (n 4) 22.
15 Sayre Nyce, Mary Louise Cohen and Bruce Cohen, ‘Labour mobility as part of the solution’ 52
refugees’ Kaldor Centre for International Refugee Law Policy Brief 8 (November 2019).
29 Claire Higgins, ‘Humanitarian corridors: Safe passage but only for a few’ Lowy Interpreter (4
August 2017)
1966, 999 UNTS 171 (entered into force 23 March 1976) art 23; UN Human Rights Committee,
‘CCPR General Comment No. 19: Article 23 (The Family) Protection of the Family, the Right to
Marriage and Equality of the Spouses’ (27 July 1990) para 5; Final Act of the United Nations
Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Status of Refugees and Stateless Persons, 189 UNTS 137
(25 July 1951) Recommendation B. See generally Frances Nicholson, ‘The “Essential Right” to
Family Unity of Refugees and Others in Need of International Protection in the Context of Family
Reunification’ (UNHCR, 2nd ed, January 2018).
37 Family reunification is one of UNHCR’s formal resettlement submission categories. UNHCR,
Protection’ in Erika Feller, Volker Türk and Frances Nicholson (eds), Refugee Protection in
International Law: UNHCR's Global Consultations on International Protection (CUP, 2003); UNHCR,
‘Central Mediterranean Family Reunification Project Information Sheet & Contact List for UNHCR
Country Office and Legal Practitioners’ (April 2020). See also Appendix 1, Section D.
39 See Appendix 1, Case Study D.
40 Jastram and Newland (n 38) 572.
41 UNHCR, Key Considerations (n 6) 10.
42 Ibid.
43 See eg Talent Beyond Boundaries, ‘A Skills-Based Solution: Opening Canada’s Economic
Pathways to Refugees’ Brief Submitted by Talent Beyond Boundaries to the Parliamentary Standing
Committee on Citizenship and Immigration (CIMM) (December 2018) 3.
44 Nyce et al (n 15) 32.
45 See further, section 4.1 below.
46 See Appendix 1, section C.
47 Conversation between the author and Aki Takada, Associate Director, Japan ICU Foundation (25
<https://www.unhcr.org/en-au/complementary-pathways-through-education.html>.
50 OECD-UNHCR, ‘Safe Pathways for Refugees: OECD-UNHCR Study on third country solutions
for refugees: family reunification, study programmes and labour mobility’ (December 2018) 6.
51 See Appendix 1, Section B.
52 See Appendix 1, Section A.
53 Ibid.
54
UNHCR ‘More resettlement needed as only 4.5 per cent of global resettlement needs met in
2019’ (6 February 2020) <https://www.unhcr.org/news/press/2020/2/5e3a81c04/resettlement-
needed-only-45-cent-global-resettlement-needs-met-2019.html>.
55 Ibid.
56 Refugee Compact, para 7; see also UNHCR, Key Considerations (n 6) 6.
57 Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration, UN General Assembly Resolution
definition as a matter of fact. See UNHCR, ‘Note on Determination of Refugee Status under
International Instruments’ (24 August 1977) para 5.
the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa, Ch 2 in Satvinder in Juss (ed) Research
Handbook on International Refugee Law (Elgar, 2019).
73 See María José Marcogliese, ‘The Solidarity Resettlement Programme, and alternatives, in Latin
November 1950, entered into force 3 September 1953) 213 UTS 222 (European Convention on
Human Rights, ECHR).
75 Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union [2012] OJ C326/391 (EU Charter)
76 Council Directive 2013/32/EU on common procedures for granting and withdrawing international
establishing a Union Resettlement Framework and amending Regulation (EU) No 516/2014 of the
European Parliament and the Council, 2016/0025(COD) (23 March 2017)
78 UNHCR, Key Considerations (n 6) 5
79
See generally UNHCR, ‘Frequently Asked Questions about Resettlement’ (February 2017)
<https://www.unhcr.org/en-au/56fa35b16>.
80 UNHCR, Key Considerations (n 6) 7.
81 See eg Katy Long, ‘Extending protection? Labour migration and durable solutions for refugees’
UNHCR New Issues in Refugee Research, Research Paper No. 176 (October 2009).
82 See Appendix 1, Case Studies B and C.
83
In some cases, an applicant is provided with a ‘provisional’ visa that leads directly to a permanent
visa. See eg ‘Partner visa (apply overseas)’ Australian Government Department of Home Affairs:
Immigration and Citizenship (22 April 2020) <https://immi.homeaffairs.gov.au/visas/getting-a-
visa/visa-listing/partner-offshore>.
84 Conversation with Aki Takada (n 47). See further below, Appendix 1, Section A.
85 UNHCR, Key Considerations (n 6) 7.
86 See Appendix 1, Case Study D.
87 See Appendix 1, Case Study E.
88 See UNHCR, Key Considerations (n 6) 7.
89 Talent Beyond Boundaries, above n 43, 1.
90
Talent Beyond Boundaries, ‘Impact’ (undated) <https://www.talentbeyondboundaries.org/impact>.
91 Nyce et al (n 15) 32.
92 According to Talent Beyond Boundaries (n 43), approximately 60% of refugees relocated under
their labour mobility programs send remittances to family and/or friends at home.
93
Ibid.
94
Ibid.
95 CEDEFOP (n 7) 49.
96 Bradley (n 17) 7.
97 Ibid; CEDEFOP (n 7) 49.
98 UNHCR, Three-Year Strategy (n 4) 23.
99 Refugee Compact, para 3.
100 See eg Jastram and Newland (n 38) 558; UNHCR Key Considerations (n 6) 10.
101 Nyce et al (n 15) 32.
102 UNHCR Complementary Pathways Roundtable (n 22).
103 Ibid.
104 Ibid.
2016) <https://www.opendemocracy.net/en/openglobalrights-openpage/global-solution-to-global-
refugee-crisis/>.
112 See, eg, Talent Beyond Boundaries, ‘The Promise of Labour Mobility: How skills can be a
for
refugees through Australia’s Migration Program’ Submission to the Department of Home Affairs,
Australian Government responding to the discussion paper entitled Managing Australia’s Migrant
Intake (2 February 2018) 10-12.
114 Global Forum on Migration and Development (GFMD) Business Mechanism, ‘The Business
Case for Migration’ The GFMD Business Mechanism’s Position Paper and Recommendations for
Presentation at the Ninth GFMD Summit (December 2016) 20.
115 UNHCR, ‘Doubling Our Impact: Third Country Higher Education Pathways for Refugees’
(February 2020) 8.. According to UNHCR, only 3 per cent of refugees have access to higher
education. UNHCR, ‘Stepping Up: Refugee Education in Crisis’ (2019) 5.
116 GFMD Business Mechanisms (n 114) 23.
117 See further below, section 2.2.1.
118 Talent Beyond Boundaries, ‘Global Evaluation: Labour Mobility Pathways Pilot 2016-2019’ (1
Refugee Policy? Opportunities and Limits of Resettlement at Global, European and National Levels’
(2018) 22-23.
124
UNHCR, ‘Global Compact on Refugees Digital Platform’ <https://globalcompactrefugees.org>.
125 Ibid, Pledges and Contributions database (18 May 2020)
<https://globalcompactrefugees.org/channel/pledges-contributions>.
126 Ibid.
127 UNHCR, Three-Year Strategy (n 4) 9.
128 See eg UNHCR Complementary Pathways Roundtable (n 22).
129 UNHCR, Three-Year Strategy (n 4) 15, emphasis added
130 Ibid, Refugee Compact, para 95.
131 European Migration Network, ‘Resettlement and Humanitarian Admission Programmes in
<https://www.unhcr.org/en-au/complementary-pathways.html>.
137
UNHCR Complementary Pathways Roundtable (n 22).
138 See Appendix 1, Case Studies B and C.
139 See Appendix 1, Case Studies A and C.
140 See UNHCR (n 62).
141 See Refugee Compact, para 47; Three-Year Strategy, p 5.
142 See eg UNHCR Complementary Pathways Roundtable (n 22)
Japan. Conversation with Aki Takada (n 47). UNHCR urges that education pathways should ensure
the safe transit of students, a legal right to remain in third countries, and facilitated access to an
asylum process. UNHCR, ‘Doubling our Impact’ (n 115) 14.
155 See discussion above, section 3.1. One question warranting further consideration is the impact
of the International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members
of Their Families, which does not apply to refugees (see art 3(d)).
156 A number of Syrian nationals who have travelled to study in Japan as part of the JICUF’s
program reportedly intend to return to Turkey following their studies. Conversation with Aki Takada
(n 47).
157 The Japanese government has provided assurances to JICUF that Syrian students participating
in their program will not be returned to Syria, though the legal status of these assurances is unclear.
Conversation with Aki Takada (n 47).
158 See generally, UNHCR ‘UNHCR Note on Diplomatic Assurances and International Refugee
Protection’(August 2006).
159 For example, those working in Italy’s Humanitarian Corridors note that the level of assistance
available to recognised refugees in Italy is often lower than in other European states. See Appendix
1, Case Study E.
160 Approximately 2,000 refugees have benefited from WUSC’s program since it was established in
1978.
161 https://www.talentbeyondboundaries.org/the-talent-catalog
162 Talent Beyond Boundaries, ‘Global Evaluation’ (n 118) 47.
163 Conversation with Aki Takada (n 47).
164 See further Appendix 1, Case Study A. Though no Turkish citizens have yet been selected for
the program, if they are, their existing citizenship may mean that the program no long constitutes a
complementary pathway.
165 UNHCR, Key Considerations (n 6) 5.
166 Talent Beyond Boundaries, ‘Global Evaluation’ (n 118) 71.
167 Conversation between the author and Stephanie Cousins. Global Co-CEO and Australia and
Humanitarian Corridors to Italy’ UCL Migration Research Unit, Working Paper 2017/5 (2017) 22.
176 Ibid 22-3.
177 Except where otherwise indicated, information regarding this complementary pathway was
copies of the latter will be accepted where the original is not available.
180 JICUF (n 178).
181
Ibid.
182 See, eg, Japanese Association for Refugees, ‘Why Japan recognizes only a few refugees?
Regular Labor Migration: A Practical Intervention to Advance Objective #5 of the Global Compact
for Migration’ Discussion Paper for Side Event at the Global Compact for Migration Adoption
Conference Marrakesh, Morocco (December 2018) 6-7
190 See Australian Government Department of Home Affairs: Immigration and Citizenship, ‘Global
Africa, where presumptions of refugee status are less applicable and UNHCR recognition of
refugees status is required. Conversation with Stephanie Cousins (n 167).
198 Conversation with Stephanie Cousins (n 167).
199 Talent Beyond Boundaries, ‘Global Evaluation’ (n 118) 65.
200 Talent Beyond Boundaries, ‘Australia Submission’ (n 113) 8.
201 According to TBB, ‘learn lessons [from the CSP] could be applied to the skilled stream of the
provided during conversation between the author and Sara Faust, Child Protection Officer, Office of
the Special Envoy for the Central Mediterranean Situation, UNHCR (12 June 2020).
204 The program includes a Best Interest Procedure prior to family reunification. Sara Faust, ‘Central
Mediterranean Family Reunification Project: Priority Situations Core Group’ Presentation (5 May
2020).
205 Ibid.
206 See above section 2.1.
207 Ibid; see also UNHCR, ‘Central Mediterranean Family Reunification Project Information Sheet &
Contact List for UNHCR Country Office and Legal Practitioners’ (April 2020). Top countries of
destination are Germany, Sweden, France and the USA.
208 See generally Nicholson (n 36) esp sections 4 and 5.
209 Faust (n 204).
210 Conversation with Sara Faust (n 203).
signals hope for Europe’ (December 2016); Claire Higgins, ‘Safe Journeys and Sound Policy:
Expanding protected entry for refugees’ Kaldor Centre for International Refugee Law, Policy Brief 8
(November 2019) esp 16.
213 Regulation (EC) No 810/2009 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 July 2009